Election Law Full Text cases -Atty.

Fernandez
R.Langrio

[G.R. NOS. 166388 and 166652 - January 23, 2006]

ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MA. SALVACION BUAC and
ANTONIO BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are two (2) petitions for certiorari:1
1. G.R. No. 166388
The petition in this case, filed by Congressman Alan Peter S. Cayetano, representing the District of Taguig-
Pateros, against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista, mainly
assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc  dated December 8, 2004 in EPC No. 98-102 declaring the
ratification and approval, through a plebiscite, of the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
into a highly urbanized city. Private respondents are residents and duly registered voters of Taguig.
2. G.R. No. 166652
The petition here, filed by the same petitioner against the same respondents, questions the (a) COMELEC
Resolution dated January 28, 2005 declaring the said Resolution of December 8, 2004 final and executory; and (b)
the recording of the said Resolution in the COMELEC's Book of Entry of Judgments dated January 28, 2005.
The facts are:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. 2 The residents of Taguig were
asked this question: "Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? "
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, declared that the "No" votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion
of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the
plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for
revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No.
98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite
cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner's motion and dismissing the petition
to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc  affirmed this
Resolution.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorariand mandamus, docketed as
G.R. No. 155855, entitled Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista v. COMELEC and Alan Peter S. Cayetano. On
January 26, 2004, we rendered a Decision reversing the COMELEC's Resolution. We held that the controversy on
the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite "is a matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a law
relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the
Constitution authorizing it 'to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.' " Thus, we directed the COMELEC "to reinstate the petition
to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without delay." Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but we denied the same in a Resolution dated February 24, 2004.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting
the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees
on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by
petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.

Page 1 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

However, the COMELEC Second Division failed to render a decision as the required number of votes among
its members could not be obtained. Consequently, pursuant to Section 5 (b), 3 Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the case was elevated to the Commission en banc for resolution.4
On November 24, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order considering the case submitted for
resolution. On December 8, 2004, it issued the assailed Resolution declaring and confirming the ratification and
approval of the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
"Considering that 21,105 affirmative votes represent the majority and the highest votes obtained during the
1998 Taguig Plebiscite, this Commission hereby DECLARES and CONFIRMS the RATIFICATION and APPROVAL of
the conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city.
"Let the Election Officer of Taguig and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implement
this Resolution.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 166388, alleging that in rendering the
said Resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On January 28, 2005, the COMELEC en banc, upon motion of private respondents, issued an Order declaring
its Resolution of December 8, 2004 final and executory as of January 9, 2005 in conformity with Section 13
(a),5 Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. On the same date, the Resolution of December 8, 2004 was
recorded in its Book of Entry of Judgments.
On January 31, 2005, petitioner again filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
166652, challenging the COMELEC en banc  Order of January 28, 2005 and the corresponding Entry of Judgment.
Subsequently, we directed that the case be consolidated with G.R. No. 166388. 6
At the outset, petitioner himself makes it clear that "for the record, - as the representative of Taguig and
Pateros - he is for the cityhood of Taguig. Conversion of a municipality into a highly urbanized city per se is not
appalling; in fact, efforts towards its realization should be welcomed. But (he) firmly believes that Taguig must
become a city the right way, by a fair count of votes and not by twisting the electoral will."7
Petitioner contends that "the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination
of the will of the electorate" because "the revision is incomplete."8 He claims that:
"Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the
revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for 'Yes' and a total of 12,602 votes for 'No.' The revision
committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots."9
Besides, "many irregularities, frauds and anomalies attended the revision proceedings." 10 He maintains that
the COMELEC "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction" in confirming
the ratification and approval of the conversion of Taguig into a highly urbanized city.
In their respective comments, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the COMELEC, and the private respondents
vehemently disputed petitioner's allegations and prayed that the instant petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
Both petitions must fail.
It is clear from petitioner's allegations that the matters being raised - the alleged incomplete canvass of
plebiscite votes during the revision proceedings and the irregularities, frauds, and anomalies purportedly
committed therein - are factual in nature. They involve an examination of the admissibility and sufficiency of the
evidence presented during the revision proceedings before the COMELEC. Certainly, this we cannot do in the
present special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section
1 of the same Rule confines the power of this Court to resolve issues mainly involving jurisdiction, including grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction attributed to the public respondent.11
Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice and considering likewise the interest of the residents and
voters of the City of Taguig, we still reviewed the evidence and found that petitioner erred when he alleged that
the revision of ballots yielded a total of "15,802 votes for 'Yes' and a total of 12,602 votes for 'No.' "
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final
Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots;
(2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but
finality.13 This is so because "the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is

Page 2 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws."14 Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 15
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC
did not gravely abuse its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176211             May 8, 2007

MAYOR IBARRA R. MANZALA, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AZCUNA, and JULIE R. MONTON, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO), or status quo ante order, and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala seeks to annul the resolution, dated August 24, 2006, of the Former Second
Division1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), declaring private respondent Julie R. Monton to be the duly
elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon in the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections, and the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc,[2] dated January 24, 2007, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
and affirming the Resolution of August 24, 2006 with modification as to the number of votes obtained by both
parties after re-appreciation.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala and private respondent Julie R. Monton were mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. On May 13, 2004,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with
2,579 votes, or a margin of 13 votes, over petitioner’s 2,566 votes.
On May 19, 2004, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81
(Election Protest Case No. 7), seeking recount in the 10 precincts of Magdiwang on the grounds of fraud, serious
irregularities, and willful violation of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) and other
pertinent COMELEC rules allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors during the election.
Private respondent filed an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, averring that the election was
held peacefully with no irregularity whatsoever. By way of counter-protest, private respondent contested the
election in certain precincts, to wit: Precincts 41A, 40A, 39A, 38A, 37A, 36A and 35A of Barangay Tampayan;
Precincts 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A and 9B of Barangay Poblacion; Precinct 16A of Barangay Agutay;
Precinct 24A of Barangay Dulangan; and Precinct 32A of Barangay Jao-asan.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to the Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.
A revision of ballots was later conducted.1^vvphi1.net In its decision of December 8, 2005, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestant IBARRA R. MANZALA is hereby proclaimed as the duly-
elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon during the election of May 10, 2004 who won over protestee
JULIE R. MONTON with a majority of 137 valid votes and is entitled to occupy said position. The proclamation by
the MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS of Magdiwang, Romblon that JULIE R. MONTON was the duly-elected
MAYOR is hereby ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal which the trial court granted on
December 16, 2005.
On appeal, private respondent raised the following assignment of errors: that the trial court seriously erred
in invalidating 144 votes of private respondent ostensibly on the ground of pattern voting; that sets of ballots
were marked, as well as written by two persons; that the trial court erred in not considering and appreciating the

Page 3 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

objections raised by private respondent involving the counter-protested precincts, and in arriving at its decision,
it considered only the objections and/or exhibits of the petitioner; and that the trial court seriously erred when it
declared petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon despite the patent defects in
the appealed decision.
On August 24, 2006, the Former Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution which reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court. It found that private respondent obtained 2,560 votes, or a margin of 17
votes, over petitioner’s 2,543 votes. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The December 8, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon in Election Protest Case No. 7 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (Former Second Division) hereby DECLARES protestee-appellant JULIE E.
MONTON, the duly-elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon during the May 10, 2004 National and
Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution of January 24,
2007. It affirmed the earlier Resolution dated August 24, 2006 which proclaimed private respondent as the duly
elected Municipal Mayor with modification as to the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-
appreciation, i.e., private respondent garnered 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over petitioner’s 2,475
votes.
Meanwhile, acting on private respondent’s Motion for Immediate Execution and Issuance of an Entry of
Judgment, the COMELEC en banc issued a writ of execution on February 28, 2007 declaring its Resolution of
January 24, 2007 as final and executory as of February 26, 2007.
Consequently, in the Order dated March 1, 2007, the COMELEC en banc directed the implementation of the
writ of execution ordering petitioner to cease and desist from discharging the powers and functions of the Office
of the Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon; to relinquish and vacate the post in favor of private
respondent; and to cause the smooth turn-over of the office to the latter.
On February 1, 2007, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring private
respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon with a prayer that the COMELEC be
directed to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Resolutions of August 24, 2006 and January 24,
2007.
Private respondent maintains that "to allow the arguments of the petitioner to prevail would make him
assume office by the grace of impropriety and misappreciation of ballots by the lower court, whose decision has
already been reversed and set aside by the Former Second Division of the COMELEC and affirmed by the
Commission en banc."
The petition should be dismissed.1ªvvphi1.nét
Petitioner argues that the motion for reconsideration filed with the Former Second Division of the COMELEC
"has thrown the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a criminal case," yet the COMELEC en
banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots.
This argument has no basis. Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution provides the COMELEC with
quasi-judicial power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
Section 3 thereof states the administrative power of the COMELEC, either en banc or in two divisions, to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Clearly, from the decision of the trial court, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction to review, revise,
modify, or even reverse and set aside the decision of the former and substitute it with its own decision. In the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution also mandates the COMELEC to hear and
decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election cases

Page 4 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court,
the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth
in the pleadings. In the present case, the COMELEC en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former
Second Division and affirmed the findings thereof with modification as to the number of votes obtained by both
parties after re-appreciation, that is, private respondent obtained 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over
petitioner’s 2,475 votes.
Petitioner further contends that the trial court’s "judicial appreciation of the contested ballots [should be]
honored, respected, and given the importance it deserves by [this] Court."
This contention has no merit. Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the COMELEC, the aggrieved party, herein petitioner, may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, in a special civil action of certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65, the only
question that may be raised and/or resolved is whether or not the COMELEC had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 Such fact does not exist in the present case.
Moreover, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best
left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country. To reiterate, the COMELEC is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction
over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and
decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with
by this Court.6
Finally, to justify the issuance of an injunctive relief, petitioner claims that there had been a
"misinterpretation and misapplication of the law" by the COMELEC and that "should the facts and circumstances
presented in this petition be sufficiently persuasive, … a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining
order be issued to prevent the public respondent COMELEC from disrupting the stability of governance in the
Municipality of Magdiwang, Province of Romblon, in the meantime that the petition is being reviewed."
As a consequence of the dismissal of the instant petition, petitioner’s prayer for any form of injunctive
relief, perforce, has no factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of showing that the Commission on Elections committed
any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution, dated August 24, 2006, by the Former Second
Division and the Resolution, dated January 24, 2007, by the Commission en banc, which declared private
respondent Julie R. Monton to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon in the May 10, 2004
National and Local Elections.
Accordingly, the Commission on Elections en banc is DIRECTED to forthwith cause the full implementation
of the Writ of Execution it issued on February 28, 2007 and the Order of March 1, 2007.
In view of the proximity of the next National and Local Elections on May 14, 2007, this Decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.No costs.
SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

G.R. No. 170365               February 2, 2010

ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc dated
October 17, 2005 in SPA No. 02-481, which declared a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A, Barangay
Bagoainguid, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and annulled the proclamation of petitioner Abdul
Gaffar2 P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The facts are as follows:

Page 5 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Respondent Abdulcarim Mala Abubakar,3 a re-electionist candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur, filed a petition 4 before the COMELEC to declare a failure of
elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A, Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and to annul the proclamation of
petitioner Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid in the July
15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
In his petition, respondent Abubakar alleged:
xxxx
3. That on July 15, 2002 at around 10:30 o’ clock in the morning, the casting of votes in the above named
precinct was commenced at its designated Polling Place in Cayagan Elementary School and while only ten (10)
voters had actually voted, a certain ALIPECRY ACOP GAFFAR, who is the son of respondent Punong Barangay
candidate ABDULGAFFAR DIBARATUN got inside the polling place and was caught in possession of Three (3) filled
up ballots where candidate ABDULGAFFAR DIBARATUN were voted which he wanted to place or insert inside the
ballot box for official (sic).
4. That when said ALIPECRY GAFFAR was confronted by the petitioner’s watcher and other watchers
confronted him of said official ballots, he got mad and flared up and committed violence which disrupted and
stopped the casting of votes and because of the commotion, the chairman left the ballot box which was held by
the companions of Alipecry Acop Gaffar and destroyed the said ballot box, took the official ballot contained
therein and inserted, placed therein a bundle of substituted ballots.
5. That due to the facts adverted to above, the casting of votes was stopped and it was never resumed nor
continued. Only Ten (10) voters had actually voted out of One Hundred Fifty One (151) registered voters.
6. That even candidates for Barangay Chairmen and Barangay Kagawad were unable to cast their votes
because the casting of votes was illegally disturbed, disrupted, interrupted and stopped by Alipecry Acop Gaffar
despite the presence of numerous registered voters ready to cast their votes.
xxxx
9. The Election Officer knowing fully that there was really a failure of election in the said precinct
recommended that a special election be called for the said precinct.
10. That unknown to the petitioner, the respondent Board of Election Inspectors, in conspiracy and
connivance with respondent – Abdulgaffar Dibaratun, surreptitiously and clandestinely canvassed the election
returns and then illegally proclaimed the respondent Abdulgaffar Dibaratun and issued Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates dated July 16, 2002 which was ant[e]dated xerox copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "C" hereof.5
Respondents therein filed their Answer denying the allegations of herein private respondent. They
contended that as 10 voters had actually voted, there was no failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct.
They further contended that the petition was filed out of time.
In the Resolution dated October 17, 2005, the COMELEC en banc granted the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GIVE
DUE COURSE to the instant petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the proclamation of respondent Abdulgaffar P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur is hereby ANNULLED and he is thus ORDERED to CEASE
AND DESIST from exercising the powers and responsibilities of the said office. Pending the conduct of the special
elections yet to be scheduled by this Commission and until no Punong Barangay has been duly elected and
qualified, the incumbent Punong Barangay shall continue to exercise the powers and duties of such office in a
hold-over capacity in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9164 (An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending Republic Act No. 7160, As Amended, Otherwise Known as The
‘Local Government Code of 1991,’ and For Other Purposes).
Let the Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (ODEDO), this Commission, furnish a copy of
this Resolution to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Sur for the implementation of the same upon its
finality.6
Dibaratun filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1) The COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
unjustly gave due course to the unmeritorious petition of respondent Abubakar for the simple reason that it was

Page 6 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

filed out of time and the validity of the proclamation of petitioner Dibaratun on July 16, 2002 can no longer be
legally assailed after the expiration of ten (10) days.
2) Private respondent Abubakar is estopped to assert whatever rights he has in the election laws/rules of
procedure when he desparately failed to make the proper objections during the casting, counting and canvassing
of votes, and, therefore, the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it erroneously heard and considered the unmeritorious petition of respondent Abubakar.
3) Public respondent COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it erroneously declared failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A of Barangay Bagoainguid,
Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and called for special elections in the said precinct. 7
The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A of Barangay Bagoainguid,
Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and in annulling the proclamation of petitioner as the elected Punong Barangay.
The petition is unmeritorious.
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections
except the question as to the right to vote.8
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may declare failure
of elections, thus:
SEC. 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call
for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code is reflected in Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In its Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, citing Banaga, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 9 enumerated the
three instances when a failure of elections may be declared by the Commission:
(1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes.1avvphi1
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of elections, two conditions
must concur: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was
voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the
elections.10 The cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.11
The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the
second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC en banc held that in this case, it was undisputed that after only 10 registered voters cast their
votes, the voting was suspended before the hour fixed by law by reason of violence. This was supported by the
affidavits submitted by both petitioner and private respondent, who only disagreed as to the perpetrator of the
violence as each party blamed the other party.
In its Resolution, the COMELEC en banc averred:

Page 7 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The letter of Mayor Abdul Jabbar Mangawan A.P. Balindong, Municipal Mayor of Tugaya, Lanao Del Sur,
addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr., the Joint Affidavit of Norhata M. Ansari and Sahara T. Guimba, Poll
Clerk and Third Member, respectively, of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 6A/7A of Barangay
Bagoainguid and the Joint Affidavit of PO1 Yahya M. Dirindigun and PO1 Casary C. Modasir all state that it is the
petitioner and his relatives and followers who started the violence that caused the suspension of the voting.
Meanwhile, the affidavits submitted by the witnesses of the petitioner all state that it is respondent
Dibaratun and his followers and relatives who were the cause of the violence which resulted in the suspension of
the election after only ten (10) people managed to vote. 12
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended before the
hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of elections in
the aforementioned precinct.13
The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of election
(i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only
be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties. 14 An application for
certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, 15 amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and
conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court. 16
Thus, the Court agrees with the COMELEC that the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence. Only 10 voters were able to cast their votes
out of 151 registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections. The
concurrence of these two conditions caused the COMELEC en banc to declare a failure of elections. When there
is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the elections and to call for special elections. 17 Public
respondent, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of the case.
Moreover, petitioner contends that respondent Abubakar’s petition for the declaration of failure of
elections and to annul the proclamation of petitioner was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy under
Sec. 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, but respondent failed to comply with the procedures therefor. Petitioner
also contends that the petition was filed out of time, and that respondent failed to pay the docket fees on time.
Petitioner’s arguments lack merit.
Respondent Abubakar’s petition for declaration of failure of elections falls under Sec. 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The allegations in respondent’s petition constitute one of the instances for the declaration by the
COMELEC of failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A. Hence, the COMELEC en banc took cognizance of the
petition pursuant to Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, 18 thus:
SEC. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and Special Elections.—The postponement, declaration of failure
of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code
shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the
declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. 19
The Court finds the petition for declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code to be in order, and it was properly disposed of by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, petitioner erred in
contending that the petition of respondent Abubakar was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy under
Sec. 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, but failed to comply with the procedures therefor. The issue addressed
by the COMELEC en banc was whether the evidence submitted supported the allegations in the petition that
violence suspended the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A, Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur, before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on July 15, 2002, which resulted in failure of elections. The issue
does not fall under pre-proclamation controversies. The issues that may be ventilated in a pre-proclamation
controversy are enumerated in Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, 20 thus:
1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
2. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code;
3. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and

Page 8 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

4. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of
which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. 21
A petition to declare a failure of elections is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as classified under Sec.
5 (h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case. 22
Further, petitioner’s basis for the allegation that private respondent’s petition was filed out of time is Sec.
252 of the Omnibus Election Code,23 covering election contests for barangay offices, wherein a petition is filed
with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. Granting that the petition filed was for an election contest, it would have been filed on time, since it
was filed on July 26, 2002, which was within the ten-day period from the proclamation of petitioner on July 16,
2002.
However, the petition filed by private respondent was not for an election contest under Sec. 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but for the declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the same Code. The
Court notes that the provisions on failure of elections in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code 24 and Sec. 2,
Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not provide for a prescriptive period for the filing of a petition for
declaration of failure of elections. It appears that the COMELEC en banc has the discretion whether or not to take
cognizance of such petition. In this case, the petition was filed 11 days after the scheduled election. In its
Resolution, the COMELEC en banc declared that petitioner’s allegation that the petition was filed out of time was
rendered moot and academic by the fact that the petition was already heard by the Commission and submitted
for resolution.25 The COMELEC’s resolution of private respondent’s petition was in keeping with its function to
ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Lastly, petitioner’s allegation that private respondent failed to pay the docket fee on time does not appear
to have been raised before the COMELEC; hence, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the
exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 26 It is not present in this case, as public respondent issued the
COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on the evidence on record and the law on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

[G.R. NO. 181478 : July 15, 2009]

EDDIE T. PANLILIO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LILIA G. PINEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the following issuances of the COMELEC:
(1) COMELEC Second Division Order1 dated July 23, 2007 giving due course to respondent Lilia G. Pineda's
election protest and, inter alia, directing the revision of ballots of the protested precincts of the Province of
Pampanga;
(2) COMELEC Second Division Order2 dated August 1, 2007 denying petitioner Governor Eddie T. Panlilio's
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order; andcralawlibrary
(3) COMELEC En Banc Order3 dated February 6, 2008 denying petitioner's omnibus motion to (a) certify his
said motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc; and (b) stay Order dated August 7, 2007 directing the
collection of ballot boxes in the contested precincts.
The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of Pampanga
during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest number
of votes of Two Hundred Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Six (219,706) votes 4 with a winning margin of One
Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven (1,147) votes over the 218,559 votes of private respondent.

Page 9 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest 5 against petitioner based on the following
grounds:
a). Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were deliberately misread and/or mis-
appreciated by the various chairmen of the different boards of election inspectors;
b). Thousands of votes of protestant such as "NANAY BABY", her registered nickname were intentionally
and/or erroneously not counted or tallied in the election returns as votes validly cast for the protestant;
c). Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;
d). Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and erroneously mis-appreciated or
considered as marked and declared as null and void;
e). Ballots with blank spaces in the line for governor were just the same read and counted in favor of
protestee;
f). Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves and fake or unofficial ballots wherein the
name of protestee was written illegally, read and counted in favor of the latter;
g). Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots prepared by two (2) persons were
purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of protestee;
h). Votes that are void because the ballots containing them were pasted with stickers or because of pattern
markings appearing in them or because of other fraud and election anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted
in favor of the protestee; and,
i). Votes reported in numerous election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of the protestee, while
votes in said election returns for the protestant were unlawfully decreased ("dagdag-bawas"), such that the
protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those actually cast in his favor, while the protestant
appeared to have obtained less votes than the actually cast in her (protestant's) favor; and,
j). Moreover, buying of votes and other forms of vote-buying were resorted to by protestee in order to
pressure voters to vote for him or not to cast their votes for the protestant herein. 6
On June 12, 2007, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest and counterclaims.
On July 23, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course to private
respondent's election protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the protested
precincts of the Province of Pampanga.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was denied by the same
Division, in the second challenged Order dated August 1, 2007.
On August 1, 2007, private respondent filed her compliance stating that she deposited with the COMELEC
Four Million Eight Hundred Eighty Six pesos (P4,000,886.00) pursuant to the July 23, 2007 Order.
On August 8, 2007, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration
at the COMELEC En Banc; and (2) to stay the COMELEC's order directing the collection of ballot boxes. Thereafter,
on August 16, 2007, petitioner filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the retrieval and collection of ballot
boxes.
On February 6, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc issued the third assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestee Eddie Panlilio's Omnibus Motion dated August 7, 2007 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Order of the Commission (Second Division) dated August 16,
2007 ordering the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Pampanga to defer the inventory, sealing and
transmittal of the contested ballot boxes involved in this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at such a disposition, the COMELEC En Banc ratiocinated that the assailed orders of the COMELEC
Second Division were interlocutory orders, which are not one of the orders required by Section 5 (C) Rule 3 and
Section 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to be certified to the Commission en banc for resolution.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari contending that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his omnibus motion and in failing to
dismiss the alleged sham election protest filed by private respondent against him:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S OMNIBUS MOTION ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 5
(C), RULE 3 IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 19 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE

Page 10 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S OMNIBUS MOTION DESPITE THE SERIOUS
IRREGULARITIES WHICH ATTENDED THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (SECOND DIVISION) OF
THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 1 AUGUST 2007, DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND WHICH
RENDERED DOUBTFUL THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH DENIAL
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S OMNIBUS MOTION AND REFUSING TO RULE ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE BASIS THAT SUCH WILL BE TANTAMOUNT TO
SANCTIONING A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) AND SECOND DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S SHAM PROTEST BELOW
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner insists that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied his omnibus
motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directing the collection of ballot
boxes of the contested precincts in the province of Pampanga. He argues that Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, on which the omnibus motion was anchored, clearly mandates the Presiding Commissioner
of the Division of the COMELEC to certify the case to the COMELEC En Banc once a motion for reconsideration is
filed, regardless of whether the order or resolution sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order or a final
one.
This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC, 7 where the Court has declared that the
remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division, which allegedly was issued with grave abuse
of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which pertinently reads:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. '
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall be resolved by the
Division which issued the order.
In Repol, the Court held that since the COMELEC's Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same
COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the
issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the same case the
Court added that:
Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs motions for reconsideration of
decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:
SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from
the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the
case to the Commission en banc.
In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the import of this rule in this wise:
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for reconsideration must
have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is
that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be
done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.
Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided
by the COMELEC en banc, thus:

Page 11 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here, the assailed
Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there was something more to be done, which
was to decide the election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved
by the COMELEC En Banc.
Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances of which the COMELEC En
Banc can take cognizance. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically
provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all
other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a
Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to
the Commission en banc.
This case is not among those specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the
COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is it one where a Division is not authorized to act nor one where the members
of the Second Division have unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the COMELEC
En Banc is not the proper forum where petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.
The July 23, 2007 Second Division Order was not a final disposition of the case. It was an interlocutory
order, which resolved an incidental matter and which did not put a complete end to the controversy.
Accordingly, petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said order was correctly resolved by the COMELEC
Second Division, which issued the assailed order. Hence the COMELEC En Banc cannot be faulted for issuing its
February 6, 2008 Order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion to certify his motion for reconsideration to the
COMELEC En Banc and to stay the order for the collection of ballot boxes.
Petitioner would next argue that the August 21, 2007 COMELEC Second Division's Order denying his motion
for reconsideration was attended by serious irregularities, warranting a closer review by the COMELEC En Banc.
According to petitioner, despite his thirty-nine page motion for reconsideration filed on July 31, 2007, the
COMELEC Second Division sweepingly disposed of the same motion and issued an order denying the subject
motion the following day, or on August 1, 2007, an order that was signed by the Presiding Commissioner only.
A cursory reading of the motion for reconsideration 8 shows that the grounds raised therein were a mere
rehash of the ground raised in his Answer,9 which prayed for the dismissal of the election protest. There was no
point in reiterating and discussing anew the issues previously resolved. Instead of assailing the COMELEC Second
Division for immediately resolving petitioner's motion for reconsideration, it should be commended for doing so.
This Court has emphasized that in this species of controversy involving the determination of the true will of
the electorate, time is indeed of paramount importance - second to none, perhaps, except the genuine will of the
majority. To be sure, an election controversy, which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of the
people's choice as gleaned from the medium of the ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence
and regard to due process.10 The considerations that dictate early on the expeditious disposition of election
protests hold true today. The term of an elective office is short. There is the contestant's personal stake which
generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest. A title to public elective office must not be left long
under a cloud. The efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable why
pitfalls that may retard the determination of election contests should be avoided. Courts should heed the
imperative need for dispatch. Obstacles and technicalities that fetter the people's will should not stand in the
way of a prompt termination of election contests. 11 For the same reason, COMELEC's rules of procedure for the
verification of protests and certifications of non-forum shopping should be liberally construed, and COMELEC's
interpretation of such rules in accordance with its constitutional mandate should carry great weight.
Quintos v. Commission on Elections12 ruled as follows:
We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged lack of verification of private respondents's
Manifestation and motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of
the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure on the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.

Page 12 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

We also see no irregularity in the fact that the Order dated August 1, 2007 was signed only by the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division. He acted within the authority vested in him by Section 6, Rule 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
SECTION 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner. - The powers and duties of the Presiding
Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as
follows:
(a) To issue calls for the sessions of the Division;
(b) To preside over the sessions of the Divisions;
(c) To preserve order and decorum during the sessions of the Division;
(d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or ruling and temporary restraining orders in cases already
assigned to the Division;
(e) To decide all questions or order, subject to appeal to the full Division; andcralawlibrary
(f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon consultation with the other members of the
Division.
Petitioner's claim - that the COMELEC Second Division's Order dated August 1, 2007 denying his motion for
reconsideration is defective because the order does not contain the facts and the law on which it is based -
deserves scant consideration. The issuance of a minute order/ resolution has long been sanctioned in this
jurisdiction. The minute Order of August 1, 2007, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
reiterated the COMELEC Second Division's earlier Order dated July 23, 2007, which sufficiently stated the facts
and the law on which it was based.
Petitioner likewise imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in giving due course to
private respondent's election protest. Petitioner insists that the election protest is a sham and is insufficient in
form and substance.
In Miguel v. COMELEC,13 the Court belittled the petitioner's argument that the protestant had no cause of
action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to
order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states the rules in election protests
cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical
pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would
require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to
order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, 14 the Court considered the allegations in an election
protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.
Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC,15 the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient
grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance
with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. - Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant,
or whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book
of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and
that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest
warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the
conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.
In an election case, the election tribunal has an imperative duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. Indeed, the Court frowns upon any interpretation
of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an
election, but also the correct ascertainment of the results. 16
Lastly, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in giving due course to the election protest, notwithstanding that private respondent failed to raise
her objections first before the Board of Election Inspectors.
The filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a condition sine qua non before the
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over the present election protest. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot
be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.

Page 13 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner's election protest, it has
the authority to issue the assailed Orders.17
We quote with approval the COMELEC's ratiocination on this matter:
As to the assertion of Protestee that objections should have been first raised before the Board of Election
Inspectors, the same holds no water. Such failure is not fatal to her instant protest case as the same is not a
requirement precedent to the acquisition by the Commission of jurisdiction over the case.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. We find
none in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, and the status
quo ante order issued by this Court on February 19, 2008 is lifted.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003.]

RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA", Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P.

JAREÑO, HON. MAYOR RAYMUND M. APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G.
CANOVAS, and DIVINA ALCOREZA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
nullify Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") en banc. Resolution No. 5404
1 dated 23 July 2002 ordered the deletion of Raymundo A. Bautista’s ("Bautista") name from the official list of
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas ("Lumbangan") in
the 15 July 2002 elections. Resolution No. 5584 2 dated 10 August 2002 provided for the policy of the COMELEC
regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they
ran for office.
The Facts

On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño ("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept
Bautista’s certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002,
Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas,

Page 14 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Branch 14 ("trial court"). 3 On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista’s
certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial
court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 4 mandates Election Officer Jareño to include the
name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. 5 In compliance with the
trial court’s order, Election Officer Jareño included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong
Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the matter of Bautista’s inclusion in the certified list
of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. 6 On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law
Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a
voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department’s recommendation
before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.

During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza ("Alcoreza") were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes
(719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of
Canvassers ("Board of Canvassers") 7 proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay 8 on 15 July 2002. On
8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain
of the First District of Batangas. On 16 August 2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-
taking ceremony administered by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.

Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August 2002
("COMELEC Resolutions"). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautista’s certificate
of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer to delete Bautista’s name from the official list
of candidates. The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 5404 reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Considering the foregoing, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the recommendation,
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. To DENY due course to/or cancel the certificates of candidacy of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. For Barangay Officials:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONRADO S. PEDRAZA — Navotas

2. PIO B. MALIGAYA — Sampaga

3. PATERNO H. MENDOZA — Sampaga all of Balayan, Batangas.

B. a. RAY OCA A. BAUTISTA, candidate for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, for not
being registered voters of barangays where they are running for an office;

2. To DIRECT the Election Officers of Balayan, Batangas and Nasugbu, Batangas, to delete their names in the
official list of candidates in their respective Barangays without prejudice to the filing of complaint against them
for misrepresentation under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code if the evidence so warrants.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELEC’s policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to
be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their election, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.

(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by virtue of

Page 15 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.

1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission deleting the name
of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;

2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or
from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Supreme Court; and

3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and
correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.

(b) For a proclaimed candidate who is subsequently declared disqualified by the Commission in the
disqualification case filed against him prior to his proclamation.

1. To DIRECT the proclaimed disqualified candidate to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from
assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme
Court; and

2. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and
correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.

(c) For a proclaimed candidate who is found to be ineligible only after his proclamation (i.e., There is no
Resolution denying due course to or canceling his certificate of candidacy and there is no petition for
disqualification pending against him before his proclamation.)

1. To DISMISS any and all cases questioning the eligibility of such candidate for LACK OF JURISDICTION, the
proper remedy being a quo warranto case before the metropolitan or municipal trial court.

In a letter dated 19 August 2002, 9 COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer
Jareño to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the
elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3) direct the proclaimed disqualified
candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position which he won
in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. Consequently, Election Officer Jareño issued on
20 August 2002 an Order 10 deleting the name of Bautista from the list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The
Order also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and discharging the functions of Punong Barangay of
Lumbangan pursuant to the COMELEC Resolutions. The Board of Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and
after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning
Punong Barangay. 11 Alcoreza thus assumed the post of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.

On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for reconsideration of the COMELEC
Resolutions.

On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC, Bautista filed this
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Issues

The issues raised are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;

Page 16 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

2. Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos.
5404 and 5584; and

3. Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the
winning candidate Bautista.
The Court’s Ruling

Before considering the merits of the case, we shall first resolve the procedural questions raised by respondents.
Respondents contend that a motion for reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions is a prerequisite to
the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Absent any extraordinary circumstances, a party who has
filed a motion for reconsideration should wait for the resolution of the motion before filing the petition
for certiorari. Respondents allege that the instant petition is premature because Bautista has a pending motion
for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions. Respondents claim that Bautista filed the instant petition barely
two weeks after filing the motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc without waiting for the
resolution of his motion. 12

The contention of respondents is wrong. The case 13 cited by respondents refers to a motion for reconsideration
pending before the COMELEC en banc seeking the reconsideration of a resolution rendered by a COMELEC
division. Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order, or ruling of a division. However, Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibits a
motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving election offenses. As held in
Angelia v. Commission on Elections: 14

We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution of the COMELEC in
question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it only had one recourse,
and that was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13, §1 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What Pleadings are Not Allowed. — The following pleadings are riot allowed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x          x          x

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;
x          x          x

As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution
was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing
a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.

The instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc which do not pertain to election
offenses. Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy 15 in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65
except as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis supplied)

Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584

Page 17 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Bautista argues that without any disqualification case formally filed against him, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of his case. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio act on the issue of his alleged lack of
qualification. Even assuming that there was a disqualification case filed against him, it is the COMELEC sitting in
division which has jurisdiction and not the COMELEC en banc. 16

On the other hand, respondents allege that the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. The Constitution thus empowers the
COMELEC to pass upon the qualification of candidates for elective office. Furthermore, respondents submit that
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to cancel the certificate of candidacy of disqualified candidates is already settled
jurisprudence. 17

Respondents cited cases to support their claim that the COMELEC has jurisdiction to cancel the certificates of
candidacy of disqualified candidates. However, the COMELEC heard these cases first in division and not en banc
in the first instance.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 18 the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc
which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

. . . The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."cralaw virtua1aw library

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on
the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be
heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by
the COMELEC itself.

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en
banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section
3 of the said Rules thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. The Commission in Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide
protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and
special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens’ arms of the Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition
and issued the order of May 2, 1996. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, Election Officer Jareño reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautista’s ineligibility for being a

Page 18 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due
course or to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in
Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002.

A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if
there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc
acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy without first
referring the case to a division for summary hearing.

The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative
functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC’s quasi judicial functions. The Court
discussed the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial functions in Villarosa v. Commission on
Elections: 19

In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres v. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted
that

(t)he term "administrative" connotes, or pertains, to "administration, especially management, as by managing or

conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution
thereon.

While a "quasi judicial function" is

A term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and
decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. 20 In Baytan v.
COMELEC, 21 the Court expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC. The Court
explained:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-
judicial powers. The COMELEC’s administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9)
of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative
powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC’s administrative powers in
the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly,
the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been
the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
x          x          x

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Page 19 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."cralaw virtua1aw library

The COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires
that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division,
and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in
Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings
involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first
decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report
of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC
en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate.

Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584

Bautista alleges that the COMELEC denied him due process because there was no notice and hearing prior to the
issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. He became aware of the issuance of the COMELEC Resolutions only
when he received a copy of Election Officer Jareño’s Order dated 20 August 2002 ordering him to cease and
desist from assuming the position of Punong Barangay. 22

The Solicitor General submits that the COMELEC did not deprive Bautista of due process. Bautista had the chance
to be heard and to present his side when he filed a letter to the COMELEC en banc requesting reconsideration of
the Resolutions. 23

This Court has explained the nature of due process in Stayfast Philippines Corporation v. NLRC: 24

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.

A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. . . (Emphasis supplied)

The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal
hearing. 25 There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings. 26 However,
the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.

We cannot ignore the importance of prior notice and hearing. Severe consequences attach to the COMELEC
Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Bautista but also the
annulment of his proclamation as Punong Barangay. What is involved here is not just the right to be voted for
public office but the right to hold public office. As held in Sandoval v. Commission on Elections: 27

. . . Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and
SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside
the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due
process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show

Page 20 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an
opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in
the adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without
benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent’s
allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property
under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it
is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial
functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in
appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we had ruled in Farinas v.
Commission on Elections, Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Gallardo v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing." (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the COMELEC en banc requesting for reconsideration of the
Resolutions is beside the point. To reiterate, the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibit a motion for
reconsideration of a COMELEC en banc resolution except in cases involving election offenses.

Respondents likewise submit that there was no need for presentation and evaluation of evidence since the issue
of whether Bautista was a registered voter is easily resolved by looking at the COMELEC registration records. 28
This reasoning fails to consider the instances where a voter may be excluded through inadvertence or registered
with an erroneous or misspelled name. 29 Indeed, if it was just a simple matter of looking at the record of
registered voters, then the COMELEC would not have included Section 7 (g) 30 in its Resolution No. 4801. This
Section allows candidates who are not registered voters to be included in the certified list of candidates until the
COMELEC directs otherwise.

Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the twin requirements of prior notice and hearing,
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 23 — Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. — A petition to deny due course to or cancel, a
certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any
citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the
exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.

Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. — The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy.

Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. — The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.

Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. — The Commission may designate any of its officials who are
members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and receive evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements of notice and
hearing. The COMELEC should have at least given notice to Bautista to give him the chance to adduce evidence to
explain his side in the cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due
process of law when it approved the report and recommendation of the Law Department without notice and
hearing. 31

Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan when he filed his certificate of candidacy

Page 21 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The events 32 that transpired after the 15 July 2002 elections necessitate the early resolution of this case. The
Court deems it proper not to remand the case to the COMELEC to avoid further delay. The Court will resolve this
case based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.

Under the Revised Administrative Code, 33 one of the qualifications of an elective municipal officer is that he
must be a "qualified voter" in his municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. — An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the
election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year, and
must not be less than twenty-three years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either
English, Spanish, or the local dialect. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370, 34 otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, a candidate for
the barrio council 35 must be a "qualified elector." Section 8 of the Barrio Charter reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Section 8. Qualifications for election to the barrio council. — Candidates for election to the barrio
council:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the barrio for at least six months prior to the
election; and

(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a crime which carries a penalty of at
least one year imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis, 36 the Court held that a candidate for an elective municipal office did
not have to be a registered voter in the municipality to qualify to run for an elective municipal office. Citing the
earlier case of Yra v. Abaño, 37 the Court ruled that the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had all the
qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the
term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter.

However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, 38 which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local
official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a "qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also
be a "registered voter." 39 Section 39 of the Local Government Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
x          x          x

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least
eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
x          x          x

These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which
prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections.
Section 2 reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Page 22 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Sec. 2. Qualifications. — (a) Candidates for Punong Barangay and Sangguniang Barangay Kagawad must
be:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Filipino citizens;

(2) At least 18 years old on election day;

(3) Able to read and write Pilipino or any local language or dialect; and

(4) Registered voters of the barangay where they intend to run for office and residents thereof for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates
are registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate. Thus, Section 7 (f) and (g) read:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(f) Before the preparation of the certified lists of candidates it shall be the duty of the Election Officer to: (1)
verify whether all candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered voters of the
barangay where they file their certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of
candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries whether the candidate concerned possesses all the
qualifications of a candidate.

(g) If there are candidates who are not registered voters in the barangay where they run for barangay or
sangguniang kabataan positions or do not possess all the other qualifications of a candidate, he shall make the
corresponding report by REGISTERED MAIL and by RUSH TELEGRAM to the Law Department of the Commission
within three (3) days from the last day for filing the certificates of candidacy, copy furnished the Provincial
Election Supervisor and the Regional Election Director. The names of said candidates, however, shall still be
included in the certified lists of candidates until the Commission directs otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of
the barangay where he intends to run for office.

Bautista admitted in his affidavit 40 dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered voter of Barangay
Lumbangan, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

AFFIDAVIT

That I, RAYMUNDO A. @ OCA BAUTISTA, of legal age, married, Mechanical Engineer by profession, Filipino citizen
and have been residing at Sitio Calamundingan, Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, after being duly sworn
according to law depose and say:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That I was born at Barangay Tumalim, Nasugbu, Batangas, on Match 15, 1954 and upon reaching the age of
four (4) our family transferred to Sitio Calamundingan, Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas and I have been
permanently residing thereat since that time up to the present, and this fact can be attested to by our immediate
neighbors.

2. That since the time I reached the age of majority, I have participated both in the National and Local Elections
up to the year 1995 and as matter of fact I ran for the Office of member of the Municipal Council in the year 1992
Elections.

3. Sometime during the late part of the year 1995, I went to the United States of America scounting (sic) for a
good job but I was not able to find one so I went home in the year 2000 but again believing that I could land a job
in the United States, I again went there but I was not able to get a job therein and so I went back to the

Page 23 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Philippines in the year 2001 but I found out that my name was no longer included in the list of registered voters
at Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas.

4. Sometime in the year 2002, I personally went to the Office of the Local Election Registrar particularly talking to
Miss Josefina P. Jareño in order to register because as I know, to run for the Office of Barangay Chairman, I have
to be a registered voter in our Barangay.

5. However, I was denied registration because according to her, her Office is not open for registration at any time
and I should wait for the General Registration and for that reason I was not able to register.
x          x          x

11. That had I known that there is a provision in Section 52, under paragraph (k) A, when Miss Josefina P. Jareño
denied my request for registration as a voter, I would have filed a Petition for Mandamus with the proper Court
so that she can be ordered to register me as a voter in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas so that any and
all technicality may be avoided." (Emphasis supplied)

According to Bautista’s affidavit, he was practically out of the country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified
list of voters ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay elections in 1997, qualified voters had to
register again to vote in any election. Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of
voters conducted by the COMELEC in 1997 since he was still out of the country during that time. Republic Act No.
8189 ("The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996") provides for a system of continuing registration of voters. Thus,
Bautista should have registered anew in the office of the Election Officer when he came back to the Philippines in
2001 and learned that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. The pertinent
provisions of RA No. 8189 read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. — Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified
list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections,
plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recall subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general
registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and, subject to the
discretion of the Commission, on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.

SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. — The personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and
ninety (90) days before a special election.
x          x          x

SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. — A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality where he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he
shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3)
copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a
voter. (Emphasis supplied)
x          x          x

It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As
early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet,
Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the
barangay to run for the office of Punong Barangay.

Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan was due to the refusal of Election

Page 24 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Officer Jareño to register him sometime in January 2002. 41 Aside from his bare allegation that he tried to
register in January 2002, Bautista did not proffer any other proof like a duly accomplished application form for
registration to substantiate his claim that he indeed attempted to register anew. On the other hand, Election
Officer Jareño denies Bautista’s allegations in her comment filed on 10 October 2002, thus:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

COMMENT

COMES NOW Respondent JOSEPINA P. JARENO (sic) and to this Honorable Supreme Court by way of comment to
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, filed by
herein Petitioner, most respectfully states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Respondent JOSEPINA P. JAREÑO (sic) is the Election Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas, while petitioner,
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA was one of the candidates for the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Lumbangan,
Nasugbu, Batangas, in the recently concluded barangay elections;

2. Based on the records in our files, petitioner was not and is not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan or
any other barangays in Nasugbu, Batangas;

3. There was never an instance during the period starting June 1997 up to December 26, 2001 when registration
of voters for the updating of the Voter’s Registration Record had been undertaken by the Commission on
Elections on an "on again/off again" system, did petitioner RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA come to our office to check or
ensure that he is still in the active list of voters of Barangay Lumbangan, i.e., assuming that he was registered as a
voter thereof, in the first place;

4. The last day of registration of voters (new or transferee) had been last December 26, 2001, and registration
shall resume again, this coming September 16, 2002. In the meantime, no general registration nor special
registration had been mandated by the Commission on Election (COMELEC, for brevity) between the period
December 27, 2001 until September 15, 2002;

5. I only met petitioner RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA for the first time when he came to our office to file his Certificate
of Candidacy last June 10, 2002, which was the last day set by the COMELEC for the filing of Certificates of
Candidacy;
x          x          x

Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked
one of the qualifications — that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore
made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that
he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. 42 An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for
elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The
importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. 43 Under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground
for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by
Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1)
prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. 44

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the people’s choice expressed in the local elections
deserves respect. Bautista’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. As held in
Aquino v. Commission on Elections: 45

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC’s conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible
for the elective position as Representative of Makati City’s Second District on the basis of respondent

Page 25 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

commission’s finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987
Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those
laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications
for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the
voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental
law itself.

Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 46 The fact that Bautista, a non-
registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he lacks one of the
qualifications for Punong Barangay.

Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of ineligibility of the winning candidate

Bautista subscribes to the view of the Solicitor General that under the law and jurisprudence, the COMELEC
cannot proclaim as winner the second placer in case of ineligibility of the winning candidate.

The Solicitor General submits that the disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista does not result in the
proclamation of Alcoreza who obtained the second highest number of votes because Alcoreza was obviously not
the choice of the electorate. The Solicitor General emphasized that the COMELEC declared Bautista ineligible for
the post of Punong Barangay only after his election and proclamation as the winning candidate.

Respondent Alcoreza, however, alleges that her proclamation as the elected Punong Barangay was legal and
valid. Alcoreza claims her case falls under the exception to the rule that the disqualification of the winning
candidate does not entitle the candidate with the next higher number of votes to be proclaimed winner. Alcoreza
cites Grego v. COMELEC 47 which held that the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.

This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot
proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate
is ineligible or disqualified. 48 The exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections 49 and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC. 50 However, the facts warranting the exception to the rule do
not obtain in the present case.

Although the COMELEC Law Department recommended to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Bautista on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act on it before the 15 July 2002 barangay
elections. It was only on 23 July 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5404, adopting the
recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department and directing the Election Officer to delete Bautista’s name
from the official list of candidates.

Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he
was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes
in case of Bautista’s disqualification. 51 The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the
votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray votes. 52 A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en banc that Bautista is
ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. 53 As held in Domino
v. COMELEC: 54

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible
candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election,
however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental

Page 26 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast
for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for
DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any
intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.

The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong
Barangay, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. — If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor,
mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay member, the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district in the immediately preceding local election. (Emphasis supplied)

Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall
become the Punong Barangay. 55

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan. The proclamation of
the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void. Instead, the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member of Barangay Lumbangan shall assume the office of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan for the
unexpired portion of the term.

[G.R. No. 194139 : January 24, 2012]

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Page 27 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari.
The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in
due course.cralaw

For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, assailing the order dated
August 13, 2010 (denying the affirmative defenses raised by the petitioner), [1] and the order dated October 7,
2010 (denying his motion for reconsideration),[2] both issued by the COMELEC First Division in EPC No. 2010-42,
an election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee.[3]
Antecedents

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province
of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results
led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the
petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. [4]

Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions,
Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42). [5] The protest was raffled to the COMELEC
First Division.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,[6] the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that
Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification
of the acts or omissions complained of.

On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner,[7] viz:
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission (First Division) makes the following
observation:
1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) on June 3,
2010 as evidenced by O.R. No. 1118105; and
2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set forth the specific details of
the acts and omissions complained of against the Protestee.

It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3, 2010 is a substantial compliance with the
requirement of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of said Resolution.
Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-
mentioned Resolution.

In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DENY the Protestee’s special affirmative
defenses.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified
the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph 2, [9] Rule 19 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,[10] requiring all decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on
which they were based; and that it also contravened Section 7(g),11] Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
requiring a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the matter be certified
to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1,[12] Section 5,[13] and Section 6,[14] all of Rule 20 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.

The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the requirement for the “detailed
specification” to prevent “shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;” [15] that such requirement contrasted

Page 28 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,[16] under which the protest needed only to
contain a “concise statement of the ultimate facts” constituting the cause or causes of action; that Bautista’s
protest did not meet the new requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that in Peña v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[17] the Court upheld the dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for not specifically alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995
elections.

In his opposition,[18] Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being  merely interlocutory, could not be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;[19] that the rules of the COMELEC
required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and
election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was based; and that Peña
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, firstly, Peña had totally different factual
antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the omission of material facts from Peña’s protest prevented the
protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of the issues that he must meet and made it eventually
impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be collected.

On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, [20] denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestee’s August 28, 2010 “Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Certify the Case to the
Commission En Banc” relative to the Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August 13, 2010 is
hereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed order is contrary to law

Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the protestant’s petition have substantially
complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the opening of the ballot
boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest but also those set forth in the Protestee’s
answer. When substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is the best
way of removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the electorate. All other issues laid down in the
parties’ pleadings, including those in the Protestee’s special and affirmative defenses and those expressed in
the preliminary conference brief, will best be threshed out in the final resolution of the instant case.

The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission En Banc is DENIED
considering that the 13 August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant case
with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
Issue

The petitioner submits that:—

THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT.

The petitioner argues that Section 9,[21] Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First
Division  to summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content; and that the insufficiency in
substance arose from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the various irregularities and
anomalies had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested precincts were “pre-
shaded bogus-ballots” used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to accurately account
for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to
receive for each of the grounds he protested. He concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its
discretion in allowing the protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.

Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere fishing expedition to be outrightly

Page 29 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

dismissed in light of the elections being held under an automated system. In support of his urging, he
cites Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[22] where the Court took judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability
of the PCOS machines and CCS computers, such that allegations of massive errors in the automated counting and
canvassing had become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertain or to give due course to defective
election protests.[23] He submits that a protest like Bautista’s cast doubt on the automated elections.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista both posit that the COMELEC had the
power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest; and
that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted within its discretion. Additionally, the OSG
maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper subjects of a petition for  certiorari.

As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.
Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review
on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following
cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections[24] are enlightening, viz:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows:
“Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” [emphasis supplied]

“We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” This decision must be a final decision or resolution of
the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court
has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is
by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided
in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.

Page 30 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx[25]

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the
protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses
to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.   It is true that
there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections.[26] In
that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division admitting an answer with counter-
protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the ground
that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court granted
the petition and nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction, and explained the exception
thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds
the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no final
decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records
to the Commission en banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and
decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission  en
banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28, 1996 and the other
orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division
and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission of
Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave
something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the
authority to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders,
falls on the division itself, and not on the Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure explicitly provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx

xxx

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)

Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject case does
not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically
provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other
cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a
Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to
the Commission en banc.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the
present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of
the First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.

In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and

Page 31 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this
is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to
review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the
matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the
members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party
can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the COMELEC First
Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained
of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the
outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving
not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but
also the resolution and determination of election controversies. [27] The breadth of such powers encompasses the
authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based on
such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest
in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.

The Court has upheld the COMELEC’s determination of the sufficiency of allegations contained in election
protests, conformably with its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within its
command, who was the candidate elected by the electorate. [28] Indeed, in  Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,
[29]
 we brushed aside the contention that the election protest was insufficient in form and substance and was a
sham for having allegations couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner’s argument that the protestant had no cause of
action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to
order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots.  The Court states the rules in election protests
cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer.  In a string of categorical
pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would
require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to
order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.

In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court considered the allegations in an election protest,
similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds
for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance with
Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. – Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order
the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought
before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.

In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest
warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the
conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.

Page 32 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The petitioner adds that with the Court having noted the reliability and accuracy of the PCOS machines and
consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[30] Bautista’s election
protest assailing the system and procedure of counting and canvassing of votes cast in an automated system of
elections should be immediately dismissed.

We are not persuaded.

Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest to challenge the outcome
of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections. Instead, the Court only ruled there that the
system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers met
the minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436. [31] The Court did not
guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be gleaned from the
following pronouncement thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful
automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on
May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the
integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to
Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional
commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its
functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and
bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of
orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec
personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like
and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.

In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other submissions of the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000]

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T. ENDOMA
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,  Respondent.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J .:

At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No.
8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".

RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996.
Section 44 thereof provides:

"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this
Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."

By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
Resolution Nos. 97-00021 and 97-06102 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued

Page 33 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

several directives3 reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different
stations.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this
Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that:

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION;

II

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF
TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS;

III

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW;

IV

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF

COMELEC AND COMELECS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN
REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article
VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE
SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and

VI

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF
PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.

Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and
constitutional.

The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court
discerns no ground to invalidate it.

Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987
Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from
holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no
substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid
classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987
Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

Page 34 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.4

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189
satisfies the aforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

In Lutz vs. Araneta,5 it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a
policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may
be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought
to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the
noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption
than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the
highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that
without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried
out.

Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of
voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative
burden on the part of the COMELEC.

Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive
them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.6cräläwvirtualibräry

"xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied)

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is
capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy
proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.

Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC
to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a
guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or
transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its
authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and
directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and
employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws,
the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress.

Page 35 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its
power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of
appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.

Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and
that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.

The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are:

1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
and

3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of
the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.7

Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case,
the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of
the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.8 Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering
that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The
Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION,
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR."
Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related
to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.9

In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor
of its validity.10

As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance
with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters
entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice
to stay the judicial hand.11

WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189
UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. NO. 166046 : March 23, 2006]

MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Page 36 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse the
Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209 dated November 18, 2004
which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguin's motion for reconsideration of the July 21, 2004 Resolution 2 of the
Comelec's First Division. The Comelec nullified his proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date, respondent Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while
respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6,647 votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering
Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact, he received 844 votes.
The MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the winning candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May
13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a
total of 6,605 votes.3
Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and Suliguin in a
Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding the figures in the Certificate of
Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially garnered 6,647 votes, as against petitioner's 6,605 votes.
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon review, the MBOC
discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes from Precincts 1A to 19A,
and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have been proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical and mental fatigue which the
members of the board experienced during the election and the canvassing of votes.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge Renato B. Bercades. 5
On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution 6 granting the petition of the MBOC.
The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections "for being based on an erroneous
computation of votes." It then ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary
corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim Sumague as the 8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member
of Nagcarlan, Laguna.7
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the motion
on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling against him. In support of his petition,
he alleges that:
4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and
4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING
COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.8
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 (General
Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in Connection with the May 10,
2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have entertained the letter-request of respondent Sumague as it was
filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days after the canvassing of votes was terminated and after he
(petitioner) was proclaimed winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore,
respondent Sumague never entered any objection during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The
MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on
May 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was terminated. Petitioner maintains that the Comelec
should have denied the petition, since according to the Revised Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not
later than five (5) days following the date of the proclamation.

Page 37 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before the Comelec.
He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the election, the MBOC adjourns
sine die and becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to nullify
petitioner's proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command who the real
candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that
would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.11 In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total
number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to the
Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than petitioner. Such result
would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and
last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in
the total number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the
MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time.
Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such rules may
be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to liberally construe
its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. 14 Disputes in
the outcome of elections involve public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the
choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. 15
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the actual total
number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669
includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate as a manifest error. 16 As correctly cited by the
Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may,
by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the voting public, to
occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. In Carlos v.
Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the
electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people." "Specifically, the term 'election,' in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
"Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can de declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election."19
We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition of the MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed by petitioner
MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted in the erroneous
proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said office.
"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may,
by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time
cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed that "a proclamation based on
faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the proper

Page 38 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

determination and resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous tabulation of votes."
Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate, there can
be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be challenged even after the candidate has assumed
office."
There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a grave abuse of
discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." Petitioner MBOC is
merely doing its function that is mandated by law - to canvass votes in the election returns submitted to it in
due form, adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and
eventually proclaim the winning candidates. Respondent miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibited
manifest bias thereby thwarting his chances of winning the last slot for Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a
strong showing to the contrary, the court must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption."
Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike the Board of
Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOC computes the votes as
appeared in the election returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not constitute a clear
violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of. He was not elected by a
majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was based on an erroneous proclamation. By any mathematical
formulation, the respondent cannot be construed to have obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would
be sheer absurdity to proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters. "Where a proclamation is
null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannot claim
that he was denied of his right to due process of law since he was given the opportunity to be heard. He was
duly notified by petitioner MBOC of the erroneous computation which resulted in his proclamation and was
afforded the opportunity to be heard by this Commission.
"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control includes the power to
revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to do what boards should have done, even if
questions relative thereto have not been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the
authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be required pursuant to law." 20
Petitioner posits that the Comelec's reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner therein was an affected candidate who
filed his petition on time.
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not
thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a
technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of
frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently
observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano v. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes v.
Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v.
Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalañang,

Page 39 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an
election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real
candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). x x x (Juliano v.
Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated
and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition
continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws
should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of
what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both
candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or
appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San
Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical
act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the
manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, 24 to wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent's assumption of office
was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the
legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent's proclamation was flawed right from the very beginning.
Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent
Castillo is concerned. As this Court once said:
"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with authority
to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It, of course, may not be availed of
where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the Comelec is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within
the area allocated by the Constitution and law to Comelec.
xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged even
after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is to
be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation.
Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect
the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission on
Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on Elections, 26 where the
proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission
the power to declare such proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.27
In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be
so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

Page 40 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 28
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the total number of
votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the Comelec by filing the
Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for Councilor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC No. 04-209
dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order issued by the Court dated
January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.

[G.R. NO. 179830 : December 3, 2009]

LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the
Commission Against Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution 1 dated August 7, 2007, held
petitioner guilty of contempt of the COMELEC and meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00. The second Resolution2 dated August 31, 2007, denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow:
On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the auspices of this Commission.
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, the respondent
[petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC's performance of its ministerial
duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the
province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan duty of
being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22,
2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for
Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for
Maguindanao. Due to certain 'observations' on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which
attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to appear
despite prior knowledge.
On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the Records and Statistics
Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even date, the canvassing documents for all
municipalities of the province of Maguindanao in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections were not
transmitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor of said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers.
The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to determine existing
controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, headed by Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was
tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the
city and municipalities in Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity
and responded to the queries from the chair. It was during this hearing that respondent [petitioner] Bedol
explained that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May
29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the

Page 41 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged
loss.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve deeper into the alleged loss by
propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol during the next scheduled proceedings, such as why he still
had in his possession said documents which should have already been turned over to the Commission, why he
did not report to the COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and other pertinent questions.
However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol failed to appear, giving the impression that
respondent [petitioner] Bedol does not give importance to this whole exercise and ignores the negative impact
his attitude has on this Commission.
Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written explanation of his absences which
he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by this Commission belatedly on July 03,
2007.
On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive interview with the
'Inquirer' and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the
Commission posted the challenge by saying that 'those that are saying that there was cheating in
Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now and I will answer
their accusations.' (Words in brackets ours)
On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head, Commissioner Nicodemo T.
Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order 3 against petitioner citing various violations of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, viz:
You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having committed during the
period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of specific paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows:
1. (a) Your (PES Bedol's) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is (sic) the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007;
(b) your failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof
when you attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May 25, 2007; (c)
your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite
notice to him in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to you of a subpoena
which you duly signed on the same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation of your
said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 - all of these failures on your part are violations
of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in Maguinadanao of the municipal certificates of
canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of Maguinadanao used in
the last elections of 2007, but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main
office in Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable documents were lost from your said
custody - these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the authority of the COMELEC over you,
challenging the institution to file a case against you in court as it is only in court that you are ready to face your
accuser are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers and radios) with your
boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public for all to see in your front-
page colored portrait in a national broadsheet and during a television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a
holster at your waist in a 'combative mode (sic)' - these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2,
Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours)
Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to appear before the COMELEC En
Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning to personally explain why he should not be held in
contempt for the above-mentioned offenses.
On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an
Order of Arrest4 issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during
the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.

Page 42 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELEC's legal basis for issuing the warrant
of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Upon petitioner's motion, he was
granted a period of ten (10) days within which to file the necessary pleading adducing his arguments and
supporting authorities. The continuation of the hearing was set on July 17, 2007.
On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested, petitioner submitted an
Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent Manifestation, containing the following averments:
1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a special appearance as he assails the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Commission and its capacity to prosecute the present case in an impartial and fair
manner.
2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. He can not be
validly arrested or re-arrested as a witness who is being compelled to testify in a hearing before the Honorable
Commission.
3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts against the Commission. He has
not committed those acts charged against him by the Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets ours.)
During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the absence of a complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any
private party. Petitioner's objection was treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was
denied forthwith by the COMELEC. Petitioner was then required to present evidence which he refused to do.
Various exhibits were then marked and presented to the COMELEC. However, the latter allowed petitioner to
file a Memorandum within a period of ten (10) days and gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his
documentary and other evidence.
On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum 5 maintaining his objection to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the COMELEC, sitting en banc
as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its
quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him for
contempt.
On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang Bedol is hereby found guilty of
Contempt of the Commission for the following acts and omissions:
1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend the reset
schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the
previously scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to attend the continuation of
hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to Respondent in open session in the
hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to him of the subpoena which he duly signed on the same
date; the failure/refusal to submit written explanation of respondent's absences which he undertook to submit
on June 13, 2007 - - - all of these failures are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondent's office in Maguindanao of the Municipal
Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of
Maguindanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which should have been delivered to the Commission on
Elections in its main office in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondent's plain admission that said accountable
documents were lost from his said custody - - - these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d),
Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
3. The respondent's pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to the authority of the COMELEC
over him, challenging the institution to file a case against him in court as it is supposedly only in court that
Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of
said Rules.
4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers and
radios) with boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public, for all to see
in his front-page colored portrait in a national broadsheet and during a television interview, a shiny pistol

Page 43 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

tucked in a holster at your waist in a 'combative mode' (sic) - - - these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and
(d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing disrespect for the institution, of
which respondent is even a ranking official, which is clearly contemptuous of this Commission, for which
Respondent Lintang Bedol is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to
pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and determine whether or not
any election offense or crime under the Revised Penal Code has been committed by respondent Lintang Bedol
and to initiate the filing of the necessary charge/s therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO INITIATE OR PROSECUTE
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSSION HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER
IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ASSUMING IT HAS
JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
We dismiss the petition.
The main thrust of petitioner's argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the
contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only
punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to the COMELEC's constitutional
mandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on Elections, 6 which held:
xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC
in the conduct of our elections.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52
[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

Page 44 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 8 described
quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
[Emphasis ours.]
The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and irregularities
attending the conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao and the non-transmittal of the canvassing
documents for all municipalities of said province.
Task Force Maguindanao's fact-finding investigation - to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud
that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass
were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed - could by no means
be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit
of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its
objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their
counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
The effectiveness of the quasi judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its
authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. As
enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9'
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear
during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELEC's investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed
when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the
various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required
petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers
are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to
determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels
for various candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the
COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the
election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to
appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
resolutions.
In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 the Court held:

Page 45 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative
duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt charges against
petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides:
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.
xxx
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission
shall constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.]
The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELEC's Rules of Procedure, Section 2
of which states:
Rule 29 - Contempt
Sec. 1. xxx
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. - After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or Division, as
the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the
Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it;
(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the Commission or any
of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rules;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; andcralawlibrary
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. - If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the
discretion of the Commission or Division.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to
allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-
quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and
penalties provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be initiated motu
proprio by the COMELEC, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision.
Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceedings which were
initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding
the absence of any complaint filed by a private party.
We turn now to petitioner's claim that the COMELEC pre-judged the case against him, and that its
findings were not supported by evidence. His claim deserves scant consideration.

Page 46 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated motu proprio by the
COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already prejudged the case against him. As borne out by the
records, the COMELEC gave petitioner several opportunities to explain his side and to present evidence to
defend himself. All of petitioner's belatedly filed pleadings were admitted and taken into consideration before
the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and with the
requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when it issued the Contempt Charge and
Show Cause Order against petitioner directing him to appear before it and explain why he should not be held
in contempt.
Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect contempt was based
merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and conjectures, and not on competent and substantial evidence.
He contends that there is no convincing evidence that he deliberately refused to heed the summonses of the
COMELEC or that he was sufficiently notified of the investigative hearings. He further argues that the loss of
the election documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he repeatedly failed to attend,
despite notice of the scheduled12 canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task
Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to
submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility to be present
during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen election documents but he failed to do so
without offering any valid justification for his non-appearance.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost while in
his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2,
Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election documents were lost while
in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted during the hearing held on June 11, 2007 that the documents were
stolen sometime on May 29, 2007. Apart from the said loss of the vital election documents, his liability
stemmed from the fact that he illegally retained custody and possession of said documents more than two
weeks after the elections. The COMELEC viewed such act as a contemptuous interference with its normal
functions.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through the media
(interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long
firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol
tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm tucked to his side and his supposed
exclusive interview. He claims that said newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary
value.
True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay, when such articles
are offered to prove their contents without any other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them.
However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,13 the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how
over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on
grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and necessity." 14 When certain facts are within judicial notice of the
Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts." 15
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay
rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 16
Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately defied or
challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution of
August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the articles that was in issue, but petitioner's conduct when he

Page 47 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

allowed himself to be interviewed in the manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution,
on a pending controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While petitioner claimed that he was
misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm
holstered at his side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It
should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He was under the administrative
supervision of the COMELEC17 and it was incumbent upon him to demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had
faithfully discharged his duties as dictated by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well
as his reliance on technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies and
newspaper publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order amounted to an implied
admission of the charges leveled against him.
All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to dispense with the
presentation of his evidence during the scheduled hearings and to explain his non-appearance at the hearings
of Task Force Maguindanao and the loss of the certificates of canvass and other election documents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012]ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI AND
MARY ANNE L. SUSANO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 201121]
SOLIDARITY FOR SOVEREIGNTY (S4S), REPRESENTED BY MA. LINDA OLAGUER; RAMON PEDROSA,
BENJAMIN PAULINO SR., EVELYN CORONEL, MA. LINDA OLAGUER MONTAYRE, AND NELSON T.
MONTAYRE, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, COMMISSIONER
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 201127]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, SOLITA COLLAS MONSOD, MARIA CORAZON
MENDOZA ACOL, FR. JOSE DIZON, NELSON JAVA CELIS, PABLO R. MANALASTAS, GEORGINA R. ENCANTO
AND ANNA LEAH E. COLINA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SMARTMATIC TIM
CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 201413]
TANGGULANG DEMOKRASYA (TAN DEM), INC., EVELYN L. KILAYKO, TERESITA D. BALTAZAR, PILAR L.
CALDERON AND ELITA T. MONTILLA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SMARTMATIC-TIM
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Pursuant to its authority to use an Automated Election System (AES) under Republic Act (RA) No. 8436,
as amended by RA No. 9369, or the Automation Law and in accordance with RA No. 9184, otherwise known as
the Government Procurement Reform Act, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) posted and published an
invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid for the 2010 Poll Automation Project [1] (the Project). On March 18,
2009, the Comelec approved and issued a Request for Proposal [2] (RFP) for the Project consisting of the
following components:
Component 1: Paper-Based Automation Election System (AES)

1-A. Election Management System (EMS)

1-B. Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) System
1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using Public Telecommunications
Network

Page 48 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Component 3: Overall Project Management[3]

On June 9, 2009, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8608 awarding the contract for the Project to respondent
Smartmatic-TIM.[4] On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the
Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
[5]
 (AES Contract, for brevity). The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the
AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given
until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option.

On September 23, 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with
corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces
of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. [6] In a letter[7] dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its
Chairman Cesar Flores (Flores), proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining 81,280
PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The
Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the
Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012.

On March 6, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9373 [8] resolving to seriously consider exercising the OTP
subject to certain conditions. On March 21, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9376 [9] resolving to
exercise the OTP the PCOS and CCS hardware and software in accordance with the AES contract between the
Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections subject to the following
conditions: (1) the warranties agreed upon in the AES contract shall be in full force and effect; (2) the original
price for the hardware and software covered by the OTP as specified in the AES contract shall be maintained,
excluding the cost of the 920 units of PCOS and related peripherals previously purchased for use in the 2010
special elections; and (3) all other services related to the 2013 AES shall be subject to public bidding. On March
29, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9377 [10] resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the
period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf
of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract [11] (Extension Agreement,
for brevity). The aforesaid Extension Agreement was signed on March 30, 2012. [12] On even date, the Comelec
issued Resolution No. 9378[13] resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM
to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines (hardware and software) to be used in the upcoming May 2013
elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The
Deed of Sale[14] was forthwith executed.

Claiming that the foregoing issuances of the Comelec, as well as the transactions entered pursuant thereto, are
illegal and unconstitutional, petitioners come before the Court in four separate Petitions
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed
Extension Agreement and Deed.
G.R. No. 201112

In G.R. No. 201112, petitioners Archbishop Fernando R. Capalla, Omar Solitario Ali and Mary Anne L. Susano
pray that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the Comelec from purchasing the PCOS
machines until after final judgment of the instant case; a writ of prohibition be issued against the Comelec for
the purchase of these defective PCOS machines; a writ of mandamus be issued compelling the Comelec to
conduct the necessary bidding for the equipment and facilities which shall be used for the 2013 National and
Local Elections; and to declare Comelec Resolution Nos. 9376, 9377, and 9378, on the purchase of PCOS
machines, null and void.

Petitioners argue that if there is a necessity to purchase the PCOS machines, the Comelec should follow RA
9184 requiring competitive public bidding. They likewise argue that the OTP clause embodied in the contract
with Smartmatic-TIM should be rendered invalid not only because the OTP has already lapsed but because of

Page 49 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

the fact that the OTP clause is a circumvention of the explicit provisions of RA 9184. Petitioners add that the
current PCOS machines do not meet the rigorous requirements of RA 9369 that the system procured must
have demonstrated capability and should have been successfully used in a prior electoral exercise here or
abroad. Petitioners submit that there are intrinsic technical infirmities as regards the PCOS machines used
during the 2010 elections which rendered it incapable for future use. Lastly, petitioners claim that the Comelec
does not have the capability to purchase and maintain the PCOS machines, because of lack of trained
manpower and technical expertise to properly maintain the PCOS machines; thus, the purchase is unfavorable
to the general public.
G.R. No. 201121

In G.R. No. 201121, petitioners Solidarity for Sovereignty (S4S), represented by Ma. Linda Olaguer, Ramon
Pedrosa, Benjamin Paulino, Sr., Evelyn Coronel, Ma. Linda Olaguer Montayre and Nelson T. Montayre, pray
that a TRO be issued directing the Comelec to desist from implementing the contract; that Resolution No. 9376
be declared unconstitutional and all acts made pursuant thereto, including the purchase of the PCOS machines
unlawful and void; that an Injunction be issued prohibiting the Comelec from further pursuing any act pursuant
to Resolution No. 9376.[15]

Petitioners argue that the Comelec’s act of exercising its OTP the PCOS machines from Smartmatic-TIM after
the period had already lapsed is illegal and unlawful. [16] They explain that the period within which the Comelec
may exercise the OTP could last only until December 31, 2010 without extension as provided in the Comelec’s
bid bulletin.[17] They further assert that the Comelec’s acceptance of Smartmatic-TIM’s unilateral extension of
the option period constitutes substantial amendment to the AES contract giving undue benefit to the winning
bidder not available to the other bidders.[18] Petitioners also contend that the Comelec’s decision to purchase
and use the PCOS machines is unconstitutional, as it allows the Comelec to abrogate its constitutional duty to
safeguard the election process by subcontracting the same to an independent provider (Smartmatic-TIM), who
controls the software that safeguards the entire election process. The purchase of the PCOS machines for use
in the May 2013 elections would be tantamount to a complete surrender and abdication of the Comelec’s
constitutional mandate in favor of Smartmatic-TIM. The control of the software and process verification
systems places the Comelec at the end of the process as it merely receives the report of Smartmatic-TIM. This,
according to petitioners, amounts to a direct transgression of the exclusive mandate of the Comelec
completely to take charge of the enforcement and administration of the conduct of elections. [19] Lastly,
petitioners aver that the Comelec’s act of deliberately ignoring the palpable infirmities and defects of the PCOS
machines, as duly confirmed by forensic experts, is in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, as it
fails to safeguard the integrity of the votes. They went on by saying that the subject PCOS machines lack
security features which can guaranty the secrecy and sanctity of our votes in direct contravention of RA 9369
which requires that the automated election system must at least possess an adequate security feature against
unauthorized access. In deciding to purchase the PCOS machines despite the above-enumerated defects, the
Comelec’s decision are claimed to be unconstitutional. [20]
G.R. No. 201127

In G.R. No. 201127, petitioners Teofisto Guingona, Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo, Solita Collas Monsod, Maria
Corazon Mendoza Acol, Fr. Jose Dizon, Nelson Java Celis, Pablo R. Manalastas, Georgina R. Encanto and Anna
Leah E. Colina pray that the Court issue a TRO enjoining and restraining respondents Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM from implementing Comelec Resolution No. 9376 and the Deed of Sale for the acquisition and purchase of
the PCOS machines and related equipment; issue writ of preliminary injunction; declare Comelec Resolution
No. 9376 void and unconstitutional and annul the Deed of Sale; and direct the Comelec to conduct public
bidding soonest for the automated election system to be used for the 2013 elections. [21]

Petitioners fault the Comelec in totally disregarding the recommendation of the Comelec Advisory Council
(CAC) not to exercise the OTP. They point out that in its Resolution No. 2012-2003, the CAC resolved to
recommend that the Comelec should exert all efforts to procure the necessary AES only through public
bidding. The CAC likewise allegedly recommended that the OTP should not be exercised if as a consequence,
the rest of the system must come from the same vendor as the Comelec would lose the opportunity to look for

Page 50 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

better technology; would prevent the Comelec from taking advantage of the best possible technology
available; would prevent other prospective vendors from competitively participating in the bidding process;
and may erode the public trust and confidence in the electoral process. In its report to the Congressional
Oversight Committee after the 2010 elections, the CAC supposedly concluded that the Comelec does not need
to use the same PCOS machines and that the Comelec would be better off not exercising the OTP the PCOS
machines so it can look for an even better solution for the May 2013 elections. [22] Like the other petitioners, it
is their position that Comelec Resolution No. 9376 is totally null and void having been issued in violation of the
express provisions of RA 9184 and the AES contract. According to petitioners, the Comelec itself provided in its
bid bulletins for a fixed and determinate period, and such period ended on December 31, 2010. Thus,
Smartmatic-TIM could not have unilaterally extended the option period and the Comelec could not have also
given its consent to the extension. In extending the option period, it is tantamount to giving the winning bidder
a benefit that was not known and available to all bidders during the bidding of the 2010 AES, which is a clear
violation of the bidding rules and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. [23] Considering that the
option period already expired, the purchase of the PCOS machines requires competitive public bidding. Lastly,
petitioners claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in opting to buy the PCOS machines
and allied paraphernalia of Smartmatic-TIM for the 2013 elections, despite incontrovertible findings of the
glitches, malfunctions, bugs, and defects of the same.[24]
G.R. No. 201418

In G.R. No. 201418, petitioners Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc., Evelyn L. Kilayko, Teresita D. Baltazar,
Pilar L. Calderon and Elita T. Montilla pray that the Court annul Resolution No. 9376 and the March 30, 2012
Deed of Sale, and prohibit the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM from implementing the same; and declare said
Resolution and Deed of Sale invalid for having been issued and executed by the Comelec with grave abuse of
discretion and for violating the provisions of R.A. 9184. [25]

Petitioners claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in contracting for the purchase of AES goods and services from Smartmatic-TIM in spite of the
below par performance of the latter’s PCOS machines, CCS and other software and hardware in the May 2010
elections and non-compliance with the minimum functional capabilities required by law. [26] They echo the
other petitioners’ contention that the Comelec’s decision to buy the CCS, PCOS machines, software and
hardware of Smartmatic violates RA 9184’s requirement of a prior competitive public bidding. Since the
Comelec is bent on pursuing the purchase of the subject goods, which is an entirely new procurement,
petitioners contend that there must be a public bidding. They argue that there is enough time to conduct
public bidding for the 2013 elections, considering that for the May 2010 elections, the Comelec only had 10
months and they were able to conduct the public bidding. Petitioners are of the view that there is no more
OTP to speak of, because the option period already lapsed and could not be revived by the unilateral act of
one of the contracting parties.[27]

On April 24, 2012, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the assailed contract of sale. The
consolidated cases were later set for Oral Arguments on the following issues:
I. Whether or not the Commission on Elections may validly accept the extension of time unilaterally
given by Smartmatic-TIM Corporation within which to exercise the option to purchase under Article 4 of the
Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections; and

II. Whether or not the acceptance of the extension and the issuance of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 9376
violate Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act and its Implementing Rules, and
Republic Act No. 9369 or the Automated Election Systems Act.

The parties were, thereafter, required to submit their Memoranda.

The petitions are without merit.

Page 51 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Simply stated, petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions for the purchase
of the subject PCOS machines as well as the Extension Agreement and the Deed of Sale covering said goods
mainly on three grounds: (1) the option period provided for in the AES contract between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM had already lapsed and, thus, could no longer be extended, such extension being prohibited
by the contract; (2) the extension of the option period and the exercise of the option without competitive
public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and, (3) despite the palpable infirmities and defects of
the PCOS machines, the Comelec purchased the same in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369.

For its part, the Comelec defends the validity and constitutionality of its decision to purchase the subject PCOS
machines, pursuant to the OTP under the AES contract with Smartmatic-TIM, on the following grounds: (1)
Article 6.6 of the AES contract which states the option period was amended by the extension agreement; (2)
the exercise of the OTP is not covered by RA 9184, because it is merely an implementation of a previously
bidded contract; (3) taking into account the funds available for the purpose, exercising the OTP was the
prudent choice for the Comelec and is more advantageous to the government; and (4) the exercise of the OTP
is consistent with the technical requirements of RA 9369.

Stated in another way, Smartmatic-TIM insists on the validity of the subject transaction based on the following
grounds: (1) there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision of law for it to extend the option period;
rather, the contract itself allows the parties to amend the same; (2) the OTP is not an independent contract in
itself, but is a provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had already satisfied the public
bidding requirements of RA 9184; (3) exercising the option was the most advantageous option of the Comelec;
and (4) Smartmatic-TIM has an established track record in providing effective and accurate electoral solutions
and its satisfactory performance has been proven during the 2010 elections. The alleged glitches in the May
2010 elections, if at all, are not attributable to the PCOS machines.

We agree with respondents.

At the outset, we brush aside the procedural barriers (i.e., locus standi of petitioners and the non-observance
of the hierarchy of courts) that supposedly prevent the Court from entertaining the consolidated petitions. As
we held in Guingona, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:[28]
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, May 2013] elections is a matter of
great public concern. On election day, the country's registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right
of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also
embodies our people's last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by
our people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything
capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it
is the coming elections, more so with the alarming turn of events that continue to unfold. The wanton wastage
of public funds brought about by one bungled contract after another, in staggering amounts, is in itself a
matter of grave public concern.[29]

Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues raised by
petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of
justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure. [30]

Now on the substantive issues. In order to achieve the modernization program of the Philippine Electoral
System, which includes the automation of the counting, transmission and canvassing of votes for the May 2010
national and local elections with systems integration and over-all project management in a comprehensive and
well-managed manner,[31] the Comelec entered into an AES contract with Smartmatic-TIM for the lease of
goods and purchase of services under the contract, with option to purchase the goods.

The option contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM is embodied in Article 4.3 of the AES contract
to wit:

Page 52 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Article 4
Contract Fee and Payment

xxxx

4.3. OPTION TO PURCHASE

In the event the COMELEC exercises its option to purchase the Goods as listed in Annex “L”, COMELEC shall pay
the PROVIDER an additional amount of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty Million Six Hundred Thirty- Five
Thousand Forty-Eight Pesos and Fifteen Centavos (Php2,130,635,048.15) as contained in the Financial Proposal
of the joint venture partners – Smartmatic and TIM.

In case COMELEC should exercise its option to purchase, a warranty shall be required in order to assure that:
(a) manufacturing defects shall be corrected; and/or (b) replacements shall be made by the PROVIDER, for a
minimum period of three (3) months, in the case of supplies, and one (1) year, in the case of equipment, after
performance of this Contract. The obligation for the warranty shall be covered by retention money of ten
percent (10%) of every option to purchase payment made.

The retention money will be returned within five (5) working days after the expiration of the above warranty,
provided, however, that the goods supplied are in good operating condition free from patent and latent
defects, all the conditions imposed under the purchase contract have been fully met, and any defective
machines, except to those attributable to the COMELEC, have been either repaired at no additional charge or
replaced or deducted from the price under the Option to Purchase. [32]

Article 6.6 thereof, in turn provides for the period within which the Comelec could exercise the option, thus:
Article 6
COMELEC’s Responsibilities

xxxx

6.6. COMELEC shall notify the PROVIDER on or before 31 December 2010 of its option to purchase the Goods
as listed in Annex “L.”[33]

The Comelec did not exercise the option within the period stated in the above provision. Smartmatic, however,
unilaterally extended the same until its final extension on March 31, 2012. The Comelec, thereafter, accepted
the option and eventually executed a Deed of Sale involving said goods. Now, petitioners come before the
Court assailing the validity of the extension, the exercise of the option and the Deed of Sale. In light of the AES
contract, can Smartmatic-TIM unilaterally extend the option period? Can the Comelec accept the extension?

We answer in the affirmative.

It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an instrument must be construed so as to give effect to
all the provisions of the contract.[34] In essence, the contract must be read and taken as a whole. [35] While the
contract indeed specifically required the Comelec to notify Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the subject goods until
December 31, 2010, a reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are
given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There
is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective.

Article 2 of the AES contract lays down the effectivity of the contract, viz.:
Article 2
EFFECTIVITY

2.1. This Contract shall take effect upon the fulfillment of all of the following conditions:

Page 53 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

(a) Submission by the PROVIDER of the Performance Security;

(b) Signing of this Contract in seven (7) copies by the parties; and
(c) Receipt by the PROVIDER of the Notice to Proceed.

2.2. The Term of this Contract begins from the date of effectivity until the release of the Performance
Security, without prejudice to the surviving provisions of this Contract, including the warranty provision as
prescribed in Article 8.3 and the period of the option to purchase (Emphasis supplied).[36]

Obviously, the contract took effect even prior to the 2010 elections. The only question now is whether its
existence already ceased. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision, it is important to determine whether or not
the performance security had already been released to Smartmatic-TIM. In Article 8 of the AES contract,
performance security was defined and the rules in releasing said security were laid down, to wit:
Article 8
Performance Security and Warranty

8.1. Within three (3) days from receipt by the PROVIDER of the formal Notice of Award from COMELEC, the
PROVIDER shall furnish COMELEC with a Performance Security in an amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of
the Contract Amount; which Performance Security as of this date has been duly received by COMELEC.

Within seven (7) days from delivery by the PROVIDER to COMELEC of the Over-all Project Management Report
after successful conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, COMELEC shall release to the PROVIDER the above-
mentioned Performance Security without need of demand. [37]

Smartmatic-TIM categorically stated in its Consolidated Comment to the petitions that the Comelec still retains
P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security. [38] In short, the performance security had
not yet been released to Smartmatic-TIM which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet
terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 [39] of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be
amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties.
In light of the provisions of the AES contract, there is, therefore, nothing wrong with the execution of the
Extension Agreement.

Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a
government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also
by RA 9184. In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government
contracts. The award of public contracts, through public bidding, is a matter of public policy. [40] The parties are,
therefore, not at full liberty to amend or modify the provisions of the contract bidded upon.

The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and
(3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids.[41] By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest
by giving the public the best possible advantages through open competition. [42] Competition requires not only
bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, and the
same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and not designed to injure or defraud the
government.[43] The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing
which means that all qualified bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.
[44]
 Another self-evident purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies
in the execution of public contracts. [45]

A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon.
However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the
same terms.[46] The determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out
constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole, would contain
substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical and/or

Page 54 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

financial proposals previously submitted by the other bidders. The modifications in the contract executed
between the government and the winning bidder must be such as to render the executed contract to be an
entirely different contract from the one bidded upon. [47]

Public bidding aims to secure for the government the lowest possible price under the most favorable terms
and conditions, to curtail favoritism in the award of government contracts and avoid suspicion of anomalies,
and it places all bidders in equal footing. Any government action which permits any substantial variance
between the conditions under which the bids are invited and the contract executed after the award thereof is
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which warrants proper judicial action.
[48]
 If this flawed process would be allowed, public bidding will cease to be competitive, and worse, government
would not be favored with the best bid. Bidders will no longer bid on the basis of the prescribed terms and
conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid in anticipation of the execution of a future
contract containing new and better terms and conditions that were not previously available at the time of the
bidding. Such a public bidding will not inure to the public good. [49]

In Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated,
[50]
 the Court nullified the right of first refusal granted to respondent therein in the Batangas Contract for being
contrary to public policy. The Court explained that the same violated the requirement of competitive public
bidding in the government contract, because the grant of the right of first refusal did not only substantially
amend the terms of the contract bidded upon so that resultantly the other bidders thereto were deprived of
the terms and opportunities granted to respondent therein after it won the public auction, but also altered the
bid terms by effectively barring any and all true bidding in the future. [51]

Also in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO),[52] this Court declared as null and
void, for being contrary to public policy, the Concession Agreement entered into by the government with
PIATCO, because it contained provisions that substantially departed from the Draft Concession Agreement
included in the bid documents. The Court considered the subject contracts a mockery of the bidding process,
because they were substantially amended after their award to the successful bidder on terms more beneficial
to PIATCO and prejudicial to public interest. [53]

The same conclusions cannot be applied in the present case.

One. Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously available to the other bidders.
Admittedly, the AES contract was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM after compliance with all the requirements of a
competitive public bidding. The RFP, Bid Bulletins and the AES contract identified the contract as one of lease
with option to purchase. The AES contract is primarily a contract of lease of goods [54] listed in the contract and
purchase of services[55] also stated in the contract. Section 4.3 thereof gives the Comelec the OTP the goods
agreed upon. The same provision states the conditions in exercising the option, including the additional
amount that the Comelec is required to pay should it exercise such right. It is, therefore, undisputed that this
grant of option is recognized by both parties and is already a part of the principal contract of lease. Having
been included in the RFP and the bid bulletins, this right given to the Comelec to exercise the option was
known to all the bidders and was considered in preparing their bids. The bidders were apprised that aside from
the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Although
the AES contract was amended after the award of the contract to Smartmatic-TIM, the amendment only
pertains to the period within which the Comelec could exercise the option because of its failure to exercise the
same prior to the deadline originally agreed upon by the parties. Unlike in PSALM, wherein the winning bidder
was given the right of first refusal which substantially amended the terms of the contract bidded upon,
thereby depriving the other bidders of the terms and opportunities granted to winning bidder after it won the
public auction; and in Agan, Jr., wherein the Concession Agreement entered into by the government with
PIATCO contained provisions that substantially departed from the draft Concession Agreement included in the
bid documents; the option contract in this case was already a part of the original contract and not given only
after Smartmatic-TIM emerged as winner. The OTP was actually a requirement by the Comelec when the
contract of lease was bidded upon. To be sure, the Extension Agreement does not contain a provision

Page 55 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

favorable to Smartmatic-TIM not previously made available to the other bidders.

Two. The amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was
P11,223,618,400.00[56] charged against the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were,
therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. After the competitive public bidding,
Smartmatic-TIM emerged as winner and the AES contract was thereafter executed. As repeatedly stated
above, the AES contract is a contract of lease with OTP giving the Comelec the right to purchase the goods
agreed upon if it decides to do so. The AES contract not only indicated the contract price for the lease of goods
and purchase of services which is P7,191,484,739.48, but also stated the additional amount that the Comelec
has to pay if it decides to exercise the option which is P2,130,635,048.15. Except for the period within which
the Comelec could exercise the OTP, the terms and conditions for such exercise are maintained and respected.
Admittedly, the additional amount the Comelec needed to pay was maintained (less the amount already paid
when it purchased 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding CCS for the special elections in certain
areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan) subject to the warranties originally agreed upon
in the AES contract. The contract amount not only included that for the contract of lease but also for the OTP.
Hence, the competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding
would be a superfluity.

The Solicitor General himself clarified during the oral arguments that the purchase price of the remaining PCOS
machines stated in the assailed Deed of Sale was the price stated in Article 4.3 of the AES contract. Therefore,
the said amount was already part of the original amount bidded upon in 2009 for the AES contract which
negates the need for another competitive bidding.[57]

Third. More importantly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and the
public.

The nature of an option contract was thoroughly explained in Eulogio v. Apeles,[58] to wit:
An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter
shall have the right to buy the former's property at a fixed price within a certain time. It is a condition offered
or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property
at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with certain terms and conditions; or which
gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. An option is not of itself a purchase, but
merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a
contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his
property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but
he does sell something, i.e., the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. Its
distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside
from the consideration for the offer.[59]

Also in Carceller v. Court of Appeals,[60] the Court described an option in this wise:

An option is a preparatory contract in which one party grants to the other, for a fixed period and under
specified conditions, the power to decide, whether or not to enter into a principal contract. It binds the party
who has given the option, not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the period
designated and, within that period, to enter into such contract with the one to whom the option was granted,
if the latter should decide to use the option. It is a separate agreement distinct from the contract which the
parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. [61]

In Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. CA,[62] the Court described an option as:

An option, as used in the law on sales, is a continuing offer or contract by which the owner stipulates
with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or
under, or in compliance with, certain terms and conditions, or which gives to the owner of the property the
right to sell or demand a sale. It is sometimes called an “unaccepted offer.” x x x [63]

Page 56 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

From the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, an option is only a preparatory contract and a continuing
offer to enter into a principal contract. Under the set-up, the owner of the property, which is Smartmatic-TIM,
gives the optionee, which is the Comelec, the right to accept the former’s offer to purchase the goods listed in
the contract for a specified amount, and within a specified period. Thus, the Comelec is given the right to
decide whether or not it wants to purchase the subject goods. It is, therefore, uncertain whether or not the
principal contract would be entered into. The owner of the property would then have to wait for the optionee
to make a decision. A longer option period would mean that more time would be given to the optionee to
consider circumstances affecting its decision whether to purchase the goods or not. On the part of Smartmatic-
TIM, it would have to wait for a longer period to determine whether the subject goods will be sold to the
Comelec or not, instead of freely selling or leasing them to other persons or governments possibly at a higher
price. This is especially true in this case as the terms and conditions for the exercise of the option including the
purchase price, had been included in the AES contract previously bidded upon. The parties are bound to
observe the limitations embodied therein, otherwise, a new public bidding would be needed.

We agree with respondents that the exercise of the option is more advantageous to the Comelec, because the
P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES contract was
considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only
P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one of
the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections. Assuming that the
exercise of the option is nullified, the Comelec would again conduct another public bidding for the AES for the
2013 elections with its available budget of P7 billion. Considering that the said amount is the available fund for
the whole election process, the amount for the purchase or lease of new AES will definitely be less than P7
billion. Moreover, it is possible that Smartmatic-TIM would again participate in the public bidding and could
win at a possibly higher price. The Comelec might end up acquiring the same PCOS machines but now at a
higher price.

The advantage to the government of the exercise of the OTP was even recognized by petitioners, shown during
the oral arguments:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:
May I just ask you, do you know the total value of the subject matter of this contract?

DEAN ESPEJO:
Php1.8 billion pesos, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

You’re referring to the Deed of Sale.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

The whole, the whole equipment, subject matter of the contract.

DEAN ESPEJO:
I think roughly, the original contract something like 10 billion I am not sure, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

10 billion pesos.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

Page 57 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Okay. Now, in the original contract of July 10, 2009, the contract was not actually a purchase contract but
merely a lease contract.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

And the lease contract is 7.1 billion.

DEAN ESPEJO:
It says 7.1 billion.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Okay. But it is here [denominated] as a lease contract.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

So the value was 10 billion pesos then you just pay the difference between ten (10) and seven (7) you get 3
billion pesos to purchase all of these equipment.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Okay. Now, you look at your Deed of Sale, this is annexed to your petition, the value of the Deed of Sale is
something like two billion one hundred thirty million (Php2,130,000,000).

DEAN ESPEJO:
Around that much, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

You add this at two [billion] one hundred thirty million and so to seven billion one ninety-one the subject
matter of your original contract; you come up with something like over 9 billion pesos.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Close to Ten, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Close to Ten.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

So that’s practically less than the total value of the equipment, because according to you the total value would
come up to 10 billion pesos, you add up the Lease Contract of 7 billion and two billion, plus under this Deed of
Sale which is the subject matter of this petition, you will come up with a little more than 9 billion pesos even
less than the 10 billion pesos. Do you think that is disadvantageous to the government?

DEAN ESPEJO:

Page 58 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

May I be allowed to explain?

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Go ahead, you go ahead, you have all the time.

DEAN ESPEJO:
It may appear advantageous, Your Honor please, but on the other hand, there are certain disadvantages there.
For one thing, these are not brand new machines; these are refurbished existing machines which could be
suffering from hardware or software problem. For the COMELEC to accept this, Your Honor please, each
machine will have to be checked as to its hardware and software. Eighty-two thousand (82,000) PCOS
machines, Your Honor please, what if half of them, [turn out] to be white elephants or malfunctioning, Your
Honor please, then we will be acquiring eighty-two thousand (82,000) with fifty percent (50%) malfunctioning
machines. There is a danger, Your Honor please, that does not appear to the naked eye. In any event, with
respect to the financial figures there appears to be some advantages, Your Honor, please.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

x x x these are merely speculative. Your’re only speculating that there are dangers, the dangers might not
come, in fact, it might even be void or favorable. Okay, now my other question is, do you think that if this was
bidden out under R.A. 9184 for the purchase of all these equipment, do you think that a bidder will come up
with a bid of less than 2 billion pesos for the whole equipment? When according to you, the equipment in
2009 is 10 billion, and elections are very near already 2013, the filing of certificates of candidacy will be on the
second to the last month of this year?

DEAN ESPEJO:
May I be allowed to answer that by way of a speculation, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Go ahead, please.

DEAN ESPEJO:
I think bidder will find it difficult to match that.

xxxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Okay. My other question is this. Okay, now you admitted that the original value is 10 billion. Are you also
aware that the budget of the COMELEC when they come up with this contract is 7 billion?

DEAN ESPEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

And the total value of the original contract is 10 billion. Do you think that the COMELEC will have money to
purchase equipment valued at 10 billion pesos with only 7 billion pesos for the elections of 2013? Because the
budget of 7 billion is not for the purpose only of the purchase of the equipment, but also includes for the
budget of the elections, pre, during and post elections expenses.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Well, Your Honor please, the shortfall of 3 billion pesos can be remedied if Congress will appropriate additional
amounts, if the President of this Republic will convince the legislature to appropriate an additional amount, I
see no problem why the shortfall of 3 billion cannot be remedied, Your Honor please.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

Page 59 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Oh, that’s again speculative.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Again, that’s unfortunate that’s my speculation.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERALTA:

You will have first to go to Congress, then you go to Senate, and then you go to the President discounting the
possibility of filing a petition to question the allocation of additional amount for the 2013 elections, by the time
that all of these exercises are finished then election is there already.

DEAN ESPEJO:
Well, I’m hopeful, Your Honor please, that our Congressmen and our Senators will rise to the occasion and
move fast and appropriate the needed amount of 3 billion pesos to help the COMELEC acquire the proper
Automated election System.

x x x[64]

Another reason posed by petitioners for their objection to the exercise of the option and the eventual
execution of the March 30, 2012 Deed of Sale is the existence of the alleged defects, glitches, and infirmities of
the subject goods. The technology provided by Smartmatic-TIM was not perfect, because of some technical
problems that were experienced during the 2010 elections. Petitioners herein doubt that the integrity and
sanctity of the ballots are protected because of these defects.

We do not agree.

Prior to the execution of the Deed of Sale, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM had agreed that the latter would
undertake fixes and enhancements to the hardware and software to make sure that the subject goods are in
working condition to ensure a free, honest, and credible elections. As former Commissioner Augusto C.
Lagman admitted[65] during the oral arguments, there are possible software solutions to the alleged problems
on the PCOS machines and it is not inherently impossible to remedy the technical problems that have been
identified. While there is skepticism that Smartmatic-TIM would be able to correct the supposed defects prior
to the 2013 elections because of its inaction during the two years prior to the exercise of the option, we agree
with the opinion of Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. that it is absurd to expect Smartmatic-TIM to invest time,
money and resources in fixing the PCOS machines to the specifications and requirements of the Comelec when
prior to the exercise of the OTP, they do not have the assurance from the Comelec that the latter will exercise
the option.[66]

Moreover, as to the digital signature which appears to be the major concern of petitioners, it has been clarified
during the oral arguments that the PCOS machines are capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
I have some questions. Counsel, the law requires that the election returns that are electronically transmitted
must be digitally signed, correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s right, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, but in the 2010 elections, all election returns electronically transmitted were NOT digitally signed,
correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
They were, Your Honors, please…

Page 60 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Why? How?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Your Honor, as we explained in our presentation, the iButtons, Your Honor, contain the digital signatures…

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, I understand that

ATTY. LAZATIN:
…and the iButtons [interrupted]

JUSTICE CARPIO:
because they are there, the machine is capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions. But you just said
that the BEI Chairman did not input their private keys because there was no time. It requires five (5) months.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Your Honor, as I said, there is a digital signature that was assigned to the BEI…to the BEIs, your Honor, okay. I
am saying that there is digital signature. What I also said, Your Honor, is that there is also a possibility that
another digital certificate or signature can come from another certification authority xxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, that’s a third party…that’s a third-party certifier, but that’s an option. The law does not require a third-
party certification. It merely says that transmission must be digitally signed.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s right.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
That’s why Chairman Melo told Congress that it will cost one (1) billion to get a third-party certifier, but the
law does not require it even now, if you said in your presentation that the BEI Chairman could not input their
private key, that’s generated because it takes five (5) months to do that and the list of BEI Chairman is known
only one (1) month before the election, then how could there be a digital signature?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Your Honor, as I mentioned it is a…not a customized or personal digital signature. It is a digital signature that is
assigned by COMELEC.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Assigned by COMELEC? How can…who inputs that digital signature?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
It is cranked out, Your Honor, and…

JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, your…it is trusted that the list of the BEI Chairman is known only one (1) month before, so how can the BEI
Chairman input their digital signature five (5) months before?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
As I said, Your Honor, it is not a personal or customized signature. It is just like …

JUSTICE CARPIO:
It is a machine ID, in other words?

Page 61 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

ATTY. LAZATIN:
No, let me explain it this way, Your Honor. The best example I can give, Your Honor, is …

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, let us define first what a digital signature means.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
The Rules of Court, Your Honor, defines “digital signature” as the first one it is electronic signature consisting
of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public
Cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer’s public
key can accurately determine: (i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer’s public key; and (ii) whether the initial electronic document has been altered after
the transformation was made.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Therefore, digital signature requires private key and public key…

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
…and this private key and public key are generated by an algorithm, correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, that’s right, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
And there is another algorithm which, if you match…if you put together the private key and the message, will
generate the signature.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s right, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
And the third algorithm, that if you put together the public key and the signature it will accept or reject the
message, that’s correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, was that used in the 2010 elections?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
How was that private key generated?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Again, Your Honor, as I said…

Page 62 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Did the BEI Chairman know what that private key is?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Your Honor, allow me to explain, Your Honor. The names, Your Honor, or the private keys are…were assigned
to the BEIs Your Honor. In the same way, Your Honor, in the office my code name, Your Honor, or assigned to
me is “00 xxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
You mean to say the private key is embedded in the machine?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
No, Your Honor, it is embedded in the iButton and they are given a x x x

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, in the machine…the iButton is in the machine.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Where is it?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
It is a gadget, Your Honors, that is used…it is a separate gadget, your Honor xxx This is a sample of an iButton,
your Honor, and in fact we said that we are prepared to demonstrate, Your Honor, and to show to this Court…

xxxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
On election Day, where was the iButton placed? In the machine?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
To start the machine, Your Honor, you have to put it on top of that Button xxx

JUSTICE CARPIO:
In other words, whoever is in possession of that iButton can make a digitally-transmitted election return,
correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s correct, Your Honor. Your Honor, together with the other BEIs because apart from this iButton, Your
Honor, for authentication the BEIs, three of them, Your Honor, have an 8-digit PIN, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
How is that 8-digit PIN given to them?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
In a sealed envelope, Your Honor, these are x x x

JUSTICE CARPIO:
And then they also input that in the keyboard?

ATTY. LAZATIN:

Page 63 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
In the display?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, that iButton contains the private key?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor, that’s my understanding.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
And who controls the public key? Who control[led] the public key in the last election?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
My understanding, Your honor, is COMELEC, your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
COMELEC had the public key?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s my understanding, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
And there was no certifying agency because it cost too much and the law did not require that?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s correct, Your Honor. But the machine, Your Honor, as I mentioned, is capable of accepting any number
of digital signatures whether self-generated or by a third-party certification authority, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So, whoever is in possession of that iButton and in possession of the four (4) PINS, the set of PINs, for
the other BEI number, can send a transmission?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
The moment you are in possession of the iButton and the four (4) sets of PINs

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
If they can send an electronic transmission that’s digitally signed and when received by the COMELEC and
matched with the public key will result with an official election return, correct?

ATTY. LAZATIN:
That’s correct. In the same way, Your Honor, that even if someone keeps his key or private key, Your Honor, if
he is under threat he will also divulge it, Your Honor. It’s the same.

Page 64 of 65
 Election Law Full Text cases -Atty. Fernandez
R.Langrio

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, so whoever wants to send it, he will have to get the private key from the BEI Chairman and the PIN
numbers from the other members…

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
…before they can send the electronic transmission.

ATTY. LAZATIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. That clarifies things. x x x[67]

As the Comelec is confronted with time and budget constraints, and in view of the Comelec’s mandate to
ensure free, honest, and credible elections, the acceptance of the extension of the option period, the exercise
of the option, and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the more prudent choices available to the Comelec
for a successful 2013 automated elections. The alleged defects in the subject goods have been determined and
may be corrected as in fact fixes and enhancements had been undertaken by Smartmatic-TIM. Petitioners
could not even give a plausible alternative to ensure the conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections, in
the event that the Court nullifies the Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
the Court on April 24, 2012 is LIFTED.

Page 65 of 65