Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
People vs Que Po Lay G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.

dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to
the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not
require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in
order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by

Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day
after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective,
this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation.
It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no
one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951

D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Maria  Juego-G.R. No. 137873, April 20 2001
Justice Kapunan

Doctrine: What negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
[p]latform but without a safety lock. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
She availed death benefits under the State Insurance Fund, without knowing that she could
recover a higher amount under the Civil Code. D.M.C.I. alleged that respondent Maria Juego knew of
the two choices of remedies available to her and yet chose to claim the benefits from the ECC, and
that such action bars her to claim the other. On the other hand, Maria only learned that there is
negligence on the part of D.M.C.I. only after choosing to claim the benefit under the ECC, hence
there is ignorance as to the facts of her husband’s death.
 Issue:
Whether or not the waiver of Maria Juego is valid.
Ruling:
No. The waiver is not valid. It must be shown that the person against whom the waiver is
asserted had actual or constructive knowledge of his rights or all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which the waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver
when he knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision.

Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University G.R. No. 15172--May 30, 1961

FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the
Arellano University. After Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law
of the defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of the fourt year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of mother of
plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled
for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and having
accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college of law of the Abad Santos University
graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying
law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were retured to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship grants
were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fess paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded
to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in
college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos
University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed
the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to
him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87 which
defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff
paid to defendant the said sum under protest.

ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that “When students
are given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to These scholarship should not be subsequently
charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses the
scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The
practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor
has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institution as in
Arellano University.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing
the defendant’s counterclaim. It is so ordered.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

Facts:
Romeo Jader was a law student at the University of the East from 1984 to 1988. In his first
semester of his fourth year, he failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester and on February 1, 1988, he
filed an examination for the removal of his incomplete grade, which was approved by the dean. He
took the examination but was given a grade of 5 (failing).
The dean and the faculty members of the university deliberated as to who among their
graduating students would be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name was in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation. The invitation for the commencement exercises also included his name,
but at the foot of the list, the following was written:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports
During the ceremony, Jader’s name was called, and he received a rolled white sheet of paper
symbolical of the law diploma. After graduation, he took a leave of absence without pay from his job to
prepare for the bar examination and enrolled in a pre-bar review class. When he learned the
deficiency in his requirements for graduation, he dropped his review class and was not able to take
the bar exam.
Jader filed a case in the trial court, and the latter granted him the amount of Php35,470 as well
as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. At the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was upheld, but
the CA added the award for moral damages amounting to Php50,000.
Issues:
1. Can the University of the East be held liable for actual damages?
2. Is the university liable to pay Jader moral damages?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status
and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages. The university could not just give the grades at any time because law students
have a deadline to meet in the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It was guilty of
negligence and for violating Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, which provide
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
2. No. The Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Jader
suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate. It was his duty to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon
himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before
preparing himself for the bar examination.
The Court affirmed the CA’s decision with modification. It granted Jader the actual damages of
Php35,470 with legal interest of 6 percent per annum computed from the date of the complaint until
fully paid, as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. The award for moral damages, however, was
deleted.

Miciano v. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927
FACTS:
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will
thathis property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation.
 The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However,
one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.
The appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the
deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his
nationality.

Issue: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
Held:
Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of the
testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be given
effect.  A person’s will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It
should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.
            The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law.  He
cannot provide otherwise.
            The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that
provision is not legal.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116     June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived
together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there
was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila
on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice
Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
 The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the Makati RTC, but the petition was
denied. Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The custody of the two children was
granted to Wolfgang by the said court.
Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter since there is already a divorce decree
obtained abroad. Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss. Carmen, however, filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the case should proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of their children and the distribution of the properties. The judge
issued an order partially setting aside her order to dismiss for the purpose of tackling the issues of
property relations of the spouses as well as the custody of the children.

ISSUE:
W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal properties
alleged in the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the custody of children.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our courts can give the
effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
 Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity
to challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the
custody of children.

Garcia v. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace
Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was
declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately even without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds
of bigamy. She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at the time she
contracted a marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha
Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had told Grace about his previous
marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads
A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.
Issue:
Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?
Ruling:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.  However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the
former presented a divorce decree.  The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country
where it will be used.
The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following
reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse
can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be
capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and
proved.
There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick
had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.
The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce
might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had
to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no
proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity
of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.