1 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional

Realism

Omar Zahid

The Second World War shattered the self-belief of the idealistic, utopian
views of international politics that prevailed during the inter-war period. This
gave rise to the political theory of Realism that has since dominated the
fields of International Relations and academia right up until the end of the
Cold War. Realism claims legitimacy from its long intellectual philosophical
tradition spanning from the ancient Greeks, through to Machiavelli, and more
recently to realist writers such as Morgenthau and Waltz to name but a few.
As with most theories of social science, traditional realism has undergone
changes, whereby ideas have been discarded or refined into what is known
today as neorealism.

Introduction
It is extremely difficult to define realism as it is not a single coherent theory,
but for the purpose of the paper two major branches of realism will be
examined. The analysis will begin by looking at traditional realism and the
modern neo-realist school of thought and evaluate the similarities and
differences between them even though they share the same central tenets1.
This analysis will be followed by outlining Kenneth Waltz’s theory of
neorealism and assess what kind of advance it makes on traditional realism.
It will evaluate the concept of anarchy and whether the structure of the
system determines state behaviour or other factors come into play according
do different versions of neorealism. Finally, the paper will examine what
direction neorealism is heading towards and if it is shifting away from its
central assumptions.

Traditional Realism
Realism developed and gained prominence during the inter-war period as a
reaction to liberal internationalist thought that strongly upheld the view wars
would cease to exist as mankind had learnt their lessons from the horrific
experiences of the First World War. Liberal idealists hoped for a better world
brought about by cooperation and collective security through the
establishment of institutions such as the League of Nations. Realists like E.
H. Carr on the other hand criticised the ‘utopian’ dreams of statesmen who
thought a world could be built on that which transcended the need for the
realpolitik of the day. For Carr, liberal internationalists were wrong in arguing
that:

1
Jack Donnelly (2000), Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 1.
2 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

The forms of international diplomacy could be restructured to make

them more peaceful and the balance of power principle would give
way to a system of collective security would be met by the collective
2
force of world opinion and military power .

Traditional realists like Carr emphasised that in order to analyse global

politics, it is necessary to adopt a rigorous scientific methodology3. As a
methodological approach of scepticism, realism’s purpose was to expose the
foreign policy ambitions formulated by the idealists which did not take due
consideration to power4. Its task was not to stand as an opposing system of
beliefs in fixed opposition to ‘utopianism’, but rather to serve as a constant
check on utopian thinking in politics5. For Carr, ‘the complexity, the
fascination and the tragedy of all political life’ was that all political life
reflected an interplay between ideals, ‘which are utopia’, and institutions,
which are ‘reality’6. Carr maintained that it is dangerous to base the study of
International Relations, ‘on an imaginary desire of how we would like the
world to be’7 and asserted ‘the teleological aspects of science of
international politics has been conspicuous from the outset’8.
During the post-Second World War period, Hans Morgenthau
attempted to consolidate traditional realism by providing intellectual support
for the United States new role within the international system. For
Morgenthau, ‘actors are guided by a rapacious quest for power that is the
result of an aggressive animal-like craving to dominate one’s fellows’9.
Morgenthau’s view of human nature emphasised aggression and self-
interest, ‘and thus inalterably inclined towards immorality’10. For Morgenthau,
human nature is the main cause of war due to it being inherently ‘bad’.
Morgenthau’s conception of human nature has been the central tenet of
traditional realism, which adopts the positivist scientific method for
investigating international politics, which according to him should be factual
and comply with strict empirical and logical criteria11.
It was not until the 1980s that Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neorealism
became the leading contender amongst realist theories. According to neo-
realists, their theory was supposed to represent a step forward from the
evolution of traditional realism into a refined scientific approach. Neorealism
and Waltz in particular are the leading critics of traditional realism’s

2
Steve Burchill (1996), ‘Realism and Neorealism’ in Steve Burchill & Andrew Linklater
(eds.), Theories of International Relations, London: Macmillan Press, p. 67.
3
Edward H. Carr (1939), The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, London: Macmillan Press,
pp. 13-14.
4
Edward H. Carr (2001), The Twenty Years Crisis, edited by Michael Cox, Basingstoke:
Palgrave, pp. 62-83.
5
Ibid, p. 87.
6
Ibid.
7
Steve Burchill (Note 2), p. 68.
8
Edward H. Carr (Note 3), pp. 11-12.
9
Hans J. Morgenthau (1946), Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 192-194.
10
Cited in Jack Donnelly (Note 1), p. 9.
11
Hans J. Morgenthau (1955), Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred A Knopf, pp. 3-13.
3 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

explanations of international behaviour based on particular conceptions of

human nature12.
For example, Morgenthau declares politics is essentially a science that
can be discovered through the use of scientific method for which the laws of
politics are grounded in human nature. As such, both human nature and
science have their place in theorising in the traditional realist paradigm.
Waltz and neo-realists on the other hand would agree that objectivity is
required and a scientific approach should be utilised, but disagree with
Morgenthau that politics originate in human nature. Humanity, to the neo-
realist, is irrelevant as laws are grounded in science alone. In other words,
Morgenthau is focusing on the statesmen and a nation’s foreign policy that
ultimately affect the international system which is counter to the neo-realist
conception, where the system and structure are more important than the
actors themselves. It should be noted that although both types of realism
hold a pessimistic worldview, in the end neorealism does not go beyond the
human nature argument of Morgenthau, but only swaps one aspect of
human nature, aggression, for another, fear13.
According to Morgenthau, power is ‘anything that establishes and
maintains the control of man over man’14. His broad definition of power
covers not only the intrinsic power of capabilities (physical violence or the
threat of it), which is all Waltz recognises, but also that of contingent power
(subtle psychological ties and mental control). Morgenthau argues that
‘National character.... morale and the quality of government’15 are more
important components of power, even more so than the intrinsic capabilities.
For Morgenthau national security as well as national interests may be
defined in terms of power. In his historical analysis of the concept of power
he declares there is no correlation between a nation’s foreign policy and
morality. Waltz would agree with Morgenthau’s conclusion here, but would
have grave misgivings with his methodology. Again, Morgenthau utilises a
reductionist angle, focusing more on the actors than the structures. He
appears to be using a historical case rather than scientific discovery, and by
including a state’s moral purpose, which neo-realists disregard, it renders
Morgenthau's methods corrupt.

Neorealism versus Traditional Realism

The core difference between Waltz’s theory and traditional realism is that it
holds a different position on the ‘structure-agency debate’, as for neo-realists
it is not the agent which determines the outcome of the structure, but the
structural prerequisites that determine the behaviour of the agents. In order
to verify his theory, Waltz makes the following central assumptions:

1. International politics is characterised by anarchy;

12
Kenneth Waltz (1959), Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press,
pp. 16-42.
13
For views on how neorealist rely on human nature, see:
Markus Fischer (1992), ‘Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual
Practices,’ International Organisation, Vol. 46, p. 465.
14
Hans J. Morgenthau (Note 9), pp. 195-200.
15
Ibid, p. 211.
4 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

2. States, as rational unitary entities, are the central actors in

international politics;
3. States seek to maximise its security above all else and consider
other factors once security has been assured;
4. States seek to increase its power as long as in doing so it does
not risk its security.

First, Waltz focuses on the systemic level of the structure of the

international system, which he believes is characterised by anarchy. For
neo-realists the international system has always been a realm of high
security pressures, which according to John Mearsheimer is a, ‘brutal arena
where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other...
International relations is not a constant state of war, but is a state of
relentless security’16. Neo-realist’s like traditional realists adopt the worst-
case scenarios for states within an anarchic environment, but differ on ideas
of security and power maximisation. For example, both traditional realists
and neo-realists agree that military power is essential for survival in an
anarchic self-help system. But whereas traditional realists would attempt to
maximise state power to gain leverage over their rivals, neo-realists would
first maximise state security and only pursue power if it did not jeopardise
state security.
Crucially, whether states are conditioned by the mere possibility of
conflict or, react to the probability of aggression, is not such a clear-cut
distinction in the first instance. Although the features of anarchy and the
pursuit of security maximisation only describe how states behave in general
terms, it is unsatisfactory, as for example; it does not explain how
international competition varies when states prioritise military security over
economic capacity. In other words, neorealisms’ systemic focus17 asserts
that anarchy and the possibility of conflict shapes the actions of state
behaviour putting emphasis on material factors while dismissing non-
material factors, such as ideas and institutions. The assumption of
unmitigated anarchy can be viewed as international politics is played out as
a non-cooperative game, but this is not always the case. Although neo-
realists acknowledge cooperation and institutions, they argue it serves the
self-interest of the most powerful states, as cooperation would not exist
solely for the aims of achieving peace.
Second, neo-realists argue the domestic politics within states are
largely irrelevant to international politics. This assumption argues foreign
policy needs to be considered separately from internal politics. States are
the central unitary actor that must maintain its survival and put aside internal
factors such as bureaucratic politics, lobby groups, and public opinion, as the
structure of the international system determines the outcomes for the state.
As Waltz opined:

16
John Mearsheimer (1994-95), ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’
International Security, Vol. 19, p. 10.
17
There is a difference in systemic and structural approaches. The former is viewed as
being interchangeable and analyses international influences but not domestic political
variables, while structural analyses focuses on the role of polarity.
5 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

Due to foreign policy which is driven by internal and external factors, it

does not amount to such an autonomous realm, a truly theoretical
explanation of it should not be strived for, rather a mere analyses
should be considered and it may include a relevant factor to a
18
particular case .

Third, the primacy of state security is above all other goals. Once
security has been established other things of value can be pursued.
Because neo-realists assume all states within the international system
pursue the same goal of security maximisation, they possess the same
characteristics and therefore do not take into account factors such as the
personalities of individual leaders or domestic political institutions that
govern state behaviour.
Finally, this assumption explicitly reveals that in a realist world, states
are always interested in maximising their power and influence over other
states if they can do so. All realists agree that military security is the state’s
prime responsibility and the third and fourth assumptions have solved the
security dilemma that caused inconvenience to early realist theories by
halting the pursuit of power maximisation by taking a more cautious
undertone.

Anarchy is What States Make of it19

Waltz contends the survival of the state is the highest goal of the state20. All
other goals can be pursued once military security has been established.
Waltz’s argument of the notion of survival is neorealism’s underlying
principle in attempting to understand state preferences under anarchic
conditions. Simply identifying the notion of state survival is not a sufficient
explanation, as surviving in anarchy requires both, a military deterrent and a
dynamic production base. Otherwise, will a rational state maximise military
security, even if this would lead to constraints on economic capacity or vice
versa? Waltz resolves the tension between military security and economic
capacity by describing, ‘moves to increase economic capability, to increase
military strength’ as being elements of an internal balancing strategy21. Neo-
realists do not relegate economic capacity, but consider it irrational for a
state to pursue economic capacity if military preparedness is subject to
defeat by its rivals. Mearsheimer further maintains:

States operate in both an international political environment and an

international economic environment, and the former dominates the

18
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 6,
(Autumn 1996), pp. 54-55.
19
The title is borrowed from; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The
Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Spring
1992).
20
Kenneth Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, p. 91.
21
Ibid, p. 118.
6 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

latter in cases where the two come into conflict. The reason is
22
straightforward: the international political system is anarchic .

Neo-realist conceptions of security favour military capabilities over both

short-term and long-term economic capacity23. Waltz argues ‘balance-of-
power politics is risky; trying to ignore it is riskier still’ 24. In effect he is trying
to say that just as firms that ignore market forces will be punished, so will
states within a competitive international arena. By examining this analysis it
is easier to ascertain why neo-realists resist in broadening the concept of
security as suggested by David Baldwin25. It is impossible for the broadening
of the neo-realist concept of security to include economic factors within its
framework, as it would require discarding the central assumptions that
provide the theories coherence. The restrictive neo-realist definition of
security is concluded on by Waltz who argues the economic domain can be
ignored when theorising international behaviour26.
Robert Gilpin argues all Realists share an assumption regarding ‘the
essentially conflictual nature of international affairs’27. Gilpin’s argument is
correct, but underspecified as to what extent is international politics
conflictual? However, this analysis does not fit into the Waltzian neo-realist
framework of worst-case scenario assumptions as Gilpin’s analysis views
actors as being conditioned by the probability of conflict. For example, Waltz
places emphasis on a single endogenous factor affecting the likelihood of
conflict – that is the balance of military capabilities. However, neorealism
does not address the issues as there are other variables besides distribution
of military capabilities that can be a catalyst for conflict. This issue has been
addressed by liberals that argue the probability of conflict depends whether
states are democratic or not,28 and on the institutional connections between
international actors29.
Given neorealism claims it adopts a scientific methodology based on
empirical observations focusing on competition in the international system,
the theory has only advanced very few hypotheses about state behaviour.
The three main hypotheses are: (1) balancing behaviour constantly recurs,
(2) states mimic the advances of their rivals and, (3) states constrained from
engaging in cooperation.

22
John Mearsheimer (1992), Disorder Restored. In Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond
the Cold War to New World Order, edited by Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton, New
York: W. W. Norton, p. 222.
23
Kenneth Waltz (Note 12), p. 206.
24
Ibid, p. 221.
25
David Baldwin (1995), ‘Security Studies and the end of the Cold War,’ World Politics, Vol.
48, pp. 117-41.
26
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), pp. 79-80.
27
Robert Gilpin (1984), ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,’ International
Organisation, Vol. 38, p. 290.
28
Bruce Russett (1993), Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
29
Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin (1995), ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,’
International Organisation, Vol. 20, pp. 39-51.
7 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

Case Studies
Neorealism’s hypothesis that balancing behaviour constantly recurs is an
argument that claims international incentives compel states to balance each
other out30. This would mean in the current environment the economic
powerhouses of Germany and Japan are likely to rise to great power status
in order to balance the US as claimed by neo-realists. In other words
according to neorealism, Germany and Japan will adopt the worst-case
scenario and both countries will strengthen their militaries. However, a
credible military deterrent would be costly to Germany and Japan. As Gilpin
suggests it would make more sense for these countries to pursue economic
capacity while avoiding large-scale military expenditure. Germany has
reduced its defence expenditures since the year 199031 as well as Japan
who have made defence spending cuts in late November 199532. Realist
writers claim they are amending and revising the Waltzian neo-realist
approach, rather than critiquing it33. However, neo-realists need to look
beyond the worst-case scenario assumption and consider that the probability
of conflict varies systematically according to factors other than the
distribution of capabilities.
The second hypothesis argues the possibility of conflict will be
conducted by force where rational states mimic each other. Neorealism
claims the mimic by states is likely to cause significant nuclear proliferation
in the post-Cold War era34. The most prominent case in point is
Mearsheimer’s 1993 argument in which he claims the Ukraine would retain
its inherited nuclear weapons following the break-up of the Soviet Union35.
Mearsheimer unequivocally forwarded his claim based on two reasons: first,
Ukraine had nuclear weapons; and second, Ukraine faced a substantial
security threat from Russia a country which it has had a history of tense
relations.
For Ukraine to maintain its nuclear weapons would have been very
costly and Steven Miller rebuts Mearsheimer by stating, ‘despite the myth
that nuclear weapons are cheap, they are in fact quite expensive for most
states’36. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians came to find out that nuclear
weapons were a costly deterrent that was far too expensive to maintain. In
the end, Ukraine decided to take up the offer of financial aid from the US
(pledged $900 million) and the financial incentives from Russia to forgo

30
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), pp. 118-21, 128.
31
Spiri (1995), Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 390.
32
New York Times, (29 November 1995), A9.
33
For example see:
Charles Glaser (1994-95), ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,’ International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 50-90.
Stephen Walt (1987), The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
34
John Mearsheimer (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,’
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.
35
Ibid, pp. 58, 66.
36
Steven Miller (1993), ‘The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,’ Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 77.
8 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

proliferation that included writing off a multibillion-dollar oil and gas debt37.
Although security tensions would dictate that Ukraine maintain a nuclear
deterrent, Ukraine opted to advance its economic capacity where in 1996 it
ceased to be a nuclear power. This case represented an anomaly to the
neo-realist perspective.
Cooperation, according to neo-realists is something states are
reluctant to engage in as Waltz argues, ‘States do not willingly place
themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system,
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest’38.
This does not mean Waltz does not believe cooperation as impossible, but
something that is greatly constrained. On the other hand, neo-realists
suggest developing countries are less likely to cooperate, as security issues
will be more salient in those regions39. Yet, recent cooperative efforts taking
place in the developing world such as ASEAN, CACM (Central American
Common Market) are examples of cooperation despite the security issues
existing within these organisations, which significantly contradicts the neo-
realist assumptions.
The brief empirical review has demonstrated how two branches of
neorealism, the Waltzian school and that supported by Gilpin have come into
direct debate against each other. Although these cases do not support
neorealism per se, they emphasise that empirical irregularities suggest the
theory’s central assumptions may not reflect the real world as neorealists
have claimed.

Conclusion
The analysis of this paper has revealed the wide-ranging neo-realist
criticisms of traditional realism. In particular, Waltz’s criticism of
Morgenthau’s ideas regarding human nature seems on the surface to tear
apart one of traditional realisms central tenets, but Waltz actually only
disregards the egoist and selfish aspects of human nature and replaces it
with fear, as he assumes conflict is based on possibility.
Neo-realists view the international system as a relentless competition
for military security and only investigate the structure of the system, which
they conclude as being anarchical. Neorealism itself reveals inherent latent
disputes within the theory regarding a series of assumptions concerning
state behaviour. Waltz’s idea of anarchy is not only a criticism, but also an
evolution from the traditional realist position. However, Gilpin who asserts
state behaviour is based on probability of conflict challenges Waltz’s
assumption of state behaviour. If conflict in the anarchic system is based on
worst-case/possibilistic assumption, then the parameters of this assumption
may simply be inflexible and restrictive. Although neorealism’s views on
state behaviour may not be completely wrong, the impression given is that
the theory does not have a unified set of assumptions concerning state
behaviour.

37
Mitchell Reiss (1995), Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Capabilities, Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 117, 129.
38
Kenneth Waltz (Note 18), p. 107.
39
Robert Powell (1991), ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,’
American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 303-320.
9 Neorealism’s Advancement on Traditional Realism

Finally, neorealism’s exclusion of other variables within the

international system leads to its proponents to see little progress in
International Relations. For example, can states really be autonomous from
the international economy or from domestic politics? As a claimed scientific
study of international politics, realism does not stand up to the empirical
regularities of its assumptions. To construct scientific progress means to
build progressively on the inherited ideas, in this case neo-realist
assumptions, and discard the components that have clearly failed under
scrutiny or when superior alternatives have been found. It would be fruitful
for the neo-realist research agenda to broaden its minimalist concepts of
structural anarchy and security and incorporate into it economic concerns.
Besides its weaknesses, realism, Buzan rightly points out, remains to be an
interesting challenge and the dominant theory within International Relations
despite its narrow focus on power politics.