foreknowledge Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts

Issue Six www.foreknowledge.info

December 2012 ISSN 2225-5613

Intelligence planning:
finding your way
through a sea of
puzzle pieces

Intelligence analyst
recruitment woes

Intelligence A cool tool for your

analysis Xmas stocking
research
Necesidades informativas
2013 intelligence en la planeficación:
conferences KIT’s and PIR’s
Contents
From the editor
Intelligence planning: finding your way
through a sea of puzzles
Know your client
Getting started checklist
Customer checklist
Concept maps
Problem restatement and redefinition
Necesidades informativas en la planeficación: KIT’s and PIR’s
Terms of reference
Role of analysis in criminal investigations:
the preliminary information assessment
A cool tool for your Xmas stocking!
Teaching intelligence analysts critical
thinking skills with learning agents
Meet Irene Bashabe from Uganda
Intelligence analyst recruitment woes
Psychology of intelligence analysis # 6
Recent published research in intelligence
analysis
News
Upcoming events
What does 2013 hold for Foreknowledge?
Advertise in Foreknowledge
Endorsing organisations:
Association of Law Association of Crime
Enforcement
Intelligence Units
International Association
of Law Enforcement
Intelligence Analysts Intelligence Officers
2 December 2012 • Foreknowledge
3
Editor:
Dalene Duvenage
Publisher:
4
4Knowledge Analysis Solutions
PO Box 40467
Moreleta Park
Pretoria
0044
South Africa
Contributions and advertising enquiries:
editor@foreknowledge.info
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 from the editor

Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa

A wonderful and blessed Festive Season to all our readers! I hope that 2013 will be a prosperous and
healthy year for you and your family and that you will achieve many good and worthy things. In our last
edition of this year, we share some tools and best practice on how to frame our understanding of an intel-
ligence problem as part of the planning or direction phase of the intelligence process. We also have con-
tributions on the recruitment of intelligence analysts, some IT tools, recent research in intelligence analysis and a
section on news and upcoming events.
We have published 6 editions of Foreknowledge this year and are grateful for the many well wishes and positive
feedback we receive. We would like to continue providing you with an excellent magazine and other resources that
serve the needs of intelligence professionals worldwide. We have many more ideas to make this project the go-to
for practitioners and scholars alike. Although we would have liked to keep distributing the e-magazine for free,
this business model is just not sustainable anymore. We are investigating various possibilities of future funding in-
cluding subscriptions, donations and crowd funding. If you like what we are doing for the intelligence profes-
sion, and have an opinion about funding, please fill in this anonymous, 3 minute survey before 31 January
2013. You can access the survey at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/foreknowledge. You are also welcome
to email me to make suggestions on how we can take Foreknowledge to new heights.
Dalene
Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:
Richards Heuer is a Mario Eybers is a Don McDowell (SCCA) Juan Pablo Somiedo is
veteran intelligence mortgage fraud received awards for his from Madrid, Spain
scholar and analyst. analyst at First Na- book Strategic Intelli- where he is a strategic
tional Bank, Johan- gence: a handbook for and competitive
He has written nu-
practitioners, managers intelligence specialist.
merous books and nesburg, South Africa.
and users, teaches intel- He runs a Spanish blog,
resides in Monterey, He has extensive ex-
ligence analysis through- on intelligence related issues, Intel Times
California, USA. He gave us permission perience as a crime intelligence analyst out the world, has a private intelligence
both in the private and public sector. here.
to summarise his book, Psychology of distance learning college and is a found-
Intelligence Analysis. ing member and fellow of AIPIO. He is
from Pambula, NSW, Australia.

December 2012 • Foreknowledge 3

 planning
Many intelligence professionals
will agree that we do not spend
enough time on the starting phase
of our intelligence task. The
reasons for this are manifold:
time pressures, an impatient
client, intellectual laziness or
arrogance or too many conflicting
priorities and pressures on our
limited resources etc.
The essentials of the first phase of
the intelligence “cycle” or
process, whether we call it
“direction”, “planning” or
“tasking”, remain the same:
determining who the client/s are
and their expectations,
understanding the intelligence
problem, knowing what we know
and don’t know, and frame all
these in time, cost and output
terms.
One step in the planning phase is
to understand the nature and
extent of the intelligence problem.
The puzzle metaphor1 is useful to
reflect on what intelligence
analysts experience every day.
I’ve tweaked and use it
extensively in training and
consulting to illustrate the
cognitive and organisational
4 December 2012 • Foreknowledge
processes involved in identifying
and solving an intelligence
problem.
A simple problem: finding
the missing puzzle piece
You’re working on an intelligence
problem of when and how many
calls your suspects made to each
other prior and after the crime.
It’s like building a puzzle, either a
small and easy or a large and
difficult one.
You’re working with knowables:
planning and collecting
information that have discernible
clues - you only need to know
where to find the missing pieces
and then fit them into each other
until the image is complete. Even
if you don’t cheat with a sampler
Intelligence
Planning:
Finding
Your Way
through a
Sea of
Puzzle
Pieces
Dalene Duvenage
Foreknowledge Editor
Pretoria, South Africa
of the final picture, you can still
get most the pieces and get a
pretty good idea of what
happened and what the image
might mean.
When planning with “puzzle”
intelligence problems, one should
be cautious not to fall in the
“more information is better” trap.
Due to time constraints, the
intelligence analyst should set a
strict timeframe to make a
judgement call, even if all the
puzzle pieces are not yet collected
and fitted.
Mysteries: a sea of puzzle
pieces
You’ve been tasked to analyse the
impact of youth unemployment
on a fragile country’s political,
military, economic and social
stability in the next 20 years.
It’s like rowing in a sea of millions
of puzzle pieces in different sizes,
colours and shapes, much like the
large ocean plastic pollution
patches. You have no idea where
land is, how far the puzzles pieces
stretch, what lies beneath the

obvious or whether anyone else is
also in the same boat as you.
Even worse, some of the “debris”
are not puzzle pieces at all, but
some other form that you have
never seen before.
The easy way out is to say that
this is too difficult and capitulate
by not planning at all, hoping that
your client forgets this instruction
or that other more urgent or
operational needs overtake its
importance. Another way of
dealing with this type of problem
is to become fascinated with the
waves of data, often playing
around with fantastic big data
software tools. You can become
overwhelmed with the
information overload, and never
move beyond your paralysis to
proper analysis. Mysteries have
no easy answers - if at all. There
are just too many unknowable
variables and contingent
“unintended consequences”.
Sometimes what is missing is not
even in the form of a puzzle piece
but something totally different!
The intelligence analyst needs to
sense and project into the future
to frame the possibilities and
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
planning
Planning for puzzle mysteries is complex -
it requires a balance between structured planning,
intuitive prodding to sense patterns and
collaboration across boundaries
uncertainties. Our work is to try collaboration between experts
and identify those critical and other role players and stake
variables, explain the dynamic holders. We need to tap other
interactions and define future people’s lenses and approaches to
possibilities. work through the visible pieces,
In planning for mysteries, we and looking for those that are
have to remember that we are beneath the surface.
working with ambiguity and In the following few pages, we
uncertainty. Collecting more offer a few tools and approaches
information is not going to solve that might assist you in planning
this problem but confound it! more effectively. •
Planning for puzzle mysteries is
complex. It requires a balance 1 Gregory Treverton coined the puzzle and
between structured planning mystery metaphors in 2001 in Rethinking
and intuitive prodding to sense Ntaional Intelligence for an Age of Information in
our bookstore here. Other articles on the topic
patterns. It also requires are here and here.
5
 planning
Engaging your client in
the intelligence
process makes sense.
Know your
client
Be aware of his context
What are the political and business
1 pressures he has to manage
everyday? Which stakeholders and
role players demand his energy and
attention? Who are waiting in the
Getting started checklist
wings in case he fails to deliver on
his mandate?
What keeps your client
awake at night?
What are those issues and priorities
2 that worry him? Make that your
focus! Speak to those fears and
put it into forewarning context.
Everyone wants to look
good
This does not mean that you should
pamper your client and keep bad
3 news away from him. Provide
explanations and options or
solutions. He would like to present
these to his client and look good.
Know his preferences
Provide your products in the
packaging and format that he
4 prefers. Regard every client
differently and market your products
accordingly. Yes, some of them
hate reading!
Educate your client
Your client needs to know what the
limitations of intelligence is and
5 what to expect. Don’t under or
overestimate his understanding of
the problem.
6 December 2012 • Foreknowledge
Planning is an ongoing
process because we
adapt our frames as
we learn and
understand new
information.
Intelligence products
are snapshots of our
understanding of the
problem at a specific
time. It is never the
whole truth.
Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson
From Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011)
Available here
● What has prompted the need for the analysis? For example: was
it a news report, new intelligence report, or a customer re-
●
●
quest?
What is the key intelligence question that needs to be an-
swered?
Why is this issue important and how can analysis make a differ-
ence?
● Has your organization ever answered this question or a similar
question before, and what was said? To whom was this analysis
delivered, and what has changed since that time?
● Who is the principal customer? Are this customer’s needs well
●
understood? If not, try to gain a better understanding of the
customer’s needs and the style of reporting the customer likes.
Are there other stakeholders who would have an interest in the
answer to this question? Who might see the issue from a differ-
ent perspective and prefer that a different question be an-
swered? Consider meeting with others who see the question
from a different perspective.
● Based on first impressions, what are all the possible answers to
this question? For example, what alternative explanations or
●
outcomes should be considered before making an analytic judg-
ment on the issue?
Based on responses to the previous questions, consider re-
wording the key intelligence question. Consider adding subordi-
nate or supplemental questions.
● Generate a list of potential sources or streams of reporting to
be explored
● Reach out and tap the experience and expertise of analysts in
other offices or organizations – both within and outside the
government – who are knowledgeable on this topic. For exam-
ple, call a meeting or conduct a virtual meeting to brainstorm
relevant evidence and to develop a list of alternative hypothe-
ses, driving forces, key indicators, or important players.
 planning

CUSTOMER CHECKLIST Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson

From Structured Analytical Techniques for
Intelligence Analysis (2011)
This checklist helps an analyst tailor the analytic product to the needs of the principal
customer. When used appropriately, it ensures that the product is of maximum possible Available here

value to this customer.

● Who is the key person for whom the paper is being written?
● Will this paper answer the question the customer asked or the
question the customer should be asking? If necessary, clarify
this before proceeding.
● What is the most important message to give this customer?
● How is the customer expected to use this information?
● How much time does the customer have to read this product?
How long should the paper be?
● Is it possible to capture the essence of this paper in a few key
graphics?
● What format would convey the information most effectively?
● What classification is most appropriate for this paper? Is it
necessary to consider publishing the paper at more than one
classification level?
● What is the customer’s level of tolerance for technical
language? How much detail would the customer expect? Can
the details be provided in appendices or backup papers?
● Has any structured analytic technique been used? If so, how
has it been flagged in the paper? In a footnote? In an
appendix?
● Would the customer expect the analyst to reach out to other
experts within or outside the Intelligence Community to tap
their expertise in drafting this paper? If this has been done,
how has their contribution been flagged in the paper? In a
footnote? In an appendix?
● To whom or to what source might the customer turn for alter-
native views on this topic? What data or analysis might others
provide that could influence how the customer reacts to what
is being prepared in this paper?

New! CONCEPT MAPS

Concept map of the question: “What is the nature and threat of the use of YouTube by jihad-
ists? and assess counter measures.” Mercyhurst University project here, here and here

Katherine Hibbs Pherson | Randolph H. Pherson

This user-friendly handbook outlines 20 key

questions that all analysts must ask themselves
as they prepare to conduct research, generate
hypotheses, evaluate information, draft papers,
and present analysis.

More info at:

www.pherson.org

Available now on:

Conceptual modelling, mindmaps, brainstorming, starbursting etc are all related

and share one goal: to externalise our thinking on all aspects, issues, factors that
relate to the intelligence problem. Once the concept map is drawn, it is easier to
BUY NOW! identify assumptions, connecting issues ,information gaps and to prioritise.

December 2012 • Foreknowledge 7

 planning

Problem restatement & redefinition

I don’t know what
intelligence I want,
but I’ll know when
I see it!
HENRY KISSINGER
All of us h a v e e x p e rie n c e o f
a c lie n t w h o h e a rd
s omet hing , s o m e w h e re a n d
is not s u re e x a c t ly w h a t
int elligen c e h e w a n t s . A
v ague req u ire m e n t is g iv e n ,
and t y pic a lly , y o u d o n o t
hav e ac c e s s t o c la rif y t h e
int ellig e n c e n e e d .
Problem re s t a t e m e n t is a
us ef ul t o o l t o f o c u s t h e
int elligen c e o p e ra t io n a n d
narrow do w n a ll is s u e s t o
t he c rux o f t h e m a t t e r -
what t he c lie n t n e e d t o
know now.
From Richards Heuer and Randolph
Pherson Structured Analytical Tech-
niques for Intelligence Analysis (2011)
and Morgan D Jones The Thinker’s
Toolkit (1998)
Available here and here
Initial question
Paraphrase without losing the origi-
nal meaning. It might provide a
better foundation for research and Is Iran buying ballistic missiles from China?
analysis to get the best answers to
the question.
Ask “Why”? Or “How?” Until the
real issue has surfaced.
Broaden the focus: what other is-
sues might be at play here? To
what is this connected?
Narrow the focus: break down the
issue further into component parts.
Redirect the focus: Shouldn’t we
rather focus on something else ?
Turn 180 degrees: Turn the issue
on its head and ask the opposite.
Is China selling ballistic missiles to Iran?
Why would China sell ballistic missiles to Iran? Because
China seeks influence with Iran.
Why does China want influence with Iran? Because Chi-
na wants to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf re-
gion.
Why does China want to reduce US influence in the
Persian Gulf region? Because China wants to reduce the
US influence throughout the world?
Final Question: Is China’s sale of military equipment to the
Middle East as part of a worldwide strategy to reduce US
influence?
Is there a partnership between China and Iran?
What kinds of ballistic missiles are being sold by China to
Iran?
Why would Iran want Chinese missiles? How is Iran going
to pay for any purchased missiles?
Is China buying ballistic missiles from Iran?

Misconception: The key part of the intelligence process is the analysis of a specific set of data.
Reality: The process of “constructing a frame” is more important.
VAST2011 STUDY

Assess nee ds of th e
In te llig ence Commun ity

Id entify p rob le m are as

Steps in the problem Select ten ta tive top ics

definition phase De lin eate scop e-state:

Te rms of referen ce,
o peration al d efinitions,
a ssump tio ns, coord in ation

Defining the problem is the 1st phase in the req uired , etc.

Ye s

planning process. Throughout the conduct of

Can th e

the overall project, the original problem may No

prop osed effo rt
be completed in
the ti me
a vailable ?

be further refined and delineated. Problem

definition involves 2 major functions: defining Ye s

the problem and determining the feasibility No

Is th ere
sufficient
manpower
a vailable ?

of the proposed approach for attackint the

Ye s

problem.
Are there
sufficient
No resourc es
a vailable ?

Jerome Clauser : An Introduction to Intelligence Research

Ye s

and Analysis (2008)

Is the p ropo sed
Are sufficien t
e ffort within the Sch ed ule
funds Yes Y es
No capabi lit ies o f su bseq uen t eve nts
a vailable ?
the research er?

BUY NOW!
Download PDF here

8 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

 planning

Necesidades Informativas en la Planificación:

KIT’s and PIR’s
Juan Pablo Somiedo

La fase de dirección y pla- La definición de las necesidades de dades prioritarias de información o

neamiento es la más im-
portante del ciclo de
inteligencia, pues configu-
ra todas las demás fases. Las áreas
estratégicas se fijan de modo con-
junto por los responsables del servi-
cio de inteligencia y de los órganos
políticos. Se asesora así a los deci-
sores políticos a la hora de establec-
er las áreas estratégicas
ayudándoles en las lagunas y las
incertidumbres que puedan tener.
El secretario de defensa de los Es-
tados Unidos durante la adminis-
tración de George W. Bush,
Donald Rumsfeld, reflejó bien esta
incertidumbre cuando dijo en una
entrevista: “We don´t know what
we don´t know”. Por eso la inter-
acción entre el usuario y el direc-
tor de inteligencia es sumamente
importante pero igualmente difícil
por razones de tiempo, distancia,
dificultades burocráticas y dispari-
dad de rango y funciones.
información es la parte más impor-
tante del proceso y, a menudo, no
es tan simple como pudiera parec-
er. Las KIT,s o necesidades críticas
de información suelen formularse
en forma de pregunta y podrán
variar conforme el decidor va perfi-
lando su plan. A partir de estas
necesidades críticas, el personal de
inteligencia desarrolla las necesi-
PIR,s. Una vez seleccionadas las
PIR,s se procede a asignar personal
y recursos a cada una y a establecer
un calendario y un orden de priori-
dad con los plazos de entrega.
Se elabora el ICP o Intelligence Col-
lection Plan, que es un plan para
recopilar información de todas las
fuentes disponibles para dar re-
spuesta a las necesidades mediante
la transformación de dichas necesi-
dades en peticiones a los órganos y
medios de obtención de informa-
ción adecuados.
Finalmente, el documento que con-
tiene todos los aspectos menciona-
dos relativos al planeamiento de
inteligencia es el Plan de Inteligen-
cia o PLINT. En él vienen referidos
la evaluación de la situación, la lis-
ta de las PIR,s, su delimitación es-
pacial o temática y la estructura y
arquitectura de inteligencia.
Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain.
He is strategic and competitive intelligence
specialist. He runs a Spanish blog, Intel Times here

When embarking on a comprehensive intelligence operation, it

Terms of Reference is always useful to compile a Terms of Reference (ToR). It de-
fines the boundaries of the scope. Include the following:

● State the problem and aim

● State the assumptions/background relating to the subject matter
● State the hypotheses
● Formulate operational definitions where necessary
● Propose a title
● Describe briefly the methodology to be used in collection and analysis
● Describe sources of information
● Indicate time frames
● Indicate resource allocation
● Indicate stake holders and clients of the study
Mercyhurst University Wiki projects ToR samples here

December 2012 • Foreknowledge 9

 need2share

The role of
analysis in
criminal
investigations
Part 3: the Preliminary
Information Assessment
Mario Eybers

The table below provides more

I n the previous two articles’ we
focused on the role of analysis
in criminal investigations. We
looked at some characteristics of
criminal investigations and
projects that are not truly intelli-
gence driven and also discussed
those factors that contribute to a
successful intelligence or analyti-
cal driven investigation. There
was also some discussion around
score card measuring to evaluate
the effectiveness of the informa-
tion analysis approach during an
investigation.
In this article we will be focusing
on Preliminary Information As-
sessments and the importance of
conducting an initial assessment
of information before project kick-
off.
Prior to any formal investigation
or project meetings, the analyst
should be given the opportunity
to assess all available information.
Potential participants in the inves-
tigation should also be afforded
the opportunity to supply availa-
ble information to the analyst.
Such an assessment would:
• afford everybody an opportuni-
ty to review available informa-
tion;
• serve as a departure point for
discussion and investigation
planning; and
• assist in structuring subsequent
intelligence and investigation
activities.
This initial assessment should fo-
cus on one or more of the follow-
ing items: 1) Available
information, 2) overview of the
threat, 3) any information gaps
that might exist, 4) criminal cases
registered 5) applicable legislation
that can be considered by the in-
vestigative team and 6) available
resources.
Focus Areas for the Information Assessment
Available information
● A description of available infor-
mation
● Sources and suppliers of informa-
tion
● Types of information such as inci-
dent type information, confes-
sions, as well as the format in
which this information was sup-
plied
● Information that is available but
not yet collected for assessment
detail that can be considered for
each of these focus areas.
The initial assessment of informa-
tion needs to be documented,
preferably in the form of a presen-
tation by the analyst utilising sup-
porting material such as the
criminal value chains and scenari-
os.
Note that this initial assessment of
information generally does not
include any form of analysis and
provides only for a general over-
view of the status quo. Specific an-
alytical products for the project or
investigation will be developed
once the analytical and investiga-
tion plans are approved by the in-
vestigating officer or project team.
Overview of the threat Information gaps
● Extent of the problem or threat ● List of information gaps
at hand identified
● Probable risk and exposure to the ● Potential sources of
public and private sector information
● Reported and perceived modus
operandi
● Geographical location of threat
● List of potential targets and
groups where applicable

Criminal cases Legislation Resources

• assist with the scope and de-
marcation of the problem;
• identify potential information
gaps;
● Overview of criminal cases al-
ready opened
● Investigation and prosecution
status of the criminal cases
● Potential targets identified
● Lists of individuals arrested
● Applicable legislation available to
prosecution
● Criminal charges which may be
considered at a later stage
● Potential jurisdictional issues.
● List of units or investigating of-
ficers currently dealing with
the threat
● List of prosecutors currently
prosecuting on the threat
● List of private sector organisa-
tions and individuals

10 December 2012 • Foreknowledge


A cool tool for
your Xmas
stocking!
Visual Understanding Environment
RJG
I was staring out of my office
window yesterday in wonder
of the slopes of Table Mountain,
silently contemplating another
hot and sunny not-so-white
Christmas… Dean Martin melodi-
ously blaring ”Rudolph the Red
Nosed Reindeer” out of my
iPod…..wondering what old San-
ta has in store for my old stocking
this year. My daydreaming was
rudely interrupted by some of the
analyst staff debating…or shall I
say partaking in heated analytical
discourse regarding the benefits
of tools for mapping out one’s
thoughts or externalizing com-
plex questions. The discussion
reminded me of an eggnog pro-
cession deliberating the benefits
of free range organic eggs togeth-
er with bourbon, cognac or bran-
dy.
In the spirit of the approaching
festive season, the editor, fully
aware of my propensity for day-
dreaming to the tunes of Messrs
Davis Jnr, Martin and Sinatra
(“The Lady is a Tramp” humming
in the background), sent me a
URL to an interesting
website….check it out here! Visu-
al Understanding Environment or
VUE for short. It is available for
Windows, Linux and Mac operat-
ing systems……and…in the spirit
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
of the festive season…decidedly
open source! At first I was expect-
ing a piece of software similar to
most mind or concept mapping
software. As luck would have it,
I was pleasantly surprised – no
garden gnomes or trolls here! It
was pure witchcraft and a good
sprinkle of good old black mag-
ic!!
Apart from obvious mapping
functionality the following addi-
tional tools are available within
the software:
● VUE allows for the con-
struction of interactive pres-
entations with the ability to
zoom any node to full
screen mode
● Dynamic Content Mapping
which facilitates adding
content to maps that aid
discovery and understand-
ing via annotation of infor-
mation
IT tools
● RSS feeds may be imported
and visualized
● CVS files can be imported
and joined allowing for
semi-automatic linking and
clustering of data
● Seasr content analysis with-
in VUE
● Search functionality allows
for querying nodes and
links and results can be
highlighted, hidden or fil-
tered.
● VUE allows dynamic addi-
tion and searching of reposi-
tories such as Fedora, Flickr,
JStor, Museum of Fine Arts
Boston, PubMed (NCBI),
Sakai, and Wikipedia to
name a few
So…When You're smiling….VUE
in addition is OKI (Open Knowl-
edge Initiative) compliant allow-
ing for the above mentioned
searching of digital repositories. It
also utilizes the open Calais web
service for entity extraction of in-
formation in nodes….now Ain’t
That A Kick In The Head!
Well what do you know…before
the moon hits your eye like a big
pizza pie it’ll be 2013. Peace and
joy to you all over the festive sea-
son. Volare! •
11
 IT tools
Teaching Intelligence Analysts Critical Thinking Skills
with learning agents
E l método LTA es un método
creado a propósito para el
análisis de inteligencia. Recoge y
sintetiza aportaciones de la in-
teligencia artificial, del jurista
John Wigmore, el filosofo de la
ciencia Stephen Toulmin y el pro-
fesor David Schum. Se aproxima
a la resolución de problemas me-
diante la doble díada Problema-
Reducción/ Solución-Síntesis, que
es un aterrizaje de las representa-
ciones de Inteligencia Artificial.
Hasta ahora reemplazar la experi-
encia analítica acumulada por los
analistas senior una vez que éstos
dejaban su puesto o se retiraban
era dificultoso, largo y muy cos-
toso. El método LTA intenta ser
una ayuda para que los analistas
Junior se adapten más deprisa. El
método se utilizó con éxito en la
Escuela Superior de Guerra de los
EE.UU y en varios experimentos
con analistas.
12
Juan Pablo Somiedo
El mismo nombre del método
(Disciple se traduce por Discípu-
lo) sugiere que el analista junior
aprende sobre análisis a través de
su interacción con la experiencia
de otro analista. Y esto es, en efec-
to, lo que hace LTA. Trata de pon-
er a disposición del analista junior
la experiencia directa de los
analistas expertos. Disciple-LTA
es la base de un agente de soft-
ware innovador para la enseñan-
za de los analistas de inteligencia.
Este agente, llamado TIACRITIS
(Teaching Intelligence Analysts
Critical Thinking Skills) contiene
estudios de casos y una enorme
cantidad de conocimiento sobre
evidencias, argumentos y sus
propiedades. Es un agente que
ayuda a los analistas junior a ad-
quirir los conocimientos, dest-
rezas y habilidades propias de su
profesión. Los analistas practican
y aprenden a vincular las eviden-
cias con las hipótesis a través del
razonamiento abductivo, deduc-
tivo e inductivo y a establecer las
credenciales básicas de la eviden-
cia como son credibilidad y rele-
vancia.
El uso de TIACRITIS en los cursos
de análisis de inteligencia se hace
con el apoyo de un libro de texto
que incluye una amplia gama de
ejemplos de la utilización del soft-
ware y ejercicios prácticos de
análisis. En la actualidad el profe-
sor Mihai Boicu de la George Ma-
son University es considerado
una autoridad en este método e
imparte clases de Disciple LTA
dentro del Curso de "Aplicaciones
Militares de Inteligencia Artifi-
cial". También lo es el profesor
David Schum, que de igual forma
imparte clases en la misma uni-
versidad y es un experto en lógica
y probabilidad aplicadas al análi-
sis en inteligencia. •
George Mason University developed the
TIACRITIS web agent and textbook for
teaching intelligence analysts the critical
thinking skills needed to perform evi-
dence-based reasoning. They are based
on a computational theory which views
Intelligence Analysis as ceaseless dis-
covery of evidence, hypotheses, and ar-
guments, in a complex world that is
changing all the time. TIACRITIS helps
students learn about the properties, us-
es, and marshalling of evidence upon
which all analyses rest, through regular
practice involving analyses of evidence in
both hypothetical and real situations.
Read more here, here and here
December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Meet Irene Bashabe
Manager: Intelligence, Tax Investigations Department, Uganda Revenue Authority
What is the role and function of
intelligence analysts in the Ugan-
da Revenue Authority (URA)?
The Intelligence division aims at
proactively deterring tax crime
whilst supporting the internal as
well as external stakeholders, fo-
cusing on an intelligence led Tax
compliance approach.
The role and function of the intel-
ligence analyst in URA is;
● Develop an understanding of
a problem or threat at hand;
● Select appropriate analytic
techniques such as link analy-
sis, flow analysis, financial
record analysis, telephone toll
analysis among others;
● Analyse (process; correlate,
select, evaluate and restruc-
ture) information gathered
from multiple sources, includ-
ing tax criminal related infor-
mation;
Ivory confiscated by URA in June 2012
● Derive insights and provide
estimates;
● Identify intelligence gaps &
threats;
● Maintain analysis systems
necessary to review, store, col-
late, retrieve and disseminate
revenue intelligence;
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
people
● Prepare reports detailing intel- ● Holding stakeholder
ligence findings and dissemi- engagements/partnerships
nate to clients appropriately. with organisations, bodies
Who are your clients and what and persons related to intelli-
type of products do you provide gence.
to them?
Our intelligence products are dis-
seminated to either the customers
who initiated the intelligence re-
quirement or any other stakehold-
er for whom intelligence has been
proactively generated. The clients
are both Internal (within the or-
ganisation) and external (Outside Cigarette smuggling is the URA’s main tax
the organization) including Ugan- evasion problem.
da Revenue Authority Manage- What are the greatest challenges
ment and staff, other government you face as an intelligence analyst
agencies as well as other tax and and how do you overcome them?
revenue agencies. We face several challenges as law
Our products are: enforcement Intelligence analysts
● Target Profiles; and among these are;
● Strategic Briefs; ● Putting into place a proactive
● Current Intelligence; based intelligence collection
and analysis functionality;
● Management Executive Com-
mittee Briefs; ● Integrity of the information
collected from both internal
● Commissioner’s Briefs;
and external sources;
● Manager’s briefs
● The application of intelligence
● Threat Analysis; analysis techniques in the
● Problem Profiles course of our work
What is your specialist area and ● Effectively managing required
what do you do to stay informed Intelligence tasks given limit-
and abreast of new develop- ed human resources at hand.
ments? What can intelligence analysts do
● Collection and analysis of tax to promote our profession?
related information with a ● Development of an Intelli-
criminal bias gence Analyst Curriculum
● Training and subscribing to which we have commenced.
professional bodies in the in- ● Keeping abreast of the best
telligence field. practices and developments
in the intelligence field. •
13
 opinion
Intelligence analyst
recruitment woes
Don McDowell
Managers should take ownership of
the recruitment process
T here was a time when, as the
senior manager of a large in-
telligence unit, I really looked for-
ward to the recruitment exercises
we ran regularly, both for analysts
and intelligence officers/collectors.
I say this in the past tense simply
because I don’t have much enthu-
siasm or even optimism for intelli-
gence staff recruitment activity
these days.
Now, I am not a senior manager
any more; I have become a global
consultant who advises agencies
on several continents on every-
thing and anything to do with in-
telligence and risk analysis
practice. And to watch them –
sometimes – bumble around with
a lack of clarity and purpose de-
Shutterstock
14
spite the plethora of new-age re-
cruitment guidelines, is a sight not
to enjoy.
Recruitment is a serious business
with laudable goals. We can usu-
ally agree on why we need new
people: for replacement or further
development of our resource pool
of analysts and collectors. But it
has become increasingly more dif-
ficult to engage managers and su-
pervisors globally in meaningful
dialogue about exactly what
they’re looking for.
Much is written in intelligence lit-
erature on the criteria, traits and
qualities, education and knowl-
edge, that might or should be ap-
plicable. No shortage there.
However, getting those in power-
ful positions to be able to articu-
late the nexus between one or
more such criteria and how they
impact on expected job perform-
ance, is far more difficult.
The exercise should in fact be easy
and, in essence, it is: use the same
suite of approaches applied in any
“needs survey” activity.
Shutterstock
Don McDowell has nearly 50 years
experience in military, national
security and law enforcement
intelligence. He is the author of the
award-winning Strategic Intelligence:
a handbook for practitioners,
managers and users, a Fellow of
AIPIO, former Presdient of AIPIO
and former International Director
of IAFIE. He runs a private intelli-
gence distance learning college and
training consultancy from Pambula,
NSW, Australia.
See more here and here
Identify what you expect of your
analysts – not in vague, generic,
comfort-zone terms, but in finite
detail – based on an expert under-
standing of precisely what it is
that analysts and collectors actual-
ly do.
Then, and only then, determine
what qualities the new recruit
needs to bring to the job or, con-
versely, what skills and tech-
niques could actually be taught to
them once in the job.
The added cost of this latter ap-
proach is twofold: firstly, develop
selection criteria that imply an
December 2012 • Foreknowledge

ability to learn new competencies;
secondly, accept your organisa-
tion’s responsibility to provide the
learning environment and oppor-
tunities for the new recruits.
Where we seem to start to go
wrong or, at least “under-achieve”
in the recruitment activity cycle, is
to increasingly rely on Human Re-
source specialists within or outside
of the organisation to cull appli-
cants, pre-select those for further
consideration, and even conduct
the short-list interview.
Having spent much of my life be-
coming and then applying skills in
interviewing and interrogation
techniques, one lesson remains
dominant in my recollection. The
interviewer (whoever it is) cannot
rely solely on skills as an inter-
viewer … these must, without any
doubt, be back up by solid knowl-
edge of the field for which one is
interviewing. Frankly, I have only
occasionally met HR specialists
Shutterstock
A post graduate degree does not
equate intelligence analysis
proficiency.
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
Very few HR recruitment personnel
really understand the requirements of
intelligence analysis
who know much, if anything,
about the life and routines that
face analysts and collectors.
It is increasingly commonplace in
a difficult world economic envi-
ronment for jobs in intelligence
and risk analysis to attract hun-
dreds or even thousands of appli-
cants.
This phenomenon is in part fed by
the plethora of developing aca-
demic courses and technical pro-
grams available for career path
development in several continents,
though not all. Good though this
may be, it does regularly provide
an increasing pool of people
“trained” (though not necessarily
tested or experienced) in intelli-
gence-related functions, all even-
tually hoping to gain a paid
position.
Recognising this reality, many HR
and similar recruitment specialist
agencies find it easy to identify
possession of an academic qualifi-
cation in analysis, criminology,
criminal justice or the like, as a
convenient threshold for weeding
out a large proportion of would-be
recruits. It is clearly shown by as-
sessing vacancy notices that many
agencies prefer to set the bar high,
perhaps at a Master’s Degree level
opinion
or even higher, with the expecta-
tion that the short-list numbers
will drop to a manageable level,
and that all applicants will quite
possibly be of a high quality in
view of their qualifications.
All this, without any demonstra-
bly rigorous examination of the
various curricula, the quality of
the applicants’ awards, the real-
ism of their assignment challeng-
es, nor of their individual results
when seen against the expecta-
tions of a future job.
My advice? Return back to basics
and conduct for yourself a proper
Needs Survey. Who do you need?
To do what? Which skills, tech-
niques and competencies rank as
essential, should-haves and could-
haves? What can be taught in-
house as opposed to hoping to
buy in everything you need?
Get this right first and, only then,
consider how to match your needs
in finite detail against what the
employment market can offer.
Short-listing for the sake of having
a limited number to finally con-
sider for selection is understanda-
ble. But doing so using the artifice
of pre-qualification – unless it is in
and of itself absolutely essential –
is delusional.
You may well have cut out of the
mix people who have lots to offer.
Conversely, you may well include
in the short-list mix those who are
good students, perhaps excellent,
but who have not yet demonstrat-
ed any ability to take their place in
your workforce.
Think it over carefully ! •
15
 thinking

Psychology
of
intelligence
analysis
Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of In-
telligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge.
This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - comparing with historic situations. You can also
download the entire book here.

Comparison with Historical situation is likely to be similar to Reasoning by comparison is a

Situations
A third approach for going be-
yond the available information is
comparison. An analyst seeks un-
derstanding of current events by
comparing them with historical
precedents in the same country,
or with similar events in other
countries.
Analogy is one form of compari-
son. When an historical situation
is deemed comparable to current
circumstances, analysts use their
understanding of the historical
precedent to fill gaps in their un-
derstanding of the current situa-
tion.
Unknown elements of the present
are assumed to be the same as
known elements of the historical
precedent. Thus, analysts reason
that the same forces are at work,
that the outcome of the present
the outcome of the historical situ-
ation, or that a certain policy is
required in order to avoid the
same outcome as in the past.
Comparison differs from situa-
tional logic in that the present sit-
uation is interpreted in the light
of a more or less explicit concep-
tual model that is created by
looking at similar situations in
other times or places.
It differs from theoretical analysis
in that this conceptual model is
based on a single case or only a
few cases, rather than on many
similar cases. Comparison may
also be used to generate theory,
but this is a more narrow kind of
theorizing that cannot be validat-
ed nearly as well as generaliza-
tions inferred from many
comparable cases.
convenient shortcut, one chosen
when neither data nor theory are
available for the other analytical
strategies, or simply because it is
easier and less time-consuming
than a more detailed analysis.
A careful comparative analy-
sis starts by specifying key
elements of the present situa-
tion.
The analyst then seeks out one or
more historical precedents that
may shed light on the present.
Frequently, however, a historical
precedent may be so vivid and
powerful that it imposes itself
upon a person's thinking from
the outset, conditioning them to
perceive the present primarily in
terms of its similarity to the past.
This is reasoning by analogy. As
Robert Jervis noted, "historical
analogies often precede, rather

16 December 2012 • Foreknowledge


than follow, a careful analysis of a
situation."
The tendency to relate contempo-
rary events to earlier events as a
guide to understanding is a pow-
erful one. Comparison helps
achieve understanding by reduc-
ing the unfamiliar to the familiar.
In the absence of data required for
a full understanding of the cur-
rent situation, reasoning by com-
parison may be the only
alternative.
Anyone taking this approach,
however, should be aware of the
significant potential for error. This
course is an implicit admission of
the lack of sufficient information
to understand the present situa-
tion in its own right, and lack of
relevant theory to relate the
Comparison
helps achieve un-
derstanding by
reducing the un-
familiar to the
familiar
present situation to many other
comparable situations
The difficulty, of course, is in be-
ing certain that two situations are
truly comparable. Because they
are equivalent in some respects,
there is a tendency to reason as
though they were equivalent in all
respects, and to assume that the
current situation will have the
same or similar outcome as the
historical situation.
This is a valid assumption only
when based on in-depth analysis
of both the current situation and
the historical precedent to ensure
that they are actually comparable
in all relevant respects.
Ernest May found that because of
reasoning by analogy, US policy-
makers tend to be one generation
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
behind, determined to avoid the
mistakes of the previous genera-
tion. They pursue the policies that
would have been most appropri-
ate in the historical situation but
are not necessarily well adapted
to the current one.
Policymakers in the 1930s, for in-
stance, viewed the international
situation as analogous to that be-
fore World War I. Consequently,
they followed a policy of isolation
that would have been appropriate
for preventing American involve-
ment in the first World War but
failed to prevent the second.
Communist aggression after
World War II was seen as analo-
gous to Nazi aggression, leading
to a policy of containment that
could have prevented World War
II.
More recently, the Vietnam analo-
gy has been used repeatedly over
many years to argue against an
activist US foreign policy. For ex-
ample, some used the Vietnam
analogy to argue against US par-
ticipation in the Gulf War - a
flawed analogy because the oper-
ating terrain over which battles
were fought was completely dif-
ferent in Kuwait/Iraq and much
more in our favor there as com-
pared with Vietnam.
May argues that policymakers of-
ten perceive problems in terms of
analogies with the past, but that
they ordinarily use history badly:
“When resorting to an analogy,
they tend to seize upon the first
that comes to mind. They do not
research more widely. Nor do
they pause to analyze the case,
test its fitness, or even ask in what
ways it might be misleading.”1
As compared with policymakers,
intelligence analysts have more
time available to "analyze rather
than analogize."
thinking
Intelligence analysts tend to be
good historians, with a large
number of historical precedents
available for recall. The greater
the number of potential analogues
an analyst has at his or her dis-
posal, the greater the likelihood of
selecting an appropriate one.
The greater the depth of an ana-
lyst's knowledge, the greater the
chances the analyst will perceive
the differences as well as the simi-
larities between two situations.
Even under the best of circum-
stances, however, inferences
based on comparison with a sin-
gle analogous situation probably
are more prone to error than most
other forms of inference.
The most productive uses of com-
parative analysis are to suggest
The most productive
uses of comparative
analysis are to
suggest hypotheses
and to highlight dif-
ferences, not to draw
conclusions.
hypotheses and to highlight dif-
ferences, not to draw conclusions.
Comparison can suggest the pres-
ence or the influence of variables
that are not readily apparent in
the current situation, or stimulate
the imagination to conceive expla-
nations or possible outcomes that
might not otherwise occur to the
analyst.
In short, comparison can generate
hypotheses that then guide the
search for additional information
to confirm or refute these hypoth-
eses. It should not, however, form
the basis for conclusions unless
thorough analysis of both situa-
tions has confirmed they are in-
deed comparable.
1 Ernest May, `Lessons' of the Past: The Use
and Misuse of History in American Foreign Poli-
cy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
17
 Research
RECENT PUBLISHED RESEARCH
IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Organisational culture
and intelligence analysis
Nicolas Paul Hare and Paul Collinson,
(2012), Organisational culture and in-
telligence analysis: A perspective from
senior managers in the Defence Intelli-
gence Assessments Staff in Public Poli-
cy and Administration 31 October,
2012 $ here
We highlight some key elements of the
organisational culture of structures en-
gaged in all-source intelligence analysis
and draw on a preliminary survey of a
small cadre of senior managers in the
Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff
(DIAS). This suggests that DIAS has a
strong identity and value system, and
that it is introspective and somewhat
averse to change. Physical and demo-
graphic isolation, and intrinsic factors
such as the nature of the job and the
personalities attracted to it also play a
part. The continued impetus towards a
more customer-facing culture appears
to carry both costs and benefits in terms
of the kinds of tasks at which the or-
ganisation is likely to excel. •
18
Structuring intelligence
organisations
Andrew D. Brunatti, (2012), The archi-
tecture of community: Intelligence
community management in Australia,
Canada and New Zealand in Public
Policy and Administration 26 Novem-
ber 31, 2012 $ here
The study of the interdepartmental ar-
chitecture that is meant to coordinate
intelligence communities has been pe-
ripheral at best. This is especially true
in the case of smaller states, such as
Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
Examination of the development of in-
telligence community management ar-
chitecture in these countries reveals that
actors in all three communities recog-
nise networks of interdependency be-
tween them. However the extent to
which they are able to exploit these in-
terdependencies is dependent on larger
dynamics in government, supporting
the idea that intelligence communities
can only be as cohesive as the govern-
ments they serve allow them to be. •
Extended participation in
intelligence production
Kira Vrist Rønn (2012), Democratizing
Strategic Intelligence? On the feasibili-
ty of an objective, decision-making
framework when assessing threats and
harms of organized crime in Policing
23 November 2012 $ here
In this article, I focus on methodologies
used for threat and harm assessments
of organized crime. I present three gen-
eral and interrelated objections con-
cerning this endeavour: (1) conceptual
vagueness, (2) inherent subjectivity,
and (3) incommensurability. I introduce
two types of suggestions for how to
overcome these objections: categorical
and conditional suggestions. I argue
that a participatory approach to the
methodology of threat and harm as-
sessments, via inclusion of interests and
values from an extended peer-commu-
nity, e.g. when designing methodolo-
gies, may render strategic intelligence
more reliable. •
December 2012 • Foreknowledge

What is published in
intelligence?
Miron Varouhakis (2013), What is Being
Published in Intelligence? A Study of
Two Scholarly Journals in International
Journal of Intelligence and Counter
Intelligence Volume 26, Issue 1, 2013
here
A total of 924 articles that were pub-
lished since 1992 in the CIA’s unclassi-
fied Studies in Intelligence and the
International Journal of Intelligence and
Counter Intelligence were reviewed to
map out a geography of knowledge
gaps and identify underdeveloped re-
search areas that are fertile for growth.
The study shows how slow and diffi-
cult it has been to bring scholastic study
of intelligence into the public domain.
One finding was that the two journals
only published 59 articles (6.4%) with
an intelligence analysis focus. •
Supporting Analytical
Reasoning
Phong H. Nguyen, Supporting Analyti-
cal Reasoning and Presentation with
Analytic Provenance. Middlesex Uni-
versity. Paper here
Analytic provenance research tries to
understand a user’s reasoning process
by examining their interactions with a
visual analytic system. Visual analytics
is the science of analytical reasoning
facilitated by interactive visual interfac-
es. Besides understanding the user’s
reasoning process, many benefits can
also be gained from analytic prove-
nance such as recalling the analysis
process, reusing performed analyses,
supporting evidence in constructing the
reasoning process, and facilitating
collaboration between colleagues in-
cluding dissemination, discussion and
presentation. •
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
Assessing Uncertainty in
Intelligence
Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard Zeck-
hauser (2012), Assessing Uncertainty in
Intelligence, HKS Faculty Research
Working Paper Series RWP12-027,
John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University here
This article addresses the challenge of
managing uncertainty when producing
estimative intelligence. Much of the
theory and practice of estimative intelli-
gence aims to eliminate or reduce un-
certainty, but this is often impossible or
infeasible. This article instead argues
that the goal of estimative intelligence
should be to assess uncertainty.
By drawing on a body of nearly 400 de-
classified National Intelligence Esti-
mates as well as prominent texts on
analytic tradecraft, this article argues
that current tradecraft methods attempt
to eliminate uncertainty in ways that
can impede the accuracy, clarity, and
utility of estimative intelligence. By
contrast, a focus on assessing uncertain-
ty suggests solutions to these problems
and provides a promising analytic
framework for thinking about estima-
tive intelligence in general. •
Research
Please assist
with my
research!
Jean Perois, CPP, PSP writes:
I am currently enrolled in a
PhD programme with the Uni-
versity of Leicester (UK) in Po-
litical Science/ International
Relations. The title of my thesis
is: What realism from which
future? A search for an interna-
tional security forecasting mod-
el.
I test the capacity of Realism –
the oldest and most prominent
theoretical paradigm in interna-
tional relations – to provide the
best framework for internation-
al affairs forecasting.
I would like Foreknowledge
readers to contribute to my the-
sis by completing the anony-
mous 20 minute survey here to
answer the following questions:
● How forecasting practition-
ers perceive the con-
straints surrounding the
search for an international
security forecasting model,
● The nature of the forces
and variables acting on the
model and how to weigh
them,
● The importance of person-
al biases and assumptions
in simulated interactions,
and
● Whether analysts/ fore-
casters think that such a
model is achievable or sim-
ply too complex to envi-
sion.
The survey can be accessed
on
https://www.surveymonkey.co
m/s/Forecasters.
All participants will be entitled
to a copy of the results, so you
might also benefit from it!
Thank you in advance for your
participation.
19
 nice2know

Pentagon’s mobile
intel centre

The US Defense Department’s Mercyhurst’s Kris

Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial- Wheaton designs game to
Intelligence System (DMIGS), is a 44- mitigate cognitive biases
foot long vehicle shaped a bit like a fire
Kristan Wheaton, associate professor of
truck. It carries generators and a 2.4-
intelligence studies at Mercyhurst
meter wide satellite dish antenna and
University designed a tabletop game
has room for up to six analysts to work.
which identifies and mitigates the six
They can update the Homeland
biases that he considers the “worst” for
Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP),
intelligence analysts. In “The Mind’s Lie,”
a common operational baseline of
players examine a scenario and then
geospatial data, with the data coming in
participate in one or more rounds of
for people on-site. This information is
voting in order to determine the bias most
then sent out to the mobile devices of
clearly present in the scenario. We will
emergency response teams so they
keep you updated on the marketing of the
can have a clearer picture of what
game. More here.
challenges lie ahead of them. It was
used during the recent Hurricane
Sandy.

International award to
UK intelligence analyst
Amy Parsons, an
intelligence analyst
with the Major
The National Geospatial Investigation
Intelligence Agency’s intelligence
Department of
analysts and their technical
Staffordshire Read the US National
specialists provided most of the
support to civil authorities during Police, UK, received an award from the Intelligence Council’s
the recent Hurricane Sandy International Association of Women 2030 Global Trends
disaster. They took photos, Police (IAWP) this year for her Report here that provides
infrared and other data from excellent work in contributing to a conceptual framework
satellites and air planes and built securing guilty convictions. Her to look at the future and
them into remarkably detailed what this might mean for
comprehensive storybook that brought
and accurate maps. The maps the intelligence
together all the strands of evidence into
also mean that police and firemen community. They identify
a shooting case was lauded by High 4 megatrends, 6 game
know what they are likely to
Court Judge, Sir Timothy Holroyd as changers and 4 future
encounter when they arrive on
the scene, whether it's simple “the best that I have ever seen in my worlds or possible
flooding, damaged buildings and many years as a judge”. See more scenarios. Might assist
ruined or blocked roads. here and here. you with your strategic
Read more here analysis!

20 December 2012 • Foreknowledge


Today, we still live largely in
the world where intelligence
is defined as “secrets;” tomorrow,
we will either embrace a new
understanding of intelligence and
knowledge, or risk marginalizing
analysts from this century’s
knowledge revolution and hence
fail to serve policy makers as
effectively as possible.
Intelligence and National Security Alliance
Rebalance Taskforce Report October 2012
here
Climate change as an
intelligence priority
Despite “climate change” being identified
as one of the main future intelligence
threats in the next decade (here), the CIA
closed its Center on Climate Change and
National Security in November 2012.
The CIA stated that “work continues to be
performed by a dedicated team in a new
office that looks at economic and energy
matters affecting America’s national
security.” The CIA relies mainly on
scientists such as the Board on
Environmental Change and Society to
assist in this task. See their report here
Intel analysis chief
accused of subversion
The Gambian National Intelligence Agen-
cy’s Analysis Director Ousman Bojang
has been detained for several months and
is accused of agreeing to provide a sketch
plan of pres Jammeh’s residences to Gam-
bian dissidents. Jammeh is accused of fab-
ricating coup stories against members of
the security forces to sow seeds of dis-
cord amongst service chiefs for his own
political survival. See more here
December 2012 • Foreknowledge
nice2know
The 7 Habits of Highly
Successful Intelligence
Analysts From Digimind.com
1
Be Organized and Disciplined
Great analysts must have the discipline to
approach each task in an orderly and
scientific manner so they can reproduce the
results and show what led them to their
conclusions.
Communicate with Confidence,
Clarity and Credibility
Present thoughts or ideas in a clear and
concise manner so that the untrained can
understand what is being presented.
2
Find Meaningful Patterns in
Meaningless Noise
Project the patterns that emerge forward and
predict, within a reasonable accuracy, what
will happen next or at some time in the future.
3
Adopt a Patient, Methodical
Approach
Have the vision to see patterns develop early
in the process and wait until the pattern
becomes clear before announcing it.
4
See the Bigger Picture
They are not afraid to stick by their
convictions when the odd outlying data point
seems to throw the pattern off. They
recognize it for what it is and factor it into the
overall picture.
5
Be Flexible and Responsive to
Change
They can recognize when they are headed
down the wrong path and have the foresight
to change direction when the pattern deviates
from what is expected due to unforeseen
6
forces or events.
Learn from Mistakes
7
They recognize when they have erred and are
free to admit they got it wrong. They learn
from experience and experience is what you
get when you don’t get it right the first time.
21
events

April 2013
January 2013
International
Studies
Brunel University Association Annual
Seminar: Convention
Intelligence and 2-6 April 2013
the cyber
San Francisco, US
environment
Information here
25-26 January 2013
IALEIA/LEIU
Uxbridge, England Annual Training
Information here Conference
8-12 April 2013
Chicago, US
Information here

discuss
share collabo
rate

May 2013 Aberystwyth

University CIISS
Conference
July 2
Past, present and
future of
013
Intelligence
23-25 May 2013
Gregynog Hall,
Wales, UK Australian Institute
Information here for Professional
Deadline for submissions Intelligence Officers
International 15 February 2013 (AIPIO)
Association for
Intelligence
24-26 July 2013
Education Canberra, Australia
Conference Information here
20-23 May 2013
El Paso, Texas, US
Information here

22 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

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December 2012 • Foreknowledge 23


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24
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December 2012 • Foreknowledge