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EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS IN RELATION TO ART 2 OF CIVIL CODE

G.R. No. 147387               December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS vs.


THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACT:

Petitioners argues that Section 16 of RA 9006 otherwise known as Fair Elections Act
which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

ISSUE:

WON the Sec 16 of the law violates the jurisprudence which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective. (YES)

HELD:

The "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall
take effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not
render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
54 

... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended…. 55

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act
56 

No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation (As repealed by
EO 200).
ISSUE ON SEC 67 OF RA 9006 BEING A RIDER

FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14


of RA 9006 or “The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it
repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure
resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy,
except for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the
said law, the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what
the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause
since the said law didn’t repeal provision relating to appointive officials.
Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of
their respective certificates of candidacy.

HELD:

Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the


Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions
of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title
rule”. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal
protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There
is reasonable classification between an elective official and an appointive
one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is
that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in
expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of
the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of
the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the
members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting
their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. 147387, 2003-12-10


Facts:
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.  They point out
the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67
of... the Omnibus Election Code, on the other.  Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on...
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate
of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not...
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive... officials, thus:
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials.  By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the
one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon... filing
his certificate of candidacy.  Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.  On the other hand, Section
66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -... they are still
considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
Creation of two (2) sets of BCC
No communication from the Senate... without copies thereof being furnished the members;
The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings,... There was no meeting actually
conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC... nl... y of the first one that convened o
The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment,"
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bil
Issues:
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners' allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006.  The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification... signed
by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that
the bill was duly enacted into law.
Ruling:
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the...
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress,
Principles:
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of... both Houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

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