G.R. NO.
L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940 evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER
AND PROPIETOR, AND 
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.  at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
 THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in
Administrative Bodies
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while  no members of the
rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a
new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition
with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make
sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Clear and Present Danger Rule: Whether the words are used in such
circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State
has the right to prevent [Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 97]. The
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear and
present but also traceable to the ideas expressed. In Gonzales v.
Comelec, 27 SCRA 835, the court said that the word “clear” seems to
point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil
arising from the utterance questioned, while the “present” refers to
the time element identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable.
Dangerous Tendency Rule. As explained in Cabansag v. Fernandez,
102 Phil 152, if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an
evil which the State has the right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and the probable
effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that
the legislative body seeks to prevent. See: People v. Perez, 45 Phil
599.
Balancing of Interests Test When a particular conduct is regulated in
the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, or partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is
to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented
´[American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 282]. In
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, slipra., the Supreme Court said that the
clear and present danger test is not the only test that is recognized
and applied by the courts. Another criterion for permissible limitation
on freedoms of speech and press is the balancing interest which
requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interest in an observable situation.
PASEI v Drilon
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing
for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the
State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the
challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been
validclassification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad
were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which
their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1
applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality
before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial
distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does
not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by
law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in
the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with
rule making powers.
People v Hernandez
Facts: Defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member
of Congress of Labor Organizations. CLO is an affiliate of Hukbong
Magpalayang Bayan, a known group performing rebellious activities.
Hernandez was charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robbery and was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Prosecution maintains that capital punishment may
be imposed for the crime he was convicted of. Defense contends that
there is no complex crime in the crime of rebellion. It was deemed
best not to disturb the course of action taken by the lower court,
which denied bail to Hernandez, hence the motion to post bail.
Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the
administration of justice?
Decision: Motion for bail granted. The ingredients of a crime form
part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and
cannot be punished either separately there from. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses
put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had
no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act,
the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for
each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption
that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for
each offense.
Nunez v Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails
the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial document committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
cases. The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and
March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such
motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it
met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It
is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree     No. 1486, as
amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process,
equal protection and  ex post facto clauses of the Constitution, thus
declaring it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of
such Decree cannot be adjudged. Those adversely affected may
under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if
they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if
not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest.
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done
before     the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when            committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than      the law
annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives
a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a  former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful
scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of
due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation,
upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had
due process of law.” This Court holds that petitioner has been unable
to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1606.
Petition dismissed. No costs.
Gallardo v People
Facts: Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur filed letter-complaint
for alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount
representing payment of their salaries by the Municipality of
Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo Gallardo with the Ombudsman.
Probable cause was found and information was filed stating that
Gallardo caused undue injury to PHW workers. Gallardo requested
for reinvestigation. This was granted by Sandiganbayan, However
Ombudsman Desierto recommended his disapproval. Petitioner filed
motion to quash on the ground that they were not accorded equal
protection of the law.  They contend that similar cases were
dismissed by Desierto previously ans should be accorded the same
to the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto violated equal protection
right of the petitioners on the ground of not uniformly deciding similar
cases?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The equal protection clause requires
that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the
classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one
class may be treated differently from another. The Ombudsman
dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient
grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand,
he recommended the filing of appropriate information against
petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial.
He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based
upon the constitutional mandate of his office.
Tiu v CA
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the
grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under
RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents
within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the
E.O. 97-A.
 Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided
by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals
upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
 Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
 Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the
City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3)
the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.  However, EO
97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the
special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the
present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only.  It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from
enjoying the benefits granted by the law.  It has effectively
discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that
Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to
delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.  He adds that the
issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was
based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the
equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification.  If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and
must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2)
be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class.
 Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were
affirmed.
ISAE v Quisimbing
Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in
wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching
counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign
hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School
and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the
Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires
such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals
under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
The first was grounded on leaving his home country, the second was
on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a
deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary
Quisimbing denied the union’s mfr.
He said, “The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause
to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on
reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based
on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same
class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires
and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.”
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin.
They were paid local salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection
clause
Held: Yes, Petition granted
Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity…”
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter promises “Fair
wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind.”
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are
often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides
that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term “equal pay for equal work”,
pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar
skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the
local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires'
limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in
salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting
foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-
hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated
their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes
of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately.
The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not
given to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any
group the power to exercise bargaining rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
Telebap and GMA v Comelec
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs.
COMELEC 
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without
legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not
able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a
result of the subject law.  Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand,
had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. 
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No.
881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which
provides:
“Comelec Time-  The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations.  For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires
COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines
with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge.  Thus it contends that Section 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to
suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.  Vacation leave with pay  7.00 days per month
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property.  According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and,
in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime
time daily for such.  was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit.  All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to
assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images.  They are merely
given the temporary privilege to use them.  Thus, such exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television
stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and
supervising them.  months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit.  Regulation of the
broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media.  To require the broadcast industry
to provide free air time for COMELEC  is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves,
no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air
time to the COMELEC.  
Serrano v Gallant Maritime Inc
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA).
FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract  12 months
Position  Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary  US$1,400.00
Hours of work  48.0 hours per week
Overtime  US$700.00 per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would
be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or
from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US
$8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3)
employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA
based his computation on the salary period of three months only —
rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days
of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause.
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting
of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month +
US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation
leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s
computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by
reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award
of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due
course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted
the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable
salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case
in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court
involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back
wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment
instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in
excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his
salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the
extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the
salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC
and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months
and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a
Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights
in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal
protection and denies them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents Respondents contend that the
constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the
earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the
NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General The Solicitor General
(OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15,
1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded
petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the
minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter
of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling: First Issue Does the subject clause violate
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law. Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to
labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of
strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for
it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that
the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the
clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also
her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms
of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally
dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process
singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion
of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries
for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less,
but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice,
simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place.
This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-
term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that
the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but
also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days
of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay
should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been
stipulated into his contract. Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and
leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No.
33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of
Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive
of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight
hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on
designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired
portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during
the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause
“or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004
Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for
the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of
nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month.
Garcia v Drilon
Facts:               Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and
also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply
with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed
to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory
that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:         1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited
authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union,  the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the

Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is
not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay

officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. 
The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

C. Equal Protection of the laws. Sec. 1. Art. Ill: 1. Meaning;

persons protected. All persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons are
entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons,
they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.