CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF IR

All academic disciplines are dedicated to the task of understanding or explaining some
aspect of the world, although they do so in very different ways. And they are all
underpinned by bodies of theory formulated in response to particular problems or
questions emerging from their particular subject matter. For example physics is
underpinned by physical theory, sociology by social theory, political science by
political theory. Although, international relations is subset of political science it has
developed its own theories.IR draws on other disciplines in the social sciences such as
history, philosophy and law.

The word theory means different things to different people. It may even mean different
things to the same person. But before one attempts to define theory, it is important to
consider three pre-theoretical or “how” issues that directly influences the approach one
takes to international relations. Often unacknowledged by theorists are the issues of
epistemology and ontology and methodology.

Epistemology (theory of knowledge: how do we come to have knowledge of the

world?) Ontology (theory of being or nature of existence: what is the world made of?
What objects do we study?) And methodology (theory of methods: what methods do we
use to unearth/search data and evidence?)

Epistemology involves the ways and means by which we come to know something (or
at least what we think we know) about the world. For example, a popular epistemology
is empiricism—the view that the only grounds for making truth claims is through direct
observation of the world using our senses.

Ontology refers to how each of us views the world—how we see or understand the
essence of things around us. Are there, for example, actual structures out there that
influence the behaviour of actors? If so, is it a material structure consisting of
capabilities such as weapons, troops, and economic resources?

Theory is derived from the Greek theoria, meaning contemplation or speculation – may
be defined as “an organized system of ideas devised to explain a certain set of
phenomena”. The phenomena about which we theorize may range from fairly simple or

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narrow ones to very wide-ranging, complex and controversial ones, such as those
involved in theories of climate change or the evolution of species.

Definition: Theory is a linked set of propositions or ideas that simplify the complex
reality so that we can describe events that have happened, explain why they happened,
and predict what might happen in the future

Theory as simply a way of making the world or some part of it more intelligible or
better understood. Theories dealing with international relations aspire to achieve this
goal. Making things more intelligible may, of course, amount to nothing more than
better or more precise description of the things we observe.

Theory also involves explanation. One goes beyond mere description of phenomena
observed and engages in causal explanation based on certain prior occurrences or
conditions. International relations scholars are always interested in the patterns of
behaviour of different actors acting internationally. In identifying patterns, they make
predictions about the possible nature and direction of change.

TYPES OF THEORY

It is reasonable to assume that a book dealing with IR theory would provide a clear
account of what theory is. Unfortunately there is not one but many. There are many
types of theories but we can cover all of them as they overlap generally there are three
major theories, explanatory normative and constitutive theory

Explanatory theory; this is probably the type of theory most students initially think of
when they use the term theory. Explanatory theory attempts to ‘explain’ events by
providing an account of causes in a temporal sequence. Thus, for example, we can think
of theories that attempt to explain the end of the Cold War in terms of a series of
connected events occurring over time

Normative Theory; Once a theorist takes the step of indicating alternative futures or
social modes of operation that do not currently exist, but might be brought into being,
they have entered the realm of normative theory. Normative theory examines what
‘ought’ to be the case.

Constitutive Theory: Constitutive theory does not attempt to generate, or track, causal
patterns in time, but asks, ‘How is this thing constituted?’ the questions that they ask for

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example what is a state and how a state is constituted? The term constitutive theory is
also used in the discipline in another sense: to refer to those authors who examine the
ways in which rules, norms, and ideas ‘constitute’ social objects.

NARRATING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The discipline of IR, in common with all the social sciences, has been deeply divided
on many issues throughout its history. A common way of narrating this history is in
terms of the great debates surrounding these key issues.

The first debate refers to the exchanges between the realists and idealists before, during,
and immediately after the Second World War. This was primarily waged over the role
of international institutions and the likelihood that the causes of war might be
ameliorated. The second debate emerged in the 1960s. It pitted the traditionalists, who
were keen to defend a more humanistic methodology, against the modernizers, who
aimed to introduce a greater level of methodological rigour to the discipline. The inter-
paradigm debate of the 1970s and 1980s focused on disagreements among the realist,
pluralist, and Marxist perspectives on how best to understand and explain international
processes. Finally, the most recent debate, which some IR theorists call the fourth
debate, has centred on deep-seated disagreements about what the discipline should
study and how it should study it. While these debates have often highlighted the
paradigmatic divisions between different and distinct IR theoretical schools of thought,
an often-unrecognized issue has cut across and underpinned all the debates. This is the
issue of whether or not IR can be, or should be, a form of inquiry based upon scientific
principles.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Let us assume one is interested in theorizing about the causes of war. Where should one
focus one’s initial efforts? Does one deal with individual decision makers, the state
apparatus, and the society as a whole or the international political system of states?

The levels of analysis constitute a framework designed to organize and assist in

systematic thinking about IR. Levels of analysis (individual or group, state and society,
and “system” as a whole What one is trying to explain or study (such as the outbreak of
war) is known as the dependent variable. Factors at different levels of analysis we
suspect as being causally related to what we are trying to explain typically are termed

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independent variables. Every good example is Waltz’ path breaking study, when he
studied whether the causes of war (dependent variable) to be found in human nature
(are humans aggressive) or the nature of states and societies (are some types of states
more aggressive than others) or is it the international system (is anarchy cause of war).

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 CHAPTER TWO

IDEALISM/ LIBERALISM

Liberal approaches to international relations acknowledge the tendency to conflict in

human affairs but focus much more on the human capacity to cooperate – to create
effective laws and institutions and to promote norms which moderate the behaviour of
states in the sphere of international anarchy. It was noted earlier that ‘liberalism’ names
one of a number of political ideologies, and that ideologies may be regarded as sets of
ideas which both incorporate a view of the world as it is and how it ought to be from a
particular normative standpoint and promote a plan of political action designed to bring
about the desired state of affairs. In short, an ideology is a normative belief system
oriented to political action. This perspective is associated with classical analysts like
John Locke, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant.

Basic assumptions

1) Human nature is essentially good and capable of altruism, mutual aid and
collaboration
2) The fundamental instincts of humans for the welfare of others makes progress
possible
3) Bad human behaviour is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions
and structural arrangements that create incentives for people to act selfishly and
to harm others including making war
4) Wars represent the worst feature of the international system
5) Wars is not inevitable and can be eliminated by doing away with the
institutional arrangements that encourage it
6) War is an international problem that requires global rather than national efforts
to eliminate and therefore
7) International society has to reorganize itself to eliminate that make war likely

Liberalism can be divided into two camps, although they share majority of the
assumptions, the two camps have joined the debate in different times, Classical
liberalism and neo- liberalism. Classical liberalism theory of international relations was
dominant during the inter-war years. But it has lost the debate after the Second World
War to the realists; neoliberals emerged during the 1970s, challenging realists in

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number of fronts. In this chapter we shall be discussing the classical liberal theory of
international relations

The decisive push to set up a separate academic subject of IR was occasioned by the
First World War (1914–18), which produced millions of casualties; it was driven by a
widely felt determination never to allow human suffering on such a scale to happen
again. The war was a devastating experience for millions of people, and particularly for
young soldiers who were conscripted into the armies and were slaughtered by the
million, especially in the trench warfare on the Western Front. For example, The
famous Battle of the Somme (France) in July–August 1916 caused more than 60.000
casualties to the British side alone in one day.

The justification for all that death and destruction became less and less clear as the war
years went by, as the number of casualties kept on increasing to historically
unprecedented levels, and as the war failed to disclose any rational purpose. Why was it
that the war began in the first place? And why did Britain, France, Russia, Germany,
Austria, Turkey, and other powers persist in waging war in the face of such slaughter
and with diminishing chances of gaining anything of real value from the conflict? These
questions and others like them are not easy to answer. But the fist dominant academic
theory of IR was shaped by the search for answers to them. The answers that the new
discipline of IR came up with were profoundly influenced by liberal ideas.

For liberal thinkers, the First World War was in no small measure attributable to the
egoistic and short-sighted calculations and miscalculations of autocratic leaders in the
heavily militarized countries involved, especially Germany and Austria. Unrestrained
by democratic institutions and under pressure from their generals, these leaders were
inclined to take the fatal decisions that led their countries into war, and the democratic
states of Britain and France was drawn into the conflict by interlocking system of
military alliance. The alliances were intended to keep the peace, but they propelled all
the European powers into war once any major power or alliance embarked on war.
When Austria and Germany confronted Serbia with armed force, Russia was duty-
bound to come to the aid of Serbia, and Britain and France were treaty bound to support
Russia.

Why was early academic IR influenced by liberalism? That is a big question, but there
are a few important points that we should keep in mind in seeking an answer. But the

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answer could be found that the United States was drawn into the war in 1917, its
military intervention decisively determined the war giving the victory to the democratic
alliance, at that moment, the president of USA was Woodrow Wilson, a liberal
democrat. Woodrow Wilson believed that the only way that Europe can be pacified is to
bring democratic ideals/values

Liberal thinkers had some clear ideas and strong beliefs about how to avoid major
disasters in the future, e.g., by reforming the international system, and also by
reforming the domestic structures of autocratic countries. President Wilson had a vision
of making the world ‘safe for democracy’ that had wide appeal for ordinary people. It
was formulated in a fourteen-point programme delivered in an address to Congress in
January 1918.

Wilson’s peace programme calls for an end to secret diplomacy: agreements must be
open to public scrutiny. There must be freedom of navigation on the seas and barriers to
free trade should be removed. Armaments should be reduced to ‘the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety’. Colonial and territorial claims should be settled with
regard to the principle of self-determination of peoples. Finally, ‘a general association
of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small nations
alike’.

Two major points in Wilson’s ideas deserve special attention, the first concern is the
promotion of democracy and self determination, this point is based on the democratic
convention that “democracies do not wage war against each other”.

The second major point in Wilson’s programme concerned the creation of an

international organization that would put relations between states on a firmer
institutional foundation than the realists’ notion of balance of powers. That means
International relations would be regulated by a set of common rules of international
law. In essence, that was Wilson’s concept of the League of Nations.

Wilsonian idealism can be summarized as follows. It is the conviction that, through a

rational and intelligently designed international organization, it should be possible to
put an end to war and to achieve more or less permanent peace. The claim is not that it
will be possible to do away with states and statespeople, foreign ministries, armed

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forces, and other agents and instruments of international conflict. Rather, the claim is
that it is possible to tame states and statespeople by subjecting them to the appropriate
international organizations, institutions, and laws.

Norman Angell (see web link 2.06) is another prominent liberal idealist of the same era.
In 1909 Angell published a book entitled The Great Illusion. The illusion is that many
statespeople still believe that war serves profitable purposes; that success in war is
beneficial for the winner. Angell argues that exactly the opposite is the case: in modern
times territorial conquest is extremely expensive and politically divisive because it
severely disrupts international commerce. The general argument set forth by Angell is a
forerunner of later liberal thinking about modernization and economic interdependence.
Modernization demands that states have a growing need of things ‘from “outside”—
credit, or inventions, or markets or materials not contained in sufficient quantity in the
country itself’ (Navari 1989: 345). Rising interdependence, in turn, effects a change in
relations between states.

The thinking of Wilson and Angell is based on a liberal view of human beings and
human society: human beings are rational, and when they apply reason to international
relations they can set up organizations for the benefit of all. Public opinion is a
constructive force; removing secret diplomacy in dealings between states and, instead,
opening diplomacy to public scrutiny assures that agreements will be sensible and fair.

liberalism seem to succeed in the early years after the first world war, but it did not last
long, its demise can be found in the events of 1920 and 1930s, first of all the
democratic values that idealism wanted to spread have failed, instead the rise of Nazi
and fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, Spain and many other states in central Europe.
The League of Nations failed to restrict the aggressive acts of its member states,
moreover USA refused to ratify the League of Nations. In addition to that United States
foreign policy was isolationist in nature, even Woodrow Wilson was isolationist.
Norman Angell’s high hopes for a smooth process of modernization and
interdependence also foundered on the harsh realities of the 1930s. The Wall Street
crash of October 1929 marked the beginning of a severe economic crisis in Western
countries that would last until the Second World War and would involve severe
measures of economic protectionism

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 CHAPTER THREE

REALISM

Realism is a theory of international relations based on the following assumptions;

TENETS AND ASSUMPTIONS

1) A reading of history teaches that humanity is by nature sinful and wicked

2) Of all man’s evil ways no sin is more prevalent than his instinctive lust for
power his desire to dominate his fellowship
3) If this inexorable and inevitable human characteristic is acknowledged, realism
forces dismissal of the possibility of progress in the sense of ever hoping to
eradicate the instinct for power.
4) Under such conditions international politics is struggle for power a war of all
against all.
5) The primary obligation of every state, the goal to which all other national
objectives should be subordinate is to promote national interest defined in terms
of the acquisition of power
6) National self interest is best served by doing anything necessary to ensure self
preservation
7) The fundamental characteristic of international politics requires each state to
trust no other but above all never to entrust self protection to international
organisation or international law
8) The national interest necessities self promotion especially through the
acquisition of military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by a potential
enemies
9) The capacity for self defence might also be augmented by acquiring allies,
10) If all states search for power, peace , stability will result through the operation of
balance of power propelled by self interest

It worth to note that not all scholars who label themselves a realists are true, but
majority of them share the above assumptions, here again as we did in the previous of
liberalism. Realism can be divided into two classical realism and neo-realism or
structural realism. Now we shall discuss in this chapter the classical realism, then neo-
realism in chapter 5.

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CLASICAL REALISM

As we have shown in chapter 3, Liberal idealism was not a good intellectual guide to
international relations in the 1930s. Interdependence did not produce peaceful
cooperation; the League of Nations was helpless in the face of the expansionist power
politics conducted by the authoritarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Academic
IR began to speak the classical realist language of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and
Hobbes in which the grammar and the vocabulary of power was central.

Classical realism is composed of different scholars who have labelled themselves as

classical realists, but who their ideas they share made them in the same group. In this
chapter we shall discuss the ideas and views of these scholars in order to determine
what they can help us understand the international politics, those scholars we shall
discuss in this chapter are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr and Morgenthau

Thucydides

What we call international relations Thucydides saw as the inevitable competition and
conflict between ancient Greek city-states (which together composed the cultural–
linguistic civilization known as Hellas) and between Hellas and neighbouring non-
Greek empires, such as Macedonia and Persia. Neither the states of Hellas nor their
non-Greek neighbours were in any sense equal. On the contrary, they were substantially
unequal: there were a few ‘great powers’—such as Athens, Sparta, and the Persian
Empire, and many smaller and lesser powers—such as the tiny island statelet of the
Aegean Sea. That inequality was considered to be inevitable and natural.

A distinctive feature of Thucydides’ brand of realism is thus its naturalist character.

Aristotle said that ‘man is a political animal’. Thucydides said in effect that political
animals are highly unequal in their powers and capabilities to dominate others and to
defend themselves. All states, large and small, must adapt to that given reality of
unequal power and conduct themselves accordingly. If states do that, they will survive
and perhaps even prosper. If states fail to do that, they will place themselves in jeopardy
and may even be destroyed.

So Thucydides emphasizes the limited choices and the restricted sphere of manoeuvre
available to rulers in the conduct of foreign policy. He also emphasizes that decisions

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have consequences; before any final decision is made, a decision maker should have
carefully thought through the likely consequences, bad as well as good

Thucydides and most other classical realists also try to distinguish from private morality
and the principle of justice. If a country and its government wish to survive and prosper,
they better pay attention to these fundamental political maxims of international
relations. According to Thucydides, justice is of a special kind in international relations.
It is not about equal treatment for all, because states are in fact unequal, Rather, it is
about recognizing your relative strength or weakness, about knowing your proper place,
and about adapting to the natural reality of unequal power.

Machiavelli

According to the political teachings of Machiavelli (1984: 66). The supreme political
value is national freedom, i.e., independence. The main responsibility of rulers is
always to seek the advantages and to defend the interests of their state and thus ensure
its survival. That requires strength; if a state is not strong it will be a standing invitation
for others to prey upon it; the ruler must therefore be a lion. That also requires
cunning/deceitful and—if necessary—ruthlessness in the pursuit of self-interest: the
ruler must also be a fox. If rulers are not astute, crafty, and adroit they might miss an
opportunity that could bring great advantages or benefits to them and their state.

The overriding Machiavellian assumption is that the world is a dangerous place. But it
is also, by the same token, an opportune place. If any political leader hopes to survive in
such a world, he or she must always be aware of dangers, must anticipate them, and
must take the necessary precautions against them. And if they hope to prosper, to enrich
themselves, it is necessary for them to recognize and to exploit the opportunities that
present themselves and to do that more quickly, more skilfully and—if necessary—
more ruthlessly than any of their rivals or enemies.

Above all, according to Machiavelli, the responsible state leader must not operate in
accordance with the principles of moral ethics: love thy neighbour, be peaceful, and
avoid war except in self-defence or in pursuit of a just cause etc, if political leaders act
in accordance with Christian virtues, they are bound to come to grief and they will lose
everything. Not only that, they will sacrifice the property and perhaps the freedom and
even the lives of their citizens, who depend upon their statecraft.

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Hobbes and security dilemma

Thomas Hobbes thinks we can gain a fundamental insight into political life if we
imagine men and women living in a ‘natural’ condition prior to the invention and
institution of the sovereign state. He refers to that pre-civil condition as the ‘state of
nature’. For Hobbes (1946: 82) the state of nature is an extremely adverse human
circumstance in which there is a permanent ‘state of war’ ‘of every man against every
man’; in their natural condition every man, woman, and child is endangered by
everybody else, life is constantly at risk, and nobody can be confident about his or her
security and survival for any reasonable length of time. People are living in constant
fear of each other. Hobbes characterizes that pre-civil condition as shown in Box 3.4. It
is obviously not only desirable but also extremely urgent to escape from those
intolerable circumstances at the earliest moment, if that is possible

Hobbes believes there is an escape route from the state of nature into a civilized human
condition, and that is via the creation and maintenance of a sovereign state. The means
of escape is by men and women turning their fear of each other into rational joint
collaboration with each other to form a security pact that can guarantee each other’s
safety. Men and women paradoxically cooperate politically because of their fear of
being hurt or killed by their neighbours: they are ‘civilized by fear of death’ (Oakeshott
1975: 36). Their mutual fear and insecurity drive them away from their natural
condition: the war of all against all. In other words, they are basically driven to institute
a sovereign state not by their reason (intelligence) but, rather, by their passion
(emotion). Their intelligence alone is insufficient to propel such action. With the value
of peace and order firmly in mind, they willingly and jointly collaborate to create a state
with a sovereign government that possesses absolute authority and credible power to
protect them from both internal disorders and foreign enemies and threats. In the civil
condition—i.e., of peace and order—under the protection of the state, men and women
have an opportunity to flourish in relative safety; they no longer live under the constant
threat of injury and fear of death. Being secure and at peace, they are now free to
prosper. As Hobbes puts it, they can pursue and enjoy ‘felicity’, i.e., happiness

However, that statist solution to the problem of the natural condition of humankind
automatically poses a serious political problem. A peaceful and civilized life can only
be enjoyed within a state and it cannot extend beyond the state or exist between states.

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The very act of instituting a sovereign state to escape from the fearful state of nature
among individual people simultaneously creates another state of nature between states.
That poses what is usually referred to as ‘the security dilemma’ in world politics: the
achievement of personal security and domestic security through the creation of a state is
necessarily accompanied by the condition of national and international insecurity that is
rooted in the anarchy of the state system.

There is no escape from the international security dilemma in the way that there is an
escape from the personal security dilemma, because there is no possibility of forming a
global state or world government. The main point about the international state of
nature is that it is a condition of actual or potential war; there can be no permanent or
guaranteed peace between sovereign states, no international peace. But there can be
domestic peace—peace within the framework of the sovereign state—and the
opportunities that only civil peace can provide for men and women to enjoy felicity.
The state is organized and equipped for war in order to provide domestic peace for its
subjects or citizens. Domestic peace can be realized in this way. International peace is
an unrealizable dream and a dangerous illusion.

E H Carr

The most comprehensive and penetrating critique of liberal idealism was that of E. H.
Carr, a British IR scholar. In The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1964 [1939]) Carr argued that
liberal IR thinkers profoundly misread the facts of history and misunderstood the nature
of international relations. They erroneously/wrongly believed that such relations could
be based on a harmony of interest between countries and people. According to Carr, the
correct starting point is the opposite one: we should assume that there are profound
conflicts of interest both between countries and between people. Some people and some
countries are better off than others. They will attempt to preserve and defend their
privileged position. The underdogs, the ‘have-nots’, will struggle to change that
situation. International relations is in a basic sense about the struggle between such
conflicting interests and desires. That is why IR is far more about conflict than about
cooperation

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Morgenthau

Morgenthau in his famous book-politics among nations has developed realist theory in
the form of six principles of political realism as explained in brief

1. Objectives laws of human nature:: political realism believes that politics is

governed by objective laws that have roots in human nature, the laws by which
man moves in social world are eternal. He cannot get rid of those laws because
they are eternal/existing forever and permanent. Man is a mixture of good and
bad, selfish and altruism loving and quarrelsome. Human nature has not
changed and it explains constancy and repetitious nature of political conduct.
The complexity of international politics can best be understood only with the
help of these objective laws
2. Interest in terms of power: concept of interest is defined in terms of power.
National interests are the motivating force of states activity in the sphere of
international politics , the state meets these interests with the help of power that
is every nations wants to gain more and more power, in this way international
politics is struggle for power , the theory of realism does not bother what is
desirable or immoral. It cares only for the national interest, which are desirable
under concrete circumstances. In short the main function of state and its
statesman is to protect national interests with the help of power.
3. Interests are dynamic: the meaning attached to interest and power is not static
and fixed once for all, national interests are changed and shaped by the
circumstances, if circumstances made the state more powerful one, its national
interest become different from what they have been when it was weak. Not only
interests are dynamic but the power position of most countries also varies with
time.
4. Universal moral principles inapplicable: realism maintains that universal
moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract
universal formulations. They must be filtered through the concrete substances of
time and place. An individual may sacrifice his interests to safeguard moral
values but they state cannot and shall not sacrifice itis interest , on the contrary
the state should sacrifice moral values for the sake of national interest.
5. Moral aspirations of nations: Political realism refuses to identify the moral
aspirations of a particular nation with the moral principles that govern the

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 universe. It refuses to accept that the national interests and policies of any
particular nation reflect universally applied moral principles. For instance, The
US anti-terror policy is governed by its own national interest and not really
based on the concept of making the world safe for freedom and democracy. A
foreign policy is always based on national interest and national power, and not
on morality.
6. The autonomy of political sphere: Morgenthau Political Realism accepts the
autonomy of International Politics as a discipline. On the basis of the above five
principles, it is ascertained by Morgenthau that there exists a real and profound
difference between political realism and other approaches and theories. Political
realism has its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude towards political
matters. It maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.

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 CHAPTER FOUR

NEO-LIBERALISM

Neo-liberalism is a renewed liberal approach which has emerged during 1960s and 70s,
realism remained the dominant international relations theory after the Second World
War, after 1945, the centre of gravity in international relations was the Cold War
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The East–West rivalry lent
itself easily to a realist interpretation of the world. Yet in 1960s and 1970s. a good deal
of international relations concerned trade and investment, travel and communication,
and similar issues emerged in liberal democracies of western Europe.

Those relations provided the basis for a new attempt by liberals to formulate an
alternative to realist thinking that would avoid the utopian excesses of earlier liberalism.
They strive to formulate and apply new methods which are scientific. In the 1950s, a
process of regional integration was getting under way in Western Europe which caught
the attention and imagination of neoliberals. By ‘integration’ we refer to a particularly
intensive form of international cooperation. Neoliberal scholars started to study how
activities across borders can help bring about mutual advantageous long term
cooperation, others studies the integration itself. Neoliberals have different types among
them are Sociological liberalism, Interdependence Liberalism, Institutional Liberalism
and Republican Liberalism

Sociological Liberalism

Sociological Liberalism is a strand of neoliberal thinking which emphasizes the impact

of these expanding cross-border activities. In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch and his associates
argued that such interconnecting activities helped create common values and identities
among people from different states and paved the way for peaceful, cooperative
relations by making war increasingly costly and thus more unlikely. They also tried to
measure the integration phenomenon scientifically (Deutsch et al. 1957)

Interdependence Liberalism

In the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye further developed such ideas. They
argued that relationships between Western states (including Japan) are characterized by
complex interdependence: there are many forms of connections between societies in

16
addition to the political relations of governments, including transnational links between
business corporations. There is also an ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’, i.e.,
military security does not dominate the agenda any more. Military force is no longer
used as an instrument of foreign policy (Keohane and Nye 1977: 25). Complex
interdependence portrays a situation that is radically different from the realist picture of
international relations. In Western democracies, there are other actors besides states,
and violent conflict clearly is not on their international agenda.

Institutional Liberalism

When there is a high degree of interdependence, states will often set up international
institutions to deal with common problems. Institutions promote cooperation across
international boundaries by providing information and by reducing costs. Institutions
can be formal international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) or European Union (EU) or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD); or they can be less formal sets of agreements (often called
regimes) which deal with common activities or issues, such as agreements about
shipping, aviation, communication, or the environment. We can call this form of
neoliberalism institutional liberalism. Robert Keohane (1989a) and Oran Young (1986)
are among the main contributors to this line of thinking.

Republican Liberalism

The fourth and final strand of neoliberalism—republican liberalism—picks up on a

theme developed in earlier liberal thinking. It is the idea that liberal democracies
enhance peace because they do not go to war against each other. It has been strongly
influenced by the rapid spread of democratization in the world after the end of the Cold
War, especially in the former Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe. An influential
version of the theory of democratic peace was set forth by Michael Doyle (1983). Doyle
fids that the democratic peace is based on three pillars: the fist is peaceful conflict
resolution between democratic states; the second is common values among democratic
states—a common moral foundation; the final pillar is economic cooperation among
democracies.

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 CHAPTER FIVE

STRUCTURAL REALISM/NEO-REALISM

Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. Great powers,
the main actors in the realists’ account, pay careful attention to how much economic
and military power they have relative to each other. It is important not only to have
a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply
shifts the balance of power in its favour. For realists, international politics is
synonymous with power politics. There are, however, substantial differences among
realists. The most basic divide is reflected in the answer to the simple but important
question: why do states want power? For classical realists like Hans Morgenthau
( 1948a ), the answer is human nature. Virtually everyone is born with a will to
power hardwired into them, which effectively means that great powers are led by
individuals who are bent on having their state dominate its rivals. Nothing can be
done to alter that drive to be all-powerful.

For structural realists, sometimes called Neorealists, human nature has little to do
with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the
international system that forces states to pursue power. In a system where there is
no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no
guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for
each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked.

Structural realist theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as

differences in regime type, mainly because the international system creates the same
basic incentives for all great powers. i.e., in spite of their different cultures or
ideologies or constitutions or histories, they all perform the same basic tasks. All
states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, and so on. States differ
significantly only in regard to their greatly varying capabilities. In Waltz’s own
words, the state units of an international system are ‘distinguished primarily by their
greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks . . . the structure of a
system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s
units’

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There is a significant divide between structural realists, which is reflected in the answer
to a second question that concerns realists: how much power is enough? Defensive
realists like Kenneth Waltz ( 1979 ), whose book is discussed as a featured text,
maintain that it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power,
because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The
pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy. Offensive realists like John
Mearsheimer ( 2001 ) take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic
sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to
pursue hegemony. The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but
instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival.

Power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. The balance of power is
mainly a function of the tangible military assets that states possess, such as armoured
divisions and nuclear weapons. However, states have a second kind of power, latent
power, which refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military
power. Latent power is based on a state’s wealth and the size of its overall population.

Why do states Want power

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among
themselves for power. It is based on five straightforward assumptions about the
international system. None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to
gain power at each other’s expense. But when they are married together, they depict a
world of ceaseless security competition.

The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they
operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by
chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no
centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states

The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability.
Each state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbour. Of
course, that capability varies among states and for any state it can change over time.

The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other
states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force

19
to alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough
with it that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states )

The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. States seek to maintain
their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can
pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must
always take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue
those other goals.

The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of
coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. This is not
to deny that they miscalculate from time to time. Because states operate with imperfect
information in a complicated world, they sometimes make serious mistakes

Again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete
with each other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the possibility
that there is a revisionist state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing about
why all states pursue power

How much Power is enough?

There is disagreement among structural realists about how much power states should
aim to control. Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for
opportunities to gain more power and should do so whenever it seems feasible. States
should maximize power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony, because that is
the best way to guarantee survival

While defensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong
incentives to gain additional increments of power, they maintain that it is strategically
foolish to pursue hegemony. Defensive realists argue states should not maximize
power, but should instead strive for what Kenneth Waltz calls an ‘appropriate amount
of power’ (1979: 40). This restraint is largely the result of three factors.

Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will
occur. Specifically, the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a
balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemony at least less secure, and
maybe even destroy it

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Some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–defence balance , which indicates
how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. In other
words, it tells you whether or not offence pays. Defensive realists maintain that the
offence–defence balance is usually heavily weighted in the defender’s favour, and thus
any state that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up
fighting a series of losing wars

Defensive realists further argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the
costs outweigh the benefits. Because of nationalism, it is especially difficult, sometimes
impossible, for the conqueror to subdue the conquered. This means the occupied
populations will rise up against the occupier.

Offensive realists do not buy these arguments. They understand that threatened states
usually balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain that balancing is often
inefficient, especially when it comes to forming balancing coalitions, and that this
inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its
adversaries. Furthermore, threatened states sometimes opt for buck-passing rather than
joining a balancing coalition. In other words, they attempt to get other states to assume
the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain on the sidelines. This
kind of behaviour, which is commonplace among great powers, also creates
opportunities for aggression

Offensive realists also take issue with the claim that the defender has a significant
advantage over the attacker, and thus offence hardly ever pays. Indeed, the historical
record shows that the side that initiates war wins more often than not. And while it may
be difficult to gain hegemony, the USA did accomplish this feat in the western
hemisphere during the nineteenth century. Also, Imperial Germany came close to
achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War.

Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay,
they also point out that sometimes it does. Conquerors can exploit a vanquished state’s
economy for gain and while nationalism surely has the potential to make occupation a
nasty undertaking, occupied states are sometimes relatively easy to govern, as was the
case in France under the Nazis (1940–4).

What causes great power war?

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A longstanding debate among realists is whether bipolarity (two great powers) is more
or less war-prone than multi-polarity (three or more great powers). It is generally agreed
that the state system was multi-polar from its inception in 1648 until the Second World
War ended in 1945. It was only bipolar during the Cold War, which began right after
the Second World War and ran until 1989.

Proponents of these rival perspectives, however, do not rely on history alone to make
their case; they also employ theoretical arguments. Realists who think bipolarity is less
war-prone offer three supporting arguments. First, they maintain that there is more
opportunity for great powers to fight each other in multi-polarity. There are only two
great powers in bipolarity, which means there is only one great power versus great
power dyad. In multi polarity, by contrast, there are three potential conflict dyads when
there are three great powers, and even more as the number of great powers increases

Second, there tends to be greater equality between the great powers in bipolarity
because, the more great powers there are in the system, the more likely it is that wealth
and population, the principal building blocks of military power, will be distributed
unevenly among the great powers. And, when there are power imbalances, the stronger
often have opportunities to take advantage of the weaker. Furthermore, it is possible in
a multi-polar system for two or more great powers to gang up on a third great power.
Such behaviour is impossible, by definition, in bipolarity.

Third, there is greater potential for miscalculation in multi-polarity, and miscalculation

often contributes to the outbreak of war. Specifically, there is more clarity about
potential threats in bipolarity, because there is only one other great power. Those two
states invariably focus on each other, reducing the likelihood that they will misgauge
each other’s capabilities or intentions. In contrast, there are a handful of great powers in
multi-polarity and they usually operate in a fluid environment, where identifying friends
from foes as well as their relative strength is more difficult

Not all realists, however, accept the claim that bipolarity facilitates peace. Some argue
that multi-polarity is less war-prone. In this view, the more great powers there are in the
system, the better the prospects for peace. This optimism is based on two
considerations. First, deterrence is much easier in multi-polarity, because there are more
states that can join together to confront an especially aggressive state with
overwhelming force. In bipolarity, there are no other balancing partners. Balancing in

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multi-polarity might be inefficient sometimes, but eventually the coalition forms and
the aggressor is defeated, as Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and
Nazi Germany all learned the hard way

Second, there is much less hostility among the great powers in multi-polarity, because
the amount of attention they pay to each other is less than in bipolarity. In a world with
only two great powers, each concentrates its attention on the other. But, in multi-
polarity, states cannot afford to be overly concerned with any one of their neighbours

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 CHAPTER SIX

ENGLISH SCHOOL/INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

‘The English School’ is a term coined in the 1970s to describe a group of

predominantly British or British-inspired writers for whom international society is the
primary object of analysis, Its most influential members include Hedley Bull, Martin
Wight, John Vincent and Adam Watson whose main publications appeared in the
period between the mid-1960s and late 1980s

The foundational claim of the English School is that sovereign states form a society,
albeit an anarchic one in that they do not have to submit to the will of a higher power.
There is, they argue, a surprisingly high level of order and a surprisingly low level of
violence between states given that their condition is one of anarchy (in the sense of the
absence of a higher political authority). They invite their readers to reflect on the
probable level of violence, fear, insecurity and distrust in even the most stable of
domestic societies if sovereign authority collapsed. A condition of chaos would be the
most likely result, and yet this is not the central characteristic of world politics.

This is not to suggest that the English School ignores the phenomenon of violence in
relations between states. Its members regard violence as an endemic feature of the
‘anarchical society’ (the title of Hedley Bull’s most famous work, 1977) but they also
stress that it is controlled to an important extent by international law and morality.

Hedley Bull (1969: 20) summarized the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical’ International Society
approach as follows: it derives from ‘philosophy, history and law’ and it ‘is
characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement”. By ‘the
exercise of judgement’ Bull meant that IR scholars should fully understand
that foreign policy sometimes presents difficult moral choices to the statespeople
involved: choices between rival political values and goals; choices that may involve the
use of armed force and may therefore bring about physical destruction and human
suffering for the people caught up in it. A difficult foreign-policy choice in this regard
would be the decision to go to war or the decision to engage in humanitarian
intervention

The traditional International Society approach seeks to avoid the stark choice between
(1) state egotism and conflict, and (2) human goodwill and cooperation presented by the

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debate between realism and liberalism. On the one hand, International Society scholars
reject classical realists’ pessimistic view of states as self-sufficient and self-regarding
political organizations that relate to each other and deal with each other only on an
instrumental basis of narrow self-interest—international relations conceived as an
unchanging state ‘system’ that is prone to recurrent discord, conflict, and—sooner or
later—war. On the other hand, they reject classical liberalism’s optimistic view of
international relations as a developing world community that is inevitably moving in the
direction of unparalleled human progress and perpetual peace, a condition which would
be increasingly indistinguishable from domestic peace and prosperity.

The first assumption underlying the English School image is that the world can be
understood as an international or anarchical society in which both states and non-state
actors operate. The emphasis is on the concept of “society,” which realists would tend
not to pair with “anarchical.”. The term international society is what distinguishes the
English schools from other theories of international relations.

Hedley Bull made an important distinction between an international system and an

international society:

A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have
sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions
to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other. A
society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one
another and share in the working of common institutions. Bull (1995: 9–13).

To understand further we can take an example of the relationship between USA and the
Soviet Union. during the Cold War the international society between the United States
and the Soviet Union was reduced to being not much more than a system in which the
foreign policy of each side was based on its calculation about the intentions and
capabilities of the other side, particularly as regards nuclear weapons (see web link
5.11). After the Cold War, however, Russia became more involved with the Western-
centred world of international organizations such as the G-8 (Group of Eight—the
United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Canada); OECD;
International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and

25
Development (EBRD), OSCE, and NATO. In order to do that, Russia had to take on
board common interests and observe, however imperfectly, the common values and
obligations of those international organizations—in short, Russia had to become a
reliable citizen of Western-centred international society.

A second Major Assumption that set distinctions of English school/international society

is the concepts of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism (Wight 1991). These are
three different ways of looking at the relations of states. The fist concept views states as
power agencies that pursue their own interests. It thus conceives of international
relations solely as instrumental relations. That is the realist view of Machiavelli.

The second concept views states as legal organizations that operate in accordance with
international law and diplomatic practice. It thus conceives of international relations as
rule-governed activities based on the mutually recognized authority of sovereign states.
That is the rationalist view of Grotius

The third concept downplays the importance of states and places the emphasis on
human beings. Humans are seen to compose a primordial ‘world community’ or
‘community of humankind’ that is more fundamental than the society of states. This is
the revolutionist view of Kant.

According to Martin Wight (1991), IR cannot be adequately understood through any

one of these conceptualizations alone. It cannot be said one is true and one is false. IR
can only be adequately understood through all of them together. If properly carried out,
the International Society approach should be an exploration of the conversation or
dialogue between these three different theoretical perspectives. Realists, rationalists,
and revolutionists each represent a distinctive normative position, or ‘voice’, in a
continuing dialogue about the conduct of foreign policy and other international human
activities. Thus the English school argues that international relations is endless debate
between realism, revisionist and revolutionist

Realism is the doctrine that rivalry and conflict between states is ‘inherent’ in their
relations. Realists emphasize ‘the element of anarchy, of power politics, and of warfare’
(Wight 1991: 15–24). Realism concentrates on the actual—what is—rather than the
ideal—what ought to be. It involves the avoidance of wishful thinking and ‘the frank
acceptance of the disagreeable side of life’. Realists therefore tend to be pessimistic

26
about human nature: humankind is divided into ‘crooks and fools’, and realists survive
and succeed by outsmarting the crooks and taking advantage of those who are stupid or
naive. That implies that world politics cannot progress but always remains basically the
same from one time or place to another. Realism taken to the extreme is denial of an
international society; what exists is a Hobbesian state of nature. The only political
society and, indeed, moral community is the state. There are no international
obligations beyond or between states.

Revolutionists identify themselves with universal human fulfilment however defied,

e.g., common humanity (Kant), or the world proletariat (Marx), or the liberal end of
history (Fukuyama 1989). They assume ‘the moral unity’ of human society beyond the
state (Wight 1991: 8–12). Revolutionary social change to bring about a universal
condition that is conducive to human fulfilment (however that may be defied) is the
ultimate goal.

According to English school, all these voices broadcast the fact that international
relations are basically human activities concerned with fundamental values. Two of the
most fundamental values are given special attention by Hedley Bull (1995):
international order and international justice. By ‘international order’. Bull means
‘a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains’ the basic goals of the
society of states. By ‘international justice’ he means the moral rules which ‘confer
rights and duties upon states and nations’, such as the right of self-determination, the
right of non-intervention, and the right of all sovereign states to be treated on a basis of
equality.

Order and Justice

The main point of the anarchical society, according to Bull (1995: 16–19), is promotion
and preservation of international order with the aim to sustain the basic and primary
goals of society of states. He identified these primary goals as (1) preservation of
international society; (2) upholding the independence of member states, maintaining
peace, and helping to secure the normative foundations of all social life, which includes
‘the limitation of violence’ (expressed in the laws of war); (3) ‘the keeping of promises’
(expressed in the principle of reciprocity); (4) ‘the stability of possession’ (expressed in
the principle of mutual recognition of state sovereignty).

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Bull distinguishes three kinds of order in world politics (Bull 1995: 3–21). The fist kind
is ‘order in social life’, which is an essential element of human relations regardless of
the form taken; the second is ‘international order’, which is order between states in a
system or society of states; and the last is ‘world order’, which is order among
humankind as a whole. English school stresses that The responsibility for sustaining
international order—order between states—belongs to the great powers, and is achieved
by ‘managing their relations with one another’.

Another important concept for the English school is Justice. Bull identifies various
conceptions of justice, but he draws particular attention to the distinction in
international relations between commutative justice and distributive justice.
Commutative justice is about procedures and reciprocity. It involves ‘a process of claim
and counter-claim’ among states. Distributive justice is about goods. It involves the
issue of how goods should be distributed between states.

Bull ends his discussion of order and justice by considering the relative weight of these
two values in world politics. In his comparison, order is seen to be more fundamental:
‘it is a condition for the realization of other values’ (Bull 1995: 93). Order is prior to
justice.

English school have been devoting increased attention to the idea world society. This
term refers to common interests and shared values that link ‘all parts of the human
community’ thus World society is seen to be manifested in various international
organizations with a humanitarian purpose, particularly the protection of human rights.
Institutions such as the UN charter, the European court of human rights, the ICC are all
institutions designed to promote world society, although International society cast doubt
the possibility of world society based on common humanity.

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 CHAPTER SEVEN

CONSTRUCTIVISM

constructivism is one of the youngest ‘major’ theories in International Relations,

Social constructivism attempts to find a practical answer to the postmodern challenge
to scientific knowledge in order to be able to conduct empirical research. It focuses in
particular on the interplay of structure and agency, and of ideas, norms and interests.

Why this approach is called ‘social constructivism’. ‘Constructivism’ here means that
these authors do not accept any social features of life as given. Instead, while they
acknowledge that human beings are always situated in particular contexts which inform
their actions, they also reproduce, or construct, their ‘world’ through their actions.

The process of construction, in turn, is a ‘social’ process – it cannot be done by one

person alone, but only in the engagement with others. The term ‘constructivism’
therefore does not imply voluntarism. Individuals are always part of broader settings
which they can shape, but only within the specific context.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

 Social constructivists try to bridge the gap between structure and agency-centred
theories and argue that structure and agency are mutually dependent. As a
consequence, most social relations are relatively stable, but the continuous
reproduction of structures brings with it the potential for change.
 Social constructivists emphasise the role of norms in people’s behaviour.
Foreign policy, for instance, is not only a matter of national interest, but also of
acceptable behaviour in the international society. Some social constructivists
also stress ideas. These are often treated as individual beliefs, whereas norms
have a much more social quality,
 Apart from norms, social constructivists emphasise the role of institutions.
Constructivists believe that there are formal and informal institutions, formal
institutions ie the state, university etc
 The focus on norms and institutions does not mean that social constructivists
disregard the role of interests (remember: they situate themselves in the middle
ground!). There are two ways in which interests enter social constructivist
research. First, they are not taken for granted. Instead, social constructivists

29
 concern themselves with how interests are formulated, and in particular the role
of institutions, norms and ideas in this process. Second, social constructivist
work often analyses the interplay between ideas and interests.

INTER-SUBJECTIVITY

Central to constructivism is the understanding that international politics is guided by

inter-subjectivity shared and institutionalized norms, rules, ideas, beliefs, and values
held by actors (or agents). Inter-subjective by definition means shared by people—
defined by their person-to-person, self-other exchanges—the ideational component of
IR. Institutionalized means these collective ideas are established or constituted in the
social world as structures or institutions, practices, and identities. These shared norms
and rules set expectations about how the world works and what constitutes legitimate
behaviour.

An example

First, we take up the social construction of the concept of sovereignty, which consists
of a set of rules or standards of behaviour providing guidance for states interacting with
one another. Specifically, sovereign states came to claim under international law a right
to complete jurisdiction over their own territories (the internal or domestic dimension);
hence, the development of the international norm prescribing non-interference in the
internal affairs of other states. Second, states claim a right to be independent or
autonomous in the conduct of their foreign relations (the external or international
dimension). To constructivists, therefore, sovereignty is not simply a property of
individual states, but rather an inter-subjectively shared and socially constructed
institution or normative structure among states.

The Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) marked the
emergence of sovereignty among the German and other states as a convenient norm that
effectively placed authority in ruling princes, dukes, and kings of the day. Even though
practice among them preceded the formalization of sovereignty—respecting the
prerogatives of other sovereign states—the new norm in time became globalized in both
its domestic and external dimensions

Of course, the internal dimension of sovereignty—non-interference in a state’s internal

affairs—has been violated many times over the centuries as when one country invades

30
another but the idea remained intact. This inter-subjective consensus on the sovereign
rights of states, however, has weakened somewhat as another consensus gradually has
emerged: growing international support for human rights and a sense that there is a
collective responsibility to do something about human rights violations

A second example is also drawn from human rights. Consider how slavery and the slave
trade were once accepted practice in international relations. From the standpoint of the
United States and many European countries, slavery was considered an economic
imperative—an institution of critical importance to the economic interests of the slave-
trading states (and their slave owners) as late as the eighteenth and well into the
nineteenth centuries. This inter-subjective consensus gradually broke down. Domestic
and internationally accepted norms against such exploitation of fellow human beings
were slow in development, but by the late nineteenth century finally became part of the
fabric of rules prohibiting such violations of human rights.

STRUCTURE

Constructivists define structure in terms of social relationships and shared meanings,

the components of the structure can be included the norms and rules, shared knowledge
etc

Rules: Rules are one of the most important characteristics of structure, Constructivists
make a distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, regulative rules; they are
formulated to regulate an existing activity—driving cars. A widely used example of
regulative rule is driving a car, the act of driving cars or other vehicles existed prior to
establishing the socially accepted rule in the United States and most other countries that
one should drive on the right-hand side or left-hand side.

Contrast this illustration with that of chess. It was not a matter of people pushing bits of
wood around the board and bumping into one another that created the need for
regulative rules. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess in
the first place: “The rules are constitutive of chess in the sense that playing chess is
constituted in part by acting according to the rules.

Norms: Norms are generally accepted values that define standards of appropriate
behaviour for agents (actors) with a given identity. Norms are another component of

31
structure. Sometimes norm can operate as rules and are said to have constituent effect,
other situations, norms act as standard and are said to have regulative effect.

AGENTS

Constructivist theorists stress the relationship between agents and structure.

Constructivists do not privilege any particular agent, actor, or unit of analysis. The
agents may be states, but also non-state actors to include individuals or groups as well
as social movements, corporations, international organizations, nongovernmental
advocacy groups, or classes. All of them can have potential effect in the creation of
international norms.

Constructivists tend to view differently the way Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism

conceptualize the relationship between agent and structure, for realists, interest and
identities are constant. But constructivist believes that Structure can encourage actors or
agents to redefine their interests and identities in an ongoing socialization process. The
same is true that agents can also influence the creation of structure (norms and rules)

Identities: are relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about

one’s self that are acquired by interacting with or defining the self in relation to an
“other”—in constructivist terms a structure composed of social relationships, shared
meanings, rules, norms, and practices.

At the level of the individual, human consciousness is important—the “self” that

interprets (and thus constitutes the “other” outside oneself), much as the “other” outside
the self gives meaning or identity to the self. For example, the respective identities of
professor and student make sense within the context and interaction of a classroom
setting; the identities are mutually constituted

In terms of IR, the dominant inter-subjective understanding and social relationship of

the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War was that of enemies. Being
anti-Soviet and anticommunist was a critical element of how Americans tended to
identify themselves and their role in the world thus identities can change over time and
across contexts. Hence, identities are not immutable characteristics of individuals,
groups, states, or whatever agent one is examining. Identities are produced and are not
givens, any more than a state’s interests are.

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Another field of constructivist research also relies heavily on international norms and
their power to constrain state action. Although realists (and neoliberals) contend that
states make decisions based on a logic of consequences (“What will happen to me if I
behave a certain way?”), constructivist scholars note that there is a powerful logic of
appropriateness (“How should I behave in this situation?”). For example, some cases of
humanitarian intervention—military intervention by a state or states to protect citizens
or subjects of another state—seem diff cult to explain in realist or liberal terms. Why,
for example, did the United States in 1992 send troops to Somalia—a country of
minimal strategic and economic importance to the United States—as Somalia
descended into political chaos and faced the possibility of mass starvation, A
constructivist explanation might point to changing norms about which kinds of people
are worthy of protection.

Constructivists claim that the interests of actors (what realists and liberals have
tended to take for granted as givens) are constructed and subject to change by the
actors themselves as they interact with others. The constructivist take on interests
is best understood in contrast to other approaches.

The concept of national interest has long been a central focus in the study of
international relations. Particularly for realists, the specific goals of states vary,
but all states have an interest in survival, wealth, security, and enough power to
secure those interests. The origins of these interests are exogeneous (external) to
any state as a result of the condition of international anarchy and the security
dilemma states face.

Constructivists would argue, however, that interests and understandings of

opportunities and threats are highly subjective. Consider, for example, a popular
constructivist example: How can some 500 nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom be
less threatening (or even nonthreatening) to the interests of the United States than a
small number of North Korean or Iranian nuclear weapons? Obviously, North Korean
and Iranian words and deeds have led the United States to view these countries as
hostile and thus threats to its interests. Here is where a constructivist would argue that
American leaders are responding to the social dimension of relations between the
United States and other countries, rather than merely to capabilities—the material
nuclear hardware they may possess or seek to acquire.

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CRITICISM OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Social constructivism is criticised by both the rationalist and the reflectivist end of the
spectrum of the fourth debate for being inconsistent or not radical enough. They argue
that most of the puzzles addressed by social constructivism can be adequately explained
by interests and other ‘material’ factors, and that the impact of such things as norms
accounts for, if anything, a very small portion of the variation in state behaviour. Some
also find the very notion of identity or norms as explanatory factors problematic, as
they cannot be readily observed.

Some major problems remain. One is that a lot of the concepts that social
constructivists operate with are rather unclearly defined. Some analyses, for instance,
talk about identity, culture, norms and institutions, and it can be rather difficult to
separate them

One criticism that is shared by many rationalists and reflectivists is that most social
constructivists, despite their emphasis on the interplay between structure and agency,
focus their analyses on structures such as identities, institutions, cultures and norms.

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 CHAPTER EIGHT

MAXISM/STRUCTURALISM

In discussions of world politics, it is not uncommon for Marxism to be dismissed out of

hand as being preoccupied with economics rather than politics, and concerning itself
with domestic rather than international social relations. In this chapter I will suggest to
the contrary that Marxist theory aims at a critical understanding of capitalism as an
historically particular way of organizing social life, and that this form of social
organization entails political, cultural, and economic aspects which need to be
understood as a dynamic ensemble of social relations not necessarily contained within
the territorial boundaries of nation states. Viewed in this way, Marxism can yield
insights into the complex social relationships—on scales from the workplace and the
household to the global—through which human beings produce and reproduce their
social relations, the natural world, and themselves.

HISTORICAL METERIALISM

While it may not be possible to provide a simple or straightforward definition of

Marxism which would comfortably encompass all its different variants and divergent
strains, one fundamental commonality is the desire to provide a critical interpretation of
capitalism, understood as an historically produced—and therefore mutable—form of
social life, rather than as the ineluctable/inescapable expression of some essential
human nature.

Contrary to Adam Smith’s, and many liberals’ world of self interested individuals,
naturally predisposed to do a deal, Marx posited a relational and process-oriented view
of human beings. On this view, humans are what they are not because it is hard-wired
into them to be self-interested individuals, but by virtue of the relations through which
they live their lives. In particular, he suggested that humans live their lives at the
intersection of a three-sided relation encompassing the natural world, social relations
and institutions, and human persons.

Insofar as humans are material beings, we must engage in some kind of productive
interchange with the natural world in order to secure our survival. Insofar as we are
social beings, this productive activity will be socially organized, necessarily involving
thinking, talking, and planning together. And in the process of this socially productive

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activity, Marx believed, humans continuously remake their world (both its natural and
social aspects) and themselves. If contemporary humans appear to act as self interested
individuals, then, it is a result not of our essential nature but of the particular ways we
have produced our social lives and ourselves. On this view, humans may be collectively
capable of recreating their world, their work, and themselves in new and better ways.

The Meaning of Dialectic

This view of human social life as relations in process forms the core of Marx’s famous
dialectical understanding of history: humans are historical beings, simultaneously the
producers and the products of historical processes.

Marx summarized his view of history in the following terms: ‘Men make their
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given, and transmitted from the past’ (2000: 329).

This process is sometimes described as a dialectic of agents and structures. Agents are
social actors, situated in the context of relatively enduring social relations or structures,
often embodied in institutions. Structures generate the possibility of certain kinds of
social identity and corresponding forms of action (i.e. roles which actors may play in
the context of those structures), but the structures are not themselves determinative or
automatic. They require human agents continuously to re-enact their structural roles.
Actors or agents may enact structural roles in ways which reproduce, alter, or
potentially even transform social structures in which they are embedded. ‘This interplay
between individual actions and the institutions that form the framework for individual
action is what Marx means by dialectic’ (Schmitt 1997 : 50).

Marx rejected the explanations that posit objective laws of social life; he said, they
distract us from the ways in which our world has been produced by historically situated
human social agents.

MARX AND CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

Marx was one of the most incisive critics of capitalism, For Marx, capitalism was not to
be confused with markets or exchange, which long predated capitalism. Rather,

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capitalism represented a form of social life in which commodification had proceeded to
such a degree that human labour itself was bought and sold on the market.

One of Marx’s central insights was that this situation presupposed the development of
historically specific class-based relations and powers: the concomitant development of
capital—socially necessary means of production reconstituted as the exclusive private
property of a few—and wage labour as the compulsory activity of the many. Under the
class relations of capitalism, direct producers are not personally tied to their exploiter,
as were slaves in bondage to their master or feudal serfs bound to the lord’s estate. In a
real historical sense, then, capitalism frees workers to treat their labour as their own
property. However, this freedom is complemented by a peculiarly capitalist kind of
unfreedom. Insofar as means of production are under the ownership and control of a
class of private owners, workers are compelled to sell their labour to members of this
owning class in order to gain access to those means of production, engage in socially
productive activity, and secure through their wages the material necessities of survival,
thus capitalism in contradictory it offers freedom and un-freedom at the same time

Capitalism is disabling insofar as this way of organizing social life distorts and
obscures real historical possibilities for social self-determination. Socially empowered
as never before to remake their world and themselves, people under capitalism are
simultaneously prevented from realizing the full implications of their socially
productive powers and the fuller forms of freedom these powers might make possible.
Within the context of capitalist commodification and the ideology it supports,
historically specific forms of social organization and activity take on the appearance of
objective, necessary, natural, universal conditions.

This is an instance of a powerful critical insight derived from Marxian theory: to the
extent that people understand existing social relations as natural, necessary, and
universal, they are prevented from looking for transformative possibilities, precluded
from imagining the social production of alternative possible worlds.

Capitalism is exploitative, On Marx’s view; capital is the result of socially productive

activity, the creation of value by labour. Viewed as a ‘thing’, capital itself has no
productive powers. But viewed as a social relation, capital is productive only as an
accumulation of previously expended labour power, set in motion by newly expended
labour power. Yet, because capitalism is characterized by private ownership of the

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means of production, as owner the capitalist controls the production process and
expropriates its product—the surplus value created by labour (i.e. the product of labour
above and beyond that required to sustain the workers themselves)

State and power

Marxism differ over the importance of states in international relations, with some
arguing that international political and economic analysis would be better focused on
social classes and the nature of transnational alliances among élites. However, even
those who prefer such a class-based analysis recognise the actual political division of
the world into states, and the role that these states play in helping to maintain class-
based inequalities.

Marxism resembles realists in recognising the importance of the state in IR. However,
rather than seeing the state as a sovereign power representing the interests of the
‘nation’ in international relations, structuralists hold that the state in some sense reflects
the interests of dominant social classes. There is, however, disagreement among
structuralist thinkers as to whether the state is dominated by élite social classes, or
whether it exercises a degree of autonomy.

In classical Marxism and early structuralist theory, the state was seen as a coercive,
repressive apparatus supporting an exploitative social and economic order and
reflecting the interests of dominant classes. Marx famously described the state as the
committee of the bourgeoisie. So-called instrumentalist views are similar to classical
Marxism in that they regard the state as a direct instrument of class rule. This school of
thought suggests that state policies and actions are designed to consolidate and reinforce
the position of the dominant class. In capitalist societies the political and legal systems
support the ownership of private property, including the private ownership of the means
of production.

Dependency theory

Dependency theory was pioneered by Latin American scholars who have different
academic backgrounds; several of these writers were associated in the 1960s with the
Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They were concerned with the important

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problem of explaining why Latin America and other Third World regions were not
developing as anticipated

One response came from mainstream modernization writers. This modernization

literature attempted to answer these questions by exploring the difficulties of LDCs in
moving from “traditional” to “modern” societies. The cultural values of a traditional
society are postulated to be a hindrance to modernization. Dependency theorists
rejected this view because not all countries in the developing world fail to experience
economic growth, some economies did grow, but growth tended to occur in an LDC
only when the developed countries had a need for a particular raw material or
agricultural product. Because many LDCs are dependent on only a few of these
commodities for their foreign exchange earnings, a drastic decline in the demand for
one of them (perhaps caused by a recession in North America) would have a calamitous
impact on an LDC’s economy. Or, alternatively, a bumper crop in several LDCs heavily
dependent on one particular export (such as coffee or sugar) would also cause prices to
fall.

Economic exploitation of LDCs by the industrialized states is not an accident or simply

an additional means by which these states enrich themselves. Rather, economic
exploitation is an integral part of the capitalist system and is required to keep it
functioning. The result is a condition of dependency, succinctly defined as a “situation
in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by the
development and expansion of another . . ., placing the dependent countries in a
backward position exploited by the dominant countries.”12 The modernization
experience of a particular society should not be seen in isolation, “but as part of the
development of an internationalist capitalist system, whose dynamic has a determining
influence on the local processes.” As a result, underdevelopment is not “a moment in
the evolution of a society which has been economically, politically and culturally
autonomous and isolated.”13 Instead, Latin American and other Third World countries
are attempting to develop under historical conditions quite different from those of the
northern industrialized states.

World Systems theory

The writings of Immanuel Wallerstein (born 1930) represent the most ambitious of
economic-structuralist work and have been the catalyst for an extensive

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amount of subsequent research. In attempting to understand the origins and
dynamics of the modern world economy and the existence of worldwide uneven
development, he and his followers aspire to no less than a historically based theory
of global development, which he terms world-system theory.

Wallerstein begins by analyzing the emergence of capitalism in Europe, tracing

its development into a capitalist world-system that contains a core, a periphery, and
a semi-periphery—a decidedly different understanding of globalization from that
offered by liberals. The core areas historically have engaged in the most advanced
economic activities: banking, manufacturing, technologically advanced agriculture,
and shipbuilding. The periphery has provided raw materials such as minerals and
timber to fuel the core’s economic expansion. Unskilled labor is repressed, and the
peripheral countries are denied advanced technology in those areas that might make
them more competitive with core states. The semi-periphery is involved in a mix of
production activities, some associated with core areas and others with peripheral
areas. The semi-periphery also serves a number of other functions such as being an
outlet for investment when wages in core economies become too high. Over time,
particular regions of the world may move from one type of status (core, peripheral,
and semi peripheral) to another

Wallerstein insist that in order to understand the development of global economic,

political, and social processes, we must keep our eyes on the development of capitalism.
Capitalism is a system-wide or global phenomenon. We should not concentrate on
individual states and national economies and then extrapolate from their experiences.
Instead, we should examine capitalism as an integrated, historically expanding system
that transcends any particular political or geographic boundaries

Imperialism: the expansion of Capitalism

Lenin (1968) developed the theory of imperialism to explain the causes of the First
World War. Lenin argued that advanced processes of capitalist accumulation were
driving the major capitalist countries into colonial expansionism. Although the precise
mechanisms driving capitalism toward imperialism varied (e.g. the quest for raw
materials, overproduction requiring a search for new markets, or over-accumulation
compelling the export of capital), advanced capitalist countries would be driven by the
imperatives of capital accumulation to support the international expansion of their great

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monopolistic blocs of industrial–financial capital. In a finite world where much of the
globe had already been colonized by one or another of the great imperialist powers,
‘inter-imperialist rivalry’ was seen as an overwhelmingly likely source of conflict, and
the First World War would have appeared as confirmation of this.

Gramsci and hegemony

Marx predicted that the proletariat in advanced countries would soon rise up and
overthrew the capitalist system which is based on exploitation upon labour. The
Marxist expectation that proletarian revolution, once ignited, would sweep the advanced
capitalist world was bitterly disappointed in the early twentieth century. The Russian
revolution gave birth to socialism in one nation and Marxists in the West were left to
ponder the reasons why working-class revolution had failed to materialize in their own
countries and, subsequently, why fascism had triumphed in some Western countries.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci became sharply critical to the economic
determinism or materialism which Marxists based on their arguments. Gramsci
developed a theory of hegemony as a subtle form of political power which relied more
strongly upon consent than coercion. In a hegemonic social situation, dominant groups
(classes, class fractions, and their various allies) articulate a social vision which claims
to serve the interests of all, and they use selective incentives to recruit junior partners
into their coalition and to divide and disable opposition. In other words, Gramsci
analysed Hegemony in terms of consent and coercion, both of which are essential to its
maintenance. Each balances the other, ‘so that force does not overwhelm consent but
rather appears to be backed by the consent of the majority’. This means Gramsci
highlights the ideational aspect of hegemony.

Gramsci believed that in advanced capitalist societies, in which civil society was highly
developed, hegemonic power might be promoted and contested in forums of popular
culture, education, journalism, literature, and art, as well as in political parties and
unions. The ideational aspects of the hegemony of a dominant and dominating class
become institutionalized in the form of a ‘hegemonic apparatus’. Most importantly,
power that is sustained and reproduced through hegemony is made to appear ‘natural’ –
and what is ‘natural’ is often taken to be ‘right’. In other words, it appears ‘right and
natural’ that those in authority, those who command the heights of political, social and

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economic power, and use that power to advantage, are awarded legitimacy through their
own self-serving hegemonic devices.

CHAPTER NINE

FEMINISM THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Feminism theories have introduced gender as a relevant empirical category and

analytical tool for understanding global power relations as well as a normative position
from which to construct alternative world orders. Together with a range of new
perspectives on world politics, including postmodernism, constructivism, critical
theory, feminist theories have contested the power and knowledge of mainstream realist
and liberal International Relations. Pointing out that most knowledge has been created
by men and is about men.

Assumptions

 Feminists do not regard human nature as immutable; liberals believe that

human beings are rational beings, but also that human capacities develop
through the process of education. Other schools of feminism regard ‘human
nature’ as being differentiated or socially constructed.
 From a feminist perspective, we cannot make a clear distinction between a
‘fact’ and a ‘value.’
 There is an intimate connection between knowledge and power and between
our ‘theories’ about the world and our practices – the way we engage with our
physical and social surroundings.
 Feminist share a commitment to women’s emancipation or liberation. Post-
structuralisms prefer to speak of ‘empowerment’ and interrogate what this
might mean in specific cultural contexts.

Difference Feminism

Difference feminism in international relations arose as a reaction against the

mainstream international relations, what is called male stream international relations,
particularly, realist and neo-realist international relations by criticizing its core
assumption such as anarchy and sovereignty. Difference feminist therefore argues that
core concepts of realism reflect the ways on which males tend to interact and see the

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world. Thus, the realist perspective simply assumes male participants when discussing
foreign policy decision-making, state sovereignty or the use of military force (Goldstein
and Pevehouse, 2008).

Difference feminists in international relations believe that there are real differences
between genders that are not just socially construction and cultural indoctrination.
Difference feminists find in realism a hidden assumption of masculinity

Liberal Feminism

Liberal feminism is very much committed to the Enlightenment view of how the world
should be organised. The notion that human societies could progress, along with
emphasize of scientific knowledge rather than traditional view, as Alizabeth Candy
once argued that the status of women was one measure of the progressive and civilised
nature of society. From a liberal perspective, participation in public life was the key to
advancing the status of women. Liberals claimed that women, like men, were capable of
intellectual development and moral progress. This meant that women, like men, were
rational creatures and so had the right to participate in public life – to vote and, more
broadly, to contribute to debates about political, social and moral issues – rather than
being confined to the private sphere of the home and the family, represented in public
life by the male ‘head of the household’.

Liberal feminism intends to empower women and give them an equal role in society,
especially in politics and at work. Its goal is to insure complete gender equality between
men and women without changing completely the way the society works or girls' and
boys' socialization. They view gender differences as perceived to be discrimination
against women

Marxism feminism

This strand of feminism has its origins in Marxism. At the very time that nineteenth-
century liberal feminists were rallying around the cause of women’s rights, Marxists
were arguing that equal rights would not lead to women’s emancipation. While they
welcomed the declining influence of religious dogmatism and traditional beliefs,
Marxists argued these developments would not necessarily bring the end of women’s
inequality, because capitalism was simultaneously creating new forms of social
subordination and inequality. The gist of the Marxist view of the position of women in

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society (most fully articulated by Friedrich Engels) was that the emergence of
capitalism as a social and economic system brought about a clear distinction between
the public world of work and the private realm of the home and the family. This led to
particular ideas about what constituted ‘work’ and ‘production’,
and in this process ‘women’s work’ came to be denigrated and undervalued. The home
and the family had come to be viewed as ‘private’ areas of human life, clearly separate
and distinct from the public realm.

A key issue that Marxist feminists highlighted was the contribution that women’s
unpaid domestic labour made to the capitalist economy. These concerns – women’s
contribution to the global economy, prevalent ideas about the naturalness of gender
roles, and the separation of the public and the private – remain central to contemporary
feminist historical materialism

It is important to note that this strand of feminism also emphasises the role of ideology
in constructing and reproducing social relations of inequality. Gender differences are
constructed as socially relevant and used to justify differential treatment between men
and women.

Post-Structuralism Feminism

Poststructuralists focus on meaning as it is codified in language. They claim that our

understanding of reality is mediated through our use of language. They are particularly
concerned with the relationship between knowledge and power; those who construct
meaning and create knowledge thereby gain a great deal of power. Feminists point out
that men have generally been seen as the knowers—what has counted as legitimate
knowledge in the social sciences has generally been based on knowledge about men’s
lives in the public sphere; women have been marginalized both as knowers and as the
subjects of knowledge

Poststructuralist feminism is particularly concerned with the way dichotomized

linguistic constructions, such as strong/weak, rational/emotional, and public/private,
serve to empower the masculine over the feminine. In international relations
constructions, such as civilized/ uncivilized, order/anarchy, and
developed/underdeveloped, have been important in how we divide the world
linguistically. Poststructuralists believe that these distinctions have realworld

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consequences. Dichotomous constructions such as these denote inferiority and even
danger with respect to those on the outside—they are also gendered and have racial
implications

Post-Colonial Feminism

Postcolonial feminism makes similar claims about the way Western feminists have
constructed knowledge about non-Western women. Just as feminists have criticized
Western knowledge for its false assumptions about universality when, in reality, it is
knowledge constructed mainly from men’s lives, postcolonial feminists see false claims
of universalism arising from knowledge which is based largely on the experiences of
relatively privileged Western women.

Chandra Mohanty ( 1988 ) critiques some Western feminists for treating women as a
homogeneous category which does not acknowledge their differences depending on
their culture, social class, race, and geographical location. This ethnocentric
universalism robs women of their historical and political agency. Postcolonial feminists,
such as Mohanty, are concerned that Western feminists assume that all women have
similar needs with respect to emancipation when, in fact, their realities are very
different. Postcolonial feminists challenge Western portrayals of Third World women
as poor, undereducated, victimized, and lacking in agency. Recent work in postcolonial
feminist IR, including that of Lily Ling and Anna Agathangelou, has analysed gender
subordination as sitting at the intersection of gender, race, and culture, and blurring the
boundaries between politics, political economy, and other relations of
domination/subordination. Recognizing this, they seek to redress these subordinations
within their own cultural context, rather than through some universal understanding of
women’s needs

Gender, Security and Global Politics

In this section we focus on how the theoretical perspectives we have outlined and how
the scholarship we have discussed contribute to our understanding of security and
insecurity. Feminist definitions of security, explanations of insecurity and suggestions
as to how to improve security are very different from those of conventional IR.

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Redefining Security

Conventional IR scholars, notably realists, define security primarily in terms of the

security of the state. A secure state is one that can protect its physical and moral
boundaries against an ‘anarchic’ international system. Neo-realists focus on anarchic
structure of international system, where states are unitary actors. The power seeking
behaviour and military capabilities of states are seen as ways to increase their security;
many security specialists believe that power-seeking in order to promote security
explains much of the international behaviour of states.

This assumption was challenged by international relations scholars in 1980s, noting that
most wars since 1945 have been fuelled by ethnic and nationalist rivalries and have not
been fought across international boundaries. Thus critical theory defined security in
terms of threats to human wellbeing and survival-the individual as well as the state.

Many IR feminists define security broadly in multidimensional and multilevel terms—

as the diminution of all forms of violence, including physical, structural, and ecological.
According to IR feminists, security threats include domestic violence, rape, poverty,
gender subordination, and ecological destruction as well as war.

CRITICISM ON FEMENISM

One criticism which could be levelled is that, while ostensibly concerned with gender
relations, feminists tend to concentrate on women, in their empirical work particularly.
This is probably an accurate observation in relation to the first wave of feminist writing
in IR

Another potential criticism is that, while offering important insights, feminists have
failed to construct a coherent account of the nature of international relations, akin to,
say, realism or liberalism. Certainly, there is no one ‘feminist paradigm’ or feminist
theory of IR. However, many poststructuralist feminists working in the field would
contend that the construction of one coherent world view is neither possible nor
desirable.

It might also be argued that feminism does not take into account other major divisions
between women based on, say, social class or ethnicity. This is a criticism which has
been levelled at liberal and radical feminism particularly, and with some justification.

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Most contemporary approaches to gender attempt a more nuanced analysis which
explores the ways in which culture, class, race, and so on intersect and cut across
gender divisions.

Another possible criticism is that feminism relies ultimately upon the notion that there
is a universal category ‘woman’ and that women share certain common experiences or
interests. In reality, gender relations, ‘women’s experiences’ and the social meaning
ascribed to gender difference differ from society to society and from culture to culture.

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