EVID DOCTRINES

I. Admissibility
A. Rule 128, Sections 1 to 4
1. People vs. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 Distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof;
Distinction among relevance, materiality, and competence)
B. Relevance
1. Lopez vs. Hessen, 365 P.2d 448
(1961)
2. State vs. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960) In the absence of proof that the money in Ball’s possession came from or is
connected with the robbery, the evidence was not relevant and was obviously
prejudicial.
C. Competence
1. Section 3, Rule 128
2. Exclusionary Rules under the 1987
Constitution
(a) Article III, Sections 2 and 3
(b) Article III, Section 12
(c) Article III, Section 17
3. Statutory Rules of Exclusion
(a) Section 201, Tax Reform Act of 2007
(b) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits
(c) R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wire Tapping Act

II. What Need Not be Proved

A. Rule 129, Secs. 1-4; Rule 10, Section
8
B. Cases
1. Judicial Notice
(b) Baguio vs. Vda. De Jalagat, 42 SCRA judicial notice of the finality of judgement in a case that was previously pending and
337 thereafter decided by it
(c) Prieto vs. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 GR: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.)
(d) Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 167 PH courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged
SCRA736 and proved as any other fact.
(e) Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 GR is that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
SCRA 650 cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or pending before the same court or same judge,
the CA applied the exception to this rule.

(g) BPI-Savings vs. CTA, 330 SCRA 507
(h) Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 151857, April 28, 2005
(i) People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos 135695-
96, October 12, 2000
EXC:
The court may take judicial notice: (1) when there is no objection, (2) done w the
archives, and (5) admitted as part of the record of the case then pending”.)
ith the knowledge of the opposing party, or (3) at the request or with consent of the
parties, (4) the original or part of the records are withdrawn from
Judicial notice is discretionary if:
1. It is considered of public knowledge - example: the scene of rape is not always
isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place;
2. Capable of unquestionable demonstration - fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. Example: judicial notice of the records of physicians concerning the
birth of two boys as “premature” since the rape occurred 6-7 months earlier.
3. Matters ought to be known to judges - example: ascertainable from the record of
the court proceedings.

To those not included in mandatory or discretionary matters, judicial notice may be

made during trial, on its own initiative or by request of another party, and upon
hearing. In this case, the judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper since
these matters require a hearing before courts can take judicial notice.
2. Judicial Admissions
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
 (a) Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48
(b) Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 131
SCRA 24
(c) CIR vs. Petron Corporation, GR No.
185568, March 21 2012
(d) Atilo III vs. CA
€ Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev Co.
III. Real and Demonstrative Evidence
A.Rule 130, Sections 1 and 2
B. Cases:
1. Calde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93980, 27 June 1994
2. People vs. Bardaje, 1999 SCRA 388
(1980)
3. Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
In the original answer to the complaint filed by Calupitan, he considered the
transaction as a sale with the right to conventional redemption. This admission was
proper, especially since it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was also acting as
his own attorney. Case law generally provides that pleadings are inadmissible as
admissions based on the theory that most of the allegations contained therein are
pleader’s matters - or fiction stated by the counsel. However, modern jurisprudence
rejects this traditionalist view. It now treats pleadings as statements of the real
issues and are admissions of the parties. The reservation is that if the pleading is
not signed by the party, there should be proof presented that he authorized it. If an
amended pleading is filed, allegations in the original pleading are held admissible.
The amended complaint takes the place of the original and the latter is considered
abandoned. GR is that a complaint is considered as a judicial admission which
requires no proof and becomes merely an extrajudicial admission. However, since it
was amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission. If
Macaria wanted to utilize the said complaint, she should have offered it in evidence.
Both parties in this case jointly stipulated before the CTA en banc that Petron did
not participate in the procurement and issuance of the TCCs. This stipulation
amounts to an admission and is treated as a judicial admission. Such admission,
according to Rule 129 Sec. 4, can only be contradicted by showing that (1) it was
made through a palpable mistake, or (2) that no such admission was made. In this
case, the exception does not apply
Admission was not admitted in this case. The GR is that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, and such does not require proof. This rule
admits of two exceptions: admission was made through palpable mistake, and
when no such admission was made.
The GR is that judicial admissions are binding on the declarant. Such does not
apply if: there is palpable mistake as to the admission, or if there was no admission
at all.
In this case, a palpable mistake was committed. Atlas had two different registration
certifications because it had a change of address from (1) Paseo de Roxas Makati,
to (2) Gil Puyat, Makati Ave. The actual VAT registration certificate became
effective on January 1, 1988. When it moved to Gil Puyat, it again registered since
its place of business changed and this became effective on August 15, 1990. Atlas
only made a palpable mistake in either referring to the wrong BIR record, or in
attaching the wrong VAT registration. The fact that Atlas only explained the
discrepancy before the CTA is understandable since that is also the time when they
became aware of the clerical error.
In this, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by
petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in
black and white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen
was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for
respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that both testamentary documents
in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the
Civil Code.
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused is not sufficient ground for
conviction unless the same is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
- There is corpus delicti when the evidence on record shows that the
crime prosecuted has been committed.
- In this case, the evidence lead to the belief that Adelino and Marcelina
eloped. Furthermore, Adelino was not assisted by counsel at the time of
investigation.
SC held that the rule in the PH is that, photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to (1) its production and (2) testified as to
the circumstances under which they were produced. The value lies in how the
photograph correctly depicts the scene at the time of the crime.
However, the photographer is not the only witness who can identify the pictures. Its
correctness may be proved either by (1) testimony of a person who made it, or (2)
by other competent witnesses. In this case, while the counsel for accused (Lazaro)
objected to the admissibility for lack of proper identification, the counsel for Tamayo
and Nerry used the same pictures to prove that his clients were not in any of the

4. Adamczuk v. Halloway, 13 A.2d 2
(1940)
5. State v. Tatum, 360 P.2d 754 (1961)
6. People v. Alejandro y Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 176350, 10 August 2011
IV. Best Evidence Rule
A. Rule 130, Sections 2-8; Rule 132,
Sections 25 and 27; Electronic
Commerce Act (R.A. 8792), Sections 5,
6-15; Rules on Electronic Evidence
(“REE”), Rule 2, Section 1; Rule 3; Rule 4
1. Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
pictures. The photographs were adopted as defense exhibits. The use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
The Regiscope films (negative and the print) may be admitted into evidence. The
court has for many years encouraged the admission and use of demonstrative
evidence, including photographs. Such admission lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the
jury. As long as some witness (not necessarily the photographer) can give some
indication as to:
1. When, where and under what circumstances the photograph was taken
and
2. That it accurately portrays the subject/s illustrated.
Elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165 are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking means
the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of
at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.]
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still
be held to be valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
shown to have been properly preserved.
 155 (1966)
2. Seiler v. Lucas Film, Ltd., 797 F.2d
1504 (1986)
3. People vs. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 98
(1990)
4. U.S. vs. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)
5. Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No.
180314, April 16, 2009
6. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free
Workers, 77 SCRA 24 (1977)
7. Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer, 25 SCRA
845 (1968)
8. National Power Corporation vs. Hon.
Codilla, G.R. No. 170491, April 3, 2007
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
The rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
The rule does not apply if the issue is on w/n such document was actually
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution .
In this case, the xerox copy was presented to establish its existence and not its
contents.
Mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthorized private document could not legally
produce the effect of suspending the sale of the land. This is not sufficient proof of
the right of Gregorio and Balistoy since it is a mere copy of a private document
whose legality has not even been proven.
- NOTE: The best evidence rule was not explicitly stated, but the doctrine
that “when the subject of an inquiry is the contents of a document, no
other evidence shall be admissible, other than the original” is inferred.
Even though the original of a falsified document is not, or may no longer be
produced, a criminal case for falsification may still stand if the person wishing to
establish its contents via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can show
that the best or primary evidence, is not available for any of the causes under
Section 3, Rule 130.
In this case, Pasacum admitted that the original was with her secretary. But when
the fiscal sent them letters/requests for the presentation of the original, they still did
not present the original clearance. Since there was proof of the existence of the
falsified document, and it was shown that despite reasonable notices, the original
document was still not presented, the presentation of the photocopy was justified.
SC held that the records should have been presented in court. If Siojo was able to
review these within two days, then it could not have been very voluminous. The
report of Siojo was not the best evidence of the said operating expenses. The
original reports on which it was based should have been presented. The best
evidence of the cost of the lost freight/ expenses for forklifts, etc. would have been
the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony of Teves, Jayme or Siojo.
Exhibits were shown to prove that Villarama co-mingled his personal funds and
transactions with those of the corporation. These exhibits are photostatic copies of
ledger entries and vouchers.
The SC held that it was admissible. Section 5 Rule 130 of the RoC, provides for the
requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the
custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent has possession of the original, (2)
reasonable notice was made to opponent, (3) satisfactory proof of its existence,
and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.
In this case, the second and fourth requisites were already established by
Villarama. As to the third, he admitted that they existed in the files of the
corporation and he personally saw some of them.
- As to the first element, it is not necessary for a party seeking to
introduce secondary evidence, to show that the original is in the
possession of the adverse party. It is enough that the circumstances
show that the writing is in his possession or under his control. The party
calling for the evidence may introduce a copy thereof, as in the case of
loss, since the loss, destruction, or non-production of the evidence is
also an exception to the best evidence rule.
- In this case, the presumption is that the originals of the vouchers are
lost, since even the corporation admits to such loss.
What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in
an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner
will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons
who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person's signature affixed
manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of
petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic

9. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs.
Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No.
170633, October 17, 2007
Secondary Evidence
1. De Vera vs. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602
(1983)
2. Ebreo vs. Ebreo, 483 SCRA 583
Parole Evidence Rule (Rule 130, Section
9; Article 1403 of the Civil Code)
1. Enriquez vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219
2. Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil 840
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation
of the law.
Since the terms “electronic data message” does not cover facsimile transmissions,
it is not a functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and it
not admissible.
Under the Rules of Court, secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But before introduction of such, the
introducing party must establish the existence of the original document. The order
of proof is: (1) Existence, (2) Execution, (3) Loss, and (4) Contents. This order may
be changed in the discretion of the court.
The SC held that, it failed to show that the document has been lost or destroyed.
The rule is that destruction/loss may be proved by:
1. Any person knowing that fact of such loss
2. A person who has made, in the judgement of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it
3. A person who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all the duplicates or counterparts
must be accounted for before using the copies.
In this case, the notary testified that the deed of sale has about four or five original
copies. Hence, all of these must be accounted for before secondary evidence can
be admitted. The petitioners failed to provide this. They were only able to account
for three out of the four or five original copies. Hence, the loss or destruction of the
original document has not been established, so the secondary evidence is
inadmissible.
Under the RoC, before a party can present secondary evidence, they must prove
the loss or destruction of the unavailability of all the copies of the original. They are
required to prove:
1. The execution and existence of the original;
2. The loss and destruction of the original and its non-production in court; and 3.
Unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.
GR is that when the terms of the agreement has been reduced in writing, it is
considered as containing all that has been agreed upon, and that no evidence other
than the terms therein can be admitted between the parties. However, this rule is
valid only if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true
intent of the parties. If there is such a claim, and this is put as an issue in the
pleadings, the agreement may be the subject of parol evidence. In this case, the
issue was raised in the answer where Ramos pleaded that the contract of sale does
not express the true intent of the parties.
GR is that the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict a
written instrument is prohibited. However, this rule does not prohibit the
establishment by parol evidence of another agreement between the parties which
was entered into subsequent to the original - even if such subsequent agreement
has the effect of adding to, changing or modifying, or even abrogating the contract.
The parol evidence presented does not deny the contents of the original
agreement, it merely shows that the parties, subsequent to such original document,
have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and
independent contract. Parol evidence does not question the original document, in
fact it recognizes the contents therein. The parol evidence pertained to the
subsequent agreement. It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the
original contract the parol was made. If it was subsequent to the original and is

3. Yu Tek & Co. vs. Gonzales, 29 Phil
384
4. Land Settlement Development Corp.
vs. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 7 SCRA
750
5. Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil 640
6. PNB vs. Seeto, 91 Phil 756
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
unobjectionable, then it may be proved and enforced.
Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their
contract. Their rights are determined by this writing. In this case, there is no clause
in the contract showing that the sugar was supposed to be raised by Gonzalez
himself. Gonzalez undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar, within a
specified period. It had no restriction as to HOW the sugar will be obtained. He can
raise it himself or purchase it from the market. While it is true that Gonzalez had a
sugar plantation, he did not limit his obligation in the contract to pertain to his own
crop of sugar.
He cannot use the parol evidence to incorporate in the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing. This can only
be availed of upon showing of fraud or mistake, which he failed to show. Hence, the
condition that he seeks to add cannot be considered
Parol evidence must be received.
- First, the fact that the letter failed to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties had been put in issue in the answer of
LASEDECO to the counterclaim of the spouses. (It is a requirement that
the allegation be put as an issue in the pleadings).
- Second, the contention that there is a condition precedent is manifested
by the letter (Exhibit L) itself: - “Please be advised that the Board has
granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which to pay your
account. This matter has been the subject of agreement between your
husband and this office” - The subject agreement referred to was the
condition that consideration be given first before the extension is
granted. Third, the subject matter treated by the parol evidence was one
of the exceptions under the parol evidence rule.
Parol evidence may be admitted when the operation of the contract is made to
depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition
precedent. This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic
agreement since there is no contract in existence. Basically, there is nothing to
apply the excluding rule. The rule excluding parol evidence does not extend so far
as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties. Such evidence
may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains
reference to such collateral agreement.
In this case, reference is made of a previous agreement. Although a document is
usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, the courts, in
the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances
to arrive at the true intention of the parties.
Parol evidence should be admitted. The consideration of a negotiable promissory
note, or any of the contract connected with it, like any other written instrument, is,
between the immediate parties to the contract, open to attack, under proper
circumstances, to show that there was an absolute lack or failure of consideration.
Under the parol evidence rule, the prohibition is there to prevent the alteration,
change or modification of the terms of the written instrument by the use of parol
evidence. - In this case, the evidence was not presented for such purpose. Its
purpose was to show that NO CONTRACT of indorsement ever existed. (no
meeting of the minds, no agreement as to the subject matter and no consideration).
The evidence was presented not to alter or modify the agreement. It was to deny
the existence of any agreement.
Dissent by Justice Torres: The presumption is that every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration, and every
person whose signature appears thereon is a party for value. The introduction of
parol evidence is not necessary since (1) there is a presumption that the instrument
is for value (law), and (2) the consideration appears from the instrument itself by the
expression of such value. Also, he cannot present parol evidence to modify or alter
the contents therein since when he signed it, he had full and perfect knowledge of
the meaning and import of the words contained therein.
According to jurisprudence and to Wigmore: Any prior or contemporaneous
conversation in connection with a note or indorsement may be proved by parol
evidence. In this case, the supposed assurances of Seeto in saying that: (1) the
drawer had funds and (2) that he will pay if it was dishonored, being the main
reasons why the bank cashed the checks can be proven by parol evidence. This is
acceptable as long as the assurances offered would not alter, vary or destroy the

7. Woodhouse vs. Halili, 93 Phil 526
8. Robles vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50
Phil 387
9. Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209
10. Lechugas vs. CA, 143 SCRA 335
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
obligations attached by law to the indorsement.
HOWEVER, the SC held that: While the CA erred in not accepting parol evidence,
such error was without prejudice since these assurances were given as part of the
obligation of Seeto as an indorser. This was discharged when there was an
unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment.
The testimony of the counsel of Woodhouse (Mr. Laurea) testified that Woodhouse
presented himself as being the exclusive grantee of a franchise. This can be seen
by the first draft (Exhibit II or OO) which was prepared by Laurea. Under the first
draft, it is stated that “The manager (Woodhouse) is the exclusive grantee of a
franchise from Mission Dry”, and that “He shall transfer this franchise to the
corporation after organization”. What happened was that the trial court did not
consider this draft relying on the principle of integration of jural acts.
SC held that the reliance on the principle is inapplicable. The purpose of
considering this prior draft was not to alter, vary, or modify the agreement. It was to
discover the intent of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the contract. Since the issue sought is on whether Woodhouse represented to
Halili that he had an exclusive franchise, it is only natural that the acts of
Woodhouse prior to the agreement be taken into consideration. These acts or
statements are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule. Furthermore, the
parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the
validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings as in this case.
A verbal contract entered was into in this case. The rule excluding parol evidence to
vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of
extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or
not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and
whether the action is at law or in equity.”
The trial court should not have admitted oral evidence of a contract different from
that in the contract of sale (Exhibit B). The written contract must be taken as
expressing all the pacts, agreements, and stipulations entered into between the
parties. Lizarraga stressed that no allegation was made to the effect that the written
contract fails to express the agreement of the parties, but the SC said that, this
case is not one for the reformation of a document on the ground of mistake or fraud
in its execution. Instead, it is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement
which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale.
The general rule that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the
terms of a contract must be taken with proper qualifications. All the authorities
agree that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract.
RECEIPT = Not evidence of the agreement
(Waiver of Parol Evidence rule) – The reason for Section 7 (Now Section 9), Rule
130 is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their agreement to
writing, they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the truth,
and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived
or abandoned.
IN THIS CASE: Section 7(Sec. 9 now), Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain
such an agreement. - It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, Cruz
received from Salonga P35k. - It was not intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement. Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that
gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual
memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgement of a
receipt of money executed by Cruz for Salonga’s satisfaction.
Parol evidence cannot be applied or invoked if at least one of the parties to the suit
is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument. Strangers to a contract
are not bound by the rule.
Basically, the rule will not apply if the controversy is between one of the parties to
the document (Lechugas) and a third person (defendant heirs). The deed of sale
was between Leoncia and Victoria. The defendants were never a party to it.
 11. Inciong vs. CA, 257 SCRA 578
12. Ortanez vs. CA, 266 SCRA 561
13. Rosario Textile Mills Corp. vs. Home
Bankers Savings & Trust Co., G.R. No.
137232, June 29, 2005
14. Madrigal vs. CA, G.R. No. 142944,
April 15, 2005
Qualification of Witnesses
A. Mental incapacity of immaturity (Rule
130, Sections 20-21)
1. People vs. Mendoza, 254 SCRA 18
2. People vs. Macapal, July 14, 2005
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
Does the parole evidence rule apply only when a document is a public instrument
and not when it is a private instrument? NO. The rule does not specify that the
written agreement be a public document. What is required is that the agreement be
in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is
so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only;
that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in
writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that
the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by
them."
Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by
parol or extrinsic evidence.
Where a parole contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause
of the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence, BUT the party invoking
the contemporaneous agreement must be able to prove fraud.
The parol evidence sought to be admissible would contradict and defeat the
operation of the deed of sale. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.”
Inocentes claim that their parol evidence falls under the exception that the alleged
failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. In this case, the
deeds of sale are clear without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Sec. 9, Rule 130. Under the parol evidence rule: Terms of a contract are rendered
conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or
contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. SC
carefully examined the Surety Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no
ambiguity therein. Documents must be taken as explaining all the terms of the
agreement between the parties when there appears to be no ambiguity nor any
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the
same does not express the true intent of the parties. Thus, the owner of the
property (Jose) may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising
as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the
parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to
prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the
repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will
enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the
parties at the time of the execution of the contract.
Based on these provisions, any child, regardless of age, can be a competent
witness as long as he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others. According to Wigmore and Underhill, the rule does not define
any particular age as conclusive of incapacity. In each case, the child is to be
investigated.
Requirements of a child’s competency:
1. Capacity of OBSERVATION
2. Capacity of RECOLLECTION
3. Capacity of COMMUNICATION
s the victim – a mental retardate – incompetent to testify on the identity of the
rapist/accused? – NO.
In rape cases, the victim’s credibility is crucial to the determination of the culpability
of the accused because the crime generally involves two persons only and usually
perpetrated in seclusion.
Mental retardation does not per se affect the credibility of the witness. A mentally

B. Marital Disqualification Rule (Rule 130,
Section 22)
1. Ordoño vs. Hon. Daquigan, G.R. No. L-
39012, 31 January 1975, 62 SCRA 270
2. People vs. Hon. Castaneda, G.R. No.
L-46306, 27 February 1979, 88 SCRA
562
3. People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568,
16 July 1947, 78 Phil. 694
4. Lezama vs. Hon. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
L-25643, 27 June 1968, 23 SCRA 1166
5. Alvarez vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439,
14 October 2005, 473 SCRA 72 (2005)
C. Dead Man's Statute (Rule 130, Section
23)
1. Guerrero vs. St. Claire’s Realty Co.,
G.R. No. L-58164, 2 September 1983,
124 SCRA 553
2. De Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten, G.R.
No. L-16741, 31 January 1962, 4 SCRA
298
3. Goni vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
27434, 23 September 1986, 144 SCRA
222
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of his or her testimony
depends on the quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can
make them known to the court. The acceptance of a mental retardate’s testimony,
as in that case, must still depend on its nature and credibility -- the quality of the
person’s perception and the manner he can make them known to the court. In this
case, albeit the victim’s testimony was tainted with inconsistencies, these are mere
collateral and minor matters which would not compel the Court from discrediting her
testimony, given her mental retardation. Testimonial discrepancies tend to
strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they negate any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony and do not destroy the substance of the victim’s testimony.
When an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation,
it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against
the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against
the other. Using the criterion in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that the rape
committed by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against
his wife (victim’s mother). T
It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence/trust which gave rise to the
offense charged and which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint
with the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with
CFI. Also, in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, the SC said that WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE
CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION. I
4 reasons for the marital disqualification rule: IP-DH:
- identity of interests
- danger of perjury
- guard against domestic disunion
- if no domestic tranquility exists, then to guard against punishing the other spouse
thru hostile testimony
Can a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, be examined as a
hostile witness by the adverse party under Sec 6, Rule 132 of the RoC without
infringing on her marital privilege under Sec 20 (b) of Rule 130? -- NO.
The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. The
fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the
spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification.
GR: MDR
EXC: strained relatiions!
Offense of arson directly impairs the conjugal relation between Alvarez and his
wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives
and flourishes.
The rule applies if:
1. The case is by a party, or assignor of the party or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted VERSUS an executor, administrator or other representative.
2. Representative, includes those that are sued in their representative, not
personal, capacity.
3. The estate pertained to must be actually owned by the deceased at the time the
case was brought
There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix
extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject of the
prohibition. Because of this, the trial judge eventually overruled the counsel’s
previous general and continuing objection and admitted the testimony of the
witness.
A waiver of the DEAD MAN’S STATUTE occurs when
(a) plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
(b) when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased’s lifetime.

4. Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, G.R. No. L-
2016, 23 August 1949, 84 Phil. 330
5. Tongco vs. Vianzon, G.R. No. 27498,
20 September 1927, 50 Phil. 698
6. Razon vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74306, 16
March 1992, 207 SCRA
7. Londres vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136427, 17 December 2002
Privileged Communications
A. Husband-Wife Privilege (Rule 130,
Section 24.a)
1. People vs. Carlos, G.R. No. 22948, 17
March 1925, 47 Phil. 626 (1925)
B. Attorney-Client Privilege (Rule 130,
Section 24.b)
1. Uy Chico vs. Union Life, G.R. No.
9231, 6 January 1915, 29 Phil. 163
(1915)
2. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
105938, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA
124 (1996)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
The object & purpose of the rule is (a) to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party
and (b) to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the
opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party when
death has close the lips of the other, in order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
Officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an
executor/administrator of a deceased person are NOT disqualified from testifying as
to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Plainly the law disqualifies only "parties or assignors of parties," and does not apply
to persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of parties.
For DMS to apply, the case must be one brought against the ADMIN or against the
ESTATE! The cases here were not brought AGAINST the admin or the estate.
Merely involves (1) a cadastral proceeding where there is no plaintiff/defendant,
and (2) a claim BY the admin to enforce a demand by the estate!
Limitations to application:
- Applicable to a case against the administrator or representative of an estate
- Upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person
repetitive
Privilege is extinguished once 3rd party takes hold of it.
The letter cannot be admissible as evidence. First, the letter was written by the
wife, but she was never put in the witness stand. Second, Fausto never indicated
his assent to the statements contained in the letter. The fact of him having the letter
in his possession does not mean that he consents. Given these reasons, the letter
was mere HEARSAY and cannot be admitted. Being pure hearsay, there can be no
difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.
However, the court held that it will be different if what is concerned is the testimony
of a third party as to the conversation he overheard between a husband and wife.
This kind of testimony is admissible since it relates to a conversation where (1) the
spouses took part, and (2) if the husband had the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him and fails to do so, his silence implies consent. Basically, the
issue is on the alleged consent of Fausto. The argument of the prosecution is that
since he did not reply to the letter, this means that he assented to it, but such is not
a case. The SC compared this with a third person hearing a conversation between
spouses. In that case, if the husband remains quiet, his silence implies assent. This
does not apply to an unanswered letter. Hence, the difference between a letter and
the testimony of a third person.
When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the
communication to the 3rd person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon
it, it cannot be classified as a privileged communication. Such a communication
after reaching the 3rd person (to whom it is intended) is a communication between
the client and a 3rd person and that the attorney simply occupies the role of
intermediary or agent.
ACCRA lawyers may refuse. PCGG cannot force the ACCRA lawyers to disclose
the identity of their clients for such would be a violation of the attorney-client
privilege.
GR: A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to disclose the name or
identity of his client. Reasons for this GR:
1. court has a right to know that the client is a real person
2. privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established
3. privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship

3. Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil
Co., G.R. No. L-21237, 22 March 1924,
46 Phil. 938 (1924)
4. Orient Insurance vs. Hon. Revilla, G.R.
No. 34098, `17 September 1930, 54 Phil.
919 (1930)
5. People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
115439-41, 16 July 1997, 275 SCRA 505
(1997)
6. Hickman vs. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
4. due process considerations require that the opposing party should know his
adversary
EXC:
1. strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
3. Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client
unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name will furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the clients name is privileged.
*information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences
When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were
obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it form a
collateral issue to try that question. • Even supposing that the letter was within the
atty-client privilege, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the
adverse party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession.
A contract for fees could not be considered privileged.
A party cannot waive such a privilege partially. He cannot remove the seal of
secrecy from so much of the privileged communications as makes for his
advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much as makes to the
advantage of his adversary. It is not material at what stage of the proceedings, a
party waives his right to maintain the secrecy of privileged communication. Thus,
Orient’s attorney was entitled to examine the whole of the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-
A), with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be
relevant to the case on trial.
PAST CONFESSION OF CRIME vs. FUTURE PLAN OF CRIME
If the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the client has
theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal
which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client’s consent, (PAST) but the same privilege does not attach with
regard to a crime which the client intends to commit thereafter or in the future.
(FUTURE)
Communications between attorney and client having to do with the client’s
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, (FUTURE) are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client.
Every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which
the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.
The protective cloak of the privilege does not extend to information which an
attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation,
nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client’s case, and it
is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney’s mental impressions,
conclusions or legal theories.
Semi-related doctrine of “work product”: Proper preparation of a client’s case
demands that he assemble info, sift what he considers to be relevant from
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories, and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference. This work is reflected in interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, metal impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other
tangible and intangible ways. These are called “work product of the lawyer.”
- Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all
that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary
gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness.
Hickman’s counsel admits that he wants the oral statements only to help
prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has
overlooking nothing. Such reason is insufficient to permit him an
exception to the policy underlying the privacy of Fortenbaugh’s
 profession activities.
7. Upjohn Co. vs. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between
(1981) attorneys and their clients, and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege rests on the need for
the lawyer to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation.
While complications may arise when such client is a corporation, which is an
artificial creature of the law, and not an individual, the SC has assumed that the
privilege still applies.

Furthermore, the privilege only protects disclosure of COMMUNICATIONS, and not

8. U.S. vs. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th
Cir. 1979)
of underlying FACTS by those who communicated with the attorney. A fact is one
thing, and a communication concerning that fact is entirely different. The client
cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you say or write to the
attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge
merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to
his attorney."
The attorney who undertakes to serve his client’s co-defendant for a limited
purpose becomes the codefendant’s attorney for that purpose, and the attorney-
client privilege applies.

Common Defense Rule – where communications by a client to his own lawyer

remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants
for purpose of a common defense has always been recognized. It is also of no
moment that the communication was made to an investigator because the latter
was an agent for Ingram’s attorney.

Physician-Patient Privilege (Rule 130,

Section 24.c)

1. Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA An attending physician may testify as an expert witness, provided his opinion is
273 (1992) based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any
personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician-patient
relationship.

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. The information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
of the patient.

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:

1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be

disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.

2. Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA
146 (1994)
Moreover, it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact
of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated.
Repetitive

EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
 State Secrets (Rule 130, Section 24.e)
1. U.S. vs. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
2. Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board,
142 SCRA 523 (1986)
3. Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No.
180643, September 4, 2008
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-
level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public
interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other
values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that even the very
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. To read the powers of the
President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public
interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and non-diplomatic discussions would upset
the constitutional balance of a “workable govt” and gravely impair the roles of the
courts.
When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use
in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
GR: a party is entitled to the production of books, documents and papers which are
material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense. The
test applied by the courts is one of reasonableness and practicability.
- If on the ground of public policy, the rules do not allow such production
because of their confidential and privileged character.
- However, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not
documents are relevant or confidential.
- Based on these principles, the SC held that these documents are NOT
privileged and are material to the issues at hand.
- SC held that the deliberations may be confidential, but not necessarily
absolute and privileged.
Under the RoC, privileged communications is not intended to protect public officers,
but to protect PUBLIC INTEREST. Where there is no public interest that would be
prejudiced, this invoked rule will not apply. In this case, the MB has not established
that public interest will suffer by the disclosure of such documents. On the contrary,
public interest will be best served by the disclosure of the documents, so that the
employees/ depositors/creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not the
closure of the bank was valid.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations.
- Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

Parental & Filial Privilege (Rule 130,
Section 25; Article 215 of Family Code)
Admissions and Confessions (Rule 130,
Sections 26 and 32)
1. Keller & Co. vs. COB Group Marketing,
Inc., G.R. No. L-68097, 16 January 1986,
141 SCRA 86 (1986)
2. People vs. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060,
20 July 1978, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)
3. People vs. Alegre, G.R. No. L-30423, 7
November 1979, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
Res Inter Alios Acta (Rule 130, Section
28)
1. People vs. Alegre, 94 Phil. 109 (1979)
2. People vs. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, 2
December 1996, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
In the case at bar, simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege
and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using
the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
- First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
- Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet.
- Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Can admissions made by the president of the company bind the company? YES.
Under the laws of agency.
Accused Paragsa is not guilty of rape because prosecution’s evidence is weak,
unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. One of the grounds pointed
out in this case is that the complainant did not bother to rebut the testimony of the
accused and his witnesses that she and accused were sweethearts and already
had sex three times prior to the alleged commission of rape (admission by silence).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the
truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. All of
the requisites of admission by silence are present, which are:
1. He had heard and understood the statement;
2. He was at liberty to interpose a denial;
3. That the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which
he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer;
4. The facts were within his knowledge, and
5. The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material
to the issue.
It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not
be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of
silence would be illusory. The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona held that the
prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police
custodial interrogation.
Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the
statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-
incrimination.
GR: the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not
admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely
hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the
case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence,
therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit
admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio
Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate
of the Pasay City jail.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be
utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused

Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta
Rule (Rule 130, Section 28)
1. Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival &
Research Center, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir.
198)
Co-conspirator's Statements (Rule 130,
Section 30)
1. People vs. Cabrera, G.R. No. L-37398,
28 June 1974, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
2. People vs. Hon. Yatco, G.R. No. L-
9181, 28 November 1955, 97 Phil. 941
(1955)
Admission By Privies (Rule 130, Section
31)
1. Alpuerto vs. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785
(1918)
2. City of Manila vs. Del Rosario, 5 Phil.
227 (1905)
Confessions (Article III, Section 17, 1987
Constitution; Rule 130, Section 33; Rule
115(e))
1. People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135
(1995)
2. People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565
(1995)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latters
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in
the case at bar.
A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-
examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only
upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for
the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their
acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
As to the entry of a corporate meeting, the directors as primary officers of the
corporation had the authority to include their conclusions in the record of the
meeting xxx But there was no servant or agency relationship which justified
admitting the evidence of the board minutes as against Mr. Poos.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession
may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to
the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt
Statement not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy as in the case
when the accused was already apprehended and two days had elapsed since and
the supposed conspiracy had already ceased cannot be considered as admission
by a co-conspirator.
Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced into writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed
under the constitution and as such cannot be admitted in court.
***Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence
during the making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect.
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION THROUGH SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY :
Inadmissible since made without the assistance of counsel
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION TO PROSECUTOR ZARATE: Admissible since not
in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda’s plea to be
utilized as a state witness (counsel not needed)
EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION TO RAY DEAN SALVOSA: Admissible since
Salvosa is a private party (admissible in evidence under Sec. 26, Rule 130) and
provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government
 3. Parker vs. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62
(1979)
Hearsay Rule
Testimonial knowledge (Rule 130,
Section 36):
1. People vs. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336
(1971)
2. People vs. Hon. Cusi, G.R. No. L-
20986, 14 August 1965, 14 SCRA 944
(1965)
3. People vs. Gaddi, G.R. No. 74065, 27
February 1989, 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
4. U.S. Vs. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464
(1980)
Exceptions:
Dying Declarations (Rule 130, Section
37:
1. People vs. Laquinon, G.R. No. L-
45470, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 91
(1985)
2. People vs. Sabio, G.R. No. L-26193,
27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)
3. People vs. Salison, G.R. No. 115690,
20 February 1996
4. People vs. Ador, G.R. Nos. 140538-39,
14 June 2004
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand
and the implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting
instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause.
As stated in People vs. Mariquina, affidavits are generally not prepared by the
affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or misunderstood by the
one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party
is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally
rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS: Not hearsay if the merely stated to
establish the fact that the statement was made!!!
- while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his
conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as
Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge;
that is, he was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed
Augusto Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
Utterances of the betters telephoning in their bets were nonassertive verbal
conduct, offered as relevant for an implied assertion to be inferred from them,
namely that bets could be placed at the premises being telephoned. The language
is not an assertion on its face, and it is obvious these persons did not intend to
make an assertion about the fact sought to be proved or anything else.
As an implied assertion, the proffered evidence is expressly excluded from the
operation of the hearsay rule by Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an
ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would
die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in
extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the
sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay
rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was
made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of
fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. Further, the fact that the victim
told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does not negative the
victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization
that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
While dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with
certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance.
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy
Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez say tinambangan kami na Ador (We
were ambushed by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned
by the witness. Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were
involved. This testimony if it will be given credence may inculpate any person with
the family name Ador as assailant.
 Declaration against Interest (Rule 130,
Section 38)
1. People vs. Aling, G.R. No. L-38833, 12
March 1980, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
2. People vs. Toledo, G.R. No. 28655, 6
August 1928, 51 Phil. 825 (1928)
3. Fuentes vs. CA, G.R. No. 111692, 9
February 1996, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
4. Heirs of Miguel Franco vs. CA, G.R.
No. 123924, 11 December 2003
Pedigree (Rule 130, Section 39)
1. Gravador vs. Mamigo, G.R. No. L-
24989, 21 July 1967, 20 SCRA 742
(1967)
2. People vs. Alegado, G.R. Nos. 93030-
31, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA 582
3. Tison vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
121027, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA 582
(1997)
Family Tradition (Rule 130, Section 40)
1. Jison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124853, 24 February 1998
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
Declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that
he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because e he was
informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and
fooling around with other men.
Declarations against interest does not refer only to pecuniary or proprietary interest
but also to PENAL interest. In this case, Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo
duel.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against
interest:
(a) the declarant must not be available to testify;
(b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and
(c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
Miguel’s claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by his statement
in the Verified Petition for issuance of letters administration that he filed. While he
explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time
he was remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof during
the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted his claim to the subject property quite belatedly,
i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in a court pleading that it belonged in
its entirety to his brother. Thus, the statement and the accompanying silence may
be appreciated in more than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a
judicial admission combined.
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her
maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on
September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-
appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under
sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
(1) That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) That the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry;
(3) That such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) That the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
• The 1 st , 2 nd , and 4 th element is not disputed. Only the 3 rd is the issue at
hand: whether the documents presented sufficiently corroborates the declaration
made by Teodora in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of Corazon.
GENERAL RULE: when the party seeks to recover against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or his estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declaration itself. There must be some other independent proof of this fact.
- EXCEPTION: the presentation of other independent proof of the relationship does
not apply when it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of
the family.
FAMILY REPUTATION vs. COMMON REPUTATION
SC ruled that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect,
a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have
been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those

Common Reputation (Rule 130, Section
41)
Res Gestae (Rule 130, Section 42)
1. People vs. Lungayan, G.R. No. 64556,
10 June 1988, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
2. People vs. Putian, G.R. No. L-33049,
29 November 1976, 74 SCRA 133 (1993)
3. People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 87085,
2 February 1993, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)
Entries in the Course of Business (Rule
130, Section 43; REE, Rule 8)
1. Palmer vs. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
Official Records (Rule 130, Section 44)
1. Africa vs. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, 31
March 1966, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation
or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin
plates.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
To be part of the res gestae, it must be
(1) spontaneous and
(2) made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her
own story.
Res gestae rule embraces spontaneous exclamations and verbal acts. Panimdim’s
statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing
treatment; he had no time to concoct a falsehood or fabricare a malicious charge;
no motive has been shown.
Elements of the principle of res gestae:
1. That the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
2. That the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise;
3. That the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
ENTRIES NOT CONSIDERED “IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS”: Accident
reports
A signed statement of a railroad engineer, since deceased, giving his version of a
grade crossing accident in which the locomotive he was operating was involved,
and made two days after the accident, when he was interviewed by an official of the
company and a representative of a state commission, held not made "in the regular
course" of business within the meaning of the Act of June 20, 1936, and not
admissible as evidence thereunder.
An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it affords information
on which the management may act. HOWEVER. It is not a typical of entry made
systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect
transactions with others, or to provide internal controls.
Accident reports are not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad
business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading,
and the like, these reports are calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the
business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.
THREE REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY
1. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so
2. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law

2. People vs. Leones, G.R. No. L-48727,
30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 382
(1982)
3. Manalo vs. Robles Trans. Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-8171, 16 August 1956, 99
Phil. 729 (1956)
4. People vs. Cabuang, G.R. No. 103292,
27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
5. People vs. San Gabriel, G.R. No.
107735, 1 February 1996
Commercial Lists (Rule 130, Section 45)
1. State vs. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843
(1979)
2. PNOC Shipping vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107518, 8 October 1998, 297
SCRA 402 (1998)
Learned Treatises (Rule 130, Section 46)
Prior Testimony (Rule 130, Section 47)
1. Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
22793, 16 May 1967, 20 SCRA 54 (1967)
2. Ohio vs. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
Previous Conduct as Evidence;
Character Evidence (Rule 130, Sections
34-35; 51; Rule 132, Section 14)
1. U.S. vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 457 (1918)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
3. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
To qualify their statements as "official information acquired by the officers who
prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have
1. personal knowledge of the facts stated and also
2. must have the duty to give such statements for record.
MEDICAL CERTIF: admissible as prima facie evidence of facts stated therein if
done by a GOVERNMENT DOCTOR, even if the latter is not presented as witness.
A sheriff's return is an official statement by a public official in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35,
Rules of Court.) The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the
facts stated in his entry.
POLICE BLOTTER ENTRY <<< TESTIMONY IN COURT
- only prima facie evid, not conclusive
- entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of
performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries. In People v. Santito, Jr.,this Court held that entries in official
records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts
therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be
incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial
is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries
made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a
police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence
gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in court.
Repetitive
They are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for
them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost. These are NOT published
in any list, register, periodical, or other published compilation. Neither are these
“market reports/quotations” as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation. These are just [.
SC held that the above provision cannot apply and their testimonies in the first case
are not admissible as evidence in the second case.
- They are not dead, nor found outside the Philippines. They are available,
however, they refused to testify. No person prevented them from testifying.
Certainly, they do not fall under the class as those “unable to testify”.
- CA defined “unable to testify” as defined as a "subsequent failure or refusal to
appear thereat second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not
amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause,
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of
speech.”
The opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing (even absent actual
cross-examination) satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
GR: the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But
appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto.
- The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix
his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion
performed similar acts,

2. People vs. Irang, 64 Phil. 285 (1937)
3. People vs. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083
(1957)
4. People vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
5. U.S. vs. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
6. People vs. Umbaña, 402 SCRA 415
7. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469 (1948)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
o accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
o negligence is intensified, and
o fraudulent intent may even be established.
- It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents.
GR:
EXC: While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution
for robbery, it is admissible when
1. it is otherwise relevant,
2. it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged,
3. tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time
charged,
4. When it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime
Maximiniana identification of Irang also corroborated by Irangs own admission
under oath that on the night of the crime he had been invited to assault the house
of Perfecto which they in fact assaulted, although against his will.
PROOF OF BAD CHARACTER OF OFFENDED PARTY – NOT APPLICABLE IN
MURDER, ONLY HOMICIDE
While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),
- such is not necessary in a crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery or premeditation.
- The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to
show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952
ed., Vol. 3, p. 126. This rule does not apply to cases of murder.
If the defense of the accused is self-defense, he may prove that the deceased was
quarrelsome But, the proof must be of his general reputation and NOT of isolated
and specific acts!
GR: A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing
1. that he has made contradictory statements;
2. by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad
NEVERTHELESS, YOU MAY SHOW BY AN
1. EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS HIMSELF
2. OR FROM THE RECORD OF THE JUDGMENT, THAT HE HAS BEEN
CONVICTED OF A HIGH CRIME.
Here, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime,
as that term is generally used. the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is
used in its ordinary signification. (assault upon persons)
- High crimes: immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in
guilt to felonies.
Objection to above question was properly interposed and should have been
sustained.
The testimony adduced portraying Cheril as disrespectful and wayward child does
not detract from her credibility as a witness narrating her ordeal in the hands of her
father. Moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of persons
accused of rape, as even prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry, another anomalous rule
comes into play. Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay,
but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything but
hearsay.  What commonly is called "character evidence" is only such when
"character" is employed as a synonym for "reputation." The witness may not testify
about defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct, or his possession of a
particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that his
own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads to his own
independent opinion that defendant possesses a good general or specific
character, inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness is, however,

Opinion Rule (Rule 130, Sections 48-50)
1. Dilag & Co. vs. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536
(1949)*****
2. U.S. vs. Trono, G.R. No. 1344, 19
January 1904, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
3. People vs. Adoviso, G.R. Nos. 116196-
97, 23 June 1999, 309 SCRA 1 (1999)
*****
4. State vs. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
5. U.S. vs. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1970)
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1933
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although much of it
may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. The evidence
which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant, but only as to the
shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. This has been well described in
a different connection as "the slow growth of months and years, the resultant
picture of forgotten incidents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct,
presumably honest because disinterested, and safer to be trusted because prone to
suspect. . . . It is for that reason that such general repute is permitted to be proven.
It sums up a multitude of trivial details. It compacts into the brief phrase of a verdict
the teaching of many incidents and the conduct of years. It is the average
intelligence drawing its conclusion."
To be an expert witness, there is no precise requirement as to the mode in which
skill or experience shall have been acquired.
- Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a
witness as an expert.
- A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his
knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than
scientific study and research.
Familiarity with Adoviso’s face and appearance minimized if not erased the
possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.
- Bonifacio had known him for 10 years.
- Elmer for 4 years.
SC held that the general rule is that a lay witness may testify only to facts and not
to opinions or conclusions. However, lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use
so-called "short hand" descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to the court
their impression of the general physical condition of a person.
- It is thus proper for a layman, who is intimately acquainted with the
insane person to testify.
- “On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of like kind, persons of skill or
experts may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in
evidence.”
- “Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary
question to be determined in the first place by the court; and the rule is, that if the
court admits the testimony, then it is for the jury to decide whether any, and if any
what, weight is to be given to the testimony. Cases arise where it is very much a
matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but
the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly
erroneous.”
One important consideration is to subject the theory or technique to peer review
and publication.
- Publication per se is not requirement for admissibility and does not correlate
reliability.
- However, subjection to scrutiny in the scientific community connotes “good
science”.
- This is because publication increases the likelihood of detecting the flaws in the
methodology. Rule 703 provide that expert opinions are to be admitted ONLY if the
facts or data are “of a type relied upon by experts in the filed in forming opinions or
inferences on the subject.”
- Rule 706 allows the court to procure the expert’s assistance of its own choosing.
- Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury” SC held that the judge must make a preliminary assessment
of whether the expert testimony's methodology is scientifically valid and properly
can be applied.

Leading Questions:
1. State vs. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)
Impeaching One's Own Witness:
1. Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706
(1960)
Cross-Examination:
1. Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81 (1982)
Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent
Statement
1. Villalon vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 443 (1986)
2. People vs. Resabal, 50 Phil. 780
(1927)
3. U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th
Cir. 1984)
Recalling Witnesses
1. People vs. Rivera, 200 SCRA 786
(1991)*****
Exclusion of Witnesses
1. State vs. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
- The inquiry must be solely on principles and methodology, or how did they arrive
at that result/ conclusion, not on the conclusions themselves.
Moreover, the (1) cross-examination, (2) presentation of contrary evidence, and (3)
careful instruction on the burden of proof is the appropriate means by which
evidence based on valid principles may be challenged.
SC cited Judge Weinstein: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge
in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the
present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”
An alternative form question is not leading unless
(1) It provides details that the witness might not otherwise
(2) Suggests to the witness a specific answer.
Wigmore states that the notion that a party is morally bound by what his witness
says is an outdated one that no longer enjoys support from anyone. In the case of
Alexander v. Gibson, Chief Justice Ellenborough observed that if a witness is called
on the part of the plaintiff and such witness swears to what is palpably false, it
would be extremely hard if the plaintiff's case should for that reason be sacrificed
1. where no opportunity (to cross examine) and the want of it was caused by the
party offering (plaintiff), the testimony should be stricken out.
2. where the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross
examiner's fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion
according to the general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
Proceedings against attorneys indeed private and confidential except for the final
order which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privilege/right which may
be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and
professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may
be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others. Even private
respondents' counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the
disbarment proceedings and which were the subject of cross examination.
Witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations
before the JOP court, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the
accused. Mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read
to the witness while he testified in the CFI , is no ground for impeaching his
testimony.
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permitted where
employed as a mere subterfuge to present before the jury evidence that is not
otherwise admissible.
When one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party voices no
objection, the motion should always be granted.
When the motion is opposed, the trial court's discretion comes into play. In this
context, as others, judicial discretion does not mean that the question of whether to
exclude witnesses is left to the trial court's whim or grace. Instead, judicial
discretion is "to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner
to subserve and not defeat the ends of justice." Specifically, the trial court must
weigh the "good cause shown," for not excluding witnesses against the policy
favoring exclusion.
 Authentication and Proof of Documents
Rule132, Sections 19-33; E-Commerce
Act, Secs. 5, 6-15; REE , Rules 5, 6, 9
and 11
1. Bunag vs. Court of Appeals, 8. (1988)
2. Heirs of Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 234 (1991)
3. Bartolome vs. IAC, 183 SCRA 102
(1990)
4. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.
vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
1. By anyone who saw the writing executed
2. By evidence of the genuineness of
LACK OF SIGNATURE ON FIRST FEW PAGES = not a blemish
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine,
petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of
falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of
signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their substitution. We
cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a
contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one
who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of
falsification.
For a private document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity,
it is not enough that it is more than 30 years old; it is also necessary that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and that it
is unblemished by any alteration or circumstance of suspicion.
The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the
documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file with
the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or
circumstances of suspicion.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document
must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the
extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to
detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copied
of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and
free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT = doubtful authenticity
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We hold,
however, that the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity.
Indeed, its importance cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature
of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains
vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale.
Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document
is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents.
POEA had no jurisdiction to recognize and enforce foreign decisions (lodged with
RTC). Even assuming that POEA had jurisdiction, the Dubai decision could not be
admitted as evidence given that it was not properly proved in POEA. The Dubai
decision is considered as a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country. Hence, the same is a public writing under Sec. 20(a) of
Rule 13. Secs. 25 and 26 (now, Secs. 24 and 25) prescribe the manner of proving a
public of official record of a foreign country:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by:
(1) Official publication thereof; OR
(2) Copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody.
(3) If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate

5. Spouses Zalamea vs. Court of
Appeals, 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
6. Teoco vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Co., G.R. No. 162333, 23 December
2008
7. Philippine Trust Company vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150318, November 22,
2010
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
maybe made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept (meaning this officer
must be a Filipino) and
(4) Authenticated by the seal of his office
LHA: Rances should have requested attestation (official publication or copy) from
the Dubai court where the decision was rendered (1 and 2 of Sec. 25) and the
certificate may be made by Filipino public official stationed in Dubai and
authenticate it by the seal of his office (3 and 4 of Sec. 25).
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.
Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed
by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
When the SPA is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is
certified by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document and
authenticated by the seal of his office. A city judge-notary who notarized the
document, as in this case, cannot issue such certification.
Assignment is not admissible in evidence as a public document in our courts.
However, this does not necessarily mean that such document has no probative
value.
three reasons for the necessity of the presentation of public documents.
1. Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated stated in
them
2. Presentation of a public document dispenses with the need to prove a
document's due execution and authenticity, which is required for the admissibility of
private documents offered as authentic:
4. law may require that certain transactions appear in public instruments,
Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document: Acts and contracts
which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of
an interest therein governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
Art. 1625. An assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect as
against third person, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is
recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real property.
(Underscoring supplied)
THAT ASSIGNMENT WAS NOT IN PUBLIC DOCUMENT WOULD NOT
PRECLUDE BROTHERS FROM REDEEMING.
● Metrobank never challenged either the content, the due execution, or the
genuineness of the assignment of the right of redemption.
● Having impliedly admitted the content of the assignment of the right of
redemption, there is no necessity for a prima facie evidence of the facts there
stated.
● impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the assignment of the
right of redemption, a private document evidencing the same is admissible in
evidence. 18
Not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
Under Sec. 23, Rule 132, notarized documents are merely proof of:

8. Salas vs. Sta. Mesa Market
Corporation, G.R. No. 157766, July 12,
2007
9. People vs. Salison, 253 SCRA 758
(1996)
10. People vs. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435
(1999)
EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
- Facts which give rise to their execution (ex. In this case, the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories
- The date of execution (ex. the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the
same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon)
- Under Sec. 30: acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence
of the execution of the instrument or document involved (ex. the notarized Answer
to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same)
• BUT: they are not prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein
• Reason for distinction: different official duties attending to execution of different
kinds of public instruments
- Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed
- But in affidavits (like Answers to Interrogatories) the only portion executed by the
person authorized to take oaths is the jurat
• So, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore
applies only to the jurat where the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was
subscribed and sworn to before him on the date mentioned
SC defines financial statements:
- Financial statements – show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a
specified period.
• include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow
- Audited financial statements – The financial statements prepared by external
auditors who are certified public accountants
• GR: Financial statements (audited or not) are private documents
• XPN: Once a financial statement is filed with a government office pursuant to a
provision of law, they become public documents
Need for authentication:
- Public Documents – admissible even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness
- Private Documents – inadmissible unless properly authenticated
Records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of
the declaration.
¬ waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as
evidence.
¬ The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted
in evidence and forms part of the record.
While usually given in oral form, they are not thereby rendered inadmissible as they
may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations have thereafter
been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to
be the best evidence, and it must be produced.
Court has previously taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine
dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in
evidence without objection by the accused. In those instances, the Court merely
ordered official translations to be made.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the
PNP-Firearm and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding
firearms in the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that
accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or
caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a
document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be
as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the
stand to this effect would be.
 11. Iwasaw vs. Gangan, G.R. No.
204169, 11 September 2013
12. GSIS vs. Raoet, G.R. No. 157038, 23
December 2009
13. IBM Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC, 305 SCRA
592 (1999)
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of
their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded
said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records
custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore
necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence
to the contrary.
Since neither the GSIS nor the ECC presented any evidence to refute that cardiac
arrest was the immediate cause, and peptic ulcer was the underlying cause of
Francisco's death, we accept as established, in accordance with the death
certificate, that the underlying cause of Francisco's demise was peptic ulcer.

Offer and Objection (Rule 132, Secs. 34-

40)*****
1. People v. Cariño y Guillermo, G.R. No.
73876, 26 September 1988
2. Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles, G.R. No.
86062, 6 June 1990
3. Catuira vs. CA, G.R. No. 105813,
September 12, 1994
4. Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116149, 23 November 1995

EVIDENCE DOCTRINES