1 PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) [GR L- Held: Yes.
Held: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in
31195, 5 June 1973] First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 concur in
separate opinion, 1 dissents, 1 concur to dissenting opinion, 1 took no part.
Facts: On 1 March 1969, members and officers of the Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on 4 March 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively). They
informed the Company of their proposed demonstration, and proceeded
with the demonstration despite pleas from the Philippine Blooming Mills. The
Company filed on 4 March 1969 with the lower court, charging the PBMEO
officers and participating members of violation of Section 4(a) to 6 in relation
to Section 13 to 14, as well as Section 15, of Republic Act 875 and with the
CBA providing for No Strike and No Lockout. The charge was followed by the
filing of a corresponding complaint on 18 April 1969. Judge Joaquin Salvador,
in an order dated 15 September 1969, found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and declaring the officers and members directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were considered to have lost
their status as employees of the company. A motion for reconsideration was
filed 15 September 1969, which was dismissed in a resolution dated 9
October 1969. On 31 October 1969, PBMEO filed with the Court of Industria
Relations (CIR) a petition for relief from the order dated 9 October 1969, on
the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
president of the Union and of the office clerk of their counsel. Without
waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief, PBMEO filed on 3
November 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal.
Issue: Whether the Company can prevent its workers from engaging in
concerted activity against alleged abuses of policemen, especially if such
work stoppage would prejudice the Company’s operation, else its profits.
Held: The demonstration, being directed against alleged abuses of policemen
and not against their employer, was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency. They exercised their civil and political rights for their
mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. It
was the duty of the firm to protect the Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of the firm to rally to
the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they
can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Although the demonstration paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company, there is no finding
involving the loss actually sustained by the firm. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of
workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might
have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
2 Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] En Banc, Yap (J): 9
concur
Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3
April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez
[Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive
Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio
and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII]
in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch
LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr.
[Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding
Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge
Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People
vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR
75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and
Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one
case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.
Issue: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.
the exercise of the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An
act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum
in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at
putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless,
i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is
presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the
limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to
wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.
3 Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989] En Banc, Grino-
Aquino (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in result
Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in
two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect
on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15
thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by
Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January
1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law,
provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the
Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the
national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their
professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the
Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued
pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was
captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not
exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the
Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of "no
substitution" and/or words of similar import Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) in their prescription in the Generics Act is a
lawful regulation.
Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it
implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost"
(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The
prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of
similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose
between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is
allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription
form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no
substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to
benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a
still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy
minority. 4
Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13
concur
Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina
S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school
year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully
take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of
applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which
established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement
for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on
20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge
denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to
all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives to govern (a)
the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation
of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of
Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather
merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
5 Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-
24693, 31 July 1967] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board
of the City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who
was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1)
imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in
a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well
as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3)
provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified
motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are required to have a
dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and
a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City
of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring
the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6
July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After
the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack
authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional
and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction
issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing
license fees, partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the
liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional.
Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared
for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) registration of transients and guests. The increase in the
license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city
government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as
the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall
be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was
intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of
the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest
of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state.
6 Sangalang v. IAC [GR 71169, 25 August 1989] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 11
concur, 3 took no part
Facts: The Supreme Court promulgated its decision on 22 December 1988.
Two (2) motions for reconsideration were filed by Atty. Sangco (in behalf of
the Sangalangs, GR71169) and Atty. Sison (in behalf of Bel-Air Village
Association [BAVA]), and a motion for reconsideration/clarification filed by
Atty. Funk (GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281). The motion for
reconsideration (GR 71169), filed by the Sangalangs, was anchored on two
grounds: (1) that contrary to the SC decision, Jupiter Street is for the
exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation
did contrive to acquire membership at BAVA purposely to bargain for access
to Jupiter Street by the general public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the
Court that it was adopting the Sangalangs' motion for reconsideration. The
motion for reconsideration (in GRs 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) raises
more or less the same questions and asks furthermore that the Supreme
Court delete the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the general public has right to to use Jupiter and Orbit streets
in Bel-Air Village, and whether the demolition of the gates in said streets was
valid or lawful.
Held: Yes. The Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala Corporation covering
Jupiter and Orbit Streets effectively required both passageways open to the
general public. The donation gave the general public equal right to it. The
opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common
good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. The opening
of Orbit Street is upheld for the same rationale. The demolition of the gates
at Orbit and Jupiter Streets does not amount to deprivation of property
without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation, as
there is no taking of property involved in the case. The challenged act of the
Mayor is, rather, in the concept of police power. The gate, the destruction of
which opened Orbit Street, has the character of a public nuisance in the
sense that it hinders and impairs the use of property. Article 699 of the Civil
Code provides that the remedies against a public nuisance are (1) A
prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or (2) A civil action;
or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. In addition, under Article 701
of the Code, summary abatement (without judicial proceeding) may be
carried out by the Mayor himself.
7 Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987] First Division,
Cruz (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave.
Facts: On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando
(Pampanga) adopted Resolution 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association (FUMTA) to construct
permanent stalls and sell along Mercado street, on a strip of land measuring
12 by 77 meters Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
(talipapa). The action was protested on 10 November 1961 by Felicidad
Villanueva, Fernando Caisip, Antonio Liang, Felina Miranda, Ricardo Puno,
Florencio Laxa, and Rene Ocampo (claiming that they were granted previous
authorization by the municipal government to conduct business therein), in
Civil Case 2040, where the Court of First Instance (CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2,
issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the FUMTA members
from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On
18 January 1964, while the case was pending, the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality," thereby impliedly
revoking Resolution 218 (series of 1961). On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres
C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by
Villanueva, et. al., being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man
and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of
preliminary injunction was made permanent. The decision was not enforced
as the petitioners were not evicted from the place. The number of vendors in
the area (talipapa) ballooned to 200. The area deteriorated increasingly to
the great prejudice of the community in general, as the makeshift stalls
render the area as virtual fire trap. The problem festered for some more
years under a presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of
whom made any move, for some reason. On 12 January 1982, the
Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a
petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution 29, to restore the
property to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Acting thereon
after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, OIC (Office of the
Mayor) Vicente Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls
beginning 1 July 1982. The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition
with the CFI Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982. The judge denied
the petition on 19 July 1982, and the motion for reconsideration on 5 August
1982, prompting Villanueva, et. al. to file a petition on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Paterno Guevarra, who replaced Macalino as OIC of San
Fernando, was impleaded.
Issue: Whether the demolition of the stalls in the place known as talipapa,
pursuant to Resolution 29 of the municipal government, is valid;
notwithstanding alleged contractual arrangements of market lessees
(Villanueva, et.al.) with the municipal government.
Held: Yes. Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the
municipal council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein. Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the
medium of a contract. In fact, a public plaza is beyond the commerce of man
and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.
The lease of a public plaza of a municipality in favor of a private person is null
and void. A plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls,
specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject
to abatement according to law. On the other hand, a portion of a public
sidewalk is likewise beyond the commerce of man. Any contract entered into
in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires. The
sidewalk was intended for and was used by the public, in going from one
place to another. The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes
as provided by ordinance or regulation. Stalls block the free passage of
pedestrians resulting to clogged with vehicular traffic.
8 De la Cruz v. Paras [GR L-42571-72, 25 July 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 9
concur, 1 reserved right to dissent, 2 on official leave, 1 on sick leave
Facts: The municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan issued Ordinance 84 (Prohibition
and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan) prohibited the operation of night
clubs, and such clubs employing hostesses. On 5 November 1975, two cases
for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the CFI Bulacan.
The cases were assigned to Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), who Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) issued a restraining order on 7 November 1975.
The answers were thereafter filed. On 15 January 1976, the lower court
upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed the
cases. Hence the petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue: Whether the prohibition on the operation of night clubs, to foster
public morals, is reasonable and/or valid.
Held: Reasonableness is consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. Sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power could not qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. On its face, the Ordinance is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. A prohibition is a clear
invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of
the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
Republic Act 938 (An Act granting municipal or city boards and councils the
power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of certain
places of amusement within their respective territorial jurisdiction) granted
the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city to have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars,
saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement
within its territorial jurisdiction. The power to regulate, was amended to
likewise prohibit on 21 May 1954; but the title remained intact. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. The power claimed to
enact the ordinance is at the most dubious and under the present Local
Government Code non-existent. The law mandates the sangguniang bayan to
"(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist
transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of
international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory
power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without
infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or
massage parlors; and (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard
pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. It
is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
9 Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J):
10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part
Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any
operator of any barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers
or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any
room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as
the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is
conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin,
Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component
members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for
declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of
the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of their
means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by
the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no
case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose
payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic
under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different
measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2)
in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) The Court has been most liberal
in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made
clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory
form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has continued to be.
10 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994] En Banc,
Cruz (J): 12 concur
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
corporation created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the
decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling
Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its
Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under
Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this
end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7
December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and
providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and
issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of
the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor
filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit
the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an
ordinance or resolution.
Held: The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal
per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people,
there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or
it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling,
to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a
modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more
so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local
Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication
that this is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute
as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
11 Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 5
concur, 4 join ponencias of Davide & Mendoza, 1 on official leave.
Facts: On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto
Princesa City enacted Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Puerto Princesa
City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and providing exemptions;
penalties and for other purposes thereof). To implement said ordinance,
Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated
22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the
Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of
the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan
enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms, to wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus
(Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams
and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother
pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger
Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper),
and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of 5 years in
and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of
Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally
charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and
Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan;
and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City
Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity
of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of
certain marine species in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid.
Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the
Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists,
even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt
is to sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted
therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare
Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)
(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances
cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act
7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June
1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the
natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve
to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies
concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and
projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a "closed
season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period
of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
second objective (to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of
Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare clause of the
LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment.
12 Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7
concur, 2 took no part
Facts: Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the
protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor
vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am
Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after
the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and
tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979,
Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation
of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified
vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39
does not impose the penalty of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for
the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the
rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion
Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC
39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain
vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional
and/or valid.
Held: A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a
presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a
questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and
manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil
products and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and
establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication
systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main
arteries; strict observance of traffic rules; effective solution of traffic
problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of
roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to
avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and
responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and
electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine
o'clock p.m.; prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars
and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program) are left to the
discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited
to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain
constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of
a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth
is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a
vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would
be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted
can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
13 Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30
September 1982] En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the
result
Facts: On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis;
refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having
year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the
Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region
(NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In
accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration
year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of
Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-
7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a "Manifestation and
Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed
before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or
Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later
than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their
interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982.
TOMMI, et. al., through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the case, but was
later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29
December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs
and older, is a valid administrative issuance.
Held: Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and
followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding
consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public
hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural
due process. Previous notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of
general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class
or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical
to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its
road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the
adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in
continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
14 Anglo-Fil Trading v. Lazaro [GR L-54958, 2 September 1983]; also
Philippine Integrated Port Services v. Lazaro [GR L-54966] En Banc, Gutierrez
Jr. (p): 7 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: 23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services,
Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring Corporation,
Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring
and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of
Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the
South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these
contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA,
created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by
Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and
management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the
strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4
May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving
and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and
Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs' policy of
placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of
arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other
things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling
contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the
qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port
facilities, etc. This was followed by the President's memorandum to Col.
Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 April 1980, directing submission of a report
on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and
emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the
PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the
committee submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive
contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal
Services, Inc. (OTSI) after Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors. The
PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980,
approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract
to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract
which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of
stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The
Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July
1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the
two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue being collected
by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining
order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al.,
filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22
August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to
include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980,
the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders "in view of the
long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing
public interest involved." On 1 September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and
set aside the restraining orders without prejudice to the Court's resolution on
the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5
September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing
him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was
withdrawing PIPSI's holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring
services at South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and
PIPSI, therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction
alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was
clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the
sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by
the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of
property rights.
Held: From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of
discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the
temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent
to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the parties on the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties'
evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not
grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion
when a court dissolves exparte a restraining order also issued ex-parte.
Further, the contention that due process was violated resulting to a
confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first
place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating merely on "hold-over" permits, which
were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over
permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy
guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as
sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI's and Anglo-Fil et.al.'s authorities
may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a
Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on
the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in
accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot
be said to have been deprived of property without due process because, in
this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere
privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they
have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be
withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless
the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative
matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body,
in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the
statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of
others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings
and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or
discretion, and to findings of fact. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
15 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October
1919] First Division, Johnson (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of
Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] alleged in its answer that it was a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of
the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of
parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels
be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished
ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such
proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should
be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would
fully satisfy the City's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing
the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in
question; that the lands in question had been used by the Chinese
Community for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were
buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it
would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure
of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some
other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the
destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in
their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese
Community and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and
monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the City was without
right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof
for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as
a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied
each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said
expropriation was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado,
with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants,
answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that
presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting.
Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants
(Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability
under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the
City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be
expropriated for the construction of a public improvement.
Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides
that the city (Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The
Charter of the city of Manila, however, contains no procedure by which the
said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190 provides for how right of
eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides that the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department
thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private
corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by Section 242 to 246.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery
in question is public (a cemetery used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church) and seems to have been established under
governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an order
creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use
and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life
sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of
necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting
place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the
courts should be invoked for that object. While Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of
the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of the active
care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred
regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law
expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be
violated.
16 Moday vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107916, 20 February 1997] Second
Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 23 July 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution 43-89, "Authorizing the
Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a 1 Hectare
Portion of Lot 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities." In due time, the Resolution was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for its approval. On 11 September 1989, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment
that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available
lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The
Municipality of Bunawan subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain
against Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur. The complaint was later amended to include the registered
owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico (+) and Leonora Moday, as party
defendants. On 6 March 1991, the municipality filed a Motion to Take or
Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had
already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it
would be in the government's best interest for the municipality to be allowed
to take possession of the property. Despite Moday's opposition and after a
hearing on the merits, the RTC granted the municipality's motion to take
possession of the land; holding that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure
to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective, and that the duty of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of BP 337 (the old
Local Government Code) and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one
of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Moday's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on 31 October 1991. Moday elevated the case
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed
on 15 July 1992. The appellate court also denied Moday's motion for
reconsideration on 22 October 1992. Meanwhile, the Municipality of
Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both
wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made
of concrete. Moday filed on 23 November 1992 the petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of
a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Held: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to
the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by
the national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For
the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must
be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Municipality of
Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as
it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa 337, the Local Government
Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of BP 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the
power to exercise the right of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of
BP337. Perforce; it follows that Resolution 43-89 is valid and binding and
could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
Moday's property.
17 Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [GR L-18841, 27
January 1969] En Banc, Reyes JBL [J]: 10 concur
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising
governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of
which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July
1947, under Executive Order 94, in addition to certain powers and duties
formerly vested in the Director of Posts. Sometime in 1933, the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), and the RCA Communications,
Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from
the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United
States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to
PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and
70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement
was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and
Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party
could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956,
PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1956.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
offices to call private parties. At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000
telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection.
The PLDT, on the other hand, was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and
had also 20,000 pending applications. Through the years, neither of them has
been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of
Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both
enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a
call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. On 5 March 1958, the Republic,
through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement
with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received
by RCA's station to and from local residents. They actually inaugurated this
joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. On 7
April 1958, PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said
bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the
rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the
use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general
public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if
said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT
would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12
April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone
services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. On 12 April
1958, the Republic commenced suit against PLDT, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (CFI, Civil Case 35805), praying in its complaint for
judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic,
through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court
might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against
PLDT to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or
restore those severed. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it
could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94,
establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited
to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of
lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the
time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands,
hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of
the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction
permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.
Both Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) parties
appealed.
Issue: Whether interconnection between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be an valid object for expropriation, i.e. the exercise
of eminent domain.
Held: Although parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of
the contract -- the freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions being of
the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the
statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or
undue influence -- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of
course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the
PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article
XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare,
transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users
of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public
use.
18 Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000] Third
Division, Panganiban (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave on official business
Facts: Barangay San Roque in Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a
property of Heirs of Francisco Pastor (Eugenio Sylianco, Teodoro Sylianco,
Isabel Sylianco, Eugenia S. Ong, Lawrence Sylianco, Lawson Sylianco, Lawina
S. Notario, Leonardo Sylianco, Jr. and Lawford Sylianco). In an Order dated 8
April 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power
to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In
an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the
exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real
property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
with this Court." When the complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), the RTC also dismissed the Complaint on 29 March 1999, holding that
an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value
of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should
be filed before the MTC or the RTC; therefore concluding that the action
should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000. The Barangay's motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied on 14 May 1999. The Barangay filed the petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) has jurisdiction over expropriation cases.
Held: The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites
for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority
of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is
the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) estimated in
monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the propriety of the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the regional trial
courts (RTC). The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 which, like Batas Pambansa 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that
courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.
19 Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974] En Banc,
Zaldivar (J): 7 concur, 4 took no part
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda.
de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de
Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year
basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the
expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic sought to
renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the
leased premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter that the heirs of
the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question
because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public,
demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the
letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition
as before occupancy. The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for
the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and
other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President. Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the Philippine Air
Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic
filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and
Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of
San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged,
among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned
lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of
P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at
P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to take immediate
possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain
and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of
condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on 10
August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga,
dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the parties. After the parties filed
their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its
decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners
of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just;
and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic
filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which motion
Castellvi and ToledoGozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the
trial court denied on 12 July 1961. The Republic's record on appeal was finally
submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for
extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December
1961 the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time,
thereby . On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the
order of 27 December 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an
amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun
filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating
that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and
finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered
the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders
and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the
trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended. Castellvi
did not insist on her Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.
Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
Held: A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property
for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private
property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than
a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth,
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The
"taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof. Two essential elements in the "taking"
of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the
owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were
not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property
in 1947. The "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of
the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the
contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi
property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property
as of that year. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just
compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was
placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on
10 August 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned
as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
20 City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-
64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and
Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the
Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof"
provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation
not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For
several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities
but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council
passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
(Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in
question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the
Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no
issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City
Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on
the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance
6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the
Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to
taking of private property without just compensation.
Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6%
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit
the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general
law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties
to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past
and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell
to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
21 People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958] En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 9
concur
Facts: On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as
mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council
passed Ordinance 7, series of 1950, providing that "any person or persons
who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor," that "a fee of
not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for
each repair permit issued," and that any violation of the provisions of the
ordinance shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor
more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24
days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. 4 years later,
after the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request
was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo
and Babilonia reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the
request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property. On 26 February 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before
and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for
violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of First
Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both to pay a
fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question
because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. From this decision,
Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on
the ground that the proposed Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an
undue deprivation of the use of the property in question, and thus a taking
without due compensation.
Held: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo
and Babilonia was predicated on the ground that the proposed building
would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen
from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently deprive
the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just
compensation. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every
structure that may be erected on Fajardo's land, regardless of its own beauty,
stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would,
in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To
legally achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
22 National Power Corporation vs. Gutierrez [GR 60077, 18 January 1991]
Third Division, Bidin (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs with reservation Facts: The
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and
controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested
with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives,
which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of
electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the
construction of its 230 KV MexicoLimay transmission lines, NAPOCOR's lines
have to pass the lands belonging to Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and
spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit (covered by tax
declarations 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively). NAPOCOR initiated
negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the
aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but
unsuccessful in this regard, NAPOCOR was constrained to file eminent
domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et. al. on 20 January 1965. Upon filing
of the corresponding complaint, NAPOCOR deposited the amount of P973.00
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional
value of the land of the Malit and Gutierrez. And by virtue of which,
NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it could
immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV
transmission line. In this connection, by the trial court's order of 30
September 1965, the spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed
provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00. Meanwhile, for the
purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due Gutierrez, et. al.,
the court appointed 3 commissioners, comprised of one representative of
NAPOCOR, one for the affected families and the other from the court, who
then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the
premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just
compensation to he paid to the owners of the lots. Hearings were
consequently held before said commissioners and during their hearings, the
case of the Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of
Way Grant executed by Guadalupe Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her
co-heirs in favor of NAPOCOR. The case against Matias Cruz was earlier
decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case against the spouses Malit
and Gutierrez still to be resolved. Accordingly, the commissioners submitted
their individual reports. With the reports submitted, the lower court
rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit and Gutierrez the sum
of P10 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the
right-of-way easement of the affected area, which is 760 squares, or a total
sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorney's fees. Dissatisfied with the
decision, NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably
acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated 10 June 1973, it
amended its previous decision, reducing the amount awarded to to P5.00 per
square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) square meters
belonging to the said spouses, in light of the classification of the land to be
partly commercial and partly agricultural. Still not satisfied, an appeal was
filed by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but appellate court, on 9
March 1982, sustained the trial court. NAPOCOR filed the petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the spouses are deprive of the property’s ordinary use and
thus the easement of right of way in favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking.
Held: The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases
of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award
of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Herein,
the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR
against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives spouses Malit
and Gutierrez of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the
Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. The above
price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market
value thereof. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and
arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected
property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.
23 United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946] Douglas (J)
Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which
were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-
southeast runway is 2,220 feet from Causby's barn and 2,275 feet from their
house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property-
which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority passes over this property at 83
feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet
above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is
pursuant to a lease executed in May 1942, for a term commencing 1 June
1942 and ending 30 June 1942, with a provision for renewals until 30 June
1967, or 6 months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the
earlier. Various aircraft of the United States, i.e. bombers, transports and
fighters, use this airport. Since the United States began operations in May
1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and
its fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby's land buildings in
considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at
times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to
the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And
at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of
the noise, the Causbys had to give up their chicken business. As many as 6 to
10 of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright.
The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off.
The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of their sleep and the
family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no
airplane accidents on their property, there have been several accidents near
the airport and close to their place. These are the essential facts found by the
Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that the property had
depreciated in value. It held that the United States had taken an easement
over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property
destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United States contends
that when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act
of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any
physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking
of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) occurring as a
consequence of authorized air navigation.
Issue: Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light
that the United States allegedly has complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the air space over the country.
Held: The United States conceded that if the flights over Causby's property
rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the
5th Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the
measure of the value of the property taken. Market value fairly determined is
the normal measure of the recovery. And that value may reflect the use to
which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use. If, by
reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use this
land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete
as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it. Herein, there was a taking. Though it would be
only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and
not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It
would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the
surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would
be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the
transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that
is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a
case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was
involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546). In that case
property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery
for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like,
incidental to the operations of the trains. Herein, the line of flight is over the
land, and the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were
used for the runways themselves. However, since the record in the case is
not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it
would be premature for the Court to consider whether the amount of the
award made by the Court of Claims was proper, and thus the Court
remanded the cause to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary
findings in conformity with the Court's opinion.
24 Filstream International Inc. [GR 125218 and GR 128077. 23 January 1998]
Third Division, Francisco (J): 4 concur
Facts: Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties
consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo
II, Manila, with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters (TCT 203937, 203936,
169198, 169199, 169200 and 169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila). On
7 January 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 15, Civil Case 140817-CV) against the
occupants of the parcels of land (Orlando Malit, Antonio Caguiat, Alicia
Cabrera, Armando Lachica, Jacinto Caguiat, Gloria Antonio, Elizalde Navarra,
Dolores Fuentes, Susana Roy, Antonio Ibañez, Benigno Basilio, Luceria
Dematulac, Florencia Gomez, Lazaro Gomez, Jose Gomez, Venancio
Manaloto, Cristino Umali, Demetria Gatus, Priscilla Malong, Domingo Aguila,
Ramon San Agustin, Julian Ferrer, Jr., Francisco Galang, Florentino Maliwat,
Severina Villar, Trinidad Naguit, Jose Naguit, Fortunato Agustin Cabrera,
Gaudencio Intal, Danilo David, Enrique David, Vicente De Guzman, Policarpio
Lumba, Belen Palma, Elen Somvillo, Leonardo Manicad, Opreng Miclat,
Benita Mata, Gregorio Lopez, Marcelina Sapno, Jesus Mercado, and Calixto
Gomez) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-
payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on September 14,
1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back
rentals to Filstream. Not satisfied, malit, et. al. appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 4, Civil Case 93-68130) which in
turn affirmed the decision of the MTC. Still not content, Malit, et. al.
proceeded to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review (CA-GR SP
33714). The result however remained the same as the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the RTC in its decision dated 25 August 1994.
Thereafter, no further action was taken by Malit, et. al., as a result of which
the decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory. However,
during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings Malit, et. al. filed on 25
May 1993, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream
before the RTC of Manila (Branch 43, Civil Case 93- Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 66059). It was at this stage that City
of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved
Ordinance 7813 on 5 November 1993, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal
means certain parcels of land which formed part of Filstream's properties
then occupied by Malit, et. al. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land
situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerrero streets in Tondo,
Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierrez, Filstream's
predecessor-in-interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed
to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development
Program of the City of Manila. On 23 May 1994, the City of Manila filed a
complaint for eminent domain before the RTC of Manila (Branch 42, Civil
Case 94-70560), seeking to expropriate the parcels of land owned by
Filstream which are situated at Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila.
Pursuant to the complaint filed by the City of Manila, the trial court issued a
Writ of Possession in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of
possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain as well as a motion to
quash the writ of possession. On 30 September 1994, the RTC of Manila
issued an order denying Filstream's motion to dismiss and the motion to
quash the Writ of Possession. Filstream filed a motion for reconsideration as
well as a supplemental motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal of the
order but the same were denied. Still, Filstream filed a subsequent motion to
be allowed to file a second motion for reconsideration but it was also denied.
Aggrieved, Filstream filed on 31 March 1996, a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CAGR SP 36904) seeking to set aside the RTC order. On 18
March 1996, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Filsteream filed a
motion for reconsideration and attached clearer copies of the pertinent
documents and papers pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. But on 20 May 1996, the appellate
court issued a resolution denying the motion as petitioner failed to submit
clearer and readable copies of the pleadings. This prompted Filstream to
proceed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari.
Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil
Case 140817-CV), the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, upon motion of Filstream,
issued a Writ of Execution as well as a Notice to Vacate the disputed
premises. Malit, et. al. filed a Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution
and Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a supervening event in that the
properties subject of the dispute have already been ordered condemned in
an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of
the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be stayed. For its part,
the City of Manila filed on 13 March 1996, a motion for intervention with
prayer to stay/quash the writ of execution on the ground that it is the
present possessor of the property subject of execution. In its order dated 14
March 1996, the MTC of Manila denied Malit, et. al.'s motion as it found the
allegations therein bereft of merit and upheld the issuance of the Writ of
Execution and Notice to Vacate in Filstream's favor. Subsequently, the trial
court also denied the motion filed by the City of Manila. On 22 April 1996,
the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure
erected on the disputed premises. To avert the demolition, Malit, et. al. filed
before the RTC of Manila, (Branch 14, Civil Case 96-78098) a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction . On 15 May 1996, the City of
Manila filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which
was raffled to Branch 23 of the RTC of Manila (Civil Case 96-78382), seeking
the reversal of the orders issued by the MTC of Manila, Branch 14.
Thereafter, upon motion filed by the City of Manila, an order was issued by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 10, ordering the consolidation of Civil Case 96-
78382 with Civil Case 96-78098 pending before Branch 14 of the RTC of
Manila. Injunctions were issued. Filstream then filed a motion for
reconsideration from the order of denial but pending resolution of this
motion, it filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge of the
RTC of Manila, Branch 14. The motion for inhibition was granted 25 and as a
result, the consolidated cases (Civil Cases 96-78382 and 96-78098) were re-
raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 33. During the proceedings before the
RTC of Manila, Branch 33, Filstream moved for the dismissal of the
consolidated cases (Civil Cases 96-78382 and 96-78098) for violation of
Supreme Court Circular 04-94 (forum shopping) because the same parties,
causes of action and subject matter involved therein have already been
disposed of in the decision in the ejectment Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case (Civil Case 140817) which has already
become final and executory prior to the filing of these consolidated cases. On
9 December 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch 33 ordered the dismissal of Civil
Cases 96-78382 and 96-78098 due to forum shopping. Immediately
thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Demolition and Ejectment and a supplemental motion to the same dated
January 10 and 13, 1997, respectively, before the MTC of Manila, Branch 15,
which promulgated the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-
CV). 23 On January 1997, the court granted the motion and issued the
corresponding writ of demolition. As a consequence of the dismissal of the
consolidated cases, Malit, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 43101). At the conclusion
of the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
of Appeals, in its resolution dated 18 February 1997, found merit in Malit, et.
al.'s allegations in support of their application of the issuance of the writ and
granted the same. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue: Whether there is violation of due process against Filstream in the
manner its properties were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City
of Manila.
Held: That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the
property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible
to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Corollary to the
expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast
tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land
sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has
evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage,
including in particular, urban land reform and housing. The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount
task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas
particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious
dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these
problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation". Thus,
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is
not without limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code
is very explicit that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws. Very clear from Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279
(Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) are the limitations with
respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank
last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same
vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in
securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their
property is expropriated for public use. There is nothing in the records that
would indicate that City of Manila complied with Section 9 and Section 10 of
RA 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned
in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition
of other lands listed under Section 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently,
there was a violation of Filstream's right to due process which must
accordingly be rectified.
25 Estate or Heirs of the late ex-Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. City of Manila [GR
132431, 13 February 2004]; also Estate or Heirs of the late ex-Justice Jose B.
L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 137146] Third Division, Corona (J): 2 concur,
1 took no part
Facts: Jose B. L. Reyes and Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-
owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940
square meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila.
These parcels of land Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) are being occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom
are respondents Dr. Rosario Abiog, Angelina Maglonso and members of the
Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). The Reyeses
leased to Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters and to Maglonso, Lot 2-R,
Block 2996 of the same consolidation plan, with an area of 112 square
meters. On 9 November 1993 and 26 May 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes
and the Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against Abiog
and Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was
substituted by his heirs. The heirs obtained favorable judgments in Civil Case
142851-CV (Metropolitan Trial Court [MTC] of Manila, Branch 10, 9 May
1994) against Abiog, and in Civil Case 144205-CV (MTC of Manila, Branch 3, 4
May 1995) against Maglonso. Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC
decisions but the same were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the
RTC of Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals
were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of
eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and
executory in 1998. During the pendency of the two ejectment cases against
Abiog and Maglonso, the City of Manila filed on 25 April 1995 a complaint for
eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of Reyeses at the RTC of
Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included
parcels of land occupied by Abiog, Maglonso and members of SBMI. The
complaint was based on Ordinance 7818 enacted on 29 November 1993
authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters, more or less, owned by Jose
B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes situated along the streets of Rizal Avenue,
Tecson, M. Natividad, Sampaguita, Oroquieta, M. Hizon, Felix Huertes,
Bulacan, Sulu, Aurora Boulevard, Pedro Guevarra and Kalimbas in the third
district of Manila. The complaint alleged that, on 10 March 1995, the City
thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the Reyeses a written offer to
purchase the subject properties for P10,285,293.38 but the same was
rejected. On 15 May 1995, SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation
composed of the residents of the subject properties, filed a motion for
intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for
injunction. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an order
dated 2 June 1995. On the day SBMI’s motion for intervention was denied,
the Reyeses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for
lack of merit, alleging various grounds, among them, "that instead of
expropriating the subject property which enjoys the least priority in the
acquisition by the City of Manila for socialized housing under Sec. 9(t) of R.A.
7279, the money to be paid should be channeled to the development of 244
sites in Metro Manila designated as area for priority development." On 6
June 1995, the trial court allowed the City to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit of the amount of P1,542,793, based on the
P10,285,293.38 offer by the City to the Reyeses which the trial court fixed as
the provisional amount of the subject properties. On 14 June 1995, the City
filed an opposition to the Reyeses’ motion to dismiss. On 3 October 1995, the
City’s complaint for eminent domain was dismissed. The City’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. On 12 January 1996, the City appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, several
motions seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction were filed by the City to prevent petitioners from
ejecting the occupants of the subject premises. On 21 March 1996, the Court
of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motions for lack of merit. The
City’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, on 27
January 1997, in view of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case
against Abiog, the MTC of Manila, Branch 10, issued a writ of execution. On
31 January 1997, SBMI filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for leave to
intervene with prayer for injunctive relief praying that the ejectment cases be
suspended or that the execution thereof be enjoined in view of the pendency
of the expropriation case filed by the City over the same parcels of land.
Abiog also filed a reiteratory motion for issuance of TRO and to stop the
execution of the order of the MTC of Manila, Branch 10. On 26 August 1997,
the Court of Appeals issued a resolution finding prima facie basis to grant
SBMI’s motions, and issued a TRO to Judge Salvador, his employees and
agents to maintain the status quo. On 27 January 1998, the Court of Appeals
rendered the decision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as
valid City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain over the Reyeses’
properties. From the aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Reyeses filed on 19 March 1998 the petition for review before the Supreme
Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the
manner their property were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City
of Manila.
Held: The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the
present case. In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in
acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a
means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings
are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these
are the only safeguards of often-times helpless owners of private property
against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from
them for public use. Herein, the City failed to prove strict compliance with
the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. The City neither alleged in
its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it
complied with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, the City in its
pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals
was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation
of the right to due process of the Reyeses.
26 City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar [GR 137152, 29 January 2001] First
Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar,
constructed residential houses several decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots
located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The
Aguilars had since leased out these houses to tenants until the present. On
the vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential
structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots were classified by
Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land
reform under Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos. As a
result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to
purchase the land from the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell. On 7
November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong, upon
petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the
subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor
Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise
condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor
Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said
property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for
expropriation, seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the names of the Aguilars, and
praying that the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except Eusebio
who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to
purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is
arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots
are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while the City
has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the fair
market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal
valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square
meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of P21 million. On 5
November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an
additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted
Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City also excluded from expropriation TCT
N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three
(3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The
Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on 18 December 1997.
On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property owners"
whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279. The court
also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for the City's
failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved
for reconsideration. On 29 December 1998, the court denied the motion. The
City filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under
the hands of private persons, but which is within the Areas for Priority
Development (APD).
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued
by then President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the
liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and
promotion of their development and modernization, the optimum use of
land as a national resource for public welfare. Pursuant to this law,
Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro Manila as
Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was
amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284
which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The acquisition of lands for
socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to
Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public
domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the
declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not
yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6)
privatelyowned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can
be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read
together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under
RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the
following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or
consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint
venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The
mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such
acquisition. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made
subject to the modes and conditions set forth in the next provision. In other
words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the modes
under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10. Herein, the City claims
that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for
socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the
acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state
with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in
Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law
states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted." The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by
negotiated purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the
lots from the Aguilars but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of
acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series of
1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong
to effect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city
government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
27 Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26
October 1983] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 on
leave
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of
rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's
express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist
zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised
Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated
resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex
(basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball
and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course,
children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for
the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria
Ardona) Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao)
Modesta Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto
Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and
Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal, Inocencio Mabini and
Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and
Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E. Magno, Alberto
Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno, Heirs of
Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Maximina Navaro,
Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In Representation of
Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao,
Estrella Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro,
Josefina and Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by
Francisca Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio
Labrador, Heirs of Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico
Labrador, Demetrio Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar,
Marino Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo)
Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of Buenaventura Francisco (Represented by
Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C. Cabuenas (Represented by
Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada (Represented by Claudio
Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the
taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution;
alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the
taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has
such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of
the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under
the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the
Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases.The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine
National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value
of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court
issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs of
Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of
constructing a sports complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine
Tourism Authority be considered taking for “public use.”
Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly
provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV
states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang
Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed
at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation
of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power
together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of
private property is concerned. The restrictive view of public use may be
appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government
activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located
public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. The Philippines
has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities which impel the
exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public
land or limited government resources. There can be no doubt that
expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications
systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,
hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems
is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to
clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The Philippine Tourism
Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes
plans that would give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons
productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric
facilities, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
better living standards. The Court’s dismissal of the petition is, in part,
predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the
establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore,
sustained.
28 Sumulong vs. Guerrero [GR L-48685, 30 September 1987] En Banc, Cortes
(J): 12 concur Facts: On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority
(NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo
Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters
and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated
were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market
value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together
with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National
Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of
land, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which defines "the policy on the
expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation." On 17 January 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued
the order issuing a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong and
Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they
had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of
law. This was, however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,” which
would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public use.”
Held: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Art. IV, sec. 9); and
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws" (Art. IV, sec. 1). The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict
use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a
public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but
also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution
made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure
adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic
human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly
and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum,
the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only
by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made,
for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
"Socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". Provisions on
economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum
clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the
public purpose of the project. Herein, the use to which it is proposed to put
the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in
question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong
Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried
government employees. The Supreme Court holds that "socialized housing"
defined in Presidential Decree 1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees
1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation.
However, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the provisions of such
decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional. Herein, the Court finds
that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees
authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due
process. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
29 Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals [GR 103125, 17 May 1993]
First Division, Quiason (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Camarines Sur passed Resolution 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin with
the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur (Hon. Benjamin V. Panga
presiding; Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89). Forthwith, the
Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated 6
December 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that San Joaquin
may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial
court issued a writ of possession in an order dated 18 January 1990. The San
Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an
amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated 26
February 1990. The San Joaquins filed their petition before the Court of
Appeals, praying (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints
for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6,
1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation
and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the
amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be
issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and
thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. The Court of Appeals set aside the
order of the trial court, and ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
to convert the classification of the property of the San Joaquins from
agricultural to non-agricultural land. The Province of Camarines Sur filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the establishment of the Pilot Development Center and the
housing project are deemed for “public use.”
Held: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. In
delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain
control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local
governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the
power or in other legislations. It is the legislative branch of the local
government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial
relation to the public use. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain
to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
Section 9 of BP 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no
provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to
the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The rules on conversion of
agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land
for the purpose to which it would Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those
rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Further, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
"public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may
be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.)
before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of
"public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and
the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or
housing project. The expropriation of the property authorized by Resolution
129, Series of 1988, is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the
people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would
make available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project
also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. Housing is a
basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum the general welfare. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property of the San Joaquins; (b)
orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c)
requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify the property of the
San Joaquins property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
30 Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [GR 106440, 29 January 1996] First Division,
Vitug (J): 4 concur
Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land
located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of
about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National
Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant
to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion
133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the
Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time,
the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it
to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by
the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August 1989, an
order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00)
values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property
once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the
complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application
of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to
dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were
denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed
the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by
the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix
Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes “public
use.” Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent
power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to
exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more
to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain
is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right
to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or
to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance
even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The
only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended
to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The
term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,
must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a
public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
134
98 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said trial
court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of PEZA to expropriate,
among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was
sought by the Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would only be
transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would
not be utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the
trial court reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-
A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.
Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise
agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise agreement provides "(1)
That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable
Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the
expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss
of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by
plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the parties agree that
defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of
13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No.
113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the
same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of
Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact
that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant
Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based
on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of
being paid Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the
just compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with
lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will
abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision
to be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final
and executory." The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the
parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of
Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the
compromise agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
to the Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT
T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the
Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In
the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties and directed PEZA to peacefully
turn over Lot 1406- A to the Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the
trial court, respondent PEZA moved for its reconsideration, which was denied
in an order dated 3 November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at
the instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3
November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that
should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November 1997,
PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional
uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the
public" has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo
to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding
and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that
might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to
be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.
31 Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone [GR 137285,
16 January 2001] Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called
as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated
riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008 square
meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T-1
prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3
November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998, partially granted the petition by
setting aside the order of the trial court regarding "the peaceful turn over to
the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and instead ordered the trial
judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings
regarding the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The
Estate sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998.
However, the appellate court in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied
the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of “public use.”
Held: This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an
expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first
order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to
the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in the
compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead
constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the
subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated.
This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which
states that the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B
covered by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of
the Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal clear from the contents
of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the
matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said expropriation order is not
closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by
PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this
effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Since the
compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping
of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot
1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash
payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the legal authority to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA
expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated
30 May 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the
power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter,
Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for
the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto."
The authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in deciding for
what public use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this
broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while
the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending PEZA's original charter. As
reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public
use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
32 Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-
72126, 29 January 1988] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC)
filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters
and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The
fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy
equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes,
pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-
stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low
cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan,
headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of
1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of
land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the
PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a
special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On 10 March
1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of
Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no
genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the
respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report,
the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976,
disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal
Council of Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the
Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid
parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21,
Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The
Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January
1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil
action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is
the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial
court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the
municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the
taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of
Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the
just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate
Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for
reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the
land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same
purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The
court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined
that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy
equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was
denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for review on
certiorari on 25 October 1985.
Issue: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property
for the purpose of a connecting road, in light of other appropriate lots for the
purpose.
Held: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. What is
questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The foundation
of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private
property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to
require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government
may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With
due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular
property to be taken and how much Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) thereof may be condemned in the exercise of
the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of
partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. The
Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no
genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the
aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for
use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available
road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question
and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by
the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the
justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and
necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of
the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the
volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other
available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to
an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may
seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for
sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of traffic because as
observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken
will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice
to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan
area." There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more
appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not
been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming
there is a real need for another connecting road.
33 De Knecht vs. Bautista [GR L-51078, 30 October 1980] First Division,
Fernandez (J): 4 concur
Facts: In 1970, the government through the Department of Public Works and
Communications (now Ministy of Public Highways [MPH]) prepared a plan to
extend Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard. The
proposed extension, an adjunct of another road-building program, the
Manila—Cavite Coastal Road Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up
to Roxas Boulevard. The route was designed to be a straight one, taking into
account the direction of EDSA. Preparatory to the implementation of the
aforesaid plan, or on 13 December 1974, then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of
the Department of Public Highways directed the City Engineer of Pasay City
not to issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or
improvement of buildings and other structures located within the proposed
extension through Cuneta Avenue. Shortly thereafter the Department of
Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old substantial
houses. Upon petition of the residents therein to the President of the
Philippines for the implementation of the original plan, the President
referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission. The Commission
submitted its report recommending the reversion to the original plan passing
through Cuneta Avenue. Notwithstanding said recommendation, the MPH
insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. In February 1979, the government filed in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City (Judge Pedro JL.
Bautista presiding; Civil Case 7001-P), a complaint for expropriation against
the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets,
among them Cristina de Knecht. De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss dated 9
March 1979. An urgent motion dated 28 March 1979 for preliminary
injunction was also filed. In June 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property sought to be
expropriated on the ground that said Republic had made the required
deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Judge Bautista issued a writ of
possession dated 14 June 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to
take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought so be
condemned. De Knecht filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court, praying that judgment be rendered annulling the order for
immediate possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation
proceedings and commanding the Republic to desist from further
proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediate
possession issued in said action.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of the residential lots in Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets is genuinely Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) necessary, in light of similar acceptable lots along Cuneta
Avenue which were subject of the original plan.
Held: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to
take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." It is recognized, however, that the government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. A
landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a
mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any
governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to
act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the
embodiment of the sporting idea off air play. In that sense, it stands as a
guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any
governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to
it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under
pain of nullity. Herein, it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways
originally establish the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue. It is to be
presumed that the Department of Public Highways made studies before
deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed
extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando
Rein — Del Pan Streets which the Solicitor General concedes "the Del Pan —
Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction While
admitting "that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein
Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore
are both acceptable", the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan —
Fernando Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to
minimize the social impact factor or problem involved." It is doubtful
whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on
the ground of social impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta
Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels. Even granting,
arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements
Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the
National Housing Authority and other government agencies in the relocation
and resettlement of those adversely affected. From the facts of record and
recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the
choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through which the
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
34 Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990] First Division,
Gancayco (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings
against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando ReinDel Pan
streets among them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus,
and some 15 other defendants (Civil Case 7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de
Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of
appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and
arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. On 29 March 1979 de
Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a
restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of
immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned.
In June 1979, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had
made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of
the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated 14
June 1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the
Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be
condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just
compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. On 16 July 1979, de
Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR No. L-
51078) and directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979
praying that the Republic be commanded to desist from further proceeding
in the expropriation action and from implementing said order. On 30 October
1980, the Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for
certiorari and prohibition and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the
Judge Bautista. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco
Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in
compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of the
Supreme Court which had become final and in order to avoid further damage
to latter who were denied possession of their properties. The Republic filed a
manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among others, that it had no
objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the
aforestated decision. However, on 2 September 1983, the Republic filed a
motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340
expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court
in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the
enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied in the order of the lower court dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht
appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on 28 December 1988, setting aside the order
appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The Republic
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final
judgment of the Supreme Court may be the subject of a subsequent
legislation for expropriation.
Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the
subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true
that the right of the Republic to take private properties for public use upon
the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and
our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic
not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the
Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the very properties subject
of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was
based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme
Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through
the Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded
the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All
residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the
EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only De
Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only
the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic
bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the
legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent
assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees
in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of
this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
35 Philippine Press Institute vs. Commission on Elections [GR 119694, 22
May 1995] Resolution En Banc, Feliciano (J): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 2 March 1995, the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
promulgated Resolution 2772, which provided that (1) the Commission shall
procure free print space of not less than 1/2 page in at least one newspaper
of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space"
from 6 March until 12 May 1995; and that in the absence of said newspaper,
"Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said
province or city; (2) that "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which
the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates
to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government; and that the "Comelec Space" shall
also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information' among others. Apparently in implementation of the Resolution,
Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical
letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the
Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times
Journal, all members of Philippine Press Institute (PPI), advising the latter
that they are directed to provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page
for use as "Comelec Space" or similar to the print support which the latter
have extended during the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections which was 2
full pages for Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from 6 March to 6 May
1995, to make known to their qualifications, their stand on public issues and
their platforms and programs of government. PPI filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
restraining order before the Supreme Court to assail the validity of
Resolution 2772 and the corresponding directive dated 22 March 1995.
Issue: Whether there was necessity for the taking, i.e. compelling print media
companies to donate “Comelec space.”
Held: To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution 2772 (not less than 1/2 Page),
amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.
Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory
"donation." The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is
not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation,"
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal property for
public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity
for the taking has not been shown by the Comelec. It has not been suggested
that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates
to Comelec for election purposes. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually
to be assumed. That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not
contested by PPI. Only that, under Section 3 of Resolution 2772, the free
"Comelec space" sought by the Comelec would be used not only for
informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of
government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of
vital election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations,
notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of
judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme
Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when
their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be
brought to the attention of the general public. The taking of private property
for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of "just compensation." Thus, although there is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free
print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution 2772;
Section 2 of resolution 2772 does not provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
36 National Housing Authority vs. Heirs f Isidro Guivelondo [GR 154411, 19
June 2003] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 23 February 1999, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended
Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu,
Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (Civil Case CEB-23386),
alleging that Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the claimant/owner of Lot
108-C located in the Banilad Estate, Cebu City; that Engracia Urot was the
claimant/owner of Lots 108-F, 108-I, 108-G, 6019-A and 6013-A, all of the
Banilad Estate; that the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the
claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu
City; and that the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner
intends to develop as a socialized housing project. On 12 November 1999,
the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, filed a Manifestation stating that they were
waiving their objections to the NHA’s power to expropriate their properties.
Hence, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the NHA has a lawful
right to expropriate the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) properties of the heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Thereafter, the trial
court appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain the correct and just
compensation of the properties of the Heirs. On 17 April 2000, the
Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the
just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per
square meter. On 7 August 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment
adopting the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just
compensation of the lands of the Heirs at P11,200.00 per square meter. The
NHA filed two motions for reconsideration dated 30 August 2000 and 31
August 2000, assailing the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the
amount of just compensation, respectively. The Heirs also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Partial Judgment. On 11 October 2000, the trial court
issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the Heirs
and the 31 August 2000 motion of petitioner, on the ground that the fixing of
the just compensation had adequate basis and support. On the other hand,
the trial court granted NHA’s 30 August 2000 motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the Commissioner’s Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and
19 within its coverage. The NHA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari (CA-GR SP 61746). Meanwhile, on 31 October 2000, the trial court
issued an Entry of Judgment over the Partial Judgment dated 7 August 2000
as modified by the Omnibus Order dated 11 October 2000. Subsequently, the
Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on 22 November 2000.
On 31 January 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari
on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final
and executory when the NHA failed to appeal the same. NHA’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Clarificatory Ruling were
denied in a Resolution dated 18 March 2001. A petition for review was filed
by the NHA with the Supreme Court (GR 147527). However, the same was
denied in a Minute Resolution dated 9 May 2001 for failure to show that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. NHA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was however denied with finality on 20 August 2001.
Prior to the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, NHA, on 16 July 2001,
filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case CEB-23386, complaint
for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized
housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the
land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not
afford. The Motion was denied on 17 September 2001, on the ground that
the Partial Judgment had already become final and executory and there was
no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. NHA filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated 20
November 2001. NHA thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR SP 68670), praying for the annulment of the Order of the trial
court denying its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration. On 5
February 2002, the Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition.
Immediately thereafter, Sheriff Pascual Y. Abordo of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, served on the NHA a Notice of Levy pursuant
to the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court to enforce the Partial
Judgment of 7 August 2000 and the Omnibus Order of 11 October 2000. On
18 February 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of the petition
and reinstated the same. Thereafter, a temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining the sheriff to preserve the status quo. On 27 May 2002, the
sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third
Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of NHA therein.
Subsequently, the sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of the NHA.
On 16 July 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
NHA filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the NHA can abandon an expropriation proceedings if it
disagrees with the price recommended by the Commissioners appointed by
the court as just compensation.
Held: Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation
of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public
purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation
to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners. The first is concerned with
the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing
more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in
the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners
would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit,
and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be
erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise.
Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by
taking an appeal therefrom. Herein, the NHA did not appeal the Order of the
trial court dated 10 December 1999, which declared that it has a lawful right
to expropriate the properties of the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the
Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any
court. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial
determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through
appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. The public purpose of
the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of
just compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent
housing to the urban poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere
fact that the land cost more than the NHA had expected. It is worthy to note
that petitioner pursued its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the amount of just compensation and its petition for review with
the Supreme Court which eloquently indicates that there still exists a public
use for the housing project. It was only after its appeal and petitions for
review were dismissed that the NHA made a complete turn-around and
decided it did not want the property anymore. The landowners had already
been prejudiced by the expropriation case. The NHA cannot be permitted to
institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it
later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
37 Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001] Second Division,
Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto.
Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-
11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6
October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved
the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed
to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the
Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Rightof-Way agreement was
executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid De Onorio the
amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently
executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any
compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as
a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year,
Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable
settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De
Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA
refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a
complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that
Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for
the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed
by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA
constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA
paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation
purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the government had
not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation
canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De
Onorio was not entitled to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) compensation for the taking of her property considering that she
secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just
compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land
owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal
plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
NIA filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time
the property was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.
Held: Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to
applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales
patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding
certificate and owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed
registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus
issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued
to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only
servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of
the government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-
determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the
time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be
compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing
and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under
the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had,
and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the
irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built
only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered
on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have
been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could
be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner
of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it
is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to
be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer
the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit,
in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking,
not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the
property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
38 Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR 71176, 21 May 1990] Third
Division, Fernan (CJ): 2 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: Avegon, Inc., offered 4 parcels of land with a total area of 9,650
square meters located at 2090 Dr. Manuel L. Carreon Street, Manila, for sale
to the City School Board of Manila on 21 July 1973 at P2,300,000. The school
board was willing to buy at P1,800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila
intervened and volunteered to negotiate with Avegon, Inc. for a better price.
Inasmuch as the alleged negotiation did not materialize, on 3 June 1974,
Avegon, Inc. sold the property and its improvements to Amerex Electronics,
Phils. Corporation for P1,800,000. Thereafter, TCTs 115571, 115572, 115573
and 115574 were issued in favor of Amerex. On 29 August 1975, the Solicitor
General filed for the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint
against Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 99190), stating therein that the property
was needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la
Fuente High School (later renamed Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High
School); that the fair market Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) value of the property had been declared by Amerex as
P2,435,000, and that the assessor had determined its market value as
P2,432,042 and assessed it for taxation purposes in the amount of
P1,303,470. On 9 October 1975, the court issued an order directing the
sheriff to place the Republic in possession of the property, after informing
the court that the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes had
been deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Escolta, Manila on
30 September 1975. The plaintiff took actual possession thereof on 13
October 1975. Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating that
while it was not contesting the merits of the complaint, the same failed to
categorically state the amount of just compensation for the property. It
therefore prayed that in consonance with Presidential Decree 794, the just
compensation be fixed at P2,432,042, the market value of the property
determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration.
Alleging that its motion to dismiss merely sought a clarification on the just
compensation for the property, Amerex filed a motion to withdraw the
Republic's deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without prejudice to its
entitlement to the amount of P1,128,572, the balance of the just
compensation of P2,432,042 insisted upon. On 3 December 1975, the lower
court issued an order vesting the Republic with the lawful right to take the
property upon payment of just compensation as provided by law. On 19
December 1975, after the parties had submitted the names of their
respective recommendees to the appraisal committee, the lower court
appointed Atty. Narciso Pena, Aurelio V. Aquino and Atty. Higinio Sunico as
commissioners. On 24 January 1977, the commissioners submitted their
appraisal report finding that the fair market value of the property was
P2,763,400. Both parties objected to the report of the commissioners. On 15
March 1977, the lower court rendered a decision, "fixing the amount of
P2,258.018.57 as just compensation for the property of the defendant and
declaring the plaintiff entitled to possess and appropriate it to the public use
alleged in the complaint and to retain it upon payment of the said amount,
after deducting the amount of P1,303,470.00, with legal interest from
October 13, 1975 when the plaintiff was placed in possession of the real
property, and upon payment to each of the commissioners of the sum of
P35.00 for their attendance during the hearings held on January 23, February
16, May 11, July 23, September 17, October 12 and December 10, 1976, plus
P500.00 each for the preparation of the report, and the costs." The Republic
elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
On 29 October 1984, it affirmed the appealed decision with the modification
that the Republic of the Philippines be exempted from the payment of the
commissioners' fees, the P500.00 granted each of them for he preparation of
the report and the costs. Its motion for the reconsideration of said decision
having been denied, the Republic filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the just compensation for the expropriated property should
be the price first offered to the Government in 1973.
Held: The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is
basically a judicial function. As the court is not bound by the commissioners'
report, it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of its right of
condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
expropriated. For that matter, the Supreme Court may even substitute its
own estimate of the value as gathered from the record. Hence, although the
determination of just compensation appears to be a factual matter which is
ordinarily outside the ambit of its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may
disturb the lower court's factual finding on appeal when there is clear error
or grave abuse of discretion. Herein, the just compensation prescribed by the
lower court is based on the commissioners' recommendation which in turn is
founded on the "audited" statements of Amerex that the property is worth
P2,258,018.57. The Certification from the accounting firm issued to Amerex
merely compared the figures in the schedules or "audited" statements with
those of the records and books of accounts of Amerex. As no investigation
was made as to the veracity of the figures in the account, there was no audit
in the real sense of the term. Thus, the accuracy of the "audited" statements
is therefore suspect. Besides the fact that the Republic was not furnished a
copy of the audited statements which were also not introduced in evidence,
Enrique P. Esteban, vice-president and treasurer of Amerex, and even a
representative of the accounting firm, were likewise not presented during
the trial thereby depriving the Republic of the opportunity to cross-examine
them. The Supreme Court having declared as unconstitutional the mode of
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) fixing just
compensation under Presidential Decree 794 in Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. Dulay (GR 59603, 29 April 1987), just compensation should be
determined either at the time of the actual taking of the government or at
the time of the judgment of the court, whichever comes first. The
reasonableness of the 5 June 1975 appraisal fixing at P2,400,000 the fair
market value of the property, is bolstered by the fact that on 4 June 1975,
Traders Commodities Corporation offered to buy the property at P2,750,000.
It must be emphasized, however, that legal interest on the balance of the just
compensation of P2,400,000 after deducting the amount of P1,303,470
which had been delivered to Amerex, should be paid by the Republic from
the time the government actually took over the property. Much as the Court
realizes the need of the government, under these trying times, to get the
best possible price for the expropriated property considering the ceaseless
and continuing necessity for schools, the Court cannot agree with the
Republic that the just compensation for the property should be the price it
commanded when it was first offered for sale to the City School Board of
Manila.
39 City of Cebu vs. Dedamo [GR 142971, 7 May 2002] Davide Jr. (CJ): 5 concur
Facts: On 17 September 1993, the City of Cebu filed in Civil Case CEB-14632 a
complaint for eminent domain against the spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo, alleging that it needed the latter's parcels of land for a public
purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an
access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City; the
lots being the most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought to be
expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786.400.
The City deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of
P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable
the City to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19
of Republic Act (RA) 7160. The spouses, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint because the purpose for which their property was to be
expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private
entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc., besides that the price offered was very low in
light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which
the City paid to the neighboring lots. On 23 August 1994, the City filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of
RA7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.
On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court
an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the
case. Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three
commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be
expropriated. Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which
contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the
valuation of the property. On the basis of the commissioners' report and
after due deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered its decision on 7 May
1996, directing the City to pay the spouses Dedamo the amount of
P24,865.930.00 representing the compensation. The City filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was inaccurate
since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation (i.e. 478 of
793 square meters only of Lot 1528). On 16 August 1996, the commissioners
submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot 1528
and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of
P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just compensation
thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996. Accordingly, the
dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.
The City elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. The City filed with the Supreme Court the petition
for review.
Issue: Whether the valuation of the just compensation that which was
recommended by the appointed commissioners.
Held: Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.
However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 31 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
therefor. Herein, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the
determination of just compensation is Section 19 of Republic Act 7160, which
expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time
of actual taking. Further, the Court did not categorically rule in the case of
NAPOCOR vs. Court of Appeals that just compensation should be determined
as of the filing of the complaint. What the Court explicitly stated therein was
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value
of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings." Furthermore, the parties,
by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to
be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court.
Records show that the City consented to conform with the valuation
recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement
now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.
40 Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987] En
Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 10 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 on leave
Facts: On 15 January 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total
area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an
export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The
proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San
Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase
the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set
forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties
failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of
land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export
processing zones, in relation to Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. On 21 October 1980, Judge
Ceferino E. Dulay issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take
immediate possession of the premises. At the pre-trial conference on 13
February 1981, the judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed
that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties
and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is
set on 2 April 1981. On 17 February 1981, the judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the
properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also
issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated. On 19 June 1981, the three commissioners
submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00
per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for
the properties. On 29 July 1981, EPZA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the order of 19 February 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on
the grounds that PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum
amount set by PD 1533. On 14 November 1981, the trial court denied EPZA's
motion for reconsideration. On 9 February 1982, EPZA filed the petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the
trial court from enforcing the order dated 17 February 1981 and from further
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and
whether the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just
compensation. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 32 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just
compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for
public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by
the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In
determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by
the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property,
or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just
compensation when private property is acquired by the government for
public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly,
Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for
private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the
compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined
by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is
lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property." The provisions of the Decrees on
just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining
just compensation under the said decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court
inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can
come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform
for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the
exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described
as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in
terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of
areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as
guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
41 Ansaldo vs. Tantuico [GR 50147, 3 August 1990] First Division, Narvasa (J):
4 concur
Facts: Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and
used for the widening of a road more than forty-three years ago, without
benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners, albeit
without protest by the latter. The lots belong to Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria
Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names, and have an aggregate
area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldos
sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is
now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. Said owners
made no move whatever until 26 years later. They wrote to ask for
compensation for their land on 22 January 1973. Their claim was referred to
the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion dated 22 February 1973,
that just compensation should be paid in accordance with Presidential
Decree (PD) 76, and thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit
be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the
Ansaldos. Pursuant to the said opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways
requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the
market value of the Ansaldos' property in accordance with PD 76. The new
valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public
Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the
recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the "current and fair
market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking." The
Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. In a
decision handed down on 26 September 1973, the Acting Chairman ruled
that "the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots," i.e. 1947. The
ruling was reiterated by the Commission on 8 September 1978, and again on
25 January 1979 when it denied the Ansaldos' motion for reconsideration.
The Ansaldos appealed to the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 33
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether the valuation of just compensation should be determined at
the time of taking in 1947, especially in light of the absence of any
expropriation proceeding undertaken before the said taking.
Held: Where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of
the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of
the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, the
assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on
its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the
property as provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the
proceedings. There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency
takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit. In these instances, the
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the
time of filing of the action of eminent domain. There was undoubtedly a
taking of the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtained possession
thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. It is as
of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the
property is to be established. The value of the Ansaldos' property must be
ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the
time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be
done. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be
adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full
payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case
law. The Court thus directed the Department of Public Works and Highways
to institute the appropriate expropriation action over the land in question so
that the just compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance
with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the time of taking until full payment is made.
42 National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107631, 26 February
1996] Third Division, Francisco (J): 4 concur
Facts: A contract was forged between the government through the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and PECORP, Inc. (PECORP, formerly Pacific
Equipment Corporation, as party-CONTRACTOR on 27 June 1974 for the
construction of the Mariveles Dam 1 and appurtenant structures of the water
supply system of the Bataan Export Processing Zone at Mariveles, Bataan. It
was agreed upon that the contract is of a "Cost-Plus a Percentage" type —
meaning, PECORP will be paid a certain percentage as fee based on the
"Actual Final Cost" of the work, and what constitutes "Actual Final Cost" is
the total cost to NAPOCOR of all the work performed by PECORP which
includes cost of materials and supplies, structures, furnitures, charges, etc.
and all other expenses as are inherent in a Cost- Plus and Percentage
Contract and necessary for the prosecution of the work that are approved by
NAPOCOR. In a letter dated 11 July 1974, NAPOCOR communicated to
PECORP that it was inclined to contract directly and separately with
Philippine Grouting and Guniting., Inc. (GROGUN) for the drilling and grouting
work on the construction project and consequently, PECORP will not be
entitled to any fees for said task. Contending that such NAPOCOR-GROGUN
arrangement will violate its rights under the NAPOCOR-PECORP contract,
PECORP made known to NAPOCOR its desire to bring the matter to
arbitration. The NAPOCOR-GROGUN drilling and grouting contract,
nonetheless, pushed through on 23 August 1974. As a result of such
purported "withdrawal", it appeared that the drilling and grouting work
ceased to be a Part of the NAPOCOR-PECORP contract. Roughly 5 years after,
PECORP on 14 June 1979 presented to NAPOCOR 4 claims, i.e. (1) Fee on the
cost of drilling and grouting which is 10% of the Actual Final Cost of
P6,962,519.50, or P696.251.95; (2) Fee on the minimum guaranteed
equipment rental which is 10% of the Actual Final Cost of P1.67 million, or
P167,000.00; (3) Fee on the inventory of unused stocks and POL,
P155,844.95; and (4) Reimbursement of Medical Hospital expenses re: TK-
001 Accident case, or P50,085.93, coupled with a request for arbitration. A
board of arbitrators was thereafter convened. But after a series of written
communications among the board, NAPOCOR and PECORP, it appeared that
NAPOCOR was willing to arbitrate on claims (3) and (4) only. As NAPOCOR
was uncompromising, PECORP filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to compel NAPOCOR to submit/confirm/certify all the 4 claims for
arbitration, where judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of PECORP.
After the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion for reconsideration of its
decision, the Court of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 34 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the same but deleted the award of
attorney's fees. However, in affirming said decision which merely ordered
NAPOCOR and PECORP to arbitrate on all 4 claims, the appellate court went
further in disposing of issues which could have been appropriately ventilated
and passed upon in the arbitration proceedings. From the adverse judgment,
NAPOCOR filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether PECORP is entitled to the collection of fees for drilling and
grouting work conducted by GROGUN under the NAPOCOR-GROGUN
contract.
Held: The NAPOCOR-PECORP Contract is for the construction, complete, of
the Mariveles Dam 1. Drilling and grouting work is just a part of the complete
construction of the total project, hence, covered by and within the scope of
the NAPOCOR-PECORP Contract. The word "Project" is defined in the
contract to mean the Dam and Appurtenant Structures. Drilling and Grouting
is part of the dam or appurtenant structures, and therefore a part of
PECORP's scope of work. Article 1725 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that "The owner may withdraw at will from the construction of the work,
although it may have been commenced, indemnifying the contractor for all
the latter's expenses, work and the usefulness which the owner may obtain
therefrom, and damages," is not applicable herein inasmuch as (a) there was
actually no withdrawal from the "construction of the work," but only a
transfer of a part of the construction, which is the drilling and grouting work,
and (b) said drilling and grouting still forms part of the project as a mere
NAPOCOR-GROGUN subcontract. Since the NAPOCOR-GROGUN Contract did
not amend nor nullify the "cost plus" provision of the NAPOCOR-Pecorp
Contract, therefore, appellee Pecorp is still entitled to the said 10% fee.
Further, the allegation that PECORP withdrew its claim for fee on the
minimum guaranteed equipment rental hours of P167,000.00 is without
merit, as it is clear that withdrawal is only a proposal conditioned upon
NAPOCOR's adjudication, endorsement and approval of all the 3 other claims.
However, as the record shows, NAPOCOR refused to certify for arbitration all
the said 3 other claims, hence, the withdrawal was rendered null and void.
These were the findings of the Court of Appeals which were approved by the
Supreme Court.
43 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989]; Also Acuna vs. Arroyo [GR 79310],
Pabico vs. Juico [GR 79744], and Manaay vs. Juico [GR 79777] En Banc, Cruz
(J): 14 concur
Facts: On 17 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
(EO) 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
Presidential Decree (PD) 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived
Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President
and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President
Aquino signed on 10 June 11988. This law, while considerably changing RA
3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code, 8 August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October
1972), nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions. [GR 79777] Nicolas Manaay and his wife
owned a 9-hectare riceland worked by 4 tenants, while Augustin Hermano Jr.
owned a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants therein
were declared full owners of these lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers
under PD 27. Manaay and Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD
27, and EOs 228 and 229, before the Supreme Court, in GR 79777, on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation. In the amended petition dated 22 November
1988, it was contended that PD 27, EOs 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 35 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) repealed by RA 6657, but that the latter statute should itself also
be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same
infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention was filed with
leave of court on 1 June 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare land,
who complained that the department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was insisting
on the implementation of PD 27 and EO 228 despite a compromise
agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. [GR
79310] Arsenio Al. Acuña, Newton Jison, Victorino Ferraris, Dennis Jereza,
Herminigildo Gustilo, and Paulino D. Tolentino are landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental; while the
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-
members. They filed a petition (GR 79310) seeking to prohibit the
implementation of Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President; that although they
agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress
was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period; and that, even assuming that the interim legislative power
of the President was properly exercised, Proclamation 131 and EO 229 would
still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection. Furthermore, they
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full,
but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the EO 229. On the
contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines
"shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the
government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls
to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council."
This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several
modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing
periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed
upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC. A motion for intervention was filed on 27 August
1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a
membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country.
On 10 September 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time
by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both
motions were granted by the Court. On 11 April 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a
coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of EO 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because (1) only
public lands should be included in the CARP; (2) EO 229 embraces more than
one subject which is not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President
to legislate was terminated on 2 July 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50
billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the
House of Representatives. [GR 79744] Inocentes Pabico in his petition (GR
79744) alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed
his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates
of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to Salvador Talento, Jaime
Abogado, Conrado Avanceña, and Roberto Taay, who then refused payment
of lease rentals to him. On 3 September 1986, Pabico protested the
erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer
and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer
in the name of the Talento, et. al. Pabico claims that on 24 December 1986,
his petition was denied without hearing. On 17 February 1987, he filed a
motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when EO 228
and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic
because they directly effected the transfer of his land to Talento, et. al.
Pabico argues that (1) EOs 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President
of the Philippines; 92) the said executive orders are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation; and (3) Pabico is denied the right of maximum
retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution. [GR 78742] The
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., Juanito D. Gomez,
Gerardo B. Alarcio, Felife A. Guico, Jr., Bernardo M. Almonte, Canuto Ramir B.
Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico, Felisa I. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Llamido, Fausto J. Salva, Reynaldo G. Estrada, Felisa C.
Bautista, Esmenia J. Cabe, Teodoro B. Madriaga, Aurea J. Prestosa,
Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C. Apresto, Consuelo M. Morales, Benjamin R.
Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S. Ferrer invoke in their petition (GR
78742) the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit
but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They
claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has so far not
issued the implementing rules required under PD 316, implementing PD 27.
They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform to issue the said rules.
Issue: Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money and
not other things of value.
Held: This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose. What is dealt with herein is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation. The Court assumes that the framers of
the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be
needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be
paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical
method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be
distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the
CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be
paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. The Court has not found in the
records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among
the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program
being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records
either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general
sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the
payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. Accepting the theory
that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion of cash payment to
the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on
the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive
upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it
more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and
other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any
time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Admittedly, the
compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and
small, not a little inconvenience. However, this cannot be avoided.
44 Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals [GR 118745, 6
October 1995]; also Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals [GR
118712] Second Division, Francisco (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 4 September 1992, the TCTs of Pedro L. Yap were totally cancelled
by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of
farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) together with a certification of the Landbank that the
sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Yap for the
parcels of lands covered by TCTs 6282 and 6283 respectively, without notice
to Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA
6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an
accessible bank. On the other hand, in November and December 1990,
without notice to the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago, the owners of a parcel
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 37 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of land located
at Laur, Nueva Ecija (18.5615 hectares, TCT NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija), the Landbank (or DAR, according to Landbank) required and
the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking to pay rentals
to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the
net harvest. On 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order
directing the Landbank to pay the heirs directly or through the establishment
of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12. On 24 February 1992, the
Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.
The beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the heirs after they signed the
Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to
the Landbank (The Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, allegedly did
not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries). Lastly,
the Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR)
owned properties in San Francisco, Quezon (a parcel of land with an area of
209.9215 hectares, TCT 34314; another parcel with an area of 163.6189
hectares, TCT 10832), and in Tabaco, Albay (a parcel of land with an area of
1,629.4578 hectares, TCT T2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay). Without
notice to AMADCOR, a summary administrative proceeding to determine
compensation of the property covered by TCT 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City. A decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 fixing
compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or
establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR. With
respect to AMADCOR's property in Albay, emancipation patents were issued
covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February
1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation
for said land. On 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was
established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition
having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. Thus, Yap, the Heirs of
Santiago, AMADCOR, being landowners whose landholdings were acquired
by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and were aggrieved by the
alleged lapses of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the
Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for
their land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (RA) 6657, filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction, questioning the validity of DAR
Administrative Order 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order 9,
Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending
summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in
trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same. Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated 9 February 1994,
the Supreme Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for
proper determination and disposition. On 20 October 1994, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition, declaring that DAR Administrative order 9,
Series of 1990, null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds; ordering Landbank to
immediately deposit — not merely "earmark," "reserve" or "deposit in trust"
— with an accessible bank designated by DAR in the names of Yap, the Heirs
of Santiago, and AMADCO the amounts of P1,455,207.31, P135,482.12, and
P15,914,127.77 respectively in cash and in government financial instruments
within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657; ordering the DAR-designated
bank to allow Yap, et. al. to withdraw the amounts without prejudice to the
final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; and
ordering DAR to immediately conduct summary administrative proceedings
to determine the just compensation for the lands in question giving Yap, et.
al. 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and to decide the
cases within 30 days after they are submitted for decision. DAR and Landbank
moved for reconsideration, but were denied on 18 January 1995. DAR and
Landbank filed their respective petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP
bonds, and whether there should be a distinction between the deposit of
compensation and the determination of just compensation.
Held: It is very explicit in Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 38 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is
allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant
an expanded construction of the term "deposit". Herein, the DAR clearly
overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a
trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property
because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, DAR and Landbank
cannot invoke LRA Circular 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing
regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. There should be
no distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18. To
withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of Yap,
et. al.'s properties was painful enough for them; but DAR rubbed it in all the
more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to Yap, et. al. in exchange
for the taking, under an misplaced appreciation of the Association of Small
Landowners case. It must be noted that the immediate effect in both
situations, the deposit of compensation and determination of just
compensation, is the same; the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Thus, to reiterate the cardinal rule, "within the context of the
State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just'
for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."
45 Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) vs. Pineda [GR 59791, 13 February
1992] First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur Facts: For the purpose of
constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower 220 at
Pililla, Rizal, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) needed portions of the
land of Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa
Bautista (simple fee owners), consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321
square meters. Despite MERALCO's offers to pay compensation and attempts
to negotiate with Arayon, et. al., the parties failed to reach an agreement. On
29 October 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by MERALCO
against 42 defendants (including Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito
Santiago, and Teresa Bautista) with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. Despite the opposition
of Arayon, et. al., the court issued an Order dated 13 January 1975
authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the possession of the property
sought to be expropriated. On 13 July 1976, Arayon, et. al., filed a motion for
withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at P40.00 per
square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be
allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from MERALCO's deposit-
account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Pasig Branch. However,
Arayon, et. al.'s motion was denied in an order dated 3 September 1976.
Pursuant to a government policy, MERALCO on 30 October 1979 sold to the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) the power plants and transmission
lines, including the transmission lines traversing Arayon, et. al.'s property. On
11 February 1980, the court issued an Order appointing the members of the
Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. On 5 June
1980, MERALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under
expropriation because of their sale to the NAPOCOR. In view of this motion,
the work of the Commissioners was suspended. On 9 June 1981, Arayon, et.
al. filed another motion for payment, but despite the opposition of
MERALCO, the court issued an order dated 4 December 1981 granting the
motion for payment of Arayon, et. al. (P20,400 or P3.00 per square meter
without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final
adjudication of the case). On 15 December 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed an
Omnibus Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 39 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of
P90,125.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with PNB. By order dated 21
December 1981, the court granted the Omnibus Motion. Arayon, et. al. filed
another motion dated 8 January 1982 praying that MERALCO be ordered to
pay the sum of P169,200.00. On 12 January 1982, MERALCO filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Orders and to declare Arayon, et. al. in contempt
of court for forging or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of
MERALCO's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of
its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. On 9 February 1982, the court
denied MERALCO's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt. In
said order, the Court adjudged in favor of Arayon, et. al. the fair market value
of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a total of
P369.720.00; the amount to bearing legal interest from 24 February 1975
until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the
sum of P10,000.00; all these sums to be paid by MERALCO the former with
costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by
Arayon, et. al. Furthermore, the court stressed in said order that "at this
stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just
compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible
real estate broker, or the Judge himself would exercise his right to formulate
an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if
he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."
MERALCO filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the
just compensation.
Held: In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination
of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to
allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The
appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain
just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of
commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where
the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted
to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence,
or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive
(Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid
of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the
report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its
own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from
the record. The "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing
Projects" executed by ABA Homes and Arayon, et. al. relied upon by the
judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is
incompetent to determine just compensation. The judge's act of determining
and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a
Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's constitutional
right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established
by the Revised Rules of Court.
46 National Power Corporation vs. Henson [GR 129998, 29 December 1998]
Third Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 21 March 1990, the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) originally instituted with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint for eminent domain, later amended on 11 October 1990, for the
taking for public use of 5 parcels of land, owned or claimed by Lourdes
Henson (married to Eugenio Galvez), Josefina Henson (married to Petronio
Katigbak, Jesusa Henson, Corazon Henson (married to Jose Ricafort), Alfredo
Tanchiatco, Bienvenido David, Maria Bondoc Capili (married to Romeo
Capili), and Miguel Manoloto, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square
meters, for the expansion of the NAPOCOR Mexico Sub-Station. On 28 March
1990, NAPOCOR filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the
subject parcels of land. On 20 April 1990, Henson, et. al. filed a motion to
dismiss. They did not challenge NAPOCOR's right to condemn their property,
but declared that the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to
P250.00 per square meter. On 10 July 1990, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 40 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the trial court denied Henson, et. al.'s motion to
dismiss, but the court did not declare that NAPOCOR had a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court fixed the
provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
63,220 square meters of Henson, et. al.'s property, to be deposited with the
Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. NAPOCOR deposited the amount on 29
August 1990. On 5 September 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession
in favor of NAPOCOR, and, on 11 September 1990, the court's deputy sheriff
placed NAPOCOR in possession of the subject land. On 22 November 1990,
and 20 December 1990, the trial court granted the motions of Henson, et. al.
to withdraw the deposit made by NAPOCOR of the provisional value of their
property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00,
remaining with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. On 5 April 1991, the
trial court issued an order appointing 3 commissioners to aid the in the
reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of
subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular
inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their individual reports.
However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports. On
19 May 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just
compensation to be paid by the NAPOCOR for the taking of the entire area of
63,220 squares meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest
thereon computed from 11 September 1990, when NAPOCOR was placed in
possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings. In due time, NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 23
July 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees
was deleted. NAPOCOR filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the determination of the court would be valid without
hearing on the report of the Commissioners.
Held: The trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at
P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent
fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The
parcels of land sought to be expropriated, however, are undeniably idle,
undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for
the Henson family, all the other landowners were admittedly farmer
beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature
and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to
determine just compensation to the landowner. Unfortunately, the trial
court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the
market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the
commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in
an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed
subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even
higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners
(Commissioner Mariano C. Tiglao fixed the fair market value at P350.00 per
square meter, while Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza fixed it at P375.00 per
square meter, and Commissioner Victorino Oracio fixed it at P170.00 per
square meter). Commissioner Atienza's recommendation appears to be the
closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed
subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw
land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the
just compensation for the taking of such raw land.
47 National Power Corporation vs. Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992] Second
Division, Paras (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 13 April and 3 December 1974, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR), a governmentowned and controlled corporation and the agency
through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for
eminent domain with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Lanao del Sur (against Lacsamana Batugan, and/or Guimba Shipping &
Development Corporation, Magancong Digayan, Moctara Lampaco, Lampaco
Pasandalan, Dimaporo Subang, Hadji Daluma Kinidar, Dimaampao Baute,
Pangonotan Cosna Tagol, Salacop Dimacaling, Hadji Sittie Sohra Linang
Batara, Bertudan Pimping And/Or Cadurog Pimping, Butuan Tagol,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 41 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Disangcopan
Marabong, and Hadji Salic Sawa in Civil Case 2248; and against Mangorsi
Casan, Casnangan Batugan, Pundamarug Atocal, Pasayod Pado, Dimaampao
Baute, Casnangan Baute, Dimaporo Subang, Tambilawan Ote, Manisun
Atocal, and Masacal Tomiara in Civil Case 2277). The complaint which sought
to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao
del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and
production of electricity as well as the erection to such subsidiary works and
constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. Both cases were
jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After a series of hearings were
held, on 15 June 1979, a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower
court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the
complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by
NAPOCOR, and ordering the latter to pay the landowners certain sums of
money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest
thereon until fully paid. Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the
consolidated decision were filed by NAPOCOR. The same were denied by the
court. NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became
final and executory. Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie
Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the decision,
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of
P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest
which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the
lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit
with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision
dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR complied with said order and deposited the
sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On 10 February
1981, another landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court
an exparte motion praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the
just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per
annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular 416 of the
Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116 and in a decision of
the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts,
in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."
On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12%
interest per annum. Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also
praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be
computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on
10 March 1981 and 28 August 1981 orders bearing similar import. NAPOCOR
moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated 28
August 1981, which the court denied on 25 January 1982. NAPOCOR filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just
compensation for expropriated lands, the rate applicable as legal interest is
6% (Article 2209 of the Civil Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular 416).
Held: Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that "If the obligation
consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall
be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum," and not
Central Bank Circular 416, is the law applicable. The Central Bank circular
applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to
judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree
116, which amended Act 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the
other hand, Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring
the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. Herein, the transaction
involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of
which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by
the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest
required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties
expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay
in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the
joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is
interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc.
Article 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
48 Republic of the Philippines vs. Salem Investment Corporation [GR 137569,
23 June 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 17 February 1983, Batas Pambansa 340 was passed authorizing the
expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of Maria del Carmen Roxas de
Elizalde and Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, including a portion of the
land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to Milagros and Inocentes
De la Rama covered by TCT 16913. On 14 December 1988, or 5 years
thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract with
Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the
entire property covered by TCT 16213, consisting of 4,075 square meters for
the amount of P11,800,000.00. The De la Ramas received the sum of
P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof
to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. On 3
November 1989, Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a
complaint for specific performance (Civil Case 6974-P) to compel the De la
Ramas to proceed with the sale. On 10 July 1990, while the case was
pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the case (Civil Case 7327) for
expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in the
complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of
Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated
property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10% of the
approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was
issued on 29 August 1990 in favor of the government. On 2 May 1991,
Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had
agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on 14 December 1988 and that a case
for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. On 9
September 1991, the trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the
rate of P23,976.00 per square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out
of the 1,380 square meters. Meanwhile, on 18 September 1991, the trial
court rendered a decision in the case for specific performance upholding the
validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the
corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of
Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-
35116) but their petition was dismissed on 28 July 1992. They tried to appeal
to the Supreme Court (GR 106488) but again they failed in their bid as their
petition for review was denied on 7 December 1992. Meanwhile, on 2
October 1991, Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the just
compensation for the land be deposited in court pursuant to Rule 67, §9 of
the Rules of Court. As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had
not yet been resolved, Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
mandamus, certiorari, and injunction with temporary restraining order (CA-
GR SP 28311) to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la
Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated
property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions. On 12
January 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of
mandamus. Nonetheless, the De la Ramas filed on 17 March 1993 a Motion
for Authority to Withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991, which
was denied on 7 May 1993. On 16 June 1993, the De la Ramas filed a Motion
for Execution again praying that the court's order dated 9 September 1991,
approving the recommendation of the appraisal committee, be enforced. On
22 June 1993, the trial court denied the motion of the De la Ramas holding
that there had been a change in the situation of the parties, therefore,
making the execution of 9 September 1991 Order inequitable, impossible, or
unjust. Thus, with the decision in the action for specific performance in Civil
Case 6974-P having become final, an order of execution was issued by the
Pasay City RTC, and as a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was
executed by the Branch Clerk of Court on 8 March 1994 in favor of Guerrero
upon payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on 11 January 1994 and
the further sum of P1,608,900.00 on 1 February 1994 as full payment for the
balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell. The entire amount
was withdrawn and duly received by the De la Ramas. Thereafter, the De la
Ramas sought the nullification of the 22 June 1993 order of the trial by filing
a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. This petition
was, however, dismissed in a decision dated 29 July 1994 of the appellate
court. Finally, on 5 April 1995, the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch
111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter
expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for
the taking of the land. This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The De la Ramas filed a petition for review. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 43 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether the legal interest should be 6% or 12%
Held: The decision dated 18 September 1991 has long become final and
executory. The decision therein ordered the De la Ramas to pay Guerrero,
among others, the legal interest of the amount of P2,200,000.00 from 2
August 1989 until the deed of absolute sale is executed in favor of Guerrero.
Specifically, the court therein rationalized that (1) the legal rate of interest
for damages, and even for loans where interest was not stipulated, is 6% per
annum (Article 2209, Civil Code); that (2) the rate of 12% per annum was
established by the Monetary Board when, under the power vested in it by PD
116 to amend Act 2655 (more commonly known as the Anti Usury Law), it
amended Section 1 by increasing the rate of legal interest for loans, renewals
and forbearance thereof, as well as for judgments, from 6% per annum to
12% per annum; and that (3) inasmuch as the Monetary Board may not
repeal or amend the Civil Code, in the face of the apparent conflict between
Article 2209 and Act 2655 as amended, the ruling of the Monetary Board
applies only to banks, financing companies, pawnshops and intermediaries
performing quasi-banking functions, all of which are under the control and
supervision of the Central Bank and of the Monetary Board. Thus, the court
held therein that (1) the interest rate on the P2,200,000.00 paid to the de la
Ramas by Guerrero at the inception of the transactions should be only 6%
per annum from 2 August 1989, and as of 2 January 1994 this amounts to the
sum of P583,000.00 and P11,000.00 every month thereafter until the deed of
absolute sale over the property subject matter of this case is executed; that
(2) the amounts payable by the de la Ramas to Guerrero therefore stands at
a total of P1,383,000.00. Offsetting this amount from the balance of
P8,800,000.00, Guerrero must still pay to the de la Ramas the sum of
P7,417,000.00; and that (3) since Guerrero has already deposited with the
Clerk of Court of the court the sum of P5,808,100.00 as of 11 January 1994;
he should add to this the sum of Pl,608,900.00. The De la Ramas can no
longer question a judgment which has already become final and executory.
Hence, they are already barred from questioning it in a proceeding before
the Supreme Court.
49 City of Manila, vs. Serrano [GR 142304, 20 June 2001] Second Division,
Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance
7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First
District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified
occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot
1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia.
Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia,
in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property
was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The
property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to
whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila
filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the
lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273,
which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita,
Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On 12 November 1997, the
Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from
expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated
9 October 1998, directing the City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00
equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made
the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998,
directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The
Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 16
November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that
although Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably
exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property
within the framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands
enumerated in §§59-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government
before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from
expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of
Appeals likewise Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of
RA 7279, §§9-10 have been complied with.
Held: Rule 67, §2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if
he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to
be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be
in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal
property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the
amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is
made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith
place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly
submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties."
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the
government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance
and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance
with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it
became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession.
The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is that in the
former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the
trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing
is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied
with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has complied
with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its
amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the
requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on
the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation
proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after
it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use
and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.
50 City of Baguio vs. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [GR L-
12032, 31 August 1959] En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in
result
Facts: The City of Baguio filed on 25 April 1956, in the Court of First Instance
of Baguio, a complaint for declaratory relief against the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), a public corporation created by Republic
Act 1383, contending that said Act does not include within its purview the
Baguio Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is
unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving the City of the
ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without
compensation and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive,
unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and
municipal districts similarly situated. On 22 May 1956, NAWASA filed a
motion to dismiss. On 21 June 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to
dismiss as well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied
the motion and ordered NAWASA to file its answer to the complaint. On 6
July 1956, NAWASA filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the grounds
already advanced in its motion to dismiss. On 14 August 1956, the parties
submitted a written stipulation of facts and filed written memoranda. And
after allowing the City to file a supplementary complaint, the Court on 5
November 1956, rendered decision holding that the waterworks system of
the City of Baguio falls within the category of "private property," as
contemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated without just
compensation. NAWASA filed a motion for reconsideration, and upon its
denial, it took the present appeal. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 45 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether the Baguio Waterworks partakes of the nature of public
property or private/patrimonial property of the City.
Held: The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park, street
or other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the
benefit of the public but it is rather a property owned by the City in its
proprietary character. While the cases may differ as to the public or private
character of waterworks, the weight of authority as far as the legislature is
concerned classes them as private affairs. (sec. 239, Vol. I, Revised, McQuillin
Municipal Corporations, p. 239; Shrik vs. City of Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169
Atl. 557). And in this jurisdiction, this Court has already expressed the view
that a waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that has
established it. (Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 509). And being owned by a
municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be
taken away without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the
protection of private property. The State may, in the interest of National
welfare, transfer to public ownership any private enterprise upon payment of
just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that no person
can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment of
just compensation. Unless the City is given its due compensation, the City
cannot be deprived of its property even if NAWASA desires to take over its
administration in line with the spirit of the law (Republic Act 1383). The law,
insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for
an effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.
51 Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga [G.R. No. L-24440.
March 28, 1968.] En Banc, Bengzon (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Act (CA) 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Section 50
of the Act also provided that "buildings and properties which the province
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be
acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50
lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of Zamboanga Province. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot),
School site (3 lots), Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school
(1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high
school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (?1 lot), and
another 23 vacant lots. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June 1948, Republic Act (RA) 286 created
the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On 26 May 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General,
pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question
left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However,
on 14 July 1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50
lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945,
when the provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog. On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the
assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the
two new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that “upon the approval of the
Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor
General." On 11 January 1955, the Auditor General apportioned the assets
and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39%
for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March
1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling
holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-
owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39, and
is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This effectively
revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Secretary of Finance
then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount
equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of
Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 1960, then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960,
and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions,
all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it. However, on 17 June
1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that
"all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga." On 12
July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte
and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of
the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City
admits that since the enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46
has already been returned to it. This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file
on 5 March 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI Zamboanga del Norte against Zamboanga
City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On
4 June 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction
as prayed for. After trial and on 12 August 1963, judgment was rendered
declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives the province of its private
properties, ordered the city to pay the province the sum of P704,200.05 and
in relation to this ordered the finance secretary to direct the Commissioner
of Internal revenue to deduct from its regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment equivalent to 25%, 25% from the regular quarterly internal
revenue allotment for the City and to remit the same to the province until
the sum has been fully paid; ordered the province to execute the
corresponding public instrument deeding to the city the 50 parcels of land
and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title upon full
payment; dismissed the counterclaim of the city; and declared permanent
the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on 8 June 1967. The province
filed a motion to reconsider praying that the City be ordered instead to pay
the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over the city’s
opposition, the lower court granted the province’s motion. Hence, the appeal
to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Zamboanga del Norte is entitled to its share of the value of
the properties belonging to the former Zamboanga province that were
transferred to the City of Zamboanga.
Held: Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that “the property of provinces,
cities and municipalities, is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial properly." Article 424 of the same code provides that “property
for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws." Applying the norm in the Civil Code, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium
sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for
public use inasmuch as they would not fall under the phrase "public works
for public service." Under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding
enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Article 424. The playgrounds,
however, would fit into this category. The records do not disclose, however,
whether the buildings were constructed at the expense of the former
Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings
must have been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the
further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of
buildings at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were
erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress
could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with
the lots in question. On the other hand, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied
to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. The fact that these 26 lots are
registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.
Thus, Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of
Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are
patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the
valuation of said Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 47 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) 26 properties as contained in Resolution 7, dated 26 March 1949,
of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General. The share,
however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already
returned to the City, as the return of said amount to the city was without
legal basis. RA 3039 took effect only on 17 June 1961 after a partial payment
of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide for
retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the
amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by the City to the
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39%
share in the 26 lots should then be paid by the City in the same manner
originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 48 )
52 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February
1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed
Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil
manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP)
purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale, Algue received a commission of
P125,000 and it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al.
organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue
received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959.
Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted
upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to
accept the warrant of distraint and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for
review with the Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue: Whether the assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
was reasonable.
Held: No. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay
must contribute his share in the running of the government. The
Government, for his part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance
their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of
taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method
of exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection, however, should be
made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason
for government itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may
still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has
not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a]
[1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to
compensation for personal services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It
has further proven that the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in
light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) to
involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a business requiring
millions of pesos. The assessment was not reasonable.
53 Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989] Third
division, Cortes (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila
issued Search and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Cases 8602 and 8603 (People
v. Sosis) for violation of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act 3720, and
violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (Substituting and altering
trademarks, tradenames, or service marks; in this case, Johnnie Walker
Scotch Whisky), respectively. On 8 December 1978, a composite team from
the Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (BII), the
Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police (INP) enforced the
search and seizure warrants, and seized and confiscated 6 tanks of scotch
whisky, 417 cartons of 1doz. Johnny Walker black, 109 empty bottles, among
others, found in the premises of the Hercules Bottling at Paco, Manila. The
articles seized remained in the premises of Hercules guarded and secured by
BII personnel. On 2 January 1979, the Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila issued a warrant of seizure and detention and ordered the immediate
seizure and turnover of the seized items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal
Division at the Port of Manila. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings were then
initiated against the articles for alleged violation of Section 2530 (f) of the
Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to RA 3720. On 29 January 1979, the CFI
issued an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the seized articles to
the customs warehouse located at South Harbor, Port of Manila. The City
Fiscal of Manila proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the criminal
cases and the Bureau of Customs also resumed hearing the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings over the said articles. On 11 June 1982, the Distiller
Co. Ltd. of England objected to the continuation by the Collector of Customs
of the seizure proceedings claiming that these proceedings would hamper or
even jeopardize the preliminary investigation being conducted by the fiscal.
The Collector of Customs ignored the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) objections. On 24 September 1982, the company
filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or TRO (Civil
Case 82-12721) to enjoin the Hearing Officer of the Bureau of Customs from
taking further action in the seizure proceedings of the subject goods. The
petition was heard not before the CFIMANILA which originally issued the
search warrants, but before another sala, that of Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila. The judge issued a TRO on 29
September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for preliminary injunction was issued
as well. On 20 July 1987, the judge rendered a decision holding that the
Collector of Customs acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the warrant
of seizure and detention considering that the subject goods had already
come under the legal custody of the CFI. Hence, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition on
11 August 1987. In the meantime, Howard Sosis and company were charged
for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of RA 3720 (Criminal Case 88-
63157) and for violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal
Case 88-63156) before the RTC and the MTC Manila.
Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court has the power to review the acts of
the Collector of Custom.
Held: Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of
the public revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the government to
carry out functions it has been instituted to perform. The Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of
Customs, and to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with, these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The RTCs are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. The provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and
that of RA 1125 specify the proper fora for the ventilation of any legal
objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Actions of the
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
decisions, in turn, are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
CTA. Thereafter, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court through the
appropriate petition for review by writ of certiorari. Undeniably, RTCs do not
share these review powers. The rule is anchored upon the policy of placing
no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive not only to prevent
smuggling and other frauds upon customs, but also, and more importantly,
to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties
due the state.
54 YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue [GR 7988, 19 January 1916] First
division, Moreland (J): 4 concur
Facts: The Young Men's Christian Association came to the Philippines with
the army of occupation in 1898. The association is nonsectarian, it is
preeminently religious; and the fundamental basis and groundwork is the
Christian religion. All of the officials of the association are devoted Christians,
members of a church, and have dedicated their lives to the spread of the
Christian principles and the building of Christian character. Its building is
located in Calle Concepcion, Ermita, which was formally dedicated on 20
October 1909. The building is composed of three parts. The main structure is
three stories high and includes a reception hall, social hall and game rooms,
lecture room, library, reading room and rooming apartments. The small
building lying to the left of the principal structure is the kitchen and servants'
quarters. The bowling alleys, swimming pool, locker rooms and gymnasium-
auditorium are located at the large wing to the right (athletic building). The
association claimed exemption from taxation on ground that it is a religious,
charitable and educational institution combined, under Section 48 of the
Charter of the City of Manila. The city of Manila, contending that the
property is taxable, assessed it and levied a tax thereon. It was paid under
protest and this action begun to recover it on the ground that the property
was exempt from taxation under the charter of the city of Manila. The
decision was made in favor of the city, and the association appealed.
Issue: Whether the institution must be devoted exclusive for religious
purposes, or exclusively for charitable purposes, or exclusively to educational
purposes, to be entitled to tax exemption. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: It may be admitted that there are 64 persons occupying rooms in the
main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take their meals at the
restaurant below. These facts, however, are far from constituting a business
in the ordinary acceptation of the word; as there is no profit realized by the
association in any sense; and that the purpose of the association is not,
primarily, to obtain the money which comes from the lodgers and boarders.
The real purpose is to keep the membership continually within the sphere of
influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, the
opportunities which vice presents to young men in foreign countries who lack
home or other similar influences. There is no doubt about the correctness of
the contention that an institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the
other of the purposes mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from
taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to
any one of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a combination of two
or three or more of those purposes and still be entitled to exemption. The
YMCA cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for religious
purposes, or exclusively for charitable purposes, or exclusively to educational
purposes; but the Court believed that it is an institution used exclusively for
all three purposes. As such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation. 55
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31
December 1927] En Banc, Avancena (J): 5 concur
Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the
municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public
streets. On the south side is a part of the church yard, the convent and an
adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area of 1,624 square
meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the
center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north side
is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a portion where
formerly stood a tower, the base of which may still be seen, containing a
total area of 8,955 square meters. As required by the provincial board, the
Church paid on 3 July 1925, under protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining
the convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the portion
where the tower stood. The Church filed an action for the recovery of the
sum paid by it to Board by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this
tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the Board from the complaint in
regard to the lot adjoining the convent and declared that the tax collected on
the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and on the portion where the
tower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment.
Issue: Whether the churchyard, the adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden,
and the old cemetery, besides the church and the convent, are exempt from
land taxes.
Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax
(sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the priest who
presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to
discharge his duties. It therefore must, in this sense, include not only the land
actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground destined to the
ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of
the population and the development of commerce require the use of larger
tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the
case of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which
comes under the exemption. Also, land used as a lodging house by the
people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental
use in religious functions, not for commercial purposes, comes within the
exemption. It cannot be taxed according to its former use (cemetery).
56 Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-19201, 16 June 1965]
En Banc, Paredes (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Sometime in 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) construction of a new Catholic
Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose
intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under
date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to
P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to
15 June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
The protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to
the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition of compromise
penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a donee’s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic
Church.
Held: The phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution
supra should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents, appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-
distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. Its
assessment was not on the property themselves. It does not rest upon
general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon
the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of
such excise tax on property used for religious purposes do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. 57 Abra v. Hernando [GR L-49336, 31 August
1981] Second Division, Fernando (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 on leave
Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from
real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. Judge Hernando of
the CFI Abra presided over the case. The Province of Abra filed a motion to
dismiss, based on lack of jurisdiction, which was denied. It was followed by a
summary judgment granting the exemption without hearing the side of the
province. Issue: Whether the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued are tax exempt. Held: Exemption from taxation is not favored and is
never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,
hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris. Herein,
the judge accepted at its face the allegation of Bishop – that the certain
parcels of land owned by it, are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as
sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of the Bishop
– instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the constitutional
provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction (contesting that the validity of the assessment may be questioned
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not the court), and of lack
of cause of action (contesting that declaratory relief is not proper, as there
had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect
taxes on such property), which should have compel the judge to accord a
hearing to the petitioner rather than deciding the case immediately in favor
of the Bishop.
58 Abra Valley College v. Aquino [GR L-39086, 15 June 1988] Second Division,
Paras (p): 4 concur
Facts: Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of its college building to
Northern Marketing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Corporation while the second floor thereof is used by the Director
of the College for residential purposes. On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and
Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and
issued a Notice of Seizure upon the petitioner for the college lot and building
(OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The treasurers served
upon the College a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the
same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra,
offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public auction involving the sale of the
college lot and building. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to
him. The College filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a quo to annul
and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and
building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the property is not being used “exclusively” for educational
purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, the College availed of the petition
for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue: Whether the College is exempt from realty taxes.
Held: No. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution. While the Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
educational purposes," reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. Herein, the lease of the first floor of the building to
the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
59 American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-9637, 30 April 1957] Second
Division, Felix (J): 7 concur, 1 concur in result
Facts: In the course of its ministry, American Bible Society's Philippine agency
has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since
1898, but except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines
and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953,
the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the Society that it
was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945,
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529,
3028 and 3364, and required the Society to secure, within 3 days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering
the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the
total sum of P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City
Treasurer under protest the said permit and license fees, giving at the same
time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to
question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being
collected, which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave
rise to this action. After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. the Society appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
certified the case to the Supreme Court for the reason that the errors
assigned involved only questions of law.
Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit to allow it
to sell and distribute bibles and religious literature, and to pay taxes from the
sales thereof.
Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) exempts
corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes, Provided however, That the income of
whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or
from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of
such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under the Code. Herein, the
act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and cannot be
made liable for taxes or fees therein. Further, Ordinance 2529, as amended,
cannot be applied to the Society, for in doing so it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs. The fact that the price of the bibles and
other religious pamphlets are little higher than the actual cost of the same
does not necessarily mean that it is already engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said “merchandise” for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance
3000 of the City of Manila is of general application and it does not contain
any provisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining
the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. The ordinance is
not applicable to the Society, as its business, trade or occupation is not
particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does
not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and
ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions
governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of
the employees engaged in the business of the Society.
60 Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L-4817, 26 May 1954] En Banc,
Reyes (J): 7 concur Facts: Ordinance 3398 was approved by the municipal
board of the City of Manila on 25 July 1950. It imposes a municipal
occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and
penalizes nonpayment of the tax by a fine of not more than P200 or by
imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The ordinance was enacted
pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila (as amended by RA 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of
said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum,
on persons engaged in the various professions, such as those were Silvestre
M. Punsalan, et. al. belong. Punsalan, et. al. (2 lawyers, a medical
practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist) filed a
suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in their own behalf and in
behalf of other professionals practicing in the City of Manila, calling for the
annulment of Ordinance 3398 of the City of Manila together with the
provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes
collected under the ordinance but paid under protest (as they have paid their
occupation tax under Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code
[NIRC]). The lower court upheld the validity of the provision of law
authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance itself
illegal and void on the ground that the penalty therein provided for non-
payment of the tax was not legally authorized. Both parties appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether professionals in Manila are being subjected to double
taxation, in light of the municipal occupation tax imposed against them by
the City of Manila.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be
taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for
taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Manila, as the seat of
the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many
times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, offers a more lucrative
field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their
brethren in the provinces.The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person
"exercising" or "pursuing" any one of the occupations named, but does not
say that such person must have his office in Manila. There is no distinction
found in the ordinance between professionals having offices in manila and
outsiders who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein.
Where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city,
the argument against double taxation may not be invoked, as there is
nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be
exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the
state and the political subdivisions thereof.
61 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L-10448,
30 August 1957] En Banc v. Montemayor (J): 10 concur
Facts: The Physical Therapy Organization , an association of registered
massagists and licensed operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and
other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal
Ordinance 3659, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
promulgated by the Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor
(Enacted 27 August 1954, and approved and effective 7 September 1954). To
stop the City from enforcing said ordinance, the Organization secured an
injunction upon filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00. A hearing was held,
but the parties without introducing any evidence submitted the case for
decision on the pleadings, although they submitted written memoranda.
Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the writ
of injunction previously issued. The Organization appealed said order of
dismissal directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the license fees imposed by the Ordinance against massage
clinic operators is unreasonable.
Held: No. The purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of
massage, much less to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified
massagists of therapeutic massage in the Philippines. The end sought to be
attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the
practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic
where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts
of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. The permit
fee is made payable not by the masseur or massagist, but by the operator of
a massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit
fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and
rather unreasonable, but much discretion is given to municipal corporations
in determining the amount of said fee without considering it as a tax for
revenue purposes. There is a marked distinction between license fees
imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes
to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to
public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large
without necessarily being a tax. Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board
considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and
beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals,
and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation.
62 Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]
Matthews (J)
Facts: The constitution of the state of California adopted in 1879, in article 1,
8, provides as follows: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury
shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county." In
pursuance of the foregoing provision of the constitution, and of the several
sections of the penal Code of California, the district attorney of Sacramento
county, on 20 February 1882, filed an information against Joseph Hurtado,
charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio
Stuardo. Upon this information, and without any previous investigation of
the cause by any grand jury, Hurtado was arraigned on 22 March 1882, and
pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter had, and on 7 May
1882, the jury rendered its verdict, in which it found Hurtado guilty of
murder in the first degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of Sacramento
county rendered its judgment upon said verdict, that Hurtado be punished by
the infliction of death, and the day of his execution was fixed for 20 July
1882. From this judgment an appeal was taken, and the supreme court of the
State of California affirmed the judgment. On 6 July 1883, the superior court
of said county of Sacramento ordered that Hurtado be in court on 11 July
1883, in order that a day for the execution of the judgment in said cause
should be fixed. In pursuance of said order, Hurtado, with his counsel,
appeared in court, and upon the court's inquiry, objected to the execution of
said judgment and to any order which the court might make fixing a day for
the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1) that it appeared upon the
face of the judgment that Hurtado had never been legally, or otherwise,
indicted or presented by any grand jury, and that he was proceeded against
by information made and filed by the district attorney of the county of
Sacramento, after examination and commitment by a magistrate of the said
county; (2) that the said proceedings, as well as the laws and constitution of
California, attempting to authorize them, and the alleged verdict of the jury,
and judgment of the said superior court of said county of Sacramento, were
in conflict with and prohibited by Amendments 5 and 14 of the constitution
of the United States, and that they were therefore void; (3) that Hurtado had
been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district attorney of
the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had
been tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any
presentment or indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment
rendered upon the alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void,
and if executed would deprive Hurtado of his life or liberty without due
process of law. Thereupon the court overruled the said objections, and fixed
13 August 1883, as the time for the execution of the sentence. From this
latter judgment, Hurtado appealed to the supreme court of the state. On 18
September 1883, the supreme court of the state affirmed the said judgment.
A review of which, by a writ of error, by the US Supreme Court was allowed.
Issue: Whether Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and found
guilty without being presented or indicted by a grand jury.
Held: The clause of the 14th article of amendment to the constitution of the
United States, provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." The phrase is to be
construed by the usus loquendi of the constitution itself. The same words are
contained in the 5th amendment. That article makes specific and express
provision for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far as relates
to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of the United
States. It declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when
in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." It
then immediately adds: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of
the constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or intended to include,
ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The
conclusion is equally Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the 14th
amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same
sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that
amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of
the grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the 5th
amendment, express declarations to that effect. Due process of law in the
latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the
legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the United
States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted
according to the principles of the common law. In the fourteenth
amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each state
which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the
state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and the
greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their
own laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The 14th amendment does not
profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same
laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in
two states separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there
may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each state
prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. Further, any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in
furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.
Herein, the Court is unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or
indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable
guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to
the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not
due process of law. The Court found no error and thus affirmed the judgment
of the supreme court of California.
63 Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978] En Banc,
Fernandez (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it
unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any
place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or
occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment
permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on
27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade
in the City of Manila without the requisite mayor’s permit; but excepting
persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries,
or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government
and any foreign government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50,
and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or
both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila,
filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case
72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2)
judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge
Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction
and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the
ordinance null and void, and the preliminary injunction is made permanent.
Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically
situated - to secure working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee
of P50, is reasonable.
Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied
only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be employed,
to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it
at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide
the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise
money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive
because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens required to
pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or
executive.
64 Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919] En
Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board
of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent
settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be
previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917,
the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the
provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan
and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan
who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding
60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the
reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of
Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the
sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act
2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes
of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that
the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes’
liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due
to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code .
Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a
judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing
and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must
be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of
liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall
be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in
its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike
to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law
depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities
of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of
a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it
is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of his liberty without due process of law and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the
other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
65 Ople v. Torres [ GR 127685, 23 July 1998 ] En Banc, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1
concurs in result
Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation
on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a
Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the implementation of
Administrative Order 308.
Issue: Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order
for the adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System,
independent of a legislative act.
Held: Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is
all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies: the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under
it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing
with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Administrative
Order 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, but
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of
power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the President to issue.
66 Lawrence and Garner vs. Texas [539 US 558, 26 June 2003] Kennedy (J): 4
concur, 1 filed concurring opinion, 2 filed dissenting opinions where 2 joined
the dissenting opinion of Scalia (J). Facts: Responding to a reported weapons
disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Geddes
Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner,
engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and
convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute
forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct. The two were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and
convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The two exercised their right to a
trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a
like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected.
The two, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) fined $200 and assessed court
costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
considered the two accused’s federal constitutional arguments under both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the
constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion
indicated that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme Court
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), to be controlling on the
federal due process aspect of the case. The US Supreme Court granted
certiorari (537 U. S. 1044 [2002], to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the
criminal convictions under the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law violate the
14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws; (2) Whether the
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate
their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186
[1986]), should be overruled.
Issue: Whether the statute and the Bower decision denies homosexual
persons the autonomy of decisions involving relationships available to
heterosexual ones.
Held: The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties
and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon
the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a
general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury
to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 14th
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right. The case of
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
67 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001] En Banc,
Bellosillo (J) : 2 concur, 2 filed separate concurring opinions, 6 joined the
concurring opinion of Mendoza, 3 dissented in a separate opinion, 1 took no
part
Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case
26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3,
paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case
26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act
142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an
Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation
of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the
charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were
never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan,
Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001,
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash
. Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform
Estrada of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.
Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as
the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,
its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and
more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder
Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of
the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that
is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of
the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense. There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review
the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The
void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes
has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
68 Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986] Resolution En Banc,
Cruz (J) : 8 concur
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tañada,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to
compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant
to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for
the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices.
Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on
various questions. They suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in
the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request
for advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took place,
which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on
the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette
only.
Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if
their enactment is “otherwise provided” or effective immediately. The term
"laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the
Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation;
(4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to
(1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e.
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case
studies. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be
published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the
laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one
required or authorized by existing law. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
69 Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21
October 1996] Second Division, Torres (J) : 4 concur
Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation
(PITC) was created as a government owned or controlled corporation under
Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071 revised the provisions
of PD 252, where the purposes and powers of the said governmental entity
were enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9 August 1976, the late
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 444, directing,
inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities) between the
Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy
Countries (SOCPEC), including the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be
undertaken or coursed through the PITC. After the EDSA Revolution, or more
specifically on 27 February 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133 reorganizing the DTI empowering the
said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and
regulatory arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and
investment activities." The PITC was made one of DTI's line agencies.
Sometime in April 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the
PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make joint
efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a
steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their
imports and exports during the period. Conformably with the MOU, the
Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990
and 1991, under which was specified the commodities to be traded between
them. On August 1989, PITC issued Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-
01 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from China (PROC)
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a
tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the
importation from PROC being applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington Industrial
Sales Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic corporations, organized
and existing under Philippine-laws, individually applied for authority to
import from PROC with PITC. They were granted such authority.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import
applications were withheld by PITC from Remington and Firestone, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. On 20 January
1992, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58).
On 4 January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld the
petition for prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil
Case 92-158), and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations
null, void, and unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition seeking the reversal of
Angeles’ decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone.
Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a
valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order
SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative
power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., PD
1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when
the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law
Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as required by
the Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the amendments to AO
SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the
National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the
effectivity of the Administrative Order. Further, the Administrative Order,
without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot exact any
obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for the 0.5%
Counter Export Development Service. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
70 Pilipinas Kao v. CA [GR 105014, 18 December 2001] First Division,
Kapunan (J) : 4 concur Facts: Pilipinas Kao, Inc. is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in multiple areas of
registered activity, or has a number of projects registered with the Board of
Investments (BOI). Batas Pambansa 391 (Investment Policy Act of 1983) was
enacted in 1983, providing, among others, for tax incentives for new and
expanding export producer. To avail itself of these tax incentives, the
company applied with BOI for registration of its expanded production
capacity, which BOI approved on 8 January 1987. Each project was entitled to
a certain set of incentives depending upon, among others, the law of
registration and the status and type of registration. These tax incentives
apply only to the company’s Certificate of Registration 87-1476 (Project 4) as
new export producer, and Certificate of Registration 87- 1247 (Project 3) as
an expanding export producer (an expansion of the company's existing
projects registered under RA +6135). The initial application by company for
tax credit incentives for the year 1987 was approved by BOI substantially as
applied for. But those applied for in 1988 and onwards were drastically
reduced by BOI with the adoption and application of a deductible "base
figure" provided in its Tax Credit on Net Local Content (NLC) and Net Value
Earned (NVE) Manual of Operations. On 31 March 1989, company filed
applications for its 1988 tax credits on the NVE for P8,583,328.00 and on the
NLC for P25,928,673.00 for a grand total of P34,512,000.00. On 10 May 1990,
the BOI Issued Board Resolution 188, series of 1990, granting company's
application for tax credit but only in the reduced amounts of P1,512,758 for
NVE and P2,631,018 for NLC for a grand total of P4,223,776. Notified of the
BOI s decision, company requested for a reconsideration. But before the BOI
could act thereon, company again filed on 3 July 1990 its applications for
1989 tax credits on the NVE in the amount of P9,649,459 and on the NLC,
P25,648,401, for a grand total of P35,297,860. On 27 July 1990, the BOI
denied company's request for reconsideration anent its 1988 tax credit, the
denial being communicated to company in a letter dated 1 August 1990 and
received by the latter on 15 August 1990.On 17 December 1990, company
again moved for reconsideration of the BOI s letter dated 1 August 1990, but
the same was denied by the BOI in a letter dated 11 March 1991. On 11
March 1991, the BOI also advised company of the approval of its application
for the year 1989 tax credit but only in the reduced amounts of P3,441,473
(NVE) and P649,471 (NLC) for a grand total of P4,090,944. On 15 April 1991,
and by registered mail, company then filed with the Honorable Supreme
Court a motion for extension of time to file petition pursuant to Article 82 of
the Omnibus Investments Code; it likewise filed a second motion for
extension of time to file petition on 15 May 1991, both of which were not
acted upon by the Honorable Supreme Court. On 6 May 1991, however, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the instant petition to the trial
Court. The trial court, however, dismissed the petition for review "on
technical and substantive grounds"; ruling that the petition for review was
filed beyond the 30 period of appeal set in Article 78 of PD 1789, as amended
by BP 391. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court and
sustained the reduction of credits on net value earned and net local content
applied for by the company in 1988 and 1989. Consequently, the company
filed petition to set aside decision of the Court of Appeals with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the Board of Investment’s Manual of Operation, especially as
to the NLC and NVE, binds Pilipinas Kao, or the public as a whole.
Held: The Manual of Operations is not exempted from publication as it is not
merely internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, nor is it a letter of instruction issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. The Manual of
Operations affected the public in a substantial way. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The Manual of Operations was
meant to enforce or implement B.P. Blg. 391, a law of general application.
The absence of publication is a fatal omission that renders the Manual of
Operations void and of no effect (See Tanada v. Tuvera). Further, Section 17
of PD 1789, as amended by BP Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) 391, explicitly provides that the rules and regulations
implementing the Investments Code take effect only after due publication.
Thus, the ''Tax Credit on NLC and NVE Manual of Operations" (Manual of
Operations) of BOI has no legal effect insofar as it adopts as a "base figure"
for net value earned (NVE) the "highest attained production volume" in the
period preceding the registration of petitioner's additional or expanded
capacity; and (2) only the expanded or additional capacity of petitioner
registered under BP 1789, as amended by BP 391, is entitled to the tax credit
provided therein, and not the pre-existing registered capacity.
71 Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. (Extelcom) [GR 147096,
15 January 2002]; also Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) Inc., vs. Express
Telecommunications Co. [GR 147210] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4
concur
Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation
(now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of
Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to install, operate
and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with
prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January
1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective
applications before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993, and
deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further
orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by
the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993,
the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application
as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties.
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But
before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC
issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of the recent
grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR,
Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not
remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency becomes available. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for
CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to
revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10,
15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was ordered
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.
(Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application; arguing that Bayantel's
motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago,
and thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said
application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the
necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an
Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS
service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order
reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a
provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide
CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to
new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install,
operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals
granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, annulling and
setting aside the NTC orders dated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case
92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended Application without prejudice to the
filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular
9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of
the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review
on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In the present
petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied
the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the
phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be
issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The
NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as
the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should
govern in the approval of Bayantel’s application.
Held: The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978
Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at
the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that
the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3,
1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is
furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts,
the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may
select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and
mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of
these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that
said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the
1978 Rules that governs.
72 Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632, 11 February
1986]; also Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition v. Napocor [ GR L-68474]
Resolution En Banc, Plana (J) : 5 concur, 2 took no part Facts: The Official
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in 1985 when
Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and Alejandro Ver Albano
had already been appointed to their present positions. Other pamphlets
entitled "Nuclear Power – Safe, Clean, Economical, and Available," and
“Nuclear Power Plant and Environmental Safety” were issued earlier, but the
majority of the Commissioners even then were already occupying positions
of responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the
PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to
July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist
from May, 1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano was PAEC
Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These
pamphlets continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March 1985. Their
official distribution continued after the filing of National Power Corporation
(Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after PAEC had
issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said motion
for conversion. In GR 70632, the competence of the PAEC Commissioners to
pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-
1) was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's motion/application for the
conversion of its construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1
was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were charged with bias and
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) prejudgment.
Issue: Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in determining
the safety of PNPP-1.
Held: The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon
the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize
such an important inquiry because they already have prejudged the safety of
PNPP-1. The PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from the
official pamphlets, which clearly indicate the prejudgment that PNPP-1 is
safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued when the
Commissioners had already been appointed to their present positions and
and even after PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally
admitting Napocor’s motion for conversion.
73 Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982] Second Division, Aquino
(J); 4 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical
Research Department) became vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar,
became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-
in-rank to the vacant position, both holding positions of Scientist Research
Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy,
UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside
from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical
technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in the NIST
in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other hand, Dr. Venzon finished
Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has served
for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin
Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the position. Dr. Anzaldo protested
against such recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee
found such protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST
Commissioner, however, did not resolve the issue. The position was not filled
up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He
appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January 1978, after
thorough study and screening of the qualifications of both doctors and upon
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes). The Civil Service
Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon appealed to the Office of
the President of the Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the Chairman of the CSC). The
appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr.
Afable’s decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman
Clave and Commissioner Jose A. Melo recommended In Resolution 1178
dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in
conflict with the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested
and approved by the CSC. The Resolution was made in pursuance to Section
19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6 October 1975),
which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of
the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5 January 1980,
after denial of her motion for the reconsideration of the resolution, Dr.
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980
revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the
Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the contested
position but that Dr. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be
considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's protest.
In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr.
Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special civil action of certiorari.
Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the
recommendation of the Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself, in
the appointment of Dr. Venzon.
Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
implemented the 23 August Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC Chairman),
concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the appointment of
Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was
"inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission",
what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's
recommendation: he was concurring with himself . It is evident that Doctor
Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil
Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of
Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the
Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the
President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the
President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested
appointment.
74 Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ): Facts: Tumey was
arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of
North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He
moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try
him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded
to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor
within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of
exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas of
Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on
the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought
review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which
reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4
May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey's application to require
the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a
petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the
mayor's court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional
grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be
dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was
involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme
Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme
Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the
system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the
mayor disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of
interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.
But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein,
the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the
person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs
are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs
imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant
had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the
normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an
inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has
not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law,
unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly
ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot
regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a
minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each
defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial
consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a
prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the
pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only
reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here.
The statutes were drawn to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of
counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try
persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the
county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the
village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be
had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a
review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no
opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the
weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the
evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant
had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection,
and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge,
which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome,
and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help
the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset
both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the present opinion.
75 People v. CA [GR 118882, 26 September 1996] Resolution of Third
Division, Melo (J); 4 concur
Facts: The are no preliminary facts provided regarding CA-GR SP No. 31733,
"People vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al." (in Court of Appeals), Criminal Case
93-01-38, "People vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al.," and Criminal Case 93-01-39,
"People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go" (both in RTC branch presided by
Judge Pedro Espina, Branch 7, RTC, 8th Judicial Region: Tacloban) in the
present resolution; except the fact that Jane Go is the principal accused in
the killing of her husband Dominador Go. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed a petition for review with urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order to annul and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 31733 in so far as it denied People’s prayer for
the inhibition of Judge Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-
39, and enjoining the judge from conducting further proceedings in such
criminal cases, before the Supreme Court. On 3 April 1995, the Court
resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and Roger Doctora, Johny Santos and
Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to comment within 10 days from notice, to
issue the temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro
S. Espina from taking further action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39
until further orders from the Court. Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and Go
failed to file their respective comments within the reglementary period, nor
within the second deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that
sanction relating to delay in the submission of the comments may not
amount to much, and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases
93-01-38 and 93-01-39, the Court resolved to dispense with the latter's
comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
Issue: Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to render the Judge to be partial or
bias in the present criminal case.
Held: One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus,
every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Due process is intended to insure
that confidence by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants
shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. The Judge will reach
his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. Herein,
Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision
in Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Special Civil
Action 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the principal accused
in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor
of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to
seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. It would have
been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself
from hearing the criminal cases.
76 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan [GR 103501-03, 17 February 1997]; also Peralta
v. Sandiganbayan [GR 103507] En Banc, Francisco (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur pro
hac vice, 1 took no part
Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the president's office and in cash what the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week
later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos'
verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G.
Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds
by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal
was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena
and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository
branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch.
Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered
on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue
any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the
second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made
on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's co-signatory to the letter- request
for a manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the
PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5
Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's
car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez'
office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a
receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was
dated January 30, 1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation
of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and
of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions
for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990
and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
Issue: Whether Tabuena and Peralta were denied due process by the active
participation of a Sandiganbayan justice in the questioning witnesses in the
trial.
Held: Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. Our courts
should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less
partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people's faith in our courts. Respect for the Constitution
is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the
rights of the accused. The Court was struck by the way the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves, as shown in the records. The volume of questions hurled by the
Sandiganbayan was more the combined questions of the counsels. More
importantly, the questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. We
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) have not
adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief
inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial
procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. The impartiality of the
judge; his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either
one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and
essential rule of special importance in criminal cases.
77 People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001] First Division,
Kapunan (J) : 4 concur
Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal
possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was
in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing
200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts
leading to the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust
operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and seizure. Arraigned
on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the
purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the
trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262)
found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked
clarificatory questions. Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot
justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have exhaustively
examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial
judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case.
Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions
on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just
determination of the case. “The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable
leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against
him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
78 Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de Leon
[GR 121245], and Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297] Second Division, Puno (J) : 2
concur, 1 on leave Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as
Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June
1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape
with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by
Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary
investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne
Marie Jennifer in their home at Parañaque. During the preliminary
investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica
Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane
passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizconde’s maids,
Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The
NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds),
Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and the genital
examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The NBI
submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in his Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by the
DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and
returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others — Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong — submitted sworn
statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in
the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their
counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last
known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution
"finding Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an
Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same
date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the
RTC Parañaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against
Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was
re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued
new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in
Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by
respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case
No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in
the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or
include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano
likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions
before the Court. Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived
Webb, et.al, of their right to fair trial. Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right
to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The
DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior
State Prosecutors; and their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the
klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias
resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on the
contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the
DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste.
Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in
every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent,
the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that
justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to
get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
79 People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001] Resolution of First
Division, Melo (J) : 3 concur Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28
June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the
latter's van, which was parked in front of Café Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los
Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito
Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan,
who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then
headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned by
Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then
brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayor’s room.
Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter
thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying
Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea – her hair
disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of
her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by
Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van
pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with
a single gunshot Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a
sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen
was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion
and Kawit. After Kawit’s turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby
armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to
Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s remains behind. Initially, the
crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador
Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However,
further investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor
Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory. On 11
March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig
City, Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of
P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin
Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6
December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack
credibility, that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter should have been
given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have
no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and
Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements
pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that
independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s
version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance
with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice
Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September
2001. Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of
the judge handling the case. Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial
to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor
Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's
right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even
by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
80 Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000] Third
division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina
Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front
seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda
pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo
Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario,
Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up
has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost
took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a
sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford
followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and
Java alighted and the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita
identified himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java whispered to him
that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to
continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the
arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where
Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified
administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming
of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of
Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for
conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board,
however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened
anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the
parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges
of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the
Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when
the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in
performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in
performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended
for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional
Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City),
but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita
filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch
31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was
not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion
to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and
annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found
Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board
appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could
not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were
eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against
or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original charges
against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority
and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. Held: Notification of the charges
contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges
against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was
eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can
be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried
cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of
due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not
include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act
of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no
indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita
was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking
alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal
to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he
was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal
Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks
while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual
findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the
odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not
on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip
fetching his wife.
81 Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Resolution En
Banc, Puno (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior opinion, 1
concurs in result Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The
Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification
of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to
the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the
United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense
or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to
evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or
television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts),
and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On
the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1
July 1999) requested copies of the official extradition request from the US
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request.
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition
against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give
him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request
impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice
Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a
vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary
timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether Jimenez
had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process. Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements
the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting
papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition
court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the
petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no
provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the
US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while
the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the
US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the
extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential
extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the extradition process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an
extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due
process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by governmental action." The
concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on
Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due
process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide
to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due
process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
82 People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000] En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur,
1 on official leave Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez
sat at the bishop’s chair while the sacrament of confirmation was being
performed at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the
security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers.
Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair.
Mararac twice tapped Estrada’s hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was
about to strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac
and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded
and bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado
Francisco received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went
inside the cathedral, approached Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and
advised the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief
Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the
confirmation rites, went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two
wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was
brought to the police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few
minutes after arrival at the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was
charged with the crime of murder for the killing of Mararac. On 6 January
1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward
at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that Estrada could not properly
and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect;
that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric
ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was opposed
by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several
questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions were understood and
answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day.
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court
on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City,
Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision upholding the
prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of the crime charged and
thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay P50,000 for
indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages.
Estrada’s counsel appealed. Issue: Whether a mental examination of the
accused should be made before the accused may be subjected to trial. Held:
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of
the accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to
require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life
or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and
sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due
process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent determination of an
accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and
more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental
examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due
process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be
nullified.
83 Lim vs. Court of Appeals [GR 111397, 12 August 2002] Third Division,
Carpio (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 7 December 1992, Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before
the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Alfredo
Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. The Bistro filed the case
because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated the
Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff.
This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistro’s night club and restaurant
operations (i.e. the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant).
Lim also refused to accept the Bistro’s application for a business license, as
well as the work permit applications of the Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.
Acting on the Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued
the temporary restraining order on 29 December 1992, ordering Lim and/or
his agents to refrain from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation
of the establishments of the Bistro. At the hearing, the parties submitted
their evidence in support of their respective positions. On 20 January 1993,
the trial court granted the Bistro’s application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still
issued a closure order on the Bistro’s operations effective 23 January 1993,
even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Lim insisted that the
power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and
their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue,
suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is
expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. On 25 January 1993, the Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for
Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped the Bistro’s
operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt
on 29 January 1993, the Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim
would respect the court’s injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26
and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and
policemen, again disrupted the Bistro’s business operations. Meanwhile, on
17 February 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to
dismiss the case. The trial court denied Lim’s motion to dissolve the
injunction and to dismiss the case in an order dated 2 March 1993. On 10
March 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. The
Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders in a decision on 25 March 1993,
and denied Lim's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated 13 July
1993. On 1 July 1993, Manila City Ordinance 778314 took effect. On the same
day, Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close
down the operations of the Bistro, which order the police implemented at
once. Lim filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court. Issue: Whether the Bistro should be given an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. Held:
From the language of Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code, it is
clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to
issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and
permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these
permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the
condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the
power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-
compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and
permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers,
which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to inspect and
investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power
to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or
investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has no authority to close
down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without due
process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these
laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down
private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if
there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given the Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) conditions of its licenses and permits.
84 Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 134278, 7 August 2002] Second
Division, Quisumbing (J): 3 concur Facts: On 24 May 1990, the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now Philippine National
Police or PNP, launched OPLAN AJAX to minimize, if not entirely eliminate,
the extortion activities of traffic policemen at the vicinity of Guadalupe
Bridge, Makati, Metro Manila. On 5 July 1990, at about 3:00 p.m., two
operatives of OPLAN AJAX, namely, 2LT Federico Bulanday, PC and
Intelligence Agent Angelito C. Leoncio, both members of the Counter-
Intelligence Group (CIG), were on board a car with Plate No. NDK-238. They
were traveling along J.P. Rizal Street, Makati, when they were flagged down
by 3 policemen in uniform. These were PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez, PFC Arsenio
Silungan, and PFC Rolando Pilandi, who were members of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command assigned with the Makati Police Station. Upon pulling up,
Bulanday and Leoncio were informed by the 3 policemen that they had
violated traffic regulations, and demanded money. Bulanday and Leoncio
handed over cash amounting to P100 consisting of two P20 bills, one P10 bill,
and one P50 bill which were marked with ultraviolet fluorescent powder. On
seeing what happened, other CIG operatives who were behind the vehicle of
Bulanday and Leoncio immediately swooped down on the 3 policemen, but
where they were able to arrest only Rodriguez and Silungan. PFC Pilandi was
able to escape by commandeering a private vehicle at gunpoint. An
administrative case for grave misconduct was subsequently filed against
Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi, who was at large, with the National Police
Commission or NAPOLCOM (Administrative Case 90-80, the case was
assigned to Atty. Narzal B. Mallares as hearing officer). A second
administrative case was filed with NAPOLCOM against the 3 erring police
officers for their summary dismissal. A charge for robbery/extortion was filed
with Headquarters, PC-INP (Administrative Case 01-91 and assigned to
P/Major Efren Santos as Summary Hearing Officer). On 7 February 1991, then
PNP Chief Major General Cesar P. Nazareno issued Special Order 35
summarily dismissing Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi from the police force.
On 27 March 1991, Rodriguez appealed the summary dismissal to the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board. He alleged that the summary dismissal
proceedings violated his right to due process, and claimed that only a
preliminary inquiry had been conducted by the NAPOLCOM hearing officer
and that he had not been afforded a chance to present his side. In the
meantime, the case against Rodriguez and his companions for
robbery/extortion was filed by PC-INP with the public prosecutor’s office of
Makati. The investigating prosecutor, however, subsequently recommended
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that “the scenarios of the
arresting officers left so much to be desired.” On 5 November 1992, the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board dismissed Rodriguez' appeal in the
summary dismissal case. On 29 March 1993, Rodriguez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the NAPOLCOM denied it on 11 March 1996. Aggrieved,
Rodriguez elevated his case to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari and
mandamus. On 22 October 1997, the appellate court denied the petition for
lack of merit. Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision, but it was denied on 27 May 21998. On 13 July 1998,
Rodriguez filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether Rodriguez was
afforded due process by the NAPOLCOM. Held: Where a police officer is
dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the
dismissal with the DILG Secretary. That the NAPOLCOM Chairman is also the
DILG Secretary is of no moment, for under the aforecited laws and
regulations, only the DILG Secretary can act on the appeal. Should the DILG
Secretary’s decision prove adverse to appellant, then he as the aggrieved
party may bring an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In instances
where the CSC denies the appeal, the remedy under Republic Act 7902 would
be to appeal the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. Neither certiorari
nor mandamus can substitute for appeal where the latter is the proper
remedy. The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus will lie only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Herein, Rodriguez had three
opportunities to appeal the decision of the NAPOLCOM. He chose not to avail
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of them, but
instead opted to file an action for certiorari and mandamus with the
appellate court. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in
dismissing petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
Rodriguez cannot now claim that he was not afforded due process by the
NAPOLCOM. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The
essence of administrative due process is the opportunity to be heard. As long
as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
was not denied due process.
85 Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001] First Division, Ynares-
Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were
Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of
the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the
supply purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and accordingly, the public bidding
was held on 14 September 1990. The lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was
disqualified since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only 1,800 liters,
far below the required 3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections made by
a A Technical Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and
Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids and Awards Committee, however,
voted to award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which
offered Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the
Bids and Awards Committee reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited
its choice to the two brands recommended by Gen. Tanchanco and, by
majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder.
Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire
trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and
Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared.
Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the amount
of P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire
truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the bid price of Tahei
Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the Purchase
Order was P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy of
P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire
trucks. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding,
awarding and purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG
Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint on 12 February 1993 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman,
against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP,
(3) Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.), (5)
P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp.
Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio
Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espeña, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary
Luis Santos, and (12) Ms. Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military conducted a preliminary investigation where the accused submitted
their respective counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the
indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of the
complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter
recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the
Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15 April 1993. Accordingly, the
appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco,
Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez
were not included among the accused. However, upon motion of Generals
Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without any notice to or
participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued
an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and
recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy
Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the
recommendation, while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented.
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation. Roxas and
Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review
Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the
Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be dismissed.
However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez
disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order dated 10
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) February 1994.
Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended
Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as
additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court. Issue:Whether the lack of notice to
Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the issuance of Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. Held: It is not material either that no new matter
or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should
be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a
reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case
the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation
of, Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances
of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any rate, Roxas and Nacpil
cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well
established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an
opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Herein, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of
the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956.
86 Philcomsat v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989] En Banc, Regalado (J):
12 concur, 1 took no part Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a
franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at
such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications," the
authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to
deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal or terminals." By designation of the Republic of
the Philippines, it is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the
Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of
the United Nations’s General Assembly. Since 1968, It has been leasing its
satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern
Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or
their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by
PHILCOMSAT enable said international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex,
facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. It
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to
Executive Order (EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC
required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public
convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders,
as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. On 9
September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such
services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it
can continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and
charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16 September
1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a provisional authority to continue
operating Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) its
existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge
the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for 6 months from the
date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on 17 March
1988, it was extended for another 6 months, or up to 16 September 1988.
Thereafter, the NTC further extended the provisional authority of
PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months, counted from 16 September 1988, but it
directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction
of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order.
Issue: Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and hearing to
PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending
final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s application. Held: The NTC, in the
exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it
was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the
benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation,"
which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the
confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration
of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. The
order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of
rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an explanation
as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted
a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which
NTC based its questioned order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such
ratefixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC,
it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail
the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless
otherwise provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such
order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion.
87 Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc, Padilla (J) : 9 concur
Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of
16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the
City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the
accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd
design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP)
compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On
15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney
recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein
he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney
referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay.
On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay
left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is at present
enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to
a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been
conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private
prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such
government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of
having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the
motion. On 7 March 1955 the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the
passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this
proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5
July 1955, Suntay’s counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action
taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying
that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the
Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the
motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his
passport may be cancelled. Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it
upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge
against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as
a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does
not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and
capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always
be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be
violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if
the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear
but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in
our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946,
42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have
acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Suntay’s suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time,
can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to
flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the
strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice.
88 De Bisschop v. Galang [GR 18365, 31 May 1963] En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 10
concur, 1 took no part Facts: George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was
allowed to stay in this country for 3 years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a
prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is
president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the
Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of
confidential and damaging reports of the Immigration Office, Benjamin de
Mesa, to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling
front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it
purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment
of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration (Emilio L. Galang), in a
communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for
extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board
of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter,
counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said
Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that,
pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases
where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and
expediency, no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the
Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial as per
letter dated 10 September 1959. No request for reinvestigation was made
with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing
of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the case on
18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio Canizares presiding, Civil Case
41477) on the same day ordering the Commissioner of Immigration to desist
from arresting and detaining de Bisschop. During the hearing, only
documentary evidence were presented. On 27 March 1961, the lower court
granted the petition for prohibition and ordered the Commissioner of
Immigration to desist and refrain from arresting and expelling de Bisschop
from the Philippines unless and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the
Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigrations in connection with
the application for extension of stay filed by de Bisschop with said Board. The
Commissioner of Immigration appealed. Issue: Whether the right to notice
and hearing is essential to due process in administrative proceedings, and
whether the Board of Commissioners are required to render written
decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Held: The administration of
immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive
branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary
on the part of immigration authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines Immigration
Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, the
Courts are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction
to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not
granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant,
for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner
advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary
step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the
start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless
he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his
expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is
not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration
laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of
Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or
exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and
(2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under
Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the immigration law
which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written
decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act
merely refers to the number of “votes” necessary to constitute the decision
of said Board.
89 Var-Orient Shipping v. Achacoso [GR L-81805, 31 May 1988] First division,
Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur Facts: Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos
Bros. filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office
(WAAO), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the
Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio
Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew
members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their
Contracts of Employment with them, which supposedly resulted in damages
arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport
Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After
joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4 March 1987 with both parties
required to submit memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda. On
10 June 1987, the seamen filed a motion to resolve, which the companies'
counsel did not oppose. Thus, on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda,
Achacoso rendered a decision on 9 September 1987 ordering (1) the
dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against Navarro, Capalad,
Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the commission of
the same or similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more severe
penalty; (2) exclusion of Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding Var-Orient
Shipping Co. for failure to comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules
and regulations and warning against committing the same or a similar offense
otherwise it shall be dealt with more severely; (4) archiving the case of
Arsolon, A. dela Cruz, Montero and D. de la Cruz with their names included in
the POEA watchlist until they shall have voluntarily submitted themselves to
WAAO’s jurisdiction; (5) payment by the companies jointly and severally,
unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cason, Manela and Genesis the
amount of P1,550.59 each, representing deductions from allotments, plus
P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6) payment by the companies
jointly and severally unto Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment representing his salaries for the unserved
portion of his employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
to be tendered thru Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) WAAO, 10 days from receipt of the decision. A copy of the decision
was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the companies'
counsel, then Attorney Francisco B. Figura through the receptionist, Marlyn
Aquino on 21 September 1987. Atty. Figura alleged he did not receive the
envelope containing the decision. The companies allegedly learned about the
decision only when the writ of execution was served on them on 20
November 1987 by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Deputy
Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. Previously, on 19
October 1987, the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the
companies' counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies,
through new counsel, Atty. Quintin Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" on the ground that the decision had not been
received by them, hence, it was not yet final and executory. On 19 January
1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D. Achacoso). In due time, the
companies filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the decision of the
POEA administrator has been received, rendering said decision final and
unappealable. Held: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Herein, the parties agreed that they would file their
respective memoranda at the 4 March 1987 hearing and thereafter consider
the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to
expedite the settlement of labor disputes. Atty. Figura's affidavit involving
that he has not received the decision is self-serving. The companies failed to
submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did
with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the
circumstances, the Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly
served on companies' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable,
should be sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution is therefore not
premature.
90 Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940] En Banc, Laurel (J): 6
concur Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid
off 89 laborers, who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due
to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among
others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of
Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated
against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly
dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to the
failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books
of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s allegation
that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial
evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or
activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for
new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations. Issue: Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural
requirements prescribe special requirements of due process in administrative
cases. Held: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character, to wit:
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) a. Right to a
hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the
party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons
to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration. c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius
of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may
refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of
its powers (Section 10) f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to
authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right
to appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty. g. The CIR should, in
all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 91 Montemayor v. Araneta
University [GR L-44251, 31 May 1977] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4
concur, 1 on leave. Facts: Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of
Araneta University Foundation (AUF), serving as head of its Humanities and
Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged
against him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then
President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) committee to investigate such charge. The
accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances
committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which
took place on 24 April 1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as the
complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the postponement
of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he
filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June
1974, he filed an affidavit to sustain his defense. On 8 July 1974, the report
and recommendation of the investigating committee came, and was adverse
to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one
degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such recommendation and
thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF for
appropriate action. On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by
Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castañeda, and Jesus Martinez against
Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another
committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set
for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was denied. The hearing proceeded in his
absence. On 5 December 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding
the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and
recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of the AUF his
separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of
the Manual of Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal
was ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his preventive
suspension. On 12 December 1974, the University filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a report of his suspension and
application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21
November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC
against AUF for reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with
all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a
motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the
NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former
position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed.
AUF appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the
Commission's order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal
justified. The AUF was, however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of
P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former
voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision,
Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Montemayor was
absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal
from AUF. Held: In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before
condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and
judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due process, a
term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible
judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may be the
consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a
conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before
dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in
specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or
permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such
trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence.
Herein, the procedure followed in the first investigation of Montemayor
(June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The second
investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for
postponement therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in
the absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting
its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently
established and recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was
remedied, as Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor
Commission. Denial of due process happened only in the proceeding he had
before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the
NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case, the
latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was
afforded his day in court.
92 Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964] En Banc, Paredes (J): 8
concur, 2 took no part Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 31 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Facts: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
filed two applications with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for
revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other nonresidential
customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case
85889) and the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate,
schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were approved by the
PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August 1955, the
Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general
power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally
approved on 31 August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7
other applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon
petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to
cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General
Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of 11
May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission on
28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano
Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of
considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found
reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de
Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the
PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties,
announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was
to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so
that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal
hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated
11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the Commission, in
which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of
return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted
the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report
addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission on 21
November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco
was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an
answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956,
the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its objection, and
prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present
their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May
11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said
report and controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed
down a decision, granting the petition for the reduction of rates. The motion
for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by
Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958.
Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956
serves the purpose of “proper notice and hearing” in administrative cases.
Held: The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties
appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief,
Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly
authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that
the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal
hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is
only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of
understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of
27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing",
as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for
requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision.
It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be
heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such
evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not
bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the
constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due
process of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but
also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law
guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 32 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) who would be affected by the
order or act contemplated.
93 Ateneo v. CA [GR L-56180, 16 October 1986] Second Division, Gutierrez
(J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon
Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado), first
year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck
at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria.
Other boarders held him from striking again, but the boarders hid the
incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the
slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was
dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the
filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The
complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving
him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are
prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the
unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university
denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of
Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good
morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a
student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and
that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop
from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and
maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as an
institution of learning. After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons
and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the
costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the
trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The
motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in
view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the
vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the University filed
a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the absence
of notice to the dismissed student’s parents negates the compliance of the
requirements of administrative due process. Held: Besides the administrative
body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the incident, due
process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the
evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision.
Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice Gancayco)
showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the
findings in the reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of
malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the
Ateneo de Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of the
proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The investigating
board acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative due process
were met. It cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon
were not given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time
was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature
enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of
the offense he committed as he asked if he could be expelled for what he did.
When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the Board of
Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and
or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them
about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his
Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University.
94 Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988] Second division, Paras (J): 3
concur. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 33 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts:
Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma.
Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso,
Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School
of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986,
the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which
would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the
students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the
negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the
school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances.
Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the
students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain
why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on
their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982,
the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter.
During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted
and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28
October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the
Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the
PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student
leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the
schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was
made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the
President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these
notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a
petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction. Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the
refusal of PSBA to readmit them. Held: After the close of the first semester,
the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or
with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is
no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into
another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to
refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is
sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not
even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid
down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5
had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to
be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is
well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained
from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective
jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not
supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition
or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful
scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating
Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate
equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies,
scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed,
should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
95 Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990] En Banc, Cortes (J): 10 concur, 1
on leave. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 34 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts:
Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon,
Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno.
Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in
Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll
by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in
student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus
filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the
petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was
filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that
they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first
semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they
duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations
laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in
which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them relates to
possible breaches of discipline. Held: The contract between the school and
the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on
the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already
expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and
enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom
guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution of
higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to
speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation
to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to
pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or
fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual
right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.
Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic
tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some
cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic
deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to
insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been subjected
to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but the
penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural
due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the
imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as
the students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been
effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed
when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the
disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would
serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained
relations between the students and the officials of the school which
necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle. Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
35 )
96 PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-
81958, 30 June 1988] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave Facts: The
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s
Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and
(3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of
Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the
absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's
non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that
PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988,
the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator
of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8 March 1988, the
Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether Department
Order 1 unduly discriminates against women. Held: Department Order 1
applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. ‘Equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
all members of the same class. The classification made — the preference for
female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament.
Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are
applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not all Filipina workers.
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select
person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a
person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or
group of persons. Where the classification is based on such distinctions that
make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young, the
women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.
97 Sison v. Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984] En Banc, Fernando (J): 9
concur, 2 concur in result, 1 concur in separate opinion, 1 took no part Facts:
Antero M. Sison Jr., as taxpayer, alleges that Section 1 of BP 135 (allegedly
modifying Section 21 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, which
provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on [a] taxable compensation
income, [b] taxable net income, [c] royalties, prizes, and other winnings, [d]
interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from
deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, [e]
dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable
partnership, [f] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
adjusted gross income. ) unduly discriminated against him by the imposition
of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his
profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character; that
there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether professionals and businessmen, like Sison, are unduly
discriminated for not being entitled to deductions for income tax purposes.
Held: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. This requirement is
met when the tax operates with the same force and effect in every place
where the subject may be found. The rule of uniformity does not call for
perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable.
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. It is enough that the
classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real
differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the
discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the
application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all
taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied
to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set
apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers
are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they
are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of
professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no
uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It
would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero
deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the
basis of gross income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system
of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of
net income taxation as regards professional and business income.
98 People v. Hernandez [GR L-6025-26, 18 July 1956] Resolution En Banc,
Concepcion (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: (1) Amado V. Hernandez
alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2)
Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3)
Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo
Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben
alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7)
Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz
alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11)
Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue,
were accused of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies. The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged with
rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the
capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other
things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A
petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which
was denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2 February 1954. A
similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on 26 June 1954 and renewed
on 22 December 1955. Issue: Whether Hernandez is entitled to right to bail.
Held: Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
constitute one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the
commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, the Supreme court has never in
the past convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with
murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion
published in the Philippine Reports (US vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs.
Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155),
the defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had
killed several persons, sometimes peace officers. The ingredients of a crime
form Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) part and
parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised
Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing
serious violence among its essential elements, thus clearly indicating that
everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary
therefor, is embraced therein. National, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same,
to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. The policy of our statutes on
rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as
constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty. Further, the
settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has
been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during
the Spanish regime. Although the Government has, for the past 5 or 6 years,
adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of
said law and in their prosecution the established policy of the State, as
regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932.
Furthermore, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong;
it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment. Thus, in conclusion, under the
allegations of the amended information against Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" for
the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision
mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of the
Supreme Court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.
99 People v. Isinain [GR L-2857, 28 February 1950] Second Division, Bengzon
(J): 8 concur Facts: In the morning of 7 March 1947, Urbano Cruz, the
encargado of the coconut grove of Arturo Eustaquio in Latuan and
Balagtasan, City of Zamboanga, was informed by one of the guards that there
were 3 persons stealing coconuts in the said plantation. Cruz called Ernesto
Fargas, Eustaquio’s truck driver, and accompanied by some laborers,
proceeded to the plantation. There the group saw 3 persons, chopping
coconuts. When they approached, the trespassers started to run away, but
Cruz fired a shot into the air, and one stopped and was apprehended. He
turned out to be Moro Isnain, who, upon investigation by the precinct
commander of the police station (Lt. Bucoy) acknowledged his culpability,
asked for pardon and identified his confederates as Moros Addi and Akik
(who are still at large). Before the justice of the peace he pleaded guilty to
the charge. However, in the Court of First Instance (CFI), he changed his
mind. He admitted he had been arrested during the raid, but submitted the
flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because he was thirsty,
and confessed that he joined the other two thieves in order to drink coconut
water. His attorney de officio raised the constitutionality of Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, as it allegedly punishes the larceny of such products (the
stealing of coconuts) more heavily than the taking away of similar produce
(rice and sugar) and thereby denies Moro Isinain equal protection of the
laws. Issue: Whether the harsher penalties in the theft of coconuts over
other objects of theft renders the penal law contrary to the constitutional
guaranty on equal protection of the law. Held: No. Although the
constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in the same place and
under like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subjected to state
legislation; a state, as a part of its police power, may exercise a large
measure of discretion, without violating the equal protection guaranty, in
creating and defining criminal offenses, and may make classifications as to
persons amenable to punishment, so long as the classifications are
reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same class, and,
where a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
reasonable classification is made as between persons or corporations, the
persons or corporations in each class may be dealt with in a manner different
from that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in other
classes. Herein, on the theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty
is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one
of the sources of the national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms
where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be
efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees;
and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be the
favorite resort of thieves. There is therefore, some reason for the special
treatment accorded the industry and as it can not be said that the
classification is entirely without basis.
100 Chavez v. PCGG [GR 130716, 9 December 1998] First Division,
Panganiban (J): 3 concur Facts: Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and
former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses
and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury
and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what
impelled him to bring the action were several news reports bannered in a
number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997 referring to (1) the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Chavez, invoking his
constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands
that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy"
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. PCGG claimed Chavez’s action is premature as he has not asked the
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and agreements and that the proposed
terms of the Agreements have not become effective and binding. They
further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to
the Sandiganbayan for its approval, which the Republic has opposed as it has
not been ratified nor submitted to the President for approval; and that the
Marcos heirs have failed to comply with the undertakings, particularly the
collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. On 19 August 1998,
Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the
Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in
Intervention. They aver that they are "among the 10,000 claimants whose
right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos Estate is recognized
by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,
Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S. Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the
Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997"; and as such, they claim to have
personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the case, since a
distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect
their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on 24 August 1998, the
Court granted their motion to intervene. Issue: Whether the civil and criminal
liabilities of the Marcoses may be compromised, as embodied in the General
and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcoses. Held:
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard
to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a
marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future
support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any
other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A
compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless
the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of
the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the
agreement may be invalidated by the courts. In the absence of an express
prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is
applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the objectives of Executive Order (EO)
14, particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that
it may be used to hasten economic recovery. However, any compromise
relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically
terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability
of the malefactor. While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by
law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The
authority must be specifically conferred. The power to grant criminal
immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO 14, as amended by EO
14-A. From the wording of the law, however, it can be easily deduced that
the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal
respondent, defendant or accused. Herein, the General and Supplemental
Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs have serious legal
flaws. First, the Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO
14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the
Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth
cases pending before the Sandiganbayan. Second, under Item 2 of the
General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the
properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the
Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG
has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its
authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Third, the government binds
itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending
before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on
judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Once a case has
been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal
or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge, once
jurisdiction is acquired by the trial court. The PCGG, as the government
prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all
such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. Fourth, the government
also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future,
matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. Again, this all-encompassing
stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud
may not be waived. The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the
exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government
thereby relinquishes. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the
Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for
public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass public
funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in
exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth. Fifth, the Agreements
do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties
shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the
Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets. Sixth, the Agreements do
not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be
forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses.
While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be
entitled to 25% of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery
expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No
similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties.
Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for
the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. Finally, the absence of then President
Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, and express condition therein,
renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even
if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
101 Nunez v. Sandiganbayan [GR L-50581-50617, 30 January 1982] En Banc,
Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part. Facts: Information were filed against
Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21 February and 26 March 1979
for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all public officials,
in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a
motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a
day later, and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486,
which created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Constitution. Issue: Whether the trial of the
accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against
the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate)
in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts. Held: The Constitution provided
for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan, with "jurisdiction
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
may be determined by law." It came into existence with the issuance in 1978
of a Presidential Decree. Classification must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. The constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of
which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by
such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January 1973, when
the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Further, the omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does
not deprive protection of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the
Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall
designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering
judgment." If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks
a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal
of the judgment. 102 Lacson v. Executive Secretary [GR 128096, 20 January
1999] En Banc, Martinez (J): 14 concur Facts: On 18 May 1995, 11 persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by PNP Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson. The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; PACC Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC)
led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC) headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Acting on a
media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, alleged
that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personnel allegedly involved in the 18 May 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. However, a
review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against 26 accused, including Lacson, Zubia, and Acop. This
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. On 2
November 1995, Lacson was among those charged as principal in 11
informations for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
Acop and Zubia were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-the-fact. Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. After conducting a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on 1 March 1996, 11 amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein Lacson was charged only as
an accessory, together with Acop and Zubia and others. One of the accused
was dropped from the case. On 5-6 March 1996, all the accused filed
separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
RTC pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act (RA) 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
to cases where one or more of the " principal accused" are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of
Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief
Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. On 8 May 1996, a
resolution penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City RTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under Republic Act, as none of the principal accused has the rank
of Chief Superintendent or higher. On 17 May 1996, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. While motions for reconsideration were
pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with
the filing of the amended informations on 1 March 1996, HB 2299 and HB
1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as SB 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of RA 7975. These bills
were consolidated and later approved into law as RA 8249 by the President
of the Philippines on 5 February 1997. On 5 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated 8 May
1996. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an Addendum to its 5
March 1997 Resolution granting the Special Prosecutor’s motion for
reconsideration in light of the enactment of RA 8249, admitting the amended
information, and retaining jurisdiction to try and decide the cases. Lacson,
thus, questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof." Issue: Whether Lacson and his co-accused were placed under a
different category from those situated similarly to them, in light of the
amendments under Republic Act 8249. Held: The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against
those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law,
rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress
to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. Sections 4 and 7 does not place Lacson
and intervenors under a different category from those similarly situated as
them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all
cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." However, to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on
ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing
the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3)
the offense committed is in relation to the office. Specifically, an offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be
alleged in the information.” Herein, the amended informations Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) are wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders. Mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by
the accused public officer "in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused's official duties. For failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan.
103 Soriano v. Court of Appeals [GR 123936, 4 March 1999] Second Division,
Quisumbing (J): 4 concur Facts: On 7 December 1993, Ronald Soriano was
convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious
physical injuries and damage to property. On 8 March 1994, his application
for probation was granted by the trial court, which imposed upon him terms
and conditions (1) to meet his family responsibilities, (2) to devote himself to
a specific employment and not to change employment without prior notice
to the supervising officer; and/or to pursue a prescribed secular study or
vocational training, and (3) to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino
Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court. On 26 April
1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel
Soriano's probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of
the victim, and a supplemental motion alleging Soriano's commission of
another crime for which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The
Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment recommending that
Soriano be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be required
instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. On 20 June 1994,
the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion and directed Soriano to submit
a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him. Thereafter,
probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that Soriano's
father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed
Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment. Said amount was not
turned over to the heirs of Daluyong. Da Maycong considered this a violation
of the terms and conditions of the probation, and thus, submitted a
manifestation to the trial court praying that Soriano be made to explain his
non-compliance with the court's order of 20 June 1994, or that he be cited
for contempt for such non-compliance. The trial court granted Da Maycong’s
prayers in its 15 August 1994 order, and ordered the Soriano once again to
submit his program of payment. Soriano instead filed a motion for
reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice of the order
dated 20 June 1994., as his counsel failed to notify Soriano after he received
a copy of said order on 23 June 1994. On 4 October 1994, the trial court
issued an order declaring Soriano in contempt of court for his failure to
comply with its orders of 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994, and revoked the
grant of probation to Soriano and ordered that he be arrested to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him. Soriano filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition, holding that Soriano's "stubborn unwillingness" to comply with the
orders of the trial court "shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a
wrong." Soriano’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
appellate court. Soriano filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the requirement to pay indemnity to the victim’s heirs, in
light of the convict’s application for probation, is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Held: The requirement to pay
indemnity to the victim's heirs is not violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Soriano's application for probation had already been
granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement before
he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his continued enjoyment
of the same. The trial court could not have done away with imposing
payment of civil liability as a condition for probation. This is not an arbitrary
imposition but one required by law. It is a consequence of Soriano's having
been convicted of a crime, and petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation
regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation. There is no reason
why Soriano cannot comply with a simple Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) order to furnish the trial court with a program of
payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the
reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of
payment. Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to
formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity. Soriano’s
refusal to comply with orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He has
refused to comply with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the
constitutionality of the requirement imposed and harping on his alleged
poverty as the reason for his failure to comply. Since probation is not an
absolute right, and that it is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and
conditions that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant
probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
104 UNIDO v. Comelec [GR 56515, 3 April 1981] En Banc, Barredo (J): 3
concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on official leave Facts: UNIDO IS a
political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines of 1973 proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa. Comelec issued 3 resolutions all dated 5 March 1981
(Resolution 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for "equal opportunity"
on public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be
submitted to the people on 7 April 1981; Resolution 1468 providing "equal
time on the use of the broadcast media [radio and television] in the plebiscite
campaign"; and Resolution 1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the
print media in the 1981 plebiscite of 7 April 1981".) UNIDO addressed a letter
to Comelec on 10 March 1981 to grant it the same opportunity as given
President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”. It also requested radio
and television coverage for its Plaza Miranda meeting on a letter dated 17
March 1981. Comelec issued a resolution on 18 March1981 denying the
request of UNIDO; stating that Marcos conduct his pulong-pulong in light of
the official government thrust to amend the constitution and in his capacity
as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political party to which
the UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister, as such, it has no right
to "demand" equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos. UNIDO
sent a letter serving as its motion for reconsideration. The Comelec denied
the letter-motion for lack of merit in its resolution of 22 March 1981. UNIDO
appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the opposition should be
given the same opportunity and facilities given to the President to
communicate and dialogue with the people on matters affecting the plan of
government or of public interest. Held: It is undeniable and but natural that
the head of state of every country in the world must, from the very nature of
his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who
are opposed to him in the sense that, since the head of state has the grave
and tremendous responsibility of planning and implementing the plan of
government itself, either by virtue of the popular mandate given to him
under the corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the laws or any
other duly recognized grant of power and authority, the opposition cannot
be placed at par with him, since logically the opposition can only fiscalize the
administration and punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that
when the duly scheduled time for the people to exercise their inalienable
power to make a better choice, the opposition may have the chance to make
them accept the alternative they can offer. Therefore, when the head of
state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon him to
communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan
of government or any other matter of public interest, no office or entity of
the government is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which
its contrary views may be ventilated.
105 Ceniza v. Comelec [GR L-52304, 28 January 1980] En Banc, Concepcion Jr.
(J): 10 concur, 1 took no part Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 22 December 1979, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa enacted Batas Pambansa 51 providing for local elections on 30
January 1980. To implement this Act, Comelec adopted Resolution 1421,
excluding 18 cities (including Cebu and Mandaue) from participating in the
election of provincial officials. Because of its income, the City of Cebu is
classified as a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in
the election of the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu,
although the Charter of Cebu City allows the qualified voters of the city to
vote in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu. The City
of Mandaue is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the
city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter
expressly provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in
the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a
candidate therefor. Ramon B. Ceniza, Federico C. Cabilao Jr., Nelso J. Rosal
and Alejandro R. Alinsug filed the petition for prohibition and mandamus
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, as taxpayers and registered
voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They vigorously assail Section 3 of
BP 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis for
classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the
province where the city is geographically located; and RA 5519 (Charter of
Mandaue City), which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by
the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They prayed that a
restraining order to temporarily prohibit the election for Provincial Governor
and elective provincial officials in Cebu, prohibiting the National Treasurer to
release public funds and the Commission on Audit (COA) to pass in audit said
funds in connection with and for the purpose of holding the local elections;
and after hearing render Section 3 of BP 885 void, as well as Section 96,
Article XVIII of RA 5519 (Charter of Mandaue). Issue: Whether the exclusion
of inhabitants of highly urbanized cities and component cities from electing
provincial government officials violate the equal protection of law. Held: The
equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar
rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a
denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an
individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials
while granting it to another individual or group of voters in the same city. The
classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the
basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The
revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit.
It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial
activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is
geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued
support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances. These cities being independent of the province in the
administration of their affairs leaves the provincial government without
governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. Such being the case, it
is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial
officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected and
exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities. Further, express
provisions in Charter of a City may exclude registered voters of the city from
voting for the provincial officials of the province. The practice of allowing
voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the
same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative
discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of
suffrage.
106 Philippine Judges Association [GR 105371, 11 November 1993] En Banc,
Cruz (J): 12 concur, 1 on leave Facts: The Philippine Judges Association (duly
represented by its President, Bernardo P. Abesamis, VicePresident for Legal
Affairs Mariano M. Umali, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila
Alfredo C. Flores, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, Jesus G.
Bersamira, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon
City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively); the
National Confederation of the Judges Association of the Philippines
(composed of the Metropolitan Trial Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Court Judges Association represented by its
President, Reinato Quilala of the Municipal Trial Circuit Court, Manila); and
the Municipal Judges League of the Philippines (represented by its President,
Tomas G. Talavera); by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the
Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
Courts throughout the Country, filed the petition assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for
Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith), as
implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular 92-28,
on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary;
contending that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of franking privilege. The National Land Registration Authority
(NLRA) has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such
as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial
proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene. Issue: Whether
the withdrawal of the franking privilege of the Judiciary violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Held: The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not
require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. The withdrawal of franking privilege
from the Judiciary would further deepen the problem in the delay in the
administration of justice. The Court are dependent on the postal service for
communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. It
should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they
have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge
of their judicial functions, considering that the Judiciary has the lowest
appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and
Executive Departments (.84% of P309 billion budgeted for 1993). The
repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denied the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and
the grantees of the franking privilege (The President of the Philippines; the
Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices or officers). In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices (the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation;
the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and
Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan or the Office of Special Prosecutor;
the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons.) from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it
should not recognize a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege.
107 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave. Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran
Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon,
charged Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's
permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarez himself approved on 6
October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night
manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran
for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15 February 1993 for which they will
use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted
all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused
to issue the same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCI’s
Reply-Affidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated 23 November 1992
issued by Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-based
organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-
Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28 November 1992 to 28 February 1993
using certain portions of the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in
Baclaran for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis
conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a
resolution recommending the prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section
3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as amended. On 16 February 1994, the
information was filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January
1994, Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation
allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered evidence.
The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February 1993,
Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information
as Olivarez does not refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with
his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18 February 1994, Olivarez
voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan
for his temporary release. On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus
Motion for a re-examination and reassessment of the prosecution's report
and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the determination of the
existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of
Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty"
entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to
suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez filed
a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With
Entry of Appearance), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition
to Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional
Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the
proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's arraignment
thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record in the interest of
justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due
to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration
which was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was remanded
to the Office of the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be terminated
within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III
Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal
of the case. On 9 December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the
recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit thru
manifest partiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant
failed to apply for a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal
and on 27 December 1994 directed the prosecution to proceed under the
existing information. On 13 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer,
SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January
1995, Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of
Reinvestigation. The latter motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez
filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether Olivarez
exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCI’s application for
license. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held:
Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a
permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by
the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements
were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse,
Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal
protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaranbased vendors'
associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of
legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It
would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it
was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred
to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to
take appropriate action on the letterapplication of BCCI although the same
was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to
prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing
department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether Olivarez was
impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court
for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental
facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a
reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent
countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez,
as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue
permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare
purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of
authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.
108 Tiu v. Court of Appeals [GR 127410, 20 January 1999] En Banc,
Panganiban (J): 14 concur Facts: On 13 March 1992, Congress, with the
approval of the President, passed into law Republic Act 7227 ("An Act
Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this
Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.”). Section 12
thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special
privileges, such as tax exemptions and duty-free importation of raw
materials, capital and equipment to business enterprises and residents
located and residing in the said zones. On 10 June 1993, President Ramos
issued Executive Order (EO) 97 clarifying the application of the tax and duty
incentives. On 19 June 1993, the President issued EO 97-A, specifying the
area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (i.e. the
secured area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base).
On 26 October 1994, Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M.
Jungco challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A
for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws,
inasmuch as the order granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and
residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and
denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in"
territory. In a Resolution dated 27 June 1995, the Supreme Court referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular
1-95. Incidentally, on 1 February 1995, Proclamation 532 was issued by
President Ramos, delineating the exact metes and bounds of the Subic
Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition as there is no substantial difference
between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227, holding that
EO 97-A cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional while maintaining the
validity of RA 7227; that the intention of Congress to confine the coverage of
the SSEZ to the secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and
other areas rely on the deliberations in the Senate; and that the limited
application of the tax incentives is within the prerogative of the legislature,
pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest.
Tiu, et. al.’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and hence, they filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether there was a
violation of the equal protection of the laws when EO 97-A granted tax and
duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of
the Subic Special Economic Zone and denied such to those who live within
the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The EO 97-A is not violative of the
equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. The fundamental right of
equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable,
capricious or unfounded. It was based, rather, on fair and substantive
considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose. There are
substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to
establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the
present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking
of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs, and on the other
hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact
will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time
the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any
impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former
military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits
and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, it will be easier to manage
and monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced
off, to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling. The
classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses
within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are
not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in
privileges granted and in obligations required. The equal-protection
guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are
actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of
the constitutional clause. Herein, anyone possessing the requisite investment
capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her
resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
109 International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing [GR
128845, 1 June 2000] First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave,
1 on leave Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and
improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws
and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or
will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four
tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a
foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile? (b) Where is one's
home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic allegiance? (d)
Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was
the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The
School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is simply the
School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in
terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to
apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired
locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for
a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the
International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union
and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The
failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties
to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE
Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo
A. Quisumbing subsequently denied ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires. Held:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.
Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from
general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are
often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees
the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive
more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is
treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar
functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to
leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-
hires and localhires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy.
110 Philippine Rural Electric Cooperative Association Inc. (PHILRECA), et. al.
vs. Secretary of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) [GR
143076, 10 June 2003] En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur Facts: Under Presidential
Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration
Decree, it is the declared policy of the State to provide “the total
electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis” the same “being
vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.” Pursuant to
this policy, PD 269 aims to “promote, encourage and assist all public service
entities engaged in supplying electric service, particularly electric
cooperatives” by “giving every tenable support and assistance” to the electric
cooperatives coming within the purview of the law. From 1971 to 1978, in
order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic
Council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA
(National Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with
the government of the United States of America through the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives,
including Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I),
as beneficiaries. The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of
approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are existing until
today. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax
application of the loan and any property or Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) commodity acquired through the proceeds of
the loan. On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural
Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and
ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives
organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Secretary of
the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending
that pursuant to the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in
the loan agreements, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including
payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government
Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly
withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the
obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United
States Government. Issue: Whether the Local Government Code unduly
discriminated against electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD
269, in violation of the equal protection clause, by providing a different tax
treatment between the former and cooperatives created under RA 6938.
Held: The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class. There is reasonable
classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended,
and electric cooperatives under RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines). First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require
cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Under the
Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers
and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing
that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at
least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the
paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00. Second, another principle
adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant
to this principle, the government may only engage in development activities
where cooperatives do not possess the capability nor the resources to do so
and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD 269, as
amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon
the happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the
management and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as
amended, is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of
funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans
from various sources to finance the development and operations of the
electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily
geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric cooperatives to
ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In
contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and
independent organizations with minimal government intervention or
regulation. Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the
recognition by Congress of the fundamental distinctions between electric
cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and cooperatives under
the new Cooperative Code. Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that
all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall be deemed registered
with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one year.
However, cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three
years within which to qualify and register with the CDA, after which,
provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric
cooperatives, would no longer apply. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 )
112 Rutter v. Esteban [GR L-3708, 18 May 1953] En Banc, Bautista-Angelo (J):
6 concur, 1 concurs with dispositive part Facts: On 20 August 1941, Royal L.
Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban 2 parcels of land situated in the City of
Manila. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage
over the same parcels of land has been constituted in favor of Rutter. The
deed of sale having been registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido
J. Esteban with the mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban
failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that
had accrued thereon, and so on 2 August 1949, Rutter instituted an action in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila to recover the balance due, the
interest due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. The
complaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties mortgaged in
accordance with law. Esteban admitted averments of the complaint but set
up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342 (approved 26 July
1948), allowing a war sufferer 8 years from the settlement of his claim by the
Philippine War Damage Commission. After a motion for summary judgment
has been presented by Esteban, and the requisite evidence submitted
covering the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint holding that the obligation which Rutter seeks to enforce is not yet
demandable under the moratorium law. Rutter filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the constitutionality of
the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Rutter appealed. Issue:
Whether Republic Act 342 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of
contracts. Held: Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of
monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. These moratorium laws
are not new. Moratorium laws have been adopted "during times of financial
distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war." The Moratorium
Law is a valid exercise by the State of its police power, being an emergency
measure. Although conceding that the obligations of the contract were
impaired, the impairment was within the police power of the State as that
power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the
legislature had found to exist. Not only is the constitutional provision
(contract clause) qualified by the measure of control which the State retains
over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter that legislation
appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts
already in effect." Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worth while, a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. Some of these laws, however, have also
been declared "void as to contracts made before their passage where the
suspension of remedies prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable in duration."
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies
in the determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required
that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be
violative of the constitution. Herein, obligations had been pending since 1945
as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act 342
and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves,
which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a
vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to be unreasonable,
if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection
becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required
to pay interest during the operation of the relief. Thus, the Court declared
that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act 342 at the
present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a
minute longer, and the same should be Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) declared null and void and without effect. This
also holds true as regards Executive Orders 25 and 32, considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. This
pronouncement is most especially needed in view of the revival clause
embodied in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid.
113 Ortigas v. Feati [GR L-24670, 14 December 1979] En Banc, Santos (J): 7
concur, 2 took no part Facts: Ortigas, Madrigal & Sia is a limited partnership
and Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Ortigas is engaged in real estate
business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway
Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong. On 4 March 1952, Ortigas, as
vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered in
separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land. On 19
July 1962, the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the lots in
favor of Emma Chavez. Both agreements contained stipulations or
restrictions as to the removal of soil, the materials of the buildings, and
sanitary installations, which were annotated in the TCTs with the Rizal
Registry of Deeds. Feati Bank eventually acquired said lots on 23 July 1962,
one bought directly from Chavez, and the other from Republic Flour Mills (to
whom Chavez sold it previously). On 5 May 1963, Feati Bank began laying the
foundation and commenced the construction of a building to be devoted to
banking purposes, but which could also be devoted to, and used exclusively
for, residential purposes. The following day, Ortigas demanded that Feati
Bank stop the construction of the commercial building on the lots, claiming
that the restrictions annotated were imposed as part of its general building
scheme designated for the beautification and development of Highway Hills
Subdivision. Feati Bank refused to comply with the demand, contending that
the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations
(Resolution 27, dated 4 February 1960 by Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong), that it has filed building and planning permit applications
with the municipality of Mandaluyong, and that it had accordingly obtained
building and planning permits to proceed with the construction. Ortigas filed
the complaint with the lower court (Civil Case 7706), seeking the issuance of
"a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of a commercial
bank building in the premises in view of the building restrictions annotated in
the Feati Bank's TCTs. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
the restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution 27, rendering the
restrictions ineffective and unenforceable. On 2 March 1965, Ortigas filed a
motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration in its order of 26 March 1965. On 2 April 1965 Ortigas filed
its notice of appeal, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond. On 14 April
1965, the appeal was given due course by the appellate court and the
records of the case were elevated directly to the Supreme Court, since only
questions of law were raised. Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantee of
non-impairment of contracts is absolute. Held: While non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has
to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described
as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense,
the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process
or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police power
"is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. Herein, the
municipality of Mandaluyong exercised police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several
cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Having been
expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations, the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified
under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution. The motives
behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it
being a "legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will
not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Further, laws and
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts
agreed upon by the parties. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile, a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The law
forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded
therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed.
114 Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987] First Division,
Cruz (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave. Facts: On 7 November 1961, the municipal
council of San Fernando (Pampanga) adopted Resolution 218 authorizing
some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association (FUMTA) to construct permanent stalls and sell along Mercado
street, on a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters (talipapa). The action
was protested on 10 November 1961 by Felicidad Villanueva, Fernando
Caisip, Antonio Liang, Felina Miranda, Ricardo Puno, Florencio Laxa, and Rene
Ocampo (claiming that they were granted previous authorization by the
municipal government to conduct business therein), in Civil Case 2040, where
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction that prevented the FUMTA members from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On 18
January 1964, while the case was pending, the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality," thereby impliedly
revoking Resolution 218 (series of 1961). On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres
C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by
Villanueva, et. al., being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man
and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of
preliminary injunction was made permanent. The decision was not enforced
as the petitioners were not evicted from the place. The number of vendors in
the area (talipapa) ballooned to 200. The area deteriorated increasingly to
the great prejudice of the community in general, as the makeshift stalls
render the area as virtual fire trap. The problem festered for some more
years under a presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of
whom made any move, for some reason. On 12 January 1982, the
Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a
petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution 29, to restore the
property to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Acting thereon
after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, OIC (Office of the
Mayor) Vicente Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls
beginning 1 July 1982. The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition
with the CFI Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982. The judge denied
the petition on 19 July 1982, and the motion for reconsideration on 5 August
1982, prompting Villanueva, et. al. to file a petition on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Paterno Guevarra, who replaced Macalino as OIC of San
Fernando, was impleaded. Issue: Whether the Ordinance impairs the alleged
lease contracts between the market stall vendors occupying the municipal
plaza and the Government. Held: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of
man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. The lease of a public plaza of a municipality in favor of a private
person is null and void. A plaza cannot be used for the construction of market
stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance
subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public
in general. They are outside the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even
leased by the municipality to private parties. Also, a portion of a public
sidewalk is likewise beyond the commerce of man. Any contract entered into
in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires. The
sidewalk was intended for and was used by the public, in going from one
place to another. The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes
as provided by ordinance or regulation; stalls block the free passage of
pedestrians resulting to clogged with vehicular traffic. On the other hand,
police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal
council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant
to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Thus,
police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium
of a contract. Every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital
infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a
postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time
to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
115 Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) [GR 71169, 22
December 1988]; also Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court [GR 74376], Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court
of Appeals [GR 76394], Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 78182], and , Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 82281] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave, 3 took no
part Facts: [GR 71169] Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue
extension across a stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the
west up to Zodiac Street in the east. When Bel-Air Village was planned, this
block between Reposo and Zodiac Streets adjoining Buendia Avenue in front
of the village was designated as a commercial block. Bel-Air Village was
owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati
Development Corporation (MDC), which in 1968 was merged with Ayala
Corporation. Spouses Sangalang reside at 110 Jupiter St. between Makati
Ave. and Reposo St.; Spouses Gaston reside at 64 Jupiter St. between Makati
Ave. and Zodiac St.; Spouses Briones reside at 66 Jupiter St.; while Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air
Village which takes care of the sanitation, security, traffic regulations and
general welfare of the village. The lots which were acquired by the
Sangalangs, the Gastons, the Brioneses in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively,
all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in
Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale (i.e. being
automatic members of Bel-Air Association who must abide by the rules and
regulations laid down by the Association [as per sanitation, security and
general welfare of the community]; that lots cannot be subdivided and only
used for residential purposes; that single family house be constructed in
single lot; no commercial or advertising signs placed or erected on the lot; no
farm animals allowed, pets allowed; easement of 2 meters within lot; lot not
used for immoral or illegal trade or activity; grass always trimmed;
Restrictions in force for 50 years starting 15 January 1957). MDC constructed
a fence on the commercial block along Jupiter Street in 1966, although it was
not part of the original plan. The fence was partially destroyed in 1970 due to
a typhoon. The fence was subsequently rebuilt by the Ayala. Jupiter Street
was widened in 1972, and the fence had to be destroyed. Upon request of
BAVA, the wall was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block.
Ayala finally decided to subdivide and sell the lots in the commercial block
between Buendia and Jupiter. BAVA requested confirmation of use of the
commercial lots. On 30 June 1972, Ayala likewise informed BAVA that in a
few months it shall subdivided and sell the commercial lots bordering the
north side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo St. up to Zodiac St.
Deed restrictions (building having set back of 19 meters, and matters RE
entrances and exits) are imposed in such commercial lots to harmonize and
blend with the development and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Ayala further
applied for special membership Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) in BAVA of the commercial lot owners, the application
submitted to BAVA’s board of governors for decision. On 25 September 1972,
height limitations for buildings were increased from 12.5 meters to 15
meters and Jupiter street is widened by 3.5 meters. The widening of the
street reduced the association dues to be remitted to BAVA, inasmuch that it
now applies to 76,726 sq.m. rather than 81,590 sq.m. Due rates have
increased from P0.5/sq.m in 1972 to P3/sq.m in 1980. On 4 April 1975,
Makati enacted Ordinance 81, providing for the zonification of Makati, which
classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in
the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street (Chapter 3, Article 1,
Section 3.03, paragraph F). The Buendia Avenue extension area was classified
as Administrative Office Zone with its boundary in the NorthNorth East
Extending also up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Chapter 3, Article 1,
Section 3.05, paragraph C). The Residential Zone and the Administrative
Office Zone have a common boundary along the center line of Jupiter Street.
The zoning was later followed under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
for the National Capital Region adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as
Ordinance 81-01 on 14 March 1981, with modification that Bel-Air Village is
simply bounded in the South-Southeast by Jupiter Street, and the blockdeep
strip along the northwest side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo to
EDSA as High Intensity Commercial Zone. Under the zoning classification,
Jupiter Street is a common boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial
zone. On 17 January 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed BAVA,
in the interest of public welfare and purpose of easing traffic congestion, the
opening of the Amapola (EstrellaMercedes; Palma gate-Villena), Mercedes
(EDSA-Imelda/Amapola junction), Zodiac (Mercedes-Buendia), Jupiter
(Zodiac-Reposo, connecting Metropolitan avenue to Pasong Tamo and V.
Cruz extension), Neptune (Makati ave.-Reposo), Orbit (F.Zobel/ Candelaria
intersection –Jupiter Paseo de Roxas; Mercedes-Buendia) streets of Bel-Air
Village for public use. On 10 February, BAVA replied, expressing concern of
the residents about the opening of the streets to general public and
requesting the indefinite postponement of the plan to open Jupiter St. to
public vehicles. BAVA, however, voluntarily opened the other streets. On 12
August 1977, the municipal officials of Makati allegedly opened, destroyed
and removed the gates constructed at the corner of Reposo St. and Jupiter
St. as well as gates/fences constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue
forcibly; thereby opening Jupiter street to public traffic. Increased traffic was
observed along Jupiter Street after its opening to public use. Purchasers of
the commercial lots started constructing their respective buildings and
demolished the fence or wall within the boundary of their lots. Many owners
constructed their own fences and walls and employed their own security
guards. On 27 January 1978, Ayala donated the entire Jupiter Street from
Metropolitan Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA. With the opening of the
entire Jupiter street to public traffic, the residential lots located in the
northern side of Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential
purposes, and became commercial in character. On 29 October 1979,
spouses Sangalang filed an action for damages against Ayala predicated on
both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict. A supplemental
complaint was later filed by the Sangalangs to augment the reliefs prayed for
in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events which
occurred during the trial of the case. Claiming to be similarly situated,
spouses Gaston, Briones, and BAVA intervened in the case. The CFI Pasig
rendered a decision in favor of the Sangalangs awarding them P500,000 as
actual and consequential damages, P2M as moral damages, P500,000 as
exemplary damages, P100,000 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit. The
intervenors Gaston and Briones were awarded P400,000 as consequential
damages, P500,000 as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages,
P50,000 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit; each. Intervenor BAVA was
awarded the same except for moral damages. The damages awarded bear
legal interest from the filing of the complaint. Ayala was also ordered to
restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at the original position in 1966 at its
own expense within 6 months from finality of judgment. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision for not being supported
by facts and law on the matter; and entered another, dismissing the case for
lack of cause of action; without pronouncement as to costs. Sangalang
appealed. [GR 74376] The Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) filed and action
to enforce the restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by the
Ayala Corporation. BAVA originally brought the complaint in the RTC Makati,
principally for specific performance, BAVA alleging that Rosario de Jesus
Tenorio allowed Cecilia Gonzalvez to occupy and convert the house at 60
Jupiter Street into a restaurant, without its knowledge and consent, and in
violation of the deed restrictions which provide that the lot and building
thereon must be used Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) only for residential purposes upon which the prayed-for main
relief was for Tenorio and Gonzalves to permanently refrain from using the
premises as commercial and to comply with the terms of the Deed
Restrictions. The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural ground,
i.e., pendency of an identical action, Civil Case 32346 (BAVA v. Tenorio). The
Court of Appeals affirmed, and held, in addition, that Jupiter Street "is
classified as High density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance 81-01 for NCR following its own ruling in AC-GR 66649
(BAVA v. Hy-Land Realty & Development Corp.). BAVA appealed. [GR 76394]
Spouses Eduardo Romualdez and Buena Tioseco are the owners of a house
and lot located at 108 Jupiter St (TCT 332394, Registry of Deeds Rizal).At the
time they acquired the subject house and lot, several restrictions were
already annotated on the reverse side of their title. The restriction(s) remain
in force for 50 years from 15 January 1957, unless sooner cancelled in its
entirety by 2/3 vote of the members in good standing of the Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA). However, the Association may from time to time, add
new ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions or parts thereof by
majority rule. During the early part of 1979, BAVA noted that certain
renovations and constructions were being made by the spouses on the
premises. The latter failed to inform BAVA of the activity, even upon request,
that prompted BAVA to send its chief security officer to visit the premises on
23 March 1979 and found out that the spouses were putting up a bake and
coffee shop. The spouses were reminded that they were violating the deed
restriction, but the latter proceeded with the construction of the bake shop.
On 30 April 1979, BAVA wrote the spouses to desist from using the premises
for commercial purposes, with threat of suit. Despite the warning, the
spouses proceeded with the construction of their bake shop. The trial court
adjudged in favor of BAVA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the strength of its holding in AC-GR 66649. BAVA elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari. The Court
initially denied the petition for lack of merit, for which BAVA sought a
reconsideration. Pending resolution, the case was referred to the Second
Division and thereafter, to the Court En Banc en consulta. Per Resolution,
dated 29 April 1988, the case was consolidated with GR 74376 and 82281.
[GR 78182] Dolores Filley leased her building and lot situated at 205 Reposo
Street to the advertising firm J. Romero and Associates, in alleged violation of
deed restrictions which stipulated that Filley's lot could only be used for
residential purposes. The Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) sought judgment
from the lower court ordering the Filley and J.Romero to permanently refrain
from using the premises in question as commercial and to comply with the
terms of the deed restrictions. The trial court granted the relief sought for by
BAVA with the a additional imposition of exemplary damages of P50,000.00
and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. The trial court gave emphasis to the
restrictive clauses contained in Filley's deed of sale from BAVA, which made
the conversion of the building into a commercial one a violation. Appeal was
made claiming that the restrictions in the deed of sale are outmoded. BAVA
on the other hand relied on a rigid interpretation of the contractual
stipulations agreed upon with Filley, in effect arguing that the restrictions are
valid ad infinitum. The Court of Appeals overturned the lower court,
observing that J. Romero & Associates had been given authority to open a
commercial office by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. [GR
82281] Violeta Moncal, owner of a parcel of land with a residential house
constructed thereon situated at 104 Jupiter Street, leased her property to
Majal Development Corporation, without the consent of the Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA). She purchased the lot from Makati Development
Corporation. The lot in question is restricted to be used for residential
purposes only as part of the deed restrictions annotated on its title. It is on
the same side of the street where there are restaurants, clinics, placement or
employment agencies and other commercial or business establishments.
These establishments, however, were sued by BAVA in the proper court. The
trial court dismissed the BAVA's complaint, a dismissal affirmed on appeal.
The appellate court declared that the opening of Jupiter Street to human and
vehicular traffic, and the commercialization of the Municipality of Makati in
general, were circumstances that had made compliance by Moncal with the
aforesaid "deed restrictions" "extremely difficult and unreasonable, a
development that had excused compliance altogether under Article 1267 of
the Civil Code. BAVA appealed. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Short Facts: GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts
to enforce the "deed restrictions" against specific residents of Jupiter Street
and, with respect to GR 78182, Reposo Street. The residents have allegedly
converted their residences into commercial establishments (a restaurant in
GR 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an advertising firm in GR
78182; and a construction company, apparently, in GR 82281) in violation of
the said restrictions. Their mother case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand, a
petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati
Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along
Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its commercial section from the
residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full
"commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it
had authored. The Court of Appeals dismissed all 5 appeals on the basis
primarily of its ruling in AC-GR 66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty
Development Corporation, et al.," in which the appellate court explicitly
rejected claims under the same "deed restrictions" as a result of Ordinance
81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of
Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise
held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police
power. Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantee on non-impairment of
contracts can be raised as a deterrent to the exercise of police power. Held:
All contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of
the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of
police power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the
"law between the contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot contravene
"law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." Above all, it
cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to
promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably
described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in
a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it
is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to property, should be
made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. Herein, the
MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the
ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is
based on compelling interests of general welfare. The restrictive easements
are similar to any other contract, and should not deter the valid exercise of
police power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a “high density
commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus
have no cause of action on the strength alone of said “deed restrictions.”
116 Ortigas v. Court of Appeals [GR 126102, 4 December 2000] Second
Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur Facts: On 25 August 1976, Ortigas &
Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land located in Greenhills
Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila (TCT 0737) with conditions duly
annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia. In 1981, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted MMC Ordinance 81-
01 (Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region), which
reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison
to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On 8
June 1984, Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P.
Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the
lease. Thereupon, Mathay constructed a single story commercial building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. On 18 Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) January 1995, Ortigas filed a complaint
against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC Pasig (Branch 261, Civil Case 64931),
seeking the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated
the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. The complaint was later
amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.,
which have 10% interest in the lot. In his answer, Mathay III denied any
knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim
against the Hermosos. On 16 June 1995, the trial court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. On 29 June 1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the
injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion. Mathay III then filed
with the CA a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP 39193), ascribing to
the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance 81-01 classified the area where
the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into
the 25 August 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power.
Ortigas & Company averred that restrictions duly annotated on the title must
prevail over the ordinance. On 25 March 1996, the appellate court granted
the petition, nullified and set aside the assailed orders. The appellate court
held that the MMC Ordinance effectively nullified the restrictions allowing
only residential use of the property in question. Ortigas seasonably moved
for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it on 13 August 1996.
Ortigas filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether ordinances, in exercise of
police power, be given retroactive effect and impair vested rights and
contracts. Held: In general, laws are to be construed as having only
prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws
existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and
not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the
contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. One exception
involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to
regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive
effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those
already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses
will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of
valid police power must be read into every contract. MMC Ordinance 81-01 is
a legitimate police power measure as previously held in Sangalang vs. IAC.
Thus, following the ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title
must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch was reclassified, the
restrictions in the contract of sale were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be
enforced. While Philippine legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so
that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless,
stipulations in a contract cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy." Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed
null and void.
117 Abella v. NLRC [GR 71813, 20 July 1987] En Banc, Paras (J): 13 concur
Facts: On 27 June 1960, Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in
Ponteverde, Negros Occidental (Hacienda Danao-Ramona) for a period of 10
years, renewable, at her option, for another 10 years. On 13 August 1970,
she opted to extend the lease contract for another 10 years. During the
existence of the lease, she employed Ricardo Dionele Sr., a regular farm
worker since 1949 and promoted to Cabo in 1963, and Romeo Quitco, a
regular employee since 1968 and promoted to Cabo in November of same
year. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, Abella dismissed Dionele
and Quitco and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof on 5 October
1981, who continued the management, cultivation and operation of the
farm. On 20 November 1981, Dionele and Quitco filed a complaint against
the Abella at the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District
Office, for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) backwages. After
the parties had presented their respective evidence, Labor Arbiter Lucas, in a
Decision dated 16 July 1982, ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the
cessation of business, but granted the two, separation pay, applying Article
284 of the Labor Code. On appeal on 11 August 1982, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), in a Resolution dated 8 April 1985, affirmed
the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. On 22 May 1985,
Abella filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a
resolution dated 10 June 1985. Abella filed the petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Article 284 of the Labor
Code, providing for the rights of the employees under the circumstances of
termination, violate the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
obligations and contracts. Held: Article 284 of the Labor Code, which
provides for the rights of the employees under the circumstances of
termination, did not violate the constitutional guarantee against impairment
of obligations and contracts. The prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general,
affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The
prohibition is not to read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula
for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws
read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference
to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be
understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power.
Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple
device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which
otherwise may be prohibited. In order to determine whether legislation
unconstitutionally impairs contract of obligations, no unchanging yardstick,
applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of
each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every
case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing
the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted
must be legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the state
construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power.
Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with reference to non-parties.
118 Tiro v. Hontanosas [GR L-32312, 25 November 1983] Second Division,
Abad Santos (J): 5 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Zafra Financing Enterprise
extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers
concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in
favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office
in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools. Aurelio Tiro, Superintendent of
Schools in Cebu City, forbade the collection of checks by persons other than
the employees concerned with Circular 21 (series of 1969, Memorandum
Order 93 of the Executive Office dated 5 February 1968 was quoted) dated 5
December 1969. Zafra sued Tiro with the now defunct Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu (Civil Case 11616). Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the
special powers of attorney, to declare Circular 21 to be illegal, and to make
Tiro pay attorney’s fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer but
the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good
faith in implementing Circular 21. Tiro seeks in the petition for review before
the Supreme Court a reversal of the trial court’s decision. Issue: Whether
Circular 21 impairs the obligations of contracts between Zafra Financing
Enterprise and the teachers. Held: The salary check of a government officer
or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically
delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government.
Accordingly, before Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over
it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. The Circular,
further, is authorized by relevant statutes such as the Revised Administrative
Code (Section 79b, Power to regulate) and the Magna Carta for Teachers (RA
4670, Section 21, Deductive prohibited). The Circular does not impair the
obligation of contracts with the teachers as the Circular does not prevent
Zafra from collecting the loans but merely makes the Government a non-
participant in their collection.
119 Caleon v. Agus Development Corp. [GR 77365, 7 April 1992] Third
Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Agus Development Corporation
(ADC) is the owner of a parcel of land located at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila,
which it leased to Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. ADC
constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the
consent of ADC, Caleon sub-leased 2 of the 4 doors of the apartment to
Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00
each. Upon learning of the sublease, ADC through counsel demanded in
writing that Caleon vacate the leased premises. For Caleon’s failure to
comply with the demand, ADC filed a complaint for ejectment with
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 12), citing the provisions of
Batas Pambansa 25, Section 5, as ground, which is the unauthorized sub-
leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the
consent of the lessor within the required 60-day period from the
promulgation of the new law (BP 25). After trial, the court a quo rendered its
decision ordering Caleon and all persons claiming possession under her (a) to
vacate the premises alluded to in the complaint; (b) to remove whatever
improvement she introduced on the property; (c) to pay ADC the amount of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (d) to pay the costs. Caleon appealed the
decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and on 24 November 1980, the RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The RTC decision was appealed to
the Court of Appeals for review. The appellate court, on 28 January 1987,
dismissed the petition outright for not being prima facie meritorious. Caleon
filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether legislation, appropriate to safeguard vital interests of the people,
may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. Held: The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and
subject to the exercise of police power of the State in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest
may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. Every contract affecting
public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Batas Pambansa 25,
"An Act Regulating Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's
Dwelling is Located and For Other Purposes" shows that the subject matter is
the regulation of rentals and is intended only for dwelling units with specified
monthly rentals constructed before the law became effective. BP 25 is
derived from PD 20 which has been declared by the Court as a police power
legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to 14 July 1971 (effectivity
date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot
be denied.
120 Meralco v. Laguna [GR 131359, 5 May 1999] Third Division, Vitug (J): 4
concur Facts: On various dates, certain municipalities of the Province of
Laguna, including, Biñan, Sta. Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana, Calauan and
Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued resolutions through
their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of the Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) for Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) the supply of electric light, heat and power within their
concerned areas. On 19 January 1983, Meralco was likewise granted a
franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric
light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna. On 12
September 1991, Republic Act 7160 (1991 Local Government Code [LGC])
was enacted to take effect on 1 January 1992 enjoining local government
units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and
charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code,
Laguna enacted Provincial Ordinance 01-92, effective 1 January 1993, which
provided a Franchise Tax (Section 2.09). On the basis of the ordinance,
Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to Meralco for the corresponding
tax payment. Meralco paid the tax under protest. A formal claim for refund
was thereafter sent by Meralco to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming
that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National
Government pursuant to PD 551 (Section 1) already included the franchise
tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. On 28 August 1995, the claim
for refund of Meralco was denied in a letter signed by Governor Lina. In
denying the claim, the province relied on a more recent law, RA 7160 (1991
LGC), than the old decree invoked by Meralco (PD 551). On 14 February
1996, Meralco filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a
complaint for refund, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO, against the Province of Laguna and Balazo in his
capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. The trial court, in its assailed
decision of 30 September 1997, dismissed the complaint and declared the
ordinance valid, binding, reasonable, and enforceable. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the withdrawal of tax exemption to Meralco by the local
government unit (province) violates the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Held: The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated
and adopted, by and large, the provisions of the now repealed Local Tax
Code (PD 231 pursuant to Section 2, Article XI, 1973 Constitution; in effect
since 1 July 1973). The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial
governments, notwithstanding "any exemption granted by any law or other
special law to impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise (Section 137).
Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of
vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government
Code has effectively withdrawn tax exemptions or incentives theretofore
enjoyed by certain entities (Section 193). While tax exemptions contained in
special franchises are in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement
for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless are far from
being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real
sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in
contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures,
lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government,
acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be
revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax
exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted
under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond
the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article
XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that
such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress as and when the common good so requires. Indeed, Article XII,
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution is explicit that no franchise for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that
such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress as and when the common good so requires.
121 Alvero vs. Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946] En Banc, de Joya (J): 4 concur, 4
acting justices concur Facts: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila
was raging, soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by men of
Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having been
suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain
papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or about 4 October 1945, Alvero
was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's Court; after which,
on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers
allegedly seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail,
at the hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition
was denied. At the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again
presented said papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its
evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26 February 1946, the judges
issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and
admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the
prosecution. On the same date that said order was issued, denying the
petition for the return of said documents, Alvero asked for the
reconsideration of said order, which was also denied. Alvero filed a petition
for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the
documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be
used as evidence against the latter. Held: The right of officers and men of the
United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military
operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II,
Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers
in the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated
29 December 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in
Chief of the United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain
citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from
any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold
them in restraint for the duration of the war. The purpose of the
constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions
of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. But it does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage
of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state
law. Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized
certain papers and documents from the residence of Alvero, were not acting
as agents or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the possession
of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of
the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said
papers and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the
trial of his case for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally
attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures,
or on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States in similar cases. (See Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465;
Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
122 People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Third Division, Bidin
(J): 3 concur Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not
inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom
and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of
Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding
dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI
agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as
the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of
Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting
Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article
11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed. Issue: Whether an act of
a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State. Held: In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the
request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
123 Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971] En Banc,
Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1
concurs, 1 concurs in result Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the
following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
Vera's letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but
still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon;
a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so,
by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the
Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned
him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for
search warrant and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then
signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR
agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the
offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's
lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3
March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed,
dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of
injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and
that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and
Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's fees. After hearing
and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the
total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus. Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to
contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office. Held: The
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In
Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the
Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object
against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold
therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively
to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the
present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various
corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched
and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired,
is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the
search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his
witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the
answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not
there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The
participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness.
This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued
for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of
Section 46(a), Section 72 and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of
business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure
to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually
removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6
provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are
under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does
not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination
of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to
include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could
possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null
and void.
124 Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc, Concepcion
(CJ): 6 concur Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government,
Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr.
and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court
of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge
Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and
Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different
dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P.
Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search
warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the
Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from
the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in
the residences of Stonehill, et. al. Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail
the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents,
papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides
their residences. Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants
are in the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The
warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
— that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However,
the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized
in the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) residences
of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause
of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents, papers and
things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the
prosecutors from using them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the
Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and
other premises.
125 Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978] White (J): 3 concur,
1 filed a separate concurring opinion, 2 filed separate dissenting opinions, to
which 1 joined, 1 took no part. Facts: On 9 April 1971, officers of the Palo Alto
Police Department and of the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department
responded to a call from the director of the Stanford University Hospital
requesting the removal of a large group of demonstrators who had seized the
hospital's administrative offices and occupied them since the previous
afternoon. After several futile efforts to persuade the demonstrators to leave
peacefully, more drastic measures were employed. The police chose to force
their way in at the west end of the corridor. As they did so, a group of
demonstrators emerged through the doors at the east end and, armed with
sticks and clubs, attacked the group of nine police officers stationed there. All
nine were injured. The officers themselves were able to identify only two of
their assailants, but one of them did see at least one person photographing
the assault at the east doors. On April 11 (Sunday), a special edition of the
Stanford Daily (Daily), a student newspaper published at Stanford University,
carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protest and the
violent clash between demonstrators and police. The photographs carried
the byline of a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been at the east
end of the hospital hallway where he could have photographed the assault
on the 9 officers. The next day, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's
Office secured a warrant from the Municipal Court for an immediate search
of the Daily's offices for negatives, film, and pictures showing the events and
occurrences at the hospital on the evening of April 9. The warrant issued on a
finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for believing that: Negatives
and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to the identity of
the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault
with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the premises of the Daily]." The
warrant affidavit contained no allegation or indication that members of the
Daily staff were in any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital. The
search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that day by 4 police
officers and took place in the presence of some members of the Daily staff.
The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper
baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms were not opened. The
search revealed only the photographs that had already been published on
April 11, and no materials were removed from the Daily's office. A month
later the Daily and various members of its staff brought a civil action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the police officers who
conducted the search, the chief of police, the district attorney and one of his
deputies, and the judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged
that the search of the Daily's office had deprived respondents under color of
state law of rights secured to them by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The District Court denied the
request for an injunction but, on the newspaper staff's motion for summary
judgment, granted declaratory relief. The court did not question the
existence of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and
to believe that relevant evidence would be found on the Daily's premises. It
held, however, that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the
issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of one not
suspected of crime unless there is probable cause to believe, based on facts
presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum would be
impracticable. The District Court further held that where the innocent object
of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved
and that such a search is constitutionally permissible "only in the rare
circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will
be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order
would be futile." Since these preconditions to a valid warrant had not been
satisfied, the search of the Daily's offices was declared to have been illegal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the
District Court. Zurcher, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the
Fourth Amendment is to be construed and applied to the "third party"
search, the recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause
to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located
on identified property but do not then have probable cause to believe that
the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that
has occurred or is occurring. Held: First, a State is not prevented by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a warrant to search for
evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched
is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement. The critical element in a
reasonable search is not that the property owner is suspected of crime but
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the "things" to be searched for
and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. Second, the
District Court's new rule denying search warrants against third parties and
insisting on subpoenas would undermine law enforcement efforts since
search warrants are often used early in an investigation before all the
perpetrators of a crime have been identified; and the seemingly blameless
third party may be implicated. The delay in employing a subpoena duces
tecum could easily result in disappearance of the evidence. Nor would the
cause of privacy be served since search warrants are more difficult to obtain
than subpoenas. Lastly, properly administered, the preconditions for a search
warrant (probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness), which must be
applied with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be
endangered by the search, are adequate safeguards against the interference
with the press' ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate news that
respondents claim would ensue from use of warrants for third-party searches
of newspaper offices.
126 Wilson vs. Layne [526 US 603, 24 May 1999] Rehnquist (CJ): Facts: In
early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved "Operation
Gunsmoke," a special national fugitive apprehension program in which
United States Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend
dangerous criminals. This effective program ultimately resulted in over 3,000
arrests in 40 metropolitan areas. One of the dangerous fugitives identified as
a target of "Operation Gunsmoke" was Dominic Wilson, the son of Charles
and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic Wilson had violated his probation on previous
felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with intent to rob, and the
police computer listed "caution indicators" that he was likely to be armed, to
resist arrest, and to "assault police." The computer also listed his address as
909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville, Maryland. Unknown to the
police, this was actually the home of Dominic Wilson's parents. Thus, in April
1992, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants
for Dominic Wilson, one for each of his probation violations. The
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) warrants were
each addressed to "any duly authorized peace officer," and commanded such
officers to arrest him and bring him "immediately" before the Circuit Court to
answer an indictment as to his probation violation. The warrants made no
mention of media presence or assistance. In the early morning hours of 16
April 1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States Marshals and
Montgomery County Police officers assembled to execute the Dominic
Wilson warrants. The team was accompanied by a reporter and a
photographer from the Washington Post, who had been invited by the
Marshals to accompany them on their mission as part of a Marshal's Service
ride-along policy. At 6:45 a.m., the officers, with media representatives in
tow, entered the dwelling at 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in the Lincoln
Park neighborhood of Rockville. Charles and Geraldine Wilson were still in
bed when they heard the officers enter the home. Charles Wilson, dressed
only in a pair of briefs, ran into the living room to investigate. Discovering at
least 5 men in street clothes with guns in his living room, he angrily
demanded that they state their business, and repeatedly cursed the officers.
Believing him to be an angry Dominic Wilson, the officers quickly subdued
him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson next entered the living room to
investigate, wearing only a nightgown. She observed her husband being
restrained by the armed officers. When their protective sweep was
completed, the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not in the house,
and they departed. During the time that the officers were in the home, the
Washington Post photographer took numerous pictures. The print reporter
was also apparently in the living room observing the confrontation between
the police and Charles Wilson. At no time, however, were the reporters
involved in the execution of the arrest warrant. Charles and Geraldine Wilson
sued the law enforcement officials in their personal capacities for money
damages, and contended that the officers' actions in bringing members of
the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied
the police officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. On interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a divided panel
reversed and held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The
case was twice reheard en banc, where a divided Court of Appeals again
upheld the defense of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether the actions of the police violated the Fourth Amendment. It
concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time of the search)
that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the
Fourth Amendment, the right allegedly violated by petitioners was not
"clearly established" and thus qualified immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d
111 (CA4 1998). Five judges dissented, arguing that the officers' actions did
violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the clearly established protections
of the Fourth Amendment were violated. Issue: Whether the police officers
were justified to bring along the Washington Post reporters in the execution
of the warrant inside the house of Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Held: No.
Although the officers undoubtedly were entitled to enter the Wilson home in
order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson, they were not
entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a photographer with them. While
it does not mean that every police action while inside a home must be
explicitly authorized by the text of the warrant (Fourth Amendment allows
temporary detainer of homeowner while police search the home pursuant to
warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that police actions in
execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion (The purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible
extent of the search). Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home
was not related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Inasmuch as
that the reporters did not engage in the execution of the warrant and did not
assist the police in their task, the reporters were not present for any reason
related to the justification for police entry into the home--the apprehension
of Dominic Wilson. This is not a case in which the presence of the third
parties directly aided in the execution of the warrant. Where the police enter
a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property, the
presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property
has long been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition. The
claim of the officers, that the presence of the Washington Post reporters in
the Wilsons' home nonetheless served a number of legitimate law
enforcement purposes ignores, the importance of the right of residential
privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment. It may well be that media ride-
alongs further the law enforcement objectives of the police in a general
sense, but that is not the same as furthering the purposes of Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the search. Were such
generalized "law enforcement objectives" themselves sufficient to trump the
Fourth Amendment, the protections guaranteed by that Amendment's text
would be significantly watered down. Although it may be claimed the
presence of third parties could serve in some situations to minimize police
abuses and protect suspects, and also to protect the safety of the officers,
such a situation is significantly different from the media presence in this case,
where the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons' home were working on
a story for their own purposes. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced
by the officers fall short of justifying the presence of media inside a home.
Thus, it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members
of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a
warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of
the execution of the warrant.
127 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984] En Banc,
Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge
Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued
2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants,
and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case
Q022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos). Issue: Whether
allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants. Held: Section 3 provides that no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that "no warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended" is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. 128
Chandler vs. Miler [520 US 305, 15 April 1997] Ginsburg (J): 6 concur, 1 filed
separate dissenting opinion. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Facts: The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler
for the office of Lieutenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of
Commissioner of Agriculture, and James D. Walker for the office of member
of the General Assembly. In May 1994, about one month before the deadline
for submission of the certificates required by §21-2-140, Chandler, Harris,
and Walker filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests required by
§21-2-140 violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, naming Governor Zell D.
Miller and two other state officials involved in the administration of §21-2-
140, as defendants. Chandler, et .al. requested declaratory and injunctive
relief barring enforcement of the statute. In June 1994, the District Court
denied Chandlers' motion for a preliminary injunction. The provision in the
statute of the State of Georgia required candidates for designated state
offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result was
negative. Chandler, et. al. apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained
the certificates required by §21-2-140, and appeared on the ballot. After the
1994 election, the parties jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on
stipulated facts. In January 1995, the District Court entered final judgment
for Miller, et. al. A divided Eleventh Circuit panel, relying on the US Court's
precedents sustaining drug testing programs for student athletes, customs
employees, and railway employees, the United States affirmed and judged
the Georgia's law to be constitutional. Issue: Whether the suspicionless
searches, required in Georgia’s drug testing for candidates for public offices,
is reasonable. Held: Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by law and
enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. (Collection and testing of urine to meet
Georgia's certification statute "constitutes a search subject to the demands
of the Fourth Amendment"). As explained in Skinner, government ordered
"collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that
society has long recognized as reasonable." (Skinner and Von Raab, 489 U.S.,
at 617). To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily
must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But particularized
exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." When such "special
needs"--concerns other than crime detection--are alleged in justification of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context specific
inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests
advanced by the parties. In limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. Our precedents establish
that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial--
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion. Miller, et. al.'s defense of the statute rests primarily
on the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding high state office; but
notably lacking therein is any indication of a concrete danger demanding
departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule, and nothing in the
record hints that the hazards Miller, et. al., broadly describe (i.e. the use of
illegal drugs draws into question an official's judgment and integrity;
jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law
enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected
officials) are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity. Further,
Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to identify candidates
who violate antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible means to deter illicit
drug users from seeking election to state office. What is left, after close
review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By
requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia
displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The need
revealed, in short, is symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning
from our case law. Thus, however well meant, the candidate drug test
Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. The
Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action. In fine, where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable." But where, as herein, public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
129 People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] En Banc, Davide Jr.
(CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling
of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline
with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29
March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay
Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao
beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a
lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored
strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and
Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms,
became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke
into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in
English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to
open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign
language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag
yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the
man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm
around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man
of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a
counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to find
a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the
meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing
yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally
arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights."
When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his
obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San
printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for
laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the
Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination
of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that
her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets,
weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037).
However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently
amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his
arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him
by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct
request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its
failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua
provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they
decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the
police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair;
that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the
speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected
opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February
1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua
prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the
Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal
entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to
flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which
Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause." Held: No. Enshrined in
the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It
explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary
or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is
the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does
not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests,
to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that
Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never
took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu
when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports
of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's
watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag
or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that
a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him
as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not
incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless
arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same
being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.
130 People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001] En Banc, Ynares-
Santiago (J): 14 concur Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed
at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he
came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of
July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle
passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y
Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@
"Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August
1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time
that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at
the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the
team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to
pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of
SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that
instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina
were accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that
point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and
asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle
this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by
the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina,
through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied.
The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision,
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. Issue: Whether
Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures
be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of
a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined
under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The foregoing
constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental
to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to
an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, they could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or
have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the
bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause
to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and
addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon
only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity
on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the
arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against them. 131 Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon
[GR 144309, 23 November 2001] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur Facts: Both Sanly and
Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi products. Solid Triangle acquires its
goods from Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with Mitsubishi
Corporation. While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming it is a
parallel importer (one which imports, distributes, and sells genuine products
in the market, independently of an exclusive distributorship or agency
agreement with the manufacturer), not an unfair competitor. On 28 January
1999, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93,
Quezon City, upon application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), issued Search Warrant 3324 (99) against Sanly Corporation
(Sanly), for violation of Section 168 of RA 8293 (unfair competition). By virtue
of Search Warrant, EIIB agents seized 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic
color paper from Sanly. Forthwith, Solid Triangle, through Robert Sitchon, its
Marketing and Communication Manager, filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for unfair competition against
the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT Co., Inc. (LWT) [IS 1-99-2870],
alleging that ERA Radio and Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated by
LWT, is in conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi
brand photo paper to the damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle, which
claims to be the sole and exclusive distributor thereof, pursuant to an
agreement with the Mitsubishi Corporation. On 4 February 1999, Solid
Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas' sala an urgent ex parte motion for the
transfer of custody of the seized Mitsubishi photo color paper stored in the
office of EIIB. On 8 February 1999, Sanly, LWT and ERA moved to quash the
search warrant which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an order dated 5
March 1999. Sanly, LWT and ERA filed a motion for reconsideration which
was granted by Judge Bruselas on 18 March 1999, where the latter hekd that
there is doubt whether the act complained of (unfair competition) is criminal
in nature. Solid Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
the quashal of the search warrant is not proper considering the pendency of
the preliminary investigation in IS 1- 99-2870 for unfair competition wherein
the seized items will be used as evidence. On 26 March 1999, Judge Bruselas
issued an order denying Solid Triangle's motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on 29 March 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the
same Court, presided by Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo (Civil Case Q-99-
37206) for damages and injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary
injunction and attachment against Sanly, LWT and ERA. On 31 March 1999,
Judge Genilo denied Solid Triangle's application for a preliminary attachment
on the ground that the application is not supported with an affidavit by the
applicant, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts.
Meanwhile, on 20 April 1999, Judge Bruselas issued an order, directing the
(1) EIIB, Sitchon and Solid Triangle to divulge and report to the court the
exact location of the warehouse where the goods subject of the proceeding
were kept within 72 hours from receipt thereof; (2) Sitchon and Solid Triangle
to appear and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court
for failure to obey a lawful order of the court at a hearing for the purpose on
12 May 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (3) the Deputy Sheriff of the Court to take custody
of the seized goods and cause their delivery to the person from whom the
goods were seized without further loss of time. Solid Triangle filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on 26 April 1999, and the latter
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Bruselas from
implementing the Order dated 20 April 1999. On 6 July 1999, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment initially granting certiorari, and held that the
quashing of the warrant deprived the prosecution of vital evidence to
determine probable cause. Upon motion by Sanly, etc., however, the Court of
Appeals reversed itself. In its "Amendatory Decision," the appellate court
held that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant, and accordingly, held that the evidence obtained by virtue of said
warrant was inadmissible in the preliminary investigation. Hence, the petition
by Solid Triangle. Issue: Whether the court that issued the warrant may
resolve the motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is
ongoing. Held: The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant
before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an
authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each
other. One is not bound by the other's finding as regards the existence of a
crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The first is to
determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the second, whether an
information should be filed in court. Section 14, Rule 126, expressly provides
that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence
obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the
action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued
the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or
suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another
court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is
therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot
entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is
ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose
property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy
while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary
investigation. Nevertheless, the evidence presented before the trial court
does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual
Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that
of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi
photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong.
Assuming that the acts of Sanly, etc. to make "it appear that they were duly
authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines"
constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation. The
court, thus, ordered Solid Triangle and EIIB to return to Sanly Corporation the
451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search
Warrant 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93.
132 People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001] Second Division,
Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied
for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to
search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the
shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application
was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s
door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police
operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory
examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.
Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA)
6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357
and Q95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing,
the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-
95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA
6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on
the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from
his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the
warrant. Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure of “drug Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may
be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.” Held: The
warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there
was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure
of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was
properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police
failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it
was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as
to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only. 133 Amarga vs. Abbas [GR L-8666, 28
March 1956] Second Division, Paras (CJ): 6 concur Facts: Natalio P. Amarga,
the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, filed in the Court of First Instance of Sulu an
information for murder (criminal case 1131, People of the Philippines vs.
Madpirol, Awadi, Rajah, Sali, Insa and Maharajah Bapayani). At the foot of
the information, Amarga certified under oath that "he has conducted the
necessary preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act 732." As the only supporting affidavit was that of Iman Hadji Rohmund
Jubair, to the effect that the latter "was told that the deceased was shot and
killed by three persons named: Hajirul Appang, Rajah Appang and Awadi
Bagali," and Amarga had failed or refused to present other evidence
sufficient to make out a prima facie case, Judge Macapanton Abbas (CFI of
Sulu) issued an order, dismissing the case without prejudice to reinstatement
should the provincial fiscal support his information with record of his
investigation which in the opinion of the court may support a prima facie
case. Amarga instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by
Amarga dispenses with the judge’s duty to determine probable cause exists
before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest. Held: Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that "no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce." The question whether "probable cause" exists or not must
depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing
the warrant. If he is satisfied that "probable cause" exists from the facts
stated in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting
attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for
arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may
deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of
arrest is prima facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed
"probable cause" for believing that the person against whom the warrant is
issued is guilty of the crime charged. The preliminary investigation conducted
by Amarga under Republic Act 732 which formed the basis for the filing in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu of criminal case 1131 does not dispense with
the judge's duty to exercise his judicial power of determining, before issuing
the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists
therefor. The Constitution vests such power in the judge who, however, may
rely on the facts stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation
by the prosecuting attorney. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) 134 Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723, 31 August 1987] En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1
took no part Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a
complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the
installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The
case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary
investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution
dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted
Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie case
which resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in
a resolution dated 14 October 1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Norte an Information
dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), charging Garrido aand Alapan
with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 October 1974, Garrido
and Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974 and 14 October
1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the
Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against
Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review."
On 6 March 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records,
reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal
case. The Company sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary
of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A
motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed by the Provincial
Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima
facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and set the case for trial on 25
February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's
ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said
purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal
Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines
Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order
dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala manifested that he would not
prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for mandamus before the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if
the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he
simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to
prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the
criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what
he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the
presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to
his direction and control. Where there is no other prosecutor available, he
should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of
his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the
evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice
had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to
move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant
to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal
of the fiscal to prosecute the case. Once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation. 135 People vs. Inting [GR 88919, 25 July 1990] En Banc,
Gutierrez Jr. (J): 14 concur Facts: On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed
a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly
transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the
Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior
permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. Acting on the
complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election
Supervision of Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to
handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case
and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a
prima facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he filed with the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 38. Dumaguete City) a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Paragraph (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In
an Order dated 30 September 1988, the court issued a warrant of arrest
against the OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at P5,000.00 as recommended by
the Provincial Election Supervisor. However, in an order dated 3 October
1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its 30
September 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information
filed in this case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal
after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and
control of the latter." In another order dated 22 November 1988, the court
gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days from receipt to file another information charging
the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Atty.
Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated 8
December 1988, the trial court quashed the information. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal is necessary before the information filed by
the Provincial Election Supervisor may be given due course by the trial court.
Held: As to the constitutional mandate that "xx no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge xx," (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) the determination of
probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and
the Judge alone makes this determination. On the other hand, the
preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely
assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not
have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. Thus, Judges and
Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in
the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether
or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not be should be subjected to
the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the
Prosecutor. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it
is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of
the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The
second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) The 1987
Constitution (Article IX C, Section 2) mandates the COMELEC not only to
investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This
means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping
the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court.
This power is exclusive with COMELEC. It is only after a preliminary
examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies
that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so,
because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the
information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or
not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The trial
court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the
information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted. 136
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991] En Banc, Regalado (J): 14
concur Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however,
transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only
Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has
not been apprehended since then. In an amended information filed on 6
October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong
Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among
others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to
Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order dated
9 January 1989, denied the omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor
"to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to
grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in
support of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation,
through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the
commission of the crime charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution
dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice
to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed the
amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead
Paderanga as one of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for
reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet
completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived
of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional
evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime
charged. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his order dated 29
January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted
a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and then a Supplemental
Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,
attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to
be a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990 wherein he implicated
Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the said
petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and prohibition
before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence,
or probable cause, or sufficient justification to hold Paderangato a tedious
and prolonged public trial. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required
in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof,
and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is that an
injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of
Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a)
To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b)
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question
which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present
case, however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the
aforesaid exceptions. 137 Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October
1989] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 on leave Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special
Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP
of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to
be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials
in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was
"Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7
December 1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila,
seeking to enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from
confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and
burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's
pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5 January 1984, Pita
filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or
their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine
before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or
not." The restraining order lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent
motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed by
Bagatsing on the ground that issuance of a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) second restraining order would violate the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 11 January 1983, providing for the
Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa 129, which
provides that a temporary restraining order shall be effective only for 20 days
from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the trial court issued an Order
setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984 "for the parties to adduce
evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy
Magazine' alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants,
are obscence per se or not." On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated
the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate
Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not
without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have
laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications;
and that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes
certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or
search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable
structure. Pita filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result
of an anti-smut campaign. Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing
and Cabrera have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been
sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The fact that the
former Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize
property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are,
arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in
carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances, from the
commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly,
the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for implementation. It is basic
that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The Court
finds greater reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the present case involves
an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a
political case, because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene."
Although the Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, the search must
have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account
of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges
being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the
Revised Penal Code. There is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be
"punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could have validly ordered the
raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to
make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. Thus, the court
mae a resume, to wit: (1) The authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
(2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge
must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question
is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
(4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the
search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is then brought in the court
under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject
to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties
seized are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however, that "these do not
foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes,
or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the
Revised Penal code." 138 Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000]
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 24 June 1994, a
complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before the Criminal Investigation
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Service
Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula
and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in connection with the death of a
certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other
persons the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on
this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in
a Resolution dated 22 August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against
the Abdulas and 5 other respondents on a finding that there was no prima
facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however,
recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the
respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an
information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the
sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the
Judge ordered that the case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the
Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, the judge noted
that although there were 8 respondents in the murder case, the information
filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8 respondents in the name of
Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor
arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court
cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of
the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw
for further investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the
initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses
were submitted to support the charge of murder against the Abdulas and the
other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw
treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant to law,
issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On 6 December 1994,
the Abdulas submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After
evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28
December 1994, found a prima facie case for murder against the Abdulas and
3 other respondents. He thus recommended the filing of charges against the
Abdulas, as principals by inducement, and against the 3 others, as principals
by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution,
Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary
investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he was
inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor
to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that
the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-
law of his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28
December 1994 was filed against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco
Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani. This information was signed by
investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on
the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason
for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest
of the Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the
Abdulas filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting
aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the Abdulas
argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in
abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that
the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the Department of
Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the Department of
Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did not act upon the
Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas
filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in
determining probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant. Held:
The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
"personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of
the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than
that imposed under previous Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he
issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a
preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found
to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is
an admission that the Judge relied solely and completely on the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) certification
made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the
information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of
the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly,
the judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of
the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty
under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should
be declared null and void. 139 Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20
June 1938] First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur Facts: On 10 November 1934,
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any
officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda.
de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search
warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has
and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that
Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers
relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in
such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by
a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de
Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's
bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who
was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two
packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and
documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to
Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length
of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the
provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de
Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of
the documents seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the
legality of the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in
the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de
garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was
illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration
was presented but was denied by order of 3 January 1938. Pasion de Garcia
registered her exception. Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of
witnesses renders the warrant void. Held: Freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to
be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as
the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search
warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the
same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause
was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did
not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and
his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized
were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.
Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by him in
building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the
warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the
averment that the warrant was issued Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and
her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not
constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley
observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law. Thus, 140 Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: In response to a sworn
application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated
5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking
the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-
Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant commanding any
peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by
Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of
said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts
and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with
their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of
law, or such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the
aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30 a. m.,
search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal
revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain
receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and
collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory
receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers
and articles seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected,
Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay
together. With a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed
to retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to
section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the date of 11
March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying
that the search warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared
illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered returned to
Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A
similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27
October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information dated
30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros, charging Yee
Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a
violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy
and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939.
The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant
issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure
accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three
days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada
which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and
because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory
provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and
of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid
articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as
evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because
the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify
against themselves. Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is
supported by the personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant,
for the judge to determine probable cause in issuing the warrant. Held: Strict
observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of
the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed. The
applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his
own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending
money without Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and
concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes,
and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony
before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing &
Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of
interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had secured
loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest;
that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of
accounts and records containing its transactions relative its activities as
money lender and the entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he
saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and records of their debts and the
interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore
that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for,
thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to
be not as their were stated under oath. That the existence of probable cause
had been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the
search warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the
warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the complainant,
Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Department of
Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he
presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to
believe as it does believe, that the above described articles, relating to the
activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of interest,
are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises occupied
by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law." 141 Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937] First Division, Imperial (J): 4
concur Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit
alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts
but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time
of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the
law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and
took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the
years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4
notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4
stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of
lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2
packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14
bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts
with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The
search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of
Alvarez who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not
been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant,
Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the
agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and
giving him a period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez,
representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of
the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 8th of said
month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of 30 days for the necessary investigation. On June
25, the court issued an order requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file the
search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings
taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition
alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet
been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection
therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be
issued directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent
who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges
be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, the court
issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and,
consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not
commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any,
within the unextendible period of 2 days from the date of notice of said
order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should not be
returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the
Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein,
that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an
investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On
October 10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed
60 days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are designated
on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-
43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order
of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said
19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the
order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him. Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by
the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent
Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the
facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that
he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person
whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not supported by
other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. Held: Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General
Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the
search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach
the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not
require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity
to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) was not personal but merely hearsay, it is
the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the
issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is
necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts. 142 Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984] Second Division, de
Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part Facts: Soriano Mata
was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306,
the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao
tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." Mata claimed
that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to
inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is
with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and
annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court
has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo
U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification
to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is
of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. Mata's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the
Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that
the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to
comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and
that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter. Issue: Whether the
judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before
issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later
that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. 143 Olaez vs. People of the
Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November 1987] Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts:
Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were charged for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, challenging the admission by Judge Alicia L. Santos (in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 73) of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant
and of an extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them
the right to assistance of counsel; and thus seek to restrain further
proceedings in the criminal case against them and ask that they be acquitted
with the setting aside of the questioned orders (the facts do not provide the
disposition of the said orders). Olaes and Cruz claim that the search warrant
issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the
specific offense they are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the
issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights. Issue:
Whether the lack of specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act renders the
caption vague, and negate the claim that the specific offense was committed
to serve as basis for the finding of probable cause. Held: No. The search
warrant issued does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine.
While in the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in general,
without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged
to have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such
codifications, there is no similar ambiguity herein. While it is true that the
caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that
Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject
of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.
The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized." 144 Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14
December 1989] En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur Facts: On 31 October 1987,
P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division
(ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by Judge Abelardo Dayrit,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application for the issuance
of a search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for violation of Presidential
Decree 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Nemesio E. Prudente." On the same day, the Judge issued the
Search Warrant, commanding Dimagmaliw "to make an immediate search at
any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
(b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and
other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of
the following personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites with
ammunition; (b) .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and
hand grenades; and (d) assorted weapons with ammunitions." On 1
November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre,
Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8
Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y
Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer
of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown
envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with
old newspapers. On 6 November 1987, Prudente moved to quash the search
warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) facts which formed the basis for the issuance of
the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the
form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a
general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place
to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the
search warrant was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the Supreme Court in
that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the
search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued
an order, denying Prudente's motion and supplemental motion to quash.
Prudente's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated
20 April 1988. Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Held: The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to issue, there must
be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection
with one specific offense,and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce,
on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. Herein, in his application
for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been
informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the
firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the
report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their
continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from
verified sources" that the holders of the said firearms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had
no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the
basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge
thereof only through information from other sources or persons. While it is
true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw
stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner
had in his possession and custody the firearms and explosives described in
the application, and that he found it to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the
record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier
information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such
information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been
searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records
yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
145 Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-43810, 26 September 1989]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur Facts: Acting on a verified report of a
confidential informant that assorted electronic and electrical equipment and
other articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in
unlawful "shipside" activities (foreign goods are unloaded from foreign ships
in transit through Philippine waters into motorized bancas and landed on
Philippine soil without passing through the Bureau of Customs, thereby
evading payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes thereon)
were found inside "Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising
(Philippines)" stores located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner Evangelista
Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-request dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to
the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Director of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action
Center, Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance of warrants of seizure
and detention. After evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued Warrants of
Seizure and Detention 14925 and 14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling
Action Center to seize the goods mentioned therein, i.e. various electronic
equipments like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles
(diamond), portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts of
TVs and radios and other electrical appliances. A RASAC team was formed
and given a mission order to enforce the warrants, which it implemented
with the assistance of: (1) the National Customs Police (augmenting the team
with 2 members), (2) the Detective Bureau of the Manila Western Police
District Headquarters (with 3 detectives), as well as, (3) Precinct 3 of the
Manila Western Police District which exercised jurisdictional control over the
place to be raided. The intended raid was entered in the respective police
blotters of the police detective bureaus. On the strength of the warrants of
seizure and detention, the raid was conducted in the afternoon of 25 April
1976 at the 2 stores of Tomas Chia. ASAC team leader Gener Sula, together
with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and Servillano
Florentin of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by two customs
policemen, Val Martinez and Renato Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio
Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from the stores, assorted electronic
equipment and other articles, the customs duties on which allegedly had not
been paid. They were turned over to the Customs Auction and Cargo Disposal
Unit of the Bureau of Customs. On 17 May 1976, in the afternoon, the
hearing officer of Acting Collector of Customs Alfredo Francisco conducted a
hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken by Gener Sula and his agents.
2 days later, Chia filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Supreme Court to enjoin the Collector of Customs and/or his
agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and prayed that
the search warrants be declared null and void, that the latter be ordered to
return the confiscated articles to Chia, and to pay damages. Issue: Whether
the warrants issued by the Collector of Customs partakes the nature of a
general warrants, and thus are invalid. Held: Not only may goods be seized
without a search and seizure warrant under Section 2536 of the Customs and
Tariff Code, when they (the goods) are openly offered for sale or kept in
storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that Chia's stores — "Tom's
Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Phil.)" — were searched upon
warrants of search and detention issued by the Collector of Customs, who,
under the 1973 Constitution, was "a responsible officer authorized by law" to
issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code provide
when a search may be made without a warrant and when a warrant is
necessary. Section 2208 provides that "For the more effective discharge of
his official duties, any person exercising the powers herein conferred, may at
any time enter, pass through or search any land or inclosure or any
warehouse, store or other building, not being a dwelling house. A
warehouse, store or other building or inclosure used for the keeping or
storage of articles does not become a dwelling house within the meaning
hereof merely by reason of the fact that a person employed as watchman
lives in the place, nor will the fact that his family stays there with him alter
the case." On the other hand, Section 2209 provides that "A dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a Judge of the
court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon
sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." The warrants
issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrants for
they identified the stores to be searched, described the articles to be seized
and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code violated. Upon
effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired exclusive
jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the goods seized for the
purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws. Further, a party dissatisfied
with the decision of the Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law and regulations. The
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court
for review. Since Chia did not exhaust his administrative remedies, his
recourse to this Court is premature. 146 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19 August 1988] Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 29 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Third Division, Gutierrez J. (J): 4
concur Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985, 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in
connection with the NBI's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-
complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree
49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-
complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the film corporation and subsequently filed 3 applications for
search warrants against the video outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul
Sagullo, and Fortune Ledesma. The applications were consolidated and heard
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September
1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants, describing the
articles sought to be seized as"(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines
used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease,
distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.". Armed with the search
warrants, the NBI accompanied by the film corporation's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the
items seized was made and left with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a motion to lift
search warrants and release seized properties filed by Barreto, et. al., the
lower court issued an order dated 8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search
warrants issued earlier against them by the court, due to the failure of the
NBI to deliver the articles to the Court, and thus ordered the return of the
articles to their respective owners. The lower court denied a motion for
reconsideration filed by the film corporation in its order dated 2 January
1986. The film corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals to annul the orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.
The 20th Century Fox Film Corporation filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles of property
which are usually connected to legitimate business, and not involving piracy
of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws, renders the
warrant to be unreasonable. Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape
store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or
related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual
property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in
violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which
could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact,
this actually happened in the present case. Although the applications and
warrants themselves covered certain articles of property usually found in a
video store, the Court believes that the search party should have confined
themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of
infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not
to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate
business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing
Betamax tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected
in the Returns of Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged
in the video tape industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure. The
applicant and his agents therefore exceeded their authority in seizing
perfectly legitimate personal property usually found in a video cassette store
or business establishment. The search and seizure is unreasonable. 147
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October 1985] En Banc, Melencio-
Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in the result, 1 took no part, 1 reserves his
vote Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the
accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military
Commission 1, and also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) MC-25-113 of
Military Commission 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on
August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted
by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea
cases. At 11:30 a.m., Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by
a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and
P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of
arrest had previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the
same day, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge of the
premises, was arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant
of arrest. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials,
and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431
items in all. On August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were
charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the
CSG against the former for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to
Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City Fiscal filed an
Information for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of
Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal,
praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with Subversion. The
Motion was denied on November 16. On September 10, the CSG submitted
an Amended Return in the Search Warrant case praying, inter alia, that the
CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, "in
connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court." On December 13, Judge
Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents
"shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against
respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to
Suppress, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned
to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground
that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other case,
apparently unaware of the Order issued by Judge Paño on December 13.
Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant
issued by RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge
Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress. Issue: Whether
the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too
general to render the warrant void. Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-
84) describes the personalities to be seized as "Documents, papers and other
records of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or
the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans
of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support
money from foreign or local sources." It is at once evident that the Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and
not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books
and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime
of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 31 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Warrant and although, ordinarily, the
articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they
cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches may be made
without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is declaratory in the
sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person
who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an
arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search
without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness
of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has
been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion
in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises
which may be searched". Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been charged
with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her
arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the
opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be
retained by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case,
leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to ask Special
Military Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and
articles. 148 Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Asuncion [GR
122092, 19 May 1999] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied
for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of
Quezon City, stating "(1) that the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G.
Santiago, is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which are being kept and
concealed in the premises herein described; (2) that a Search Warrant should
be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties: 'Seventy (70) M16
Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2)
UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal 40mm., ten
(10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and
ten (10) handgrenades.'" The joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached
to the application. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On 4 February
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized various firearms and ammunition. Believing that the warrant was
invalid and the search unreasonable, Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, Evaristo M. Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago, Roberto A.
Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V. Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix
O. Baito, Harold B. Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S. Legacion,
Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad and Herminio V. Villamil filed a "Motion to
Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
"Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence." On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued the Order which denied PICOP,
et. al.'s motions. On 3 August 1995, the trial court rendered its Order denying
their Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition. Issue: Whether the fact that the warrant identifies only one
place, i.e. the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur," satisfies the
requirements of the particularity of the place to be search, and thus render
the warrant valid. Held: No. The fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search
warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, detail the requisites Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 32
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In
view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be
searched only to those described in the warrant. Thus, this Court has held
that "this constitutional right is the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the
belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government no less than
to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in
case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the
lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not
been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to
be found in a particular place. Herein, the search warrant is invalid because
(1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents: (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for
the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that PICOP,
et. al. were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to
be searched was not described with particularity. As to the particularity of
the place to be searched, the assailed search warrant failed to described the
place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned
premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only
one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur." The
PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/buildings, 15 plants,
84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of
which spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the
warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search
all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. Because the search
warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding." 149 Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 126859, 4 September 2001] Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan
City, issued search warrants 54-95 and 55-95 for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the police searched Apartment 8, in the same
compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2
M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, 1 Bar of
demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed
with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber
handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1 Box containing 40 pieces of
.25 caliber ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade, 1 roll of
detonating cord color yellow, 2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to
be explosives substance, 22 detonating cords with blasting caps, ½ and ¼
pound of high explosives TNT, 1 timer alarm clock, 2 bags of suspected gun
powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance, 1 small box of
plastic bag of suspected dynamites, One weighing scale, and 2 batteries 9
volts with blasting caps and detonating cord. The firearms, ammunitions,
explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments were
acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al
Ghoul, Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-
Riyami, Ashraf Hassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad Abushendi were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations
(Criminal Cases C-48666-67) accusing them with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1866.
Thereafter, they were arrested and detained. They filed a motion for bail on
24 May 1995, the resolution of which was held in abeyance by the RTC
pending the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to determine
whether or not the evidence presented is strong. On 7 February 1996, at the
hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 33
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) being offered for whatever purpose that they
maybe worth" after the prosecution had finished adducing its evidence
despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence.
On 19 February 1996, the RTC denied their motion for bail earlier filed. As
their action before appellate court also proved futile, with the appellate
court dismissing their special civil action for certiorari, they filed the petition
for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search and seizure
orders are valid, and the objects seized admissible in evidence. Held: As held
in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged
nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing
their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional
and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the search made at
Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is
inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et. al. In contrast, the search
conducted at Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants
specifically mentioned Apartment 2. The search was done in the presence of
its occupants, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court. The articles seized during the search of Apartment 2 are of the same
kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant. The items
seized from Apartment 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in
question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a
technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to
be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would
be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not
be so invariant as to require absolute concordance between those seized and
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles
described as a class or species would suffice. 150 People v. Omaweng [GR
99050, 2 September 1992] Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt.
Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all
vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a
cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and
headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and
had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to
inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into
the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered
by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which
Omaweng consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it
contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after
sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter
boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the
incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to
the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance
contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be
positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12
September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the
granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had
waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On
14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province
filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713).
After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal,
Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 34 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During
the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did
not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn
Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph
Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated
its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited
drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to
the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which
violates his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed
to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the
PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by
Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily
submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises.
He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41
packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no
warrant was necessary for such seizure. 151 People vs. Correa [GR 119246,
30 January 1998] En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur Facts: A week before 18
June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the Police
Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports
received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street,
Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and
confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives were
alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs
that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives,
together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3
vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and
waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00
am. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang
extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers
of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable
Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants.
The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected
contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were
brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The
packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for laboratory
analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that
the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789
kilograms. The defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested
without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s house to get
the things of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan
Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to
the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12
July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having violated Section 4, Article
II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty.
After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty
as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million. Issue:
Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search
and seizure, due to waiver on their part. Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @
"Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 35 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Santos @ "Boy
Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when
they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search
and seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened the tin can
loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when
they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to
the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly." Further, they effectively
waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered
a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial. 152
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3
concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came
to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a
cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling
marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City.
Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling
cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos
was requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-
peso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall
yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small
table where Ramos displayed the wares she was selling. Ramos was
thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a
statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City
Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were
confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented
to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of
her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She
claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by
one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which was used to buy
marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being saved for the
rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where
she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel
during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the document at
the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale
(Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal
Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA
6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of
P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to life
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the decisions
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the
warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under
her control. Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was
found under the table where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he
was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was under
her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of
the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law,
actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and
control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the
offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may
be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must
have dominion and control over the contraband. These requirements are
present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found
inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) NARCOM
agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramps to
stand so that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The
trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another person
to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her
customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in
evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is
correct. 153 People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994] Third Division,
Feliciano (J): 3 concur Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and
S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command,
rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus
stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the
back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan
before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to
inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he
found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the
owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao
alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to
the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the
carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was
opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the
carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who
pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was
charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation
of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed. Issue:
Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the
moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver. Held:
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search
and seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior
to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There
are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the
search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it
not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle,
since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of
moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that
is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to
visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
lawoffender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there
had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents
of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be
brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4)
Narcom agents had received information that Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 37
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in
his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential
information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of
the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the
record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably
constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box
allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers
who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando
Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such
probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed to have waived
the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest
"simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear
first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto,
but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box
was equally nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and
seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been
admitted in evidence against Barros. 154 Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18
June 1992] En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy
are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When Veroy was promoted to
the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System
sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City. The
care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys,
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of
the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon
for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of
their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only
the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was
entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an emergency. On 12
April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP
raided Veroy’s house in Davao City on information that the said residence
was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the
yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the
owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Permission
was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition
that the search be conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. The
following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroy’s house to
conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt.
Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live bullets
in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the children’s room. 3 half-
full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the
children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed
a big travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containing
a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of
the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and
religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and
receipt of seized articles were made. The case was referred for preliminary
investigation to the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated
Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the DOJ through Department
Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal
recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for violation of
PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of
Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for the said offense was
filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 38 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Davao City). No
bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution was
received by the Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail
on the same day which was denied for being premature, as they have not
been arrested yet. The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon
Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o the ground that his office has not
received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August
1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various
ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by
the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted
their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed
under guard thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys
pleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement, which was
denied. The court ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation
Center pending trial on the merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court
issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys
were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition
remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a
directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the
basis of the 2 October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer
pursuant to the order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the
court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining
thereat the presence of alleged “rebel soldiers” include the authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house. Held: The Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among
the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2)
a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People
v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa
underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to
enter the house. The permission granted by was for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search
once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a search
warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search
warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search,
violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The offense of illegal
possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the
articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in
the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides,
assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita,
while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the
same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. 155
People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992] First Division, Medialdea (J):
3 concur Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine
Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In
said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba,
Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia
Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station
Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia
Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm
and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan
City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 39 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of
Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with
Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented
by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found
that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to
give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the
Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house
rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go
with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco
outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the
NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she
requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the
group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled
"Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found
persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).
The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around.
When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood
radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and
Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to
their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons
found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons
revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned
the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally
charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda
Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie,
Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric
Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such
information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso
from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its
case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed
his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds
of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence
for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision,
finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
proceedings. Damaso appealed. Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part
of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house. Held: Damaso was
singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and
credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the
same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other
subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case
against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers
failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so
in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that
time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the
authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that
Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such
an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's
dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and
seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the
search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different
if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 40 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) on this point.
The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them
the license to go inside his house. 156 Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs
[GR L-27968, 3 December 1975] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1
took no part Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the
combined team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao
prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V
[Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by
Mr. Tomas Velasco. During the period from the latter part of August to
September 18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it
loaded copra and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of
Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the
Philippines which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee
beans and subsequently taken to Davao City. Said vessel passed Marore,
Indonesia on 18 September 1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before
proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended on 19 September 1966.
At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after
Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the charterer of the
vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia
carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and
Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior
NBI Agent of Davao, proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel
in Davao City, to ask for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel
room when they entered the room. There are conficting claims whether the
manicurist Teofila Ibañez or whether Velasco's wife, who was allegedly inside
the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter; and
whether the police officers "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which
only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and
took away the same," or whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the
suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things
contained therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao seized
1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo
Lema. The seizure was declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad
vs. Court of Tax Appeals (GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In
the present special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; the
only question left then is whether the search conducted by a party headed by
Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who
entered into a contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine
Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for
fishing, is violative of such constitutional provision. Issue: Whether there was
consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel room
then rented by Velasco. Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and
Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the written statement of
Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one
Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and
another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the person who was present at
his hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, "a manicurist by occupation." If such
indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that
person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at
the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent
readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most
prudent course of action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from
any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they
would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all
indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she
was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded
that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a
search warrant. 157 Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January
2002] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 41 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt.
Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was
loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the
vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked what was
loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous.
With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor
wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes
where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from
Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought
to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and
the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in
the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an
information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes
pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993,
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding
Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution
dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15
September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari. Issue:
Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that
the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes’ part on warrantless search and
seizure. Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The
mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift
the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see
the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also,
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is
not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure. Unfortunately, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) none exists in the present case. Further, the
evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search
leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot
be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they
be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes,
they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused
was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure. 158 People vs. Asis [GR 142531, 15 October
2002] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 7 concur, 6 on official leave Facts: Danilo Asis
y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information
dated 18 February 1998; the information stating "That on or about February
10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force
and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING
GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the
body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in
the amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch' one (1) gold necklace; and
undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less,
belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or
less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death." When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty.
Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio,
but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution
presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime
committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by
them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both
accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8 March 2000, held
that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article
294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to
the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence
including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely
proved that the two (2) x x x committed the crime," and appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and
treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do
not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto
before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained
pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the
search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal
and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand,
contends that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag
that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that
her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant. Issue:
Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the
bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search.
Held: Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 43 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) so on his or her
behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered,
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very
subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent.
Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any
other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the
accused therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to
constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second,
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search
when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that
moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the
arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more
pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there
was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece
of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it
is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to
evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely
arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It
must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt.
It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption
of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal. 159 People vs.
Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003] Second Division, Tinga (J): 3 concur,
1 filed a separate dissenting opinion Facts: Sometime during the months of
July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report
from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the
Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa,
Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that
Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police
that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with
new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short,
and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed
of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at
the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. All
wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and
helped each other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet
away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the
men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1
Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police
had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that
night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was
carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of
the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box
himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and
another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.
They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The
police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights
and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The
confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the
confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag
contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained
another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were
subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City
with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused
pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question
the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial
ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-
up. Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the
admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized
in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Issue:
Whether the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all
right” when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be
considered a waiver. Held: The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC
justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first
exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a
lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that
the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that
the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein
had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this
jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the
exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus,
herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud
was in possession of marijuana be described as “personal,” having learned
the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that
he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of
Tudtud. Solier’s information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious
informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
“surveillance.” This “surveillance,” it turns out, did not actually consist of
staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a
mere “gathering of information from the assets there.” The police officers
who conducted such “surveillance” did not identify who these “assets” were
or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following
requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the
prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records
disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and
requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and
opened the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than
the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained. Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
45 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 160 Chimel vs. California [395 US 752, 23
June 1969] Stewart (J) Facts: Late in the afternoon of 13 September 1965,
three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California, home of the Chimel
with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The
officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and
asked if they might come inside. She ushered them into the house, where
they waited 10 or 15 minutes until Chimel returned home from work. When
Chimel entered the house, one of the officers handed him the arrest warrant
and asked for permission to "look around." Chimel objected, but was advised
that "on the basis of the lawful arrest," the officers would nonetheless
conduct a search. No search warrant had been issued. Accompanied by
Chimel's wife, the officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom
house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In some rooms
the search was relatively cursory. In the master bedroom and sewing room,
however, the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and "to
physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so that they might
view any items that would have come from the burglary." After completing
the search, they seized numerous items - primarily coins, but also several
medals, tokens, and a few other objects. The entire search took between 45
minutes and an hour. At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of
burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against
him, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was
convicted, and the judgments of conviction were affirmed by both the
California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Both courts
accepted Chimel's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid because the
supporting affidavit was set out in conclusory terms, but held that since the
arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since in any
event they had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for
Chimel's arrest, that arrest had been lawful. From this conclusion the
appellate courts went on to hold that the search of Chimel's home had been
justified, despite the absence of a search warrant, on the ground that it had
been incident to a valid arrest. Issue: Whether the “search incident to arrest”
extends to the whole of the house where the accused was arrested. Held:
Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to
have been articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United
States, 232 US 383. The statement therein however made no reference to
any right to search the place where an arrest occurs, but was limited to a
right to search the "person." 11 years later, the case of Carroll v. United
States (267 U.S. 132) brought the following embellishment of the Weeks
statement: "When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found
upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and
which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence
in the prosecution." A similar analysis underlies the "search incident to
arrest" principle, and marks its proper extent. When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And
the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
"within his immediate control" - construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-
recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search
warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth
Amendment requires no less. Herein, the search went far beyond Chimel's
person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a
weapon or something that could have been Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) used as evidence against him. There was no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending
the search beyond that area. The scope of the search was, therefore,
"unreasonable" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Chimel's
conviction cannot stand. 161 People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990]
Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: After receiving a confidential
report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by
the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime
Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente
Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia
at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the
pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his
companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la
Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy
first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he
was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo
Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his
pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of
suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal
to his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were
strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of
Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana.
Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in
Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with
violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic
Act 6425, as amended. The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and
Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs.
From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the
Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the
death of de la Cruz on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la
Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989.
The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran. Issue: Whether
the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates
Beltran’s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Held:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment
since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit
a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that
in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person
without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not
necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were
invariably caught redhanded. There being no violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are
admissible in evidence. 162 People v. Kalubiran [GR 84079, 6 May 1991] First
Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July
1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics Command (NARCOM) elements. His
arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo
acted as Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 47 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the
buyer while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the
pre-arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was
with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he
could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately
produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously
marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado
approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-appellant.
He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on
Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo
Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they boarded
Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana were
marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were
analyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran contended however that one
Quindo approached and frisk him on the same night, and found nothing on
him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun point
to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station.
He was released the following day with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as charged
and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran
appealed. Issue; Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19
sticks of marijuana found in his possession during his arrest. Held: Kalubiran
was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless
arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an
incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule
116. In addition to the Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying
warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions established in the
case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of
marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also
have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person
at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer
for the second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate
information for violation of Section 8 of the said law. 163 People v.
Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991] En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime
in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt.
Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set
up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received
by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At
about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of
the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the
inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the
bulge on Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's
passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply,
the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana,
when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage
carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus
for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy
bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to
the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation.
At the investigation room, the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 48 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish
found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought
to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the
objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling
bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride
and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet
each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed against
Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment,
Malmstedt entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989,
the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of
the trial court. Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be
searched without an issued warrant. Held: The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is
made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search
warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or
a private person under the following circumstances. Section 5 provides that
“a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was
caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus,
the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1)
of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest. 164 People v. Cuenco, G.R. 126277, November 16, 1988
165 Espano vs. Court of Appeals [GR 120431, 1 April 1998] Third Division,
Romero (J): 3 concur Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo
Pagilagan and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio
Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went
to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted
bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14
August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the
crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the
trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate
against his right against unreasonable search and seizure. Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 49 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: Espano's arrest falls squarely
under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was caught in flagranti
as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis
of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing
over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him
and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of
marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in
evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under
the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless
search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
Espano. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said
rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at
Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. 166
People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr.
(J): 4 concur Facts: In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio
Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station,
together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at
Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission
was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the
said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around 9:30
p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was
acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by
Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the
person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his
name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as
Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo
City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that
Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's
Report. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San
Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben
appealed. Issue: Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest,
even in light of the Court’s ruling in People vs. Aminnudin. Held: One of the
exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident
to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule
126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 50 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within
the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is
consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v.
Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier
received a tip from an informer that accusedappellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the
gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag
contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be
admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there was lack of
urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, herein,
the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an
informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such
on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not
enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply
the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require search warrants during on-the-
spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng
collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated. 167 People v. Che Chun Ting [GR 130568-69, 21
March 2000] En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 14 concur Facts: Following a series of buy-
bust operations, the elements of the Special Operation Unit, Narcotics
Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po,
after she delivered a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline
substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When
questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government agents
and revealed the name of Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs. On 27
June 1996 NARCOM deployed a team of agents for the entrapment and
arrest of Che Chun Ting. At 7:00 am they proceeded to the Roxas Seafront
Garden in Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place under
surveillance. When they moved to the McDonald's parking lot, Mabel called
Che Chun Ting through her cellular phone and spoke to him in Chinese,
ordering one (1) kilo of shabu. At 10:30 am Mabel receive a call from the
accused. Mabel, along with NARCOM agents, proceeded to the Roxas
Seafront Garden. Mabel honked twice upon arriving at the said place and
went to Unit 122. NARCOM agents parked 2 meters away saw the door of the
unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a transparent plastic bag
containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately
alighted and arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by
Mabel as Che Chun Ting. Unit 122 was searched by the agents, where a black
bag with several plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance in an
open cabinet in the second floor was seized. The bag was examined in the
presence of Maj. Garbo, the accused and his girlfriend. The accused and the
evidence were brought to Camp Crame. The contents of the bank were
tested and found positive for shabu. The Defense alleged otherwise. It
alleged that it was Noli Ortiz, the brother of Che Chun Ting’s girlfriend who
rang the doorbell of Unit 122. When Nimfa opened the door, 2 NARCOM
officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli
alleged that he did not see any black bag seized but saw his sister’s video
camera being carted away by the NARCOM agents. He claimed that his sister
was frightened and crying during the conduct of the search while Che Chun
Ting was asleep at the second floor. Defense further contends that Unit 122
is owned by Nimfa Ortiz and that Che Chun Ting lived at 1001 Domingo
Poblete St., BF Homes, Parañaque. Che Chun Ting was found guilty by the
trial court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in
transit 999.48 grams of shabu; and, having in his custody, possession and
control 5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. He was meted two (2)
death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of
Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended). He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first
case, and P12,000,000.00 in the second. He is now before the Supreme Court
on automatic review. Issue: Whether the search of Unit 122 is within the
purview of the warrantless search incidental to an arrest. Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 51 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The 1987 Constitution
ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized
exceptions. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense, without a search warrant. The search may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his
immediate control. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the
validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be
limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As
to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the
person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to
"dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the
warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.
Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about
the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where
the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Herein, although the case falls within the exception, Che
Chun Ting was admittedly outside unit 122, which was not his residence but a
sojourner thereof, and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag
of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. The inner
portion of the house can hadly be said to constitute a permissible area within
his reach or immediate control, to justify a warrantless search therein. The
search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu
were illegal for being violative of one's basic constitutional right and
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. The inadmissibility of
such however does not totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in
Unit 122 was preceded by a valid arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante
delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM operatives on
the basis of the information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the
accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3
Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of white crystalline substance to
Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu
weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the
crime. 168 People vs. Estrella [GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003] Third
Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: Prior to 20 November 1996,
Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales
issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of
Antonio C. Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
In the morning of 20 November 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio
Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose
Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group
based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They
coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of
Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay
Captain Barnachea accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay
Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the search warrant. On their
way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair
located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, the
latter's brother, and being rented by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva.
They approached Estrella and introduced themselves as police officers. They
showed Estrella the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1
Buloron asked Estrella if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and
if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. While
inside the hut, Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing dried
marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks of fruiting tops. The
team searched the hut in the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner.
They found a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 52 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained 4 big bricks of
dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions.
The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The
team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain
Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also
signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested
Estrella and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales. The defense, however,
alleged otherwise and claimed that on 20 November 1996 between 10:30
and 11:00 a.m., while Estrella was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and
Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and
about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The
group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were
looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued against
him. Estrella identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from Estrella
as to where his house is located and Estrella told them that his house is
located across the road. The police did not believe him and insisted that
Estrella's house is that house located about 5–8 meters away from them.
Estrella told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea
as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his
house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the
policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they had
with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to Estrella. They photographed
Estrella and brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Estella
was investigated at San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police
officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses
Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Still, Estrella was charged for possession of
prohibited drugs and unlicensed firearms. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iba, Zambales (Branch 69), in Criminal Case RTC 2143-I and on 25 August
1998, found Estrella guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The 8.320
kilograms of dried marijuana was ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, and the Sheriff was directed to deliver the subject marijuana to
the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition. On the other hand,
Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866 The .38 caliber
revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of the
offense, were however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of
the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Estrella appealed said decision. Issue: Whether the search
undertaken inside the hut — during which the incriminating evidence was
allegedly recovered — was legal. Held: There is no convincing proof that
Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or
otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds
rather than clarifies the prosecution's story. Given this backdrop, the police
authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such
a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked
through Section 5 (Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112." Never was it
proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of
the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that
there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing
an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge,
there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. Assuming
arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence
of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it
still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the
law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section
12 (Search incident to lawful arrest), Rule 126 of Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 53 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." However,
the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person
to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can
destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the
arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter's person —
that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the
case. The purpose of the exception in Chimel v. California is to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might
be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Herein, searched was
the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within Estrela's immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be
considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. 169 People vs. Libnao [GR
136860, 20 January 2003] Third Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On August
1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed
in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug
dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from
Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal
drugs once a month in big bulks. On 19 October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief
Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection
with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a
tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert
Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the
suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3
Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00 a.m. of
the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing
tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black
bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked
about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center
2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag. Upon
reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and
the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio.
As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the
presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the center. Found inside it were
8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The
leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and
its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Nunga stated that it was
owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter,
they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any
counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the
course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu
conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles
were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. Libnao and Nunga were charged
for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. On 19 November 1998, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty.
For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. Libnao appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and
Nunga was reasonable. Held: The constitutional guarantee (in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution) is not a blanket prohibition against all
searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 54 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants
of arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute.
There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to
search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles
are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle
is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. The warrantless search herein is not bereft of a
probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded
the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big
bulks. At 10:00 pm of 19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the two
will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-
looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy.
Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of Libnao’s
bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she
was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting
prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under
the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry
out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught
committing a crime in flagrante delicto. 170 People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27
January 1993] Third Division, Romero (J): 4 concur Facts: On 13 December
1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga City conducted
surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga
City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was
able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00, which was
turned over to the Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was planned with
Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site
in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa
returned to his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried
marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM team
rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked
Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to Musa’s
wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under
arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper
marijuana and the plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent to the PC
Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his house without any search warrant,
neither his permission to enter the house. The NARCOM agents searched the
house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said,
he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in
another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was handcuffed and
was taken to the NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa
claimed that he was subjected to torture when he refused to sign the
document containing details of the investigation. The next day, he was taken
to the fiscal‘s office to which he was allegedly made to answer to a single
question: that if he owned the marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell
the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he
was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa was
brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was filed on 15
December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded
not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC Zamboanga City
(Branch XII) found him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 55 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the
contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as
evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest. Held: Warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a
search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher,
the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the
person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and
search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the
discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer
merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure
of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld
the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, however, may
not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the 'plain view'
cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of
the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. The "plain view"
doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating
nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Thus,
the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however,
diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue
of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of
marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt
of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
171 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals [GR 121917, 12 March 1997] Third Division,
Francisco (J): 4 concur Facts: At about 8:00 p.m. of 26 October 1992, Enrique
Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa
Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from
the heavy downpour that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles along
Mac Arthur Highway. While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a
vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him
to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the
inclement weather. Immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and
hard braking of a vehicle running very fast, followed by a sickening sound of
the vehicle hitting something. Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate
and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the
highway giving it a slight tilt to its side. Manarang, being a member of both
the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council,
decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Angeles City. He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller
of the PNP of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 56 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Angeles City. By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had
started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the
north. Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the
vehicle had hit somebody. Manarang asked Cruz to look after the victim
while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the
vehicle. During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the
vehicle as PMA 777. He called the Viper through the radio once again
reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was
involved in a hit and run accident. SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile 3
were able to intercept the vehicle by cutting into the latter's path forcing it to
stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and
instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his
head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C.
Padilla. SPO2 Miranda told Padilla to alight to which Padilla complied. Padilla
was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed, its butt
protruding. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but Padilla held
the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2
Borja disarmed Padilla and told the latter about the hit and run incident.
Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with
his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." Because Padilla's jacket was
short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his
back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when Padilla turned around
as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from Padilla. Suspecting that Padilla could also be carrying a rifle
inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla
from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padilla's
vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the
driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-
automatic mode. He asked Padilla for the papers covering the rifle and
Padilla answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified
the arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms.
SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights. The police
officers brought Padilla to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard
where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol
with a single round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with 7 other live
bullets. Padilla also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine. Padilla was
correspondingly charged on 3 December 1992, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions ([1] One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN32919
with 6 live ammunitions; [2] one M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120
with 4 long and 1 short magazine with ammunitions; [3] one .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and 8 ammunitions; and [4] Six additional live
double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." ) under PD 1866. The
lower court then ordered the arrest of Padilla, but granted his application for
bail. During the arraignment on 20 January 1993, a plea of not guilty was
entered for Padilla after he refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any
plea. Padilla waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of
the case. After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment
dated 25 April 1994 convicting Padilla of the crime charged and sentenced
him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum". Padilla filed his notice of appeal on 28 April 1994. Pending the
appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that the
conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on 2 December 1994 a
motion to cancel Padilla's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was
incorporated in the appellate court's decision sustaining Padilla's conviction.
Padilla received a copy of this decision on 26 July 1995. On 9 August 1995 he
filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" but
the same was denied by the appellate court in its 20 September 1995
Resolution. On 28 September 1995, Padilla filed the petition for review on
certiorari with application for bail followed by two "supplemental petitions"
filed by different counsels, a "second supplemental petition" and an urgent
motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Issue: Whether
the firearms and ammunition confiscated during a warrantless search and
seizure, especially the baby armalite, are admissible as evidence against
Robin Padilla. Held: The 5 well-settled instances when a warrantless search
and seizure of property is valid, are as follows: Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 57 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search; (3) Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity; (4) consented warrantless search; and (5)
customs search. In conformity with the trial court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon Padilla's firearms and
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle
magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in Padilla's
waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting
from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took
a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat. Thus it has been held that "When in pursuing an illegal action or
in the commission of a criminal offense, the police officers should happen to
discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant." With respect to the
Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, Padilla
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of Padilla
indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that
his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were
products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and
vehicle of Padilla, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still
be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search
of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
Padilla's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This
satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate
control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The
products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like Padilla with respect to the hit and run) or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 172 People vs. Valdez [GR
129296, 25 September 2000] En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a
member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, received a tip from
an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's
hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I.
Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately 5:00
a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left
for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a
three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found Valdez
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 58 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) around the area where Valdez had
his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants, which weighed
2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing beside the
cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the
Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium
carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical
examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez
alleged otherwise. He claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September 1996,
he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a
person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter
to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez to the place
where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away
from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand
in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them
to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle
of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the
police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay
peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua,
who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the
former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the
marijuana, otherwise be would "be put in a bad situation." At the police
headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana
plants seized by the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged
for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana plants. On 15
November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. On 18
February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case 3105, found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to
warrantless search and seizure, based on the “plain view” doctrine. Held: The
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and
seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there
was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers
themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to
search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The
place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the
information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the
excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need
not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of
Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the
evidence must Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 59 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers first located the
marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there
was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's
premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain
view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Also,
upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. 173 Arizona
v. Hicks [480 US 321, 3 March 1987] Scalia (J): 4 concur, 1 filed a separate
concurring opinion, 2 filed separate dissenting opinions to which 1 concurs.
Facts: On 18 April 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks'
apartment, striking and injuring a man in the apartment below. Police
officers arrived and entered Hicks' apartment to search for the shooter, for
other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weapons,
including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their search also discovered a
stocking-cap mask. One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of
expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid and
otherwise illappointed four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were
stolen, he read and recorded their serial numbers - moving some of the
components, including a Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so -
which he then reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised that
the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately.
It was later determined that some of the other serial numbers matched those
on other stereo equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant
was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. Hicks was
subsequently indicted for the robbery. The state trial court granted Hicks'
motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals
of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial entry and search,
although warrantless, were justified by the exigent circumstance of the
shooting. The Court of Appeals viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers,
however, as an additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Both courts -
the trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary implication -
rejected the State's contention that Officer Nelson's actions were justified
under the "plain view" doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire. The Arizona
Supreme Court denied review, and the State filed this petition. Issue:
Whether the policeman’s actions come within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. Held: The policeman's actions come within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. The mere recording of the serial numbers did not
constitute a "seizure" since it did not meaningfully interfere with Hicks’
possessory interest in either the numbers or the stereo equipment. However,
the moving of the equipment was a "search" separate and apart from the
search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. The fact that
the search uncovered nothing of great personal value to Hicks is irrelevant.
The "plain view" doctrine does not render the search "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. The policeman's action directed to the stereo
equipment was not ipso facto unreasonable simply because it was unrelated
to the justification for enteringthe apartment. That lack of relationship
always exists when the "plain view" doctrine applies. In saying that a
warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation," Mincey was simply addressing the scope of the primary
search itself, and was not overruling the "plain view" doctrine by implication.
However, the search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the
policeman had only a "reasonable suspicion" - i. e., less than probable cause
to believe - that the stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required
to invoke the "plain view" doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be
illogical to hold that an object is seizable on lesser grounds, during an
unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a
warrant for it if it had been known to be on the premises. Probable cause to
believe the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 60 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
equipment was stolen was also necessary to support the search here,
whether legal authority to move the equipment could be found only as the
inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence
of some independent power to search objects in plain view. The policeman's
action cannot be upheld on the ground that it was not a "full-blown search"
but was only a "cursory inspection" that could be justified by reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause. A truly cursory inspection - one that
involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without
disturbing it - is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and
therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. This Court is unwilling
to create a subcategory of "cursory" searches under the Fourth Amendment.
174 People vs. Compacion [GR 124442, 20 July 2001] First Division, Kapunan
(J): 4 concur Facts: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant
that Armando Compacio y Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana
plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic
Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City
Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion who
was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on 9 July 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall
plants in the backyard of Compacion which they suspected to be marijuana
plants. SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance
to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who
immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence
Division Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the
Special Action Force. Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and
another from DYRL Radio, were also included in the composite team. On 12
July 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive
Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada
informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter.
The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around
6:30 p.m., then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to
secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it was
nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge
to go back in the morning. Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay
Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of Compacion in the early morning of
13 July 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for
Compacion. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The
prosecution contends that Compacion opened the gate and permitted them
to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same
for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then
told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425 and
informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the
suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the
plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a
positive result. On 15 July 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command,
particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector
Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and
weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams.
Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic
test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded
positive results. On his part, Compacion maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on
13 July 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody
knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight.
After he opened the gate, 4 persons who he thought were members of the
military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he
could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only
by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room.
Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house.
None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises.
After about 20 minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought
him to the backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic)
marijuana here at your backyard" to which Compacion replied: "I do not
know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are
medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from migraine. After he was
informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took
pictures of him and themselves. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 61 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and
the military men spent the night. At around 10:00 a.m., they brought him
with them to the city hall. Compacion saw that one of the 2 service vehicles
they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military
men that said plants were marijuana. Upon arrival at the city hall, the men
met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A
picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged
marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the
SAF Headquarters. A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425,
as amended by RA 7659 was filed against Compacion. On 2 January 1996, the
trial court convicted Compacion of the crime charged, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Issue: Whether
Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
Held: Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards
against reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty.
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence secured
thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a
warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the
conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several
instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of
the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of
the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in cases
of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations. In these instances, a search may be validly
made even without a warrant. Herein, the search and seizure conducted by
the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by
a search warrant, It does not appear either that the situation falls under any
of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, Compacion's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. As a general rule,
objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be
applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into
Compacion's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion on
9 July 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana
when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the
agents entered his premises on 13 July 1995, their intention was to seize the
evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant
but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents,
therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they
conducted a surveillance and barged into Compacion's residence. As held in
People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
"plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the crime to
which he was charged. 175 Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975] First
Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 62 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De
Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a
civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for
the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and
impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. On
10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI
set aside its order of 10 April 1964 and granted the company's motion for
reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the
company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine
Fisheries Commission adn the Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On
10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case 56701 for failure of the
company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the Navy
to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta.
Winnie however, remained in the possession of the company. On 20 July
1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to
apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta.
Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. On
August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal
fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite
were then found aboard the two vessels. On 18 August 1965, the Fisheries
Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges
against the crew members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965,
there were filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against
the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of
Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by
Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of
dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the
boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4,
likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in
custody. On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with application
for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of
Manila against the Commission and the Navy. Among others, it was alleged
that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were
engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by
virtue of the offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by the company
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous
violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels
were settled. On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order
granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond of
P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965, the
Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the ground, among
others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the
Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine
Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels
should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond
of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case
the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach
of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the
crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for
reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from
enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction thereunder issued. Issue: Whether the Fisheries
Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the
vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without
the requisite licenses. Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20
March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the
provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or
through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of
Court, of "explosives such as dynamites and the like; including fishery
products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to
seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 63 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) effectively implement the enforcement of
existing fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same
Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine
Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore
exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine
Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits
fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76
thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than
five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives,
boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in
violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law
provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its
tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession
and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing
boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting
caps and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this
Section, and that the possession or discover in any fishing boat or fish caught
or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony,
shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat,
or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives."
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or
corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license
prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other
order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for
each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not
more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in
case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be
directly responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven
that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall
extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence
of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of
such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided,
further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." Under
Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among
others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of
laws and regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended by PD 34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any
official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the
Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package,
bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach
or violation of the customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the Philippine Navy,
upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6,
1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known
respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be
without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the
same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license
required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Search and seizure
without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs
laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of
a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such
warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The
same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our
fishery laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable
them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. 176
Hizon vs. Court of Appeals [GR 119619, 13 December 1996] Second Division,
Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports
of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to
these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the
police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.
On 30 September 1992 at about 2:00 p.m., the Task Force Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 64 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by
"muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa.
The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task
Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded
to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big
fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline
of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their
inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SPO3
Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies.
The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted
fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked
the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order.
Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the
fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation. At the city harbor,
members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to
guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were again
interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an
Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and
fishermen were charged with the following violations: (1) Conducting fishing
operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor's permit; (2)
Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized — 26; On board — 36);
and (3) Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports."
The following day, 1 October 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain
to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for
laboratory examination. On 7 October 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia
Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they
contained sodium cyanide. In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint against the owner and
operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc.,
represented by Richard Hizon, the boat captain Silverio Gargar, the boat
engineer Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong
nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat for the offense of illegal fishing
with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD) 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. In an Information
dated 15 October 1992, Hizon, et. al. were charged with a violation of PD
704. Hizon, et. al. were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. On
23 November 1992, however, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the
NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish
negative for the presence of sodium cyanide. On 9 July 1993, the trial court
found Hizon, et. al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for a
minimum of 8 years and 1 day to a maximum of 9 years and 4 months. The
court also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28
sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of
the offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hizon, et. al. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure conducted in Hizon’s boat is valid.
Held: Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of
persons without a judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained
without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the
recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not
required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and
seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception ought to apply
to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to
elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other
government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. The warrantless search on
the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal
fishing, thus is valid. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the
search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, Hizon failed to
raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 65 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to question any irregularity that may
have attended the said search and seizure. However, Hizon et. al. are not
guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish
samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of
fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The absence
of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports Hizon, et. al.'s claim
that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught
the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their
sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The
authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in
order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under
suspicious circumstances, that Hizon, et. al. were charged with illegal fishing
with the use of poisonous substances. Hence, Hizon, et. al. are acquitted of
the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances defined
under Section 33 of Republic Act 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. 177
People vs. Gatward [GRs 119772-73, 7 February 1997] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: At about 3:30 p.m. of 30 August 1994, U Aung
Win, a Passenger of TG Flight 620 of the Thai Airways which had just arrived
from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag for
examination to Customs Examiner Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the
Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City. U
Aung Win also handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration 128417 stating
that he had no articles to declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his
luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding towards the direction of
Carousel 1, the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight
620, as if to retrieve another baggage from it. After having inspected the
luggages of the other incoming passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the
failure of U Aung Win to return and suspected that the bag of U Aung Win
contained illegal articles. The Customs Examiner reported the matter to his
superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was turned over to the office of
the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination where it was detected
that it contained some powdery substance. When opened, the bag revealed
two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its
partitions. Representative samples of the substance were examined by
Elizabeth Ayonon, a chemist of the Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and by Tita
Advincula, another chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp
Crame, and found to be positive for heroin. The two chemists concluded that
the entire substance, with a total weight of 5,579.80 grams, contained in the
two packages found in the bag of U Aung Win, is heroin. A manhunt was
conducted to locate U Aung Win. At about 7:45 p.m. of the same date, Rey
Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the commander of
the NAIA Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese national
by the name of U Aung Win appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as
a departing passenger. Immediately, a team of law enforcers proceeded to
the Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been
identified through his signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation Arrival Card. Customs Examiner Tawano also
positively identified U Aung Win as the person who left his bag with him at
the Arrival Area of the NAIA. During the investigation of U Aung Win, the
agents of the Customs Police and the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
gathered the information that U Aung Win had a contact in Bangkok and that
there were other drug couriers in the Philippines. Following the lead, a team
of lawmen, together with U Aung Win, was dispatched to the City Garden
Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to enable U Aung Win to communicate
with his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police officers
were standing by, they noticed two persons, a Caucasian and an oriental,
alight from a car and enter the hotel. U Aung Win whispered to Customs
Police Special Agent Edgar Quiñones that he recognized the two as drug
couriers whom he saw talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau.
The members of the team were able to establish the identity of the two
persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing, a Thailander, from
the driver of the hotel service car used by the two when they arrived in the
hotel. It was gathered by the law enforcers that Gatward and Zaw Win Naing
were scheduled to leave for Bangkok on board a KLM flight. On 31 August
1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a surveillance
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 66 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) operation at
the Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who might be leaving
the country. At about 7:45 p.m., Special Agent Gino Minguillan of the
Customs Police made a verification on the passenger manifest of KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines Flight 806, bound for Amsterdam via Bangkok, which was
scheduled to depart at about 7:55 p.m. He found the name
"GATWARD/NRMR" listed therein as a passenger for Amsterdam and
accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately Customs
Police Captain Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM
airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from the aircraft and
to have his checked-in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager acceded to the
request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as
the plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight.
However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned
immediately to the Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok.
Upon his disembarkment. Gatward was invited by the police officers for
investigation. At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994, Gatward's luggage,
was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai airways,
pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers
subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence of Gatward and
some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance.
Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each
containing the powdery substance, together with many clothes. The
envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between a double-
wall, the other inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination by
Chemists Ayonon and Advincula pursuant to the request of Police Senior
Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery substance contained in
the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was
found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with violating Section
4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (transporting);
while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge
when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon
his arraignment. On 3 March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the
crime charged. Issue: Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcases may be
searched without warrant. Held: While no search warrant had been obtained
for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his personal luggage as
a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in
accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of
strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His
subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in
flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His
culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the
evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the
lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly
proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage
which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the
international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was
authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present
any authority to do so. 178 People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December
2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: Leila Reyes Johnson was,
at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean
Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as
an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered
nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in
convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly
back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the
Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26
June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a
lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs,
prohibited drugs, contraband Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 67 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a
departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-
912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry,
Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon."
She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for
inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson
was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked
her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three
plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a
substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the
plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at
the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken
and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings
were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2
grams; a violation of §16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by
RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City,
found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson
appealed. Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the
airport violates her right against unreasonable search and seizure. Held: The
constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and
person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances
surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of
the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to
custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may
lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto. 179 People vs. Suzuki [GR
120670, 23 October 2003] En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez (J): 13 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 68 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts:
Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive
to all Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport
terminals within their respective areas of responsibility, following reports
that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate with
local airport authorities and the PASCOM. In the morning of 12 April 1994,
Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the
pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Suzuki was bound for
Manila via flight 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.” At the pre-departure
area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM,
Suzuki proceeded to the “walk-through metal detector,” a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or
in the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao of the
Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no
metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and
passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3
Poyugao then ordered Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection
counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were present. SPO1
Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box. He appeared tense
and reluctant and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually
he consented, saying in faltering English, “open, open.” SPO1 Casugod
opened the box and found therein 18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped
in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting
tops which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, Suzuki ran outside the
pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.
They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal and brought him
to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes
Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug
trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he
arrived, the police apprised Suzuki of his constitutional rights. Meanwhile,
SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same.
The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms
or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a “confiscation receipt” which Suzuki, upon
the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned
over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation. Subsequently, Suzuki and his
companions were brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest and placed
under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office.
The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three tests on the
specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki was charged
with unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in violation of the
Dangerous Drug Act. Suzuki entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed
thereafter. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case
94-16100 convicted Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana, defined
and penalized under Section 8, Article II of RA 6525, as amended, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether the PASCOM
has the authority to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags. Held: The Police
Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the
National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of
Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) 399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18
February 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of
National Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director General, National
Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed.
Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now
PASCOM) shall have the following functions and responsibilities: (1) Secure
all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;
(2) Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations; (3) Exercise operational
control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport security
operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace
and order, and provide other pertinent public safety services within the
airports; xxx. Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to
President LOI 399, in relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal
authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages
or Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 69 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hand-carried
bags. This is not the first time that the Court recognize a search conducted
pursuant to routine airport security procedure as an exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton, and People
vs. Johnson, the Court validated the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons.
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search
of prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying
suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the
authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and
ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society. It should be
stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and
seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search
or seizure. Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted
by the PASCOM agents. 180 Bureau of Customs vs. Ogario [GR 138081, 30
March 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: On 9 December
1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of
"SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which
was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis
of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB),
Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported. The report stated that
the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks
marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on
board the vessel M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the
customs office in Cebu (Cebu Seizure Identification Case 17-98). On 10
December 1998, Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and
his buyer, Nelson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case CEB-
23077) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. In separate motions,
the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu and the EIIB, as well as the
Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were denied in
a resolution dated 11 January 1999. BOC and EIIB moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its order dated 25
January 1999. In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of
Ogario and Montelibano’s bond to P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court
of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained on 15 April
1999. Accordingly, on 26 April 1999, upon motion of Ogario, et. al., the RTC
ordered the sheriff to place in their possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of
Cebu, a decision was rendered forfeiting the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the
25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks bearing Plates
GCC 844 and GHZ 388 in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner prescribed by law while releasing the 7 trucks bearing Plates GFX
557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 in favor of their
respective owners upon proper identification and compliance with pertinent
laws, rules and regulations. Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings
before the District Collector of Customs despite due notice sent to his
counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the forfeiture
proceedings On 30 April 1999, Ogario and Montelibano filed the petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether
the Regional Trial Courts are competent to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau
of Customs. Held: Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and
forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
Under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure
of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine.
The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 70 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) or are intended to be shipped
abroad before they may exercise the power to effect customs’ searches,
seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative
hearings. 181 Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968] Warren (J) Facts:
Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective, on a downtown beat which
he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (Terry and
Richard Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back
and forth along an identical route, strolling down Huron Road, pausing to
stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.
Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two
on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left
swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer
followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in
front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a
policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something,"
whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing,
and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took
out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised.
He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver
from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which
might have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments
until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and
Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved
to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution
theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful
arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons
into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted,
and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their
outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and
between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search
for evidence of crime. Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate
appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Issue: Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person
and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable
cause for an arrest. Held: The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to
the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. The issue in this
case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct but the admissibility
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. The
exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques; and this Court's
approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective
sanction. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such
as those followed here. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search"
under that Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in
the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others
is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty
that the individual is armed. Though the police must whenever practicable
secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be
followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat is required. The reasonableness of any particular search
and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against
the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in
believing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 71 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) that
the action taken was appropriate. The officer here was performing a
legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to
approach Terry and his companions. An officer justified in believing that an
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary
measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. A search
for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. An officer may make an
intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger
before being possessed of information justifying arrest. The officer's
protective seizure of Terry and his companions and the limited search which
he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. The
actions of Terry and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were
armed. The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to
determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made
for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to
ascertaining the presence of weapons. Herein, Officer McFadden patted
down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did not place
his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until
he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns.
He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of
criminal activity he might find. Thus, the revolver seized from Terry was
properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time McFadden seized
Terry and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable
grounds to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.
The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the
discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will,
of course, have to be decided on its own facts. Where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken. 182 People v. Solayao [GR 119220, 20 September 1996] Second
Division, Romero (J): 4 concur Facts: On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members,
headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused Nilo
Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon
seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to run away
and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut
leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long
homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who
issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with
the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the
firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of
firearm. Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred
that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes
Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using
the coconut leaves as a torch. Salayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro
Balano. On 15 August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found
Salayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and
imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no
mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced
accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law. Salayao appealed to Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 72 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether the search upon Solayao, yielding the firearm wrapped in coconut
leaves, is valid. Held: Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations
aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he
himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon
espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the
peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The
circumstances are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals
where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did
not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents
were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant." As
with Posadas, the case herein constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable
cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could
not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Thus, there was no
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted
the homemade firearm as evidence. 183 Manalili v. CA [GR 113447, 9
October 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: At about 2:10
p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini
street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen
were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold
Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the
Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of
the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male
person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male
person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat.
Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person
had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it.
He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and
its marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over
to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over
to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana
contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988,
Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with
violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment
on 21 April 1988, Manalili pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a
P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on 19
May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana
residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon,
counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 1989. On 19
April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial
court. The appellate court denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated 20
January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. Held: In the landmark case
of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 73 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of effective crime
prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to
make an actual arrest. What justified the limited search was the more
immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. It did not, however,
abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the
general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The
recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to
the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to
a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court
further explained that in these cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has
already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-
frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had
obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too
late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a
police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information,
rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein,
Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance
that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan
City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit
of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of
drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason
to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk. 184 Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595,
12 December 1997] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur Facts: On 27 August
1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,
Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug
store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite
sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These
men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both
groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group
of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase,
Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu
recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990,
likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate
a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the
grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At
arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that
he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 74 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) other police officers mauled him,
hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure
of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and
not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court
of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid,
pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.” Held: The general rule as
regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless
searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search
of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ
in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at
least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, there is
grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other
police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in
Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground,
probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications
as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that
Malacat was indeed Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 75 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is
unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. 185
Florida vs. J.L. [000 US 98-1993, 28 March 2000] Ginsburg (J) Facts: On 13
October 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a
young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt
was carrying a gun. There is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is
known about the informant. Sometime after the police received the tip, two
officers were instructed to respond. They arrived at the bus stop about 6
minutes later and saw 3 black males "just hanging out [there]." One of the
three, J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no
reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see
a firearm, and J. L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements.
One of the officers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the bus
stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J. L.'s pocket. The second officer
frisked the other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been
made, and found nothing. J. L., who was at the time of the frisk "10 days shy
of his 16th birth[day]," was charged under state law with carrying a
concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the
age of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search,
and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate appellate court
reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and held
the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Issue: Whether the
anonymous tip is sufficient basis to conduct “stop adn frisk” upon the person
of J.L. Held: In Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]), it was held that "where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him." Herein, the officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose
not from any observations of their own but solely from a call made from an
unknown location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip from a known informant
whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her
allegations turn out to be fabricated, "an anonymous tip alone seldom
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." The tip herein
lacked the moderate indicia of reliability. The anonymous call concerning J. L.
provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without
means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. That the allegation
about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers,
prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J. L. of engaging in
unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured
by what the officers knew before they conducted their search. All the police
had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable
informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied
any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L. The requirement
that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a
stop in no way diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry,
to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately
stopped. On the other hand, an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of
the kind contemplated in Adams (Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 [1972]) and
White (Alabama v. White, 496 US 325) does not justify a stop and frisk
whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm. 186
People vs. Balingan [GR 105834, 13 February 1995] Second Division, Puno (J):
4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 76 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts:
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City
Police Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant.
He passed the information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to
Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt.
Manuel Obrera formed a surveillance team to monitor Balingan's
movements. The team as deployed at different places in Baguio City,
including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus stations. Cpl. Garcia soon
reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at Brookside and
board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street.
Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage with orange or
yellow belts. She also reported the make and plate number of the taxicab
which Balingan boarded. Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl.
Garcia to proceed to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would
go there. Pat. Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also
reported that the taxicab described by the latter passed along Bonifacio
Rotunda. Lt. Obrera instructed him to move out and proceed to the Police
Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy. From
his post at the Dangwa Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera that
Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for
Manila. Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the
report. There, he went up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw
Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the luggage
carrier above her head was the gray luggage earlier described by Cpl. Garcia.
He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned area to
wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 a.m., the bus moved out (on its
way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was
at the Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters
behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon Road
Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt. Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at
the Checkpoint less than a minute after the bus did and immediately boarded
it. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong identified himself as
a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage, she
did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the luggage
in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found suspected
marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera.
Thereupon, Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and
tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Lt.
Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit
Terminal in the City proper, so that she would be the one to bring out
Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained inside the bus holding
the confiscated luggage while the other passengers alighted from the bus.
After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out of the bus and
brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in jail.
On 24 October 1988, Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April
1989, Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs. Balingan appealed. Issue: Whether the search conducted in the
Dangwa bus, subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an informant’s
tip, is valid. Held: The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public
vehicle. The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on
the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to
the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. A
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information
that Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their
surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been
previously monitored by the Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 77 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) bus bound for
Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When the moving,
public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under
those circumstances, the warrantless search of Balingan's bag was not illegal.
187 Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals [GR 125959, 1 February 1999] Resolution
of First Division, Martinez (J): 4 concur Facts: On 6 December 1993, in
compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify
campaign against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Tañong, the Chief of
the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on
the area with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain
plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas.
Pursuant thereto, SPO1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide
were dispatched at around 11:45 p.m.. The team proceeded to Barangay
Tañong where they were joined by their confidential informant and the latter
informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the
purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along Leoño Street, the
confidential informant pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told
them that the occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The policemen
immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the
driver, who turned out to be Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor
using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy.
Advincula then asked Asuncion if they can inspect the vehicle. As Asuncion
acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle and he found a
plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride beneath the driver's seat. Asuncion told
the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and he is not the owner
thereof. Asuncion was thereafter taken at the police headquarters for the
purpose of taking his identification. However, when he was frisked by
Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from
his underwear, which when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out
to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride. A press conference was conducted the
following day presided by Northern Police District Director Pureza during
which Asuncion admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride were for
his personal use in his shooting. On the other hand, Asuncion denied the
charges against him. He claimed that on that day, "between 8:00 and 9:00
p.m., he was abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives
by men who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics
Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen who took
over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng
Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said
hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police
Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 p.m.
as he was then sleeping at the said office." On 14 June 1994, a decision was
rendered by the trial court finding Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged, adn sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 1 year 8 months and 20 days as minimum, to 3 years 6 months and
20 days, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June 1994, a
Notice of Appeal was filed and the records of the case were transmitted by
the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On 30 April 1996 a decision was
rendered by the appellate court, modifying the penalty imposed (reducing
the sentence to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum and deleting the fine of P3,000.00 imposed on Asuncion).
On 6 August 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Asuncion. Asuncion filed a petition for review on
certiorari Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search upon Asuncion’s vehicle
is valid. Held: Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest,
search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent
judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental
law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle
is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate
that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued
by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The
prevalent circumstances of the case Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 78 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in
question was made as regards a moving vehicle — Asuncion's vehicle was
"flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore,
the police authorities were justified in searching Asuncion's automobile
without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action. The
apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the
car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by
virtue of a valid warrantless search and Asuncion himself freely gave his
consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were
admissible in evidence. 188 Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968]
En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-
intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would
be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila
and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at
about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita,
Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the
two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry
No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case
67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the
police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and
examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods
and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued
an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and
Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496.
However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some
bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in
the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November
1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants
Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao
of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the
lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of
the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives
of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling
Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed
an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of
the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the
same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of
the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March
1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing
of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own
behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing
the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold
the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting
for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that
they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Held: The Chief of the
Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing
by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement
of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it
was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for
any fine imposed under Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 79 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any
box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of
the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to
demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what
happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made
the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods
in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of
Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant
in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that
said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no
search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the
members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. 189 People vs. CFI Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City [GR L-41686, 17
November 1980] First Division, Guerrero (J): 4 concur Facts: One week before
9 February 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was
informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable
goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge
car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and Macario Sabado,
on said date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations
Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the
vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon
City. At about 6:45 a.m. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate 21-
87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina
approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards
Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent
Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead
of heeding, made a Uturn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could not
go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents
succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and
Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their identification cards to Hope
and Medina and introduced themselves as RASAC agents. The Agents saw 4
boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes
were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further, Hope and Medina were
asked where they were bringing the boxes, to which Medina replied that
they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos.
Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with Hope and Medina while Agent
Manuel Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 80 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) took
their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop
at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had
joined them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was
supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called
off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo
arriving there at about 9:00 a.m. An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp
Aguinaldo yielded 11 sealed boxes, 4 on the rear seat and 7 more in the
baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the
same order of the intelligence officer, the boxes were opened before the
presence of Hope and Medina, representatives of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and photographers of the
Department of National Defense. The contents of the bozes revealed some
"4,441 more or less wrist watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less
watch bracelets of assorted brands," supposedly untaxed. As consequence,
thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of
Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles
including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on 12
February 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending
agents arrested respondents and brought them together with the seized
articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed
with a warrant of arrest and seizure. In conjunction with the Warrant of
Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector of Customs, seizure
proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification 14281
against the wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m)
— 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification No. 14281-A
against the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of the same Code. On the
other hand, Hope and Medina disclaimed ownership of the seized articles.
Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened
in the proceedings. Hope claimed that at the time of apprehension, he had
no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such
knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he
consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon
request of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present
when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents
on the way. On the part of Monina Medina, she testified that what she did
was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport
the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will
in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the
contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were
opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there was not enough evidence to controvert
the testimonies of respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del
Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on 1
April 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject
of forfeiture. Meanwhile, on 14 March 1974, after the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a prima
facie case against Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case Q-3781 in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on 23 April 1974,
respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on 28 January 1975 and
while the prosecution through its first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was
adducing as evidence the pictures of the 11 boxes containing the assorted
watches and watch bracelets, the defense counsel objected to the
presentation of the pictures and the subject articles on the ground that they
were seized without the benefit of warrant, and therefore inadmissible in
evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New Constitution. After the
parties have argued their grounds in their respective memoranda, the trial
court issued the order of 20 August 1975 declaring that the alleged smuggled
articles and the pictures taken of said items as inadmissible in evidence. The
prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on 30 September 1975.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari which was treated as a special
civil action in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 5 May 1976. Issue: Whether
the search and seizure made on the boxes in the blue Dodge car was valid,
even after the Collector of Customs declared the seized articles not subject to
forfeiture. Held: It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made
no findings that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated
was that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient
to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles. In a general sense, this does
not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. The decision of the
Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 81 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the res rather
than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally
imported goods. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact
that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence
to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated
simply because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final
declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his
findings that untaxed goods were transported in Hope and Medina's car and
seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability
lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code
adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal
action. Hope and Medina's exoneration in the administrative cases cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal
responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. As enunciated in the leading case of Papa
vs. Mago, in the exercise of the specific functions, the Code does not mention
the need of a search warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides
that a "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge (or justice of the peace), upon sworn application showing
probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and
person or thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that
case expressed the considered view that "except in the case of the search of
a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws." The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the
traditional doctrine in Carroll v. United States 6 wherein an imprimatur
against, constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a warrantless search
and seizure of such nature as herein. On this stable foundation, the
warrantless seizure did not violate Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973
Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of the American
Constitution. 190 Whren v. United States [ 517 US 806 (No. 95-5841), 10 June
1996] Scalia (J) Facts: On the evening of 10 June 1993, plainclothes vice-
squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
were patrolling a "high drug area" of the city in an unmarked car. Their
suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with
temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the
driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck
remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long
time--more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order
to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right,
without signalling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed. The policemen
followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped
behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and Officer
Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver's door, identifying
himself as a police officer and directing the driver, James L. Brown, to put the
vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver's window, he immediately
observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in
Michael A. Whren's hands. Whren and Brown were arrested, and quantities
of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. They were
charged in a four-count indictment with violating various federal drug laws,
including 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression
hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of
the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable
cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that they were engaged in
illegal drug-dealing activity; and that Officer Soto's asserted ground for
approaching the vehicle--to give the driver a warning concerning traffic
violations--was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion,
concluding that "the facts of the stop were not controverted," and "[t]here
was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the officers were
contrary to a normal traffic stop." Whren and Brown were convicted of the
counts at issue here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding
with respect to the suppression issue that, "regardless of whether a police
officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be
engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as
a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car
for the suspected traffic violation." Issue: Whether the seizure involving
possession of drugs valid, when the vehicle was stopped due to a
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 82 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) violation of the
traffic code. Held: The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Temporary detention of individuals
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period
and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the
meaning of this provision. An automobile stop is thus subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the
circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred. It is of course true that in principle every Fourth
Amendment case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness" determination,
involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not
applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt where
the search or seizure is based upon probable cause. analysis involved
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests--such as, for
example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a home,
entry into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.
The making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely qualify as such
an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause
to believe the law has been broken "outbalances" private interest in avoiding
police contact. Herein, the officers had probable cause to believe that Whren
and Brown had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible.
191 Arkansas vs. Sullivan [000 US 00-262, 29 May 2001] Per Curiam. Facts: In
November 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police
Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for speeding and for having an
improperly tinted windshield. Taylor approached Sullivan’s vehicle, explained
the reason for the stop, and requested Sullivan’s license, registration, and
insurance documentation. Upon seeing Sullivan’s license, Taylor realized that
he was aware of “intelligence on Sullivan regarding narcotics.” When Sullivan
opened his car door in an unsuccessful attempt to locate his registration and
insurance papers, Taylor noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the car’s
floorboard. Taylor then arrested Sullivan for speeding, driving without his
registration and insurance documentation, carrying a weapon (the roofing
hatchet), and improper window tinting. After another officer arrived and
placed Sullivan in his squad car, Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search
of Sullivan’s vehicle pursuant to the Conway Police Department’s Vehicle
Inventory Policy. Under the vehicle’s armrest, Taylor discovered a bag
containing a substance that appeared to him to be methamphetamine as
well as numerous items of suspected drug paraphernalia. As a result of the
detention and search, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug
offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan moved to
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was
merely a “pretext and sham to search” him and, therefore, violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
trial court granted the suppression motion and, on the State’s interlocutory
appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The State petitioned for
rehearing, contending that the court had erred by taking into account Officer
Taylor’s subjective motivation, in disregard of the US Supreme Court’s
opinion in Whren v. United States (517 US 806 [1996]). Over the dissent of
three justices, the court rejected the State’s argument that Whren makes
“the ulterior motives of police officers irrelevant so long as there is probable
cause for the traffic stop” and denied the State’s rehearing petition. The
Arkansas Supreme Court declined to follow Whren on the ground that “much
of it is dicta.” The court reiterated the trial judge’s conclusion that “the arrest
was pretextual and made for the purpose of searching Sullivan’s vehicle for
evidence of a crime,” and observed that “we do not believe that Whren
disallows” suppression on such a basis. Finally, the court asserted that, even
if it were to conclude that Whren precludes inquiry into an arresting officer’s
subjective motivation, “there is nothing that prevents this court from
interpreting the U. S. Constitution more broadly than the United States
Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more rights.” Hence, the
State’s petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 83 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether subjective intentions play a
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Held: The
Arkansas Supreme Court never questioned Officer Taylor's authority to arrest
Sullivan for a fineonly traffic violation (speeding). Rather, the court affirmed
the trial judge's suppression of the drug-related evidence on the theory that
Officer Taylor's arrest of Sullivan, although supported by probable cause,
nonetheless violated the Fourth Amendment because Taylor had an
improper subjective motivation for making the stop. The Arkansas Supreme
Court's holding to that effect cannot be squared with the US Supreme Court
decision in Whren, in which the Court noted its "unwillingness to entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual
officers," and held unanimously that "subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." That Whren involved
a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, is of no particular moment;
indeed, Whren itself relied on United States v. Robinson (414 US 218 [1973]),
for the proposition that "a traffic-violation arrest will not be rendered invalid
by the fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics search.'" The Arkansas
Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it may interpret the United States
Constitution to provide greater protection than this Court's own federal
constitutional precedents provide, is foreclosed by Oregon v. Hass (420 US
714 [1975]). While "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards," it "may not impose such
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them." Thus, the judgment of the
Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the US Supreme Court's opinion. 192
People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994] Second Division, Regalado
(J): 5 concur Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform
the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
against the Government. At that time, various government establishments
and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist
group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November
1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor
Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army
coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San
Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the
Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City,
together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon
Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The
surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at
around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by
elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt. Crispin
Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters
away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino
had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd
was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the
car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team,
which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought
cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might
be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5
December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team
leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of
the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar
Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 84 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"
bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to
enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia
was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the
nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team
arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were
janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory,
written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the
raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside
from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able
to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez
and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in
two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide (Criminal
Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment,
de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he
is not authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The
parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from
November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed. Issue: Whether the military
operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the
December 1989 coup d’etat. Held: It is admitted that the military operatives
who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there
was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team
was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the
former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a
gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely
engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of
high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the
office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for
that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the
foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The
trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. 193 Valmonte
vs. de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May 1990] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 on
leave Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of
the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 85 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part
of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the
dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints,
for the protection of the people. They aver that, because of the installation of
said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in
the air. Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. They further
contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution. In the Supreme Court's decision dated 29 September 1989,
Valmonte’s and ULAP’s petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration of said decision. Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a
blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search and seizure
and, thus, are violative of the Constitution. Held: Nowhere in the Supreme
Court's decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at
all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that
checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as
where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed
and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have
absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events have pointed to
the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or
police forces. Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian
system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and
practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or
performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended
for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has
the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and
methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such
means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude,
to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
Further, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and
outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international
airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded
on public interest, safety, and necessity. Lastly, the Court's decision on
checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 86 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) abuses committed by the military
manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power,
i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power to install
said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry
ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is
abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a
checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but
subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act
beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and
civilly for their abusive acts. 194 Aniag vs. Commission on Elections [GR
104961, 7 October 1994] En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 6 concur, 3 on leave Facts: In
preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on
11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11
December 1991 Resolution 2323 ("Gun Ban"), promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly
weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members
of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance
of reaction forces during the election period. Subsequently, on 26 December
1991 COMELEC issued Resolution 2327 providing for the summary
disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting
of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P.
Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote Congressman
Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then Congressman of the 1st District of
Bulacan requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by
his staff, Aniag immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up
the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about 5:00 p,.m. of the same day, the Philippine National
Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from its
entrance. About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost
flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint.
They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun
cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by Aniag to
get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms Taccad
of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's
case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not
include Aniag as among those charged with an election offense. On 15
January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after
finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. On 28 January 1992, the
City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on the circumstances mentioned
in Arellano's sworn explanation. Aniag not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City
Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. On 6 March 1992, the Office of
the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the
"unofficial" charge against Aniag be also dismissed. Nevertheless, on 6 April
1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued
Resolution 92-0829 directing the filing of information against Aniag and
Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881 otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166; and Aniag to show
cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective
position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 2327, in relation to Secs. 32, 33
and 35 of RA 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of BP 881. On 13 April 1992, Aniag
moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative
proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court. On 23 April 1992,
the COMELEC denied Aniag's motion for reconsideration. Aniag filed a
petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC. Issue: Whether the search of Aniag’s car that yielded the firarms
which were to be returned to the House of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 87 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Representatives within the purview of the
exception as to the search of moving vehicles. Held: As a rule, a valid search
must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving
vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search
conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal
per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. As there was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading
them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor was there any indication
from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically
pointing to the culpability of Aniag and Arellano, the search could not be
valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into Aniag's
privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of Aniag's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding. 195 People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez [GR 129756-58, 28
January 2000] First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur Facts: On 5 April 1995
and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police,
namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los
Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the
corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).
They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found
suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past
midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a
long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was
later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D.
Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US
Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police, parked along
Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searched for more weapons.
Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño. The
three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the
Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned
over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of
the vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed
and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it,
which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in
tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic
Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143
kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño,
were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
6425, as amended. Escaño and Usana were also charged in Criminal Cases 95-
937 and 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and
jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17
June 1997, the trial court convicted Escaño, Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case
95-936, Escaño in Criminal Case 95-937, and Usana in Criminal Case 95-938.
Escaño filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed
a Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial
court in its Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal
on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that they were appealing to the
Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties
imposed, the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was appealed to the Supreme
Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from
Criminal Case 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal
Case 95-936 to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938 to
the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in
Criminal Case 95-936 that is before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 88 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether the search conducted
on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired therein would
be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs. Held:
The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The
checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by
the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its
deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also
defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to
bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not
constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely
stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At
best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would
stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body
search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the
conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The
following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to
Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped
and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a
policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4)
the car's trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño, without the
presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and
until the opening of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control
of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the
hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the
latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to
implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the
prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of
the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same
before it was seized. 196 Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country
of San Francisco [387 US 523, 5 June 1967] White (J) Facts: On 6 November
1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a
routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing Code.
The building's manager informed the inspector that Camara, lessee of the
ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of
the ground floor, the inspector confronted Camara and demanded that he
permit an inspection of the premises. Camara refused to allow the inspection
because the inspector lacked a search warrant. The inspector returned on
November 8, again without a warrant, and Camara again refused to allow an
inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the
district attorney's office. When Camara failed to appear, two inspectors
returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed Camara that he
was required by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code.
Camara nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without
a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with
refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. Camara
was arrested on December 2nd released on bail. When his demurrer to the
criminal Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 89 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
complaint was denied, Camara filed the petition for a writ of prohibition in a
California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal
charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a
warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should
issue to the criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such
inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the
writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of
California denied a petition for hearing. Issue: Whether Camara can validly
refuse the inspection of his dwelling by the Division of Housing Inspection.
Held: The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused
to permit a warrantless codeenforcement inspection of his personal
residence. The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable
against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. With
certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of
private property is "unreasonable." Administrative searches of the kind at
issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted
without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in
Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless
searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland,
Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal
fire, health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is
to determine the existence of physical conditions not complying with local
ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal process,
as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrative searches
cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on
occupants; that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection
programs could not function under reasonable search-warrant requirements.
Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area
code-enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that
a particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of the
enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The
standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will
necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Nothing here is
intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the
law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in
the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to
inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens
allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical
matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant
specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should
normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen
complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry.
Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any
change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. Herein, Camara has
been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to
enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in
an attempt to obtain Camara's consent to search. Yet no warrant was
obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the
appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the
public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the
building's manager, but the City/County does not contend that such consent
was sufficient to authorize inspection of Camara's premises. Assuming the
facts to be as the parties have alleged, camara had a constitutional right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may
not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It
appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these
circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under
California law. 197 In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also
Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-82], Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 90 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583-84], In
RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR 83162], In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR
85727], and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station Commander of
Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332] En Banc, Per Curiam: 11 concur Facts:
[GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of
the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information
about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated
for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was
listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2
CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of
the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated
inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural
alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon
Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original
information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto
Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a
Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard
on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva
posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they
were accordingly released. Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested
without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. Held: Dural, it clearly
appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM
soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of
persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more
an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for
a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination
by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously,
the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities. 198 People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 91 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a
member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr.
(Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of
Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was
selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio
positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo
Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a
chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of
a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back
to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and
reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante
at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical
Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens
were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro,
assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty
of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed. Issue:
Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states
that "A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An offense
is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause
existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for
the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to
seize the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest;
ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
199 People vs. Doria [GR 125299, 22 January 1999] En Banc, Puno (J): 13
concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 92 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: In
November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and
arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on 5
December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. On 5 December
1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents
formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and
PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as
members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and
SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security.
Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District
PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From
this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and
six (6) one hundred peso bills — as money for the buy-bust operation. The
market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit
marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter. The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20
a.m., "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in
buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked
bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the
corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from
his associate. An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from
his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3
Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon
inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at
Daang Bakal. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and at
woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua
asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and
inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of
the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of
what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's
discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with
the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that
"Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.
The 1 brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the 10 bricks
recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The bricks were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. On 7 December 1995, Doria and
Gadda were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig City convicted Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court found the
existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both to
death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally
permissible. Held: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain
amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to
violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment
the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction"
of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,
there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense
is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public
officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense,
or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure
the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the
accused must be Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 93 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices
to catch a criminal. The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: "A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. xxx" Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be
arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of
Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box
of marijuana and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our
Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be lawful, the
warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She
was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court,
there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify
her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when
the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be
justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of
facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save for Doria's word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged
in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows
that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. 200 People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14 March 2001]; also Go vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 123943] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: On 22
October 1992, at around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3
Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the
Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to
follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent
Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw Luisito Go, also
known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco House with two women.
Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in Go's waist. Together, the
three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a
hundred meters away from the outpost. When they arrived at the Flamingo,
the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an
"Operation Bakal," whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The
owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up
to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the
police officers saw Go and his lady companions seated at a table. They
identified themselves and asked Go to stand up. When the later did so, the
policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the
license of the gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought
out the driver's license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte
confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 94 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Serial Number
006784, with a magazine containing 10 rounds of live ammunition. Go was
invited to the police precinct for questioning. On the way out of the disco, Go
asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside. The police
officers accompanied Go to his car, a Honda Civic with license plate number
TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National
Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked Go if he
was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked Go for his
driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable
to produce them. When Go opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card
and found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police
officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of
the car. They asked Go why he had these items, but he did not say anything.
Instead, Go suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he
had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police
headquarters. Go took out an attaché case from the car and opened it. There
were two black clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which contained
shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained
P120,000.00 in cash. The police officers brought Go to the police station.
When they arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attaché case
together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator
found eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in
one of the clutch bags. When the attaché case was opened, the police
officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an
improvised burner, magazines and newspapers. Consequently, two
Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 (Criminal Case 3308-92-C, for violation of Article
III of RA 6452 or the Dangerous Drugs Act; and Criminal Case 3309-92-C, for
violation of PD 1866) After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment
convicting Go in the two criminal cases, and sentencing him in Criminal Case
3308-92-C to a penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and
a fine of P12,000.00; and in Criminal Case 3309-92-C to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Go appealed his conviction in Criminal
Case 3309-92-C directly to the Supreme Court (GR 116001). On the other
hand, Go brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case 3308-92-C
before the Court of Appeals. In an Amended Decision dated 21 February
1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed Go's conviction but modified the penalty
imposed by the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of
6 years and 1 day to 12 years, to pay a fine of P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of
RA 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Go filed the
petition for review (GR 123943). The two cases were subsequently
consolidated. Issue: Whether Go was legally arrested without warrant for
illegal possession of firearms and illegal drugs. Held: The constitutional
proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest
having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of
Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be
effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a
peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Herein,
the police saw the gun tucked in Go's waist when he stood up. The gun was
plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Go could not
show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or
thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it
being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of
Go's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is
a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his
car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later
identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made
during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the
exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of
the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any
proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the
objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and
the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it
has been held that drugs Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 95 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in
evidence. 201 People vs. de Guzman [GR 117952-53, 14 February 2001] First
Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: Prior to the arrest of Danilo de
Guzman, the Police Chief Inspector of the Cavite Philippine National Police
Command issued an Order of Battle listing the names of the suspected drug
pushers in Cavite City. Included therein was the name of de Guzman. In
response to the said directive, the Noveleta Police Station assigned SPO1
Arnel Cuevas to conduct surveillance at the Villamar Beach Resort. On 18
October 1992, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de Guzman at the Villamar
Beach Resort, but the latter stayed for only 30 minutes. Subsequently, he
learned that De Guzman was engaged in a drug sale that day and reported
the same to headquarters. Pursuant to his report, the Chief of Intelligence of
their station, SPO2 Rowell Tendero, instructed him to continue his
surveillance of said beach resort with the hope of catching de Guzman. On 26
October 1992, at around 9:00 p.m., de Guzman returned to Villamar Beach
Resort with companion Edsel Martin. They rented one of the resort cottages.
15 minutes later, SPO1 Cuevas climbed the ladder which he perched on the
concrete wall of the cottage. He, then, peeped through the window of the
cottage and saw Danilo and Edsel seated face to face while using shabu. He
also saw on top of the table 3 plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and
other drug related paraphernalia. SPO1 Cuevas hurriedly descended the
ladder and hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver to inform SPO2 Tendero
to proceed to Villamar Beach Resort immediately. Shortly, SPO2 Tendero,
along with other police officers, arrived at the beach resort. However, instead
of rushing to the cottage of De Guzman and Martin, the police officers
decided to wait for them to come out of the cottage. SPO1 Cuevas explained
that they did this so as not to forewarn the two of their presence. Otherwise,
the two might simply flush the shabu down the toilet bowl and destroy the
evidence. The police officers waited the whole night for De Guzman and
Martin to come out of the cottage. Finally, De Guzman came out at around
7:40 a.m. the next day. SPO2 Tendero nabbed him upon seeing that his waist
was bulging with a gun. While Police Officer Vedar held De Guzman, SPO2
Tendero went up the cottage to check on Martin. SPO2 Alfaro and SPO3
Benavise, accompanied by a chambermaid and a boy from the resort, also
went up with him. Inside the cottage, the same paraphernalia which the
witness saw the night before were found, namely, 3 plastic bags of shabu, a
plastic scoop, a burner, a lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils, 3
pieces of tooter, rubber band, several pieces of paper, a black clutch bag
containing a disposable lighter, 2 forceps, a pair of scissors, a knife and a key
holder with a knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket electronic
weighing scale. De Guzman was brought to the police station for questioning
and detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or search
warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation
was conducted largely during nighttime, the police officers were unable to
secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance.
Subsequent forensic examination by Felicisima Francisco of the National
Bureau of Investigation showed that the substance seized was indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 299.5 grams. In Criminal
Case 39-94, De Guzman and Martin, the latter is still at large, were charged
with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972). In Criminal Case 40-94, de Guzman was charged with violation
of Section 1, PD 1866 (Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition). De
Guzman was arraigned on 22 February 1993 with the assistance of his
counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. On 22 August
1994, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, found de Guzman
guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425 and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Furthermore, the trial
court found him guilty of violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866 and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to pay the costs in both instances. De Guzman appealed. Issue: Whether de
Guzman’s arrest and the subsequent seizure of drug paraphernalia inside de
Guzman’s cottage were legal even without issued warrants for those
purposes. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 96 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held:
The police officers' manner of conducting de Guzman's arrest was not tainted
with any constitutional infirmity. Despite word from their fellow officer, SPO1
Cuevas, that he saw De Guzman sniff "shabu", they resisted the first impulse
to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously
disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the
needed opening to validly arrest de Guzman. To their minds, it would be the
arrival of drug buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest was
necessitated by the presence of de Guzman with a gun obviously tucked in
his pants. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that "A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In this jurisdiction, the
mere possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition is a criminal offense under PD 1866. De Guzman was caught by
the police officers in flagrante delicto while carrying a firearm without the
necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was in violation of PD 1866, Section 1,
at the time of the arrest. Necessarily, the search conducted immediately after
De Guzman's arrest was valid. Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court
provides that "a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. The legal parameters of this rule limit its
application to instances when the search is made contemporaneous to the
arrest and within a permissible area of search." In this case, it was impossible
for the police officers to obtain a search warrant as they were merely on
surveillance, and to do so might abort any possible illegal activity that was
taking place. Any attempt at leaving the place may cause them to lose sight
of the accused-appellant altogether. Second, their presence in the area was
not planned as they acted purely on a tip given by a fellow officer. Further,
there was not enough opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant as the surveillance was conducted from 10:00 p.m. up to 7:00 a.m.
The search conducted immediately after de Guzman was apprehended was
made more necessary by the presence of his companion inside the cottage
which was just a few steps away from where he stood. The presence of de
Guzman's companion posed a danger to the police officers' life and limb,
hence, it became necessary for them to locate him. Upon entry at the rented
cottage, the police officers saw the shabu and drug- related paraphernalia
scattered on top of the table. Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personality
despite absence of warrant under the "plain view doctrine," so long as the
area of search is within the immediate control of the arrested person and
that the object of the search was open to the eye, as in the present case. 202
People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993] First Division, Grino-
Aquino (J): 3 concur Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly
started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerente's house which is
about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her
house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention
to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying,
"Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace." Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and
Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the
same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the
first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he
fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter,
the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At
about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela
Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the
victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim
died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused
by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with
Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo
de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of
wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They
were informed by Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen
proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 97 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Patrolman
Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained
dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist
found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was apprehended by the police.
The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On 2 May
1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA 6425, and
for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to
both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990,
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found
Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day,
as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder
for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. . Gerente appealed. Issue: Whether the police officers have the
personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to allow them to arrest, and the
subsequent searchly Gerente’s person, without the necessary warrant. Held:
The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it;" The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death:
a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of
the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant,
he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted
on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident
to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and
search of Gerente's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is
about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. 203 People vs. Sinoc [GR 113511-12, 1 July 1997] Third Division,
Narvasa (CJ): 4 concur Facts: On 20 September 1991, at about 6:00 a.m.,
Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoring
from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte) to
Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (DFX-
397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were
approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by several
armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New
People's Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed.
When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered
Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their
back to a coconut grove some 6 meters from the road, and after making
them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis
miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the
spot. At about 7 a.m. the following day, a secret informant (known as a
"civilian asset") named Boyet reported to the police Station at Monkayo,
Davao del Norte that the stolen ("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked behind
the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at
Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station Commander, a police
team Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 98 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) went to
the place. They saw the "Pajero" and, their initial inquiries having yielded the
information that the man who had brought it there would return that
morning, posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some 3
hours later, at about 10:30 a.m., they saw a man approach the "Pajero" who,
on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that
the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Norte, had the key of the
"Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain companions who were
waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the
recovered "Pajero," the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only
to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turned over
Sinoc to the 459th Mobile Force, together with the "Pajero." Sinoc, Vicente
Salon @ "Dodong," Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime Jornales @ "James,"
Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-Gren," and one Roger Doe @ "Ram" (at large)
were charged on 23 January 1992. Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were
arraigned, on 14 July 1992, the other accused being then at large. Assisted by
their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and
were thereafter jointly tried. On 7 October 1993, the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 30, found Sinoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two
cases jointly tried: one, of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 2 and 48 3 of the Revised
Penal Code) — in Criminal Case 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of
kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6 4 and 48 of the
same Code) — in Criminal Case 3565. In each case, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed on him. Salon, on the other hand was acquitted
inasmuch as conspiracy was not proven. Sinoc appealed. Issue: Whether the
police officer had personal knowledge of the crime Sinoc committed to allow
them to arrest the latter without a warrant of arrest. Held: The law provides
that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter
alia. "When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it." There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that
an offense had just been committed; i.e., that some 12 hours earlier, a
"Pajero" belonging to a private company had been stolen ("carnapped") and
its driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on
the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer ("asset") had
reported that the stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss Housing Project at
Monkayo. It was precisely to recover the "Pajero" that a team composed of
SPO1 Michael Aringo and "joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Moncayo
Police Station led by Insptr Eden T. Ugale," went to that place and, on taking
custody of the "Pajero," forthwith dispatched a radio message to "Higher
Headquarters" advising of that fact. There is no question either that when
SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the place where the "Pajero" was
parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind
which the vehicle was parked, that the man who had brought the "Pajero"
would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus described did in fact
show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as
"the one who rode on that car 'Pajero;'" just as there is no question that
when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the stolen
"Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take
possession of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum together with
another suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the
kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable. The
foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest
Sinoc and take possession of the "Pajero." His arrest without warrant was
justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear duty to apprehend
him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable. 204 People vs.
Baula [GR 132671, 15 November 2000] Third Division, Vitug (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 13 December 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., Jupiter Caburao, allegedly
decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their
house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due
obligations at a store, about 1 1/2 kilometers away, owned by a certain
Brigida Tumamang. While traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter
allegedly noticed a commotion near the creek about 10 meters away from
him. He allegedly focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard
the commotion and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 99 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) saw Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a
person who was lying on the ground, while Robert Baula and Ruben Baula
stood as lookouts. The assault allegedly lasted for about 4minutes. The
Baulas and Dacucos allegedly fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter
with death if he were to divulge the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near
the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be his own mother. Her
head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her
brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his niece and nephew to the
house of a neighbor for their safety. For fear of reprisal from the Baulas, et.
al. and believing that the police would be able to solve the gory killing on
their own, Jupiter did not reveal the damage to either his relatives or the
police. About 2:00 a.m. of 14 December 1995, the police authorities, led by
SPO4 Fermin Mirande, went to the locus criminis, and took pictures of the
body of the victim. The investigation revealed that before the victim was
killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that the Baulas, et. al.
were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that, 15 minutes later, the Baulas, et.
al. also left. SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the
respective houses of accused-appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula
and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder.
Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula
turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut
of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall a
bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo,
together with the victim's dried blood samples, were sent on the same day to
the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for forensic
examination. The results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains
found in the bolo, the bloodstains on the polo shirt and the bloodstains on
the pair of short pants had the same type "O" blood as that of the victim. On
7 August 1996, Crisanto Baula, Ruben Baula, Robert Baula and Danilo
Dacucos were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. When arraigned, the accused all entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial shortly thereafter ensued. The
Baulas, et. al. denied their involvement in Patrocinia’s killing. The trial court
rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997, convicting Baula, et. al. of the
crime charged, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Patrocinia Caburao (a)
50,000.00 for the death of Patrocinia Caburao; (b) P15,000.00 for funeral
expenses; (c) moral damages of P75,000.00; and (d) to pay proportionally the
costs. Baula, et. al. appealed. Issue: Whether the Baulas can be arrested
without warrant for the killing of Petrocinia Caburao, and whether seizures
can be effected pursuant to such arrests. Held: The proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, and the Court has had
occasions to rule that a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid
under certain circumstances. There can, for instance, be a lawful warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rules 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in
"plain view," its elements being extant; or search of a moving vehicle; or
consented search; or customs search. The situation here in question,
however, can hardly come within the purview of any of the established
exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest
itself must have to be effected under the circumstances enumerated by law.
One such case is when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the
peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben
Baula were not being arrested at the time that the bloodstained bolo, polo
shirt and short pants were allegedly taken from them but were just being
questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the
death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime.
Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were
thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. The
police officers acted on a mere suspicion that Baula, et. al. could be
responsible for the commission of the crime and only because of their being
at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the
requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be
undertaken Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 100 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that
search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution
that the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged
consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption by
itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. 205 People vs.
Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July 2001] En Banc, Mendoza (J): 12 concur, 1 on
official business, 1 on leave Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt.
Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call
that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard
in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1
Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo,
responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his
tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana
took pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on the handle
of the tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to
divulge his name, told him that Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin Jr. and the victim
were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio
near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away
from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to
the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe.
Garcellano described Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned, and
mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants.
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce."
Armando Plata, who knew where Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1
Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubin's house in Garcia Extension,
Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the door for about 3 minutes before it
was opened by a man who answered the description given by Danet
Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The police operatives
identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in
connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied
involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
permission to enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that
upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name
"Hanes" and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the shirt's
hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he
said that he found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two
spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he
conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for
purposes of identification. There, Cubcubin was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victim's companion. The police investigators asked
Cubcubin where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused
to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought the latter's permission to go
back to his house to conduct a further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo,
and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. Inside the house, they saw Cubcubin's 11-
year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water container
(drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38
revolver (six shooter), without a serial number. He found the gun loaded with
five live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials "RDE" (for
Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object.
While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3
Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala. The .38 caliber gun, the white
"Hanes" t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all photographed.
Cubcubin was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed
along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for the crime of
murder. On 5 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
found Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether there was "probable
cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe
that Cubcubin committed the crime, to allow them to conduct the latter's
warrantless arrest. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 101 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Held: Rule 113, §5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another." Under §5(b), two conditions
must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. It has been held that "personal knowledge of
facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Herein,
the arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim was killed. There
was no "probable cause, however, for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the
arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime. The two did
not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they
allegedly inferred that Cubcubin was probably guilty was based entirely on
what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP
station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997 and
reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said
city; by an alleged witness who saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of
the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that
the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned
and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle
driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description
given by Garcellano fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew
where Cubcubin lived and accompanied them to Cubcubin's house. Thus,
PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them
by others. Be that as it may, Cubcubin cannot now question the validity of his
arrest without a warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the
charge when arraigned on 11 November 1997. Cubcubin did not object to the
arraignment, and thus has waived the right to object to the legality of his
arrest. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house was illegal and,
consequently, the things obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the
white "Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are
inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber
gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing Cubcubin to the
Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet
Garcellano as the victim's companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked
Cubcubin where he hid the gun used in killing the victim. According to SPO1
Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin refused to answer, he sought Cubcubin's
permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber revolver
on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was
purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon
it. Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt
placed on top of the divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it
incriminating in nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that
it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed his attention to
take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt, it is not visible
that there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt merely had some small specks
of blood at its lower portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to link
Cubcubin directly to the crime. 206 People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4
February 1992] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: [Prosecution]
At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong
Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B.
Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a
team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was given P200.00 in
different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with
ultraviolet powder at the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 102 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe
gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to
look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to
Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked
Segovia where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia
left for a while and when he returned, he was accompanied by a man who
was later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza. After agreeing on the
price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle
driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia.
When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a
plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment
therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a
report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on that information,
Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the
suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe
proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio
Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed
with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. The
arrests were brought to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter,
agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house
of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father. Taduran did not go with them. During
the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any
search warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from
detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on
the other hand, claimed that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in
San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the
place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that their
father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Rodrigueza went
to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987.
When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was
made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for
examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was
detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit
his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. On 10 July 1987, Don
Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100
grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100
grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00. During the
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them.
The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425, as amended) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres.
Rodrigueza appealed. Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodrigueza’s arrest is
material in determining his culpability in the crime charged. Held: As
provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government
authority. True, in some instances, the Court has allowed government
authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant.
Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such
incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on
vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in
cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even
without a search warrant. Herein, however, the raid conducted by the
NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under
any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodrigueza's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it
been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they
easily could, have first secured Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 103 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) a search warrant during that time. Further, the
inconsistencies made by prosecution witnesses give more credibility to the
testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodrigueza's defense
amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal
prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the
truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of 1
July 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza was not with
them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents. Hence,
Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure of the
prosecution to establish its cause. 207 Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837,
11 February 1992] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 5 concur Facts: On 2 July 1991,
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y Tambunting entered Wilson St.,
where it is a one-way street and started traveling in the opposite or "wrong"
direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's
cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Go's car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting
and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a
9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed
that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police
returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from; they were informed that Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop
shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of
the credit card used by Go from the cashier of the bake shop. The security
guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of Go and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established
that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a manhunt for Go.
On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified Go as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly
filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis
Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the Presence of his lawyers. that
he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Go refused to execute any such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the
complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information
for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional
Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the
Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's
counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of
Go was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. On 12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V.
Pelayo (Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on the same date, approved the
cash bond posted by Go and ordered his release. Go was in fact released that
same day. On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court
a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in
the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. On the said date,
the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until
after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. On
17 July 1991, however, the Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1) recalling
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail: petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and cancelling
the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the Prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation: (3) treating Go's omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a petition for
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 104 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) bail and set for
hearing on 23 July 1991. On 19 July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July
1991 Order. Go also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition: this motion was,
however, denied by Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go surrendered to the
police. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, the Supreme Court remanded the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. On
16 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting Go's
arraignment on 23 August 1991. On 19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, Judge
Pelayo issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal
to admit Go into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go
was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial court then set the criminal case
for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17
October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. On 27 August 1991.
Go filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. On 30 August
1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. The petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for
habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution
denying Go's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion
had become moot and academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal
case commenced. On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
consolidated decision dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Go's
warrantless arrest was valid and Go's act of posting bail constituted waiver of
any irregularity attending his arrest, among others. On 3 October 1991, the
prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Go's Counsel
also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" with the trial court, with Go's
conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go filed the present petition for Review on
Certiorari. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing Judge
Pelayo to held in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until
further orders from the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Go was arrested
legally without warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus not entitled to
be released pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Held: Go's
warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5
of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that "A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Go's "arrest" took place 6
days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that Go was the gunman another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned
out to be registered in Go's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was
no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule
113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed,
Go was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of
the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in
all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 105 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) When the police filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon
Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the
erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required
Go to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not
been arrested; with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. 208
People vs. Calimlim [GR 123980, 30 August 2001] En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 14
concur Facts: Lanie S. Limin was 14 years old and had been living with the
family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years.
On the night of 2 April 1995, she was left alone in one of the two houses of
the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons of Manny and Cresencia,
were out for the night (disco). The Ferrers were in the other house about 15
meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened when she heard
somebody, later identified as Manuel Calimlim y Muyano, enter her room.
Calimlim immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said
"Accompany me because I killed my wife." She was then dragged to the pig
pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she
was again forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room and to
the kitchen. In each of these places, Calimlim forcibly had sexual intercourse
with her while he poked a knife against her neck. According to Limin, she first
recognized Calimlim while they were in the kitchen when she was able to
remove the cloth covering his face. She stated that she knew Calimlim
because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to
school. Limin claimed that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist because
she was afraid that appellant might kill her. After the fourth intercourse,
Calimlim threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents.
Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported
the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby. The rapes were reported to
the station of SPO1 Mario Suratos by Kagawad Ferrer. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer
conducted the physical examination on Lanie, and found that there was
minimal vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen, the
positions of which were at 9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock, all
fresh, indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours. There
was also a whitish vaginal discharge which was found positive for
spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim denied the accusations. Calimlim was charged
in 4 informations for rape in Criminal Cases U-8525, 8638 to 8640. On 17
November 1995, the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 46,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Calimlim guilty of 4 counts of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the offended party the
amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs, in each of the cases.
Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether Calimlim may raise the illegality
of the warrantless arrest conducted against him, especially as the arrest was
made a day after the crime was committed. Held: Calimlim avers that his
arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, 40 since his arrest was made one day
after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant, although
the police had ample time to get one. This he claims is also in violation of
Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. But here it will be noted that Calimlim
entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape.
Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which
might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his liberty.
This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that "the failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and
(i) of section 3 of this Rule." Given the circumstances of his case,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 106 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the exceptions
do not apply here and the Court is constrained to rule that Calimlim is
estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
The defense's claim of warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot render void
all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of Calimlim,
nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to his culpability. 209 People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26
May 1993] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur Facts: At about 6:30 p.m. of 25
October 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat.
Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched
to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato
Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer. On that
occasion the policemen saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked
money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with
the money and returned 10 minutes later with a wrapped object which he
gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him
under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent
laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops
weighing 22 grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house at
20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he
called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate.
Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the
policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right
front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal.
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile
refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer. Antonio
Enrile y Villaroman and Rogelio Abugatal y Marquez were charged for
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The RTC, after trial and on 14 February 1986, found Enrile and Abugatal
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to life imprisonment
and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed. Abugatal, however, was killed in an
attempted jailbreak and thus the appeal is dismissed as to him. Issue:
Whether the mark money found in Enrile’s possession, pursuant to a
warrantless arrest, search and seizure, provide for his criminal culpability.
Held: It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen
as he sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the
entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's
house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even
assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's
warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless arrest only
under any of the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in
point because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no
personal knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. According to
the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal
who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this
reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately arrested him.
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the
basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with such authority,
proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no
right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and
subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of
the marked money on him did Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 107 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The
marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone
would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. 210
People vs. Pasudag [GR 128822, 4 May 2001] First Division, Pardo (J): 4
concur Facts: On 26 September 1995, at around 1:30 p.m., SPO2 Pepito Calip
of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng
operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school.
About 5 meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There
were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired
from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The
storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag y Bokang owned it. SPO2 Calip
went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero.
The latter dispatched a team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3
Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 p.m.,
the team arrived at Brgy. Artacho and went straight to the house of Pasudag.
SPO3 Fajarito looked for Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his
backyard garden which was about 5 meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana
plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of
Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted 7
marijuana plants. The team brought Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the
police station. On 17 December 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan Emiliano M. Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Pangasinan, Urdaneta an Information charging Pasudag with violation of RA
6425, Sec. 9. On 10 February 1997, the trial court arraigned the accused. He
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Branch
46, Urdaneta found Pasudag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
cultivation of marijuana and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of
the law. Pasudag appealed. Issue: Whether time was of the essence to
uproot and confiscate the marijuana plants. Held: As a general rule, the
procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual.
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." Any
evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. Herein, the
police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search
warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some
plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of
the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old
and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on
that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants, the seized
plants are inadmissible in evidence against Pasudag. 211 People vs.
Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur Facts:
Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC
officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his
bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a "thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and
trial proceeded only against Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 108 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sentenced to
life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. Issue: Whether there was ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against Aminnudin, for alleged
possession and transport of illegal drugs. Held: It is not disputed, and in fact
it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was
carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was
arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest (this was
the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.),
another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25." There was no
warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant. The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head
of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search
warrant was not necessary." 212 People vs. Plana [GR 128285, 27 November
2001] En Banc, Per Curiam. 15 concur. Facts: On 23 September 1994, at
around 10:30 a.m., Felix Lagud was walking at the feeder road in Barangay
Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. He just came from his farm in Alipasyawan, Dumarao
and was on his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. A movement at about 50
meters to his left side caught his attention. He saw 3 persons who seemed to
be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see them more clearly.
From about a distance of 20 meters, he saw the 3 men holding a girl while
another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was later
stabbed. Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away. He
intended to go straight home but when he passed by the house of Porferio
Haguisan, the latter invited him for a "milagrosa." Lagud obliged and stayed
at the house of his "kumpare" until 2:00 a.m. On 26 September 1994, the
victim, Helen Perote, was found dead by her brother and the police in Brgy.
Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body was in prone position and was already in an
advance state of decomposition. Lagud identified Antonio Plana (@
"Catong"), Edgardo Perayra and Rene Saldevea as the three men who were
holding the girl while their fourth companion was raping her. At the time of
the incident, he did not yet recognize the fourth man who was on top of the
girl. However, when he saw Plana, et. al. at the municipal hall where they
were brought when they were arrested on 26 September 1994, he identified
the fourth man to be Richard Banday. On the other hand, per the post
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Ricardo Betita, Rural Health Officer of
Cuartero, Capiz, the victim sustained the following injuries: (1) Clean edges
stab wound 2x5 cm left anterior chest; (2) Avulsion with irregular edges
wound 8x12 cm middle chest area; (3) Avulsion of the nose and upper lip
portion/area; (4) Clean edges wound or stab wound 2x5 cm epigastric area;
(5) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left hypogastric area; (6) Clean edges stab
wound 2x5 cm hypogastric area; (7) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left
posterior upper back; (8) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm mid upper portion
of the back; (9) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior back level of
8th ribs; (10) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left back level of left lumbar
area; (11) Clean edges wound 2x5 cm middle low back area; (12) Clean edges
wound 2x5 cm right low back area at level of lumbar area; (13) Clean edges
wound 2x5 cm left gluteal area near the anus; (14) Vagina: Introitus can
easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with laceration 3 and 9 o'clock (old
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 109 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) laceration)
and on the state of decomposition; and that the most probable cause of
death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss secondary to multiple stab
wounds. According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than 72 hours already
before the police authorities found her body. An information was filed
against Plana, et. al. for the crime of rape with homicide before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City (Criminal Case 4659). At their
arraignment, Plana, et. al. pleaded not guilty. On 23 November 1996, after
due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding Plana, et. al.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The trial
court imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, and ordered them
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim, Helen Perote, P25,000.00
as actual damages and P50,000.00 as civil liability. Hence, the automatic
review. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of
the police authorities in detaining Plana, et. al. without benefit of Court filed
information nor judicial order of detention as well as violation of their
constitutional rights during their so-called custodial invitation and
interrogation. Held: Plana, et. al. already waived their right to question the
irregularity, if any, in their arrest. They respectively entered a plea of "not
guilty" at their arraignment. By so pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. 213
People vs. Conde [GR 113269, 10 April 2001] Second Division, Quisumbing (J):
4 concur Facts: On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was
home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in
Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian nationals (bombay) on a
motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked a gun at the two Indians while his
three companions (Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and
another unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis took the
goods which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the
stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street.
PO3 Rodencio Sevillano of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of
the PNP, Kalookan City investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the police
arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police recovered the weapons used in the
robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police station
to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a
routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a
search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched
the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde,
Perez and Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The
accused entered pleas of not guilty. On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the
victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00. Conde,
et. al. appealed. However, the counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M.
Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his
appeal. The decision of the trial court became final and executory with
respect to Perez. Hence the present appeal concerns only Atis and Conde,
who filed their separate briefs. Issue: Whether the illegal warrantless arrest,
which was waived, is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of error. Held: The
arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they
were seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police
were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when
an arrest can be made without warrant, namely: (a) When, in his presence
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 110 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. None of the above
circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al. were merely walking along
Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be
said that the crime had just been committed as 5 days had already passed
from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the
arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge, as PO3
Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero
and certain unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police
more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply
for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde, et. al., provided in Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did not
assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to
their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if
he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. When they entered their pleas on arraignment without
invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have
accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or
irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they
entered their pleas. It is much too late for them to raise the question of their
warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment
constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free
from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and
his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to their culpability. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 111 )
214 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate court [GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
Second Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: In the morning of 22
October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of Pintor's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come
to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, Gaanan went to the office of Laconico where he
was briefed about the problem. When Pintor called up, Laconico requested
Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault. 20 minutes later, Pintor called up again to
ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered "Yes."
Pintor then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that Pintor himself should
receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Gaanan
executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion
which he filed against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without Pintor's consent, Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower
court, in a decision dated 22 November 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200. The two were
each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the
decision, Gaanan appealed to the appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
listening in an extension telephone renders one liable under the wire-tapping
law. Held: There is no question that the telephone conversation between
Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from
words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of
the parties gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's
message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand
for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct
assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if
he knew that another lawyer was also listening. However, an extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension herein was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers
intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan
thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. 215 Katz s. United States [389 US 347, 18 December
1967] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Stewart (J)
Facts: Katz was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of
California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in
violation of a federal statute (18 U.S.C. 1084). At trial the Government was
permitted, over Katz's objection, to introduce evidence of Katz's end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his
conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings
had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here
was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." Issue:
Whether the Government’s eavesdropping activities violated Katz’ privacy
(while using a telephone booth). Held: The Government's eavesdropping
activities violated the privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than
places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is
no longer controlling. What Katz sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed
his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he
might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication. Further, although the surveillance in this case may have
been so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been
authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant
procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. 216 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 93833, 28 September
1995] First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: A civil case for
damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim,
Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a
result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case
before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." Ramirez was
charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the
violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court's
Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, which forthwith Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of 3 May
1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 19 June 1990. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the party sought to
be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication Held: Section 1 of
RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described." The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said provision of RA 4200. Further,
the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the
contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. 217 In RE Laureta [GR
68635, 12 March 1987] Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam. 14 concur, 1 took no
part Facts: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent
to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and
a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance
of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution (in GR
68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed), Eva Maravilla
Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that "we are pursuing further
remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold
responsible members of the First Division who participated in the
promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the
members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others,
none of the division members are above the law." True to her threats, after
having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Maravilla-Ilustre filed on 16
December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging
some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making"
her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates; charging some Justices of
the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20
January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith"; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing
the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their "unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." Atty. Laureta reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized
in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished the
Supreme Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily
Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading:
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES" thereby making it unjustly
appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the other respondents
were Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) charged
with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a
disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in the
Supreme Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
dismissed Maravilla-Ilustre's Complaint. In the Resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it required (1) Eva Maravilla Ilustre to
show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she should not be held in
contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme
Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements,
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety
and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days
from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the
official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with
the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public
confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. Issue:
Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices sre matters
shielded bythe constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and
are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of
those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en
banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial
acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court
that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of 28
October 1986, Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta would realize the unjustness and
unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in
the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper
motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity
of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or
right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the
Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the
Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of
respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land
by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting
and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements,
conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his
disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find
disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in
the Supreme Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the
Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme
Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft
and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a
tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has
been brought thrice before the Supreme Court, and who would readily
accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts
concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and
of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the
Courts. 218 People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987] En Banc,
Melencio-Herrera (J): 13 concur Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at
about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper
Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of Romeo
Lawi-an, when Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Alexander Albofera called him and informed him they would run after
somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once
to the house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was
around making a list of people engaged in "caingin." Whereupon, Albofera
asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to
overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the
road. Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons
were already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy
Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began
questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he
was there to inspect the "caingin" as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an,
alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the
forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did not join the
group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group
returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio. Albofera's hands, as well
as alias Jun's hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera
warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to
any person or the military. The following day, at about 9:00 a.m., Efren
Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called
him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an told him that the forester was
already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise
he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not
reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981,
Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a
CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in
the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police
authorities arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the two, shortly
after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang
where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the
forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where
the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera
executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge,
stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his
life; that said group had ordered the "arrest" of Carancio which sentenced
the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while
under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter
testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial
evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both
Albofera and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered
them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 "by
way of moral as well as actual damages" in its Decision of 5 October 1984.
Hence, the mandatory review. Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma
should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or
invasion of the accused’s privacy. Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on the security of
a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that
letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure
nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his
testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the
letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera
stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of
his culpability. 219 Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February
1996] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 3 concur Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife
of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against
her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents
and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to
the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other. 220 Deano vs. Godinez [GR L-19518, 28
November 1964] En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 10 concur Facts: On or about
20 March 1956, Diogenez Godinez, as a responsible public school official,
wrote a letter to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate
superior officer, in essence that "Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño, as the school dentist
of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating
therein a contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the
dental-medical drive, when she knew well that the drive included the Boy
Scout Rally of the district; that in view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping
critic, a fault finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be
potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds; and thus the
lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school year as
she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated.
Deaño, assisted by her husband Manuel Deaño, filed an action for damages
against Godinez before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte based
on a communication sent by the latter as district supervisor to his immediate
superior, the Division Superintendent of Schools. Trinidad claims that, with
malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted
administrative practices, Godinez wrote the aforesaid communication making
therein statements which are contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby causing irreparable
damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason
she asks that she be paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees for bringing the
present action. Godibnez moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the letter Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
complained of is a privileged communication and the action has already
prescribed. The motion was upheld, and the trial court dismissed the
complaint. Deano appealed. Issue: Whether the letter in which the alleged
defamatory statements appear partake of the nature of a privileged
communication. Held: The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon
public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Public policy is the
foundation of the doctrine of privilege communications. It is based upon the
recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from
the publication or untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not
absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order to
accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good
faith believing themselves to have, knowledge to such wrong doing, to
perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge or belief,
without restraining them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently
or honestly made, may subject them to punishment for defamation, the
doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. Herein, the communication
denounced as defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate superior
in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in
the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a matter
contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report
submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so Godinez
employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable
in the interest of public policy. The letter sent by Godinez being a privileged
communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice. It being a
communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable
for damages. 221 Waterous Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) [GR 113271, 16 October 1997] First Division, Davide Jr.
(J): 4 concur Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico
received a memorandum from Waterous Vice President-General Manager
Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable
to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards
the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven
"obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when
she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Department,
Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, Waterous Supervisor
Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines
without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control Clerk
Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding
the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked
Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms.
Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. Forthwith, in her
memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within 24
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time
to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. In a letter
dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Sales Invoice 266
for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she
protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990,
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred
that the preventive suspension was illmotivated, as it sprang from an earlier
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office
of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex
Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against Waterous.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to
"prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause
and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the
parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at
one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and
the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days
work"; for a total of P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the
decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside. In its decision of 30 September
1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from
her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but
modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the
special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is
contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a
person’s right to privacy of communication. Held: In light of the decision in
the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication, and
Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process.
Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge
against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative
if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. Although
Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The
Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidence in [Waterous] possession,"
which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidence" other than the
sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's
dismissal then was grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify
an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. Thus,
the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason
for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against
Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which was set aside. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 222 Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States
[251 US 385, 25 January 1920] Holmes (J) Facts: An indictment upon a single
specific charge having been brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his
father (of Silverthorne Lumber Co.), they both were arrested at their homes
early in the morning of February 25, and were detained in custody a number
of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department
of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went
to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books,
papers and documents found there. All the employes were taken or directed
to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also
the books, &c., were taken at once. An application was made as soon as
might be to the District Court for a return of what thus had been taken
unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had found
evidence against Silverthorne, and it was stated that the evidence so
obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District
Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act by an invalid
subpoena for certain documents relating to the charge in the indictment
then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired through the
wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government
planned or at all events ratified the whole performance. Photographs and
copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed
based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return
of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to
produce the originals then were served and on the refusal of the
Silverthornes to produce them the Court made an order that the subpoenas
should be complied with, although it had found that all the papers had been
seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this
order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form
repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to
avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it
would not have had. Issue: Whether the exclusion of papers acquired in
illegal search and seizure applies also their copies. Held: It is that although of
course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may
study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form
to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act, to be sure, had established
that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it
is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean
that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot
be used by it in the way proposed. The numberous decisions, like Adams v.
New York (192 U.S. 585) holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in
which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised
for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is
explained in Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383). Whether some of those
decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to
inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is
stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States (233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A.
367). In Linn v. United States (251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A. 470), it was
thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it
was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if
the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. 223 People vs.
Aruta [GR 120915, 13 April 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 13
December 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the
following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 p.m.
of 14 December 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.
Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO
printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 p.m. of the same day from where two females and a male got
off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling
Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. Having ascertained that Rosa
Aruta y Menguin was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about
the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection,
the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Upon
examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Aruta was charged with
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." Aruta claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater
where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an
old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them
to the NARCOM Office. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Aruta appealed. Issue: Whether the plea
of “not guilty” during Aruta’s arraigment effectly waived the non-
admissibility of the evidence acquired in the invalid warrantless search and
seizure. Held: Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in
Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it can be said that the
State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects,
and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches
and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Therewithal,
the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.
To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back
a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often
violated. While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment
and by actively participating in the trial, Aruta may be deemed to have
waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply
herein for the following reasons: (1) The waiver would only apply to
objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty"
and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to
the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would
not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence
into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far. (2) Granting
that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible
upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that
accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) objected and opposed the
prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. As held in People vs. Barros, waiver
of the non-admissibility of the " fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of
a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In fine, there was really no excuse
for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that
they had more than 24 hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible
subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 224
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] En Banc, Per curiam: 15
concur Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late
from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was
not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask
for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan
to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00
a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo
started on his way home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house,
Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the
artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the
school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing
that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong
continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men
decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search
anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they
found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the
canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely
bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A
blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5
policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They
found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as
hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he
had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the
artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in
Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's
body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero.
Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of
Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife,
Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked
about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their
quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were
found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with
hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30
March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to
the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination
on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of
the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while
the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics
to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial
court issued an order modifying its earlier Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed. Issue:
Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are
admissible as evidence. Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance,
substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as
evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of
the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the
bloodstained undershirt and short pants taken from Rondero are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant
from the police officers. Rondero's wife testified that the police officers, after
arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline
without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. Simply put, Rondero's garments, having been seized
in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are
inadmissible in court as evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission
of the bloodied garments of Rondero as corroborative evidence, the
circumstances obtaining against Rondero are sufficient to establish his guilt.
225 Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988] En Banc, Yap (J): 10 concur, 1
concurs in separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: The
case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino,
Noel Etabag, Danilo De La Fuente, Belen DiazFlores, Manuel Mario Guzman,
Alan Jazminez, Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando
Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo Tabara, Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca
Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila." Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with
said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et.
al. were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.'s
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla,
Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj.
Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo
Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought
actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in
the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss. On 8 November Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding, issued
a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order
dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983,
respectively. On 15 December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising,
"to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the]
aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and
to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted Aberca, et.
al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of
the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by
Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In
an order dated 11 May 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding,
without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983, issued
an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al.
for failure to move for reconsideration nor to interpose an appeal therefrom.
Assailing the said order of 11 May 1984, Anerca, et. al. filed a motion for
reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21 September 1984, the
court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984
declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November
1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8
November 1983 granting Ver, et. al.'s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985,
Aberca, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid
search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional rights or liberties of
another in general. Held: It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation 2054 of President Marcos,
despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military,
owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which
renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor.
However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start
to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure
in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was
callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations
of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators
of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article
32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Further, the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.'s right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause
of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year." Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.'s right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of Ver, et. al.'s
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.

214 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate court [GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
Second Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: In the morning of 22
October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of Pintor's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come
to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, Gaanan went to the office of Laconico where he
was briefed about the problem. When Pintor called up, Laconico requested
Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault. 20 minutes later, Pintor called up again to
ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered "Yes."
Pintor then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that Pintor himself should
receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Gaanan
executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion
which he filed against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without Pintor's consent, Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower
court, in a decision dated 22 November 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200. The two were
each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the
decision, Gaanan appealed to the appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
listening in an extension telephone renders one liable under the wire-tapping
law. Held: There is no question that the telephone conversation between
Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from
words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of
the parties gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's
message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand
for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct
assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if
he knew that another lawyer was also listening. However, an extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension herein was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers
intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan
thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. 215 Katz s. United States [389 US 347, 18 December
1967] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Stewart (J)
Facts: Katz was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of
California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in
violation of a federal statute (18 U.S.C. 1084). At trial the Government was
permitted, over Katz's objection, to introduce evidence of Katz's end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his
conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings
had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here
was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." Issue:
Whether the Government’s eavesdropping activities violated Katz’ privacy
(while using a telephone booth). Held: The Government's eavesdropping
activities violated the privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than
places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is
no longer controlling. What Katz sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed
his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he
might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication. Further, although the surveillance in this case may have
been so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been
authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant
procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. 216 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 93833, 28 September
1995] First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: A civil case for
damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim,
Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a
result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case
before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." Ramirez was
charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the
violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court's
Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, which forthwith Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of 3 May
1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 19 June 1990. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the party sought to
be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication Held: Section 1 of
RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described." The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said provision of RA 4200. Further,
the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the
contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. 217 In RE Laureta [GR
68635, 12 March 1987] Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam. 14 concur, 1 took no
part Facts: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent
to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and
a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance
of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution (in GR
68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed), Eva Maravilla
Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that "we are pursuing further
remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold
responsible members of the First Division who participated in the
promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the
members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others,
none of the division members are above the law." True to her threats, after
having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Maravilla-Ilustre filed on 16
December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging
some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making"
her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates; charging some Justices of
the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20
January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith"; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing
the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their "unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." Atty. Laureta reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized
in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished the
Supreme Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily
Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading:
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES" thereby making it unjustly
appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the other respondents
were Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) charged
with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a
disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in the
Supreme Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
dismissed Maravilla-Ilustre's Complaint. In the Resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it required (1) Eva Maravilla Ilustre to
show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she should not be held in
contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme
Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements,
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety
and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days
from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the
official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with
the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public
confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. Issue:
Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices sre matters
shielded bythe constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and
are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of
those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en
banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial
acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court
that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of 28
October 1986, Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta would realize the unjustness and
unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in
the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper
motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity
of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or
right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the
Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the
Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of
respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land
by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting
and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements,
conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his
disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find
disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in
the Supreme Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the
Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme
Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft
and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a
tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has
been brought thrice before the Supreme Court, and who would readily
accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts
concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and
of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the
Courts. 218 People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987] En Banc,
Melencio-Herrera (J): 13 concur Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at
about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper
Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of Romeo
Lawi-an, when Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Alexander Albofera called him and informed him they would run after
somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once
to the house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was
around making a list of people engaged in "caingin." Whereupon, Albofera
asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to
overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the
road. Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons
were already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy
Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began
questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he
was there to inspect the "caingin" as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an,
alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the
forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did not join the
group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group
returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio. Albofera's hands, as well
as alias Jun's hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera
warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to
any person or the military. The following day, at about 9:00 a.m., Efren
Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called
him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an told him that the forester was
already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise
he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not
reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981,
Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a
CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in
the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police
authorities arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the two, shortly
after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang
where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the
forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where
the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera
executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge,
stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his
life; that said group had ordered the "arrest" of Carancio which sentenced
the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while
under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter
testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial
evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both
Albofera and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered
them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 "by
way of moral as well as actual damages" in its Decision of 5 October 1984.
Hence, the mandatory review. Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma
should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or
invasion of the accused’s privacy. Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on the security of
a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that
letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure
nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his
testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the
letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera
stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of
his culpability. 219 Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February
1996] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 3 concur Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife
of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against
her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents
and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to
the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other. 220 Deano vs. Godinez [GR L-19518, 28
November 1964] En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 10 concur Facts: On or about
20 March 1956, Diogenez Godinez, as a responsible public school official,
wrote a letter to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate
superior officer, in essence that "Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño, as the school dentist
of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating
therein a contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the
dental-medical drive, when she knew well that the drive included the Boy
Scout Rally of the district; that in view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping
critic, a fault finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be
potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds; and thus the
lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school year as
she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated.
Deaño, assisted by her husband Manuel Deaño, filed an action for damages
against Godinez before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte based
on a communication sent by the latter as district supervisor to his immediate
superior, the Division Superintendent of Schools. Trinidad claims that, with
malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted
administrative practices, Godinez wrote the aforesaid communication making
therein statements which are contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby causing irreparable
damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason
she asks that she be paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees for bringing the
present action. Godibnez moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the letter Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
complained of is a privileged communication and the action has already
prescribed. The motion was upheld, and the trial court dismissed the
complaint. Deano appealed. Issue: Whether the letter in which the alleged
defamatory statements appear partake of the nature of a privileged
communication. Held: The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon
public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Public policy is the
foundation of the doctrine of privilege communications. It is based upon the
recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from
the publication or untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not
absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order to
accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good
faith believing themselves to have, knowledge to such wrong doing, to
perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge or belief,
without restraining them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently
or honestly made, may subject them to punishment for defamation, the
doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. Herein, the communication
denounced as defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate superior
in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in
the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a matter
contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report
submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so Godinez
employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable
in the interest of public policy. The letter sent by Godinez being a privileged
communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice. It being a
communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable
for damages. 221 Waterous Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) [GR 113271, 16 October 1997] First Division, Davide Jr.
(J): 4 concur Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico
received a memorandum from Waterous Vice President-General Manager
Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable
to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards
the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven
"obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when
she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Department,
Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, Waterous Supervisor
Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines
without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control Clerk
Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding
the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked
Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms.
Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. Forthwith, in her
memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within 24
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time
to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. In a letter
dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Sales Invoice 266
for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she
protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990,
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred
that the preventive suspension was illmotivated, as it sprang from an earlier
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office
of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex
Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against Waterous.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to
"prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause
and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the
parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at
one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and
the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days
work"; for a total of P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the
decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside. In its decision of 30 September
1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from
her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but
modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the
special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is
contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a
person’s right to privacy of communication. Held: In light of the decision in
the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication, and
Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process.
Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge
against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative
if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. Although
Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The
Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidence in [Waterous] possession,"
which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidence" other than the
sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's
dismissal then was grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify
an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. Thus,
the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason
for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against
Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which was set aside. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 222 Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States
[251 US 385, 25 January 1920] Holmes (J) Facts: An indictment upon a single
specific charge having been brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his
father (of Silverthorne Lumber Co.), they both were arrested at their homes
early in the morning of February 25, and were detained in custody a number
of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department
of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went
to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books,
papers and documents found there. All the employes were taken or directed
to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also
the books, &c., were taken at once. An application was made as soon as
might be to the District Court for a return of what thus had been taken
unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had found
evidence against Silverthorne, and it was stated that the evidence so
obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District
Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act by an invalid
subpoena for certain documents relating to the charge in the indictment
then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired through the
wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government
planned or at all events ratified the whole performance. Photographs and
copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed
based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return
of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to
produce the originals then were served and on the refusal of the
Silverthornes to produce them the Court made an order that the subpoenas
should be complied with, although it had found that all the papers had been
seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this
order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form
repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to
avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it
would not have had. Issue: Whether the exclusion of papers acquired in
illegal search and seizure applies also their copies. Held: It is that although of
course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may
study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form
to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act, to be sure, had established
that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it
is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean
that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot
be used by it in the way proposed. The numberous decisions, like Adams v.
New York (192 U.S. 585) holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in
which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised
for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is
explained in Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383). Whether some of those
decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to
inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is
stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States (233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A.
367). In Linn v. United States (251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A. 470), it was
thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it
was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if
the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. 223 People vs.
Aruta [GR 120915, 13 April 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 13
December 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the
following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 p.m.
of 14 December 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.
Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO
printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 p.m. of the same day from where two females and a male got
off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling
Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. Having ascertained that Rosa
Aruta y Menguin was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about
the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection,
the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Upon
examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Aruta was charged with
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." Aruta claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater
where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an
old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them
to the NARCOM Office. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Aruta appealed. Issue: Whether the plea
of “not guilty” during Aruta’s arraigment effectly waived the non-
admissibility of the evidence acquired in the invalid warrantless search and
seizure. Held: Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in
Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it can be said that the
State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects,
and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches
and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Therewithal,
the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.
To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back
a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often
violated. While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment
and by actively participating in the trial, Aruta may be deemed to have
waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply
herein for the following reasons: (1) The waiver would only apply to
objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty"
and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to
the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would
not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence
into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far. (2) Granting
that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible
upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that
accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) objected and opposed the
prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. As held in People vs. Barros, waiver
of the non-admissibility of the " fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of
a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In fine, there was really no excuse
for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that
they had more than 24 hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible
subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 224
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] En Banc, Per curiam: 15
concur Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late
from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was
not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask
for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan
to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00
a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo
started on his way home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house,
Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the
artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the
school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing
that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong
continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men
decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search
anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they
found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the
canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely
bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A
blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5
policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They
found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as
hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he
had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the
artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in
Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's
body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero.
Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of
Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife,
Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked
about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their
quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were
found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with
hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30
March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to
the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination
on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of
the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while
the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics
to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial
court issued an order modifying its earlier Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed. Issue:
Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are
admissible as evidence. Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance,
substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as
evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of
the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the
bloodstained undershirt and short pants taken from Rondero are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant
from the police officers. Rondero's wife testified that the police officers, after
arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline
without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. Simply put, Rondero's garments, having been seized
in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are
inadmissible in court as evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission
of the bloodied garments of Rondero as corroborative evidence, the
circumstances obtaining against Rondero are sufficient to establish his guilt.
225 Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988] En Banc, Yap (J): 10 concur, 1
concurs in separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: The
case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino,
Noel Etabag, Danilo De La Fuente, Belen DiazFlores, Manuel Mario Guzman,
Alan Jazminez, Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando
Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo Tabara, Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca
Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila." Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with
said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et.
al. were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.'s
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla,
Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj.
Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo
Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought
actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in
the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss. On 8 November Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding, issued
a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order
dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983,
respectively. On 15 December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising,
"to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the]
aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and
to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted Aberca, et.
al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of
the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by
Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In
an order dated 11 May 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding,
without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983, issued
an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al.
for failure to move for reconsideration nor to interpose an appeal therefrom.
Assailing the said order of 11 May 1984, Anerca, et. al. filed a motion for
reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21 September 1984, the
court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984
declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November
1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8
November 1983 granting Ver, et. al.'s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985,
Aberca, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid
search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional rights or liberties of
another in general. Held: It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation 2054 of President Marcos,
despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military,
owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which
renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor.
However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start
to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure
in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was
callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations
of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators
of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article
32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Further, the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.'s right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause
of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year." Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.'s right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of Ver, et. al.'s
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.
214 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate court [GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
Second Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: In the morning of 22
October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of Pintor's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come
to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, Gaanan went to the office of Laconico where he
was briefed about the problem. When Pintor called up, Laconico requested
Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault. 20 minutes later, Pintor called up again to
ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered "Yes."
Pintor then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that Pintor himself should
receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Gaanan
executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion
which he filed against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without Pintor's consent, Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower
court, in a decision dated 22 November 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200. The two were
each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the
decision, Gaanan appealed to the appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
listening in an extension telephone renders one liable under the wire-tapping
law. Held: There is no question that the telephone conversation between
Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from
words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of
the parties gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's
message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand
for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct
assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if
he knew that another lawyer was also listening. However, an extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension herein was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers
intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan
thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. 215 Katz s. United States [389 US 347, 18 December
1967] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Stewart (J)
Facts: Katz was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of
California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in
violation of a federal statute (18 U.S.C. 1084). At trial the Government was
permitted, over Katz's objection, to introduce evidence of Katz's end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his
conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings
had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here
was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." Issue:
Whether the Government’s eavesdropping activities violated Katz’ privacy
(while using a telephone booth). Held: The Government's eavesdropping
activities violated the privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than
places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is
no longer controlling. What Katz sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed
his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he
might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication. Further, although the surveillance in this case may have
been so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been
authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant
procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. 216 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 93833, 28 September
1995] First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: A civil case for
damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim,
Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the
trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As a
result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case
before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." Ramirez was
charged of violation of the said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the
violation punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. From the trial court's
Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, which forthwith Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of 3 May
1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 19 June 1990. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the party sought to
be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication Held: Section 1 of
RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described." The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said provision of RA 4200. Further,
the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the
contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. 217 In RE Laureta [GR
68635, 12 March 1987] Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam. 14 concur, 1 took no
part Facts: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent
to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and
a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance
of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution (in GR
68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed), Eva Maravilla
Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that "we are pursuing further
remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold
responsible members of the First Division who participated in the
promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the
members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others,
none of the division members are above the law." True to her threats, after
having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Maravilla-Ilustre filed on 16
December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging
some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making"
her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates; charging some Justices of
the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20
January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith"; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing
the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their "unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." Atty. Laureta reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized
in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished the
Supreme Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily
Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading:
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES" thereby making it unjustly
appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the other respondents
were Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) charged
with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a
disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in the
Supreme Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
dismissed Maravilla-Ilustre's Complaint. In the Resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it required (1) Eva Maravilla Ilustre to
show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she should not be held in
contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme
Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements,
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety
and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days
from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the
official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with
the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public
confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. Issue:
Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices sre matters
shielded bythe constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and
are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of
those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en
banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial
acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court
that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of 28
October 1986, Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta would realize the unjustness and
unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in
the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper
motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity
of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or
right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the
Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the
Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of
respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land
by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting
and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements,
conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his
disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find
disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in
the Supreme Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the
Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme
Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft
and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a
tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has
been brought thrice before the Supreme Court, and who would readily
accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts
concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and
of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the
Courts. 218 People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987] En Banc,
Melencio-Herrera (J): 13 concur Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at
about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper
Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of Romeo
Lawi-an, when Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Alexander Albofera called him and informed him they would run after
somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once
to the house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was
around making a list of people engaged in "caingin." Whereupon, Albofera
asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to
overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the
road. Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons
were already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy
Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began
questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he
was there to inspect the "caingin" as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an,
alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the
forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did not join the
group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group
returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio. Albofera's hands, as well
as alias Jun's hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera
warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to
any person or the military. The following day, at about 9:00 a.m., Efren
Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called
him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an told him that the forester was
already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise
he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not
reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981,
Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a
CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in
the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police
authorities arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the two, shortly
after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang
where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the
forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where
the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera
executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge,
stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his
life; that said group had ordered the "arrest" of Carancio which sentenced
the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while
under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter
testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial
evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both
Albofera and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered
them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 "by
way of moral as well as actual damages" in its Decision of 5 October 1984.
Hence, the mandatory review. Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma
should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or
invasion of the accused’s privacy. Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on the security of
a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that
letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure
nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his
testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the
letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera
stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of
his culpability. 219 Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February
1996] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 3 concur Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife
of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against
her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents
and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to
the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other. 220 Deano vs. Godinez [GR L-19518, 28
November 1964] En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 10 concur Facts: On or about
20 March 1956, Diogenez Godinez, as a responsible public school official,
wrote a letter to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate
superior officer, in essence that "Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño, as the school dentist
of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating
therein a contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the
dental-medical drive, when she knew well that the drive included the Boy
Scout Rally of the district; that in view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping
critic, a fault finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be
potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds; and thus the
lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school year as
she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated.
Deaño, assisted by her husband Manuel Deaño, filed an action for damages
against Godinez before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte based
on a communication sent by the latter as district supervisor to his immediate
superior, the Division Superintendent of Schools. Trinidad claims that, with
malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted
administrative practices, Godinez wrote the aforesaid communication making
therein statements which are contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby causing irreparable
damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason
she asks that she be paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees for bringing the
present action. Godibnez moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the letter Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
complained of is a privileged communication and the action has already
prescribed. The motion was upheld, and the trial court dismissed the
complaint. Deano appealed. Issue: Whether the letter in which the alleged
defamatory statements appear partake of the nature of a privileged
communication. Held: The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon
public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Public policy is the
foundation of the doctrine of privilege communications. It is based upon the
recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from
the publication or untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not
absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order to
accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good
faith believing themselves to have, knowledge to such wrong doing, to
perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge or belief,
without restraining them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently
or honestly made, may subject them to punishment for defamation, the
doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. Herein, the communication
denounced as defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate superior
in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in
the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a matter
contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report
submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so Godinez
employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable
in the interest of public policy. The letter sent by Godinez being a privileged
communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice. It being a
communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable
for damages. 221 Waterous Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) [GR 113271, 16 October 1997] First Division, Davide Jr.
(J): 4 concur Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico
received a memorandum from Waterous Vice President-General Manager
Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable
to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards
the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven
"obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when
she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Department,
Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, Waterous Supervisor
Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines
without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control Clerk
Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding
the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked
Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms.
Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. Forthwith, in her
memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within 24
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time
to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. In a letter
dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Sales Invoice 266
for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she
protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990,
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred
that the preventive suspension was illmotivated, as it sprang from an earlier
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office
of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex
Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against Waterous.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to
"prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause
and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the
parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at
one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and
the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days
work"; for a total of P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the
decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside. In its decision of 30 September
1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from
her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but
modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the
special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is
contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a
person’s right to privacy of communication. Held: In light of the decision in
the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication, and
Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process.
Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge
against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative
if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. Although
Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The
Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidence in [Waterous] possession,"
which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidence" other than the
sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's
dismissal then was grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify
an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. Thus,
the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason
for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against
Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which was set aside. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 222 Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States
[251 US 385, 25 January 1920] Holmes (J) Facts: An indictment upon a single
specific charge having been brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his
father (of Silverthorne Lumber Co.), they both were arrested at their homes
early in the morning of February 25, and were detained in custody a number
of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department
of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went
to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books,
papers and documents found there. All the employes were taken or directed
to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also
the books, &c., were taken at once. An application was made as soon as
might be to the District Court for a return of what thus had been taken
unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had found
evidence against Silverthorne, and it was stated that the evidence so
obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District
Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act by an invalid
subpoena for certain documents relating to the charge in the indictment
then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired through the
wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government
planned or at all events ratified the whole performance. Photographs and
copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed
based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return
of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to
produce the originals then were served and on the refusal of the
Silverthornes to produce them the Court made an order that the subpoenas
should be complied with, although it had found that all the papers had been
seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this
order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form
repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to
avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it
would not have had. Issue: Whether the exclusion of papers acquired in
illegal search and seizure applies also their copies. Held: It is that although of
course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may
study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form
to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act, to be sure, had established
that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it
is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean
that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot
be used by it in the way proposed. The numberous decisions, like Adams v.
New York (192 U.S. 585) holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in
which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised
for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is
explained in Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383). Whether some of those
decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to
inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is
stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States (233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A.
367). In Linn v. United States (251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A. 470), it was
thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it
was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if
the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. 223 People vs.
Aruta [GR 120915, 13 April 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 13
December 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the
following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 p.m.
of 14 December 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.
Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO
printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 p.m. of the same day from where two females and a male got
off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling
Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. Having ascertained that Rosa
Aruta y Menguin was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about
the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection,
the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Upon
examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Aruta was charged with
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." Aruta claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater
where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an
old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them
to the NARCOM Office. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Aruta appealed. Issue: Whether the plea
of “not guilty” during Aruta’s arraigment effectly waived the non-
admissibility of the evidence acquired in the invalid warrantless search and
seizure. Held: Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in
Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it can be said that the
State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects,
and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches
and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Therewithal,
the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.
To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back
a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often
violated. While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment
and by actively participating in the trial, Aruta may be deemed to have
waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply
herein for the following reasons: (1) The waiver would only apply to
objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty"
and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to
the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would
not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence
into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far. (2) Granting
that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible
upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that
accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) objected and opposed the
prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. As held in People vs. Barros, waiver
of the non-admissibility of the " fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of
a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In fine, there was really no excuse
for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that
they had more than 24 hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible
subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 224
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] En Banc, Per curiam: 15
concur Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late
from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was
not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask
for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan
to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00
a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo
started on his way home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house,
Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the
artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the
school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing
that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong
continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men
decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search
anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they
found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the
canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely
bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A
blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5
policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They
found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as
hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he
had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the
artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in
Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's
body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero.
Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of
Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife,
Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked
about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their
quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were
found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with
hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30
March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to
the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination
on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of
the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while
the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics
to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial
court issued an order modifying its earlier Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed. Issue:
Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are
admissible as evidence. Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance,
substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as
evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of
the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the
bloodstained undershirt and short pants taken from Rondero are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant
from the police officers. Rondero's wife testified that the police officers, after
arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline
without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. Simply put, Rondero's garments, having been seized
in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are
inadmissible in court as evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission
of the bloodied garments of Rondero as corroborative evidence, the
circumstances obtaining against Rondero are sufficient to establish his guilt.
225 Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988] En Banc, Yap (J): 10 concur, 1
concurs in separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: The
case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino,
Noel Etabag, Danilo De La Fuente, Belen DiazFlores, Manuel Mario Guzman,
Alan Jazminez, Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando
Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo Tabara, Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca
Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila." Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with
said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et.
al. were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.'s
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla,
Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj.
Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo
Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought
actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in
the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss. On 8 November Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding, issued
a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order
dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983,
respectively. On 15 December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising,
"to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the]
aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and
to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted Aberca, et.
al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of
the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by
Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In
an order dated 11 May 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding,
without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983, issued
an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al.
for failure to move for reconsideration nor to interpose an appeal therefrom.
Assailing the said order of 11 May 1984, Anerca, et. al. filed a motion for
reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21 September 1984, the
court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984
declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November
1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8
November 1983 granting Ver, et. al.'s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985,
Aberca, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid
search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional rights or liberties of
another in general. Held: It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation 2054 of President Marcos,
despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military,
owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which
renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor.
However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start
to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person
"directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure
in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was
callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations
of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators
of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article
32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Further, the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.'s right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause
of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year." Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.'s right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of Ver, et. al.'s
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Herras
Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945] … 1 People vs. San Diego
[GR L-29676, 24 December 1968] … 1 Cortes vs. Catral [AM RTJ-97-1387, 10
September 1997] … 2 Lavides vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129670, 1 February
2000] … 3 Government of the United States of America, Represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, vs. Purganan [GR 148571, 24 September
2002] … 4 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995] … 6
Go vs. Bongolan [AM RTJ-99-1464, 26 July 1999] … 8 People vs. Gako [GR
135045, 15 December 2000] … 9 Marallag vs. Cloribel-Purungganan [AM 00-
1529-RTJ, 9 April 2002] … 11 Enrile vs. Salazar [GR 92163, 5 June 1990] … 13
People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991] … 14 People vs. Fortes [GR 91155,
25 June 1993] … 16 Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February
2000] … 17 Obosa vs. Court of Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] … 19
Villasenor vs. Abano [GR L-23599, 29 September 1967] … 21 De la Camara vs.
Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971] … 22 Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-
31665, 6 August 1975] … 23 Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June
2001] … 25 Cabañero vs. Cañon [AM MTJ-01-1369, 20 September 2001] … 26
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] … 26 This collection
contains twenty (20) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
266 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945] En Banc,
Hilado (J): 3 concur, 4 concur only in the result Facts: Haydee Herras
Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps,
United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the
Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29
December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs.
Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined in the Correctional
Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government
since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government.
On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto
Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the
provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon
which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively,
that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity
with the aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an
order be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her
person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo
Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order referring the
petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the
People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should
be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the
Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order
disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the
offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special
Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release."
Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate
Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition
for the writs of certiorari and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a
formal charge or information is filed against him. Held: Article III, section
1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail
shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against
whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays
down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed
under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim
this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until
he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed
if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under
a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason
for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may
even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place
the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the
least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor
of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article
III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of
one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained. 267 People vs.
San Diego [GR L-29676, 24 December 1968] En Banc, Capistrano (J): 9 concur,
1 took no part Facts: Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza,
Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco were Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) charged before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch (Criminal case Q-8711) as principals of the murder
of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men and craft or fraud. The
prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the
defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of
in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the
prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the
motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution
on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. Fiscal Oscar
Inocentes moved for reconsideration. Inocentes, for the People, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the order to
grant or deny bail (especially those involving capital punishment) should be
made only after the prosecution has presented its evidence. Held: Whether
the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in
the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
268 Cortes vs. Catral [AM RTJ-97-1387, 10 September 1997] Resolution En
Banc, Romero (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part Facts: A sworn letter complaint
was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of
Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he
granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v. Duerme, et al.,
Criminal Case 07-893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal
Case 08-866 for murder); (2) he reduced the bailbond granted by the
provincial prosecutor from P180,000 to P30,000 without hearing (Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of
Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond of P14,800 in a homicide case (Barangay
Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors
spreading that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s
house to get the envelop. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in
the allegations of the complainant that would warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against the judge. Issue: Whether Judge Catral is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in
Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866. Held: As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the
judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it
against the accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07-874 was
subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda does not completely exculpate
Judge Catral. The judge is not bound by the recommendation of the
prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses are
mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for determining
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The
procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the
accused in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be
arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. The right
to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be
curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-
866 without having conducted the requisite hearing. 269 Lavides vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 129670, 1 February 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4
concur Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to
the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by
Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first
time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date,
the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where
Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they
arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of
the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information
for violation of Article III, §5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was
filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
(Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the
Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had
sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in
prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual
intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate
applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an
order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-
70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his
arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must
therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and that
the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right
to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those
filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his
motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23
May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that
the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that
the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court,
in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash
the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and
then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the
"hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on
7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its
two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and
maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively.
While the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case
was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which
were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e.
that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during
the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings
of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia --
and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the court should impose the
condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these
cases before the bail can be granted. Held: In cases where it is authorized,
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment
of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage
of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be
held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides'
presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights. 270
Government of the United States of America, Represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, vs. Purganan [GR 148571, 24 September 2002] En
Banc, Panganiban (J): 8 concur, 2 filed separate opinions, 2 filed separate
dissenting opinions, 1 filed separate concurring opinion Facts: Pursuant to
the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale 0522
dated 16 June 1999, supplemented by Notes 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of
Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them
to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5
of Presidential Decree (PD) 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon
learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition
for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ
in a Petition before the Supreme Court in GR 139465. Initially, the Court -- by
a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution. By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding
no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which was Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
on 15 April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CRSEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title
18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343
and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and
2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code
Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1069. Before the RTC
could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Jimenez’s application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001.
In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court
a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The
alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Jimenez is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held:
Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person
who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested
by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to
bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion." Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That
the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. The
denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with
and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage
the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their
detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process is
broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has
no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. 271 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28
August 1995] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: On 28 January
1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information
as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of
members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6
October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially
indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe
And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of
the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only
one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually
convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at
large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely")
Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6
October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his
former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's
services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989
but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon
the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of
said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution
of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated
6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated 6 October 1992.
Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the
Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon.
Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen
B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19
April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information
against him. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served
on him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for
admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5
November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and
the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November 1992, the
trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then
confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated
Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo,
on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the
directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge. Upon Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo
announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On
that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court
admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day,
6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel
by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial
court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned
and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992
by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court
in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than
6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The resolution and the
order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24
November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for
review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the
custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail, and
whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutor’s
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or grant the
application of bail, respectively. Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore,
be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should
be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint
of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to
quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his
counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court
during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was
then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave
the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their
explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody
of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a
hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive
custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors
agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;
and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the
said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any
intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from
the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial
court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing
the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a
gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must
inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to
determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no
objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless
set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be
attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution
of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March 1993 abundantly
reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lower court exhausted all means to
convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary
of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after
sifting through them did the court conclude that Paderanga could be
provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since
then and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of
the conditions of his bail. 272 Go vs. Bongolan [AM RTJ-99-1464, 26 July
1999] Second Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On 10 November 1997, at
6:30 p.m. at Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra, Jaime Balmores, Butch Reynaldo,
PO1 Rolando Molina, Edgardo Cacal, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3
kidnapped Samuel Go and brought him outside the province of Abra by the
ue of a Nissan Sentra, Super Saloon bearing fictitious plate UGG 652 and
transferred Go at Pidigan, Abra to a Toyota Taxi bearing Plate PVB 169 with
markings "Naple Leaf" on both sides and were intercepted by San Esteban
PNP at San Esteban, Ilocos Sur where they recovered Go. On 13 November
1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Abra filed an information
against Balmores, et. al. charging them with kidnapping (Criminal Case 97-
123). The case was assigned to Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Bangued,
Abra presided by Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan. Since kidnapping with ransom
is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution
recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. On 5 January
1998, then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona created a panel of
prosecutors, consisting of Regional State Prosecutor of Region I Virgilio
Manipud, Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur Jessica Villoria, and Provincial
Prosecutor of Abra Rodor Gayao, to handle the investigation and prosecution
of the case. When trial commenced, the prosecution panel presented its
witnesses consisting of Samuel Go, the kidnap victim, Alfredo Go, an alleged
previous victim who was released after paying a P500,000.00 ransom money,
the Chief of Police of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, the Senior Inspector of the PNP
Provincial Command in Abra, and a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. After their testimonies, Balmores filed a "Motion for the
Amendment of the Information and for the Fixing of the Bail" alleging that
the evidence presented did not show that the kidnapping was for ransom. He
asked the prosecution to amend the information from kidnapping with
ransom to simple kidnapping to bring it within the ambit of bailable offenses
and enable him to post bail as a matter of right. On 20 May 1998, Judge
Bongolan issued an Order (1) denying the Motion to Amend the Information,
but (2) allowing Balmores to substantiate his "Motion to Fix Bail" and (3)
allowing Cacal and Molina to submit their own motion for admission to bail
with accompanying memorandum. Pursuant to the order, Molina and Cacal
filed their "Motion for Bail with Memorandum Thereof" which reiterated the
claim of Balmores that the prosecution failed to prove kidnapping for
ransom. The prosecution, in its "Opposition to Motion to Bail" dated June 2,
1998, maintained that it has established that the accused committed
kidnapping with ransom and that the Motion to bail is "prematurely filed
since they (sic) are still in the process of presenting further evidence to prove
that the crime had been committed by the accused." The next day, 3 June
1998, Judge Bongolan issued his Order granting the two applications for bail.
Judge Bongolan gave the prosecution 10 days to file its Motion for
Reconsideration which was submitted on 11 June 1998. It was accompanied
by a request to the Branch 2 Clerk of Court to set the motion for hearing on
23 June 1998 at 9:00 a.m. However, before the prosecution could submit said
motion, the accused were already released. It appears that in the morning of
10 June 1998, the bondsmen arrived in Branch 2 and did not find Judge
Bongolan. They proceeded to see Judge Alberto Benesa, who was then Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 1 and designated pairing Judge of Branch 2. The
bondsmen presented Judge Benesa with a copy of Judge Bongolan's Order
granting bail and fixing the amount at P50,000.00 for each of the accused.
Upon seeing that Judge Bongolan already approved the Motion for Bail,
Judge Benesa issued his order releasing the accused. On 23 June 1998, the
date set for the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution
informed Judge Bongolan that the accused had already been released by
Judge Benesa. Judge Bongolan stated that he was not aware of their release
as he was in the hospital when the release order was issued. In the afternoon
of 23 June 1998, Judge Bongolan issued his Order denying the prosecution's
Motion for Reconsideration. An administrative case was filed against Judges
Benjamin A. Bongolan and Alberto Benesa for usurpation and abuse of
authority, rendition of unjust order Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) and ignorance of the law in granting bail to several accused
charged with kidnapping for ransom. Issue: Whether it is necessary for the
prosecution to present all its witness ebfore the judge could resolve the
motion for bail, and whether the judge should set a bail hearing even if the
Provincial Prosecutor did not interpose an objection to the grant of bail.
Held: A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable
opportunity to oppose the application by showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The prosecution was caught off guard in the regular hearing of 20
May 1998, when Atty. Astudillo sprang on it a Motion to Amend the
Information and Fix Bail. When asked by Judge Bongolan whether the
prosecution would present additional evidence, Prosecutor Gayao responded
in the negative. Subsequently, however, the prosecution changed its mind
when it stated in its Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for admission
to bail would be premature since it has additional witnesses to present. In his
Comment, Judge Bongolan contends that it is not necessary for the
prosecution to present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion
for bail. The stance cannot be sustained. The prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the
prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process. The records show that the prosecution was
supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses on 4 June 1998 when Judge
Bongolan prematurely resolved the motion. A bail application does not only
involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of
the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in
the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of
discretion. Further, Judge Bongolan fixed the bail at P50,000.00 without
showing its reasonableness. The judge should have set the petition for bail
hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for
fixing the amount of bail, even if the Provincial Prosecutor would not
interpose an objection to the grant of bail. Furthermore, the release of the
accused was done in haste by Judge Benesa. If Benesa examined the records
of the case, he would have discovered that the prosecution was given by
Judge Bongolan, 10 days from 3 June 1988 within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration from his Order granting bail to the accused. Without the 10
day period having lapsed, Judge Benesa ordered the release of the accused.
Again, the prosecution was denied its day in court. 273 People vs. Gako [GR
135045, 15 December 2000] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 3 concur
Facts: Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991,
Leopoldo de la Peña executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein
Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan.
On 9 July 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely,
de la Peña, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr.
(Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against
the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital
was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with
the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On 6
August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having crossexamined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report. On 15
July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Peña was presented as a
witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections
of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to
establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. On 20 November 1992, the
Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the
ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Peña
to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its Decision dated
18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of
Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of
the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and
Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995,
the criminal case was set anew Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) for trial. The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28
October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and
Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a
Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13 February 1997, Go filed a
Petition for Bail. On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the prosecution
presented de la Peña who was acquitted in 1993. De la Peña testified on
matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify
on. On 21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed
urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of
the prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes
Court was denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Peña. The case was
finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing
resumed. On 26 September 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias
Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of Go first before his
Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On 10 November 1997, Judge Gako,
Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go. On 11 November
1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due
to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of
Go. On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of
the Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the order which granted
bail to Go. On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge
Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako,
Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully
evaluating why it is short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life
imprisonment. On 15 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated 10 November 1997 because
the transcripts were allegedly not read. On 1 December 1997, a Motion for
the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a
was filed to determine if the medical findings on Go were not exaggerated to
prevent his arrest. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in
which he denied the prosecution’s Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on
the confinement of Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant
of Arrest dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 10 November 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental
Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on
10 February 1998. On 20 March 1998, Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the
victim, filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 471460) before the Court of
Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of Judge Gako,
Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Peña. The petition was signed by the
counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity
of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On 26 March 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a
Resolution dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition
was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the
Philippines; and (2) that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed
by counsel for Galan, not by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through
counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution indicating that
the OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same date, the OSG
manifested before the Court of Appeals that it was joining Galan in her
petition and was adopting her petition as its own. On 18 June 1998, the Court
of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of
Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not
signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that “the fact that the
OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency”. The OSG
received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On
12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the
petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March
1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari. Issue: Whether the appreciation of the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the
“voluminous records” of the case, without necessarily hearing the
prosecution. Held: The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail
is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases
when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose
must Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) first be
conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances
when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.” Based on the foregoing, bail is not a
matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence
of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder
in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
accused Go’s right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary,
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or
lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how
Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the
prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of
the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime
charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that
hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth
stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another
compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to
determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted
to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and
without basis. Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr.
merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive
and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that
after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is
mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judge’s
findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated 4
February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November
1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of
health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report
when 9 had already passed from the time that said medical report was
prepared. It was therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on
the dated medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present
a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to
apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his life.
274 Marallag vs. Cloribel-Purungganan [AM 00-1529-RTJ, 9 April 2002] First
Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur Facts: On 3 December 1996, an information
for murder was filed against Segismundo Duarte charging him with the
murder of Ferdinand T. Feri. Subsequently, Duarte filed a petition for bail. On
28 January 1997, the date set for the hearing of the petition for bail, Atty.
Fred Henry V. Marallag, the private prosecutor handling Criminal Case 7316,
manifested that Duarte first had to be arraigned in order that the trial court
may acquire jurisdiction over said accused. Upon arraignment, Duarte
pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution informed the
court that during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Duarte admitted to the killing of Ferdinand
Feri but claimed that he did it in selfdefense. Thereafter, the prosecution
orally moved that the reverse order of trial be conducted, in view of Duarte’s
admission of the killing. Judge Loreta Cloribel-Purungganan ordered Duarte
to clarify in writing whether he admits to the killing of Ferdinand Feri or not.
She likewise set for oral argument the next day, 29 January 1997, the issue of
whether the reverse order of trial should be followed in the criminal case. On
29 January 1997, after both parties were heard, the Judge granted the
motion to conduct the trial in reverse order. The defense moved to
reconsider the trial court’s ruling. Subsequently, the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the issue of whether the
trial should be in the reverse order. On 4 February 1997, the prosecution
submitted a Memorandum of Authorities while the defense submitted its
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Position Paper.
In an Order dated 26 February 1997, the Judge ruled that the prosecution
shall first present evidence regarding the petition for bail. The prosecution
moved to reconsider the same, and its motion was granted in part by the
Judge in her Order of 18 June 1997, which acknowledged that a hearing on
the petition for bail must first be conducted before the court may resolve the
same. On 14 July 1997, Marallag and Feri filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition questioning the 26
February 1997 Order of the Judge, but the same was dismissed by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 24 July 1997, on the ground that the
prosecution failed to report the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General
for appropriate action. Meanwhile, at the hearing of the petition for bail on
12 August 1997, the prosecution moved for postponement thereof in view of
the pendency of the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals. The Judge informed the parties of the dismissal of said
petition, but the prosecution reiterated their motion for postponement,
arguing that since they had not yet received a copy of the appellate court’s
resolution denying their petition, said dismissal had not yet attained finality
and that they were going to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
Judge ordered the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of its
witnesses but only Feri was present in court. When the Judge called on Mrs.
Feri to testify, the prosecution refused, reasoning that the latter was not an
eyewitness to the crime charged and would be testifying only with respect to
the civil aspect of the case. However, the judge considered the petition for
bail submitted for resolution. On 14 August 1997, the trial court issued an
Order granting bail to Duarte. Marallag and Feri thereafter filed the instant
administrative case against the Judge, claiming that her issuance of the 14
August 1997 Order reflects gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and
grave abuse of discretion on her part, since said Order granting bail did not
contain a summary of evidence presented by the prosecution which
summary is necessary to determine whether a judge has adequate basis for
granting bail. Issue: Whether the prosecution’s failure to submit evidence on
the accused’s application for bail justified the Judge’s act of granting bail to
the accused without a hearing. Held: The criminal case before the Judge
involved an accused who was charged with murder, a capital offense. Thus,
the conduct of a hearing on the accused’s application for bail was necessary
before the trial court could grant bail. The records of the case however reveal
that although the trial court set several dates for the hearing on the
application for bail, the parties were not able to adduce evidence which
would enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence of the
accused’s guilt was strong, for purposes of resolving the issue of whether the
latter is entitled to bail. It was the other issues raised by the prosecution,
such as the necessity of Duarte’s arraignment before the application for bail
may be resolved, and the propriety of conducting trial in reverse order, which
were taken up during the scheduled hearings. The prosecution was thus
deprived of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of Duarte’s guilt was
strong, and the defense was also denied the chance to prove otherwise. The
records further indicate that when the prosecution failed to present any
evidence during the hearing on the application for bail on 23 August 1997,
the Judge proceeded at once to pronounce that the motion was deemed
submitted for resolution. The prosecution’s failure to submit evidence on the
accused’s application for bail did not justify the Judge’s act of granting bail to
the accused without a hearing, because the established rule is that even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct
a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer
the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt of the accused. A judge is in fact
required to include in his or her order granting or refusing bail a summary of
the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, such order would be
uncontrolled and may be deemed capricious or whimsical. The Judge’s act of
granting bail to the accused without hearing the parties on the matter or
asking searching and clarificatory questions runs counter to the rule requiring
the conduct of a hearing on a petition for bail in cases where an accused is
charged with a capital offense. However, the Court notes that the
prosecution’s failure to present evidence in relation to the petition for bail
was not entirely due to the fault of the Judge. The prosecution is also partly
to blame for such failure. On the dates set by the trial court for hearing of the
petition for bail, the prosecution raised other issues which sidetracked the
hearing on the petition for bail. Moreover, it was the prosecution which
refused to heed the Judge’s order that it proceed with the presentation of its
evidence relative to the petition for bail during the hearing of 12 August
1997. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Hence,
the Court finds that an imposition on the Judge of a fine would not be
justified under the circumstances of the case. 275 Enrile vs. Salazar [GR
92163, 5 June 1990]; Panlilio vs. de Leon [GR 92164] En Banc, Narvasa (J): 3
concur, 2 on leave, 1 concurs in GR 82164 and took no part in GR 92163
Facts: In the afternoon of 27 February 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City Branch 103, in Criminal Case 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, 28 February 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to
the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres. On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,
through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on 2 March 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a) held to
answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b)
charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied
due process; (c) denied his right to bail; and (d) arrested and detained on the
strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The Court issued the
writ prayed for, returnable 5 March 1990 and set the plea for hearing on 6
March 1990. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return for the respondents in the present case and in GR 92164, which had
been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on 6
March 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety
bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a
more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in
both cases. Four Members of the Court voted against granting bail to Senator
Enrile, and two against granting bail to the Panlilios. Issue: Whether a
petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial. Held: The criminal case
before Judge Jaime Salazar (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City [Branch 103]) was the normal venue for invoking Senator Enrile's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said judge. The correct course
was for Enrile to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there. Even acceptance of Enrile's premise that going by the
Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would
not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the Judge. All the grounds upon which
Enrile has founded the present petition, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) whether these went into the substance of what
is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the Judge in dealing with the charges against him,
were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should
have been brought up there instead of directly to the Supreme Court. There
was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions
was beyond the ability or competence of the Judge — indeed such an
assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none
whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except the Supreme Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing established
judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy
of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of 4
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to Enrile: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no difference that the Judge issued a warrant of
arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a
capital offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to
whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him. Hence, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read
as charging simple rebellion only, hence Enrile and the Panlilios are entitled
to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant
of bail to them being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered remanded to the Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by Enrile and the Panlilios. Once bail is fixed by the judge, the
corresponding bail bond filed with the Supreme Court shall become functus
oficio. 276 People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J):
13 concur, 1 took no part Facts: In the original Information filed on 2 October
1986 in Criminal Case 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later
amended in an Amended Information which was filed on 24 October 1986,
Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog" (of the New People's Army [NPA]),
and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134,
in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. At the time the
Information was filed, Salas and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General
Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention
and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. A day after the
filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas
corpus for Salas and his co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which
was dismissed in the Court's resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of
the agreement of the parties under which Salas "will remain in legal custody
and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the
warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall
be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person. On 7 November 1986, Salas filed with the court
below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, to
which the Solicitor General filed an Opposition. In his Order of 6 March 1987,
Judge Procoro J. Donato (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII,
Manila) denied the motion to quash. Instead of asking for a reconsideration
of said Order, Salas filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, which the Solicitor
General opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 on the ground that
since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of PD 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain,
or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his
guilt is strong. On 5 June 1987, the President issued Executive Order 187
repealing, among others, PDs 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Executive Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Order 187 was published in
the Official Gazette in its 15 June 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was
officially released for circulation on 26 June 1987. In his Order of 7 July 1987
the Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order 187, granted Salas'
petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon Salas
the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every 2
months within the first 10 days of every period thereof. In a motion to
reconsider the above order filed on 16 July 1987, the Solicitor General asked
the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging
therein that per Department of Justice Circular 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail
for the provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed
at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because Salas "had in the past escaped from the custody of the
military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government
through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
foreign ideology is attained." On 17 July 1987, the Solicitor General filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to Salas and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with
this main condition of his bail — to appear in court for trial." In a subsequent
Order dated 30 July 1987, the Judge granted the motion for reconsideration
of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
but denying the Solicitor General's supplemental motion for reconsideration
of 17 July 1987 which asked the court to allow the Solicitor General to
present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of
7 July 1987. The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor
of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge a
Advocate General, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/ preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether Salas
should be granted temporary liberty pursuant to his right to bail. Held: Bail
cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as
defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore,
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that "all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, also provides that "all persons in custody shall, before
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong." Therefore, before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Accordingly, the prosecution
does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. The 1987 Constitution strengthens
further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
overturning the Supreme Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile. However,
Salas has waived his right to bail in GR 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion,
et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]. On 3 October
1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal
Case 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas, and
his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with the
Supreme Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas
against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the
petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) respondents to
produce the bodies of Salas and his co-accused before the Court and explain
by what authority they arrested and detained them. When the parties in GR
76009 stipulated that "Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person," they simply
meant that Salas will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in
actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation
concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall
of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should
be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect
to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-
accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to
Salas and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer
language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally
manifested before the Supreme Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and
conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by
the trial court against Salas and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the
warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be
recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the
agreement that Salas shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement. Consequently, having agreed in GR 76009 to remain in legal
custody, Salas had unequivocably waived his right to bail. The right to bail is
another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. 277 People vs. Fortes [GR 91155, 25
June 1993] Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 November
1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the
police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the
latter by Agustin Fortes y Garra at around 11:00 a.m. of that day. Following
this, Fortes was forthwith apprehended. Thereupon, on 5 December 1983,
Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint for rape against Fortes
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in
Matnog, Sorsogon. Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary
examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on 9 December 1983 an order
for the arrest of Frotes. The bond for the latter's temporary liberty was
initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00 upon motion
of Fortes. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the
court ordered his release on 15 December 1983. When the case was finally
called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, Fortes, through his
counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto.
The court then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. On 25 January 1985, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel C.
Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for
rape against Fortes (Criminal Case 219). Fortes pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment on 28 February 1985. The protracted trial began on 26 June
1985 and ended nearly 3 years later when the case was finally submitted for
decision on 22 February 1988. On 25 January 1989, the trial court
promulgated its decision convicting Fortes of the crime charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs. The
court also order the commitment of Fortes to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail
through the Provincial Warden or through any of his provincial guards and
eventually Fortes' commitment to the National Penitentiary in accordance
with law. On the same day, Fortes filed his notice of appeal, wherein he
requested that the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The
following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal
but did not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April
1989, Fortes filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" reiterating his earlier
request that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set.
This was subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989
on the ground that "the accused has already been found guilty Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from
the decision already approved by the Court." Thereupon, on 10 August 1989,
the trial court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the
person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the
RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his application for bail pending appeal, but
the same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989. In the meantime,
the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to the Supreme Court the
records of Criminal Case 219 (GR 90643). On 9 December 1989, Fortes filed
with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to
reconsider the said denial (GR 91155). On 18 June 1990, the said cases were
ordered consolidated. Issue: Whether Fortes, a convicted rapist, is entitled to
bail on appeal. Held: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that "before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute." Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right." The clear
implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of
guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the Supreme Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991
in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that "Pursuant to the aforecited provision,
an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." Herein, the
rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor
and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the
trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the
appeal. 278 Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February 2000]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur Facts: Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and
Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun
Maguddatu and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S.
Pascual. On 23 October 1985, Maguddatu, et. al. filed a motion to be
admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution's evidence is not strong.
After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated 20
December 1985, granting Maguddatu, et. al.'s motion for bail and fixing the
amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day, Maguddatu, et. al. posted bail
through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. On 6 January 1987, AFISCO Insurance
filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of
Maguddatu, et. al.'s bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the
same upon its expiration on 20 December 1986. There is no showing,
however, of any action by the court on said motion. On 2 January 1998, the
trial court convicted Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun
Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime of Homicide
and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 8 years of
Prision Mayor medium, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on 19 February 1998, the trial court
issued an order for the immediate arrest of Maguddatu, et. al. and their
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) commitment to
the custody of proper authorities. While remaining at large, Maguddatu, et.
al., on 27 February 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of
conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court does nor appear to have
resolved the motion for bail pending appeal. Instead, it forwarded the
records to the Court of Appeals. On 8 January 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause within 10 days
from notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and
accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit themselves to the proper
authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from which they seek relief in
the meantime that no bail has yet been approved for their temporary liberty
and, further considering that the approval of the same is discretionary and
not to be presumed; and in the meanwhile, the Station Commanders of the
Manila Police Station, Manila and the Makati Police Station, Makati City to
file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional trial Court, Branch
64, Makati City on 19 February 1998 in Criminal Case 12010. A Compliance
and Motion, dated 8 February 1999, filed by Maguddatu, et. al. explained
their failure to submit to the proper authorities. Despite the compliance and
motion filed by Maguddatu, et. al., they remained at large. on 23 June 1999,
the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying
Maguddatu, et. al.' application for bail and ordering their arrest. Aggrieved by
the foregoing resolution, Maguddatu, et. al. brought the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. Pending resolution of
the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, dated 8 September
1999, declaring that the appeal filed is deemed abandoned and dismissed
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124, New Rules on Criminal Procedure, and thus
ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City to issue warrants of
arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of sentence of Aniceto
Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu. Issue: Whether
Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail during the whole duration their case is
on appeal. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the
accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of
arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals,
Maguddatu, et. al. had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be
entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance
and Motion dated 8 February 1999, came short of an unconditional
submission to the court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Further, the trial
court correctly denied Maguddatu, et. al.' motion that they be allowed
provisional liberty after their conviction, under their respective bail bonds.
Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94,
provides that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman." The bail bond that the accused
previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule
122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with
Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail" shall be effective upon
approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
canceled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it." This
amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure
from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain
in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even
during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the
accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the
period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. From the record, it
appears that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in
the trial court on 6 January 1987 for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond
for the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the
consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. Furthermore, pursuant to
the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon
the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However, such
bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be canceled if the penalty
imposed is imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if
any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 5 is present.
Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al.
violated the conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance
during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite due notice and
without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper
authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constitutes violations of the
conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed to
renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987,
filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation, praying for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same upon
its expiration. Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their
application for bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely because
it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail
pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice.
It has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of
bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. 279 Obosa vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4
concur Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts,
by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments
Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August
1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila, as
Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near
the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that
the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band.
The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly,
Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At the
time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual "escapee"
from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at
the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for
robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena
illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon,
Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext
that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the
whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him
as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver. In its
decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the lower
court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested
his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's motion and
fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed a written
notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the
decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of
P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the
lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of
release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa
also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of
the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6
September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for
cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to
which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued
its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b)
nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa,
and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for
reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the
appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings
were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its
second Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether the bailbond was validly
approved by the trial court. Held: Since Obosa did file the written notice of
appeal on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without
need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the
subject of the case. While bail was granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990
when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without
authority, because by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the
trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have
been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the
notice of appeal was filed. As the approval was decreed by the trial court in
excess of jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On this
basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable
that the petition should be dismissed. Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Herein, while Obosa, though
convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense.
Obosa can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of
things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the
corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not
insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead
being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an
instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. Our Rules of Court,
following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be
observed in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin, which was promulgated in 1993,
the Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail. However, said
guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by
Administrative Circular 12-94, which was issued by the Supreme Court and
which came into effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa made
application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, the case would have
been readily and promptly resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to amendments,
not only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of homicide disqualify
him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail
application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the
circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e of Paragraph 3,
Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are present in
Obosa's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail,
except that a retroactive application of the said circular is barred as it would
obviously be unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules on bail at
the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor Obosa's cause either. The appeal
in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the
penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and
evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the
original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so
in the present case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite
conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of
resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on
whether Obosa will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While
the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the court, that discretion — particularly with respect to
extending the bail — should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of
the law and the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must
attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although
the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless, when
imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6
years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is
an undue risk that the accused may commit Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) another crime while his appeal is pending) that
point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released on
bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even
after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his
conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in
deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still
be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than
the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound
discretion. The trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and
caution required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside
from being too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of
judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from
legal confinement as well as his prior convictions. 280 Villasenor vs. Abano
[GR L-23599, 29 September 1967] En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur Facts: The
Provincial Fiscal charged Reynaldo C. Villaseñor for the murder of Boac police
sergeant Alfonso Madla ebfore the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
(Criminal Case 2299). Villaseñor was, on motion, admitted to a P60,000.00
bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of Villaseñor's
wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On 29 May 1964, Villaseñor posted a property
bond, was set at provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the murder
charge, however, the Provincial Fiscal amended the information. This time he
accused Villaseñor with "Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder." On 7 August 1964, the judge sua sponte (Judge
Maximo Abaño) cancelled Villaseñor's bond, and ordered his immediate
arrest. On Villaseñor's motion to reconsider, the judge, on 9 September 1964,
after hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond
of P60,000.00. On 15 September 1964, on Villaseñor's motion that the
original bond previously given be reinstated, the judge resolved to fix "the
bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only
by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with
properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents
for five years." On 1 October 1964, Villaseñor came to the Supreme Court on
certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the
P60,000.00-bond fixed by judge transgress the constitutional injunction that
"excessive bail shall not be required,” in light of the fact that the accused is a
mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and
the sole breadwinner of a family of five. Held: To be read with the
constitutional precept, that "excessive bail shall not be required,” is Section
12, Rule 114, Rules of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good
cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that
"defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the
increased amount he is called upon to furnish." Along with the court's power
to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount therefor, and,
as stated, to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is
excessive "lays with the court to determine." In the matter of bail fixing,
courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail is
required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives
this purpose — "the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance." And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule
states that the condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the
complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be
transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court
of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that
he will surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate
court may render, or that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded
for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be remanded and
submit himself to the orders and processes thereof." Expressions in varying
language spell out in a general way the principles Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) governing bail fixing. One is that the amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required
but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another is
that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused," and "the
need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary
restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each
particular accused, "should all be balanced in one equation. The inability of a
defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not make the
amount excessive. For, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to
bail him out, or none to turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no
matter how small would fall into the category of excessive bail; and, he
"would be entitled to be discharged on his own recognizance." So it is, that
experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be
summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the
offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of
the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8) forfeiture of
other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
other cases. But, at bottom, in bail fixing, "the principal factor considered, to
the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability
of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."
Importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted. Of course,
penalty depends to a great extent upon the gravity of the offense. Here,
Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the
imposition of capital punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated 5 July 1946 of the
Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of 18 July 1963, directed
prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher
penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has already received the Court's
imprimature in Edaño vs. Cea (GR L-6821, 10 May 1954). The Court is
unprepared to downgrade this method of computation, what with a
compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate. The
Court thus find no discernible abuse of discretion, given the facts and the
law, when the judge fixed Villasenor's bail at P60,000.00. 281 De la Camara
vs. Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971] Resolution En Banc, Fernando
(J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: Ricardo de la Camara,
Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7
November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968.
Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with
the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another
for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then
on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with
the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link
him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his
innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of
de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July
1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the
opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount
of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder. On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos,
upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that
the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond,
either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion
for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained
adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the
amount of bail, excessive enough Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) to discourage the accused from fleeing. Held: Where the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more
forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental
law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself
to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under
the Eighth Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the
challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for
the information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the
sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision.
Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for
murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor
should it be ignored in the present case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at
rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same
time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the
situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the
command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There
is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under
the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from
confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that
such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no
disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape,
however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief
prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation
from the Supreme Court. 282 Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-31665, 6 August 1975]
First Division, Castro (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Leonardo Almeda (alias
Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz. The amount
of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was
P15,000, and this was approved by the judge with a direction that it be
posted entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked
the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond
required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed
habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. At the same
hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his
assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for
amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously
objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was premature since no
copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to
amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object
formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place him in double
jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the
information. The trial court nevertheless granted the fiscal's motion in open
court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately
thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then
and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of
the document. Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on
the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for
reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed the present special
civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether
the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the
recomended bail excessive. Held: Bail is "the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to
conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be
denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by
reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused
to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be
required." This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may
negate the very right itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory
powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the amount fixed for bail,
while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be
excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does
not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the
property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained
by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the
reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price
at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to
guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various
proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of
the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the
accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional
right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may
have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to
the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose
of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court,
and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor
revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu
of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly
provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash
with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very
nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of
the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the
option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties
and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash
bond. The court is not without devices with which to meet the situation,
considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in crime
weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.
Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and
for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be
required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person
periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And
third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to
the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may
proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the
bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following
factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the
nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the
character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6)
the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the
accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of
previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise
extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in
regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other
precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety
bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their
undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this
jurisdiction. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 283
Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June 2001] Third Division, Gonzaga-
Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to
P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and
two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional
liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 17 February 1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap
filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of
Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is
a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the
proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive
bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999,
upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed
by the court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999.
Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged. Held: The
Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on
appeal. The court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and
despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of
the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason
the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the
Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la
Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, the Court made
the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory
powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled
to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting
unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following
factors in the setting of the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused
to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty for the
offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and
health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g)
Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j)
Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Thus, the court has
wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure
against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an
appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court
and to make an accounting of his movements. Herein, where Yap was found
to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court
of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a
hold-departure order against him. Under the circumstances, we find that
appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against
the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order
and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of
residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail
while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount
should Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot
allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of
civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court. 284 Cabañero vs. Cañon [AM MTJ-01-1369, 20 September 2001]
Resolution of First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur Facts: A certain Jaime Cañal
accused Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabañero's son, Jessie D. Cabañero, of entering
Cañal’s farmland and harvesting falcata trees valued at P3,191.00. The chief
of police filed the case with the 7th MCTC Hinatuan-Tagbina, with station at
Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, presided over by Judge Antonio K. Cañon. The
Judge conducted a preliminary investigation of the case to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On 1 October 1998,
Judge Cañon issued a warrant of arrest not only against Jessie Cabañero but
also against Guillerma D. Cabañero for covering up for her son. On 15
October 1998, policemen arrested Guillerma and detained her at the
Hinatuan Municipal Jail. To secure her temporary liberty, she posted bail,
which could not be issued and approved in her name because she was not an
accused in Criminal Case 4036-H. The judge pegged the bail at P30,000.00.
On 16 October 1998, Guillerma was released. Incidentally, on 7 October
1998, when her son was arrested, he also posted bail amounting to
P30,000.00. In a complaint dated 16 September 1999, Mrs. Guillerma D.
Cabañero charged Judge Antonio K. Cañon, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Hinatuan-Tagbina, at Hinatuan, Surigao Del Sur with partiality, issuance of
unjust interlocutory orders and grave abuse of discretion relative to Criminal
Case 4036-H (People vs. Jessie Cabañero, for qualified theft), alleging that
considering the value of the property allegedly stolen, the bail required was
excessive. On 24 April 2000, the judge died. Issue: Whether Judge Cañon
imposed excessive bail in the case of qualified theft. Held: Judge Cañon erred
in ordering the arrest of Guillerma D. Cabañero. She was not included as one
of the respondents in the criminal case filed by the chief of police of
Hinatuan. The judges’s interpretation of his powers under the Revised Rules
of Court was far-fetched. The judge also imposed excessive bail. Under
Department Circular 4, the 1996 Bail Bond Guide for the National
Prosecution Service for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the
property stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00, the bail
recommended is P24,000.00. Herein, the monetary value of the falcata trees
cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail of P30,000 is not proportionate to the
amount stolen. When the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know
or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Antonio K. Cañon
was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00, to be taken from his
retirement benefits in view of his demise. 285 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals
[GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] En Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of
Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the
hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but
acts as president of the former corporation. Following the "run" on stock
brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
Manotoc, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with
his costockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for the appointment of a management committee, not
only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case 001826,
"In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr.,
Petitioners"), was granted and a management committee was organized and
appointed. Pending Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) disposition of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for
departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner
on 4 February 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc.
was suspected to be a fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against Manotoc and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-
president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating
fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399
and 45400, assigned to Judge Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545,
raffled off to Judge Pronove). In all cases, Manotoc has been admitted to bail
in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety. On 1 March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country", stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both Judge Camilon and Judge Pronove in their orders
dated 9 March 1982, and 26 March 1982, respetively, denied the same. It
appears that Manotoc likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter
requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated 4
February 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated 27 May
1982. anotoc thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying
his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October 1982, the appellate court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Dissatisfied with the
appellate court's ruling, Manotoc filed the petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the petition, Manotoc filed on
15 August 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. On 20
September 1984, the Supreme Court in a resolution en banc denied
Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. Issue: Whether a
court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines
bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in
the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. As held in People v. Uy Tuising (61 Phil. 404 [1935]), "the
result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of
the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge
to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested
with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner
himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the
country in the first place, if it were otherwise. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27
)
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Herras
Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945] … 1 People vs. San Diego
[GR L-29676, 24 December 1968] … 1 Cortes vs. Catral [AM RTJ-97-1387, 10
September 1997] … 2 Lavides vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129670, 1 February
2000] … 3 Government of the United States of America, Represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, vs. Purganan [GR 148571, 24 September
2002] … 4 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995] … 6
Go vs. Bongolan [AM RTJ-99-1464, 26 July 1999] … 8 People vs. Gako [GR
135045, 15 December 2000] … 9 Marallag vs. Cloribel-Purungganan [AM 00-
1529-RTJ, 9 April 2002] … 11 Enrile vs. Salazar [GR 92163, 5 June 1990] … 13
People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991] … 14 People vs. Fortes [GR 91155,
25 June 1993] … 16 Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February
2000] … 17 Obosa vs. Court of Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] … 19
Villasenor vs. Abano [GR L-23599, 29 September 1967] … 21 De la Camara vs.
Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971] … 22 Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-
31665, 6 August 1975] … 23 Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June
2001] … 25 Cabañero vs. Cañon [AM MTJ-01-1369, 20 September 2001] … 26
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] … 26 This collection
contains twenty (20) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
266 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945] En Banc,
Hilado (J): 3 concur, 4 concur only in the result Facts: Haydee Herras
Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps,
United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the
Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29
December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs.
Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined in the Correctional
Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government
since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government.
On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto
Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the
provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon
which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively,
that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity
with the aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an
order be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her
person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo
Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order referring the
petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the
People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should
be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the
Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order
disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the
offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special
Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release."
Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate
Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition
for the writs of certiorari and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a
formal charge or information is filed against him. Held: Article III, section
1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail
shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against
whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays
down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed
under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim
this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until
he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed
if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under
a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason
for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may
even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place
the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the
least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor
of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article
III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of
one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained. 267 People vs.
San Diego [GR L-29676, 24 December 1968] En Banc, Capistrano (J): 9 concur,
1 took no part Facts: Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza,
Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco were Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) charged before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch (Criminal case Q-8711) as principals of the murder
of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men and craft or fraud. The
prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the
defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of
in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the
prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the
motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution
on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. Fiscal Oscar
Inocentes moved for reconsideration. Inocentes, for the People, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the order to
grant or deny bail (especially those involving capital punishment) should be
made only after the prosecution has presented its evidence. Held: Whether
the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in
the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
268 Cortes vs. Catral [AM RTJ-97-1387, 10 September 1997] Resolution En
Banc, Romero (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part Facts: A sworn letter complaint
was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of
Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he
granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v. Duerme, et al.,
Criminal Case 07-893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal
Case 08-866 for murder); (2) he reduced the bailbond granted by the
provincial prosecutor from P180,000 to P30,000 without hearing (Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of
Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond of P14,800 in a homicide case (Barangay
Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors
spreading that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s
house to get the envelop. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in
the allegations of the complainant that would warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against the judge. Issue: Whether Judge Catral is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in
Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866. Held: As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the
judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it
against the accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07-874 was
subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda does not completely exculpate
Judge Catral. The judge is not bound by the recommendation of the
prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses are
mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for determining
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The
procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the
accused in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be
arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. The right
to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be
curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-
866 without having conducted the requisite hearing. 269 Lavides vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 129670, 1 February 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4
concur Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to
the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by
Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first
time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date,
the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where
Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they
arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of
the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information
for violation of Article III, §5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was
filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
(Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the
Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had
sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in
prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual
intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate
applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an
order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-
70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his
arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must
therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and that
the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right
to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those
filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his
motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23
May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that
the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that
the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court,
in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash
the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and
then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the
"hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on
7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its
two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and
maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively.
While the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case
was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which
were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e.
that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during
the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings
of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia --
and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the court should impose the
condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these
cases before the bail can be granted. Held: In cases where it is authorized,
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment
of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage
of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be
held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides'
presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights. 270
Government of the United States of America, Represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, vs. Purganan [GR 148571, 24 September 2002] En
Banc, Panganiban (J): 8 concur, 2 filed separate opinions, 2 filed separate
dissenting opinions, 1 filed separate concurring opinion Facts: Pursuant to
the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale 0522
dated 16 June 1999, supplemented by Notes 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of
Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them
to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5
of Presidential Decree (PD) 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon
learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition
for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ
in a Petition before the Supreme Court in GR 139465. Initially, the Court -- by
a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution. By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding
no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which was Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
on 15 April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CRSEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title
18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343
and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and
2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code
Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1069. Before the RTC
could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Jimenez’s application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001.
In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court
a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The
alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Jimenez is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held:
Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person
who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested
by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to
bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion." Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That
the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. The
denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with
and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage
the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their
detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process is
broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has
no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. 271 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28
August 1995] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: On 28 January
1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information
as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of
members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6
October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially
indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe
And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of
the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only
one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually
convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at
large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely")
Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6
October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his
former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's
services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989
but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon
the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of
said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution
of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated
6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated 6 October 1992.
Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the
Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon.
Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen
B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19
April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information
against him. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served
on him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for
admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5
November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and
the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November 1992, the
trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then
confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated
Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo,
on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the
directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge. Upon Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo
announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On
that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court
admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day,
6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel
by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial
court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned
and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992
by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court
in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than
6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The resolution and the
order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24
November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for
review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the
custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail, and
whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutor’s
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or grant the
application of bail, respectively. Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore,
be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should
be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint
of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to
quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his
counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court
during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was
then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave
the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their
explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody
of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a
hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive
custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors
agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;
and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the
said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any
intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from
the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial
court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing
the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a
gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must
inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to
determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no
objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless
set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be
attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution
of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March 1993 abundantly
reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lower court exhausted all means to
convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary
of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after
sifting through them did the court conclude that Paderanga could be
provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since
then and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of
the conditions of his bail. 272 Go vs. Bongolan [AM RTJ-99-1464, 26 July
1999] Second Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On 10 November 1997, at
6:30 p.m. at Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra, Jaime Balmores, Butch Reynaldo,
PO1 Rolando Molina, Edgardo Cacal, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3
kidnapped Samuel Go and brought him outside the province of Abra by the
ue of a Nissan Sentra, Super Saloon bearing fictitious plate UGG 652 and
transferred Go at Pidigan, Abra to a Toyota Taxi bearing Plate PVB 169 with
markings "Naple Leaf" on both sides and were intercepted by San Esteban
PNP at San Esteban, Ilocos Sur where they recovered Go. On 13 November
1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Abra filed an information
against Balmores, et. al. charging them with kidnapping (Criminal Case 97-
123). The case was assigned to Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Bangued,
Abra presided by Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan. Since kidnapping with ransom
is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution
recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. On 5 January
1998, then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona created a panel of
prosecutors, consisting of Regional State Prosecutor of Region I Virgilio
Manipud, Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur Jessica Villoria, and Provincial
Prosecutor of Abra Rodor Gayao, to handle the investigation and prosecution
of the case. When trial commenced, the prosecution panel presented its
witnesses consisting of Samuel Go, the kidnap victim, Alfredo Go, an alleged
previous victim who was released after paying a P500,000.00 ransom money,
the Chief of Police of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, the Senior Inspector of the PNP
Provincial Command in Abra, and a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. After their testimonies, Balmores filed a "Motion for the
Amendment of the Information and for the Fixing of the Bail" alleging that
the evidence presented did not show that the kidnapping was for ransom. He
asked the prosecution to amend the information from kidnapping with
ransom to simple kidnapping to bring it within the ambit of bailable offenses
and enable him to post bail as a matter of right. On 20 May 1998, Judge
Bongolan issued an Order (1) denying the Motion to Amend the Information,
but (2) allowing Balmores to substantiate his "Motion to Fix Bail" and (3)
allowing Cacal and Molina to submit their own motion for admission to bail
with accompanying memorandum. Pursuant to the order, Molina and Cacal
filed their "Motion for Bail with Memorandum Thereof" which reiterated the
claim of Balmores that the prosecution failed to prove kidnapping for
ransom. The prosecution, in its "Opposition to Motion to Bail" dated June 2,
1998, maintained that it has established that the accused committed
kidnapping with ransom and that the Motion to bail is "prematurely filed
since they (sic) are still in the process of presenting further evidence to prove
that the crime had been committed by the accused." The next day, 3 June
1998, Judge Bongolan issued his Order granting the two applications for bail.
Judge Bongolan gave the prosecution 10 days to file its Motion for
Reconsideration which was submitted on 11 June 1998. It was accompanied
by a request to the Branch 2 Clerk of Court to set the motion for hearing on
23 June 1998 at 9:00 a.m. However, before the prosecution could submit said
motion, the accused were already released. It appears that in the morning of
10 June 1998, the bondsmen arrived in Branch 2 and did not find Judge
Bongolan. They proceeded to see Judge Alberto Benesa, who was then Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 1 and designated pairing Judge of Branch 2. The
bondsmen presented Judge Benesa with a copy of Judge Bongolan's Order
granting bail and fixing the amount at P50,000.00 for each of the accused.
Upon seeing that Judge Bongolan already approved the Motion for Bail,
Judge Benesa issued his order releasing the accused. On 23 June 1998, the
date set for the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution
informed Judge Bongolan that the accused had already been released by
Judge Benesa. Judge Bongolan stated that he was not aware of their release
as he was in the hospital when the release order was issued. In the afternoon
of 23 June 1998, Judge Bongolan issued his Order denying the prosecution's
Motion for Reconsideration. An administrative case was filed against Judges
Benjamin A. Bongolan and Alberto Benesa for usurpation and abuse of
authority, rendition of unjust order Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) and ignorance of the law in granting bail to several accused
charged with kidnapping for ransom. Issue: Whether it is necessary for the
prosecution to present all its witness ebfore the judge could resolve the
motion for bail, and whether the judge should set a bail hearing even if the
Provincial Prosecutor did not interpose an objection to the grant of bail.
Held: A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable
opportunity to oppose the application by showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The prosecution was caught off guard in the regular hearing of 20
May 1998, when Atty. Astudillo sprang on it a Motion to Amend the
Information and Fix Bail. When asked by Judge Bongolan whether the
prosecution would present additional evidence, Prosecutor Gayao responded
in the negative. Subsequently, however, the prosecution changed its mind
when it stated in its Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for admission
to bail would be premature since it has additional witnesses to present. In his
Comment, Judge Bongolan contends that it is not necessary for the
prosecution to present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion
for bail. The stance cannot be sustained. The prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the
prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process. The records show that the prosecution was
supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses on 4 June 1998 when Judge
Bongolan prematurely resolved the motion. A bail application does not only
involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of
the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in
the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of
discretion. Further, Judge Bongolan fixed the bail at P50,000.00 without
showing its reasonableness. The judge should have set the petition for bail
hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for
fixing the amount of bail, even if the Provincial Prosecutor would not
interpose an objection to the grant of bail. Furthermore, the release of the
accused was done in haste by Judge Benesa. If Benesa examined the records
of the case, he would have discovered that the prosecution was given by
Judge Bongolan, 10 days from 3 June 1988 within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration from his Order granting bail to the accused. Without the 10
day period having lapsed, Judge Benesa ordered the release of the accused.
Again, the prosecution was denied its day in court. 273 People vs. Gako [GR
135045, 15 December 2000] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 3 concur
Facts: Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991,
Leopoldo de la Peña executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein
Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan.
On 9 July 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely,
de la Peña, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr.
(Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against
the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital
was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with
the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On 6
August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having crossexamined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report. On 15
July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Peña was presented as a
witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections
of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to
establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. On 20 November 1992, the
Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the
ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Peña
to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its Decision dated
18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of
Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of
the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and
Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995,
the criminal case was set anew Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) for trial. The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28
October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and
Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a
Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13 February 1997, Go filed a
Petition for Bail. On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the prosecution
presented de la Peña who was acquitted in 1993. De la Peña testified on
matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify
on. On 21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed
urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of
the prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes
Court was denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Peña. The case was
finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing
resumed. On 26 September 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias
Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of Go first before his
Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On 10 November 1997, Judge Gako,
Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go. On 11 November
1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due
to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of
Go. On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of
the Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the order which granted
bail to Go. On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge
Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako,
Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully
evaluating why it is short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life
imprisonment. On 15 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated 10 November 1997 because
the transcripts were allegedly not read. On 1 December 1997, a Motion for
the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a
was filed to determine if the medical findings on Go were not exaggerated to
prevent his arrest. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in
which he denied the prosecution’s Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on
the confinement of Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant
of Arrest dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 10 November 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental
Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on
10 February 1998. On 20 March 1998, Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the
victim, filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 471460) before the Court of
Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of Judge Gako,
Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Peña. The petition was signed by the
counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity
of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On 26 March 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a
Resolution dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition
was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the
Philippines; and (2) that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed
by counsel for Galan, not by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through
counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution indicating that
the OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same date, the OSG
manifested before the Court of Appeals that it was joining Galan in her
petition and was adopting her petition as its own. On 18 June 1998, the Court
of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of
Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not
signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that “the fact that the
OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency”. The OSG
received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On
12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the
petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March
1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari. Issue: Whether the appreciation of the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the
“voluminous records” of the case, without necessarily hearing the
prosecution. Held: The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail
is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases
when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose
must Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) first be
conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances
when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.” Based on the foregoing, bail is not a
matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence
of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder
in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
accused Go’s right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary,
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or
lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how
Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the
prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of
the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime
charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that
hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth
stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another
compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to
determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted
to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and
without basis. Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr.
merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive
and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that
after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is
mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judge’s
findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated 4
February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November
1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of
health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report
when 9 had already passed from the time that said medical report was
prepared. It was therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on
the dated medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present
a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to
apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his life.
274 Marallag vs. Cloribel-Purungganan [AM 00-1529-RTJ, 9 April 2002] First
Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur Facts: On 3 December 1996, an information
for murder was filed against Segismundo Duarte charging him with the
murder of Ferdinand T. Feri. Subsequently, Duarte filed a petition for bail. On
28 January 1997, the date set for the hearing of the petition for bail, Atty.
Fred Henry V. Marallag, the private prosecutor handling Criminal Case 7316,
manifested that Duarte first had to be arraigned in order that the trial court
may acquire jurisdiction over said accused. Upon arraignment, Duarte
pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution informed the
court that during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Duarte admitted to the killing of Ferdinand
Feri but claimed that he did it in selfdefense. Thereafter, the prosecution
orally moved that the reverse order of trial be conducted, in view of Duarte’s
admission of the killing. Judge Loreta Cloribel-Purungganan ordered Duarte
to clarify in writing whether he admits to the killing of Ferdinand Feri or not.
She likewise set for oral argument the next day, 29 January 1997, the issue of
whether the reverse order of trial should be followed in the criminal case. On
29 January 1997, after both parties were heard, the Judge granted the
motion to conduct the trial in reverse order. The defense moved to
reconsider the trial court’s ruling. Subsequently, the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the issue of whether the
trial should be in the reverse order. On 4 February 1997, the prosecution
submitted a Memorandum of Authorities while the defense submitted its
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Position Paper.
In an Order dated 26 February 1997, the Judge ruled that the prosecution
shall first present evidence regarding the petition for bail. The prosecution
moved to reconsider the same, and its motion was granted in part by the
Judge in her Order of 18 June 1997, which acknowledged that a hearing on
the petition for bail must first be conducted before the court may resolve the
same. On 14 July 1997, Marallag and Feri filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition questioning the 26
February 1997 Order of the Judge, but the same was dismissed by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 24 July 1997, on the ground that the
prosecution failed to report the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General
for appropriate action. Meanwhile, at the hearing of the petition for bail on
12 August 1997, the prosecution moved for postponement thereof in view of
the pendency of the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals. The Judge informed the parties of the dismissal of said
petition, but the prosecution reiterated their motion for postponement,
arguing that since they had not yet received a copy of the appellate court’s
resolution denying their petition, said dismissal had not yet attained finality
and that they were going to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
Judge ordered the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of its
witnesses but only Feri was present in court. When the Judge called on Mrs.
Feri to testify, the prosecution refused, reasoning that the latter was not an
eyewitness to the crime charged and would be testifying only with respect to
the civil aspect of the case. However, the judge considered the petition for
bail submitted for resolution. On 14 August 1997, the trial court issued an
Order granting bail to Duarte. Marallag and Feri thereafter filed the instant
administrative case against the Judge, claiming that her issuance of the 14
August 1997 Order reflects gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and
grave abuse of discretion on her part, since said Order granting bail did not
contain a summary of evidence presented by the prosecution which
summary is necessary to determine whether a judge has adequate basis for
granting bail. Issue: Whether the prosecution’s failure to submit evidence on
the accused’s application for bail justified the Judge’s act of granting bail to
the accused without a hearing. Held: The criminal case before the Judge
involved an accused who was charged with murder, a capital offense. Thus,
the conduct of a hearing on the accused’s application for bail was necessary
before the trial court could grant bail. The records of the case however reveal
that although the trial court set several dates for the hearing on the
application for bail, the parties were not able to adduce evidence which
would enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence of the
accused’s guilt was strong, for purposes of resolving the issue of whether the
latter is entitled to bail. It was the other issues raised by the prosecution,
such as the necessity of Duarte’s arraignment before the application for bail
may be resolved, and the propriety of conducting trial in reverse order, which
were taken up during the scheduled hearings. The prosecution was thus
deprived of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of Duarte’s guilt was
strong, and the defense was also denied the chance to prove otherwise. The
records further indicate that when the prosecution failed to present any
evidence during the hearing on the application for bail on 23 August 1997,
the Judge proceeded at once to pronounce that the motion was deemed
submitted for resolution. The prosecution’s failure to submit evidence on the
accused’s application for bail did not justify the Judge’s act of granting bail to
the accused without a hearing, because the established rule is that even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct
a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer
the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt of the accused. A judge is in fact
required to include in his or her order granting or refusing bail a summary of
the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, such order would be
uncontrolled and may be deemed capricious or whimsical. The Judge’s act of
granting bail to the accused without hearing the parties on the matter or
asking searching and clarificatory questions runs counter to the rule requiring
the conduct of a hearing on a petition for bail in cases where an accused is
charged with a capital offense. However, the Court notes that the
prosecution’s failure to present evidence in relation to the petition for bail
was not entirely due to the fault of the Judge. The prosecution is also partly
to blame for such failure. On the dates set by the trial court for hearing of the
petition for bail, the prosecution raised other issues which sidetracked the
hearing on the petition for bail. Moreover, it was the prosecution which
refused to heed the Judge’s order that it proceed with the presentation of its
evidence relative to the petition for bail during the hearing of 12 August
1997. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Hence,
the Court finds that an imposition on the Judge of a fine would not be
justified under the circumstances of the case. 275 Enrile vs. Salazar [GR
92163, 5 June 1990]; Panlilio vs. de Leon [GR 92164] En Banc, Narvasa (J): 3
concur, 2 on leave, 1 concurs in GR 82164 and took no part in GR 92163
Facts: In the afternoon of 27 February 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City Branch 103, in Criminal Case 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, 28 February 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to
the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres. On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,
through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on 2 March 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a) held to
answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b)
charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied
due process; (c) denied his right to bail; and (d) arrested and detained on the
strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The Court issued the
writ prayed for, returnable 5 March 1990 and set the plea for hearing on 6
March 1990. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return for the respondents in the present case and in GR 92164, which had
been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on 6
March 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety
bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a
more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in
both cases. Four Members of the Court voted against granting bail to Senator
Enrile, and two against granting bail to the Panlilios. Issue: Whether a
petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial. Held: The criminal case
before Judge Jaime Salazar (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City [Branch 103]) was the normal venue for invoking Senator Enrile's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said judge. The correct course
was for Enrile to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there. Even acceptance of Enrile's premise that going by the
Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would
not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the Judge. All the grounds upon which
Enrile has founded the present petition, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) whether these went into the substance of what
is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the Judge in dealing with the charges against him,
were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should
have been brought up there instead of directly to the Supreme Court. There
was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions
was beyond the ability or competence of the Judge — indeed such an
assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none
whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except the Supreme Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing established
judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy
of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of 4
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to Enrile: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no difference that the Judge issued a warrant of
arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a
capital offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to
whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him. Hence, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read
as charging simple rebellion only, hence Enrile and the Panlilios are entitled
to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant
of bail to them being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered remanded to the Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by Enrile and the Panlilios. Once bail is fixed by the judge, the
corresponding bail bond filed with the Supreme Court shall become functus
oficio. 276 People vs. Donato [GR 79269, 5 June 1991] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J):
13 concur, 1 took no part Facts: In the original Information filed on 2 October
1986 in Criminal Case 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later
amended in an Amended Information which was filed on 24 October 1986,
Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog" (of the New People's Army [NPA]),
and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134,
in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code. At the time the
Information was filed, Salas and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General
Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention
and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. A day after the
filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas
corpus for Salas and his co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which
was dismissed in the Court's resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of
the agreement of the parties under which Salas "will remain in legal custody
and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the
warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall
be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person. On 7 November 1986, Salas filed with the court
below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, to
which the Solicitor General filed an Opposition. In his Order of 6 March 1987,
Judge Procoro J. Donato (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII,
Manila) denied the motion to quash. Instead of asking for a reconsideration
of said Order, Salas filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, which the Solicitor
General opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 on the ground that
since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of PD 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain,
or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his
guilt is strong. On 5 June 1987, the President issued Executive Order 187
repealing, among others, PDs 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force
and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Executive Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Order 187 was published in
the Official Gazette in its 15 June 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was
officially released for circulation on 26 June 1987. In his Order of 7 July 1987
the Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order 187, granted Salas'
petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon Salas
the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every 2
months within the first 10 days of every period thereof. In a motion to
reconsider the above order filed on 16 July 1987, the Solicitor General asked
the court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging
therein that per Department of Justice Circular 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail
for the provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed
at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because Salas "had in the past escaped from the custody of the
military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government
through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
foreign ideology is attained." On 17 July 1987, the Solicitor General filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to Salas and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with
this main condition of his bail — to appear in court for trial." In a subsequent
Order dated 30 July 1987, the Judge granted the motion for reconsideration
of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
but denying the Solicitor General's supplemental motion for reconsideration
of 17 July 1987 which asked the court to allow the Solicitor General to
present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of
7 July 1987. The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor
of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge a
Advocate General, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/ preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether Salas
should be granted temporary liberty pursuant to his right to bail. Held: Bail
cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as
defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore,
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that "all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, also provides that "all persons in custody shall, before
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong." Therefore, before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Accordingly, the prosecution
does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. The 1987 Constitution strengthens
further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
overturning the Supreme Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile. However,
Salas has waived his right to bail in GR 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion,
et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de
Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]. On 3 October
1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal
Case 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas, and
his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with the
Supreme Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas
against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the
petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) respondents to
produce the bodies of Salas and his co-accused before the Court and explain
by what authority they arrested and detained them. When the parties in GR
76009 stipulated that "Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person," they simply
meant that Salas will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in
actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation
concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall
of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should
be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect
to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-
accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to
Salas and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer
language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally
manifested before the Supreme Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and
conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by
the trial court against Salas and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the
warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be
recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the
agreement that Salas shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement. Consequently, having agreed in GR 76009 to remain in legal
custody, Salas had unequivocably waived his right to bail. The right to bail is
another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. 277 People vs. Fortes [GR 91155, 25
June 1993] Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 November
1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the
police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the
latter by Agustin Fortes y Garra at around 11:00 a.m. of that day. Following
this, Fortes was forthwith apprehended. Thereupon, on 5 December 1983,
Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint for rape against Fortes
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in
Matnog, Sorsogon. Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary
examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on 9 December 1983 an order
for the arrest of Frotes. The bond for the latter's temporary liberty was
initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00 upon motion
of Fortes. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the
court ordered his release on 15 December 1983. When the case was finally
called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, Fortes, through his
counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto.
The court then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. On 25 January 1985, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel C.
Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for
rape against Fortes (Criminal Case 219). Fortes pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment on 28 February 1985. The protracted trial began on 26 June
1985 and ended nearly 3 years later when the case was finally submitted for
decision on 22 February 1988. On 25 January 1989, the trial court
promulgated its decision convicting Fortes of the crime charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs. The
court also order the commitment of Fortes to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail
through the Provincial Warden or through any of his provincial guards and
eventually Fortes' commitment to the National Penitentiary in accordance
with law. On the same day, Fortes filed his notice of appeal, wherein he
requested that the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The
following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal
but did not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April
1989, Fortes filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" reiterating his earlier
request that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set.
This was subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989
on the ground that "the accused has already been found guilty Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from
the decision already approved by the Court." Thereupon, on 10 August 1989,
the trial court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the
person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the
RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his application for bail pending appeal, but
the same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989. In the meantime,
the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to the Supreme Court the
records of Criminal Case 219 (GR 90643). On 9 December 1989, Fortes filed
with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to
reconsider the said denial (GR 91155). On 18 June 1990, the said cases were
ordered consolidated. Issue: Whether Fortes, a convicted rapist, is entitled to
bail on appeal. Held: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that "before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute." Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right." The clear
implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of
guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the Supreme Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991
in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that "Pursuant to the aforecited provision,
an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." Herein, the
rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor
and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the
trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the
appeal. 278 Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February 2000]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur Facts: Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and
Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun
Maguddatu and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S.
Pascual. On 23 October 1985, Maguddatu, et. al. filed a motion to be
admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution's evidence is not strong.
After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated 20
December 1985, granting Maguddatu, et. al.'s motion for bail and fixing the
amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day, Maguddatu, et. al. posted bail
through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. On 6 January 1987, AFISCO Insurance
filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of
Maguddatu, et. al.'s bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the
same upon its expiration on 20 December 1986. There is no showing,
however, of any action by the court on said motion. On 2 January 1998, the
trial court convicted Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun
Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime of Homicide
and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 8 years of
Prision Mayor medium, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on 19 February 1998, the trial court
issued an order for the immediate arrest of Maguddatu, et. al. and their
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) commitment to
the custody of proper authorities. While remaining at large, Maguddatu, et.
al., on 27 February 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of
conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court does nor appear to have
resolved the motion for bail pending appeal. Instead, it forwarded the
records to the Court of Appeals. On 8 January 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause within 10 days
from notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and
accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit themselves to the proper
authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from which they seek relief in
the meantime that no bail has yet been approved for their temporary liberty
and, further considering that the approval of the same is discretionary and
not to be presumed; and in the meanwhile, the Station Commanders of the
Manila Police Station, Manila and the Makati Police Station, Makati City to
file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional trial Court, Branch
64, Makati City on 19 February 1998 in Criminal Case 12010. A Compliance
and Motion, dated 8 February 1999, filed by Maguddatu, et. al. explained
their failure to submit to the proper authorities. Despite the compliance and
motion filed by Maguddatu, et. al., they remained at large. on 23 June 1999,
the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying
Maguddatu, et. al.' application for bail and ordering their arrest. Aggrieved by
the foregoing resolution, Maguddatu, et. al. brought the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. Pending resolution of
the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, dated 8 September
1999, declaring that the appeal filed is deemed abandoned and dismissed
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124, New Rules on Criminal Procedure, and thus
ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City to issue warrants of
arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of sentence of Aniceto
Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu. Issue: Whether
Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail during the whole duration their case is
on appeal. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the
accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of
arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals,
Maguddatu, et. al. had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be
entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance
and Motion dated 8 February 1999, came short of an unconditional
submission to the court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Further, the trial
court correctly denied Maguddatu, et. al.' motion that they be allowed
provisional liberty after their conviction, under their respective bail bonds.
Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94,
provides that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman." The bail bond that the accused
previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule
122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with
Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail" shall be effective upon
approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
canceled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it." This
amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure
from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain
in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even
during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the
accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the
period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. From the record, it
appears that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in
the trial court on 6 January 1987 for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond
for the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the
consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. Furthermore, pursuant to
the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon
the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However, such
bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be canceled if the penalty
imposed is imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if
any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 5 is present.
Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al.
violated the conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance
during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite due notice and
without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper
authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constitutes violations of the
conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed to
renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987,
filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation, praying for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same upon
its expiration. Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their
application for bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely because
it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail
pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice.
It has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of
bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. 279 Obosa vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4
concur Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts,
by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments
Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August
1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila, as
Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near
the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that
the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band.
The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly,
Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At the
time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual "escapee"
from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at
the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for
robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena
illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon,
Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext
that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the
whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him
as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver. In its
decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the lower
court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested
his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's motion and
fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed a written
notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the
decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of
P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the
lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of
release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa
also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of
the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6
September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for
cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to
which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued
its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b)
nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa,
and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for
reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the
appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings
were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its
second Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether the bailbond was validly
approved by the trial court. Held: Since Obosa did file the written notice of
appeal on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without
need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the
subject of the case. While bail was granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990
when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without
authority, because by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the
trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have
been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the
notice of appeal was filed. As the approval was decreed by the trial court in
excess of jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On this
basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable
that the petition should be dismissed. Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Herein, while Obosa, though
convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense.
Obosa can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of
things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the
corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not
insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead
being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an
instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. Our Rules of Court,
following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be
observed in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin, which was promulgated in 1993,
the Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail. However, said
guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by
Administrative Circular 12-94, which was issued by the Supreme Court and
which came into effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa made
application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, the case would have
been readily and promptly resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to amendments,
not only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of homicide disqualify
him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail
application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the
circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e of Paragraph 3,
Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are present in
Obosa's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail,
except that a retroactive application of the said circular is barred as it would
obviously be unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules on bail at
the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor Obosa's cause either. The appeal
in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the
penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and
evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the
original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so
in the present case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite
conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of
resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on
whether Obosa will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While
the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the court, that discretion — particularly with respect to
extending the bail — should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of
the law and the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must
attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although
the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless, when
imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6
years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is
an undue risk that the accused may commit Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) another crime while his appeal is pending) that
point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released on
bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even
after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his
conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in
deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still
be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than
the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound
discretion. The trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and
caution required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside
from being too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of
judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from
legal confinement as well as his prior convictions. 280 Villasenor vs. Abano
[GR L-23599, 29 September 1967] En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur Facts: The
Provincial Fiscal charged Reynaldo C. Villaseñor for the murder of Boac police
sergeant Alfonso Madla ebfore the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
(Criminal Case 2299). Villaseñor was, on motion, admitted to a P60,000.00
bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of Villaseñor's
wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On 29 May 1964, Villaseñor posted a property
bond, was set at provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the murder
charge, however, the Provincial Fiscal amended the information. This time he
accused Villaseñor with "Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder." On 7 August 1964, the judge sua sponte (Judge
Maximo Abaño) cancelled Villaseñor's bond, and ordered his immediate
arrest. On Villaseñor's motion to reconsider, the judge, on 9 September 1964,
after hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond
of P60,000.00. On 15 September 1964, on Villaseñor's motion that the
original bond previously given be reinstated, the judge resolved to fix "the
bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only
by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with
properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents
for five years." On 1 October 1964, Villaseñor came to the Supreme Court on
certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the
P60,000.00-bond fixed by judge transgress the constitutional injunction that
"excessive bail shall not be required,” in light of the fact that the accused is a
mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and
the sole breadwinner of a family of five. Held: To be read with the
constitutional precept, that "excessive bail shall not be required,” is Section
12, Rule 114, Rules of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good
cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that
"defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the
increased amount he is called upon to furnish." Along with the court's power
to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount therefor, and,
as stated, to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is
excessive "lays with the court to determine." In the matter of bail fixing,
courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail is
required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives
this purpose — "the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance." And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule
states that the condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the
complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be
transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court
of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that
he will surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate
court may render, or that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded
for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be remanded and
submit himself to the orders and processes thereof." Expressions in varying
language spell out in a general way the principles Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) governing bail fixing. One is that the amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required
but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another is
that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused," and "the
need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary
restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each
particular accused, "should all be balanced in one equation. The inability of a
defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not make the
amount excessive. For, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to
bail him out, or none to turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no
matter how small would fall into the category of excessive bail; and, he
"would be entitled to be discharged on his own recognizance." So it is, that
experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be
summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the
offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of
the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8) forfeiture of
other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
other cases. But, at bottom, in bail fixing, "the principal factor considered, to
the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability
of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."
Importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted. Of course,
penalty depends to a great extent upon the gravity of the offense. Here,
Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the
imposition of capital punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated 5 July 1946 of the
Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of 18 July 1963, directed
prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher
penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has already received the Court's
imprimature in Edaño vs. Cea (GR L-6821, 10 May 1954). The Court is
unprepared to downgrade this method of computation, what with a
compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate. The
Court thus find no discernible abuse of discretion, given the facts and the
law, when the judge fixed Villasenor's bail at P60,000.00. 281 De la Camara
vs. Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971] Resolution En Banc, Fernando
(J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: Ricardo de la Camara,
Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7
November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968.
Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with
the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another
for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then
on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with
the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link
him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his
innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of
de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July
1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the
opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount
of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder. On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos,
upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that
the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond,
either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion
for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained
adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the
amount of bail, excessive enough Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) to discourage the accused from fleeing. Held: Where the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more
forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental
law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself
to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under
the Eighth Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the
challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for
the information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the
sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision.
Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for
murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor
should it be ignored in the present case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at
rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same
time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the
situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the
command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There
is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under
the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from
confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that
such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no
disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape,
however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief
prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation
from the Supreme Court. 282 Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-31665, 6 August 1975]
First Division, Castro (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Leonardo Almeda (alias
Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz. The amount
of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was
P15,000, and this was approved by the judge with a direction that it be
posted entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked
the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond
required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed
habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. At the same
hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his
assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for
amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously
objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was premature since no
copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to
amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object
formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place him in double
jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the
information. The trial court nevertheless granted the fiscal's motion in open
court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately
thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then
and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of
the document. Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on
the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for
reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed the present special
civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether
the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the
recomended bail excessive. Held: Bail is "the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to
conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be
denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by
reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused
to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be
required." This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may
negate the very right itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory
powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the amount fixed for bail,
while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be
excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does
not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the
property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained
by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the
reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price
at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to
guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various
proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of
the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the
accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional
right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may
have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to
the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose
of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court,
and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor
revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu
of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly
provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash
with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very
nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of
the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the
option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties
and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash
bond. The court is not without devices with which to meet the situation,
considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in crime
weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.
Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and
for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be
required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person
periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And
third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to
the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may
proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the
bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following
factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the
nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the
character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6)
the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the
accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of
previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise
extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in
regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other
precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety
bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their
undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this
jurisdiction. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 283
Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June 2001] Third Division, Gonzaga-
Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to
P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and
two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional
liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 17 February 1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap
filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of
Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is
a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the
proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive
bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999,
upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed
by the court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999.
Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged. Held: The
Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on
appeal. The court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and
despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of
the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason
the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the
Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la
Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, the Court made
the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory
powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled
to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting
unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following
factors in the setting of the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused
to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty for the
offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and
health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g)
Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j)
Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Thus, the court has
wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure
against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an
appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court
and to make an accounting of his movements. Herein, where Yap was found
to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court
of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a
hold-departure order against him. Under the circumstances, we find that
appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against
the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order
and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of
residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail
while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount
should Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot
allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of
civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court. 284 Cabañero vs. Cañon [AM MTJ-01-1369, 20 September 2001]
Resolution of First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur Facts: A certain Jaime Cañal
accused Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabañero's son, Jessie D. Cabañero, of entering
Cañal’s farmland and harvesting falcata trees valued at P3,191.00. The chief
of police filed the case with the 7th MCTC Hinatuan-Tagbina, with station at
Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, presided over by Judge Antonio K. Cañon. The
Judge conducted a preliminary investigation of the case to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On 1 October 1998,
Judge Cañon issued a warrant of arrest not only against Jessie Cabañero but
also against Guillerma D. Cabañero for covering up for her son. On 15
October 1998, policemen arrested Guillerma and detained her at the
Hinatuan Municipal Jail. To secure her temporary liberty, she posted bail,
which could not be issued and approved in her name because she was not an
accused in Criminal Case 4036-H. The judge pegged the bail at P30,000.00.
On 16 October 1998, Guillerma was released. Incidentally, on 7 October
1998, when her son was arrested, he also posted bail amounting to
P30,000.00. In a complaint dated 16 September 1999, Mrs. Guillerma D.
Cabañero charged Judge Antonio K. Cañon, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Hinatuan-Tagbina, at Hinatuan, Surigao Del Sur with partiality, issuance of
unjust interlocutory orders and grave abuse of discretion relative to Criminal
Case 4036-H (People vs. Jessie Cabañero, for qualified theft), alleging that
considering the value of the property allegedly stolen, the bail required was
excessive. On 24 April 2000, the judge died. Issue: Whether Judge Cañon
imposed excessive bail in the case of qualified theft. Held: Judge Cañon erred
in ordering the arrest of Guillerma D. Cabañero. She was not included as one
of the respondents in the criminal case filed by the chief of police of
Hinatuan. The judges’s interpretation of his powers under the Revised Rules
of Court was far-fetched. The judge also imposed excessive bail. Under
Department Circular 4, the 1996 Bail Bond Guide for the National
Prosecution Service for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the
property stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00, the bail
recommended is P24,000.00. Herein, the monetary value of the falcata trees
cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail of P30,000 is not proportionate to the
amount stolen. When the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know
or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Antonio K. Cañon
was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00, to be taken from his
retirement benefits in view of his demise. 285 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals
[GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] En Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of
Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the
hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but
acts as president of the former corporation. Following the "run" on stock
brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
Manotoc, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with
his costockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for the appointment of a management committee, not
only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case 001826,
"In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr.,
Petitioners"), was granted and a management committee was organized and
appointed. Pending Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) disposition of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for
departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner
on 4 February 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc.
was suspected to be a fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against Manotoc and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-
president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating
fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399
and 45400, assigned to Judge Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545,
raffled off to Judge Pronove). In all cases, Manotoc has been admitted to bail
in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety. On 1 March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country", stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both Judge Camilon and Judge Pronove in their orders
dated 9 March 1982, and 26 March 1982, respetively, denied the same. It
appears that Manotoc likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter
requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated 4
February 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated 27 May
1982. anotoc thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying
his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October 1982, the appellate court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Dissatisfied with the
appellate court's ruling, Manotoc filed the petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the petition, Manotoc filed on
15 August 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. On 20
September 1984, the Supreme Court in a resolution en banc denied
Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. Issue: Whether a
court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines
bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in
the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. As held in People v. Uy Tuising (61 Phil. 404 [1935]), "the
result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of
the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge
to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested
with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner
himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the
country in the first place, if it were otherwise. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27
) Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents People vs.
Dramayo [GR L-21325, 29 October 1971] … 1 Alejandro vs. Pepito [GR L-
52090, 21 February 1980] … 2 Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-
52245, 22 January 1980] … 3 People vs. Mingoa [GR L-5371, 26 March 1953]
… 4 Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31
May 1991] … 5 People vs. Martos [GR 91847, 24 July 1992] … 6 Corpuz vs.
People [GR 74259, 14 February 1991] … 7 Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People [GR
111426, 11 July 1994] … 8 People vs. Holgado [GR L-2809, 22 March 1950] …
10 Delgado vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-46392, 10 November 1986] … 11
People vs. Baluyot [GRs L-35752-3, 31 January 1977] … 11 People vs. Magsi
[GR L-32888, 12 August 1983] … 13 People vs. Malunsing [GR L-29015, 29
April 1975] … 14 Moslares vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129744, 26 June 1998] …
15 Borja vs. Mendoza [GR L-45667, 20 June 1977] … 16 People vs. Alcalde [GR
139225-28, 29 May 2002] … 17 People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37, 29 January
2002] … 19 People vs. Sadiosa [GR 107084, 15 May 1998] … 21 People vs.
Perez [GR 122764, 24 September 1998] … 22 People vs. Lozano [GR 125080,
25 September 1998] … 24 People vs. Ladrillo [GR 124342, 8 December 1999]
… 25 People vs. Lumilan [GR 102706, 25 January 2000] … 26 Evangelista vs.
People [GRs 10813536, 14 August 2000] … 29 People vs. Valdesancho [GR
137051-52, 30 May 2001] … 30 People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May
2002] … 31 People vs. Ostia [GR 131804, 26 February 2003] … 32 People vs.
Flores [GR 128823-24, 27 December 2002] … 35 Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR
L-28025, 16 December 1970] … 36 People vs. Laya [GR L-53873, 13 May
1988] … 37 Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924] … 39 Dacanay vs.
People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995] … 39 People vs. Rivera [GR 139180, 31
July 2001] … 40 Solar Team Entertainment vs. How [GR 140863, 22 August
2000] … 42 Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973] … 43 Re: Request
Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial of the Plunder Cases against Estrada. Perez vs.
Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001] ...45 Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7
March 1927] … 45 Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000] … 46
United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918] … 48 United States vs.
Garcia [GR L-3951, 14 March 1908] … 48 People vs. Sandal [GRs 32394-95, 5
September 1930] … 49 People vs. de Luna [GR 77969, 22 June 1989] … 50
People vs. Prieto [GR L-46542, 21 July 1978] … 51 People vs. Salas [GR L-
66469, 29 July 1986] … 51 Gimenez vs. Nazareno [GR L-37933, 15 April 1988]
… 52 Aquino vs. Military Commission No.2 [GR L-37364, 9 May 1975] … 53
People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] … 55 Carredo vs. People [GR
77542, 19 March 1990] … 55 This collection contains forty seven (47) cases
summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law
student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law
Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University
School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero
entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He
passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 286 People vs.
Dramayo [GR L-21325, 29 October 1971] En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1
took no part Facts: In the morning of 9 January 1964, Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of
Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its
chief of police, to shed light on a robbery committed in Nogaliza's house 5
days before. The response was decidedly in the negative as they themselves
were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least 2 individuals who
had confessed. At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while they were in the
house of Priolo Billona, Dramayo invited all those present including Francisco
Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking
session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion
that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could
not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station
themselves nearby. Soon Nogaliza was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo
with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of
wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate
from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the
group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His
equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the
house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had
just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police
were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of
daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo, et. al. were charged for the
murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The lower court found Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder,
qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by
night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not convicted as, two of them,
Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses,
and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla
acquitted. Dramayo and Ecubin appealed. Issue: Whether Dramayo and
Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused have been
acquitted due to reasonable doubt. Held: The starting point is the
presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which is a right
safeguarded both Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
to demonstrate that culpability lies. Dramayo and Ecubin were not even
called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit
only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore,
for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It
is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience
must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It cannot be
denied that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral
certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by the Supreme
Court as to the culpability of Dramayo and Ecubin. The force of the
controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three
accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and
Ecubin, the requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who testified
for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The
judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part
of Dramayo and Ecubin, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest
credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumption of innocence Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently
overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would
have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no
reasonable doubt being entertained, Dramayo and Ecubin would have been
acquitted likewise just because the other 5 defendants were not similarly
sentenced. There had been cases where the Supreme Court, notwithstanding
a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy
likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties responsible for
the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having arisen as to
their culpability. 287 Alejandro vs. Pepito [GR L-52090, 21 February 1980]
First Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur Facts: During Bianito Alejandro's
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the crime of Homicide before the Court
of First Instance of Aklan (Branch III, presided by Judge Gerardo M.S. Pepito).
Alejandro, however, admitted in open court that he killed the deceased but
that he acted in self-defense. The judge, on 6 July 1979, in an order required
the defense counsel, first to prove evidence in self-defense and the
prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same. Alejandro moved
for reconsideration, reiterated in an Amended Motion, of the Order
contending that the Court action was violative of Section 3 Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the presentation of
evidence by the parties in criminal cases, first by the prosecution and then by
the defense, and not vice versa. Additionally, Alejandro claimed that the
procedure adopted by the Judge is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused in the sense that the same would give rise to the presumption that
the prosecution had already established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt when what is only on record is the accused's admission
that he had killed the victim in self defense. The Judge denied
reconsideration in an Order dated 9 October 1979. Alejandro filed the
petition for certiorari with tthe Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the trial order
should be in reverse order inasmuch as the accused has admitted to the
killing but under the claim of self-defense. Held: Enshrined in our
Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the
requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. That requirement simply requires that the
procedure established by law shall be followed. Section 3 of Rule 119
prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases, provides that "the plea of not
guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the following order: (a)
The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in
support of the charges. (b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence
in support of the defense. (c) The parties may then respectively offer
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permit
them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question. (d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded,
unless the case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must
open the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal
may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or
written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as may
be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case." Thus, it behooved
the Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth. That procedure
observes the "mandate of reason and the guarantee of fairness with which
due process is identified". The procedure outlined safeguards and protects
the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice and is
intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies
can, the conviction of an innocent person. Indeed, the form of a trial is also a
matter of public order and interest; the orderly course of procedure requires
that the prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the first
instance. As held in People vs. Balicasan (17 SCRA 1119 [1966]), "in view of
the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the court
should have taken anew defendant's plea and then proceeded with the trial
of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court." The Judge's desire to abbreviate the trial and unclog his docket is
commendable but it must yield to the paramount objective of safeguarding
the rights of an accused at all stages of criminal proceedings, and to
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the interest of
orderly procedure adopted for the public good. 288 Dumlao vs. Commission
on Elections [GR L-52245, 22 January 1980] En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 5
concur, 1 abstained as far as Dumlao is concerned. Facts: A Petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed by
Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., in their own
behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa 51, 52, and 53 for being Dumlao specifically
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides that "In addition to
violation of section 10 of Art. XIIC of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for
any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired
elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired." Dumlao alleged that the aforecited
provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation." For their part, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of
Section 7 of BP 51, which provides that "Unless sooner removed for cause, all
local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of 6
years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980"; Section 4
of BP 52, which provides that "any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of
the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence
of such fact"; Section 1 and Section 6 of BP 52. In addition to the said
provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also questioned the accreditation of some
political parties by the COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that
it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides
that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination." Issue: Whether Section 4, BP 52, which
disqualifies elective candidates who have been charged in civil and/or
military tribunals, is valid. Held: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the
ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right
to hold office during the term of the sentence. Although the filing of charges
is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty
from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be
aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as
the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) bodies, to the
extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected with
constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. The first paragrap of Section 4, BP 52, on
the other hand, is valid. However, that portion of the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for
the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is
hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. 289 People vs. Mingoa
[GR L-5371, 26 March 1953] En Banc, Reyes (J): 10 concur Facts: Found short
in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to
P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was
prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First
Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some
days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he
took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there
anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no
evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to
the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that
court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a
constitutional question. Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved cannot be sustained. Held: The validity of statutes
establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley,
in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says
that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that
the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they
shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and
shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between
the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the
one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of
lack of connection between the two in common experience. The same view
has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme
court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs.
Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a
presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act
presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted
to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper
demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact
proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between
the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie
presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to
rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid
down in the above citations. Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently
unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was
really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would
be to so inform his superiors and apply for release Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) from liability. But this he did not do. Instead,
he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he
preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the
police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa
had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his
accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and
other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good
ground to believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and
that his story about its loss was pure invention. 290 Feeder International Line
PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel
of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping
Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons
of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel
anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the
Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the
knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in
the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo
dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The
Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required
ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port
authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof,
the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
over the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder International Line
PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International (Phils.) Inc. then filed its
Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention
which the District Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December 1986. In
the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective
counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17 March 1987, the District
Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating
Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464),
as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are
found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code
and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder
International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a
decision dated 13 May 1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of
Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International filed a
petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner
from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court of Tax
Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed a petition for review
of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March
1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the disposition of the
case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's decision in Development
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final
judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of
Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals. Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having
been denied on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition. Issue:
Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the
corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent. Held: A forfeiture
proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to
the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive
analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal
proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture proceedings under
the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in
the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided
for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the
code, seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the
main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) forfeiture incident to unlawful
importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure
cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be
imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of
penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do
not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him
of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to
justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely
substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, a corporate
entity has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which
right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently
established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has
been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting
the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of illegal importation,
there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial
evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are in consonance with
the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as
affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason
to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter,
are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court
absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. 291 People vs. Martos [GR 91847, 24 July 1992] First Division,
Nocon (J): 3 concur Facts: On 1 February 1989, acting on the tip of a
confidential informer (C.I.) or asset, a team from the First Narcotics Regional
Unit based in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, composed of Sgts. Rogelio Raguine,
Peregrino Benito and Ramon Padilla, went to Bgy. Carmen East, Rosales,
Pangasinan at about 4:00 p.m., in pursuit of a certain "Lito" who was
engaged in selling marijuana to students and adults alike. "Lito", whose full
name is Carlito Martos, was washing his feet at the water pump near his
house when Sgt. Raguine and the CI approached him. Sgt. Raguine, acting as
poseur-buyer, was introduced by the CI to "Lito". The former then inquired if
"Lito" had "stuff" for sale, and upon eliciting an affirmative answer, ordered
P50.00 worth of stuff. Lito went inside his house and returned after a while to
where Sgt. Raguine and the CI were. He handed the stuff contained in a small
plastic bag, to Sgt. Raguine while the latter gave Carlito Martos a P50.00 bill,
which serial number was earlier recorded by him in a log book. After being
convinced that the content of the plastic bag was marijuana, Sgt. Raguine
immediately signalled Sgts. Benito and Padilla, who were then positioned in
separate places some 10 meters away from the water pump, to close in and
effect arrest. After identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, Sgts. Benito
and Padilla seized Carlito Martos, but the latter was able to wrench himself
free from his captors and escaped. The three agents pursued him, but when
Carlito Martos heard a shot, he stopped running, raised his hands and
surrendered. It turned out that the shot was fired from the gun of Sgt. Padilla
which accidentally hit the CI on the left arm. Thereupon, Carlito Martos was
brought to the NARCOM office in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The stuff was turned
over to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, for analysis. The report
confirmed the fact that the stuff was marijuana. Martos was charged for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information dated 20 March 1989.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 53 of Rosales, Pangasinan, found Martos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of selling marijuana, defined
and penalized under Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P30,000.00, and to pay
the costs. Martos appealed. Issue: Whether the Court could presume that
official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers to determine
the culpability of the accused person. Held: There is no dispute that the
findings of facts of the trial courts deserve great weight and respect for they
have the privilege of examining the demeanor of the witnesses while on the
witness stand and determine the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) veracity of the their testimonies. The rule, however, admits
of certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusions is a finding based
entirely on speculations; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. The
present case calls for a careful scrutiny of the records due to the
irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which weakens the case for the People. For instance, the P50.00 bill which
was supposed to have been offered to the Martos to purchase the marijuana
was not formally offered in evidence. The decision further states that the
confidential informer was wounded on the right arm, when all the
testimonies of both the prosecution and defense witnesses consistently state
that the informer was hit on the left arm. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are replete with inconsistencies. Further, there was no evidence
presented to prove that the marijuana shown in evidence is the same
marijuana allegedly sold by martos to the buy-bust team. In prosecuting a
case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the prosecution
must be able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person
charged at a particular time, date and place committed any of such unlawful
acts. As it is, the Court is not convinced that the evidence of the prosecution
could stand ground sufficient to convict Martos. The Court cannot even
presume that official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers,
for it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence accorded an accused person. "If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction." The accused is not even called upon to
offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. An assiduous and
thorough analysis of the evidence on record disclosed that Martos'
conviction has no basis. The prosecution's evidence in support of its theory is
not convincing. If there was any evidence presented, it was so slender and
shaky, not presented with care and thoroughness which the gravity of the
offense demanded and, taken in its entirety, is utterly insufficient to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 292 Corpuz vs. People [GR 74259, 14
February 1991] En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur Facts: As Supervising Accounting
Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, Generozo
Corpuz y Padre was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office.
In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank
deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On 13 April
1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on
22 April 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the
petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage
in the amount of P72,823.08. A letter of demand dated 22 April 1981,
required Corpuz to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only
P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated 12 October
1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to
Corpuz of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary
before his dismissal from the service. On 27 September 1982, a final letter of
demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to Corpuz. The
demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said
amount was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan on 11 October 1983.
Corpuz insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the
shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons. On 27 February
1986, the court found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Sandiganbayan sentenced him to suffer imprisonment ranging from 12
Years and 1 Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva
Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to
pay the costs of the suit. Further, the court ordered Corpuz to suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the
amount embezzled. Hence, the petition. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether the equipose rule applies in the
present case. Held: Except for Check 958525, which was only entered in
Corpuz's Cash Book on 31 March 1981, or 3 months after its issuance and
encashment, all the other 3 were duly entered. Then Check 956639 which
was issued and encashed on the same day as Check 958525, was duly
entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle
way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent. There
seems to be no logical reason why Checks 956639 and 958525 could not have
been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay
salary differentials of government officials and employees of the province of
Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.
Corpuz could not have been absent since his Employee's Leave Card, wherein
his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of December
1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is
the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly
from 7 July 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was
absent on 23 December 1980, the day when Check 958525 was issued and
encashed, yet, the other check which was issued and encashed on the same
day was duly liquidated. These findings are mainly factual and are based on
substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent any of the
exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the
contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point
unmistakably to Corpuz's guilt of the offense charged. This conclusion is
bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that Corpuz's denial of
responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
(1) when he entered the said amount in his cash book in March 1981, he did
not make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually
received; (2) At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over, he did not
make any certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged
against him; (3) Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez
misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether civil, criminal
or otherwise, against either or both. Corpuz's claim that he is the victim of a
"sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is
less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure
to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a
scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the
"untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that
does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on Corpuz
would be abetted by the Supreme Court unless his conviction is reversed
must be rejected as an arrant presumptuousness. The equipoise rule invoked
by Corpuz is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should
tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by
Corpuz with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he
malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose
confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed. 293 Dizon-
Pamintuan vs. People [GR 111426, 11 July 1994] First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4
concur Facts: Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public
Works and Highways arrived at his residence located at Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of 12 February 1988 coming
from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving
behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal
belongings from his case. 5 unidentified masked armed persons appeared
from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to
his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. The men
pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. Thereafter,
the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal
properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the
matter immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque
police and was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the
case. He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on 15
February 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his
house and he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other
valuables Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) that
were lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some
of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police
had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation,
on 14 February 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m.
and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at
about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to
recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by
Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with
diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of
earring diamond worth P15,000, and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000.
Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
(Criminal Case 88-64954). On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the offended parties), Cp. Ignacio Jao,
Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the trial
court (Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila) promulgated on 16
November 1990 its decision, finding DizonPamintuan guilty for violation of
Presidential Decree 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 14 years of prison
mayor to 18 years of reclusion temporal. No civil liability was imposed in view
of the recovery of the items. Dizon-Pamintuan then appealed her conviction
to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 11024) where she raised two issues: (1)
that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the
prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is
P93,000.00. On 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals held that the guilt of
Dizon-Pamintuan was established beyond reasonabe doubt. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence
to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to
the imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of PD 1612. It opined
that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered
jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of Teodoro Encarnacion
and the self-serving list he submitted; and thus remanded the records to the
court of origin. Dizon-Pamintuan filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether
the prosecution proved the existence of the third element in the crime of
fencing, i.e. the accused know or should have known that the items
recovered from here were the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft.
Held: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the
act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." Herein, there is no
doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A
robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of Encarnacion
who afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western
Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and
sketches of the jewelry taken from them. Three of these items stolen, viz., (a)
a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00; (b) one
set of earrings worth P15,000.00; and (c) a chain with crucifix worth
P3,000.00, were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by Dizon-Pamintuan in
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles
for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of Dizon-Pamintuan.
As to the thrid element, one is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the
cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, of is aware of the existence
of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something
within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he
actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers
to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate
the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that
person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Since Section 5 of PD 1612 expressly provides that
"mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it
follows that Dizon-Pamintuan is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that
the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The
presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise
from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of
innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. Dizon-Pamintuan was unable to
rebut the presumption under PD 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of
her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that Dizon-Pamintuan was engaged in the purchase
and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo. 294 People
vs. Holgado [GR L-2809, 22 March 1950] Second Division, Moran (CJ): 7
concur Facts: Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information,
being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty." On 8 May 1948, the day set for the trial, Holgado pleaded guilty
without the benefit of a lawyer. Two days later, or on 10 May 1948, the trial
court rendered judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the
medium degree, as minimum, or 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20
years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. Holgado
appealed. Issue: Whether the duties required of the trial court when the
accused has no counsel were complied with. Held: Under the circumstances,
particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such
a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and
imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision
mayor to twenty years, without absolutely any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of
Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is
his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If
he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney
de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of
these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses
that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor
did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire
whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. One of the
great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be
of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and
it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for
the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own. Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is
remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the
accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 295 Delgado vs.
Court of Appeals [GR L-46392, 10 November 1986] Second Division, Paras (J):
4 concur Facts: Emma R. Delgado -- together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia
Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista (at large) -- was
charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents
resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging
her travel to the United States. All the accused (except Catalino Bautista)
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Delgado
was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco.
On 13 December 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense
evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice.
Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground
allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted.
The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there
had been numerous postponements in the past at Delgado's behest. The trial
Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to
have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered the case
submitted for decision. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by
the trial court, dated 20 March 1974, finding Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R.
Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents, and
sentencing each to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional, as minimum to 6 years, also of prision
correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended party
Erlinda Ruedas in the amount of P7,431.00. Each was further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the complainant moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings. Tortona did not
appeal from the decision. Capistrano and Delgado appealed to the Court of
Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and
the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained." On 6 December
1976, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
trial court as to Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Capistrano. On 27
December 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on 1 February
1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for
execution of judgment. Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of
notices and copy of the decision as Delgado was not informed or notified of
said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado filed
on 17 February 1977 with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the Movant to
Personally Receive Copy of the Decision." The motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 April 1977. On 11 May 1977 an
Order was issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest
of Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the
execution of judgment on 11 May 1977. On 27 May 1977, Delgado filed a
Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside
Entry of Judgments, etc.. and prayed that she be granted a new trial on the
ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent
counsel (Yco not being a member of the Philippine Bar). On 3 June 1977, the
Court of Appeals denied Delgado's motion. Delgado filed a petition for
"Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction"
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial,
inasmuch as “Atty.” Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado’s counsel, is not a member of
the Philippine bar. Held: A accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional
Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that
any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly
be a denial of due process. Herein, since Delgado’s "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto
G. Yco, is not a real lawyer, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for
new trial. 296 People vs. Baluyot [GRs L-35752-3, 31 January 1977] First
Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 6 August 1970, in the Municipality of Malolos,
Province of Bulacan, Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio
Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot robbed money from Gerry Sureta alias
Marcelino Carceles y Abasola, then driving a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate
14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9345 s/69), to the damage and prejudice of Sureta.
They stabbed Sureta, hitting him n the neck, thereby inflicting serious
wounds (stab wounds), which directly caused the death of Sureta. Baluyot,
Pinca and Balinjari were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide
before the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions
in Malolos, Bulacan (Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, presiding). Upon arraignment
on 28 September 1970, all the accused, assisted by attorney de oficio, Atty.
Oscar Torres, pleaded not guilty to the information. The following day —
September 29 — when the case was called for trial, the prosecution started
presenting its evidence. The accused were assisted by the same attorney de
oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres, who manifested that he was appearing as counsel
for the accused in that day's trial only. Trial was continued the following day,
30 September 1970. The accused were this time assisted by another counsel
de oficio, Atty. Godofredo Linsangan. Thereafter, the continuation of the trial
was reset for 7 October 1970. At this hearing, the accused were assisted by
another counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by
the trial court after the accused informed it that they had no lawyer. Then
the trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what his pleasure was, and the
latter requested that he be given a few minutes within which to confer with
the accused. The trial court gave him 20 minutes within which to
"consummate" his conference. Accordingly, when the session was resumed,
Atty. Villafuerte manifested that "after conferring with the accused, they
intimated their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to
substitute in lieu thereof the plea of guilty to the offense charged." Without
inquiring from the prosecution what its stand was on the motion of counsel
for the accused, the trial court, addressing itself to all the accused said "You
have heard the manifestations of counsel. Do you now affirm the
truthfulness and correctness of the manifestation of counsel to the effect
that you now desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty and to
substitute the same with that of guilty to the offense charged?" All of the
accused replied in the affirmative. When asked whether the accused were
ready to hear their sentence, the latter replied in the affimative. Then and
there, and without much ado, the trial court dictated in open court its
decision convicting Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing each and all of them to death, "with the other
accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said heirs by way of
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00, proportionately;
and similarly, to proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings." Hence,
the automatic review. Issue: Whether it is sufficient for the trial court to ask
the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they
had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's
manifestation on their change of plea. Held: Similar to the identical case of
People vs. Ricalde (L-34673, January 30, 1973), it is held that previous
decisions have repeatedly warned against the danger of the plea of guilty
being improvidently entered in capital cases. The Court has uniformly
stressed the importance of the trial court's receiving evidence
notwithstanding the plea of guilty in order that no reasonable doubt may
remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused. The Court
has time and time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be
extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of inevitable
conviction. Herein, the trial court did not even ascertain for itself whether
the accused completely understood the precise nature of the charge and the
meaning of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of
superior strength as having attended the commission of the crime, so as to
obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood the
nature and gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty. The trial
court did not conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational
attainment, especially considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures
on the statements they gave to the Malolos Police Force tends to show that
they have very little or scanty education. Moreover, after the arraignment,
trial was held on three dates and on each day the accused were assisted by 3
different counsel de oficio. In the hearing of 7 October 1970 — the day the
decision under review was rendered — the counsel de oficio who assisted
the accused was designated by the trial court only after the case was called
for Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) trial, i.e.,
after the accused had informed the trial court that they did not have a
lawyer. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that
said counsel de oficio proceeded to trial without first fully investigating the
facts of the case and that his interview with the accused, even if it lasted for
20 minutes as the record insinuates, was not, and could not have been
sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp, much less a
comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the case. Incidentally,
under the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oficio is employed or
assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he shall be given a
reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before
proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than 2 days in case of
trial. The record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a "good cause"
to justify the trial court in shortening the trial fixed by the Rules. The trial
court cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed towards
trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to the
accused not only the nature and meaning of the accusation and the full
import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning — in layman's language —
of the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the trial court did not even consult the testimonies of the 3
State witnesses — namely, the doctor and the police officers who took down
the statements of the accused — who testified during the first and second
hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the degree of the
penalty that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the
accused. What the trial court did was only to ask the accused whether they
were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the
"truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their
change of plea. In short, the trial court did not even inform the accused that
their plea of guilty might mean death for all of them. 297 People vs. Magsi
[GR L-32888, 12 August 1983] En Banc, Makasiar (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part,
1 on official leave, 1 on sick leave Facts: On 14 January 1968 in the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, Eloi Magsi, Juan Ponce y
Billon (@ Johnny), Perfecto Arce (@ Peping), along with Gerardo Flores (@
Gerry), Opring Olazo, Doro Doe and Peter Doe, conspired in the killing of one
Jesus Gallardo outside the latter's house through the use of carbine, pistols
and revolvers. Magsi, et. al. were charged before the Court of First Instance
of La Union, Second Judicial District on 10 January 1968 for murder, with
aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, i.e.
(1) abuse of superior strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was
committed in the dwelling place of the offended party; and (4) that the
offense was committed by a band. "Doro Doe," subsequently identified as
Teodoro del Rosario. Altogether, the case was actually set and rescheduled
for 6 times: (1) On 1 August 1970, where despite appointment by the court of
Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to
8 September 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it
because of accused's desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to
the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it
was favorably acted on by the court on 7 September 1970. (2) On 8
September 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear,
despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the
accused. (3) On 9 September 1970, neither the de parte nor the de officio
counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio
counsel for arraignment purposes only. Del Rosario entered a plea of guilty
but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of
his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-accused. Accused's allegation of
duress prompted Atty. Rivera to move for the re-setting of the case for the
study and presentation of possible mitigating circumstances. The case was
accordingly re-set for 14 September 1970. (4) On 14 September 1970, the
presentation of mitigating circumstances was not held as scheduled, but de
officio counsel Atty. Cariaso's explanation regarding his close ties with the
deceased and his family was heard, and his motion to be relieved as counsel
by reason thereof, and be replaced by one who can attend to the defense of
the accused with candor, was denied by the court. However, per the note
presented to the Court by Atty. Cariaso presumably from Atty. Baterina, de
parte counsel for the accused, the contents of which sought the re-setting of
the case for the first week of October, the case was again re-set for 6
October 1970. The Court motu proprio changed accused's plea of guilty to
not guilty. (5) On 6 October 1970, Atty. Cariaso, who appeared in court only
after a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) warrant
for his arrest was issued, informed the Court that those interested in the
conviction of the accused opposed his appearance as de officio counsel, and
at the same time, also turned over another note, the contents of which asked
for another resetting. The Court denied the motion of Atty. Cariaso to
withdraw as counsel, but re-set the case for 19 October 1970. (6) On 19
October 1970, Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused
was ready to enter an unqualified plea of guilty. Based on accused's plea of
guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged
aggravating circumstances nor accused's evidence on duress, the Court
rendered its decision the next day, 20 October 1970, finding del Rosario
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the mandatory review. Issue: Whether
the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on
an improvident plea of guilty. Held: Of the six hearing dates held relative to
the case, accused at two instances entered a qualified plea of guilty. De
officio counsel Atty, Rivera and accused were hardly afforded by the Court
any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty
resulted from the Court's proddings rather than from accused's spontaneous
volition. The Court knew that accused's prior plea of guilty was qualified by
alleged duress employed on him by the other accused. It behooved the Court
to allow the accused an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged
duress, as well as discover for itself the reasons for accused's change of mind
regarding his plea. But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as
it failed to do so the first time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise
the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the qualifying
and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be
imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's
evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense charged. But these considerations
notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor
from the defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries
addressed to the accused whether he confirmed the same or not, the Court
proceeded to decide the case. The Court has consistently enjoined strict and
substantial adherence to its rulings in cases where defendants are charged
with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel,
who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of
hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
compliance with the Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly
established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who
was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty. 298 People vs. Malunsing [GR
L-29015, 29 April 1975] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur Facts: In the
original complaint, Manuel Villegas was charged along with other accused
Geremias Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito. After the preliminary investigation,
no doubt due to the efforts of Atty. Geronimo Pajarito (same surname as
Geremias and Samuel), possibly a kinsman, Geremias and Samuel "were both
discharged for lack of probable cause." Atty. Pajarito explicitly manifested in
the opening of the trial Manuel Villegas intimated to him that he had his own
lawyer. There was an admission that he did appear for him in the preliminary
investigation but only because there was no other counsel. Villegas was
informed that "the Court will give you a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito is appointed as
counsel de oficio for you. We will proceed with the trial"; nothwithstanding
Atty. Pajarito’s reservations about the matter, stating that as Villegas had
manifested that he had dispensed with his services, his representation might
later on be questioned. After marking it of record that Atty. Pajarito was
appointed as such counsel de oficio, the attorney was asked whether he
wanted to confer with Villegas. This was the answer: "I think I know the
case." The Court then immediately proceeded with the hearing, having the
first witness called. The prosecution during the trial presented its witnesses,
and likewise all the defendants, except Manuel Villegas, took the witness
stand and testified for and in their defense. Villegas is a very old man,
ignorant and unlettered; during the entire proceedings in the Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case, Villegas while present
did not know what was going on. The trial court never apprised Villegas of his
fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer. The trial court did not bother
inquiring why Villegas did not take the witness stand, something out of the
ordinary as all defendants, except Villegas, had testified. The trial court went
on throughout the proceedings of the case without knowing why Villegas did
not testify, that if Villegas testified what would his testimony be like, what
would be his demeanor during his testimony. The trial court rendered
decision, admitting that "No evidence was presented for and in behalf of
Manuel Villegas," but convicting Villegas for murder. Issue: Whether a
counsel de oficio’s appointment as counsel for the accused is sufficient to
satisfy the Constitutional guarantee of the accused’s right to counsel. Held: It
is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here,
where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a
decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right
if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused,
would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his
exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not
rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. Villegas could then rightfully
invoke this constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a
just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new trial where he
can be duly represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed
de oficio, one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and
conscientious manner and would not readily assume that he need not bother
himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the case.
For only in such a way may there be an intelligent defense. If the matter be
viewed thus, there is no unfairness to the state either. It can still see to it that
a person against whom a probable cause had been found would have to
stand trial, but, to repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards. 299
Moslares vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129744, 26 June 1998] Second Division,
Melo (J): 4 concur Facts: On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased
three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. which were
thereupon registered under his name, under the name of Manila
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the
name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued
Philippine Bank of Communications Check 841644 dated 24 May 1991 in the
amount of P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said check was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares
was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 and for Estafa. The hearings
of the case were postponed several times either at the instance of Moslares
or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September 1995, the
scheduled date of the presentation of evidence by Moslares, he failed to
appear, but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio
Landero, who claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he
was not yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial court set the
promulgation of the decision on 30 October 1995. On 9 October 1995,
Moslares filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Re-Trial. However, on 26
October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares did not
attend during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the
defense. The Court set the presentation of evidence for the defense 19
times, 4 of which were cancelled on the ground that there was a typhoon and
the public prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify
and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila. Subject cases were
submitted for decision 4 times for failure of the accused to present evidence
but was lifted in the interest of justice upon motion of the accused. He
changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case
submitted for decision for failure of the accused to present his evidence in
order to gain a delay." The court therein found Moslares guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal
Case 92-0100), and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for
each criminal case. On 30 October 1995, the trial court proceeded to
promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14 November 1995,
Moslares filed a notice of appeal which was denied due course by the lower
court in its assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) court, relying on the case of
People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have
waived his right to appeal. On 14 February 1996, Moslares filed a petition for
relief from judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14
March 1996, Moslares filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
which treated the petition as one for certiorari. Moslares also filed on 3
October 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented. On 29 November
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration
subsequently filed by Moslares were denied. Moslares filed the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Moslareshas waived his
right to present evidence Held: While it is true that the right to present
evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that
Moslares had waived said right in the present case. The postponements
sought by Moslares and counsel appear to be justified and were not
vexatious and oppressive. The intention and the willingness of Moslares to
present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented
one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although this
was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and his
counsel, Moslares' confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between
the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial
are given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure.
Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution
itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to make sure
that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our
system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. It would
have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it
ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares'
evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of postponements,
the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been
given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have
been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a
speedy disposition of the case but at the expense of a fundamental right.
Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the
promulgation of decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right
to appear in court to present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in
affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a decision
of the lower court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due process.
300 Borja vs. Mendoza [GR L-45667, 20 June 1977] Second Division,
Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Manuel Borja was accused of slight
physical injuries before the City Court of Cebu. No arraignment was made.
Notwithstanding this, Judge Romulo R. Senining proceeded with the trial in
absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on 18 August 1976, found
Borja guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a
period of 20 days of arresto menor. Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated
to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Judge Rafael T. Mendoza.
Without any notice to Borja and without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on 16
November 1976 affirming the judgment of the City Court. Borja filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Borja should
be arraigned first before the trial can commence. Held: The plea to nullify the
proceedings in the criminal case finds support in the procedural due process
mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense
he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in
accordance with a valid law. Due process is where the accused is "heard in a
court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority
of a constitutional law." An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the
means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he
is required to meet." Upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid
by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of
certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty
is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform,
unless waived." No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to
the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the
trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which
he himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must
act of its own volition, as arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any
criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less. Nor is it only
the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As
noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the
Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature
of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him.
An arraignment serves that purpose. It is true, the complaint or information
may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the
charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea
with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.
It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not
useless formality, much less an idle ceremony. 301 People vs. Alcalde [GR
139225-28, 29 May 2002] En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 14 concur Facts: At 1:00
p.m. of 29 August 1997, SPO2 Nicanor Avendaño, arriving at the house of
Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio in Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna,found the
house in disarray. He saw a naked woman lying dead on a wooden bed with
both hands and feet tied from behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The
dead woman was Wendy Alcalde, and the dead child was Arwin Alcalde.
Some clothes and a puppy were also burned. Avendaño and his team
recovered a piece of steel near Wendy’s face and empty bottles of gin and
Royal Tru-Orange on top of the cabinet. They took pictures of the dead
bodies and caused the entry of the incident in the police blotter. He learned
later that Arnel's two daughters, Bernalyn and Erica, had been rushed to the
provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived at the crime
scene. On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna filed before the trial court two informations against Arnel for
parricide, committed against his wife Wendy and his 11-month old son
Arwin, and two informations for frustrated parricide, committed against his
two daughters Bernalyn and Erica the before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
28, Santa Cruz, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, Arnel,
who was assisted by a counsel de parte, refused to speak. Pursuant to
Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him
a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense
waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. The
witnesses initially presented by the prosecution were SPO2 Nicanor
Avendaño, Dr. Nilo Pempengco, Dr. June Mendoza, and Salud Suillan. After
the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense
filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense, through counsel de parte Atty.
Renato B. Vasquez, Sr., filed a demurrer to evidence based on the grounds
that (a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not an iota of
incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and
presented by the prosecution during the trial; and (c) The constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any
evidence or contrary presumption. In its Order of 22 May 1998, the trial
court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the dates for the presentation
of the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4 June
1998, Atty. Vasquez informed the court that the defense Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) opted not to present evidence for
Arnel’s defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its Comment on the
manifestation and prayed for the re-opening of the presentation of
prosecution’s evidence for the purpose of proving that Arnel was at the
scene of the crime. In its Order of 21 August 1998, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense questioned the
propriety of the said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. In its resolution of 17 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court, and for the further reason that the order sought to be set aside was
interlocutory in character and could not, therefore, be the subject of a
petition for certiorari; and that even granting that the exception applied, the
trial court committed no capriciousness in issuing the assailed order. The
prosecution thereafter presented SPO1 Neptali de la Cruz and Jose Alcalde as
additional witnesses. After the prosecution finally rested its case, the trial
court set on 8 October 1998 the presentation of the evidence for the
defense. However, on 7 October 1998, counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr.,
informed the trial court of his inability to communicate with Arnel because of
Arnel’s “out of touch of the world” behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that
the defense was constrained to submit the case for decision. In its decision of
30 April 1999, the trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence has duly
established a succession of circumstantial evidence that leads to the
inescapable conclusion that Arnel committed the crimes charged. The court
found Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt (Criminal Cases SC-6651 and
SC6654) for the killing of Wendy and Arwin, and imposed upon him the
penalty of death in both cases. Likewise, the court found Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated parricide (Criminal Cases SC-6652
and SC-6653), after considering the severity of the wounds suffered by his
daughters Bernalyn and Erika. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether
arraignment may be had when the accused is suffering from an unsound
mental health. Held: The failure of Arnel’s counsel de parte to ask for the
suspension of his arraignment on the ground that Arnel was suffering from
an unsound mental health did not amount to a waiver of such right. It must
be recalled that Arnel’s arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At the time,
what was applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which reads "The arraignment shall be suspended, if at
the time thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement
for such purpose." Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by
the accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence
of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension
of arraignment. True, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, requires a motion by the proper party, but this new requirement
of “motion by the proper party” could not be applied to these cases because
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement,
took effect only on 1 December 2000. Besides, a waiver must be knowingly
and intelligently made by the person possessing such right. Unfortunately,
Arnel was apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver,
impliedly or expressly, could have been made by Arnel at the time of his
arraignment by reason of his mental condition. Settled is the rule that when a
judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present
condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the
matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not,
with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of
detention until his faculties are recovered. Moreover, the aforementioned
Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the suspension of the arraignment and
the mental examination of the accused should it appear that he is of unsound
mind. In these cases, the trial court should have ascertained Arnel’s mental
state instead of proceeding with his arraignment and its subsequent
proceedings. The physical and outward manifestations of Arnel at the time of
his arraignment, which were brought to the attention of the trial court,
indicated substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered Arnel
unfit to be arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases. The trial court failed
to exercise utmost circumspection in assuming that Arnel was in full
possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against
him. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the accusation
against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to
effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively
prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not
every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of
the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial
court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the
assistance the law secures or gives. Under the circumstances in these cases,
the trial court gravely failed in this regard. 302 People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37,
29 January 2002] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: Gina
Marie Mobley, together with her companion Helen Kathleen Tennican, both
American nationals, were exchange students at the Chengdu University of
Science and Technology in Chengdu, Sichuan, China. Gina was taking up
Biology. Helen was also a Biology major and took Chinese Studies as an
additional course. Both were enrolled at the Pacific Lutheran University at
Tacoma, Washington, where Gina was a university scholar. Having heard of
the renowned Filipino hospitality from their Filipino-American friends, Gina
and Helen decided to spend their semestral break in the Philippines. They
arrived in the country on 10 January 1994. In the afternoon of 12 January
1994, they were driven from their hotel to the Philippine Rabbit Bus terminal
in Dau, Pampanga, where they were supposed to take a ride to Baguio City.
While waiting for their bus, they went to a Shakey’s Pizza Parlor near the
terminal. Gina and Helen took the table near the comfort room, while Bryan
Dy y La Madrid and Giovan Bernardino y Garcia, who are brothers-in-law, and
their driver Rizal, were seated at the next table. With them was their driver,
Rizal. Bryan and Giovan offered the girls a ride to Baguio City, which
eventually, was accepted by Helen and Gina, thinking that they could save
some money besides the thought that the boys looked nice and trustworthy.
They left Shakey’s at 7:30 p.m. and boarded a white 1991 four-door
Mitsubishi sedan. Rizal took the wheel, while Bryan sat at the front passenger
seat. Helen, Gina and Giovan stayed on the back seat, in that order. Before
proceeding to Baguio, they stopped at a residential area where Bryan
delivered some papers and picked up some jackets. The group arrived in
Baguio City at 10:45 p.m., proceeding first to the house of Bryan’s uncle, but
shortly afterwards, looked for another place to stay. They went to the
Terraces Hotel, the Baden Powell, and the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn to check
the rates and the rooms. They checked in at the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn at
11:00 p.m. They got two rooms on opposite sides of the corridor on the
second floor. After a while, Bryan and Giovan asked the girls out for some
drinks and dancing at the Songs Jazz Bar along Session Road. While at the
Songs Jazz Bar, Helen drank a margarita, tequila and blowjob with plenty of
water. Gina drank Singaporean sling, blowjob and half a glass of Giovan’s mai
tai. Bryan drank just one shot of tequila while Giovan drank half a glass of mai
tai. After the group left Songs Jazz Bar, Giovan drove to a convenience store
on the pretext that he was thirsty and wanted to buy cola drinks. Giovan and
Bryan alighted and returned after some 10 minutes with Giovan carrying 3
plastic cups of Sprite or Seven-Up and Bryan, two cups and a plastic bag
containing Chinese food with small lemons to be squeezed on it. Bryan gave
Helen and Gina a cup each. Helen and Gina drank from the cups. Meanwhile,
as they were drinking their cola drinks, Giovan drove the group to Club John
Hay where he told the guards at the gate that they were just going to check
on the Club’s billeting rates. They parked in front of the billeting office. Gina
was then about to finish her cola drink when she felt something gritty in it
which stuck into her teeth; they were like small particles. She spat them back
into the cup and dumped out the remaining contents of the cup outside the
car and thereafter gave the cup to Giovan who threw it into a trash can. Gina
commented out loud about the gritty substance in her drink and related that
in China they often found strange things in their food. There was no word
from the boys. Helen finished her drink and then handed the empty cup to
Giovan who likewise threw it into a trash can. After leaving Club John Hay,
the group returned to their hotel. Gina and Helen appeared to have been
drugged, as they were disoriented by the events thereafter. Helen felt that
someone was violating her personal space before she became unconscious.
Gina remembered that Giovan forcefully kissed her and inserted two fingers
in her vagina before someone else entered her room; finding Bryan
attempting to have carnal knowledge with her, she did oral sex on Bryan to
prevent him from penetrating her before she passed out. Gina woke up at
3:00 p.m. feeling groggy and confused. She opened her purse to get money
to pay for the room, but found that her Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) US$290.00, P2,000.00, 300 yuan and US$200.00
traveller’s check were all missing. Only her US $100.00 traveller’s check was
left. She tried to wake Helen up but the latter only rolled over. Gina ran
downstairs and met Hilda, a hotel desk girl, who asked her if she was alright.
Gina cried and told her that she had been robbed. Hilda said she will call the
police. Gina returned to their room to wake up Helen but the latter still did
not wake up. After sometime, Gina again went downstairs and was
introduced to 5 or 6 members of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). She
told them that she was robbed and sexually molested and narrated to them
what had happened. Bryan and Giovan were charged with Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness in Criminal Cases 12600-R, and 12601-R. The two cases were
tried jointly. Bryan and Giovan refused to be arraigned and enter a plea;
hence, a plea of “not guilty” was entered on their behalf. During the trial, and
based on the set of facts provided by the private prosecutor, the entries in
Gina’s journal and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary examination conducted by the trial court in the afternoon of
January 26 and 27, 1994, Dr. Hernandez opined that Gina and Helen were
drugged, possibly with lorazepam or ativan, which is a benzodiazepine. On 16
March 1994, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Bryan and Giovan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness as charged. In Criminal Case 12600 (rape), the court sentenced
Bryan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum
(appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender); and Giovan to an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to 20 years and 1 DAY of reclusion perpetua, as maximum
(appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender). Both were
ordered to pay Gina Marie Mobley in the amounts of: P50,000.00 for her
being raped, P12,195.00 (the equivalent of US$450.00 dollars at the
exchange rate of P27.10 to US$1.00) as actual damages, and P500,000.00 as
moral damages, plus costs. In Criminal Case 12601-R (acts of lasciviousness),
the Court sentenced Bryan to suffer a straight penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor; and Giovan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
maximum. Both were ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally Gina Marie
Mobley in the amount of P100,000.00 for and as moral damages, plus costs;
and furthermore, pay, jointly and severally, the offended party attorney’s
fees in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases. Bryan and Giovan filed
separate appeals. Issue: Whether the alleged lack of arraignment nullifies the
proceedings against Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino. Held: Concededly, the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be
waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the
court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their behalf. However, it becomes
altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not
hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
information. The reason proffered by Bryan and Giovan for their refusal to be
arraigned, i.e., that to do so would supposedly constitute a waiver of their
right to appeal the resolutions of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice,
appears to be specious. Evidently, Bryan and Giovan only wanted the trial
court to suspend the arraignment to enable them to exhaust their remedy of
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. However, Bryan and Giovan had no valid
ground to move that their arraignment be held in abeyance, considering that
at that time they had not filed a petition for review of the prosecutor’s
resolution before the Department of Justice. It is also important to stress that
to nullify the proceedings had before the court a quo would set a dangerous
precedent. For, all that an accused would do is to refuse to be arraigned and
then proceed to trial, and if found guilty would just invoke the absence of
arraignment to set aside the proceedings had in the trial court. Such practice
would run counter to the purpose and spirit of our rules of procedure which
is: to help achieve an orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Nonetheless,
Bryan and Giovan were substantially informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the
Prosecutor’s resolution maintaining the charge for rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language
or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was
eventually non-prejudicial to Bryan and Giovan. Not only did they receive a
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) copy of the
information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the
complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk
and deny the charges against them. The conduct of the defense, particularly
their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them. Interestingly, after the
arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed invalidity or defect
thereof. Rather, Bryan and Giovan and their counsel vigorously and fully
participated in the trial of the case. Bryan and Giovan are clearly estopped to
question the alleged invalidity of or infirmity in their arraignment. By actively
participating in the trial of the case, they have effectively waived whatever
procedural error there was in their arraignment. In short, whatever was the
defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by their own omission
and subsequent actions. 303 People vs. Sadiosa [GR 107084, 15 May 1998]
Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur Facts: Arsenia Conse went to
Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met Cely Navarro, Marcela
Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to apply for
overseas employment informing them that she had a cousin who could send
them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse,
the four went with her on 5 February 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they
proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St., Pasay City where
Arsenia Conse introduced the group to Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied
for work as domestic helpers. On that occasion, Sadiosa assured the four that
she could dispatch them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from
each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from
Cely Navarro). She assured the group that she would facilitate the processing
of all the necessary documents needed by them. She further promised them
that upon payment of the required fees, they would be able to leave for
Kuwait immediately. The four did give Sadiosa the money demanded
although on different dates. The latter issued the corresponding receipts
therefor. Again, she assured them that they could leave for Kuwait on
different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on 17 February 1992 which was
rescheduled twice on 19 February 1992 and on 25 February 1992, and
Benilda Domingo and Marcela Manzano on 17 March 1992 which was moved
twice on 24 February 1992 and on 17 March 1992. However, not one of them
was able to leave for Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money,
Sadiosa refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the
complaint for illegal recruitment against Sadiosa. The information read: "That
on or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January 1992 to March
1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta,
well knowing that she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure
employment as domestic helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo,
Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y
Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously recruit
aforesaid persons and collected from them the amount of P8,000.00 each,
which amount were given to the accused by the aforesaid complainants upon
receipt of which, far from complying with her obligation aforestated, accused
appropriated for herself the said amount and failed to deploy complainants
abroad. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment, Sadiosa pleaded "not guilty."
The trial court found Sadiosa guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and 2018, and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. The court also ordered
Sadiosa to indemnify Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum of P8,000.00;
Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y Sabado,
the sum of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To
pay the costs. Sadiosa appealed. Issue: Whether the information was
sufficient to allege illegal recruitment, and that said charge will not be
confused with estafa by the facts stated therein. Held: The information is
sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute
and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular section or
subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. No law requires
that in Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) order
that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act
charged should be mentioned in the information. What identifies the charge
is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the
preamble thereof. It is not even necessary for the protection of the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense,
that the accused be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged. Herein, the information
filed against Sadiosa sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and
penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it is designated as for "illegal
recruitment" only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the
recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in
any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused has
not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an
authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and (3)
accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or
as a group." All these elements are to be found in the information. It alleges
that Sadiosa, knowing fully well that she was "not a duly licensed job
recruiter," falsely represented that she could "secure employment as
domestic helpers abroad" for the four complainants. As such, the purpose of
the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule 110 to inform and apprise the accused of
the true crime of which she was charged, has been complied with. The main
purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting an offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language is to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his defense. It is also
required so that the trial court could pronounce the proper judgment. This
gives substance to the constitutional guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Herein, Sadiosa was fully accorded the right to be
informed of the charges against her. The fact that she put up the defense of
having accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer of the
recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and cause of
the accusation against her. Furthermore, it is incorrect for Sadiosa to
maintain that the information filed against her contained conflicting and
irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under the same article but under par. 2
(a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the information may
constitute estafa, it merely describes how Sadiosa was able to consummate
the act of illegal recruitment — through false and fraudulent representation
by pretending that she was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure
employment for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the information
therefore do not render the information defective or multiplicitous. Sadiosa
could have been validly charged separately with estafa under the same set of
facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to
have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the
information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients that
constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor simply captioned
the information with the generic name of the offense under the Labor Code
— illegal recruitment. Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation
of the information, the prosecutor should have indicated in its caption, the
offense he had clearly alleged in its body, that the crime charged was for
illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such omission or lack of skill of
the prosecutor who crafted the information should not deprive the people of
the right to prosecute a crime with so grave a consequence against the
economic life of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did allege
in the information the facts sufficient to constitute the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale. 304 People vs. Perez [GR 122764, 24 September
1998] En Banc, Regalado (J): 12 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: According to
Maribel Perez, Ernesto Perez brought her to Samar from their residence in
Sampaloc, Manila sometime in February 1994, supposedly to separate her
from her siblings who were drug users or addicts. Maribel was only 13 years
old then. Ernersto is her stepfather, he being the second husband of her
mother, Anacleta de la Cruz. When they arrived in Samar, they stayed in the
house of the spouses Raul and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Nida Nieva at Barangay Ilo in the town of Sta. Margarita.
While Ernesto and the Nievas were drinking in the kitchen on the night of 21
February 1994, Maribel proceeded to the bedroom to sleep. The kitchen,
wherein the Nievas would be spending the night was about one arm's length
away from the bedroom. At around 9:00 p.m., Maribel was awakened by the
presence of someone pulling down her panties. Maribel soon realized that it
was Ernesto who was removing her underwear. Ernesto spread her legs,
went on top of her and started thrusting his genital organ toward her private
parts. Maribel cried in pain when Ernesto's penis penetrated into her vagina.
To stifle Maribel's outcries, Ernesto covered her mouth with his hand and
warned her that he would box her if she again shouted or resisted his bestial
advances. Faced with that threat, Maribel no longer struggled against
Ernesto as he continued with his lechery. After a while, Ernesto withdrew
from Maribel and masturbated in front of her. Semen, which Maribel later
naively referred to as water, was thereafter ejaculated by Ernesto toward her
vagina. Eventually, Ernesto proceeded to sleep beside the victim. The
following morning, Nida Nieva asked Maribel why she was crying the night
before. After Maribel revealed to Nida the sexual assault committed by
Ernesto, the two immediately went to the capitan of Barangay Ilo and then to
the police headquarters of Sta. Margarita to report the incident. On the same
day, Maribel was brought to the Calbayog District Hospital for physical
examination. On the basis of a complaint subscribed by Maribel, an
information was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City,
Samar (Criminal Case 1899) against Ernesto for allegedly raping Maribel, his
stepdaughter. The indictment alleged "That on or about the 21st day of
February, 1994, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Ilo,
Municipality of Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) MARIBEL PEREZ
against her will; that in the commission of the said offense, the accused acted
with grave abuse of confidence, he being the stepfather of the complainant,
by enticing her to leave their house located at 159 J. Fegiras (sic) St.,
Sampaloc, Manila and was brought to Barangay Ilo, Sta. Margarita, Samar
where the above-mentioned offense was committed." On being duly
arraigned, Ernesto pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him.
Thereafter, a full-blown trial was conducted in the court below, wherein the
People and Ernesto were afforded full opportunity to establish their
respective versions of the criminal charge. The trial court convicted Ernesto
Perez, also known as Erning, of the felony of rape committed against his
stepdaughter, and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death, and
ordering him to pay his victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and the costs of the criminal action. Hence, the automatic review. Issue:
Whether the death sentence should be applied inasmuch as the victim is
below 18 years of age and is the accused’s stepdaughter, notwithstanding
the fact that the information alleges simple rape. Held: Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
carnal knowledge of a woman procured through force or intimidation and
without any other attendant circumstance. With the advent of Republic Act
7659 on 31 December 1993, and in addition to the two instances theretofore
introduced by Republic Act 4111, 7 new special circumstances of rape were
added to Article 335 calling for the single indivisible penalty of death. The
first of such additional circumstances, upon which the trial court based its
judgment of conviction against Ernesto Perez, is the conjoined factual
requirement, which must be alleged and proved, that the victim is under 18
years of age and that the offender inter alia is the stepparent of the victim,
which duality and concurrence of circumstances could warrant the
imposition of the death penalty. The modality of the rape, as well as the
other six modes introduced by Republic Act 7659, partakes of the nature of a
qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the
penalty for rape by one degree. It cannot be considered as equivalent to an
aggravating circumstance because aggravating circumstances affect only the
period of the penalty and do not increase the penalty to a higher degree.
Also, under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be
considered as such must be so alleged in the information, which is not
required of aggravating circumstances. The information filed against Ernesto
in the present case does not support or justify the penalty of death imposed
upon him by the trial court. A reading of the information discloses that,
contrary to the findings of said court, only the crime of simple rape was
charged against Ernesto and no attendant special circumstance, which would
in effect qualify the crime Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) was alleged as such in the information. While the fact that Ernesto
is the stepfather of complainant was pleaded in the information, it was
mentioned therein merely as the basis for the allegation that Ernesto acted
with grave abuse of confidence. On the other hand, and of significant
importance, the circumstance that Maribel was less than 18 years of age at
the time of the rape was never, in any manner, stated in the information. For
that matter, the allegations in the victim's complaint are substantially the
same as those in the information, including the omission of her age at the
time of the rape. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified
form punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the minority
of Maribel and the relationship of Ernesto and his victim were established
during the trial, Ernesto can only be convicted of simple rape because he
cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with which he was
charged. The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the
indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the
nature of the charge against him, so that he may adequately prepare for this
defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The fact,
however, is that it is the prosecution which determines the charges to be
filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as
components of the information. It is not for the accused, usually a layman, to
speculate upon the purposes and strategy of the prosecution and be
thereafter prejudiced through erroneous guesswork. Thus, since the People
dictate what he should be charged with, fairness demands that he should not
be convicted of a crime with which he is not charged or which is not
necessarily included therein. 305 People vs. Lozano [GR 125080, 25
September 1998] First Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Fact: On 29 August
1990 at about 4:30 p.m., Lilia Montederamos, a resident of Barangay Sta.
Rosa, Maasin, Southern Leyte, was requested by her mother, Catalina
Montederamos to buy rice at the neighboring barangay of Ibarra. On her way
to Ibarra, Lilia passed by the coconut plantation of Luding Bandibas where
she saw Temestocles Lozano. When Lilia resumed walking to her destination,
Lilia noticed that Lozano was following her. As she was alone, Lilia got
frightened and started to run. Eventually, however, Lozano caught up with
Lilia. Once astride each other, Lozano suddenly covered Lilia's mouth, poked
a sharp-pointed stick on her side and warned her not to make any noise or
else she would die. Lilia pleaded to Lozano not to do anything to her because
she was pregnant but the plea fell on deaf ears. Instead, Lozano forcibly
brought her to a banana plantation at the lower portion of the road. When
Lilia tried to shout, appellant boxed her thrice on her right cheek causing her
to feel dizzy. After delivering the fist blows, Lozano ordered Lilia to take off
her clothes and threatened her with death if she refused. When Lilia finished
undressing, Lozano took off his clothes but his pants and briefs were only
pulled down to his knees. He then ordered Lilia to lie down on the stony
ground after which, he lay on top of Lilia and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Thereafter, Lozano pulled out his penis from the vagina of Lilia,
wound it up with banana fiber and inserted it again into Lilia's vagina. Then,
he pulled out again his penis and forced Lilia to suck it. After he was through,
Lozano brought Lilia with him. As they proceeded to the Bodega of
Montalbo, Lilia saw persons coming towards their direction. Lilia seized this
as an opportunity for escape especially so that the left arm of Lozano was no
longer holding her neck. She then pushed Lozano and ran to the persons
coming towards their way. She recognized these persons as Aniceto
Malasaga, Diony Malasaga and Juanito Bandibas. Lilia ran directly to Diony
Malasaga and told his group that somebody wanted to kill her. The 3 brought
Lilia home and upon arrival thereat, she informed her parents that appellant
raped her. On the same night, Lilia's father reported the incident to the
Maasin Police Station. On the following day, 30 August 1990, Lilia went to the
Maasin Police Station to report the incident; there, she executed a sworn
statement. Provincial Prosecutor Iñego A. Gorduiz charged Lozano with rape
in an Information dated 24 October 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 (Criminal Case 1471), which reads as
follows: "The undersigned, acting upon a sworn complaint originally signed
and filed by the offended party, Lilia L. Montederamos, hereby accuses
Temestocles Lozano, alias Tommy, a resident of Ibarra, Maasin, Southern
Leyte and is presently Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) detained at the Provincial Jail, Maasin, Southern Leyte of the crime
of Rape, committed by him as follows: 'That sometime in the afternoon of
August 29, 1990, in [B]arangay Ibarra, [M]unicipality of Maasin, [P]rovince of
Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused with lustful intent and lewd design and by
means of force, threats, intimidation and/or violence did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually attack, assault and ravish the
offended party, Lilia L Montederamos, and had carnal intercourse without
her consent and against her will, to her damage and [to the prejudice of the]
social order." Upon his arraignment on 13 March 1991, Lozano, assisted by
Counsel de Parte Porfirio P. Siayngco, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued in due course. On 29 February 1996, the trial court rendered its
Decision, finding Lozano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
as defined and punished by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify
the offended party [in] the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. Lozano appealed.
Issue: Whether Lozano is liable to one count of rape only even if the evidence
showed that he had carnal knowledge with his victim at least twice. Held:
Although the prosecution's evidence tended to prove that Lozano had carnal
knowledge of the victim at least twice, he cannot be held liable for two
counts of rape, because the Information charged him with only one count. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right. he case is similar to the case of People v.
De Guzman, where the appellant therein was convicted of only one count of
rape because the Information charged him with only one, despite the fact
that evidence presented during the trial showed that there were at least two
acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape. 306 People vs. Ladrillo
[GR 124342, 8 December 1999] Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur Facts:
Jane Vasquez, the 8-year old complaining witness, could not state the month
and year she was supposedly abused by her cousin Edwin Ladrillo. She could
narrate however that one afternoon she went to Ladrillo's house in Abanico,
Puerto Princesa City, which was only 5 meters away from where she lived.
There he asked her to pick lice off his head; she complied. But later, he told
her to lie down in bed as he stripped himself naked. He removed her panty
and placed himself on top of her. Then he inserted his penis into her vagina.
He covered her mouth with his hand to prevent her from shouting as he
started gyrating his buttocks. He succeeded in raping her 4 times on the same
day as every time his penis softened up after each intercourse he would
make it hard again and insert it back into her vagina. After successively
satisfying his lust Ladrillo would threaten to "send her to the police" if she
would report the incident to anyone. Sometime in 1994 Salvacion Ladrillo
Vasquez, mother of Jane, noticed that Jane had difficulty urinating and kept
pressing her abdomen and holding her private part. As she writhed in
discomfort she approached her mother and said, "Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa
akin na 'yung uten ni Kuya Edwin ipinasok sa kiki ko" (Ma, you won't believe
that Kuya Edwin inserted his penis into my vagina). Perturbed by her
daughter's revelation, Salvacion immediately brought her to their church, the
Iglesia ni Kristo, where she was advised to report to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). At the NBI Salvacion was referred to the Puerto Princesa
Provincial Hospital so that Jane could be physically examined. On 3 February
1995, Jane Vasquez with the assistance of her mother Salvacion Ladrillo
Vasquez filed a criminal complaint against Edwin Ladrillo. The Information
alleged "That on or about the year 1992 at Abanico Road, Brgy. San Pedro
Puerto Princesa City... the said accused, with the use of force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the undersigned five (5) years of age, minor, against
her will and without her consent." The defense is anchored on alibi and
denial. Ladrillo claimed that in 1992, the year he allegedly raped Jane as
stated in the Information, he was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City,
and did not even know Jane or Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) her mother at that time. That it was only in 1993, according
to him, that he moved to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. Edito Ladrillo,
Edwin's father, testified that his family lived in Abanico for the first time only
in 1993; that when he and his sister Salvacion, mother of Jane, had a quarrel,
he forbade his son Edwin from attending church services with Salvacion at
the Iglesia ni Kristo, which caused his sister to be all the more angry with him;
and, the instant criminal case was a means employed by his sister to exact
revenge on him for their past disagreements. Still, the trial court found
Ladrillo guilty as charged, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered
him to indemnify Jane Vasquez the amount of P100,000.00, and to pay the
costs. Ladrillo appealed. Issue: Whether the peculiar designation of time in
the Information, i.e ."on or about the year 1992," runs afoul of the
constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Held: Preliminarily, the crime was
alleged in the Information to have been committed "on or about the year
1992." The peculiar designation of time in the Information violates Section
11, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court which requires that the time of the
commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the
information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the
constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently
explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed. The phrase "on or
about the year 1992" encompasses not only the 12 months of 1992 but
includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for
which Ladrillo has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure
of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of
the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived Ladrillo of
his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the
charges against him. At most, Ladrillo could only establish his place of
residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular
time he supposedly committed the rape. Certainly, time is not an essential
ingredient or element of the crime of rape. However, it assumes importance
in the instant case since it creates serious doubt on the commission of the
rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The
Information states that the crime was committed "on or about the year
1992," and complainant testified during the trial that she was sexually
abused by Ladrillo in the latter's house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. It
appears however from the records that in 1992 Ladrillo was still residing in
Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, a town different from Abanico, Puerto Princesa
City, and had never been to Abanico at any time in 1992 nor was he familiar
with the complainant and her family. He only moved to Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City, in 1993. It was therefore impossible for Ladrillo to have
committed the crime of rape in 1992 at his house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa
City, on the basis of the prosecution evidence, as he was not yet residing in
Abanico at that time and neither did his family have a home there. The
materiality of the date cannot therefore be cursorily ignored since the
accuracy and truthfulness of complainant's narration of events leading to the
rape practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime. 307 People
vs. Lumilan [GR 102706, 25 January 2000] Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4
concur Facts: In the early evening of 12 October 1987, Meliton Asuncion,
Modesto Roque, Eliong dela Cruz, Jerry Palomo, Simeon Pacano, Benito
Alonzo, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho were drinking
liquor inside the house of Policarpio Palomo when it was sprayed with
bullets. The successive gunshots emanated from the fence about 6 meters
away from where they were drinking, killing Meliton Asuncion, Modesto
Roque, and Eliong dela Cruz and seriously wounding Jerry Palomo, Simeon
Pacano, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho. Simeon Pacano
was hit in the left leg causing him to fall on his face. When the firing ceased,
he remained in the said position pretending to be dead, as he recognized
Fred Orbiso who entered the house and checked the bodies of the victims for
survivors. He also recognized Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia who joined
Orbiso inside the house. They were purportedly after a certain Ben
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Estrada who
was the barangay captain of Gayong-Gayong Sur, Ilagan, Isabela. The
Provincial Fiscal charged Orbiso, Lumilan, and Garcia of the crime of qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in murder. The information reads "The
undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Fred Orbiso, Leon Lumilan and Antonio
Garcia of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms used in Murder,
in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows: 'That on
or about the 12th day of October 1987, in the municipality of Ilagan, Province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused, not being authorized or allowed by the law to keep, possess
and carry firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession and under their control and custody, firearms
without first having obtained the necessary permit and/or license to possess
the same, and that on the occasion of such possession, the herein accused
with treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving them chance to
defend themselves, fired [sic] at and shoot Meliton Asuncion, Modesto
Roque, and Eliong dela Cruz inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which
directly caused their deaths; and further inflicting on the same occasion
gunshot wounds upon Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario
Palomo and Simeon Pacano, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death
of the said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and
Simeon Pacano, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder with respect to the last named victims as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario
Palomo and Simeon Pacano which prevented their deaths.' Contrary to Law."
Both Lumilan and Garcia interposed the defense of alibi. After an assessment
of the evidence, the trial court declared that no proof beyond reasonable
doubt was adduced by the prosecution to justify the conviction of Orbiso, et.
al. for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder. However, the
trial court found Garcia and Lumilan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of 1) Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in conjunction with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on three counts
each for the killing of Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque and Eliong dela
Cruz. They were also found guilty of frustrated murder and were sentenced
to a prison term of 8 years and 20 days as minimum to 14 years, 10 months,
and 21 days as maximum on two counts each for the wounding of Jerry
Palomo and Simeon Pacano. They were also found guilty of attempted
murder and were sentenced to a prison term of 5 years as minimum to 8
years and 21 days as maximum on three counts each for the wounding of
Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho. They were ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Meliton Asuncion damages in the
amount of P30,000.00, moral damages of P10,000.00 each, actual damages
of P4,150.00 and lost earning of P27,000.00 for one year as farmer; the
deceased Modesto Roque damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of
P10,000.00 each actual damages of P8,000.00 and lost earning of P10,000.00
for one year as farmer; and the deceased Eliong dela Cruz, damages of
P30,000.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00 each; for the wounding of
Simeon Pacano and Jerry Palomo, moral damages of P10,000.00 each and
actual damages of P11,550.00 for jerry Palomo; and for an attempt on the life
of Nolasco Estrada and Mario Palomo, an actual damages of P100.00 for
NOLASCO ESTRADA and actual damages of P200.00 and lost earning of
P10,500.00 for one year as farmer for Mario Palomo, with costs. Lumilan and
Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
trial court in its Resolution dated 24 October 1991. Lumilan and Garcia
appealed. Issue: Whether Lumilan and Garcia may be properly convicted of
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder under an Information that
charges them with qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder in
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Held: At the
time the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction in September
1990, it had already been 6 months since the Court held in People v. Tac-an
that the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition,
whether or not homicide or murder resulted from its use, on one hand, and
murder or homicide, on the other, are offenses different and separate from
and independent of, each other. While the former is punished under a special
law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Consequently,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the prosecution
for one will not bar prosecution for the other, and double jeopardy will not
lie. It cannot be said that murder or homicide necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder
or homicide. To state otherwise is to contradict Tac-an and its progeny of
cases where the Court categorically ruled out the application of double
jeopardy in the simultaneous prosecution for murder or homicide and
qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide against
same accused involving the same fatal act. On the other hand, Sec. 4, Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be
convicted of an offense other than that with which he is charged in the
Information, unless such other offense was both established by evidence and
is included in the offense charged in the Information. Since murder or
homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, the trial court may not
validly convict an accused for the former crime under an Information
charging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the
Information with homicide or murder may not be convicted of qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, for the latter is not
included in the former. Pursuant to the amendments to Section 1 of PD 1866,
however, where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing
homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the
two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code
and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under
PD 1866. As amended by RA 8294, PD 1866 now mandates that the accused
will be prosecuted only for the crime of homicide or murder with the fact of
illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere special aggravating
circumstance. To obviate any doubt, RA 8294 expressly restricts the filing of
an information for illegal possession of firearms to cases where no other
crime is committed. The Information charging Lumilan, et. al. with Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, violates Section 1 of PD. 1866,
as amended by RA 8294, which obliterated the now obsolete concept of
qualified illegal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to
reclusion perpetua or death by the attendance of homicide or murder. In
fact, qualified illegal possession of firearms, which used to be a distinct
offense, no longer exists in our statute books. Still, while the Information
specifically states that Lumilan, et. al. are being accused of the crime of
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder in violation of PD
1866, its text is so worded that it describes at least three (3) crimes: (1) Illegal
possession of firearms, (2) murder, and (3) frustrated / attempted murder.
The Information is undeniably duplicitous. Sec. 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in cases where the law prescribed a single punishment
for various offenses. Duplicity or multiplicity of, charges is a ground for a
motion to quash under Sec. 2 (e), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
accused, however, may choose not to file a motion to quash and be
convicted of as many distinct charges as are alleged in the information and
proved during the trial. In the same vein, failure to interpose any objection to
the defect in the information constitutes waiver. Herein, Lumilan, et. al. did
not file any motion to quash the Information. More significantly, the bulk of
the evidence that they presented during the trial was intended to disprove
their complicity in the murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder of
the victims. Appellants were undeniably defending themselves, not so much
with the charge of qualified illegal possession in mind, but with the full
awareness that they were as well and more vigorously being prosecuted for
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. As such, Lumilan, et. al.
cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise them of the
charges against them as to cause them surprise in the event of conviction.
The appellation of the crime charged as determined by the provincial fiscal
may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the criminal
acts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused,
but what controls is the description of the said criminal acts and not the
technical name of the crime supplied by the provincial fiscal. Since Lumilan,
et. al. defended themselves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms Used in Murder as specified in the Information, but
also, and more seriously against the crimes of Murder, Frustrated Murder
and Attempted Murder as described in the body of the Information, it cannot
be said that their conviction for the latter crimes is infirm and invalid.
Parenthetically, the accused were acquitted due to reasonable doubt
inasmuch as there are serious doubt as to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) whether Simeon Pacano actually saw the
assailants. 308 Evangelista vs. People [GRs 10813536, 14 August 2000]
Resolution of First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: On 17
September 1987, Tanduay Distillery, Inc. filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue an application for tax credit in the amount of P180,701,682.00, for
allegedly erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes from 1 January 1986 to 31
August 1987. Tanduay claimed that it is a rectifier of alcohol and other spirits,
which per previous ruling of the BIR is only liable to pay specific taxes and not
ad valorem taxes. Upon receipt of the application, Aquilino Larin of the
Specific Tax Office sent a memorandum to the Revenue Accounting Division
(RAD), headed by Potenciana M. Evangelista, requesting the said office to
check and verify whether the amounts claimed by Tanduay were actually
paid to the BIR as ad valorem taxes. Larin's memorandum was received by
the Revenue Administrative Section (RAS), a subordinate office of the RAD.
After making the necessary verification, the RAS prepared a certification in
the form of a 1st Indorsement to the Specific Tax Office, dated 25 September
1987, which was signed by Evangelista as RAD chief. The 1st Indorsement
states that Tanduay made tax payments classified under Tax Numeric Code
(TNC) 3011-0001 totalling P102,519,100.00 and payments classified under
TNC 0000-0000 totalling P78,182,582.00. Meanwhile, Teodoro Pareño, head
of the Tax and Alcohol Division, certified to Justino Galban, Jr., Head of the
Compounders, Rectifiers and Repackers Section, that Tanduay was a rectifier
not liable for ad valorem tax. Pareño recommended to Larin that the
application for tax credit be given due course. Hence, Larin recommended
that Tanduay's claim be approved, on the basis of which Deputy
Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in the
amount of P180,701,682.00. Sometime thereafter, a certain Ruperto Lim
wrote a letter-complaint to then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr.
alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo 5177 was irregular and
anomalous. Based on this, Larin, Pareño, Galban and petitioner Evangelista
were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 268 (4) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Larin, Pareño and Evangelista were later
convicted of both crimes, while Galban was acquitted inasmuch as his only
participation in the processing of Tanduay's application was the preparation
of the memorandum confirming that Tanduay was a rectifier. The three
accused filed separate petitions for review. Pareño's and Larin's petitions
were consolidated and, in a decision dated 17 April 1996, both were
acquitted by the Supreme Court in Criminal Cases 14208 and 14209. On 30
September 1999, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision acquitting
Evangelista of the charge of violation of then Section 268 (4) of the National
Internal Revenue Code but affirming her conviction for violation of RA 3019,
Section 3 (e), [gross negligence in issuing a certification containing TNCs
which she did not know the meaning of and which, in turn, became the basis
of the Bureau's grant of Tanduay's application for tax credit] thus imposing
on her an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for 6 years and 1 month
as minimum to 12 years as maximum, and the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office (Criminal Case 14208). Evangelista
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether Evanglista was
founf guilty of an offense different from that alleged in the information, adn
thus she was unable to properly defend herself from the crime for which she
was convicted.. Held: The Information against Evangelista and her co-accused
in Criminal Case 14209 alleges in fine that they caused undue injury to the
Government and gave unwarranted benefits to Tanduay when they endorsed
approval of the claim for tax credit by preparing, signing and submitting false
memoranda, certification and/or official communications stating that
Tanduay paid ad valorem taxes when it was not liable for such because its
products are distilled spirits on which specific taxes are paid, by reason of
which false memoranda, certification and/or official communications the BIR
approved the application for tax credit, thus defrauding the Government of
the sum of P107,087,394.80, representing the difference between the
amount claimed as tax credit and the amount of ad valorem taxes paid by
Tanduay to the BIR. Instead of convicting her of the acts described in the
Information, she was convicted of issuing the certification without identifying
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the kinds of tax
for which the TNCs stand and without indicating whether Tanduay was really
entitled to tax credit or not. Further, Evangelista was convicted of a supposed
crime not punishable by law. She was charged with violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states that "In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, judicial or administrative functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. xxx" RA 3019,
Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that
the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Herein,
Evangelista, in issuing the certification, did not cause any undue injury to the
Government. She also did not give unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to Tanduay. Neither did Evangelista display manifest partiality to
Tanduay nor act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Quite
the contrary, Evangelista's certification was against the interest of Tanduay. It
did not advocate the grant of its application for tax credit. The certification
can even be read as a recommendation of denial of the application.
Evangelista's conviction was merely based on her alleged failure to identify
with certainty in her certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay and to
indicate what the TNCs stand for, which acts were different from those
described in the Information under which she was charged. This violated her
constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her. It is well-settled that an accused cannot
be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right. Herein, the acts for which she was convicted are
different from those alleged in the Information. More importantly,
Evangelista's act of issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt
practices as defined in Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Evangelista's omission to
indicate what kind of taxes TNCs 3011-0001 and 0000-0000 stand for was not
a criminal act. Employees of the BIR were expected to know what the TNCs
stand for. If they do not, there is a "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of
Revenue Sources" which they can consult. 309 People vs. Valdesancho [GR
137051-52, 30 May 2001] First Division, Puno (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts:
Vicente Valdesancho y Delmo is the husband of Elvie's sister, Erlinda
Valdesancho. Elvie and her two younger brothers, Erick and Eddie, lived with
their brother in the mountains of Barangay Minayutan, Famy, Laguna. In
1994, however, Elvie's mother, Leonida Basco, requested the spouses Erlinda
and Valdesancho to let Elvie, Erick and Eddie live in their house in San
Antonio, Mabitac, Laguna. The three were going to study in Barangay San
Antonio. They resided with the accused from 24 June 1994 to June 1995.
Elvie was then 14 years old and in Grade 1 at the Barangay San Antonio
School. The first incident of rape happened in the early morning of 15 August
1994. Elvie was in the house of Valdesancho while Erlinda was then in
Manila. Valdesancho succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Elvie,
subsequent to Valdesancho's order to powder his back. Valdesancho warned
her not to reveal the dastardly act to anybody, otherwise he would kill her
and her family. All this time, Elvie's brothers were sleeping in the other room.
The second incident of rape happened in the evening of 16 August 1994.
Elvie was in the house of Valdesancho studying. He called Elvie to his room
and ordered her to look under the bed for a chick. Valdesancho again had
carnal knowledge of her against her will. Again, Valdesancho threatened Elvie
not to report the incident to anybody, otherwise he would kill her and her
family. Elvie kept her harrowing experience to herself for fear that
Valdesancho would carry out his threat. In September 1995, however, when
Elvie was already residing with her brother and mother in Barangay
Minayutan, Famy, Laguna, she reported the rape incidents to her Tiya Soling.
She was fearful that Valdesancho might rape her again. Although she no
longer lived with Valdesancho, the latter Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) stayed in their (Elvie's) house in Barangay
Minayutan for less than a month in September 1995 and he gave her
malicious looks. Tiya Soling reported the rape incidents to Elvie's mother who
verified the story from Elvie herself. On 15 January 1996, Elvie executed a
sworn statement at the Mabitac Police Station narrating the rape incidents.
On 27 March 1996, two informations were filed against Valdesancho. In
Criminal Case S1964, the information reads "That on or about August 15,
1994 at Sitio Mahabang Parang, Barangay Nanguma, Municipality of Mabitac,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd designs and by means of force and violence,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Elvie B. Basco, 15 years old, single (,) against her will
and consent and to her damage and prejudice. Contrary to law." In Criminal
Case S-1965, the information reads "That on or about the evening of August
16, 1994 at Sitio Mahabang Parang, Barangay Nanguma, Municipality of
Mabitac, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs and by means of force
and violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one Elvie B. Basco, 15 years of age, single (,) against
her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. Contrary to law."
Valdesancho denied the rape charges leveled against him. He contends that
Elvie, with the assistance of her mother Leonida, filed the instant cases
against him because of the serious quarrel between his wife, Erlinda, and
Leonida spurred by Leonida's relationship with a lesbian named Melita
Flores. The trial court upheld the prosecution's story. The court found
Valdesancho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "rape"
committed against Elvie Basco, in the 2 informations for rape, and sentenced
him to 2 Reclusion Perpetua; to pay the victim the sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages in the two (2) cases; and to pay the cost. Valdesancho
appealed. Issue: Whether Valdesancho was denied due process when he was
convicted for rapes alleged committed August 15 and 16, 1993, when the
information alleged such rapes were committed on August 15 and 16, 1994.
Held: Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person
shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It
further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took effect on 1 December 2000,
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict
an accused for an offense not alleged in the complaint or information violates
such right. Herein, the informations in Criminal Cases S-1964 and S-1965
charged Valdesancho with rape committed against Elvie Basco on 15 August
1994 and 16 August 1994, respectively. All evidence of the prosecution tried
to prove that the victim was raped by Valdesancho on these dates.
Valdesancho interposed the defense of alibi. He proved that on these dates
he was in the town of Sta. Maria helping a friend butcher a pig for the town
fiesta. He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie, was no longer
living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She already transferred to Minayutan,
Famy, Laguna where she was in Grade 2. Despite the parties' evidence, the
trial court convicted Valdesancho for allegedly raping Elvie on August 15 and
16, 1993. Without doubt, the accused was not given any chance to prove
where he was on August 15 and 16, 1993. What he did was to prove where
he was on August 15 and 16, 1994 for the informations charged him with
rapes on those specific dates. He had no opportunity to defend himself on
the rapes allegedly committed on the earlier dates. This is plain denial of due
process. 310 People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002] En Banc,
Davide Jr. (CJ): 14 concur Facts: At 1:00 p.m. of 29 August 1997, SPO2
Nicanor Avendaño, arriving at the house of Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio in
Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna, found the house in disarray. He saw a
naked woman lying dead on a wooden bed with both hands and feet tied
from behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The dead woman was Wendy
Alcalde, and the dead child was Arwin Alcalde. Some clothes and a puppy
were also burned. Avendaño and his team recovered a piece of steel near
Wendy’s face and empty bottles of gin Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 31 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and Royal Tru-Orange on top of the cabinet.
They took pictures of the dead bodies and caused the entry of the incident in
the police blotter. He learned later that Arnel's two daughters, Bernalyn and
Erica, had been rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and
his team arrived at the crime scene. On 24 September 1997, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed before the trial court two informations
against Arnel for parricide, committed against his wife Wendy and his 11-
month old son Arwin, and two informations for frustrated parricide,
committed against his two daughters Bernalyn and Erica the before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on
22 October 1997, Arnel, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, refused to
speak. The trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases.
On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then
consolidated and jointly tried. After the prosecution has presented its
witnesses and rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense
filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence based on
the grounds that (a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not
an iota of incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced
and presented by the prosecution during the trial; and (c) The constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any
evidence or contrary presumption. In its Order of 22 May 1998, the trial
court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the dates for the presentation
of the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4 June
1998, Atty. Vasquez informed the court that the defense opted not to
present evidence for Arnel’s defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its
Comment on the manifestation and prayed for the re-opening of the
presentation of prosecution’s evidence for the purpose of proving that Arnel
was at the scene of the crime. In its Order of 21 August 1998, the trial court
allowed the prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense
questioned the propriety of the said order before the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari. In its resolution of 17 December 1998, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 65,
Rules of Court, and for the further reason that the order sought to be set
aside was interlocutory in character and could not, therefore, be the subject
of a petition for certiorari; and that even granting that the exception applied,
the trial court committed no capriciousness in issuing the assailed order. The
prosecution thereafter presented their additional witnesses. After the
prosecution finally rested its case, the trial court set on 8 October 1998 the
presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, on 7 October 1998,
Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to communicate
with Arnel because of Arnel’s “out of touch of the world” behavior. Atty.
Vasquez manifested that the defense was constrained to submit the case for
decision. In its decision of 30 April 1999, the trial court found that the
prosecution’s evidence has duly established a succession of circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that Arnel committed the
crimes charged. The court found Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt
(Criminal Cases SC-6651 and SC-6654) for the killing of Wendy and Arwin, and
imposed upon him the penalty of death in both cases. Likewise, the court
found Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
parricide (Criminal Cases SC-6652 and SC-6653), after considering the
severity of the wounds suffered by his daughters Bernalyn and Erika. Hence,
the automatic review. Issue: Whether the trial court should have ascertained
the mental state of the accused before he was read the information during
the arraignment. Held: The constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it
the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the
information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the
bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or
exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to
justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied
that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or
gives. Herein, the trial court should have ascertained Arnel’s mental state
instead of proceeding with his arraignment and its subsequent proceedings.
311 People vs. Ostia [GR 131804, 26 February 2003] Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 32 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) En Banc, Callejo Sr. (J): 11 concur, 1
believes the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of Treachery should
warrant the grant of exemplary damages, 1 on leave Facts: The Spouses
Ponciano Onato and Edita Onato resided with their 4-year old daughter,
Beverly Onato, in Sitio Mactang, Barangay Ilo, Sto. Niño, Samar. Ponciano
was a fisherman and a farmer but was employed by Tito Soria in his buy-and-
sell of fish business. Roberto Ostia, a co-worker of Ponciano, resided in the
poblacion of Sto. Niño. On 13 May 1995, a Saturday, at about 7:00 p.m., Rufo
Legaspi (a carpenter, a Barangay Tanod, and a neighbor of Ponciano) was
seated near his house, resting before retiring for the evening, when he saw
Roberto, with Beverly perched on his right shoulder, walking towards the
direction of the poblacion. Roberto’s left hand was holding the right hand of
Mary Donoso, a 9-year old playmate of Beverly. The trio were in animated
conversation on their way towards the poblacion. After the lapse of an hour
or so, Edita noticed that Beverly had not yet returned to their house. She
went out of the house to look for her daughter. Rufo told Edita that earlier he
saw Beverly perched on the shoulder of Roberto on their way towards the
direction of the poblacion. Thereafter, Roberto sauntered by; however,
Beverly was no longer with him. Puzzled, Edita inquired from Roberto where
Beverly was. Instead of responding, Roberto fled. Edita was flustered. Rufo,
who witnessed the incident, advised Edita to report the incident to the police
authorities. Edita rushed back home and woke up Ponciano. She told her
husband that Beverly had been taken by Roberto and that Beverly had not
yet returned home. The couple rushed from their house and reported the
incident to the police authorities. With the help of their neighbors and police
officers Manuel Toribio and Dodong Espino, the couple looked for Beverly
but failed to locate her. They resumed their search the next day, 14 May
1995, and, at 3:00 p.m., they found Beverly sprawled in a grassy portion
below a copra kiln about 120 meters away from the house of the Onato
couple and about 15 meters from the nearest house. Beverly was already
dead. Pictures of Beverly were taken where her body was found. Lorenzo
Bernabe, the Municipal Sanitary Inspector who had been trained by the
District Hospital to perform autopsies in the absence of the Municipal District
Officer (Dr. Renato Ortiz), performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Beverly.
On 18 May 1995, a criminal complaint for rape with homicide was filed by
Ponciano against Roberto with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and after the
requisite preliminary investigation, an Information charging Roberto with
Rape with Homicide was filed on 7 December 1995 with Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City which reads "That on or about the 13th
day of May, 1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at Sitio Mactang,
Barangay Ilo, Municipality of Sto. Niño, Province of Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge against a minor
four (4) years old girl, BEVERLY ONATO, without the latter’s consent and
against her will, and thereafter, with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict upon the said Beverly Onato
fatal wounds on the different parts of her body, which caused her untimely
death. Contrary to law." On the date set for his arraignment, Roberto
appeared without counsel. The court issued an order appointing Atty.
Artemio Apostol as counsel de oficio of Roberto. Said counsel prayed for the
resetting of the arraignment to 30 January 1996 to enable him to secure a
copy of the necropsy report and study the case intelligently. The court
granted the motion. During the arraignment of Roberto on 30 January 1996,
he, through his counsel de oficio, manifested to the court that he was willing
to plead guilty to the lesser offense of murder. However, the public
prosecutor prayed for a continuance so that he could consult the provincial
prosecutor and the father of the victim, Ponciano, on the offer of Roberto.
The arraignment of Roberto was reset to 29 February 1996, on which date,
he, through his counsel de oficio, moved that a reinvestigation be conducted
by the public prosecutor. The motion was granted by the trial court.
However, despite notice from the office of the public prosecutor, Roberto
failed to adduce controverting evidence. On motion of the prosecution, the
arraignment of Roberto was set on 9 August 1996. When arraigned on said
date, Roberto, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
Not Guilty to the charge of rape with homicide. Trial ensued. During the trial
set on 6 May 1997, Roberto, through counsel, moved that he be allowed to
withdraw his plea of not guilty to rape with homicide and to enter a plea of
guilty to murder. Ponciano, the father of Beverly, and the public prosecutor
agreed to Roberto’s pleading guilty to murder. On 19 May 1997, Roberto, per
Certificate of Re-arraignment signed by the Branch Clerk of Court,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 33 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) was re-
arraigned for the lesser offense of murder and pleaded guilty thereto. The
court then informed Roberto that the penalty for murder was reclusion
perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and that the court may impose
the death penalty on him depending on the circumstances found by the trial
court. When trial resumed on 22 May 1997, for the prosecution to continue
presenting its evidence, Roberto took the witness stand to answer more
questions from the court. During the trial on 26 May 1997, the prosecution
formally offered its documentary evidence. The court admitted all the
prosecution’s documentary evidence without any objection from Roberto.
The latter did not anymore adduce any testimonial and documentary
evidence in his behalf and on said date, the court issued an order declaring
that the case was submitted for its decision. On 25 August 1997, the trial
court rendered judgment finding Roberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and with
the generic aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of confidence considering
that Roberto and Ponciano were co-workers, (b) nighttime considering that
Beverly was killed in the evening and (c) despoblado considering that the
nearest house to the situs criminis was 14 meters. The court sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim Beverly Onato in the amount of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic
appeal. Issue: Whether the trial court porperly informed the accused of the
nature of the charges against him. Held: The trial court is required to probe
thoroughly into the reasons as well as the facts and circumstances for the
change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to
him the elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature
and effect of qualifying circumstances, generic aggravating circumstances
and mitigating circumstances in the commission thereof; and inform him of
the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the crime for which he would
plead guilty to. Herein, the Information was merely read and translated to
Ostia in the “waray” dialect which he understood. The trial court informed
Ostia that by pleading guilty, he admitted all the facts alleged in the
Information and that the court would no longer conduct any trial but that it
would impose on him the proper penalty for the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a heinous crime under RA 7659
punishable by two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death
and that either of said penalties may be imposed on him depending upon the
circumstances which may ultimately be appreciated by the court. When
asked by the trial court if he pleaded guilty on his own volition, and if nobody
forced, threatened or coerced him into admitting having killed Beverly, Ostia
answered that he admitted having killed Beverly on his own free will. Thus,
the trial court failed to comply with its duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that Ostia did not even know how to
read and write. In fact, he merely affixed his thumbmark on the Waiver of
Right to a Preliminary Investigation. The trial court failed to explain to Ostia
(a) the nature of murder and the elements thereof; (b) that killing Beverly, a
four-year old girl, constituted treachery, a qualifying circumstance; Ostia
being unlettered could not be presumed to understand the requisites of
treachery, a highly technical legal term; (c) the nature and effect of a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the killing of Beverly and its effect on
the penalty that may be imposed on him; (d) what heinous crimes are and
the meaning and import of indivisible penalties; (e) the specific
circumstances which may be considered by the court in the imposition of
reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (f) whether his plea of guilty after the
prosecution had commenced presenting its evidence may still be considered
by the trial court as a mitigating circumstance; (g) the nature of civil liabilities
that he may be ordered to pay and the amounts thereof. The trial court even
failed to probe into the reasons for Ostia’s change of plea from “not guilty” of
rape with homicide to “guilty” of murder and for his failure to adduce
evidence during the reinvestigation of the case despite having been granted
the right to do so by the trial court. The trial court did not even bother
inquiring from Ostia whether he sought the advice of his counsel before
pleading guilty to murder and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his
behalf to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime
to warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Notwithstanding the improvident plea of guilty of Ostia, the Court found it
unnecessary to remand the case to the trial court. This is so because
independent of Ostia’s plea of guilty and his testimony admitting liability for
Beverly’s death, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, albeit
circumstantial, established the guilt of Ostia for murder beyond reasonable
doubt. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 34 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 312
People vs. Flores [GR 128823-24, 27 December 2002] En Banc, Carpio-
Morales (J): 14 concur Facts: On 5 December 1996, Filipina L. Flores, 11 years
old at the time, and her younger sister Catherine were left to the care of their
father, Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores (@ "Pesiong"), at their family residence in
Sitio Buenlag, Barangay Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, their
mother Marcelina L. Flores having departed for Singapore to work as an
overseas contract worker. After partaking of supper on the night of 9
December 1996, Pedro asked Filipina to accompany him to the comfort room
situated outside their house, claiming that he was afraid of ghosts. Albeit
Filipina did not believe him, she acquiesced because her mother had told her
to always obey her father. When Pedro came out of the comfort room, he
ordered Filipina to remove her short pants, threatening her with death if she
disobeyed, and made her lie down. He then removed his short pants and
brief and, against her will, he inserted his finger and later his penis into
Filipina’s vagina where she later felt hot fluid. Pedro thereafter wiped
Filipina’s vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if she reported what he
did, directed her to put on her shorts, and they both went home. The
following morning, Filipina reported the incident to her “Inang Lorie” whose
full name is Norielyn Antonio, the aunt of her mother, who told her that if
her father would sexually assault her again, he would have him detained. 19
nights later or on 28 December 1996, as Filipina lay asleep in their house, she
was awakened when Pedro touched her right foot. Armed with a knife, Pedro
told her not to talk and ordered her to remove her short pants and panty.
She complied. Pedro thereupon removed his short pants and brief and went
on top of her chest during which she tried to push him away but failed. Pedro
then inserted his finger into Filipina’s vagina for some time, wiped his hands,
and then inserted his penis for a long time as he was sucking her breast.
Filipina felt Pedro’s semen drop into her private organ where she noticed the
presence of blood and a bit of whitish substance. Pedro later wiped her
vagina with a towel. The following morning, Filipina again reported the
matter to her grandaunt Norielyn, and to her playmate Carla Salvador. On 31
January 1997, Filipina, accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle
driver-neighbor, reported the matter to the Philippine National Police of
Urdaneta where she gave a statement. On the same day, she, still
accompanied by Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical examination at the
Don Amadeo J. Perez, Jr. Memorial General Hospital. On 3 February 1997,
complaints were filed against Pedro. The criminal complaint in Criminal Case
U-9184 reads "The undersigned, Filipina Flores y Lazo, 11 years old, grade
three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores
for the crime of “rape”, committed as follows: 'That on the 9th day of
December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West,
Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness Filipina Flores
y Lazo, 11 years old, all against her will.'" The criminal complaint in Criminal
Case U9185, on the other hand, reads "The undersigned, Filipina Flores y
Lazo, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy.
Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses
Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores, alias "Pesyong", committed as follows: 'That on the
28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness Filipina Flores, an
11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with the use of sharp
pointed bladed weapon and all against her will. '" Arraigned on 10 February
1997, Pedro pleaded not guilty to both charges. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Pedro guilty of Statutory Rape
and sentenced him to death in both cases in its 7 April 1997 Joint Decision,
besides ordering him to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus all the necessary penalties
and costs in each case. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether the
informations violates the constitutional right of Pedro Flores to be informed
of teh nature Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 35 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
and cause of the accusation against him. Held: From a reading of the
complaints, Pedro Flores was denied the constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right has the
following objectives: (1) To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) To avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; (3) To inform the court of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. The right cannot be waived for reasons of
public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed
against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense,
even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
complaint or information. The trial court found Pedro guilty of Statutory
Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659
(which restored the death penalty for heinous crimes effective 31 December
1993). Article 335 provides that "Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By
using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented." The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge
or sexual intercourse between a man and a woman under the circumstances
enumerated in the penal code. Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or
information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual
intercourse with the private complainant. In the criminal complaints herein,
however, no such allegation was made. The allegation that Pedro did
“sexually abuse” Filipina does not suffice. Sexual abuse cannot be equated
with carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse. The allegation in the criminal
complaints that the accused “sexually abused” the private complainant
cannot thus be read to mean that accused had carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse with the private complainant. The Court is not unaware of the
rule in case there is a variance between allegation and proof as etched in
Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads
that "When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved." The present case, however,
is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of facts in the
criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, “sexual abuse” not
being an essential element or ingredient thereof. Neither can Pedro be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter under our
penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the complaint or
information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Even under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), Pedro cannot be held liable. The
phrase “sexually abuse” in the criminal complaints does not comply with the
requirement that the complaint must contain a specific averment of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase “sexual abuse” is
not used under RA 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate
offense. Section 5 of RA 7610 enumerated the punishable acts that must be
alleged in the complaint or information to hold an accused liable, none of
which is reflected in the present complaints charging Pedro Flores. Thus, the
informations in Criminal Cases U-9184 and U-9185 were declared null and
void by the Supreme Court for being violative of the constitutional right of
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias “Pesiong,” for Rape to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 313 Acebedo vs. Sarmiento
[GR L-28025, 16 December 1970] First Division, Fernando (J): 7 concur. 3 on
official leave Facts: It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal
filed in the Court of First Instance of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Pampanga a criminal information for damage to
property through reckless imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and
a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were no further proceedings in the
meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge.
Judge Malcolm G. Sarmient was not in agreement as shown by his order of
denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two more years, came the trial with the
complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet
been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for 7 June 1967
such witness did not show up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement.
Counsel for Acebedo, however, not only objected but sought the dismissal of
the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Judge this
time acceded, but would likewise base his order of dismissal, orally given, on
the cross-examination of complainant not having started as yet. Later that
same day, the Judge did reconsider the order and reinstated the case, his
action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the
complainant had already started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Acebedo is entitled to have the case dismissed based on the
right ofteh accused to speedy trial. Held: The right to a speedy trial means
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may
interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by
habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. The right of the
accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without
good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without having his case tried. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.
It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove
from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.
Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the
part of the prosecutor or the court. The Constitution does not say that the
right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime
is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its
operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the
nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced. More specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the
view that a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the
prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an
accused being twice put in jeopardy. Herein, Acebedo not once but twice did
seek to have the prosecution for damage to property against him terminated
as the matter was pending for at least 6 years, the first time he sought to put
an end to it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the complaining
witness testified on direct examination but made no appearance when his
cross-examination was to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to
a speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of dismissal that
amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had
without offending the provision on double jeopardy. 314 People vs. Laya [GR
L-53873, 13 May 1988] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts:
Soledad Castro and Crisologo Abines were charged with the crime of grave
coercion in an information filed by Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel R.
Potot on 15 January 1980 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 15
(Criminal Case AR-645). The crime was allegedly committed as follows: "That
on the 29th day of December, 1978, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or
less, in the Barangay of Looc, Municipality of Santander, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating and helping one another,
without authority of law and by means of violence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevent the spouses Leoncio
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 37 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Wenceslao and
Valena B. Wenceslao and their laborers from fencing a piece of land owned
by the Wenceslaos, the fencing not being prohibited by law. In violation of
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code." Upon arraignment on 13 February
1980, Castro and Abines pleaded "not guilty." In an order dated the same
day, the trial of the case was set on March 14 and 25, 1980 both at 8:30 a.m.
"as requested by the prosecution and defense." Representing the
prosecution during the arraignment was Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sotero R.
Camello, the prosecutor assigned to the sala of the judge. Fiscal Camello
inhibited himself from prosecuting the case because when he originally
investigated the case. The case was assigned to Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Potot. On 12 March 1980, Fiscal Potot received notice of the hearing
scheduled for 14 March 1980. On this same day, Fiscal Potot filed an urgent
ex-parte motion for postponement stating among others that before learning
of the scheduled 14 March 1980 hearing, he was already committed to
appear in Branch 3 and Branch 12 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and
that on March 14, 25, and 26, 1980, all in the afternoon, he, as special
prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, had already set for clarificatory examination
the Toledo City Highways Engineering District cases for estafa and violation of
RA 3019. On the scheduled 14 March 1980 hearing, the defense counsel
objected to the postponement on the ground that the prosecution
represented by Fiscal Camello had agreed to the scheduled hearings of
March 14 and 25, 1980 and manifested that on said dates Fiscal Potot will be
available. The Court granted the motion for postponement of the scheduled
March 14, 1980 hearing but ordered the hearing on 25 March 1980 at 8:30
a.m. to be held as scheduled. On 18 March 1980, Fiscal Potot requested the
Provincial Fiscal that the case be assigned to Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Andres Amil. The case was transferred to Fiscal Amil on 21 March 1980. Fiscal
Amil then filed a motion to postpone the scheduled 25 March 1980 hearing
on the grounds that he has long been committed to appear before the
Municipal Circuit Court of Barili, Cebu which date was personally chosen by
his and besides the undersigned is not prepared to enter a trial of the case
considering that he is not familiar with the facts of the case since the records
of the case is with Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sotero R. Camello; and that it is
physically impossible for the undersigned to be appearing on two courts in a
distance about 50 kilometers apart. Fiscal Amil prayed that the hearing of the
case be transferred to another date in the month of May 1980. During the
scheduled hearing of 25 March 1980, Castro and Abines objected to the
motion for postponement. They manifested their readiness for trial, and
insisted on proceeding with the hearing. In an order dated 25 March 1980,
the court denied the motion for postponement and sustained the objections
of the accused. The case was ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the People of the Philippines was denied.
Hence, the petition for review. Issue: Whether the 2-months' delay of the
trial from 25 March 1980 to May 1980 violated the constitutional right to
speedy trial of Castro and Abines. Held: The right to a speedy trial is defined
as that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays,
its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his
guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may
interpose. Whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not
susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of
speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account
the circumstances of each case. The right to a speedy trial is a more vague
and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed
to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days
or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial
process when the right must be asserted or considered waived. A claim that a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing
test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right
to a speedy trial has been denied. Herein, the manner the prosecution
handled a simple case of coercion is deplorable. It must be noted that after
Fiscal Camello inhibited himself from the case because he could not in
conscience prosecute the case considering that he had recommended its
dismissal as its initial investigator and after prosecuting Fiscal Potot asked
that he be relieved from the case because of his tight schedule, the court
below Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 38 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
specifically ordered that the case be assigned to another fiscal furnishing a
copy of said order to the Provincial Fiscal himself. The Provincial Fiscal
assigned another Fiscal, Fiscal Amil, but it turned out that the latter like Fiscal
Potot was not also available during the scheduled 25 March 1980 hearing
because of previous commitments on the very same day. The cavalier
attitude of the Provincial Fiscal's Office not only towards a more efficient
management of its work but, more important, a greater respect for the rights
of the accused greatly prejudiced the constitutional right to speedy trial of
Castro and Abines. The case was a simple one. It did not need lengthy and
tedious preparation for trial. The 2-months' delay of the trial from 25 March
1980 to May 1980, if requested for sound reasons may not be unreasonable.
However, owing to the nature of the case, the reasons for the
postponements, and the fact that one of the accused is a municipal mayor,
who had to leave his work everytime he was haled to court only to be told to
return another day, the delay because vexatious because the lower court
stated —" the delay is not only prejudicial to him but also to the people of
Santander, Cebu." 315 Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924] First
Division, Malcolm (J): 7 concur Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal
midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five
information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on 8 different occasions only
to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than 1
year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away
from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether mandamus will ie to compel the dismissal of the information
in light of delays in the trial of the case. Held: The Philippine organic and
statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law.
Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on
courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her
consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public.
By the use of upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the
formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The Government of
the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral
and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that
the accused is discharged from the custody of the law. Thus, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial
of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the
Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas to abstain from further attempts to prosecute
Conde pursuant to informations, and dismissed the charges pending before
the justice of the of Lucena, Tayabas. 316 Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25
January 1995] En Banc, Quiason (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part Facts: In 1985,
Jaime C. Dacanay was the vice-president of the National Sugar Trading
Corporation (NASUTRA). In 1986, a criminal complaint for economic sabotage
through smuggling, with regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and
1984 by NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the principal
officers of the said corporation including Dacanay. On 10 October 1986, the
Tanodbayan approved the resolution of the team of Special Prosecutors who
investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 39 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) evidence against Dacanay and his co-
accused to warrant the filing of an information with Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On November
20, Dacabat filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew the same. On 14
October 1988, a resolution was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P.
Gervacio and Robert E. Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the complaint
against Dacanay and his co-accused for lack of sufficient evidence and the
withdrawal of the information filed in court. The resolution was approved by
Acting Special Prosecutor Jose Ferrer. On 6 January 1989, the resolution
issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was reviewed by special
Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its disapproval. The
recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia was approved by Acting Special
Prosecutor Jose F. Guerrero and by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. On
February 22, Jose Unson, Dacanay's co-accused, filed a motion to quash the
information in the Sandiganbayan. The motion was adopted by Dacanay. On
December 12, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Likewise, the
motion for reconsideration filed by Unson and adopted by Dacanay was
denied. On 3 April 1991, Dacanay filed a motion for immediate and separate
trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial. On April 23, the People
of the Philippines opposed the said motion on the ground that a separate
trial for Dacanay would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding. In a
resolution dated 24 April 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion.
On June 6, Dacanay filed a motion for reconsideration setting forth as
grounds therefor his advanced age and the protection of his reputation. On
July 9, the People of the Philippines filed a comment to Dacanay's motion for
reconsideration and alleged that the parties should first await the resolution
of the petition for certiorari filed by his co-accused Jose Unson with the
Supreme Court. In a resolution dated 6 August 1991, the Sandiganbayan
denied Dacanay's motion for reconsideration. Dacanay filed the petition for
review on certiorari. Issue: Whether Dacanay is entitled to a separate trial.
Held: Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly
states: "When two or more accused are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of
the fiscal or any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused." The
resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the Government (due to
a repetition of the presentation of the same evidence) cannot be given
preference over the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person's life,
liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. This is particularly true in
Dacanay's case where the prosecutors' opposition to the request for separate
trial was based on the ground that the principal accused in the case, the
former President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an
accused cannot be placed under arrest because he remains outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason should his co-
accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial. A separate trial
is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed
to him by the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2) of
Article III thereof. Herein, it has been 8 years since the information against
Dacanay was filed, but the case against him has yet to be tried. The long
delay has clearly prejudiced Dacanay, who is now more than 73 years of age.
317 People vs. Rivera [GR 139180, 31 July 2001] En Banc, Mendoza (J): 9
concur, 4 on official business, 1 on leave Facts: Sometime in March 1997,
Erlanie Rivera's younger sister, Zaira, was taken by their parents to the
Escolastica Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Erlanie's mother
stayed with her sister in the hospital, but her father, Rolando Rivera, went
back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 p.m. of the same
day, Erlanie was awakened as Rolando started kissing her and fondling her
breasts. Erlanie tried to resist by kicking and pushing Rolando, but her efforts
were to no avail. Rolando removed her shorts and panty, touched her private
parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with
her, Rolando told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he
would kill Erlanie's mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came home
the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened because she
was afraid of Rolando. On 9 April 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of
her mother, told her aunt, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 40 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that
she had been raped by Rolando. For this reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin
for physical examination. She also executed a sworn statement before the
police of Lubao, Pampanga. Rolando Rivera was charged in an information
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, which
reads "That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago,
municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO
RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge [of] his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the
latter's will and without her consent. Contrary to law." During the
arraignment on 30 September 1997, the information was read to Rolando in
the local dialect (Pampango). Rolando, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial was held. On 22
June 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, finding Rolando Rivera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For having
violated Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim is under 18 years of
age and the offender is the father of the victim and absent any circumstance
that could mitigate the commission thereof, the Court sentenced Rolando to
suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, and ordered him, in
line with established jurisprudence, to indemnify the offended party Erlanie
Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00
as moral damages. Rolando appealed. Issue: Whether the right to speedy and
adequate justice of one party necessary limits the right to competent and
independent counsel of choice of another, and whether the speedy
disposition of the case (a day after the memorandum was filed) denies due
process to the accused. Held: While the Constitution recognizes the accused's
right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his option to
secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the
State's and the offended party's right to speedy and adequate justice, the
court may restrict the accused's option to retain a private counsel if the
accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is
not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused
for a valid reason. The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to
represent Rolando on 6 October 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty.
Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty.
Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. As held in
People v. Serzo, Jr. (274 SCRA 553, 568 [1997]), the Courts are not required
to wait indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are
also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed,
public policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that
appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him. Atty. Bansil
was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness,
on that day. Dr. Barin's testimony on direct examination was simple,
containing primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal laceration
sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require considerable study
and extraordinary preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose
of cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary to
cross-examine Dr. Barin. Further, Rolando was not denied due process
considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against
him, which judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his
memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account
of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the court's
findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and
its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. As held in the analogous case
of People v. Mercado (GR. 116239, 29 November 2000.), the speed with
which the trial court disposed of the case cannot be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to
study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark
of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the
deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day
period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 41 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) consider their arguments and to
incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice
the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision
with due dispatch. 318 Solar Team Entertainment vs. How [GR 140863, 22
August 2000] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 28 May
1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information for estafa against
Ma. Fe Barreiro based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. (Criminal Case 99-536) before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 257, presided by Judge Rolando G. How. Before the scheduled
arraignment of Barreiro on 5 August 1999 could take place, the court issued
an Order dated 29 June 1999, resetting the arraignment of Barreiro on 2
September 1999 on the ground that Barreiro had “filed an appeal with the
Department of Justice (DOJ)”. Barreiro manifested in the same Order that she
would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal
on or before the second scheduled arraignment. On 24 September 1999, the
court issued an Order denying Solar Team Entertainment’s motion for
reconsideration of the order that previously reset the arraignment of
Barreiro. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of Barreiro to 18
November 1999. On 10 November 1999, Barreiro filed another “Motion to
Defer Arraignment”. On 15 November 1999, before the scheduled date of
the arraignment of Barreiro and before the date set for the hearing of
Barreiro’s “Motion to Defer Arraignment”, the court issued an Order further
deferring the arraignment of Barreiro “until such time that the appeal with
the said office (SOJ) is resolved”. Solar Team Entertainment’s motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied by the court on 22 November 1999.
Solar Team Entertainment filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus,
bewailing the fact that 6 months have elapsed since Barreiro appeared or
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court and up to now she still has
to be arraigned. Issue: Whether the court may indefinitely suspend the
arraignment of the accused pending the resolution of the accused's appeal of
the prosecutor's act with the Secretary of Justice. Held: The power of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the
information has already been filed in court is well settled. Decisions or
resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in
relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. Supplementing
the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of RA 3783 and Section 37 of Act
4007. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary
over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. Procedurally
speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control
of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The
decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with
the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. A court can defer to
the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of
whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information. This is in line
with the Court's general pronouncement that courts cannot interfere with
the prosecutor’s discretion over criminal prosecution. Thus, herein, Judge
How did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the
arraignment of Barreiro to await the resolution of her petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already
been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day
period prescribed by Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act. Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act
of 1998 prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment of the accused is
not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the same law enumerates periods of delay
that shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence. Section 10 (f) of said law provides that "The following periods of
delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence: (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by
any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge
granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall
be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of
the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.” Accordingly, the
exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that the concept of “speedy trial” is “a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.” Prudence and wisdom dictate that
the court should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of
Justice resolves the petition for review questioning the resolution of the
prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the determination of
whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the
right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical process.
Hence, the length of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered, several
factors must be taken into account in determining whether or not the
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The factors to
consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion
of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay. 319
Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973] Resolution En Banc, Fernando
(J): 5 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: In Branch I of the City Court of
Manila presided over by Judge Gregorio N. Garcia, there were commenced,
by appropriate informations all dated 16 January 1968, 8 criminal actions
against Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco Lorenzana, as
follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1)
Criminal Case F-109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case F-
109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case F-109193, for
maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case F-109197,
for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and
(3) Criminal Case F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana
(on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case F-109201, for
violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an
officer); and (2) Criminal Case F-109200, for slander. The trial of the cases
was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20; May 4 and 11;
June 1, 15, 22, and 29; and August 3 and 10, 1968. All 14 trial dates — except
March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 — fell on a Saturday. This was arranged
by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of Calo and Carbonnel who,
as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to
be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled
for trial on the usual criminal trial days. The trial of the cases in question
were held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the
chambers of Judge Garcia. During all 14 days of trial, spanning a period of
several months, the accused were at all times represented by their respective
counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of
the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day when
Atty. Consengco, representing Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on
20 April 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded,
and Carbonnel cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the
adverse party. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel,
asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and Carbonnel,
thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum
with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the
conviction of Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter.
The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on 23 September 1968.
This was postponed to 28 September 1968, at the instance of Atty. Rafael
Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to 1
October 1968, this time at Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 43 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had,
in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for Calo and
Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon and
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. Early in the morning of 1
October 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S.
Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. After proceedings duly had, Judge
Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order declaring that the constitutional
and statutory rights of the accused had been violated, adversely affecting
their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court
room open to the public; and ordering the city court Judge (Garcia) "to desist
from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may
have rendered already in the criminal cases in question pending in his Court,
until further orders of the CFI. A motion for reconsideration proving
unavailing, Garcia and Lorenzana on 28 January 1969, elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court by means of a suit for certiorari and prohibition. Issue:
Whether the conduct of the trial inside the Judge’s air-conditioned chambers,
rather than the usual open court, render the proceedings violative of the
constitutional mandate for public trial. Held: The 1935 Constitution which
was in force at the time of the antecedents of the petition explicitly
enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Trial
should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an
illegal and unjust manner, and thus serve as a deterrence to arbitrariness.
There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It
possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be
no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies
behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. It is understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is
quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals
desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized
exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
Still, herein, when the trial was held on Saturdays and in the air-conditioned
chambers of the City Judge for the convenience of the parties and of the
Judge, the proceedings were not violative of the right to public trial. There is
no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that
the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those
who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged." Reference may also be
made to the undisputed fact at least 14 hearings had been held in chambers
of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen. An
objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone
far in dispelling the apprehension that there was an evasion of a
constitutional command. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases
handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not
being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its
presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of
such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from
that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life,
it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever
solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the
eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run
the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just
because, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather
than in the usual place that the trial took place. 320 Re: Request Radio-TV
Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the Former
President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 2 file separate concurring opinions, 2
file separate dissenting opinion, 1 joins separate opinion of one concurring
justice Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized
television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter
requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in
our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of
5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez formally filed the petition. Issue: Whether the press should
be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public. Held: The press is a mighty
catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an important
instrument in the quest for truth. Recent history exemplifies media's
invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The
Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media
in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and
partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes
during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II. The propriety of
granting or denying the petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on
the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race
against one another, the right of the accused must be preferred to win. With
the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of
an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused
receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a
verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that
might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper
influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions. Due process guarantees the accused a
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not
lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention
and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where
fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an accused has a right
to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and
that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as
to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings. 321 Tumey vs. Ohio
[273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ): Facts: Tumey was arrested at White
Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill,
charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his
dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the
14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial,
convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton
county Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 45 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) as
charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine
and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case
on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard
the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was
disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of
the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and
affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme
Court refused Tumey's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify
its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of
right, asking that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the appellate
court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme
Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment
was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by
the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the
system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the
mayor disqualified from hearing the case. Held: All questions of judicial
qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to
be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of
law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he
exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall
remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct
personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before
him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not
have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional,
but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he
convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the
general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be
regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small
that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non
curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an
emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor
for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his
acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied
to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small
municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities,
to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the
Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law
for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without
opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law
presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court
to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should
appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias,
or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the
evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial
judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of
his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official
motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the
village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
present opinion. 322 Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: According to Soriano, Ruel
Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, who were members of the Caloocan
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) police, barged
into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, shortly after
midnight on 7 November 1991, looking for Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay
captain. Ruel Garcia gave Soriano fist blows on the face 4 times with his left
hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time
cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" (You son of a bitch chief"). Although
there were 4 barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro
Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to
the aid of Soriano because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The
Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the
hall. Soriano was treated for his injuries in the hospital. On the other hand,
Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He alleged that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of 6 November 1991 because his younger
brother had been reportedly arrested for figuring in a brawl with Dennis
Mones and a certain Ocampo, and beaten up by Soriano. As Garcia saw
Soriano near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of
his brother and the reason for the latter's arrest. Apparently thinking that
Garcia was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, Soriano
angrily told Garcia to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis dito" (Your being a
policeman doesn't pull strings here"). When Garcia insisted on going inside
the barangay hall, Soriano blocked him and then pushed him on the chest.
Garcia also pushed Soriano, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and
injure himself. All the time, Garcia claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist.
Private respondent's uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.
Garcia was charged with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City,
for direct assault (Criminal Case C40740). on 26 August 1992, before Garcia's
arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels to her chambers and
urged them to settle the case, and, to which Soriano refused. The hearing on
15 September 1992 was postponed to September 16 to allow Garcia’s
counsel to prepare for the case. On 15 March 1993, the trial court acquitted
Garcia. In acquitting Garcia, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible
that Soriano did not resist or even say anything when Garcia allegedly
assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him
came to his aid. She thought that if Soriano had indeed been attacked, he
would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead,
erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. The judge
also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of Soriano and barangay
tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not been
formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, §534 to 35 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Soriano filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that
the decision is void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether the judge was biased in trying to make the parties arrive at an
amicable settlement , and allowing Garcia’s counsel to postpone the hearing
on the 16 September 1992 instead of 15 September 1992. Held: It is settled
that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough
evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed,
especially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to
administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the
poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming
from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some
basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
Herein, the judge's efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable
settlement is not evidence of partiality for Garcia. She could have been
motivated by factors other than a desire to clear Garcia of criminal liability,
i.e., the clearing of her court docket or in setting a good example considering
that Soriano and Garcia were neighbors occupying public offices charged with
the maintenance of peace and order in the community. As for the allegation
that the trial was not held until after 3 weeks to give garcia more time to
persuade Soriano to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was
not judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who assigned the
dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the
15 September 1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give Garcia's
counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and prepare for
trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of Garcia, it was
for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular
counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the
case. A postponement to the next day, 16 September 1992, was not an
unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the case since 16
September 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial
dates.Nor is there any showing that the judge decided the criminal case on
grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision acquitting Garcia
shows Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 47 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) that the
same was made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the
prosecution and of the defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the
parties as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily based on her
appreciation of the eligibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the
defense. 323 United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918] First
Division, Malcolm (J): 7 concur Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of
22 October 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in
the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On
the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the
gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported
the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the
leadership of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20, encountered Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the
ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the
following day, the Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house
of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San
Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had
been taken from his corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of Javier. Javier was charged
for stealing the carabao before the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of
sergeant Presca, now deceased, was presented in court by the prosecution.
Presca's signature in the statement was identified. Javier alleged that the
lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence. Issue:
Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now
deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch as the accused is not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof. Held: The Philippine Bill of
Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states taht "In all criminal prosecutions
the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill
of Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as
facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet
him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and
give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits,
and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection
of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other
words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A
second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn
statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a
witness deceased, given in a former action between the same relating to the
same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of
the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower
court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration
or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, the sworn statement was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court. Still, although the Court
could find this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case
for a new trial. The Court however is convinced that this would gain the
accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao
and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on
behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 324 United States vs. Garcia [GR L-3951, 14 March 1908]
First Division, Carson (J): 6 concur Facts: Simeon de los Santos, Feliciano
Garcia, Alberto Tolentino, and a certain Gutierrez, were charged for
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 48 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the crime of
robbery. De los Santos, Garcia and Gutierrez were convicted of the crime
charged, while Tolentino was acquitted. Counsel for Simeon de los Santos
insists that there is no evidence of record connecting de los Santos with the
commission of the crime other than his own confession in the court of the
justice of the peace, and that this confession was improperly admitted in
evidence, it not affirmatively appearing that it was made voluntarily. On the
other hand, counsel for Feliciano Garcia calls attention to the fact that one of
his coaccused, Alberto Tolentino, was acquitted by the trial judge although
he was identified by the witness Soto as a member of the band which
committed the crime, and yet Garcia was convicted upon the testimony of
this witness; and thus argues that since the trial court did not accept Soto's
testimony as to Tolentino, it should not have been accepted as to Garcia.
Lastly, the counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los Santos asked for a new
trial on the ground that, their counsel in the trial court having been taken ill
before the trial, they were not able to secure the presence of their witnesses.
Issue: Whether the defense can complain, about the failure to secure the
presence of witnesses at trial, on appeal. Held: As to the allegation of the
counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los Santos their counsel in the trial
court having been taken ill before the trial, they were not able to secure the
presence of their witnesses, to warrant the conduct of a new trial; the record
discloses, however, that, it appearing that the original counsel assigned to
defend these accused was sick at the time of the trial, new counsel was
assigned for their defense by the court, and it does not appear that any effort
was made to secure the presence of witnesses nor was any motion made to
the court for a continuance for that purpose. The appellants in a criminal
case can not be heard for the first time on appeal to complain that they could
not secure the presence of witnesses at the trial, when it does not appear
that they made any effort so to do before or during the progress of the trial,
or that they sought the aid of the court to compel the attendance of their
witnesses, or objected to proceeding without them. 325 People vs. Sandal
[GRs 32394-95, 5 September 1930] En Banc, Avancena (CJ): 5 concur, 1
dissents Facts: When Tomas Permites went to Manila to look after certain
matters he left Eleno Lamorena in charge of his interests in Monungan. While
Permites was in Manila, Sandal, Lonsing, Arimao, Mama and Pampang caused
some injuries to his carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a dispute with
them. Eleno sent word of what happened to Permites in Manila, and when
the latter returned to Monungan, he verified the facts and filed a complaint
against Sandal, et. al.. Eleno was to be the principal witness. On 18 February
1929, in Abaga, District of Monungan, Province of Lanao, Inambar, a Moro
woman, heard Sandal call Eleno Lamorena, and later saw them engaged in
conversation. While the two were talking, Pampang went up to them and
with a hammer struck Lamorena (the deceased) on the back of the neck,
felling him to the ground. Sandal, Lonsing, Arimao, and Mama, then closed in
on the fallen man beating him to death. On that night Moro Dimaponong was
going home, he saw Sandal, et. al. near a sawmill, carrying the corpse of
Eleno, which they threw into the river. Upon the the inquiry made by the
Constabulary lieutenant into Eleno's disappearance, Dimaponong testified
that Sandal, et.al. carried the corpse of Eleno which they threw into the river.
The corpse was found in that part of the river indicated by Dimaponong.
Doctor Pablo Hamoy in the post-mortem examination found the following
lesions: The right side of the neck and the right shoulder were bruised; the
neck was fractured and the right shoulder dislocated; the right eyes was
bruised; marked cyanosis and acute hemorrhage of both eyes which were
somewhat sunken; marked cyanosis of the lips with the incisors jutting
forward and loose cyanosis and hemorrhage of the gums, and hemorrhage of
the nose; cyanosis of the whole face, a wound in the left arm and forearm,
and a contusion on the breast and abdomen. Sandal, et. al. were charged for
the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of Lanao. Sandal, et.
al. denied the facts set forth and attempted to prove an alibi. The trial court
convicted Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama, and Pampang of murder, and
sentenced each of them to 20 years of cadena temporal, with the accessories
of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased jointly and severally in the
amount of P1,000, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 49 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) to pay their proportional part of the costs. Sandal, et. al. appealed.
Sandal, et.al. assigned as an error the fact that the trial court failed to require
the fiscal to exhibit the testimony given by the witnesses during the
preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace. Issue:
Whether the witnesses during the preliminary investigation should be
presented as witnesses during trial. Held: Sandal, et.al. assigned as an error
the fact that the trial court failed to require the fiscal to exhibit the testimony
given by the witnesses during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
justice of the peace. But the only effect of this failure was to entitle the
defense to adduce secondary evidence touching the testimony of said
witnesses, for the purpose of attacking their veracity, should they have been
presented as witnesses during the trial. 326 People vs. de Luna [GR 77969, 22
June 1989] Second Division, Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: Patrick de Luna was
charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, under the following information, "That on or about the 17th day of
December 1986, at about 7:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her
body thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries: 'Cardio
respiratory arrest, secondary to severe multiple injuries, traumatic.' and as a
consequence of said injuries Tricia died in the next day. Contrary to law." De
Luna, assisted by Counsel-de-Oficio Atty. David Ompoc, when arraigned on
23 December 1986, entered a plea of guilty with the qualification that "hindi
ko sinasadya." The accused allegedly waived his right that the prosecution
present its evidence in order to determine for the court the degree of
culpability of the accused under the present charge. The trial court, on 23
December 1986, rendered the decision convicting de Luna of the crime of
Murder, and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to
indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00. de Luna appealed. Issue:
Whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution, when the accused pleaded guilty during the arraignment. Held:
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely,
voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the complaint or information. While it is true that a plea of guilty
admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating and
qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification stated by
de Luna as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the
trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its
consequences. Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning
and effect of the technical language used in the information qualifying the
acts constituting the offense. In order to be valid, the plea must be an
unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the
defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court
no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under the
circumstances of the case, de Luna's qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea
of guilty. While the Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible
for an accused to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with the
reservation to prove mitigating circumstances, considering, however, the
gravity of the offense charged, the more prudent course for the trial court to
follow is to reject the plea made by de Luna and direct the parties to submit
their respective evidence. When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution
to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. Thus, after a plea of guilty in capital offenses,
it is imperative that the trial court requires the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 50 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) presentation of evidence for the
prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the
degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense
charged. Notwithstanding the waiver made by de Luna as to the presentation
of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be
required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of
the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that
there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as
to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or
require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition
of the prescribed penalties. 327 People vs. Prieto [GR L-46542, 21 July 1978]
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur Facts: On 7 February 1977, Judge
Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr., of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, issued an
order issuing "a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of accused Dario
Gamayon for his continuous failure to appear in Court everytime the case is
called for trial." The order continued: "His bail bond is declared forfeited,"
and likewise gave the bondsmen thirty days "from notice thereof within
which to produce the body of accused Dario Gamayon and show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their
undertaking." On 5 April 197, in resolving a motion for reconsideration,
however, the judge reversed. Hence, the petition for certiorari. Issue:
Whether the provision allowing the continuation of a trial after arraignment
notwithstanding rhw absence of the accused affected the traditional concept
of bail. Held: The last sentence of Section 19 of the Constitution allows the
continuation of a trial after arraignment, notwithstanding the absence of an
accused, provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. However, it must be considered that the constitutional right to
bail would be rendered nugatory if, by the mere fact that the trial could
proceed in the absence of the accused, the undertaking in a bail bond and
the Rules of Court provision could be ignored. Clearly, the innovation
introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a
judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the
conditions therein specified. It does not give him the right to jump bail.
Where it is undisputed that the accused had gone abroad, the usual
procedure provided by the Rules of Court to determine the liability of his
bondsmen should be followed. There is no justification in law, therefore, for
such valid and correct order being reconsidered, just because of the
innovation in the Constitution as to the trial being held in the absence of an
accused. The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent on the
traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a
person in the custody of the law on condition that he would appear before
any court whenever so required, Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest
previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his confinement. All that
is assured on accused who posts bail, therefore, is that prior to his conviction,
he need not be deprived of his liberty. The mere fact that the trial could not
continue in his absence certainly affords no justification for his jumping bail
nor for his bondsmen to escape from the legal effects of their undertaking.
328 People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] First Division, Cruz (J): 4
concur Facts: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it
was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for
homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail
and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The judge, learning later of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong,
however, was gone. Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved
that the hearing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 51 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion,
however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The
order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and
mandamus. Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his
escape. Held: Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In
all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal
cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many
times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old
case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain
stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the
defendant had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be
present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such
escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the
authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section
19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply
escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction
provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of
the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be
present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.
Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this
right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings
will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have
received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to
appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the
pale, and protection, of the law. 329 Gimenez vs. Nazareno [GR L-37933, 15
April 1988] En Banc, Gancayco (J): 14 concur Facts: On 3 August 1973,
Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio
and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. On 22
August 1973, the accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon.
Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at
1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled
date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention center
and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals
handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a
motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against
all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the
application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the
above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case
but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand
the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973,
the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five
accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de
la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on
the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial
in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an
Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether judgment
upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the
accused before the court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 52 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the
following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2)
that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his
failure to do so is unjustified. Herein, all the above conditions were attendant
calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and
in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the
scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced
by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by
a certified copy of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his
detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of
the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence
unjustified. The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the
evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of de la
Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a
trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape
from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings
for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court, and
such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be
no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to
be heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his
behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right
to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him. 330 Aquino vs. Military Commission
No.2 [GR L-37364, 9 May 1975] En Banc, Aquino (J): 5 concur, 1 inhibited
himself, 2 filed separate opinions, 1 filed separate concurring opinion, 2 filed
separate dissenting opinions Facts: Following the proclamation of martial law
in the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was arrested on 23 September 1972,
pursuant to General Order 2-A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy
to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio in Rizal province. On 25
September 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus in which he questioned
the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention.
The Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it, and
required the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philipines, the Secretary of
National Defense, etc. to file their respective answers, after which the case
was heard. Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda. Aquino's last
Reply memorandum was dated 30 November 1972. On 17 September 1974,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of martial
law and the arrest and detention of Aquino. The original petition in the case
was filed on 23 August 1973. It sought to restrain the Military Commission
from proceeding with the hearing and trial of Aquino on 27 August 1973.
Because of the urgency of the petition, the Supreme Court called a hearing
on Sunday, August 26, on the question of whether with its membership of
only 9 Justices, it had a quorum to take cognizance of the petition in view of
the constitutional questions involved. At that hearing, the Court asked the
parties to agree to seek from the Military Commission a postponement of
Aquino's trial the following day. The purpose was to relieve the Court of the
pressure of having to decide the question of quorum without adequate time
to do so. When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened the
following day, however, Aquino questioned the fairness of the trial and
announced that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings even as he
discharged both his defense counsel of choice and his military defense
counsel. The proceedings were thereupon adjourned to another day. In the
meantime, for Aquino's assurance, a Special Committee, composed of a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court, to be designated by the Chief Justice, as
Chairman, and four (4) members to be designated respectively by petitioner,
the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice
and the Secretary of National Defense, was created to reinvestigate the
charges against Aquino. The Secretaries of Justice and National Defense
designated their representatives but Aquino refused Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 53 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to name his. The Chief Justice asked
former Justice J. B. L. Reyes but the latter declined, as he also declined in his
capacity as President of the IBP to designate a representative to the
Committee. As a result, with only two of its members designated, the Special
Committee has not been able to function. On 4 September 1973, a
supplemental petition alleging the creation of the Special Committee and
questioning the legality of its creation was filed. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the Secretary of Justice were included as respondents.
Subsequently, the Court resolved to require the respondents to file their
answer and on 21 August 1974, within the extended period granted by the
Court, respondents, with, the exception of the Chief Justice, filed their
answer to the supplemental petition. Thereafter, Aquino was required to file
a reply and was granted additional time after the lapse of the original period,
but instead of doing so, Aquino asked for the admission of a second
supplemental petition challenging the continued enforcement of martial law
in the Philippines, in the light of Presidential statements to the effect that
with the coming into force of the new Constitution on 17 January 1973,
martial law was "technically and legally" lifted. To this petition respondents
answered. Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda in
lieu of oral argument as per Resolution of the Supreme Court on 14 January
1975. On 24 March 1975, Aquino filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying
that said Commission be prohibited from proceeding with the perpetuation
of testimony under its Order dated 10 March 1975, the same being illegal,
until further orders from the Supreme Court. On 14 April 1975, the Supreme
Court issued a restraining order against Military Commission No. 2,
restraining it from further proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony
under its Order dated 10 March 1975 until the matter is heard and further
orders are issued. When the case was called for hearing, Aquino's counsel
presented to this Court a motion to withdraw the petition, as well as all other
pending matters and/or incidents in connection therewith. Respondents'
counsel interposed objections to the granting of the aforesaid motion to
withdraw. After the hearing, the Supreme Court Resolved: "(a) to require the
Solicitor General to furnish the Court as well as the petitioner and the latter's
counsel, with copies of the transcript of all the stenographic notes taken at
the hearing before the Military Commission No. 2 for the perpetuation of the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution in various criminal cases filed
against herein petitioner, within five (5) days from today; (b) to request the
Solicitor General and the AFP Judge Advocate General to make the necessary
arrangements for the petitioner to confer with his counsel on matters
connected with the aforementioned motion to withdraw; (c) to allow counsel
for the petitioner, if they so desire, to file a manifestation in amplification of
the aforesaid motion to withdraw, within ten (10) days from the date they
confer with the petitioner, and thereafter to allow the Solicitor General to file
a counter-manifestation within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
and (d) to consider the case submitted for decision after submission by both
parties of their respective pleadings on the motion to withdraw."
Subsequently, the parties manifested their compliance. Issue: Whether
Aquino may waive his right to be present during the hearings before the
Military Commission. Held: As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions,
any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if such waiver is not
against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the
beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty, has
been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense.
The "trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a
criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or
statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." There are, for instance,
certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which
may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in
person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to
face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights necessary either
because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial
trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary
power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be waived.
Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 54 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) appear is unjustified." Thus,
considering the provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law
specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there appears,
therefore, no logical reason why Aquino, although he is charged with a
capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in
the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right was
conferred upon him for his protection and benefit. Further, Section 7 of Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for the prosecution)
the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore
provided, shall be considered a waiver," Similarly, Presidential Decree 328
expressly provides that "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or
the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver." Herein, then,
Aquino has the full right to waive his presence at said proceedings. Since only
6 Justices (Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino) are of the view that Aquino may waive his right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings while 5 Justices (Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in agreement that he may so waive such right,
except when he is to be identified, the result is that the Military
Commission's Order requiring his presence at all times during the
proceedings before it should be modified, in the sense that Aquino's
presence shall be required only in the instance just indicated. 331 People vs.
Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: Mario
Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on
motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking
advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the
city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he
escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail
bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless
(Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia
under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the
trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus. Issue:
Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape. Held: Section
19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." Section 19,thus,
allows trial in absentia, The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his
continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that:
a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his
failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may
now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability
of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The
same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he
has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
332 Carredo vs. People [GR 77542, 19 March 1990] First Division, Gancayco
(J): 4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 55 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Facts: On 3 February 1983, Carredo was charged with malicious mischief
before the Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a
cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of
not guilty and thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance dated 14
May 1984 which reads as follows: "IN COMPLIANCE with the Letter of
Instruction No. 40, dated November 10, 1972, the undersigned accused
hereby waives his appearance during the trial or any stage thereof and he
agrees that in case he fails to appear for trial despite due notice, his absence
will be deemed as express waiver of his right to be present, and the
Honorable Court may proceed with the trial of his case as if he were present.
In this connection, he admits that he could be identified by witnesses who
are testifying at the time that said accused was not present." At the hearing
on 14 August 1985 the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal
witness for the purpose of identifying Carredo who was not then present.
Hence, the hearing was re-scheduled on 9 October 1985 and a subpoena was
issued to Carredo who failed to appear on said date. The defense counsel
justified Carredo's absence in that the latter's presence can no longer be
required as he already filed a written waiver of appearance. Nevertheless,
the municipal judge issued an order dated 27 May 1986 ordering the arrest
of Carredo, the confiscation of the cash bond, and at the same time ordering
the bondsman, who is Carredo himself, to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against the bondsman. A motion for reconsideration
thereof having been denied, Carredo elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In an
order dated 28 January 1987, the said trial court denied the same. Carredo
filed the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether the express waiver
of appearance after arraignment includes the instance where the accused
need to be identified by witnesses. Held: Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." It is important to state that
the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the
accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice
simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to
face among others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in
this case, is of the same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial
in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its
right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by
its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a
right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his
obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The
accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 56 ) Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael
Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons
AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license. Some Rights
Reserved. Table of Contents United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber
1912] … 1 United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917] … 2
People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950] … 2 Villaflor vs. Summer [GR
16444, 8 September 1920] … 3 Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July
1937] … 3 Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] … 4 People vs.
Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994] … 5 South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US
553, 22 February 1983] … 6 Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June
1966] … 7 People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] ... 8 People vs.
Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] … 9 Pascual vs. Board of Medical
Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] … 10 Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-
09, 30 August 1985] … 11 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896] …
14 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] … 15 This
collection contains fifteen (15) cases summarized in this format by Michael
Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester,
school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano
Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as
PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and
eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar
examinations immediately after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 333 United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7
Septmber 1912] First Division, Johnson (J): 5 concur Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a
girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the house of her
sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a
number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house. Some of said
Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva
Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan
Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which
she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his private parts, he
threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained
in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two,
the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a
venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery
that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of
September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the
Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called
upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one
who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore
every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known
as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from
the body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the
examination showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng
was charged with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among
others, that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of
Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was
arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the
defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the
Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of
abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal
Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months
and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.
Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he
has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground
that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against selfincrimination.
Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man
in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features
with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the
evidence if material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in
section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit
compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them
in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body
of Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made by competent
medical authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from
said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found
with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no
question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the
same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by
reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to
taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think
of even suggesting that stolen property and the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) clothing in the case indicated, taken from
Tan Teng, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. 334
United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917] En Banc, Malcolm
(J): 5 concur Facts: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from
his mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court,
based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of
the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question
that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. Issue:
Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when
the morphine was forced from his mouth. Held: By analogy, the decision of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.
145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of
other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from
the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit
himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles
taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving
his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine
Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken
from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main
purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion
by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime. 335 People vs. Otadora [GR L-
2154, 26 April 1950] First Division, Bengzon (J): 6 concur Facts: Due to a
family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in August 1946, a
criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband
Francisco Galos. These were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was
later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In
December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors
surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition of real property and
damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on 24 June
1947. Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through
Amando Garbo. Thereafter they conversed on several occasions. In the early
part of May 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told
him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon
she would give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was
invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being
offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun,
procured from one Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a
pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a flashlight. Early in
the morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon
were shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of
21 June 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing
to escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-
judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with
offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On
25 June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against Otadora and
Carreon in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary
investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first
instance, where on 3 September 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the
assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a
separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness
for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's criminal connection with the bloody
affair was collaborated, among others, by Otodora’s possession of the pants
of Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied
ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that
it fitted him perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sentenced to death and other
accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Hilaria Carreon appealed. Issue: Whether Galos’ fitting of the
pants is contrary to the constitutional protection against selfincrimination.
Held: When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered
to put it on, and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly; this gave the
defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No
timely objection was made, however, upon that specific ground. It is doubted
whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Measuring or
photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-incrimination.
Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done. 336 Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] En Banc,
Malcolm (J): 5 concur Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco
were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal
for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body
to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in
contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: Whether the compelling of
a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if
she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure,
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing
that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every person has
a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It
is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to
decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be
invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a
woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However,
between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law
and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most
extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by
merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that
the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that
torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the
rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. 337 Bermudez vs. Castillo
[Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) First Division, Diaz (J): 4 concur Facts: In the course of the
investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-
General against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative
case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in support of his defense,
the six letters. He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's.
Bermudez denied that the letters were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted
that three others were in her own handwriting. As Castillo believed that the
three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were insufficient for purposes
of comparison with the six letters questioned in the case and as he was
determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he required her to
copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator.
Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to
which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate
herself and alleging that the three other letters and the other letters already
in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to
do. The investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to
the trial required, thereby denying Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree
to the decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying
that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he
acted, be ordered to require and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens
of her handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose. Issue: Whether
Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillo’s possession
which were allegedly in her handwriting. Held: The reason for the privilege is
evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the
repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling
a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be
sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person
himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity
by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to
furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the
opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration
may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a
liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. Thus,
Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. 338 Beltran vs.
Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] First Division, Romualdez (J): 6
concur Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered
Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco
Jose, to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose
for such was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine
if it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed
a petition for a writ of prohibition. Issue: Whether the writing from the
fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."). Held: The fiscal under
section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion
of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any
crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice
to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege is found
in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to
declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is not
limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing
means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the
falsifier, as the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious,
the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not
so serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work
cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of
Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of documents or
chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response
to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of
process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the
tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling),
may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally
conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case
is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may
identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to
obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would
go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of, that is
not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the
judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. 339
People vs. Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994] First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 3
concur, 1 on leave Facts: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent"
or informer went to the office of the National Capital Region NARCOM Unit
(NCRNU) and proceeded to the desk of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano.
Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco
Matundan, and PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano to a briefing.
The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a certain "Jon-Jon"
(later identified as Carlos Tranca y Arellano) was selling shabu along Kalayaan
Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust team
with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and the
rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave to
Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 and which had been
dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The
team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target area. At the corner of
Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer spotted Tranca, who
was standing in front of the house, and pointed him out to the team
members. The team then circled back and alighted from their vehicles. As
planned, Sgt. Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of
the team took vantage points so as to observe the operation and close in at
the opportune time. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to Tranca and
told the latter that his companion was interested in buying shabu. The
informer then asked Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered in the
affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied,
"Pare, tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In illegal drug parlance, "piso"
means one hundred pesos) Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt.
Latumbo who in turn handed to Tranca the P100 marked money. Sgt.
Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it
was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt.
Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on Tranca. They
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested Tranca. Upon
interrogation by Capt. Miano, Tranca voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag
of shabu and the P100 marked money . Tranca was handcuffed and taken to
the NARCOM headquarters. On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested
Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of
the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of
Tranca and a P100 bill with serial number Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to
ultraviolet radiation and found the presence of fluorescent powder thereon.
She likewise exposed the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and
discovered flourescent power on his hands, face and on the opening of the
left-side pocket of the white shorts that he was then wearing. In an
information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Tranca was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Criminal Case 2574). The case was assigned to Branch 136 of the said court.
Tranca pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca
denied the allegations against him and contended that he was framed by the
police officers. On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision
finding Tranca guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court. The defense contends that the rights of
Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo
an ultraviolet ray examination. Issue: Whether the subjection of Tranca’s
body to ultraviolet powder violates Tranca’s right against selfincrimination.
Held: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against
his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's body to
ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant
the presence of counsel. 340 South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US 553, 22
February 1983] O'Connor (J): 6 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion
to which 1 joined Facts: Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped
Neville's car after they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked
Neville for his driver's license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left
the car, Neville staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The
officers smelled alcohol on his breath. Neville did not have a driver's license,
and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous drivingwhile-
intoxicated conviction. The officers asked Neville to touch his finger to his
nose and to walk a straight line. When Neville failed these field sobriety tests,
he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights. Neville
acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a
lawyer present. Reading from a printed card, the officers then asked Neville
to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could lose his
license if he refused. Neville refused to take the test, stating "I'm too drunk, I
won't pass the test." The officers again read the request to submit to a test,
and then took Neville to the police station, where they read the request to
submit a third time. Neville continued to refuse to take the test, again saying
he was too drunk to pass it. Neville was thereafter charged. South Dakota law
specifically declares that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test "may be
admissible into evidence at the trial." Nevertheless, respondent sought to
suppress all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit
Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the South Dakota
statute allowing evidence of refusal violated Neville's federal constitutional
rights; the officers failed to advise Neville that the refusal could be used
against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before the
court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that 32-
23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the federal
and state privilege against self-incrimination. The court reasoned that the
refusal was a communicative act involving Neville's testimonial capacities and
that the State compelled this communication by forcing Neville "to choose
between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing
testimonial evidence against himself." Issue: Whether the the admission into
evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test likewise offend the
right against self-incrimination. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Held: As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving,
South Dakota has enacted an "implied consent" law. This statute declares
that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have
consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested
for driving while intoxicated. In Schmerber v. California (384 U.S. 757 [1966]),
the Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it
infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
recognized that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the
"inviolability of the human personality" and the "requirement that the State
procure the evidence against an accused `by its own independent labors,'"
but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the
values it helps to protect. The Court therefore held that the privilege bars the
State only from compelling "communications" or "testimony." Since a blood
test was "physical or real" evidence rather than testimonial evidence, the
Court found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. South Dakota
further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the refusal to be used
against the defendant at trial. As the Court recognized in Schmerber, the
distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and
communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many
cases. The situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from
a person who indicates refusal by complete inaction, to one who nods his
head negatively, to one who states "I refuse to take the test," to Neville here,
who stated "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." Since no impermissible
coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test,
regardless of the form of refusal, the Court prefer to rest its decision on this
ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other
circumstances. The values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered
when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol
test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so
safe, painless, and commonplace, that Neville concedes, as he must, that the
State could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the
test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly
legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a
second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making
that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced Neville into
choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true
choice. To the contrary, the State wants Neville to choose to take the test, for
the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far
stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test. Therefore, a refusal
to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is
not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination. 341 Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June
1966] Brennan (J) Facts: Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while
receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an accident involving the
automobile that he had apparently been driving. At the direction of a police
officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from Schmerber's body by a
physician at the hospital. Schmerber was charged in Los Angeles Municipal
Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed
a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which
indicated intoxication, and the report of this analysis was admitted in
evidence at the trial. Schmerber objected to receipt of this evidence of the
analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn despite his
refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. He contended
that in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the admission of
the analysis in evidence denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights secured
against the States by that Amendment: his privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Appellate Department of
the California Superior Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the
conviction. Issue: Whether Schmerber was thus compelled "to be a witness
against himself." Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Held: In requiring Schmerber to submit to the withdrawal and chemical
analysis of his blood the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to
discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense.
He submitted only after the police officer rejected his objection and directed
the physician to proceed. The officer's direction to the physician to
administer the test over Schmerber's objection constituted compulsion for
the purposes of the privilege. If the scope of the privilege coincided with the
complex of values it helps to protect, the Court might be obliged to conclude
that the privilege was violated. However, as the passage in Miranda implicitly
recognizes, the privilege has never been given the full scope which the values
it helps to protect suggest. History and a long line of authorities in lower
courts have consistently limited its protection to situations in which the State
seeks to submerge those values by obtaining the evidence against an accused
through "the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In
sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will." It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of
responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a
subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both federal and
state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion
to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or
speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to
walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged,
often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against
compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does
not violate it. Schmerber's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated;
indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of
the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the
blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was
neither Schmerber's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative
act or writing by Schmerber, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds. 342
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] En Banc, Per curiam: 15
concur Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late
from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was
not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts.
Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask
for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan
to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00
a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo
started on his way home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house,
Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the
artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the
school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing
that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong
continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men
decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search
anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they
found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the
canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely
bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different
parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A
blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5
policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They
found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as
hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he
had seen Rondero earlier washing his Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hands. The policemen found that the artesian
well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen,
together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City.
There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw
Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this
lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some
policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero
from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife, Christine, with
them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the
blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the
night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were found on the
victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair
specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30
March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to
the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination
on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of
the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while
the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics
to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial
court issued an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting Rondero of the
crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed. Issue:
Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are
admissible as evidence. Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from Rondero and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. Consequently, although
Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired
from the accused under duress. 343 People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17
February 2000] First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur Facts: In the evening of
26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were
Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and
Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan.
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the
kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too,
stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon
Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but
instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his
house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene
lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered
that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde
fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed.
Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing.
Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle,
Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance.
The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie
Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and
fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was
the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the
house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short
pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and
knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not
know, I did not do anything to her." To the question, Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) "where did you come from since a
while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with
Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry
and countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was
with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez
brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter
that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with the missing child.
Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez
tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled
grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad
Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand
pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain
Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!"
Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen
on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of
Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl.
Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together
with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked
when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any
counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. During the arraignment on 1
September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial
Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting
Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with
homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for
reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28
February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether The
taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against
selfincrimination. Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the
assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it
has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused
may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance
taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine
its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or
his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done. 344 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
[GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2
on official leave Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the
initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel,
made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of
First Instance of Manila Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court
ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon
Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for
intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that
they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted
and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965
sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a
witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the lower court
on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and
against himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed. Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative
case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against
himself. Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not
limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which
could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one
aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, is
the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably
apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to
other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it
becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court
reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand—
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands
for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished
according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the
most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice
Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in
an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent. 345-346 Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-
09, 30 August 1985], also People vs. Sandiganbayan [GRs 71212-13] En Banc,
Cuevas (J): 1 concur, 1 on leave, 8 filed separate concurring opinions, 3 filed
separate dissenting opinion, 1 voted to dismiss (thus concur) before leaving
for abroad Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
was gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila International
Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating
an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as
the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board
conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified
and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the
witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board
were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo
Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.
Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the
investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) one, jointly
authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano
Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for
appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation,
the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder —
one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and
another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was
found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen.
Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were
charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the
joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan,
marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their
respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a
formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that
its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus
prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major
Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions
to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied
upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30
May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and
having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the
Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved,
issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending
motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the
memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments,
raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the
prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On
3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence"
which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other
evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been
previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by
them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by
the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by
Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan,
along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of
the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for
certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right against self-
incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the
proceeding before the Agrava Board. Held: Although referred to and
designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and
to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the
function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing,
but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally
responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice.
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of
its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits,
their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as
safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify
before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings."
Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in
the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include
not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-
participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called
to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person
testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly,
to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. Among
this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said
assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained
(under technical arrest) at the time Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) they were summoned and gave their
testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be
witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice.
They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain
of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed
behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against
themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our
fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally
foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as
ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony
given by them. It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws
were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That
no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a
criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also
applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be
compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding
that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a
criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred
constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental
fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the
oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to
reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which
the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional
standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary
rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional
infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted
against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of
claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by
law. Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be
invoked before the board in order to prevent use of any given statement
against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Held (2):
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants
"use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional
immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity"
prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand,
"transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution
for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree
1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the first type of
immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement
given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on
the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render
the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the
right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him
of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk
of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The
dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that Ver,
et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned
that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them.
This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it
and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right
against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to
prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation is repugnant to
Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of
admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in
violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but
also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an
accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense. In fine, in view of the potent sanctions imposed on
the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the
testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of
the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot
be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination which
the same law practically strips away from the witness. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 347 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591,
23 March 1896] Brown (J) Facts: Brown had been subpoenaed as a witness
before the grand jury, at a term of the district court for the Western district
of Pennsylvania, to testify in relation to a charge then under investigation by
that body against certain officers and agents of the Alleghany Valley Railway
Company, for an alleged violation of the interstate commerce act. Brown
appeared for examination, in response to the subpoena, and was sworn.
After testifying that he was auditor of the railway company, and that it was
his duty to audit the accounts of the various officers of the company, as well
as the accounts of the freight department of such company during the years
1894 and 1895, he was asked the question: "Do you know whether or not the
Alleghany Valley Railway Company transported, for the Union Coal Company,
during the months of Jul , August, and September, 1894, coal, from any point
on the Low Grade Division of said railroad company to Buffalo, at a less rate
than the established rates in force between the terminal points at the time of
such transportation?" To this question he answered: "That question, with all
respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline to answer, for the
reason that my answer would tend to accuse and incriminate myself" He was
then asked: "Do you know whether the Alleghany Valley Railway Company,
during the year 1894, paid to the Union Coal Company any rebate, refund, or
commission on coal transported by said railroad company, from points on its
Low Grade Division, to Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company obtained a
transportation of such coal between the said terminal points at a less rate
than the open tariff rate, or the rate established by said company? If you
have such knowledge, state the amount of such rebates or drawbacks or
commissions paid, to whom paid, the date of the same, and on what
shipments, and state fully all the particulars within your knowledge relating
to such transaction or transactions." He answered "That question I must also
decline to answer, for the reason already given." The grand jury reported
these questions and answers to the court, and prayed for such order as to
the court might seem meet and proper. Upon the presentation of this report,
Brown was ordered to appear and show cause why he should not answer the
said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and, upon the hearing of the rule
to show cause, it was found that his excuses were insufficient, and he was
directed to appear and answer the questions, which he declined to do.
Whereupon he was adjudged to be in contempt and ordered to pay a fine of
5 dollars, and to be taken into custody until he should have answered the
questions. He thereupon petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The writ was issued, Brown was produced in court, the hearing was
had, and on 11 September 1895, it was ordered that the petition be
dismissed, the writ of habeas corpus discharged, and Brown remanded to the
custody of the marshal. Brown appealed. Issue: Whether the Brown, as a
witness and not an accused, can refuse to answer the questions about the
anomalies in the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, in light of the
constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination. Held: The Act of Congress
of 1 February 1893 is supposed to have been passed in view of the opinion of
the US Supreme court in Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 US 547), to the effect
that section 860 of the Revised Statutes, providing that no evidence given by
a witness shall be used against him, his property or estate, in any manner, in
any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, did not afford that
complete protection to the witness which the a endment was intended to
guaranty. The inference from the language of said decision is that, if the
statute does afford such immunity against future prosecution, the witness
will be compellable to testify. So also in Emery's Case (107 Mass. 172, 185)
and in Cullen v. Com. (24 Grat. 624), upon which much reliance was placed in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, it was intimated that the witness might be required
to forego an appeal to the protection of the fundamental law, if he were first
secured from future liability and exposure to be prejudiced, in any criminal
proceeding against him, as fully and extensively as he would be secured by
availing himself of the privilege accorded by the constitution. To meet this
construction of the constitutional provision, the act in question was passed,
exempting the witness from any prosecution on account of any transaction
to which he may testify. The danger of extending the principle announced in
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Counselman v.
Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason,
or for a purely fanciful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger,
and for the real purpose of securing immunity to some third person, who is
interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good
citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to
permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name, to be
made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his
privilege. The act of congress in question, securing to witnesses immunity
from prosecution, is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a
class of legislation which is not uncommon either in England or in this county.
Although the constitution vests in the president "power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment," this power has never been held to take from congress the
power to pass acts of general amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in
cases of individuals after conviction, although "it extends to every offense
known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission,
either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after
conviction and judgment." It is entirely true that the statute does not
purport, nor is it possible for any statute, to shield the witness from the
personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime; but
the authorities are numerous, and very nearly uniform, to the effect that, if
the proposed testimony is material to the issue on trial, the fact that the
testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. The design of the constitutional
privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect
him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal
charge. If he secure legal immunity from prosecution, the possible
impairment of his good name is a penalty which it is reasonable he should be
compelled to pay for the common good. If it be once conceded that the fact
that his testimony may tend to bring the witness into disrepute, though not
to incriminate him, does not entitle him to the privilege of silence, it
necessarily follows that, if it also tends to incriminate, but at the same time
operates as a pardon for the offense, the fact that the disgrace remains no
more entitles him to immunity in this case than in the other. Herein, the
grand jury was engaged in investigating certain alleged violations of the
interstate commerce act. Brown, the witness, was the auditor of the road,
whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the officers, and the money paid
out by them. Having audited the accounts of the freight department during
the time in question, he was asked whether he knew of any such
discrimination in favor of the Union Coal Company, and declined to answer
upon the ground that he would thereby incriminate himself. As he had not
apparent authority to make the forbidden contracts, to receive the money
earned upon such contracts, or to allow or pay any rebates, drawbacks, or
commissions thereon, and was concerned only in auditing accounts, and
passing vouchers for money paid by others, it is difficult to see how, under
any construction of section 10 of the interstate commerce act, he could be
said to have willfully done anything, or aided or abetted others in doing
anything, or in omitting to do anything, in violation of the act, his duty being
merely to see that others had done what they purported to have done, and
that the vouchers rendered by them were genuine. But, however this may
be, it is entirely clear that he was not the chief, or even a substantial,
offender against the law, and that his privilege was claimed for the purpose
of shielding the railway or its officers from answering a charge of having
violated its provisions. To say that, notwithstanding his immunity from
punishment, he would incur personal odium and disgrace from answering
these questions, seems too much like an abuse of language to be worthy of
serious consideration. But, even if this were true, he would still be compelled
to answer, if the facts sought to be elucidated were material to the issue. If
witnesses standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity
from testifying, the enforcement of the interstate commerce law, or other
analogous acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties to conceal their
misdoings, would become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of
those having knowledge of the inhibited contracts that the facts can be
ascertained. While the constitutional provision is justly regarded as one of
the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished
by the statutory immunity, that the witness was compellable to answer. 348
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] En Banc, Sanchez
(J): 7 concur Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw
Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor
Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car,
Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively
and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met
Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the Thunderbird. But
Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead,
he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to
cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they
went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages
and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the
same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on
how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone
who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run
away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a
profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was included in the plan. He
furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. In the
morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for
an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in
his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested
buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After
Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they went to
Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was
registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon
City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of
sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the
vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As
payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them
then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other
papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at
the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money
should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to
exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. Then, the two Chinese
were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to
pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left never to return.
So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying
cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went
out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone.
They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI
recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Right after the
meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day
at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument
in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set
worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City,
and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez,
Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging"
Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were
charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird car (Motor
H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories
worth P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the
accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before
the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon
City. When trial opened, the prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify
as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial proceeded, with "Fiscal
Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February
1965, the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused
except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not
more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun
Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the
custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose
to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
The sentence was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals resolved to
dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968,
the Court of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14
resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where
Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of
Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending
execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the
Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of
mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme
Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. Issue:
Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the
court’s disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus
is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when
the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack,
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals
does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary
remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose
liberty is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional
right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Further, a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. Still,
since Chavez is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for
another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 17 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Duterte vs.
Sandiganbayan [GR 130191, 27 April 1998] … 1 Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [GR
L-72335-39, 21 March 1988] … 2 Abardo vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 139571-72,
28 March 2001] … 4 Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman [GR 140529, 6
September 2001] … 6 Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 145851, 22 November
2001] … 8 This collection contains five (5) cases summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First
Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under
Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June
2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine
bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 349 Duterte vs.
Sandiganbayan [GR 130191, 27 April 1998] Third Division, Kapunan (J): 3
concur Facts: In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched
by the city government of Davao. The goal of said project was to make Davao
City a leading center for computer systems and technology development. It
also aimed to provide consultancy and training services and to assist all local
government units in Mindanao set up their respective computer systems. To
implement the project, a Computerization Program Committee, composed of
the following was formed: Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman (City Administrator)
as Chairman; and Mr. Jorge Silvosa (Acting City Treasurer), Atty. Victorino
Advincula (City Councilor), Mr. Alexis Almendras (City Councilor), Atty. Onofre
Francisco (City Legal Officer), Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr. (Chief of Internal
Control Office), and Atty. Mariano Kintanar (COA Resident Auditor) as
members. The Committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar
computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd.,
South Korea and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus,
Inc. (SPI), the total contract cost amounting to P11,656,810.00. On 5
November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao
unanimously passed Resolution 1402 and Ordinance 173 approving the
proposed contract for computerization between Davao City and SPI. The
Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the City Mayor (Rodrigo R. Duterte) to sign
the said contract for and in behalf of Davao City. On the same day, the
Sanggunian issued Resolution 1403 and Ordinance 174, the General Fund
Supplemental Budget 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00 for the
city's computerization project. Sometime in February 1991, a complaint (Civil
Case 20,550-91), was instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 12 by Dean Pilar Braga, Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw
Foundation, Inc. against the Duterte, de Guzman, the City Council, various
city officials and SPI for the judicial declaration of nullity of the resolutions
and ordinances and the computer contract executed pursuant thereto with
SPI. On 22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a
proposal to Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sanggunian issued Resolution 449 and
Ordinance 53 accepting Goldstar's offer to cancel the computerization
contract provided the latter return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to
the City Treasurer's Office within a period of 1 month. On 6 May 1991,
Duterte, in behalf of Davao City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and
the downpayment was duly refunded. The city government, intent on
pursuing its computerization plan, following the recommendation of Special
Audit Team of the Commission on Audit, sought the assistance of the
National Computer Center (NCC). The NCC recommended the acquisition of
Philips computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied
with the NCC's advice and hence, was finally able to obtain the needed
computers. On 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-Davao City Chapter,
through one Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Duterte and de Guzman, the City Treasurer,
City Auditor, the whole city government of Davao and SPI, alleging that the
latter, in entering into the computerization contract, violated RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code and other
pertinent penal laws (OMB-3- 91-1768). On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T.
Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case 20,550-91. On 12 November
1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768
directing Jorge Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and
Manuel T. Asis of SPI to file in 10 days their respective verified point-by-point
comment under oath upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case
20,550-91. On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the affidavits of
the Special Audit Team but failed to furnish Duterte, et. al. copies thereof. On
18 February 1992, Duterte, et. al. submitted a manifestation adopting the
comments filed by Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar dated 25 November
1991 and 17 January 1992, respectively. Four years after, or on 22 February
1996, Duterte, et.al. received a copy of a Memorandum prepared by Special
Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8 February 1996
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding OMB-MIN-90-0425
and OMB-3-91-1768. Instead of the charges of malversation, violation of Sec.
3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor De Guzman
recommended that Duterte, et. al. be charged under Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 "for
having entered into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, the elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to
government being immaterial." Accordingly, Duterte, et. al. were charged
before the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Sandiganbayan in an information dated 8 February 1996 (Criminal Case
23193). On 27 February 1996, Duterte, et. al. filed a motion for
reconsideration and on 29 March 1996, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that, among others, "petitioners were
deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the
speedy disposition of their case." On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued
a Resolution denying Duterte, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration. On 18 June
1997, Duterte, et. al. filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. On 15 July 1997, Duterte, et.
al. moved for reconsideration of the above order but the same was denied by
the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997.
Duterte and de Guzman filed a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether there was
unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted
preliminary investigation. Held: Compounding the deprivation of Duterte's
and de Guzman's right to a preliminary investigation was the undue and
unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted
preliminary investigation. Their manifestation adopting the comments of
their co-respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on
22 February 1996 or 4 years later, that they received a memorandum dated 8
February 1996 submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De
Guzman recommending the filing of information against them for violation of
Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate
delay in the conduct of the "preliminary investigation" infringed upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case.
Further, the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come
into play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution
makes no such distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may have been
a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases,
the particular facts of each case must be taken into consideration in the grant
of the relief sought. Duterte, et. al. herein could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case is the fact
that Duterte, et. al. were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-
affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being
in the dark, they, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against
them had already been dismissed. On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason
which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty
and is no longer appealing. The incident herein does not involve complicated
factual and legal issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject
computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto
even before the AntiGraft League filed its complaint. The Office of the
Ombudsman capitalizes on Duterte, et. al.'s three motions for extension of
time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was
not caused by the motions for extension. The delay occurred after petitioners
filed their comment. Between 1992 to 1996, Duterte, et. al. were under no
obligation to make any move because there was no preliminary investigation
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the
first place. Hence, the petition was granted. 350 Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [GR
L-72335-39, 21 March 1988] En Banc, Yap (J): 14 concur Facts: Sometime in
October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the
then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge
of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging Francisco S. Tatad, who was
then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with
alleged violations of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or 5 years later, it became publicly known that Tatad
had submitted his Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) resignation as Minister of Public Information, and 2 months after,
or on 12 December 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan (TBP Case 8005-16-07) against Tatad, accusing him of graft and
corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public
Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous
report filed by complaint before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security
Command (PSC). On 26 January 1980, the resignation of Tatad was accepted
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. On 1 April 1980, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On 16 June 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his
Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, "evidence gathered
indicates that former Minister Tatad had violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA
3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. Antonio L. Cantero is also liable
under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the
matter. Tatad moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied
on 26 July 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on 5
October 1982. On 25 October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On 5 July 1985, the Tanodbayan
approved a resolution, dated 1 April 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor
Marina Buzon, recommending that the informations be filed against Tatad
before the Sandiganbayan, for (1) violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA
3019 for giving D'Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-
law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith; (2)
violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of
P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; and (3) violation of Section 7
of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978." Accordingly, on
12 June 1985, informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad
(Criminal cases 10499 to 10503). On 22 July 1985, Tatad filed with the
Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the information on the
ground that, among others, "the prosecution deprived accused-movant of
due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed
against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction of file the informations." On 26
July 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated
motion to quash. On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
resolution denying Tatad's motion to quash. On 10 August 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case 10500, changing
the date of the commission of the offense to 30 September 1974. On 30
August 1985, Tatad filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 17 September 1985. On 16 October
1985, Tatad filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction, before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the long delay in teh
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan violated
tatad’s rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Held: A
painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing
from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for
fact-finding investigation and report. The Court cannot emphasize too
strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether
rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence
to the established procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality
of the prosecutor be enhanced. Coming into the main point, the long delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan is
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of Tatad's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to 3 years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the present case. The Court is
not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay
by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against Tatad
were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by RA 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the
period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. After
a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court was
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of Tatad to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal
Cases 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. 351
Abardo vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 139571-72, 28 March 2001] Third Division,
Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 May 1991, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan two separate informations for
falsification of public documents (Criminal Cases 16744 and 16745) against
Roger N. Abardo who was then the provincial assessor of Camarines Sur. The
information in Criminal Case 167444 charged Abardo and six others with
falsifying Tax Declarations 008-13, 008-14, 008-15, 008-17, 008-18, 008- 19,
008-20 and 008-21 on or about 8 December 1988 by making it appear that
property consisting of 1,887 hectares had been declared in the name of the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) since 1985 and that, having been
reclassified to first-class unirrigated land, the market value thereof has
increased to P16,008.00 per hectare when in fact said property, which was
formerly classified as pasture land under Tax Declarations 3915 and 3916
issued in the name of Rosita Alberto, had a market value of only P1,524.00
per hectare and was declared in the name of UCPB only in 1988. The same
property was subsequently transferred by UCPB to Sharp International
Marketing (Phil.) Inc. (Sharp) and the tax declarations issued in the name of
Sharp are the subject of Criminal Case 167455. In the latter case, Abardo and
five others were charged with falsifying Tax Declarations 008-22 to 008-29 on
or about 8 December 1988, by making it appear that the property covered
therein was transferred from UCPB to Sharp, and by also increasing its
appraisal to first-class unirrigated riceland when in truth and in fact the same
is cogonal and mountainous. At the scheduled arraignment on 8 July 1991,
Abardo filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the facts charged in the
informations do not constitute the crime of falsification of public documents;
that the informations contain averments which constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and that the criminal offense of falsification of public documents
cannot be validly filed against Abardo. In view of the pendency of the said
motions, Abardo’s arraignment was postponed until further notice. On 24
July 1991, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Opposition to Abardo’s
Motion to Quash. On 3 September 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying the Motion to Quash for lack of merit. A motion to
reconsider the said resolution was denied. Eventually, Abardo filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to set aside
the Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan on 3 September 1991 denying
his motion to quash. As a consequence, the arraignment scheduled for 7
October 1991 was reset to 28 November 1991, upon motion of Abardo’s
counsel. Thereafter, Abardo’s arraignment was reset several times upon
motion of his Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
counsel and for the same reason. Thereafter, in an Order dated 28 May 1992,
Abardo's arraignment was cancelled and reset to 28 July 1992, in view of the
reorganization of the Sandiganbayan. In a Resolution dated 5 March 1992,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, no grave abuse of discretion being
imputable to the Sandiganbayan. Similarly, the motion for reconsideration
filed by Abardo was denied. On 28 July 1992, Abardo was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to both cases. On even date, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order setting the trial of Abardo "on the date of trial of his co-accused whose
cases are being reinvestigated." In a letter dated 20 March 1997 to the Office
of the Ombudsman, Abardo requested for the payment of his retirement
benefits which had been withheld since his compulsory retirement in 1994
due to the pendency of the subject criminal cases. This letter was brought to
the attention of the Sandiganbayan in a letter dated 22 September 1997. In a
Resolution adopted on 4 November 1997, the Sandiganbayan set for a
conference all the lawyers of the defense and the prosecution to see how
these cases can move faster. On 7 January 1998, co-accused Salvador P. Pejo
filed a Motion for Leave to Participate in the Reinvestigation of the Cases
which was granted in an Order dated 9 January 1998. In an Order dated 27
January 1998, the Sandiganbayan gave the prosecution a period of 60 days to
conduct a thorough reinvestigation of Criminal Cases 16739 to 16749
involving all the accused therein and ordering it to submit its report within
the same period containing its findings and recommendation together with
the action taken by the Ombudsman. On 12 August 1998, Abardo filed a
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation on the ground that "the
ultimate purchase by the Philippine government of the Garchitorena estate
at the price of P33,000.00 has veritably rendered all the pending criminal
cases moot and academic." On 12 October 1998, Abardo filed a
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the criminal cases
should be dismissed to implement the provisions of RA 8493, otherwise
known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, considering that the two pending
criminal cases against him have already exceeded the extended time limit
under Section 7 of Supreme Court Circular 38-98." On 1 December 1998,
Abardo filed a Motion for Early Resolution to speed up the early judgment
and resolution of the cases. In a Resolution dated 1 December 1998, the
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit Abardo’s two motions (Motion to
Dismiss and/or Motion for Reinvestigation and the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss). His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution
dated 16 July 1999. Abardo filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Speedy Trial Act should apply to
dispose the cases, which remain pending after a considerably prolonged
delay. Held: Unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases in judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies is a serious problem besetting the
administration of justice in the country. As one solution on the problem of
delay in the disposition of criminal cases, Republic Act 8493, otherwise
known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998", intended to ensure a speedy trial of
all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court was passed by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on 4 February 1998 and 3 February
1998, respectively. Supreme Court Circular 38-98 which was promulgated for
the purpose of implementing the provisions thereof took effect on 15
September 1998. The time limits provided by RA 8493 could not be applied
to the present case as Abardo was arraigned way back in 28 July 1992. At
that time, there was yet no statute which establishes deadlines for
arraignment and trial; and the time limits for trial imposed by RA 8493 are
reckoned from the arraignment of the accused. Nevertheless, RA 8493 does
not preclude application of the provision on speedy trial in the Constitution.
Indeed, in determining whether Abardo’s right to a speedy trial has been
violated, resort to Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
imperative. It provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies." The Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage, but
also in the disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in cases of violations
thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not only the accused.
However, the right of an accused to a speedy trial should not be utilized to
deprive the state of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals.
Herein, the records disclose that the two informations against petitioner
were filed almost Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
a decade ago or way back on 21 May 1991. What glares from the records is
that from his arraignment on said date, there was an unexplained interval or
inactivity of close to five years in the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, on 27
March 1997, Abardo brought to the attention of the Ombudsman the
withholding of his retirement benefits and that no hearing of the case has yet
been conducted. Granting that the delay or interval was caused by the
separate motions for reinvestigation filed by the different accused, again,
there is no explanation why the reinvestigation was unduly stretched beyond
a reasonably permissible time frame. Apparently, the Office of the
Ombudsman did not complete the reinvestigation during the five-year
interval. It is apparent that the delay is not solely or even equally chargeable
to petitioner, but to the Office of the Ombudsman where the conduct of the
reinvestigation has languished for an unreasonable length of time. Clearly,
the delay disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty, as mandated by the
Constitution and RA 6770, to enforce the criminal liability of government
officers or employees in every case where the evidence warrants in order to
promote efficient service to the people. The fact that up to this time no trial
has been set, apparently due to the inability of the Ombudsman to complete
the reinvestigation is a distressing indictment of the criminal justice system,
particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars. Hence, the Court grants
the petition and directed the Sandiganbayan to dismiss Criminal Cases 16744
and 16745. 352 Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman [GR 140529, 6
September 2001] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 30
June 1959, Jose P. Lopez Jr. started working with the DECS as a classroom
teacher. Through hard work, exemplary performance and continuous studies,
he was promoted and assigned to different positions such as Special
Education Teacher; Child and Youth Specialist; 2nd Lt., 36 Battalion Combat
Team, Philippine Army (Reserved Force); Asst. Director and concurrent
Director, Child and Youth Research Center (now a defunct office); and finally,
he was appointed as Administrative Officer V, DECS-Region XII, Cotabato City.
Among Lopez' tasks as Administrative Officer V is to determine whether
certain expenses are necessary in the attainment of the objectives of the
DECS-Region XII and to pass upon, review and evaluate documents and other
supporting papers submitted to him in relation to his duties. Between 1992
and 1993, DECS-Region XII ordered several pieces of laboratory equipment
and apparati requested by different school divisions of the region. The
concerned officers of DECS-Region XII submitted to Lopez the documents
covering the transactions. After careful scrutiny of the documents submitted
to him, Lopez affixed his signature on the disbursements vouchers that were
accompanied by Purchase Orders, Sales Invoices, Delivery/Memorandum
Receipts and proof that the transactions were post audited by the COA
Resident Auditor who found them in order. Disregarding the findings of the
COA Resident Auditor - DECS Region XII, Cotabato City, who post audited the
transactions and found them in order, for reasons of his own, the COA
Regional Director formed a Special Audit Team to investigate and audit the
transactions. Without seeking the presence of the concerned officials and
employees of DECS – Region XII, the COA Special Audit Team conducted an
audit of the transactions. On 20 December 1993, the members of the COA
Special Audit Team submitted to the COA Regional Director-Region XII, their
Joint Affidavit claiming alleged deficiencies in the transactions of DECS –
Region XII implicating thereto Lopez and some concerned officials and
employees of DECS-Region XII. Dispensing conducting an exit conference and
inviting Lopez to clarify the allegations of the COA Special Audit Team in their
Joint Affidavit-Complaint, in post-haste the COA Regional Directors indorsed
it to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for preliminary investigation
(Case 3-93-27791, for Falsification of Documents by Public Officers). In her
Order dated 1 March 1994, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah
Tolentino directed the petitioner to submit a Counter-Affidavit without
informing him of his constitutional right to counsel. On 14 April 1994, without
the assistance of counsel, Lopez wrote the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao requesting for an extension of 10 days from 19 April 1994 to
submit his Counter-Affidavit. On 19 April 1994, Atty. Edgardo A. Camello,
counsel for Makil Pundaodaya and the other respondents in Case OMB-3-93-
8791 filed a Motion for Extension of Time to submit their Counter-Affidavits.
On 22 April 1994, without the assistance of counsel, Lopez submitted to the
Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao his Counter-Affidavit he personally
prepared denying specifically each and every criminal act attributed to him
by the Commission on Audit. Although Lopez did not submit any written
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) statement
authorizing Atty. Camello to represent him in Case OMB 3-93-8791, the
Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao erroneously assumed or deliberately
made to appear that he was represented by said attorney. As a consequence
thereof, the Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao did not notify him of the
progress of the preliminary investigation. More than 4 years after he
submitted his Counter-Affidavit, Lopez was surprised that, without
preliminary investigation and clarificatory question asked, on 17 July 1998,
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the preliminary
investigation recommending that he, together with the other respondents in
Case OMB 3-93-9791, be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Within the reglementary period,
without the assistance of counsel, Lopez sent a letter to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao dated 8 June 1999 seeking the reconsideration of the
Resolution in Case OMB 33-93-2791 wherein he stressed that he was
deprived of due process and that there was inordinate delay in the resolution
of the preliminary investigation; and there was no exit conference wherein
he could have explained to the Graft Investigation Officer his exculpatory
participation in the transactions investigated. In addition, he also submitted
to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation reiterating the allegations mentioned in his letter dated 8
June 1999. Unfortunately, said Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation
was not acted upon by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao by giving the
excuse that its Resolution was already forwarded to Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto. Lopez filed a petition for mandamus seeking (1) the dismissal of
Ombudsman Case OMB-3- 93-2793 (now Criminal Cases 25247-25226); and
(2) the issuance of a clearance in his favor. Issue: Whether the cases against
Lopez should be dismissed in light of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
Held: The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited
to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice. However, the right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
even without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed,
and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept. Herein, the preliminary investigation
was resolved close to 4 years from the time all the counter and reply
affidavits were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. After the last
reply-affidavit was filed on 28 February 1995, it was only on 17 July 1998 that
a resolution was issued recommending the filing of the corresponding
criminal informations against Lopez and the others. It took 8 months or on 27
February 1999 for Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve
the same and close to another year or on 30 April 1999 for Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto to approve the recommendation. During this interval, no
incidents presented themselves for resolution and the delay could only be
attributed to the inaction on the part of the investigating officials. Indeed,
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time was allowed to
elapse at the preliminary investigation stage before the informations were
filed. The cases are not sufficiently complex to justify the length of time for
their resolution. Neither can the long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the number of
informations filed before the Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions involved.
The thirty informations consist of 16 counts of violations of Section 3 (g) of
RA 3019 relative to the overpricing and lack of public bidding of laboratory
apparatus and school equipment; while the 14 counts are for violations of
Section 3 (e) of the same law relative to the certification in the inspection
reports that the subject items have already been delivered and received,
when in fact they have not yet been actually delivered and received, in order
to facilitate payment to the suppliers. There is no statement that voluminous
documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. Verily, the delay
disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty, as mandated by the Constitution and
Republic Act 6770, to enforce the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) criminal liability of government officers or employees in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
to the people. The failure of said office to resolve the complaints that have
been pending for almost four years is clearly violative of this mandate and
the rights of petitioner as a public official. In such event, Lopez is entitled to
the dismissal of the cases filed against him. 353 Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan
[GR 145851, 22 November 2001] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur Facts:
On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and
divested of cash in the amount of P19,731,320.00. In the evening of 6 June
1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to Abelardo B. Licaros), one of the
principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks a
substantial portion of the stolen money to the Concepcion Building in
Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had its offices, of which
Abelardo Licaros was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery was
made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank
Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr., then Chairman of the Bank and father of
Abelardo, that the money to be deposited came from some Chinese
businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; that Governor
Licaros left for the United States on 28 May 1982 for his periodic medical
check-up, so left to his son, Abelardo, to attend to the proposed deposit.
Abelardo attempted to report the incident to General Fabian Ver but he
could not get in touch with him because the latter was then out of the
country. It was only the following day, 9 June 1982, when Abelardo was able
to arrange a meeting with then Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya, Senior
Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson, and Central Bank Chief Security Officer,
Rogelio Navarete, to report his suspicion that the money being deposited by
Modesto Licaros may have been stolen money. With the report or
information supplied by Abelardo, then CB Governor Laya called up then NBI
Director Jolly Bugarin and soon after the meeting, the NBI, Metrocom and
the CB security guards joined forces for the recovery of the money and the
apprehension of the principal accused. All the aforesaid Central Bank officials
executed sworn statements and testified for Abelardo, particularly CB
Governor Jaime C. Laya, CB Senior Deputy Governor Gabriel Singson and CB
Director of the Security and Transport Department Rogelio Navarette, and
were one in saying that it was the report of Abelardo to the authorities that
broke the case on 9 June 1982 and resulted in the recovery of the substantial
portion of the stolen money and the arrest of all the principal accused. On 6
July 1982, after preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan (now Special
Prosecutor) filed an Information for robbery with the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case 6672) against two groups of accused: (a) Principals: Modesto
Licaros y Lacson (Private Individual), Leo Flores y Manlangit (CB Security
Guard), Ramon Dolor y Ponce (CB Assistant Regional Cashier), Glicerio
Balansin y Elaurza (CB Security Guard), Rolando Quejada y Redequillo (Private
Individual), Pio Edgardo Flores y Torres (Private Individual), Mario Lopez Vito
y Dayungan (Private Individual), and Rogelio De la Cruz y Bodegon (Private
Individual); and (b) Accessory After the Fact: Abelardo B. Licaros (Vice
Chairman and Treasurer, Home Savings Bank and Trust Co. (HSBTC), Private
Individual). On 26 November 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an Amended
Information naming the same persons as principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz
who is now charged as an accessory, together with Abelardo. De la Cruz died
on 6 November 1987 as per manifestation by his counsel dated and filed on
17 November 1987. On 29 November 1982, the accused were arraigned,
including Abelardo, who interposed the plea of not guilty. On 7 January 1983,
the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Discharge" of
Abelardo to be utilized as a state witness which was granted in a Resolution
dated 11 February 1983. The Supreme Court, however, on petition for
certiorari filed by accused Flores, Modesto Licaros and Lopez Vito, annulled
the discharge because it ruled that the Sandiganbayan should have deferred
its resolution on the motion to discharge until after the prosecution has
presented all its other evidence. At the close of its evidence, or on 23 July
1984, the prosecution filed a second motion for discharge of Abelardo to be
utilized as a state witness but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated 13
September 1984 denied the Motion stating in part that the motion itself does
not furnish any cue or suggestion on what petitioner will testify in the event
he is discharged and placed on the stand as state witness. Meanwhile, as of
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 8 March 1983,
the prosecution has presented 10 witnesses. None of the witnesses, nor any
of the principal accused who executed the sworn statements implicated
Abelardo to the crime of robbery directly or indirectly. On 17 September
1984, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. In a
Resolution dated 1 October 1984, the Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence
covered by said formal offer and the prosecution was considered to have
rested its case. On 14 January 1986, Abelardo filed a Motion for Separate
Trial contending that the prosecution already closed its evidence and that his
defense is separate and distinct from the other accused, he having been
charged only as accessory. The motion was granted in an Order dated 17
January 1986. Thereafter, Abelardo commenced the presentation of his
evidence. On 8 August 1986, Abelardo filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. On
14 August 1986, Abelardo filed his Memorandum praying that judgment be
rendered acquitting him of the offense charged. In a Resolution dated 26
August 1986, the Sandiganbayan, through Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena (then newly appointed after the EDSA revolution), admitted all
the exhibits covered by said Formal Offer of Exhibits at the same time,
ordering the prosecution to file its Reply Memorandum, thereafter the case
was deemed submitted for decision. On 26 September 1986, the prosecution
filed its Reply Memorandum. Abelardo also filed his Reply Memorandum on
29 September 1986 praying that judgment be rendered acquitting him of the
offense charged. In a Resolution dated 8 October 1986 copy of which was
received by Abelardo on 15 October 1986, the Sandiganbayan deferred the
decision of the case regarding Abelardo until after the submission of the case
for decision with respect to the other accused. Abelardo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration on 16 October 1986, but the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated 16 December 1986 and promulgated on 6 January 1987 denied the
same. The case was submitted for decision on 20 June 1990. More than 10
years after the case was submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not
rendered the Decision. On 15 August 2000, Abelardo filed his Motion to
Resolve. This was followed by Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution filed on
21 September 2000. Abelardo filed a petition for mandamus with the
Supreme Court Issue: Whether the dismissal of Abelardo’s case is warranted
by the guarantee on speedy trial or speedy disposition of the case. Held:
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only
90 days to decide a case from the time it is deemed submitted for decision.
Considering that the subject criminal case was submitted for decision as early
as 20 June 1990, it is obvious that the Sandiganbayan has failed to decide the
case within the period prescribed by law. Even if the Court was to consider
the period provided under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which is 12 months from the submission of the case for decision, the
Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform its mandated
duty to render a decision on the case within the period prescribed by law.
Clearly then, the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period to
decide the case under the law has long expired. Even more important than
the above periods within which the decision should have been rendered is
the right against an unreasonable delay in the disposition of one's case
before any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body. This constitutionally
guaranteed right finds greater significance in a criminal case before a court of
justice, where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of justice for the
accused altogether. Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied"
is by no means a trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken for granted
by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice. Indubitably, there
has been a transgression of Abelardo's right to a speedy disposition of his
case due to inaction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Neither that court nor
the special prosecutor contradicted his allegation of a ten-year delay in the
disposition of his case. The special prosecutor in its Comment9 even openly
admitted the date when the case had been deemed submitted for decision
(i.e. 20 June 1990), as well as Sandiganbayan's failure to act on it despite
Abelardo's several Motions to resolve the case. It has been held that a breach
of the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case may have
consequential effects, but it is not enough that there be some procrastination
in the proceedings. In order to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must
be established that the proceedings have unquestionably been marred by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Herein, the failure of the
Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after the lapse of more than 10 years
after it was submitted for decision involves more than just a mere
procrastination in the proceedings. From the explanation given by the
Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) slumber, allegedly due to
reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics and facilities for case
records. Had it not been for the filing of the Petition for Mandamus, Abelardo
would not have seen any development in his case, much less the eventual
disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now, with only the
Sandiganbayan's assurance that at this time "work is being done on the case
for the preparation and finalization of the decision." Hence, the dismissal of
the criminal case against Abelardo for violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-
year delay in the resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) Abelardo has
suffered vexation and oppression by reason of this long delay; (3) he did not
sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4) he has not
contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5)
he did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised
on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did
not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted
that the case was one of those that got "buried" during its reorganization,
and (7) Abelardo was merely charged as an accessory after the fact. For too
long, Abelardo has suffered in agonizing anticipation while awaiting the
ultimate resolution of his case. The inordinate and unreasonable delay is
completely attributable to the Sandiganbayan. No fault whatsoever can be
ascribed to Abelardo or his lawyer. It is now time to enforce his constitutional
right to speedy disposition and to grant him speedy justice. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 10 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents People vs. dela
Cruz [GR L-5790, 17 April 1953] … 1 People vs. Borja [GR L-22947, 12 July
1979] … 1 Veniegas vs. People [GRs L-57601-06, 30 July 1982] … 3 People vs.
Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May 1989] … 4 State of Louisiana vs. Resweber [329
US 459, 13 January 1947] … 5 Ford vs. Wainwright [477 US 399, 26 June
1986] … 6 People vs. Camano [GRs L-36662-63, 30 July 1982] … 7 Echegaray
vs. Secretary of Justice [GR 132601, 19 January 1999] … 8 This collection
contains eight (8) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
354 People vs. dela Cruz [GR L-5790, 17 April 1953] En Banc, Bengzon (J): 8
concur Facts: In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr.
went to the store of Pablo de al Cruz in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased
from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. As the
purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms
with Pablo de la Cruz, the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted
in this criminal prosecution. Executive Order 331 (issued by authority of
Republic Act 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of
commodity. Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the
ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first
instance of Manila, to imprisonment for 5 years, and to pay a fine of P5,000
plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business
for 5 years. De la Cruz appealed. Issue: Whether 5 years and P5,000 are cruel
and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the
accused. Held: The Constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of
the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishments which never existed in America or which public
sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance those inflicted at
the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus
be within the prohibition. However, there are respectable authorities holding
that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and
unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental
restriction. These authorities explain, nevertheless, that to justify a court's
declaration of conflict with the Constitution, the prison term must be so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.
Seldom has a sentence been declared to be cruel and unusual solely on
account of its duration. The Court does not regard such punishment (5 years
adn P5,000) unusual and cruel, remembering the national policy against
profiteering in the matter of foodstuffs affecting the people's health, the
need of stopping speculation in such essentials and of safeguarding public
welfare in times of food scarcity or similar stress. The damage caused to the
State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused,
inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential
breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls. However, considering
that the modest store-owner has a family to support, and shall serve in
Muntinglupa a stretch of 5 years, for having attempted to earn a few extra
centavos, the Court exercised its discretion vested in the courts by the same
statutory enactment by reducing the imprisonment to 6 months and the fine
to P2,000; thus skirting the constitutional issue yet executing substantial
justice. 355 People vs. Borja [GR L-22947, 12 July 1979] En Banc, Abad Santos
(J): 8 concur, 1 voted for affirmance of death penalty, 1 filed separate
concurring opinion, 1 took no part Facts: On 18 December 1958, the
Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general meeting at the
bahay-pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio
Buragwis, Legaspi City. The locale of the meeting was so chosen because
many AFAG members are also Watawat members. One of the accused, Pedro
Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a 100
members, announcing that their backpay was forthcoming at the rate of
P36,000 for a ranking officer, and a lesser amount for those of lower rank.
Borja, who has the rank of a full colonel, is the AFAG head for the entire Bicol
region, which is said to have 36,000 members. When the meeting ended,
Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and members,
including Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe Benavides,
Dominador de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina. At the secret
meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following
morning at the Hacienda San Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the
bay from Tabaco, Albay. With the conference over, all 8 men slept in the
bahay-pulungan. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
When they woke up the next day, the 8 men held an early-morning
conference, with Balimbing airing to Borja his grievances against Santiago
Gancayco, Jr. the manager of the hacienda. That same morning, the 8 men
left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. In Tabaco, the group went to Barrio
San Jose. Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by
Mariano Burac. Crossing the bay, the group disembarked at the hacienda,
and at a seashore conference, they agreed to pose as members of the
Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to inspect the firearms of
the hacienda. Borja herded the men of the hacienda inside the bodega,
where they were guarded by Benavides and Fustigo. Therein, Balimbing
accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing's cousin, and demanded that Gancayco
produce the .45 caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the
death. Gancayco explained that it was not he but Solon Demetrio who
accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that Gancayco had no such pistol.
Pavia, as well as Demen, fired upon Gancayco. Demen aimed rapid fire at
Salustiano Isorena, the hacienda overseer, who fell flat on the balcony floor.
Gancayco, bloodied, rushed out of the bodega. He was pursued by the
gunmen. While the pursuers tracked their prey, Emilio Lanon, a security
guard and barrio lieutenant of the hacienda, left the bodega by the back door
and went to Gancayco's house, where Mrs. Gancayco instructed him to close
all the windows and take the children downstairs, to which he complied.
Lanon left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in the abaca
plantation. Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other
personnel of the hacienda, were able to rendezvous at the seashore. They
got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards Tabaco, in the hope of
taking the wounded men to the hospital there. Gancayco died enroute, in the
arms of his wife. While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of 8 men
reached the seashore and chanced upon a motorboat anchored there. When
they discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline, they
looked for another and dragooned Bienvenido Taller into transporting them.
The men alighted at the lighthouse at Malinao and immediately afterwards,
Taller reported to the police authorities of the town. However, he was
advised to report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had jurisdiction
over the case. The 8 men reached the poblacion of Malinao. Borja instructed
Pavia and Demen to make their separate way towards Barrio Buragwis. The
remainder of the group boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi. As the bus
stopped near the market at Tiwi, another car overtook it and policemen from
Tabaco, headed by Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded
the bus. Firaza in a loud voice called for the surrender of all those in the bus
responsible for the killing at the Hacienda San Miguel. He was suddenly fired
upon by Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him on the right
cheek, and he ordered his men to return fire. The encounter resulted in the
death of Balimbing and Oljina; the capture of Benavides and de los Santos;
and the escape of Borja and Fustigo. The encounter in Tiwi took place in the
afternoon of 19 December 1958. Subsequently, the rest of the band fell one
by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo were arrested, and
Borja, the last one to fall, was captured on 27 February 1959 after a
nationwide manhunt. Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino
Pavia, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, John Doe and Richard Doe
(Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina being the last two), were charged for
murder in Criminal case 2578 and for frustrated murder in Criminal Case
2590 before the Court of First Instance of Albay. On 8 September 1960, the
court, in Criminal case 2590, found Borja, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, and sentenced each to
imprisonment ranging from 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor,
as the minimum, to 14 years, 10 months, and 21 days of reclusion temporal
as the maximum; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify
Salustiano Isorena in the sum of P5,000.00, as moral and exemplary
damages, severally and jointly, and to pay the costs. The court also, in
Criminal Case 2578, founf Borja, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of murder, and sentenced each of them to the maximum penalty
of death; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended
parties, Mercedes Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her children in the sum of
P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago Gancayco, Jr., and another amount in the
sum of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, both severally and
jointly, and to pay the costs. In the decision, the trial court — pursuant to the
Revised Penal Code, Article 5 — recommended to the President, through the
Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los Santos,
"that executive clemency be extended to him, or that at least his death
penalty be minimized or commuted to life imprisonment." The court so
recommended because "the testimony of the accused had contributed in a
large measure to the Court in its pursuit of truth and justice in these cases."
Borja, et. al. appealed. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Issue: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court, in light of
the aggraviating circumstances, be reduced from the penalty from death and
its accessory penalties, to reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties.
Held: Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos do not deny their
culpability for the offenses charged, but prayed for the reduction of the
penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion temporal and its
accessory penalties. They admitted with candor: "The finding of facts in the
decision of the trial court having been found to be a faithful narration of the
incident as related during the trial of the case and given in the two ocular
inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it would seem a
useless endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts." The five accused
controverted the findings of the trial court that there were five aggravating
circumstances in the case for murder. Instead, they contended that the trial
court should have appreciated only three aggravating circumstances. The
trial court correctly considered that either treachery or evident
premeditation qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the other alternative
circumstance should be considered as aggravating. The trial court found five
aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de
los Santos, to wit: (1) the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were
committed by a band, or with the aid of armed men; (2) means were
employed to weaken the defense, wherein is included taking advantage of
superior strength; (3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were employed; (4) there
was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and (5) there was
treachery or evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to
qualify the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. With respect to Pedro
Borja in both cases, the trial court considered against him four aggravating
circumstances as above excluding the promise of backpay. It found another
aggravating circumstance in the case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling.
Hence, in the case of frustrated murder, it found six aggravating
circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos;
and five aggravating circumstances against Borja. It msut be noted, however,
that the circumstance of band and aid of armed men, cannot be taken
separately from the circumstance of use of means to weaken the defense,
and advantage of superior strength. All these circumstances are absorbed in
treachery and may not be considered independently. Treachery absorbs the
circumstance of craft, fraud and disguise. Nonetheless, this leaves the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which applies to all the
accused; and the aggravating circumstance of promise of backpay, which
applies to all the accused, except Borja. In disposing the case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case 2590 in toto;
while modifying Criminal Case 2578 in respect of the principal penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes, and in respect of the
civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.00. 356 Veniegas vs. People [GRs L-
57601-06, 30 July 1982] Resolution En Banc, Abad Santos (J): 10 concur, 2
reiterate positions in Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 1 took no part Facts: The
Sandiganbayan convicted Lazaro Veniegas of 6 counts of malversation and 6
counts of falsification. Veniegas assailed the decision as violative of due
process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the
petition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he was convicted without
evidence of his guilt; that having been convicted of malversation he should
not be convicted of falsification; that he was made to answer several times
for a single offense; and that for the 12 convictions he would be made to
serve 92 years of imprisonment. Issue: Whether the decision imposed cruel
and unusual punishment because for the 12 convictions, he would be made
to serve 92 years of imprisonment. Held: The decision imposing 92 years of
imprisonment for the 12 convictions is not cruel and unusual punishment,
and not "shocking to the moral sense, an offense to the constitution." The
provisions of Article 70, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
mandates that "Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding,
the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than
threefold the length of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after
the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period." 357
People vs. Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May 1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 14
concur Facts: In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on 4
April 1975, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria,
public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act
4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on 29 May 1975. At the
arraignment, Matondo, et. al. pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately
thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was
subsequently reduced to writing on 13 June 1975. On 21 August 1975, the
municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On 2
September 1975, Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the
further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
considering that Section 32 of RA 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for Matondo,
et. al. on 20 October 1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On 26
October 1975, Matondo, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch VIII (Civil Case B-622), to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial
Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of
said Criminal Case 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of
Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an
amended petition alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said
law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to
reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely
left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government. On 30 March 1976, having been advised
that the petition of Matondo, et. al. was related to Criminal Case 1978 for
violation of PD 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of
the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunato B. Cuna of the
former branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further
proceedings (Civil Case 5428). On 15 March 1976, the Provincial Fiscal of
Leyte filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended petition but
Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy denied the same in his resolution of 20 April
1976. On 2 August 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a supplementary
memorandum in answer to the amended petition. On 8 September 1976,
Judge Dacuycuy rendered the decision holding in substance that RA 4670 is
valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the
former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
On 25 September 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion for
reconsideration. Likewise, Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration
of the lower court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion
thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of RA 4670. Judge Dacuycuy
denied both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated 19 October
1976. The Provincial Fiscal filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court. Issue: Whether Section 32 of RA 4670, by not providing a
determinable term of imprisonment, renders the penalty excessive, cruel and
unusual. Held: The rule is established beyond question that a punishment
authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the
nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community. Based on this principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of
fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.
"The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of cruel Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which
never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the
like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. That
the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to
declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court
will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate
determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no
decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or
"excessive." However, Section 32 of RA 4670 provides for an indeterminable
period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration
having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the
benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range,
from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in
nature and which does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well
as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of
constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue
of the separability clause in Section 34 of RA 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be declared
unconstitutional. 358 State of Louisiana vs. Resweber [329 US 459, 13
January 1947] Reed (J): 2 concur Facts: Willie Francis is a colored citizen of
Louisiana. He was duly convicted of murder and in September 1945,
sentenced to be electrocuted for the crime. Upon a proper death warrant,
Francis was prepared for execution and on 3 May 1946, pursuant to the
warrant, was placed in the official electric chair of the State of Louisiana in
the presence of the authorized witnesses. The executioner threw the switch
but, presumably because of some mechanical difficulty, death did not result.
He was thereupon removed from the chair and returned to prison where he
now is. A new death warrant was issued by the Governor of Louisiana, fixing
the execution for 9 May 1946. Applications to the Supreme Court of the state
were filed for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus,
directed to the appropriate officials in the state. By the applications Francis
claimed the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the ground that an execution under the circumstances
detailed would deny due process to him because of the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment. These federal constitutional protections,
Francis claimed, would be denied because he had once gone through the
difficult preparation for execution and had once received through his body a
current of electricity intended to cause death. Execution of the sentence was
stayed. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied the applications on the
ground of a lack of any basis for judicial relief; i.e. the state court concluded
there was no violation of state or national law alleged in the various
applications. Issue: Whether the imposition of death, or to prepare the
accused for electrocution once again, is a cruel and unusual punishment in
the constitutional sense. Held: The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-
American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of
the death sentence. Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has
come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear
in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth would prohibit by its due process
clause execution by a state in a cruel manner. Francis' suggestion is that
because he once underwent the psychological strain of preparation for
electrocution, now to require him to undergo this preparation again subjects
him to a lingering or cruel and unusual punishment. Even the fact that Francis
has already been subjected to a current of electricity does not make his
subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any
other execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact
that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of the
sentence cannot add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There
is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in
the proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this
accident is just as though he had suffered the identical amount of mental
anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as a fire in the cell
block. The Court cannot agree that the hardship imposed upon Francis rises
to that level of hardship denounced as denial of due process because of
cruelty. 359 Ford vs. Wainwright [477 US 399, 26 June 1986] Marshall (J): 3
concur Facts: Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and
sentenced to death in a Florida state court. There is no suggestion that he
was incompetent at the time of the offense, at trial, or at sentencing. But
subsequently he began to manifest changes in behavior, indicating a mental
disorder. This led to extensive separate examinations by two psychiatrists at
his counsel's request, one of whom concluded that Ford was not competent
to suffer execution. Counsel then invoked a Florida statute governing the
determination of a condemned prisoner's competency. Following the
statutory procedures, the Governor appointed three psychiatrists, who
together interviewed Ford for 30 minutes in the presence of 8 other people,
including Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and correctional officials. The
Governor's order directed that the attorneys should not participate in the
examination in any adversarial manner. Each psychiatrist filed a separate
report with the Governor, to whom the statute delegates the final decision.
The reports reached conflicting diagnoses but were in accord on the question
of Ford's competency. Ford's counsel then attempted to submit to the
Governor other written materials, including the reports of the two
psychiatrists who had previously examined Ford, but the Governor's office
refused to inform counsel whether the submission would be considered. The
Governor subsequently signed a death warrant without explanation or
statement. After unsuccessfully seeking a hearing in state court to determine
anew Ford's competency, his counsel filed a habeas corpus proceeding in
Federal District Court, seeking an evidentiary hearing, but the court denied
the petition without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue:
Whether the execution of a convict gone insane is cruel and unusual. Held:
Since the Court last had occasion to consider the infliction of the death
penalty upon the insane, the Court's interpretations of the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment have evolved substantially. Now that the
Eighth Amendment has been recognized to affect significantly both the
procedural and the substantive aspects of the death penalty, the question of
executing the insane takes on a wholly different complexion. The adequacy
of the procedures chosen by a State to determine sanity, therefore, will
depend upon an issue that the Court has never addressed: whether the
Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the
life of an insane prisoner. There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a
minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered
cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted. Moreover,
the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not limited to those practices
condemned by the common law in 1789. Not bound by the sparing
humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment also recognizes
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." In addition to considering the barbarous methods generally
outlawed in the 18th century, therefore, the Court takes into account
objective evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a
particular punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that
the Amendment protects. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim
be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment. Ford's allegation of insanity in his habeas corpus petition, if
proved, therefore, would bar his execution. The adequacy of a state-court
procedure is largely a function of the circumstances and the Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) interests at stake. In capital
proceedings generally, the Court has demanded that factfinding procedures
aspire to a heightened standard of reliability. This especial concern is a
natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most
irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different. Florida
law directs the Governor, when informed that a person under sentence of
death may be insane, to stay the execution and appoint a commission of
three psychiatrists to examine the prisoner. Ford received the statutory
process. The Governor selected three psychiatrists, who together
interviewed Ford for a total of 30 minutes, in the presence of 8 other people,
including Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and correctional officials. The
Governor's order specifically directed that the attorneys should not
participate in the examination in any adversarial manner. This order was
consistent with the present Governor's "publicly announced policy of
excluding all advocacy on the part of the condemned from the process of
determining whether a person under a sentence of death is insane." After
submission of the reports of the three examining psychiatrists, reaching
conflicting diagnoses but agreeing on the ultimate issue of competency,
Ford's counsel attempted to submit to the Governor some other written
materials, including the reports of the two other psychiatrists who had
examined Ford at greater length, one of whom had concluded that the
prisoner was not competent to suffer execution. The Governor's office
refused to inform counsel whether the submission would be considered. The
Governor subsequently issued his decision in the form of a death warrant.
That this most cursory form of procedural review fails to achieve even the
minimal degree of reliability required for the protection of any constitutional
interest is self-evident. The first deficiency in Florida's procedure lies in its
failure to include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process. A related flaw in
the Florida procedure is the denial of any opportunity to challenge or
impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions. Perhaps the most
striking defect in the procedures is the State's placement of the decision
wholly within the executive branch. Under this procedure, the person who
appoints the experts and ultimately decides whether the State will be able to
carry out the sentence that it has long sought is the Governor, whose
subordinates have been responsible for initiating every stage of the
prosecution of the condemned from arrest through sentencing. The
commander of the State's corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the
neutrality that is necessary for reliability in the factfinding proceeding. Having
identified various failings of the Florida scheme, the Court must conclude
that the State's procedures for determining sanity are inadequate to
preclude federal redetermination of the constitutional issue. 360 People vs.
Camano [GRs L-36662-63, 30 July 1982] En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 12
concur, 1 opined that intoxication and voluntary surrender should mitigate
the guilt of the accused, 1 dissented Facts: Three years prior to 17 February
1970, Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor had a misunderstanding
with Filomeno Camano while fishing along Sagñay River. During this occasion
it appears that Camano requested Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the
motor boat owned by Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered Camano against the Pascua and
Buenaflor. No less than 10 attempts were made by Amado Payago, a
neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were
refused. Instead, Camano when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge
Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention to kill them. On 17
February 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of
Camarines Sur, between the hours of 4 to 5 p.m., after Camano had been
drinking liquor, he stabbed twice Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular
Bicol "palas" while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost
infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. Pascua sustained two mortal
wounds for which he died instantaneously. After hacking and stabbing to
death Pascua, Camano proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on
finding Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling
position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down
hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim
fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until
he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when Camano gave him a final thrust
of the bolo at the left side of the chest, causing instant death. Buenaflor
sustained eight wounds. After killing the two victims, he returned to his
house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan
Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by said peace officers for him to
surrender. When brought to the Police Headquarters of the town for
investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by him under the
table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched,
and recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to
the Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from the base of the
handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who was the owner
of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. However, when he was asked to
sign a statement, he refused. For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and
Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under 2 separate
informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident premeditation
and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly.
Camano admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-
defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. The Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur found Camano guilty of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases
T-20 and T-21, and sentenced him to death. Hence, the mandatory review.
Issue: Weather death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the
present case, considering Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the 1973 Constitution which
provides that: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted." Held: The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or
excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741, 747) the
Court said that "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In ExParte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the Constitution.' It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Still,
since the offense was attended by the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable
penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Camano should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case. 361
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [GR 132601, 19 January 1999] Resolution
En Banc, Puno (J): 10 concur, 2 took no part, 2 filed separate dissenting
opinions Facts: [Acquired from GR 117472, 25 June 1996; People vs.
Echegaray (En Banc, Per curiam: 15 concur] Rodessa is a 10-year old girl, a
fifth-grader, and the daughter of Rosalie and Leo Echegaray. Sometime in the
afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers
(aged 6, 5 and 2) in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in
another place, she heard her father order her brothers to go out of the
house. As soon as her brothers left, Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and
suddenly dragged her inside the room. Before she could question Leo, the
latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor.
Thereafter, Leo likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed
himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, Leo forcefully inserted his penis
into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain. After satisfying his
bestial instinct, Leo threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what
had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by Leo, Rodessa kept
to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of Leo because the
latter, most of the time, was high on drugs. The same sexual assault
happened 5 times and this usually took place when her mother was out of
the house (her mother was pregnant during those times). However, after the
fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who
in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to
the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit. From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination. At first, her
mother was on her side. However, when Leo was detained, her mother kept
on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong." Lo Echegaray
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, in a complained
formulated as "The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime
of RAPE, committed as follows: 'That on or about the month of April 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation did then and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.'
Contrary to law." Upon being arraigned on 1 August 1994, Leo, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty." On 7 September 1994, tge
RTC, Branch 104, found Leo guilty of the crime of rape, aggravated by the fact
that the same was commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of
the complainant, and thus sentenced him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as
provided for under RA 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the
sum of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by
law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 when the case was raised to the Supreme Court in
automatic review. [Acquired from GR 117472, 7 February 1997 (Resolution
En Banc, Per Curiam: 14 concur)] On 25 June 1996, the Court rendered its
decision affirming the conviction of Leofor the crime of raping his 10-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994 during
which time RA 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, Leo Echegaray was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death. On 9 July 1996, Leo timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of
rape against the accused. On 6 August 1996, Leo discharged the defense
counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines
(FLAG). On 23 August 1996, the Court received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on Leo's behalf. The motion raises the
following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence, i.e. (1) Leo should
not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the offended party and her
mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his criminal
prosecution; (2) The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented
Leo from preparing an adequate defense; (3) The guilt of the accused was not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) The Honorable Court erred in finding
that Leo was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the
sentence of death against him on this basis; (5) The trial court denied Leo of
due process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial; (6) Leo was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to due
process, due to the incompetence of counsel; and that (7) RA 7659,
reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se: (a) for crimes where
no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and
excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution; and (b) The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. [Acquired from GR 132601, 12 October
1998 (En Banc, Per curiam: 13 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on official leave)] On
25 June 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Leo Echegaray y
Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law
spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Leo duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and
on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of RA 7659 (the death penalty law) and
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. On 7 February
1998, the Supreme Court denied Leo's Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly
complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty
and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional. In the
meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed RA 8177 (An
Act designating Death by Lethal Injection as the method of carrying out
Capital Punishment, amending for the purpose Article 81 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act 7659). Pursuant to the
provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement RA 8177 ("implementing rules") and directed the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
On 2 March 1998, Leo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director
of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of
Leo under RA 8177 and its implementing rules as these are Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) unconstitutional and void for
being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by
reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process,
(c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants,
(d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an
unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
Director. On 3 March 1998, Leo, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and
Supplemental Petition attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of
violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin them from acting under the
questioned rules by setting a date for Leo's execution. On 10 March 1998, the
Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement
Petition. After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to
the petition. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied the petition insofar as
Leo seeks to declare the assailed statute (RA) as unconstitutional; but
granted the petition insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement RA 8177 are concerned, which were declared
invalid because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to
provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence
unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
The Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons were
enjoined from enforcing and implementing RA 8177 until Sections 17 and 19
of the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with the Court's Decision.
[Present case] On 28 December 1998, at about 11:30 p.m.. Leo filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that
his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b)
that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency
and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to
Leo and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by 13 other
senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S.
Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death
penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and 35 other
congressmen are demanding review of the same law. When the Very Urgent
Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would
only resume session on 18 January 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on 4 January 1999 17 at 10.
a.m. to deliberate on Leo's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had 5 hours
to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus,
the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether Leo's allegations
about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are
mere speculations or not. Thus, on 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued
a Resolution temporarily restraining the execution of Leo Echegaray. The
Secretary of Justice filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Resolution, and a Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. The Secretary, et. al. averred that "(1) The Decision in this
case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may
be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; (2) The
issuance of the temporary restraining order creates dangerous precedent as
there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility
that Congress may repeal a law. (3) Congress had earlier deliberated
extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may
now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within
the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been
fully debated upon. (4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex
praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, the
Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial
review. (5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events
transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing
death penalty has become nil, to wit: (a) The public pronouncement of
President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes; (b) The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al.,
that they are against the repeal of the law; and (c) The fact that Senator
Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel." In their Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Secretary, et. al. attached a copy of House Resolution 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review RA 7659 which provided for the
re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the
Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this
matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was
concurred in by 113 congressmen. Issue: Whether the execution of the
convict may be stayed by the Supreme Court. Held: An accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights
can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity, as it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the
government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane
at the time of execution. The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot
be denied that Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is
like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination
can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final
sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in
various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly
granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the
power of the President to grant reprieves. To contend that only the Executive
can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches
of our government.The extreme caution taken by the Court herein was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of Leo Echegaray will preclude any further relief for
all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's
majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not change the
circumstance of Leo Echegaray as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that
law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State
to take the life of one its citizens. The temporary restraining order of the
Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. Posterior events
negated beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the
death penalty law, i.e. (a) The public pronouncement of President Estrada
that he will veto any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes; (b) The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against
the repeal of the law; (c) The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the
law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." On the other
hand, House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review RA 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of
the position of the House of Representatives on this matter and urging the
President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the
death penalty law," was signed by 113 congressmen as of 11 January 1999.
The House of Representatives, on 18 January 1999, with minor amendments
formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House
Resolution 25 expressed the sentiment that the House "does not desire at
this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated
that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments,
the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and
humanitarian purpose. The Court thus ordered the trial court judge (Hon.
Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set
anew the date for execution of Leo Echegaray in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) The Resolution of 7 February
1997 is better suited to discuss the matter involving the sentence of death as
supposed to be “a severe and excessive penalty, or cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.”
The 1999 Resolution is better suited for Constitutional Law I issues such as
the separation of powers, especially as to the issue of reprieve in execution.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents In RE Habeas
Corpus. Aclaraction vs. Gatmaitan [GR L-39115, 26 May 1975] … 1 This
collection contains one (1) case summarized in this format by Michael
Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester,
school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano
Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as
PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and
eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar
examinations immediately after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 362 In RE Habeas Corpus. Aclaraction vs.
Gatmaitan [GR L-39115, 26 May 1975] En Banc, Aquino (J): 7 concur, 1 concur
in result, 3 filed separate concurring opinions Facts: Segifredo L. Aclaracion
functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija from 1 October 1969 to 21 November
1971. His appointment expired on 21 November 1972 while he was working
as a temporary stenographer in the CFI of Manila. Thereafter, he was
employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication
Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working. After
Aclaracion had ceased to be a court stenographer, the Court of Appeals
required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by the
Gapan court which had been appealed (Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-GR 49711-R
and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-GR 52367-R). He failed to comply with the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was declared in contempt of court.
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N.
Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of
Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal (Colonel
Ruperto B. Acle), to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of that municipality, and to
confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his notes in the
said cases. Aclaracion was arrested on 21 June 1974 and incarcerated in the
municipal jail. In a petition dated 12 July 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals
that he be not required to transcribe his notes in all the cases tried in the
Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken.
The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 7 August 1974
ordered the release of Aclaracion. Later, he transcribed his notes in the
Muncal case. However, the warden did not release him because of the order
of arrest issued by the Seventh Division. On 9 August 1974 Aclaracion filed in
the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel
contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he
ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no
involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill
of Rights, 1972 Constitution). Issue: Whether the fact that a former court
stenographer was compelled to transcribe his stenographic notes is a
transgression of the right against involuntary servitude. Held: An Appellate
Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate
jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the
ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due
administration of justice. The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court that "upon the approval of the record on appeal the clerk shall direct
the stenographer or stenographers concerned to attach to the record of the
case 5 copies of the transcript of the oral evidence referred to in the record
on appeal" includes stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. The
traditional made of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the
recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not
comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him
until he obeys the order. Another sanction to compel the transcription is to
hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a
stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is
provided for in Circular 63 of the Secretary of Justice. Aclaracion's contention
that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute
involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition
of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his
will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not. That situation does not
obtain in this case. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Lozano v.
Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] … 1 People vs. Linsangan [GR
43290, 21 December 1935] … 1 Sura vs. Martin [GR L-2509, 29 November
1968] … 2 People vs. Nitafan [GR 75954, 22 October 1992] … 3 In RE Habeas
Corpuz of Benjamin Vergara et. al. Vergara vs. Gedorio [GR 154037, 30 April
2003] … 4 This collection contains five (5) cases summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First
Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under
Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June
2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine
bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 363 Lozano v.
Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur Facts:
Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April
1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under
BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila,
Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge
Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and
Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in
GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch
LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr.
[Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding
Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge
Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People
vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR
75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and
Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one
case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. Issue: Whether
BP 22 is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt. Held: The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a
safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth
century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the
people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by
common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors
who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising
from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a
contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized
and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction
awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a
barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be
generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. This
humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at
the turn of the century and embodied in Philippine organic laws. Later, the
Philippine fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but
also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for
non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. It may be constitutionally
impermissible to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu.
Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions
ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in
actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not
arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed
upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as
punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal
proceedings as punishments for crime. Herein, the thrust of the law (BP 22) is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the effect of the law
may be to coerce payment of an obligation, it is intended to banish a practice
(i.e. the issuance of worthless checks) considered harmful to public welfare.
364 People vs. Linsangan [GR 43290, 21 December 1935] En Banc, Abad
Santos (J): 9 concur Facts: Ambrosio Linsañgan was prosecuted for
nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in connection with
section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case
was tried and decided in the trial court before the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Constitution of the Philippines took effect.
But while the appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective,
and section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall
be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsañgan appealed,
alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718
of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional and void, as the
judgment of conviction violates the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act
interdicting imprisonment for debt. Issue: Whether, in view of section 1,
clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of conviction against
Linsañgan can stand. Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution." Section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of
Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes
imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it.
It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the
Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. It
results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the case
dismissed with costs de oficio. 365 Sura vs. Martin [GR L-2509, 29 November
1968] En Banc, Capistrano (J): 8 concur Facts: In Civil Case 5580 of the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through Judge Eduardo D.
Enriquez, judgment was rendered on 20 June 1961, amended on 15 July
1961, ordering the Vicente Martin Sr. to recognize Vicente Martin Jr. as his
natural son; to provide Vicente Martin Jr. support in the monthly rate of P100
from 10 December 1959 until the latter reaches the age of majority, and to
pay the attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000 plus the costs. From the
judgment, Vicente Martin Sr. appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
Court, in CA-GR 30388-R, affirmed said decision on 30 January 1964. On 9
May 1964, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through
Judge Jose R. Querubin issued the order, ordering the Clerk of Court to issue
writ of execution, same being forwarded to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Oriental. Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issued on 9 May
1964 by the Clerk of Court, and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental
served the same upon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros Oriental but returned
the writ unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service,
dated 21 September 1964, stated that "the judgment debtor is jobless, and is
residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at
Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported
by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides."
On 6 October 1964, Nilda Sura's counsel (in behalf of here minor child
Vicente Martin Jr.) prayed that Vicente Martin Sr., for failure to satisfy the
writ of execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. On 28 November
1964, the Court issued the order granting Vicente Martin Sr. to fulfill the
decision of the court within the period of 30 days or he shall be held in
contempt. Vicente Martin Sr. having failed to satisfy said order, the Court on
9 January 1965 issued the order ordering the arrest of Martin Sr. On 26
January 1964, Martin Sr.'s counsel filed a notice of appeal, and at the same
time prayed for the fixing of a bond for the temporary release of the
defendant. On 1 February 1965, the Court issued the order directing the
confinement of Martin Sr. to the provincial jail, adn fixed bail at P7,000 if
Martin Sr. desired to appeal the case. Martin Sr. appealed. Issue: Whether
the imprisonment of Martin Sr. for failure to satisfy the decision requiring
him to support his natural son at the monthly rate of P100, due to insolvency,
violative of the constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The orders
for the arrest and imprisonment of Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court
for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following
considerations: (1) The judgment ordering Martin Sr. to pay past and future
support at P100 per month was a final disposition of the case and was
declaratory of the obligation of Martin Sr.. The writ of execution issued on
the judgment with respect to past support in the amount of about P6,000
required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to
satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment
debtor in the manner specified in Rule 39, Section 15, of the Rules of Court.
The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other
proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment
debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of
things, have committed disobedience to the writ. (2) The sheriff's return
shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of January
9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in
violation of the Constitution. (3) The disobedience to a judgment considered
as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition
of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a
special judgment, a judgment "which requires the performance of any other
act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal
property." According to Moran, generally, any order or judgment of a court
finally disposing of an action should be enforced by ordinary execution
proceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by
contempt proceedings. The Court reversed the orders of the lower court. 366
People vs. Nitafan [GR 75954, 22 October 1992] En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 13
concur Facts: K.T. Lim (@ Mariano Lim) was charged before respondent court
with violation of BP 22 in an Information alleging "that on 10 January 1985, in
the City of Manila, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine
Trust Company Check No. 117383 dated February 9, 1985 in the amount of
P143,000.00, xxx well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice." On 18 July 1986, Lim moved to quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as BP 22 was
unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check
which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1
September 1986, Judge David G. Nitafan, ruling that BP 22 on which the
Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the Order quashing the
Information. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor
General in behalf of the government. Issue: Whether BP 22, which is ruled to
be constitutional in Lozano vs. Martinez (not contrary to right against
imprisonment from debt), applies also to a memorandum check. Held:
Although a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is
not to be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself
when the loan falls due; with the promulgation of BP 22, such understanding
or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal
sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance
from the punitive provisions of BP 22 on the basis of such agreement or
understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was
enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having
effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the
country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing
checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered
exempt from the operation of BP 22. It is common practice in commercial
transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely
as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not as mode of
payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities. 367 In RE Habeas Corpuz
of Benjamin Vergara et. al. Vergara vs. Gedorio [GR 154037, 30 April 2003]
Second Division, Austria-Martinez (J): 3 concur Facts: Pending the settlement
of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, Eleuteria P. Bolaño, as Special
Administratrix of the estate, included the property (located in Dr. A. Santos
Ave., Parañaque City) leased by Berlito P. Taripe to Benjamin Vergara, Jona
Sarvida, Milagros Majoremos, Majorie Jalalon, May Joy Mendoza (@ May Joy
Sandi), Joy Saballa (@ Josephine Saballa), Mabelyn B. Vergara, Rio Sarvida,
Francisco Majoremos in the inventory of the estate. The probate court issued
the Order dated 5 October 1999, decreeing, among others, that the Taripe's
lessees and listed in the Inventory to pay their respective monthly rental
regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the
duly appointed Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolaño, until further
notice. Copies of the order were sent on 12 October 1999 to Vergara, et. al.
via registered mail. 5 months later, on motion of Bolaño, as Special
Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution on 3 March 2000
to enforce the order dated 5 October 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return
dated 10 August 2000 stating that on 5 June 2000, he met with Vergara, et.
al. but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already
collected from them three months advance rentals. On 4 August 2000,
Bolaño filed a motion to require Vergara, et. al. to explain why they should
not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the 5 October 1999 order of
the probate court. Vergara, et. al. were served copies of the motion by
registered mail. The probate court granted the motion in its Resolution dated
7 September 2000. Vergara, et.al. were furnished copies of the said Order on
September 27, 2000 by registered mail. 6 months later, in a letter dated 18
March 2001, some of the lessees, together with the other tenants of the
property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their monthly
rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom to pay the rentals. Bolaño then
filed on 20 March 2001, a motion to cite Vergara, et. al. in contempt, which
was set for hearing on 11 May 2001. In its Order dated 11 May 2001, the
probate court found Vergara, et. al. guilty of indirect contempt and ordered
them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until
they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals. Vergara,
et. al. again wrote the probate court on 11 June 2001 asking that the indirect
contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated that their
failure to attend the 11 May 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints,
most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and
repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that
they are uncertain as to whom to remit it. Upon motion of Bolaño, the
probate court, per its Order dated 16 November 2001, issued a warrant of
arrest on 19 November 2001. On 24 December 2001, Vergara, et. al. were
arrested by Ormoc City policemen. On 26 December 2001, Vergara, et. al.
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. On 3 January 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary
release of Vergara, et. al. After due proceedings, the appellate court
rendered its decision on 26 March 2002 denying the petition for lack of
merit. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Vergara, et. al.
filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether imprisonment due to non-payment of rentals, made in
contravention of the trial court’s order, is within the purview of the right
against imprisonment from debt. Held: The trial court's finding of contempt
and the order directing the imprisonment of Vergara, et.al. to be
unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must
be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their
contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint. Except
where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has
been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a
contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of
money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order.
Imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) civil purpose cannot be resorted to
until all other means fail, but the court's power to order the contemnor's
detension continues so long as the contumacy persists. In Philippine
jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It
means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied.
Herein, Vergara, et. al., as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased,
were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
Vergara, et. al. did not comply with the order for the principal reason that
they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals
because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the
subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the
constitutional guarantee against imprisonment. Constitutional Law II, 2005
(5)
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents In RE:
Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132.
Kay Villegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970] … 1 Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs
L-56741-42, 15 April 1988] … 1 People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27
December 1972] … 3 Misolas vs. Panga [GR 83341, 30 January 1990] … 4
People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 101724, 3 July 1992] … 5 Wright vs. CA [GR
113213, 15 August 1994] … 6 This collection contains six (6) cases
summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law
student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law
Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University
School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero
entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He
passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 368 In RE:
Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132.
Kay Villegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970] First Division, Makasiar (J):
4 concur, 1 reserves vote, 2 maintain opinions in Imbong vs. Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec, 1 concurs partly, 1 on leave, 1 files separate dissenting
opinion Facts: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief,
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Section 8 of RA 6132 and a declaration of
petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, "Kay
Villegas Kami" avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, and that in paragraph 11 of said
petition, it intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. "Kay Villegas
kami" actually impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground
that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law. Issue: Whether Section 8 of RA
6132 is in the nature of an ex-post facto law. Held: An ex post facto law is one
which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post
facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are
given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed
only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply
to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that
the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on 24
August 1970. 369 Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988] En
Banc, Gancayco (J): 14 concur Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately
in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan,
Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and
Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against
Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI,
presided over by the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro (Civil Case 122794 to
122799). On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and
Villamor entered into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the
Endangan, et. al. individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in
consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in
question and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of
the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the
authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof
chargeable against them. The compromise agreement was submitted to the
court. Josefina Meimban did not join her co-defendants in entering into the
compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record
of the defendants was Atty. S. G. Doron. On 22 August 1979, Atty. Modesto R.
Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to
inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAO
regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to him. As
a consequence, Atty. Doron filed on 30 August 1979 his motion to withdraw
appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan,
Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) settle with Lu through compromise
agreement that they signed, Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in
her own case, Civil Case 122795. When Meimban followed up her case in
Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila and had occasion to talk to Danilo
Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already
submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was
instructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She
returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first
came to know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been
decided because there was still one party who has not signed the
compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked
that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a
certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the
presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give
P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she would broach
the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto
Espano and told the lawyer the case was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano
instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did. Thereafter,
she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and Gloria Antonio,
daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help offered by Atty. Mejia. The two
said they would think it over as they had already signed something. When
she went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her
companions were agreeable to the suggestion and she replied she had
already told them and that they would consider the matter. On 20 November
1979, Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion who loaned Meimban P500 accompanied
the latter to the court. She was seated at the corridor near the door of Atty.
Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw Meimban handed an
envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer. On 7 December
1979, the date set for the hearing of the motion to withdraw the
compromise and to file memoranda filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio
in behalf of their fathers, Atty. Mejia approached Meimban and said no
oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought 1/2 of the
P1,000.00. Bautista placed P600 in an envelope and the two of them,
Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the
envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it. On 3
September 1980, Atty. Mejia attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator
(Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a pendant
hearing an inscription of letter "C," (which the investigator returned through
an employee, Dante Ramos). CorallPaterno investigated the complaints of
Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the
Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019
and sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years
and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina
Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the money given to her. The
Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and
likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4
years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista
the amount of P500 representing the money given to her. Mejia was also
ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whetehr Presidential Decree is an ex-post
facto law. Held: The contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to
the ex post facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the
allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy
wise." Mejia alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan
are ex post facto and hence all proceedings taken against her are void ab
initio being in violation of the Constitution. It is further argued that only one
stage of appeal is available to Mejia under PD 1606 which effectively deprives
her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said
appeal to the Supreme Court only issues of law may be raised and worse still
the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. A
more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of
persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision,
promulgated in 1970, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement
on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post
facto law is one which: (1) makes Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the said definition fails to sustain
Mejia's claim. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become
entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that
the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein
embraced. 370 People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972] First
Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate
opinion Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4
of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed
the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The
twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That on or about
May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been
committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the
crime was committed by a band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground
that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May
1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation
was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash,
impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) Republic Act
1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal
protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial
court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad,
and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government
appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil
action for certiorari. Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the
nature of a Bill of Attainder. Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution
states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill
of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the
principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and
thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes
and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a
burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of
attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) or the
members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to
declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of
the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not
on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But
the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing
its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective,
i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal
means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign
power. Further, the statute specifically requires that membership must be
knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the
Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be
unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of
the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former
requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities,
while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal
objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and
not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is
only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it
enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall
within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that
Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated
that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and
that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion
Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts
committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or
of any subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are punished. Those who
were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time
of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging
themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their
membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation
shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties
prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable. 371 Misolas vs. Panga
[GR 83341, 30 January 1990] En Banc, Cortes (J): 11 concur, 1 concurs in
result, 2 dissented in separate opinions Facts: After receiving information
from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's Army
(NPA) were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del
Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
raided said house in the early morning of 8 August 1987. Three persons were
inside the house, Arnel P. Misolas and two women known by the aliases "Ka
Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the
confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a
red bag under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington
shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and
brought to the PC headquarters. On 4 September 1987, an information
charging Misolas with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
Presidential Decree 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The information
alleged that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance of
subversion so as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1
of PD 1866. Upon arraignment, Misolas, with the assistance of counsel de
oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, a few days later, the same
counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) basis for the
filing of a motion to quash. Judge Benjamin V. Panga, as Judge of RTC Branch
33, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, gave Misolas time to file a motion to quash.
Misolas filed a motion to quash on the grounds (1) that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because the information does not charge the
proper offense since from the allegations the offense that may be charged is
either subversion or rebellion; and (2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner because of violations of his constitutional
rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and ammunition were
illegal. The judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit in an order
dated 7 January 1988. Misolas moved for reconsideration, but such was
denied on 15 February 1988. Misolas filed the petition for certiorari. Issue:
Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. Held: Misolas objected to PD
1866 on the ground of substantive due process. Established rules of
constitutional litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the theory
that PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. Yet, even if a challenge on the
ground that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately considered,
it will still be met with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a
bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of
attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals,
the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of
guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most
essential. PD 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It
does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the
measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding
punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for
the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances
that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of
the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached
to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution
and judicial precedents require. 372 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 101724, 3
July 1992] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 14 concur Facts: Two letter-complaints
were filed on 28 October 1986 and 9 December 1986, with the Tanodbayan
by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the Ceferino
S. Paredes had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del
Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor
Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent
title for Lot 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq.m., more or less, in the
Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On 23
February 1989, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of
Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was
served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to
Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a
preliminary investigation ex parte. He recommended that an information be
filed in court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who,
on 10 August 10, 1989, filed an information in the Sandiganbayan (TBP Case
86-03368), alleging "That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been
duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position,
did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce
the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison
to violate an existing rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent
authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an
application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a
free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had already been
reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) misrepresentation in his capacity as
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report
favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said
Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a
decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed
by the accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest." Paredes was
arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the
information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had
been denied his right to a preliminary investigation, Paredes refused to post
bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his
release, but the Supreme Court denied her petition because the proper
remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the
Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information
before being arraigned. On 5 April 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan
"An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest."
After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued
a resolution on 1 August 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of
prescription of the offense charged. The People of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Paredes
may no longer be prosecuted for his violation of RA 3019 in 1976. Held: Batas
Pambansa 195 which was approved on 16 March 1982, amending Section 11
of RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to 15 years the period for the prescription
or extinguishment of a violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,
may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed
by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It
would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years)
prescriptive period under Section 11, RA 3019 which was an essential
element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply BP 195 to
Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already
been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Since an ex
post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that
Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA 3019
in 1976, 6 years before BP 195 was approved. The new prescriptive period
under that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed
after the approval of BP 195. 373 Wright vs. CA [GR 113213, 15 August 1994]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: On 17 March 1993,
Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs
indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note 080/93 dated 19
February 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of
Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a
formal request for the extradition of Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for
the indictable crimes of: 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary
to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Herbert
Lance Orr, obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round
Solicitors by falsely representing that all relevant documents relating to the
mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell who control Ruven
Nominee Pty. Ltd. Which owned the Bangholme, Victoria property); and 13
counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the
Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and John Carson Cracker, obtaining 11.2
million commission including $367,044 in bonus commission via Amazon
Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 215 life insurance proposals and paying
premiums thereon, but where life proposals were not in existence and
approximately 200 were allegedly false; attempting to obtain $2,870.68
commission in the name of Amazon Bond by submitting one proposal for life
insurance with AMP Society; signing and swearing before the Solicitor); one
count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section
321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Carson attempting to
cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name
of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting a proposal for Life Insurance to the
AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist); and one count of
Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and
Cracker signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing
certificate pursuant to the Legal Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Profession Practice Act of 1958, a Statutory Declaration
attending to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of
AMP Society and containing 3 false statements). Pursuant to Section 5 of PD
1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of
the Philippines and Australia on 10 September 1990, extradition proceedings
were initiated on 6 April 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of
Justice before the Regional Trial Court. In its Order dated 13 April 1993, the
trial court directed Wright to appear before it on 30 April 1993 and to file his
answer within 10 days. In the same order, the Judge (Jose de la Rama, Branch
139) ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of Wright. The
trial court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by
NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that Wright was
arrested on 26 April 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently
detained at the NBI detention cell where Wright continue to be held. The
trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granted the petition for
extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the
documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements
of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the
petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article
2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions
of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the
offense — in relation to the extradition — was committed, provided that the
offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the
acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. Wright challenged
the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's decision on 14
September 1993 and denied Wright's Motion for Reconsideration on 16
December 1993. Hence, Wright filed the petition for review on certiorari to
set aside the order of deportation. Issue: Whether the Treaty's retroactive
application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Held: Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws
of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post
facto laws are (1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such
act was not an offense when committed; (2) laws which, while not creating
new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; (3) statutes which
prescribe greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, (4) laws
which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to
convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has
held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the
substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there is absolutely no merit
in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the
Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to
the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of
criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for
the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime
which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time
the treaty was ratified." Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives
Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under
Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines
license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents People vs. Obsania [GR L-
24447, 29 June 1968] … 1 Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] … 2
People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] … 3 People vs. Bocar [GR
L-27935, 16 August 1985] … 3 Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670, 12
September 1986] … 4 Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] … 6
Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] … 7 People vs.
Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987] … 8 Perez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80838,
29 November 1988] … 10 People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24
Septembe 1987] … 11 Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988] … 12
Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] … 13 People vs. Grospe [GRs
L-74053-54, 20 January 1988] … 15 People vs. Santiago [GR 80778, 20 June
1989] … 16 Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861, 8 September 1989] … 17 Caes vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989] … 18 Nierras
vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] … 19 Icasiano vs.
Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28 May 1992] … 20 People vs. Milflores [GRs L-
32144-45, 30 July 1982] … 21 People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April
1993] … 22 People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] … 23 People vs.
Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] … 24 Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1
October 1999] ... 26 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 140633, 4 February 2002]
… 27 This collection contains twenty four (24) cases summarized in this
format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the
First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under
Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June
2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine
bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 374 People vs.
Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur Facts: On
22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime,
Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and
Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a
complaint for rape with robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of
November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio
Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have
carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on
the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was
alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo." After the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the
assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused,
embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional averment
that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for
failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by
the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with
'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this
order, the fiscal appealed. Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government
constitutes double jeopardy. Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal
case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that "When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information." In order that the protection against
double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites
must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the present case was
valid; the trial court was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the
case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. The particular aspect of double jeopardy, i.e. dismissal or
termination of the original case without the express consent of the
defendant, has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from the
Supreme Court. In People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the
case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him." The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs.
Marapao (85 Phil 832, 30 March 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5
March 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53, 28 March 1952), Co Te
Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and People vs. Desalisa
(GR L-15516, 17 December 1966). On the other hand, the doctrine of
estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated in
Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer
of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on
appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea
of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as
the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on
the merits, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his
express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of
double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The
Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., (96 Phil 927,
30 April 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al., (98 Phil 646, 23 March 1956); People
vs. Casiano (GR L-15309, 16 February 1961), and People vs. Archilla (GR L-
15632, 28 February 1961). The case of Bangalao, Ferrer, and Labatete, did
not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said
cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel
established in Acierto). In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles, like in Cloribel,
the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered
acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a
speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. Therefore,
even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal. Here, the controverted dismissal was
predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint
was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial court,
and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in the present
case did not terminate the action on the merits. The application of the sister
doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first,
the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the present
case falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been
preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. The case was
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with
law. 375 Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] Second Division, Moran
(CJ): 6 concur Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly
inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill,
several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from
performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On 29 December
1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at
10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence
of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the
following day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed charging
Melo with consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion to quash the
amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by
the court. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from
further entertaining the amended information. Issue: Whether the second
information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accused’s right
against double jeopardy. Held: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides
that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint
or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial."
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first
information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper
offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the
accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is
identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly
the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. This rule
of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution,
to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Further, when a
person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a
new Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and greater
offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the
second offense. 376 People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] En
Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged
with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended
party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate
issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the
Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to
the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16
April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor.
He started serving his sentence forthwith. On 18 April 1968, the provincial
fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act
against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968
issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. The later information for frustrated murder
was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from
the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was
much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer
a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by
the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no
supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy,
sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June
1968. The People appealed. Issue: Whether the new medical findings warrant
the filing of the new information against the accused, without violating the
rule against double jeopardy. Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case should
be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in
the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that
sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as
possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases.
For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to
plan his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to
mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to
redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional
guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly
mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position
to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As ruled in Melo vs. People, the
rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence
at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent." Stated differently, if after
the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be
held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a
new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." There is then the indispensable
requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to
him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and
distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a
fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on 10 December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or
supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the
filing of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently
lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and
inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray
examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been
disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at
the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which
justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People
vs. Manolong, for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should
be applied. 377 People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985] Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Second Division, Makasiar (J): 5
concur, 1 on leave Facts: On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos
Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
(now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose
Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft, committed as "That on or
about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true names,
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away the following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1
Grade Exportable round logs, valued at — P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62
belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency. Contrary to
law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not
guilty." Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L.
Bocar (Branch XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions
to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation,
" the Judge issued the order dismissing the case, holding that the case is
more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a
copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On 18 July 1967, the
private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"; and on 8
August 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their
motion for reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said order was received by
the City Fiscal's Office on 11 August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for
certiorari seeking the annulment of the CFI order of 7 July 1967. Issue:
Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Held: The parties were not placed under
oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. Verily, no evidence
in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court.
The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary,
whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme
Court cannot permit. Thus, the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967
being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is
that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as "Former conviction or
acquittal or former jeopardy. — When a defendant shall have been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy. 378 Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670,
12 September 1986] Resolution En Banc, Teehankee (CJ): 4 concur, 3 took no
part, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 1 joined Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 21 August 1983, Benigno S.
Aquino Jr. was killed while being escorted by soldiers from his plane at the
Manila International Airport. The military investigators reported within a
span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando
Galman, although he was the personal friend of Col. Arturo Custodio who
picked him up from his house on 17 August 1983) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military
later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version
and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the
spot. President Marcos instantly accepted the military version and repeated
it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening
of 22 August 1983. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board
to investigate the killing of Aquino. After two false starts, he finally
constituted the Board on 22 October 1983 which held 125 hearing days
commencing 3 November 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings
in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses
recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority
and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. Both
majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as
propounded by the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, that
Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. It opines that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot.
The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the 26 respondents headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver
involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the
premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at
the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would
exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the 6 persons who were on the
service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther
Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and
implemented without his intervention." On 11 November 1985 Saturnina
Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late
Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of 3 former Justices of
the Supreme Court, 5 incumbent and former university presidents, a former
AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid
citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that Tanodbayan
and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. They prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) restraining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled
on 20 November 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial
and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-
trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. At the hearing
on 18 November 1985 of Galman, et. al.'s prayer for issuance of a TRO
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes to issue the restraining
order prayed for. But 10 days later on 28 November 1985, the Court by the
same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift
the temporary restraining order issued 10 days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. On 29 November 1985, Galman,
et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration. On 20 March 1986, Galman, et. al.
filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached
therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the
startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by
Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 accused and produce
a verdict of acquittal. On 3 April 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit
the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to
comment thereon. The accused opposed the second motion for
reconsideration and prayed for its denial. As a whole, all the other
respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues
had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all accused on 2 December 1985,
with counsels for Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is
a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon
the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the
cause of the nullity. Issue: Whether the acquittal of the 26 accused during
Marcos’ time bars subsequent prosecution, on account Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of new evidence that the proceedings
leading to said acquittal was rigged. Held: President Marcos misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to
corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, and borne out by the
happenings (res ipsa loquitura), since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for
the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable
(it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was
not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for
acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacañang
conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of
the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of
giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy.The
Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified; and declared the sham trial a mock trial and that
the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. It is
settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial
of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. More so does the
rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the present cases where
the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the accused. Manifestly,
the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law
with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment. Therefore, no
double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at
all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out
of it are void. 379 Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] En Banc,
Concepcion Jr. (J): 9 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 reserve votes, 1 took no part
Facts: On 19 October 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D.
Castro", alias "Rolando Moreno", alias "Norberto de Ramos"; Corazon R.
Serrano, and Atty/ Domingo V. Flores, Jr., and two other "John Does" were
charged before the Military Commission No. 13 with estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, and falsification of commercial
documents (Criminal Case MC 13-2). Flores and his co-accused were
arraigned on 25 October 1973 and all pleaded not guilty. The case was
thereafter set for trial. The presentation of evidence for the prosecution
which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974, and
the reception of the evidence for the defendants was set for March 26 and
27, 1974. On 25 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, in
a memorandum to the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, directed the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo V.
Magpantay, et al., from Military Commission No. 13. The next day, the day
scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants, counsel for
Magpantay handed to the Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of
National Defense and the letter of the Judge Advocate General, directing the
withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The prosecution deplored the
withdrawal of the case, claiming that they have proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the Military Commission held itself to
be without discretion on the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) matter. On 28 March 1974, however, the Secretary of
National Defense, after a full consideration of all the aspects of the case,
withdrew his previous order and directed the Commission forthwith to
proceed with the trial of the accused. Pursuant thereto, the Military
Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the
evidence for the defendants to 1 April 1974. Pleading double jeopardy, in
that the "Withdrawal Order of the Honorable Secretary of the Department of
National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an acquittal of the
accused Flores and a revocation and reinstatement of the case against the
Domingo V. Flores, Jr. constitutes 'double jeopardy", Flores moved to quash
the case against him, but the Military Commission denied his petition to
quash. Flores filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The
other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other hand, started
presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. But, the proceedings were
suspended upon the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a
person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was violated
when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum
and directed that further proceedings be had in the case. Held: The rule on
double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution
which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), as "No person shall, without his consent, be
tried a second time for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an
accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or
specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the
reviewing and, if there be one, the confirming authority shall have taken final
action upon the case"; and in Section 70-C of the Manual on Courts Martial
which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted, acquitted or
put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, cannot be further or
again pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity." For
double jeopardy to exist, it is essential that the first judgment of conviction
or acquittal or dismissal is final; otherwise, there is no judgment of conviction
or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not claim double
jeopardy. Herein, Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of
the Military Commission 13, terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974
pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the
Judge Advocate General and of the letter of the latter to the Commission, is
not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. Under military law, a decision of a
military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal, is merely
recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority, the
review boards, and the reviewing authority. It is apparent that in the
administration of justice by the military, a military commission acts merely as
a commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the
convening and reviewing authorities with his recommendation. While the
Military Commission 13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of
Criminal Case MC 13-2, pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of
National Defense to the Judge Advocate General, and the letter of the latter
to the Military Commission 13, directing the withdrawal of the charges
against Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, the order has none of
the attributes of a final judgment since it was not passed upon by the
convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the President.
Although jeopardy had attached, it has not yet terminated. Being so, the
constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense was not violated when the Secretary of
National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that
further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the Secretary of
National Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The constitutional
mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second
time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is no
second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy. 380 Heirs
of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] First Division, Cruz (J):
4 concur Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held
guilty only of less serious physical injuries Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court
said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound
inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was
pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which
was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had succumbed not
to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of
the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did
not agree. Through their counsel acting under the direct control and
supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by
registered mail on 2 February 1980. It was denied on 28 February 1980, in an
order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18 March 1980.
On 20 March 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the
signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.After
considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo
N. Firme (Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV,
Bauang, La Union) dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980, for tardiness. Both
the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied on 12 May 1980. The heirs of Tito
Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the
old case of Kepner v. United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing
a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote
that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the
purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place
him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this
jurisdiction. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot
appeal, much less then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly
concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a "bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical
injuries, of which the accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily
included in the offense of homicide. The petitioners argue that double
jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less
serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and
therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may
have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision.
This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. Infine, thus, however
erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a miscarriage
of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because
of the timely plea of double jeopardy. 381 People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6
March 1987] First Division, Feliciano (J): 5 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 1
February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel
of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued
by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the
Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by
Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the
city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building" owned by Opulencia. These electric devices and contraptions
wereallegedly "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of
electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and
cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia
admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the
electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) electric meter."
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from P5.00 to
P50.00 or imprisonment, which shall not exceed 30 days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the information
filed. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon
the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that
the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction
of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the
Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which
prescribes 2 months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after
discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. 14 days later, on 20 April
1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch II, another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 266)
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be
arraigned thereon, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976,
Judge Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered
the case dismissed. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied
by the Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976. On 1 December 1976, the
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court by the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People. Issue: Whether
under the information in case 16443, Opulencia could — if he failed to plead
double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case 16054, in
which he has already been acquitted. Held: The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for
an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies
an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection,
against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under
an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses
spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of Rights deals with two (2)
kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III
of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or
does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a
statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to
sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So
long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Thus, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections
of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to
the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense
is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is
said to have committed and which are alleged to have given Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the
acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the
offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to note that the rule
limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be
absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the
"same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first
offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for
the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent
harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Acts of a person
which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common
intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not
be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as
there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an
enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by
the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City
Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for
"total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. 382 Perez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80838,
29 November 1988] Third Division, Cortes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 October
1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for
Consented Abduction (Criminal Case 618) with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits
ensued. On 28 June 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered against
Perez. On appeal, and on 29 October 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed,
and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to
Perez's acquittal, Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against
Perez on 22 July 1983, this time for Qualified Seduction (as was intimated by
the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case 618) with the Municipal Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch VI (Criminal Case 83-8228). Perez filed a motion to quash
invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of
Mendoza. However, this motion and Perez's motion for reconsideration were
denied. Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR 68122)
questioning the denial of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed
with the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case 83-8228. In a resolution of the
Second Division dated 8 August 1984, the Supreme Court referred the case to
the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 16 December 1985 the Intermediate
Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the
proper Regional Trial Court. Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga (Special
Civil Case 7623). Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed the
petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration. Perez filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the filing of an information
for Qualified Seduction against Perez after he was acquitted for Consented
Abduction constitutes double jeopardy. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is
that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the
1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means identical offense or any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information. The rule on double jeopardy under the
Rules of Court is explicit, i.e. "When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information." Herein, there is no question that Perez was validly
charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent
jurisdiction. That he had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the
charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed.
Although it is true that the two offenses for which Perez was charged arose
from the same facts, this does not preclude the filing of another information
against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different
elements, arose. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded
merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever
closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the
protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense
or identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof
of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other. Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on
double jeopardy. Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would
negate any identity between them. 383 People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-
36528, 24 Septembe 1987] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 concur with
reservation, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave Facts: Agapito
Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section
7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court
of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases,
the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for
violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA 3060), by alleging that the
accused, "conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each
other did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit
and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion
film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the
projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection
equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to
the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and
censorship, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room
309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the
other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same
date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring and confederating
together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical
application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen,
indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8
mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and
male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd
and lascivious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and
morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309,
De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May
1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The
other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at
large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in
the 2 cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense.
The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7
August 1972. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as Gonzales
moved for postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2
other dates. On 15 November 1972, Gonzales moved for permission to
withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without
however, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion and
reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972,
Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case F147348 on the
ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending
against him Criminal Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the
information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in
Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the City Court
dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After the dismissal of Criminal
Case F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case F-147347, Gonzales
changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of
RA 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10
February 1973, the People filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F147348. This was however denied
by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973, and in its amended order
dated 16 March 1973. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue:
Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under
Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, constitutes double jeopardy. Held:
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All
these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which
the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. In other words,
the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of
motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures
does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of
the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral
motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each
other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved would show that the 2 offenses are
different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also
shows their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum
prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is
presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient.
Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of
the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in
the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence
required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.
384 Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988]; also In RE Habeas
Corpus of Usman, et. al. Usman vs. Secretary of National Defense [GR L-
79077]; Gloria vs. Chief of Staff (AFP) [GRs L79599-79600]; In RE Habeas
Corpus of de la Cruz, de la Cruz vs. Gen. Goyena [GR L-79862]; and Jose vs.
Director of Prisons [GR L-80565] First Division, Narvasa (J): 13 concur, 1 filed
separate opinion Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the
Supreme Court on 1 October 1986 to test the legality of the continued
detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-
year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before
various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this
had neither been pleaded nor proved. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians,
and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. 115 accused had been
condemned to die, 46 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 others were
meted prison terms of from 20 to 30 years; 41 were given prison terms of 10
to 20 years; and 3 were meted prison terms of less than 10 years. As of the
date of filing of the petitions, the sentences of 68 had become final upon
their approval by the Office of the President, 75 cases were pending review in
either that Office or before the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or
review of the remaining 73 cases either had been expressly suspended
pending the outcome of these petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the
records. Presidential amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this
date he remains a prisoner at the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar,
Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they were
acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino
de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on
them by the military commissions which convicted them. The petitioners
urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military
tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity
of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result of
which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Issue: Whether the
petitioners’ cases may be retried without subjecting said accused to double
jeopardy. Held: No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice
putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would
result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases, for the simple reason that the
absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are
required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the
accused in the second prosecution. In fine, the Court holds that the merits of
the indictments against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to
weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are
entitled to the retrial they have explicitly requested of their respective cases
in the civil courts. 385 Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] En
Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 took no
part Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972,
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27
September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals
"to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the
military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction
among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which
were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the
safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November
1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable
by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in
the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section
2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public
interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan
(@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan
(@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon
Hoc], Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones,
Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping],
Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@
Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and
charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed
firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25 August 1973 of
Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-
1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation
to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan
de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to
the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the
accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon
arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel
Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from
detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13
months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense
witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages.
On 10 June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely:
Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo
Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20
years. A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both
murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun,
Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin
Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11
June 1976. On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and
abolished the military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the
Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission
34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December
1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that
military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly
cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as
they did during the period of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus
petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the
national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted
by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule
(G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and
entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA
700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the Supreme Court in Cruz vs.
Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of
non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of
justice as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be
controlled by martial rule. On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor
Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in
the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the
evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was
designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular
fiscal who inhibited himself. Without conducting an
investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal
Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case
88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67
including those who had already died. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of
the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC
Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the
accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring
State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting
affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme
Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from receipt"
of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7
November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in
Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October
1988 be annulled, among others. Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan,
et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy. Held:
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-
1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos
in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be
justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer
was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the
limit of its logic. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings
against Tan, et. al. and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no
serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the
jurisdiction of the military Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) commission that heard and decided the charges against them
during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court
(Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these
established operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al.
would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional
logic. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment
by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of
finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects
an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a
closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to
whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been
referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal
prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do
so." 386 People vs. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988] Second
Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel Parulan is an
authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. On
13 June 1983, Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria,
Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of
SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The
check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance
Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On 8 July
1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said
check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa
Maria, Bulacan. On 18 June 1983, Parulan likewise issued PDB Check
19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received
also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the
spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor
to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn, deposited the
check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On 8 July
1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for
"insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. In Criminal Case 2800 of the RTC Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) for having issued a check on 13
June 1983 for P86,071.20 in favor of SMC ([PDB] Check 19040865) but which
was dishonored for having been drawn against "insufficient funds" and, in
spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said
check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. In Criminal Case 2813 of the
same Court, Parulan was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983
in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC (PDB Check 19040872) in payment
of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for
"insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and
refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two
cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense
being the same for the two suits. The trial court, through the Hon Nathaniel
M. Grospe (Presiding Judge, Branch 44, RTC Pampanga) rendered judgment
dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction, and ordered the cancellation of
the bail bond posted by the accused. Hence, the special civil action for
certiorari. Issue: Whether the present petition for certiorari places the
accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. Held: The dismissal of the
subject criminal cases by the Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is
correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not
an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions
covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari,
inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial
Court null and void. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside
the void Decision of the Judge does not place the accused in double jeopardy
for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was
not an adjudication on the merits. It was a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) dismissal upon the Judge's erroneous conclusion
that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order
dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res
judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. The dismissal being
null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to have
been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which
would subject the accused to double jeopardy. 387 People vs. Santiago [GR
80778, 20 June 1989] First Division, Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: On 2 June
1987 an information for violation of PD 772 was filed by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the
same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others,
"That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior
thereto and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines,
the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a
portion of the said property, by then and there constructing his/her house
therein for residential purposes, without the consent and against the will of
the said offended party." Upon arraignment, Rosario pleaded not guilty and a
pretrial conference was held on 14 August 1987 wherein Rosario informed
the court that she has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the
subject land. On 27 October 1978, the decision was rendered by Judge Pedro
T. Santiago (Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City) acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de
oficio. Hence, the counsel for the private offended party, the University of
the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, in behalf of the People of the
Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the decision for want
of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial
on the merits. Issue: Whether double jeopardy has set in in this case. Held:
The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court.
The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure
on the land belonging to U.P. At the pretrial, U.P. presented its title and plan
showing that the accused built a structure within its property. The accused by
her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the
questioned land. However, as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused
is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title could not cover
the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the
structure of accused was built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere
examination of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial on
the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the
place where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the
accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her
structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any
factual or legal basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the
questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence"
simply demonstrates that a trial on the merits should have been held to
enable the prosecution to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the
accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given
the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations
of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the
accused in a criminal case. Hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a
bar to another prosecution in this case. There is double jeopardy only when:
1) there is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent
court; 3) to which defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously
been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without
his express consent. In fine, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard
of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. It was not a court of
competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal
after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of the
rules. Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in in this case. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 388 Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861,
8 September 1989]; also People vs. Martelino [GR 83114] Third Division,
Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur Facts: The information for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents involving the amount of P2,120,511.24 was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XVI, on 29 November 1985. The
case was set for arraignment and pre-trial on 31 March 1986. In a motion for
postponement dated 24 March 1986, which was received by the court on 1
April 1986, Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for Bernabe Que and Amelia Que,
filed a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial, and prayed that the
date be reset to 8 May 1986. On 31 March 1986, Gualberto Devera, Bernabe
Que, Amelia Que, Warren Machado and Paz L. Martelino were arraigned
while the other accused, namely, Antonio Blancaflor, Wilfredo Azarco,
Renato Elauria and Amelita Tutica could not be arraigned because they were
still at-large. The court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on 8
May 1986. On that date, Judge Enrique Suplico directed the prosecution to
file its written stipulation of facts with respect to the US checks with machine
copies of the said documents attached thereto, copy furnished all the
defense counsel, within 30 days from 8 May 1986. In turn, the defense
counsel were given 10 days from receipt of the stipulation of facts to file
their counter proposal or answer. Upon motion of the City Fiscal, the pre-trial
was then reset to 26 June 1986. The setting for 26 June 1986 was, however,
postponed to 22 July 1986 due to the motion for postponement filed by Atty.
Lorenzo Coloso. On 22 July 1986, the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for
admission of facts, which was duly received on the same date by the defense
counsel. On the same date, the court again directed the prosecution to
furnish machine copies of the 489 US treasury warrants to the accused
through counsel within 15 days from the said date, after which the defense
counsel shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from receipt
thereof. In the meantime, the date was reset to September 17 and 18, 1986.
On 17 September 1986, the prosecution submitted supplemental proposals
for admission of facts. The hearing of September 18, 1986 was reset to
November 10, and 11, 1986 upon request of the prosecution and without
objection on the part of the defense counsel as the prosecution witnesses
were in Manila. On 10 November 1986, Judge Enrique P. Suplico issued the
order dismissing the case, in light of the accused's constitutional rights to
speedy trial. On 21 November 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration from the order of dismissal. In the meantime, the case was
re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico, as the former judge was not reappointed
after the reorganization of the judiciary. Judge Cosico in an order dated 22
May 1987, granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused
the case to be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
the defense was denied in an order dated 27 November 1987. On 17
December 1987, Paz Martelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be
declared null and void on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court of
Appeals, in its decision dated 22 April 1988, found merit in the petition and
set aside Judge Cosico's order. The People of the Philippines filed the petition
to review on certiorari (GR 83114) the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for certiorari
directly with the Supreme Court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders
dated 22 May 1987 and 27 November 1987 as null and void and to prohibit
the judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case C-2152. Issue: Whether
the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the accused in double
jeopardy. Held: Criminal Case C-2152 may be reinstated as no double
jeopardy has attached. The rule on double jeopardy is found in sec. 21,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
This is complemented by the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended which
provides that "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."
Thus, the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are, to wit:
1) a valid complaint or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3)
the accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the
express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant
case. The case was dismissed upon motion and with the express consent of
the accused. The accused Bernabe Que, Amelia Que and Paz Martelino
invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution
refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the motion for
inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the lower court ordered the case
to be dismissed. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the
dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused.
Moreover, as held in Bermisa v. Court of Appeals (92 SCRA 136, 141-143
[1979]), "the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of
the constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense. where a
defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the case
against him, even if the court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is
definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of
another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense." 389 Caes vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989] First
Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 November 1981, Joel Caes was
charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The
cases were consolidated on 10 December 1981. Arraignment was originally
scheduled on 11 January 1982, but was for some reason postponed. On 31
August 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled
for 13 October 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. On 15
November 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not
appear in the record. On 20 December 1982, the trial was again postponed
because the prosecution witnesses were absent. On 19 January 1983, the
third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason appearing in the
record. On 21 February 1983, 21 March 1983, and 19 April 1983, no trial
could be held as the prosecution witnesses were absent. On 3 June 1983, a
sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses,
namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado, had been
personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing
scheduled on 6 June 1983. On said day, the trial was again postponed, this
time because there was no trial fiscal. On 12 July 1983, trial was reset for lack
of material time. On 6 September 1983, the trial was once more reset by
agreement of the parties. On 19 October 1983, the trial was reset to 14
November 1983. On 14 November 1983, the prosecution moved for the
provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. On
the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the order provisionally
dismissing the case. On 9 January 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed
by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado,
who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14
November 1983, for lack of notice. Copy of the motion was furnished the City
Fiscal of Caloocan City but not Caes. On 18 May 1984, the judge issued the
order granting the "Motion for the Revival of the Case." A motion for
reconsideration filed by Caes dated 7 June 1984, was denied on 9 October
1984, and the revived cases were set for hearing on 19 November 1984. Caes
filed the petition for certiorari with th Supreme Court, which was referred to
the appellate court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on 20
May 1986, and reconsideration was denied on 17 June 1986. Caes filed the
present petition. Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in
double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights. Held: Fittingly described as
"res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the
prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously
acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter
be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for
the same offense. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute
double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) filed before a
competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which
he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. There is no question that
the first three requisites are present in the present case. It is settled that a
case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused
himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the
accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a
dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was
made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be
presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his
failure to object As held in a number of cases, such consent must be express,
so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the
dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the
case. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final
and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on
motion of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has
rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal. The other exception is where the dismissal is made,
also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy
trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. The circumstance that the
dismissal of the cases against Caes was described by the trial judge as
"provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on
the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial
of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the
merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred
in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent is not enough; neither may it be
lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here
with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter
must be resolved in favor of the accused. 390 Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs
59568-76, 11 January 1990] En Banc, Paras (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with the delivery of the
products, he issued 9 checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the
reason that his account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to deposit
funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he
failed and refused to do either. Nierras was charged for for estafa under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379, 4380, 4381,
4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387) and similarly for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa 22 (Criminal Cases 3790, 3791,
3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125). In both sets of criminal
cases, Nierras entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower
court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases,
petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not
guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by Judge
Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17 September 1981. Nierras filed
the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether Nierras
may be held liable for the 9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22, and
separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of
the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks. Held:
Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315
(2d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in BP 22. Under the latter law,
mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without
sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of
a dishonored check may be convicted under BP 22 even if he had issued the
same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific
and different penalties are Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a
crime against property, while violation of BP 22 is principally a crime against
public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of BP 22 are
mala prohibita. Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides
that "Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code." While the filing of the
two sets of Information under the provisions of BP 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to
identical acts committed by Nierras, the prosecution thereof cannot be
limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a
multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between
the elements of an offense in one law and another law, there will be no
double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers
to identity of elements in the 2 offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for
the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense. Hence, the mere filing of the 2 sets of information does not itself
give rise to double jeopardy. 391 Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28
May 1992] En Banc, Padilla (J): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Acting Municipal
Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. issed 2 orders of
detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 against Romana Magbago for
contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth
alias writ of execution. Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17
February 1987 with the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. After
evaluating the allegations of the complaint, Icasiano's comment thereon and
the Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed
the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated
2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago also filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman the same lettercomplaint earlier filed with the
Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) in TBP-87-
00924. After considering Judge Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated April
1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was approved by then
Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the
records of the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the Supreme Court,
upon order of the Court in connection with this case, that the resolution
dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988. The office of the
Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana Magbago
(TBP-87-01546). The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not stated
but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the
then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted
records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924.
Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case
(TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-
00924. The corresponding information against Icasiano was thereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said information was
filed on 21 March 1990, Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for
reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29
June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano then moved to quash
the information on the grounds, among others, that the accused shall be
placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme
Court in Administrative Case RTJ-87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to quash. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Icasiano
filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the
resolution of the administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the
subsequent filing of a criminal case against the accused in the
Sandiganbayan. Held: After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court
is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal
proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the
other. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double
jeopardy does no apply in the present controversy because the Supreme
Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in character while the
Sandiganbayan case also against Judge Icasiano is criminal in nature. When
the Supreme Court acts on Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its
supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing
discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative
procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts
subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental
that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid
arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do
not apply visa-vis the administrative case, which should take care of Judge
Icasiano's contention that said administrative case against him before the
Supreme Court, which was dismissed, entitled him to raise the defense of
double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge
against Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of
detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's
available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with
the Rules. It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing
the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to
the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge
(Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed
against the judge for issuing the orders. It is precisely for this reason, among
other, that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano was dismissed by
the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this
point that Judge Icasiano is not criminally liable under RA 3019, par. 3(e) for
issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has
found a prima facie case which led to the filing of the information. In any
case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the
present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo
Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a
preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-
00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. 392 People vs.
Milflores [GRs L-32144-45, 30 July 1982] Second Division, Barredo (J): 7
concur Facts: Early in the morning of 27 November 1967, at about 7:45 a.m.,
an old man approached the house on 2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila,
calling out the name of one of the occupants — Mrs. Javier. Heeding such
call, Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller. The old
man handed to her a paper bag containing some vegetables — pechay, upo
and sigarillas — and then left the place. Mrs. Florencia Javier brought the bag
into the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. As she did
so, however, something inside the paper bag began emitting smoke and
whistling sound, followed moments later by a deafening bomb explosion
which caused death of one, and multiple injuries and wounds to 7 other
occupants of the house. Investigations thereafter conducted by various police
agencies led to the arrest of Naño Milflores y Laksa. On 6 December 1967, he
was charged with multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case 88173) before
the Court of First Instance of Manila. In a separate information filed with the
same court on even date, he was likewise charged for murder (Criminal Case
88174). Milflores was arraigned on said two informations on 14 December
1967 and 23 January 1968, respectively, and entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to
the charges. Later, he moved to quash the information for murder but the
same was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the two cases were tried
jointly, at the conclusion of which the the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch XI) rendered the decision of conviction and and sentenced Milflores
to imprisonment of 4 Years, 2 Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
8 Years of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law for the crime of multiple attempted murder; and to reclusion perpetua
and to pay the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the crime of murder. Milflores
appealed. Issue: Whether the filing of Criminal Case 88174 placed Milflores
under risk of double jeopardy. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Held: The first information for frustrated murder, Criminal
Case 88173, does not include among the victims or offended parties Felicidad
Mique, the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the
murder case, Criminal Case 88174. In the sense, therefore, that Milflores was
ever in jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to see that such was impossible
or could not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double
jeopardy. To be accurate, the legal error of the prosecution here consists of
having filed two separate informations for a single offense. For there can be
no doubt about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended
parties in Criminal Case 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the
accused that caused the death of Felicidad Mique, the victim in Criminal Case
88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which according to the
prosecution was handed by Milflores to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for
which Milflores could be made to answer is the virtually single complex
offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. There is in law only one offense because there is only
one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact
involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. Still, the technical
error of the fiscal in filing two separate informations did not cause Milflores
any substantial prejudice at all. In effect, as the proceedings were actually
conducted, it is as if Milflores had been prosecuted and tried under a single
information. It would be giving premium to technicality and sacrificing
substantial justice to yield to counsel's contention. Besides, to do so would
result in duplicating what had already been done, the full-dressed trial of the
case, with both prosecution and defense presenting all their respective
evidence. But the more untenable aspect of the position of Milflores is that
when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the
first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled
jurisprudence in the Court that the mere filing of two informations or
complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in
those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of
the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been
convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated
without his consent. 393 People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993]
First Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases
7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo
Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for
allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the
spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and
hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal
area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR 101557),
and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo
which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). On 3
June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria
Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August
1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of
"not guilty." On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for
trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved
for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by
the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial
Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor. On 12 December
1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of
their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice.
On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial
Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the
reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the
real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9
February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396
and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2
new Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed
by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and
8573). On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations,
the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was
opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) court granted
the motion and dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to
reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor
Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the
petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent
to the dismissal of the original Informations; and, whether the first jeopardy
was invalidly terminated. Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits
any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has
previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of
the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against
him for the same offense. It is undisputed that valid Informations for
frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against
Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent
jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly
arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is
whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent.
This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move for
reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express
consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to
strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express
consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the
original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions
should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these
cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates
the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who
after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in
these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and
Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-
accused merely defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites.
Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the
accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer who
instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing
on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a
hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in
this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best
interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the other
hand, are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving
for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to
dismiss would be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the
motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a
competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved
party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal
from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid
defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and,
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all
being present in these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.
394 People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] Third Division, Davide Jr. (J):
4 concur Facts: At around 11:00 p.m. of 24 February 1989, Leonardo Bolima y
Mesia and his wife were awakened by the loud knocks on their door.
Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking
was their "Pareng Troping", Eutropio Tiozon. Leonardo invited Tiozon, who
appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house. Once inside their
house, Tiozon sat down and the two exchanged pleasantries. Tiozon showed
a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it. The two left. 5
minutes later and or after Leonardo's wife heard two successive gunshots,
and heard Tiozon knocking at their door and at the same time informing her
that he accidentally shot Leonardo, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
sinasadya." Leonardo's wife sought help to carry Leonardo towards the main
road. Some of the neighbors arrived bringing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) with them lights. Thereafter, Kalookan
policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of Tiozon. In an information
filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with
Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for violation of
Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on 15 March 1989. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial
court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision promulgated on 30
June 1989, the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to
suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo
Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum
of P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and
to pay the costs. According to the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the
death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of PD 1866,
as amended", should have been imposed. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a
motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was denied by the court
in its order of 16 August 1989. On 17 August, Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal.
Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by
murder or homicide, bars prosecution for murder or homicide, in light of the
right against double jeopardy. Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
"upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose
or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the
offense penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which
increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or
murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results
whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum.
The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws
on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order
and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured
firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of
PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249
(Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar
to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot
be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code. 395 People vs.
Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 24 August 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation
of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said
section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine
ranging from P6,000 to P12,000. The information against him reads: "That on
or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. Contrary to law."
During the arraignment, Manuel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. On 21 November 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On 9 January
1991, Manuel's counsel verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was
willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended. The said
section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and a fine ranging from P600 to P4,000 shall be imposed upon any
pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who
violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if
the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) That same day, Judge Martin S. Villarama Jr.
issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991.
On said date, the Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to 18
February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of
the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, Manuel filed his Request to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On 18 February 1991, the Judge issued another
order postponing the promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give
Manuel further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On 20
February 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already
rested its case on 21 November 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of
Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong
evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and
the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On 21 February 1991,
Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is
allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on 25 February
1991, the Judge rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Forthwith,
the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. The prosecutor filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right
against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rule of Court applies to the accused's change of plea in the preent case.
Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and
the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty
to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal
proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient
opportunity to change his plea thereafter, as provided by Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, which provides that "The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser
jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to
a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under
the rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Herein,
Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had
already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial
court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. The trial court need not wait for a
guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the
accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his
comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court
to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end
that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
hand, the judge's acceptance of Manuel's change of plea is improper and
irregular. Further, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of
both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea
of guilty to a lesser offense. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where
both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the accused's change of
plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel cannot claim this privilege.
Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section
7 (c), Rule 117 which states that "the conviction of the accused shall not be a
bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule,
Manuel could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial
court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper. 396 Tupaz
vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] First Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur Facts:
On 8 June 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information
against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate
officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency
corporate income tax for the year 1979, amounting to P2,369,085.46, in
violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977.
On 11 September 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of
jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990, the trial court denied the prosecution’s
motion for reconsideration. On 10 January 1991, SP Molon filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321
and Q-91-17322), against Jose and Petronila Tupaz for the same alleged
nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal
Case Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105, presided over by Judge
Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided over
by Judge Antonio P. Solano. On 25 September 991, both accused posted bail
bond in the sum of P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty. On 6
November 1991, the Tupazes filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the
reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the Tupazes
pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on 11
November 1991, Judge Solano denied the motion. In the meantime, on 25
July 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City. Subsequently, Petronila C.
Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition
for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August
1994. On 5 September 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez
stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and
no cogent reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the
investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated,
and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. On 20
September 1994, the trial court (Branch 105) arraigned Petronila Tupaz in
Criminal Case Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not guilty to the information
therein. On 17 October 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended
information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the
commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently
thereafter. Despite opposition of the accused, on 2 March 1995, the trial
court granted the motion and admitted the amended information. Petronilia
was not re-arraigned on the amended information, as the amendment was
only on a matter of form. On 5 December 1995, Petronilia filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and
admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial court granted the motion in its
order dated 13 December 1995. On 15 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion for
consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the
same date, the court granted the motion for consolidation. On 20 May 1996,
Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the
motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 and
dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On 28 May 1996,
Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating
that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable
mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal
Case Q-91- 17321 was identical to Criminal Case Q-90-12896, wherein
Petronilia was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax,
amounting to P346,879.29. Over the objections of Petronilia, on 6 August
1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion
and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. On 24
September 1996, Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial court denied the motion.
Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-
17321 exposes Petronilia Tupaz Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) to double jeopardy. Held: The reinstatement of the
information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy. An accused is
placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has
been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment
against him was dismissed without his consent. Herein, there was a valid
complaint filed against her to which she pleaded not guilty. The court
dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
Petronilia’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such
consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s
conformity. As Petronilia’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of
the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the
case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the information against Petronilia in violation of her
constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. 397 People vs.
Sandiganbayan [GR 140633, 4 February 2002] Third Division, Sandoval-
Gutierrez (J): 3 concur, 1 abroad on official business Facts: The Information
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against
Geronimo Velasco, then Minister of Energy, for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019 ("The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended,
reads: "That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986, in Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Board
and President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a government
owned and controlled corporation, did then and there deliberately and
unlawfully, in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of his administrative
official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC President
and Chairman of the Board, spend funds and utilize equipment and
personnel of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of
P3,032,993.00 in the construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach
Resort located at Bagac, Bataan, Philippines, managed by Telin Development
Corporation and owned by Gervel, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by said
accused, thereby giving himself unwarranted benefits and causing undue
injury to PNOC, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount of P3,032,993.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, Velasco pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested
its case, the accused filed, with leave of court, a Demurrer to Evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 11 October 1999.
Consequently, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Hence,
the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the dismissal of a criminal case
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a
plea of double jeopardy. Held: Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Thus, in
resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to
evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception
to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double
jeopardy. On the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of acquittal rule, confined exclusively
to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the
exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice
system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding. Such is the magnitude of the accused's right against
double jeopardy that even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence by the trial court will not lie. The only instance when double
jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due
process, i.e., that the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case. However, while certiorari may be resorted to cure an abusive acquittal,
the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Here, Velasco filed his
demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested
its case. Obviously, the People was not deprived of its right to due process.
Thus, Velasco's plea of double jeopardy must be upheld. Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 28 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Villavicencio vs.
Lukban [GR 14639, 25 March 1919] … 1 Moncupa vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-
63345, 30 January 1986] … 2 In RE Habeas Corpus of Teodosio Lansang, et. al.
Lansang vs. Gen. Garcia [GR L-33964, 11 December 1971] … 2 Chavez vs.
Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] ... 5 Gumabon vs. Director of
the Bureau of Prisons [GR L-30026, 30 January 1971] … 6 In RE Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Rolando Abadilla. Abadilla vs. Ramos [GR L-79173, 1
December 1987] … 8 Feria vs. Court of Appeals [GR 122954, 15 February
2000] … 9 Ilusorio vs. Bildner [GR 139789, 12 May 2000] … 10 This collection
contains eight (8) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
398 Villavicencio vs. Lukban [GR 14639, 25 March 1919] En Banc, Malcolm (J):
3 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 dissented in separate opinions Facts: The
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period,
the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor
for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and
Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about
midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief
of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that
region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by
a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25. The vessels reached their destination at
Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and
Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties
in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the city of Manila. Just about the time the
Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the
relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an
application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made
to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and,
as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered
as including them. Some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities,
others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
means to return to Manila (7 of which became witnesses in the present
case). Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy to acquire the persons of the prostitutes shipped to Davao. Held: A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings,
they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they
freely and truly waived this right. Further, if the public official is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to
do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted
with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila
to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The said officials, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Both on
reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. 399 Moncupa vs.
Ponce-Enrile [GR L-63345, 30 January 1986] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 8
concur, 1 took no part, 1 reserves vote Facts: Efren C. Moncupa, together
with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at about 10:50 p.m. at the corner
of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought
to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On 23
April 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF)
staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against
him and 8 other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted first,
by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa
Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of
Quezon City, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any
subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of
Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
subversive documents under Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two
separate informations were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession
of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for
violation of PD 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other
accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of PD 885 as amended.
Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion
Law. Moncupa's arraignment and further proceedings have not been
pursued, and yet, Moncupa's motions for bail were denied by the lower
court. Moncupa filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando Gorospe, and Jose Castro
contend that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily
be denied, as Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell (i.e.
temporary release). Issue: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus
has become moot and academic in view of Moncupa's temporary release.
Held: Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on
him, i.e. (1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro
Manila. (2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of
residence. (3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign
mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is
inimical to the interest of national security." (4) He is required to report
regularly to respondents or their representatives. The reservation of the
military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release
constitute restraints on the liberty of Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the
freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is
inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the ruling in
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, which held that "a prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient," the present petition for habeas corpus has
not become moot and academic. A release that renders a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to
be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in
the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of the writ. 400 In RE Habeas Corpus of Teodosio Lansang, et. al.
Lansang vs. Gen. Garcia [GR L-33964, 11 December 1971]; also Arienda vs.
Secretary of National Defense [GR L-33965], David vs. Garcia [GR L-33973], In
RE Habeas Corpus of Nemecio Prudente. Prudente vs. Yan [GR L33982], In RE
Habeas Corpus of Gerardo Tomas [GR L-34004], Rimando vs. Garcia [GR
LConstitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 34013], In RE
Habeas Corpus of Sgt. de Castro. Rabago vs. Garcia [GR L-34039], In RE
Habeas Corpus of Oreta. Oreta vs. Garcia [GR L-34265], and Olivar vs. Garcia
[GR L-34339] En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 7 concur Facts: In the evening of 21
August 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the general elections scheduled for 8 November 1971, 2 hand
grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, 8 persons were killed
and many more injured, including practically all of the candidates, some of
whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been
fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them. On
August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced
the issuance of Proclamation 889, dated 21 August 1971, suspending "the
writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others
who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith." Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed by persons, who,
having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon
the authority of said proclamation. On 30 August 1971, the President issued
Proclamation 889-A, amending Proclamation 889, suspending "the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all
others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection
or rebellion[,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] over acts committed by
them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof [,] [or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith]." Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang had been allegedly
released from custody on 31 August 1971, "after it had been found that the
evidence against them was insufficient." On 1 September 1971, Cases L-
33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties
therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from
September 3 to September 9, 1971. Soon thereafter, or on 18 September
1971, Proclamation 889 was further amended by Proclamation 889-B, lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the 27
provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities of the Philippines. On 25 September
1971, the President issued Proclamation 889-C, restoring the privilege of the
writ in 14 more provinces and 13 other cities. On 4 October 1971, the
suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation 889-D, in 7
more provinces and 4 other cities. As a consequence, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus was still suspended in 18 provinces (Bataan, Benguet,
Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, North Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal,
South Cotabato, Tarlac, and Zambales), 2 sub-provinces (Aurora and Quirino),
and 18 cities (Angeles, Baguio, Cabanatuan, Caloocan, Cotabato, General
Santos, Iligan, Iriga, Lucena, Manila, Marawi, Naga, Olongapo, Palayan, Pasay,
Quezon, San Jose, San Pablo). On 5 October 1971, the Court issued, in L-
33964, L-33955, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that the
Court resolved that the cases be set for rehearing on 8 October 1971. On 8
October 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this
time jointly with cases L-34004, L34013, and L-34039, and the parties were
then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their respective
oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to
October 21, 1971. In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339
(Olivar) had been filed and the parties therein were heard in oral argument
on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively. On 15 November 1971, the
Solicitor General filed manifestations — motions stating that on 13
November 13, 1971 the following petitioners were (a) released from custody:
(GR L-33964) Teodosio Lansang and Bayani Alcala, (GR L-33965) Rogelio
Arienda, (GR L-33982) Nemesio Prudente, (GR L-34004) Gerardo Tomas, (GR
L-34013) Reynaldo Rimando, (GR L34039) Filomeno M. de Castro and
Barcelisa de Castro, and (L-34265) Antolin Oreta, Jr.; (b) charged, together
with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a
violation of the AntiSubversion Act, in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:
(GR L-22982) Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison; (c) accused, together
with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a
violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal: (GR L33969) Rodolfo del Rosario, (GR L-33973)
Luzvimindo David, and (GR L-33982) Victor Felipe, and continue under
detention pursuant to Proclamation 889, as amended, and praying that the
petitions in GRs L33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be
dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of the remaining cases. Issue: Whether
Proclamation 899, which suspended the writ of habeas corpus, is
constitutional. Held: The very tenor of the original proclamation and
particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly
suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion
in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly a
felicitous one, it having, in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in
arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The
pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of the public officers have
consistently and abundantly emphasized — to justify the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence and subversion
committed prior to 21 August 1971, by lawless elements, and the conditions
obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short,
Proclamation 889-A has superseded the original proclamation and that the
flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature. Still, the Court has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power
to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority
conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of
Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is
more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended." It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" —
or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when
the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension
shall exist." For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only
by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but,
also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised.
These factors and the setting or conditions mark, establish and define the
extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not
exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental
Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance
therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended
to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility. As heretofore adverted to,
for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section
10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public
safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared
in Proclamation 889, as amended, that both conditions are present. As
regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the
Communist activities in the Philippines aimed principally at incitement to
sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. There are no doubts about
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to
overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. All Communists,
whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe
that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and
ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may
disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place;
and there is a New People's Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of
the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se
proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its
establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such
announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted
authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish
a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual
commencement of hostilities. The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing
on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the
privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by public safety.
Considering that the President was in possession of the pertinent data —
except those related to events that happened after 21 August 1971 — when
the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that
the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he
then concluded that public safety and national security required the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) were to strike simultaneously
with violent demonstrations staged by the 245 KM chapters, all over the
Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front
organizations, and the bombing of water mains and conduits, as well as
electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how
remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to
anticipate and arrest. In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three
(3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces;
(b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out
the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the
desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension of the
privilege is the least harsh. In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that
the President has acted arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation 889, as amended,
nor that the same is unconstitutional. 401 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-
29169, 19 August 1968] En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur Facts: A few days
before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving
a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in
mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee
whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address
with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop,
informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed
his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to
mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City.
Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew
was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent
Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however told the
two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce
him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale
is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it,
sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was
included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling
his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned
Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon,
Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang
was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car,
took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase
price (P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun
Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a
lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the
deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang
as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson
Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's
restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to
that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of
Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which
stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote
on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the
same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note
bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For
Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and
came back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after
he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate
Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was
parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to
the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and
impounded it. Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and
Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54
near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to
Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in
the transaction. On November 14, the registration of the car was transferred
in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of
Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez",
Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis
Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter
Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were charged with qualified theft of a motor
vehicle, a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962)
together with its accessories worth P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y
Lim. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not
been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial
commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial opened, the prosecution called
upon Roger Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The
trial proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of
Roger Chavez. On 1 February 1965, the trial court rendered judgment which
acquitted all other accused except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day,
as minimum and not more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum,
to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird
car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo
Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless
the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract
price for the car. The sentence was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger
Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of
Appeals resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing
as, on 21 June 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution,
disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed
the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant
of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered
remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
Chavez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative,
prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the
two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file
brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to the
Supreme Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for
the court’s disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus
is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when
the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack,
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals
does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary
remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose
liberty is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional
right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Further, a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. Still,
since Chavez is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for
another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted. 402 Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons [GR L-30026, 30 January 1971] First
Division, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concur in separate
opinion to which 2 Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) joined, 2 more concur in separate opinions, 2 took no part Facts:
Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on 5 May 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno
Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made
to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on 8
March 1954 and, as to the third, on 15 December 1955. Lastly, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses and on 12 January 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above
convictions. Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in
People v. Hernandez (reaffirmed by People vs. Lava), the supreme Court
ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense. The
fear that the Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons ruling stands as an obstacle to
their release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted Gumabon, et.al. to
ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. Issue: Whether
habeas corpus the appropriate remedy where the accused had served the full
term for which they could have been legally committed, and in light of the
Hernandez ruling. Held: The writ of habeas corpus' latitudinarian scope to
assure that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the
truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ
imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is
any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be
such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid
sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period
provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the
termination of the imprisonment. The liberality with which the judiciary is to
construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face
devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen. Likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of
jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom." The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered wit the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. Where,
however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been
judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order," the writ does not lie. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality
of the detention. Thus, the continued incarceration after the 12-year period
when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is
fraught with implications at war with equal protection. Where a sentence
imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such
sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the
sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition
that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts
are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his
discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the
sentence as was valid. The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal
provision favorable to the accused is the writ of habeas corpus. Insofar as the
remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the
only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a
favorable decision holds true. Gumabon, et. al. clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) release. 403 In RE Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Rolando Abadilla. Abadilla vs. Ramos [GR L-79173, 1 December 1987] En
Banc, Gancayco (J): 13 concur Facts: On 27 January 1987, a group of officers
and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radiotelevision
broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7)
located in Quezon City, ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing
constitutional government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to
similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On 29
January 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the
possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof.
Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the
matter. On 18 April 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the
Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny,
dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. After the
incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation. The first
investigation was concluded on 12 March 1987. The investigation disclosed
that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the
AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA
radiotelevision facilities. The Board of Officers investigating the matter
recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for
violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition 1, Article of War 94) in
relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of PD 1866,
and such other offenses that may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly,
a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel. The investigation
conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt" ended on 27 May 1987. It was
found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the
mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also
recommended that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that
the appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel. The Colonel was
likewise charged, accordingly. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both
investigations were conducted. On 4 May 1987 or some two weeks before
the second investigation was concluded, Major General Renato De Villa,
Commanding General of the PC and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an
Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. On 21 May 1987,
AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders 342 dropping
Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. On 7 July 1987,
the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight Physical
Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon
City against Colonel Abadilla (Criminal Case 0237558). On 27 July 1987, a
combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary
arrested Colonel Abadilla. He was detained first in Camp Crame in Quezon
City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati. On 30 July 1987,
another Information, this time for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon
City against Colonel Abadilla. The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-53382). On the same
date, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with
their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma.
Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to the
Supreme Court and filed the Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the
validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla. Issue: Whether Colonel
Abadilla's confinement is illegal because under Article of War 70, a person
subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a
serious offense under the Articles of War. Held: Article of War 2 enumerates
who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel Abadilla was a
military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to military law. Section 10
of the Manual for CourtsMartial, AFP, which discusses court-martial
jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be "The general rule is that
court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in the
military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation
from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a
period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military
service." Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the
Section, to wit "So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the
offense." This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as
he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior
officers, and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a
dishonorable discharge. Section 1 (b) of PD 1860, as amended, even
acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an
individual even after he shall have been separated from active service, which
provdes that "all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the
aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned situations, the
case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities
when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article
38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction
over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service
without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law." Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military
authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a
serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared
against him, which satisfies the requirement of Article of War 70, which
provides that a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is
charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War. Thus, as
the detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances is not illegal, the
Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit. 404 Feria vs.
Court of Appeals [GR 122954, 15 February 2000] Second Division,
Quisumbing (J): 4 concur Facts: Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under
detention since May 21, 1981, up to present by reason of his conviction of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United
States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. Some 12 years
later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria sought to be transferred from the Manila City
Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of
the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch
2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the
inquiries made by counsel of Feria, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2
attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case 60677 could not be
found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records
appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the
second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on 3 November 1986. On 3
October 1994, Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City
Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the
City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process. In its Resolution dated 10
October 1994, the Second Division of the Supreme Court resolved (a) to issue
the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to order the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate raffle of the case among the
incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to require [1] the Judge to whom this case
is raffled to set the case for hearing on 13 October 1994, try and decide the
same on the merits and thereafter furnish the Supreme Court with a copy of
his decision thereon; [2] the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, et. al. to make
a return of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on 12 October
1994 and appear personally and produce the person of Norberto Feria y
Pa[c]quing on said date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom the case is
raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his
duly authorized representative(s) to serve the Writ and Petition, and make a
return thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized
representative(s) to appear personally and escort the person of Norberto
Feria y Pacquing at said date and time of hearing. The case was then raffled
to Branch 9 of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on 15 November 1994, after
hearing, issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground that the mere
loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper
remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be
filed with the court which rendered the decision. Feria duly appealed said
Order to the Court of Appeals, which on 28 April 1995, rendered the Decision
affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the
interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of
the case" Feria may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements. With the motion
for reconsideration being denied for lack of merit, Feria filed the petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the mere loss or
destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the
accused would render the judgment of conviction void, or would it warrant
the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. Held: The high
prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently,
the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the
first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process. Herein, based on the
records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient
evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as
the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both
verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang
buhay". Further, the records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly
Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the
fact that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on 11
January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records
under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is
prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a general rule, the burden of
proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In
other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it
sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of
the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter
that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention
of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the
petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Since
the public officials have sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also no showing that
petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already
become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is
not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order
that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must
be void for lack of jurisdiction. 405 Ilusorio vs. Bildner [GR 139789, 12 May
2000]; also Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139808] First Division, Pardo (J):
4 concur Facts: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On
11 July 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo
City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (present age, age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age
50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On 30
December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia
and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano
an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. As a consequence, Potenciano’s
health deteriorated. On 25 February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On 31 May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On 11
March 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio-Yap refused Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio’s
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City. After due hearing, on 5 April 1999, the Court of
Appeals rendered decision, ordering Bildner and Yap to allow visitation rights
to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children,
notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, and ordering the writ of
habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the petition for habeas
corpus be denied due course. Hence, the two petitions, which were
consolidated and are jointly decided. Issue: Whether a wife may secure a writ
of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Held: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the
petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral. Herein, there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his
actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make
choices. The crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any
true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. Still, with his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The
Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents United States
vs. Bustos [GR L-12592, 8 March 1918] ...1 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR
64261, 26 December 1984] … 2 New York Times vs. Sullivan [376 US 254, 9
March 1964] … 3 In RE: Declaratory Relief RE Constitutionality of RA 4880.
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-27833, 18 April 1969] … 5 Social
Weather Stations Inc. vs. Commission on Elections [GR 147571, 5 May 2001]
… 6 Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 79690-707, 1 February 1989]; also
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales [GR 80578] … 7 Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 90878, 29 January 1990] … 8 Janet Reno vs. Americal Civil Liberties Union
[521 US 884,26 June 1997] … 9 Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 127930, 15 December 2000] … 10 Babst vs. National Intelligence
Board [GR L-62992, 28 September 1984] … 12 Espuelas vs. People [GR L-
2990, 17 December 1951] … 12 Lopez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-26549, 31
July 1970] … 14 Quisumbing vs. Lopez [GR L-6465, 31 January 1955] … 15
Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Noel [GR 76565, November 1988] ... 16
Texas vs. Johnson [491 US 397, 21 June 1989] … 18 Borjal vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 126466, 14 January 1999] … 19 Bartnicki vs. Vopper [532 US 514, 21 May
2001] … 22 Cabansag vs. Fernandez [GR L-8974, 18 October 1957] … 23
People vs. Castelo [GR L-11816, 23 April 1962] … 25 People vs. Alarcon [GR
46551, 12 December 1939] … 26 Nestle Philippines vs. Sanchez [GR 75209, 30
September 1987] … 27 Primicias vs. Fugoso [GR L-1800, 27 January 1948] ...
28 Navarro vs. Villegas [GR L-31687, 26 February 1970] … 30 Ignacio vs. Ela
[GR L-6858, 31 May 1956] … 30 Reyes vs. Bagatsing [GR L-65366, 9 November
1983] … 31 Ruiz vs. Gordon [GR L-65695, 19 December 1983] … 32
Malabanan vs. Ramento [GR 62270, 21 May 1984] … 33 Arreza vs, Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation [GR L-62297, 19 June 1985] … 34 German vs.
Barangan [GR 68828, 27 March 1985] … 35 Acosta vs. Court of Appeals [GR
132088, 28 June 2000] … 36 Gonzales vs. Kalaw-Katigbak [GR L-69500, 22 July
1985] … 37 Lagunzad vs. Soto Vda. de Gonzales [GR L-32066, 6 August 1979]
… 39 Ayer Production Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong [GR L-82380, 29 April 1988] … 40
People vs. Kottinger [GR 20569, 29 October 1923] … 42 People vs. Go Pin [GR
L-7491, 8 August 1955] … 43 Janet Reno vs. Americal Civil Liberties Union
[521 US 884, 26 June 1997] … 43 Miller vs. California [413 US 15, 21 June
1973] … 44 Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans [GR L-59329, 19 July
1985] … 45 This collection contains thirty eight (38) cases summarized in this
format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the
First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under
Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June
2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine
bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 406United States
vs. Bustos [GR L-12592, 8 March 1918] First Division, Malcolm (J): 5 concur
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, the prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and 5 individuals
signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. Crossfield & O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits
with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by
these attorneys was signed by 34 citizens. The Executive Secretary referred
the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District
requesting investigation, proper action and report. The Honorable Percy M.
Moir, recommended to the Governor-General that Punzalan be removed
from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province
of Pampanga, and ordered that the proceedings had in the case be
transmitted to the Executive Secretary. Later the justice of the peace filed a
motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and
reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by
the municipal president and is councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting
that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one
Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges
for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of
the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for
complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General. On 12 October
1916, Felipe Bustos, et. al. (the petitioners against Punzalan) were charged
for libel. The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the
exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel
Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and 1/32 of
the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New
attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of
the decision, filed on 16 December 1916, a motion for a new trial, the
principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by then
counsel for the defendants to the admission of the document consisting of
the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All
the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed.
Issue: Whether the intemperate allegations set forth in the information
against the public official may be the basis of a libel case against the
petitioning citizens. Held: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These paragraphs
found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The
language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and
American Constitutional cases. The interest of society and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the
individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set
of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to
any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free speech
and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law
is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If
the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny
of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not
hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a
citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a
duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the wrongful act of any public officer
to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely
to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only
in a despotism." The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of
free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. Public policy, the welfare of society, and
the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. Privilege is classified
as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to
qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which
may be lost by proof of malice. A pertinent illustration of the application of
qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in
regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an
officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege
may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which
a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact
he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law
of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The
rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and
honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. Hence, the
Court find the defendants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning
qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of
rights. 407 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984] En
Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge
Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued
2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants,
and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case
Q022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos). The prayer of
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic when,
on 7 July 1983, the Solicitor General manifested that said articles would not
be used until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of said articles.
Issue: Whether the continued sealing of the printing machines in the offices
of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” is anathematic to the democratic
framework. Held: The premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises of the Metropolitan
Mail and We Forum were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such
closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the freedom of
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of Burgos, et. al.'s freedom to express themselves in print. Thus state
of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry. Although the public officers would justify the
continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of PD 885, as amended, which authorizes
"the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is
doubtful, however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense. 408 New York Times vs. Sullivan [376 US 254, 9
March 1964] Brennan (J) Facts: L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He was "Commissioner
of Public Affairs and the duties are supervision of the Police Department, Fire
Department, Department of Cemetery and Department of Scales." He
brought the civil libel action against the four individual petitioners, who are
Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against the New York Times Company,
a New York corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily
newspaper. Sullivan's complaint alleged that he had been libeled by
statements in a full-page advertisement that was carried in the New York
Times on 29 March 1960. Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," the
advertisement began by stating that "As the whole world knows by now,
thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-
violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human
dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." It went
on to charge that "in their efforts to uphold these guarantees, they are being
met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and
negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the
pattern for modern freedom." Succeeding paragraphs purported to illustrate
the "wave of terror" by describing certain alleged events. The text concluded
with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student
movement, "the struggle for the right-to-vote," and the legal defense of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment
then pending in Montgomery. The text appeared over the names of 64
persons, many widely known for their activities in public affairs, religion,
trade unions, and the performing arts. Below these names, and under a line
reading "We in the south who are struggling daily for dignity and freedom
warmly endorse this appeal," appeared the names of the four individual
petitioners and of 16 other persons, all but two of whom were identified as
clergymen in various Southern cities. The advertisement was signed at the
bottom of the page by the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South," and the officers of the Committee were
listed. Of the 10 paragraphs of text in the advertisement, the third and a
portion of the sixth were the basis of Sullivan's claim of libel. Third paragraph
read as "In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang `My Country, 'Tis of
Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and
truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama
State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an
attempt to starve them into submission," while the sixth paragraph reads
"Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful
protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost
killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested
him seven times - for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And now
they have charged him with `perjury' - a felony under which they could
imprison him for ten years." A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County awarded him damages of $500,000, the full amount claimed, against
all the petitioners, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. Background
on Alabama laws on the matter: Under Alabama law, a publication is
"libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person in his reputation" or to
"bring [him] into public contempt"; the trial court stated that the standard
was met if the words are such as to "injure him in his public office, or impute
misconduct to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public
trust." The jury must find that the words were published "of and concerning"
the plaintiff, but where the plaintiff is a public official his place in the
governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding that his
reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of
which he is in charge. Once "libel per se" has been established, the defendant
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they
were true in all their particulars. His privilege of "fair comment" for
expressions of opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the
comment is based. Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth,
general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary injury. A showing of actual malice is apparently a prerequisite to
recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may in any event forestall a
punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements. Good
motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are
relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord
them weight. Further, Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of
punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication
concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a
public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. Issue:
Whether printed allegations or criticism against official conduct should be
supported by actual facts, to free persons from liabilities attendant to libel.
Held: The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by the
Court's decisions. The constitutional safeguard was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system. It is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions, and this opportunity is to be afforded for "vigorous advocacy" no
less than "abstract discussion." The First Amendment presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. Against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression
of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would
seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. Authoritative
interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused
to recognize an exception for any test of truth - whether administered by
judges, juries, or administrative officials - and especially one that puts the
burden of proving truth on the speaker. The constitutional protection does
not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered." Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use
of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.
That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space"
that they "need to survive." Injury to official reputation affords no more
warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual
error. Where judicial officers are involved, the Court has held that concern
for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment
as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. This is true even
though the utterance contains "half-truths" and "misinformation." Such
repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the
obstruction of justice. If judges are to be treated as "men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate," surely the same must be true of other government
officials, such as elected city commissioners. Criticism of their official conduct
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. A rule compelling
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions
- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount - leads
to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false
speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate
safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the alleged libel
was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 409 In
RE: Declaratory Relief RE Constitutionality of RA 4880. Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections [GR L-27833, 18 April 1969] En Banc, Fernando (J): 4
concur in result, 3 filed own separate opinions Facts: Two new sections were
included in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act 4880, which was
approved and took effect on 17 June 1967, prohibiting the too early
nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity. On 22 July 1967, Arsenio Gonzales and Felicisimo R.
Cabigao filed an action entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Injunction," a proceeding that should have been started in the Court of First
Instance, but treated by the Supreme Court as one of prohibition in view of
the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Gonzales
and Cabigao alleged that the enforcement of said RA 4880 would prejudice
their basic rights, such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly
and their right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that therefore said
act is unconstitutional. Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition,
an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista
Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on 11 November 1967; while Gonzales is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
co-petitioner. Issue: Whether the freedom of expression may be limited.
Held: The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of
course a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall he
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. It embraces, at the
very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings
unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for
freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by
the people in social including political decision-making, and of maintaining
the balance between stability and change. The trend as reflected in
Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and
assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. It is not going too far to view the
function of free speech as inviting dispute. "It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Freedom of speech and
of the press thus means something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of
public consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right
belongs as well, if not more, for those who question, who do not conform,
who differ. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that
we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. From the language
of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude
however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values
that press for recognition. Two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion
for permissible restriction. These are the "clear and present danger" rule and
the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) "dangerous
tendency" rule. The Court is of the view that no unconstitutional
infringement exists insofar as the formation of organizations, associations,
clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving,
soliciting, or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or
indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity. The restriction on
freedom of assembly as confined to holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the
purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or
both for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other
legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless,
after a thorough consideration, it should not be annulled. The other acts,
likewise deemed included in "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity" tax to the utmost the judicial predisposition to view with sympathy
legislative efforts to regulate election practices deemed inimical, because of
their collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. The scope of
the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not
foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process. The majority
of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the solicitation or undertaking of
any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual,
the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding
interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public
office, or the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials,
suffers from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one more affirmative
vote to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. The necessary 2/3 vote,
however, not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul
statutes to come into play. Such being the case, it is the judgment of the
Court that RA 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional. 410 Social Weather
Stations Inc. vs. Commission on Elections [GR 147571, 5 May 2001] Second
Division, Mendoza (J): 3 concur Facts: The Social Weather Stations, Inc.
(SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing,
and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news-worthy items of information
including election surveys. SWS and Kamahalan Publishing brought the action
for prohibition with the Supreme Court to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides
that "Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days be- fore an election." SWS states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey
as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan Publishing, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of
the elections on 14 May 2001. They argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and
published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections
up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion
among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence
to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger
to tile voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no
similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or
on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they
contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the
results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Issue: Whether
§5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press. Held: §5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) press. §5.4 lays a
prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting
the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the
prescribed periods of 15 days immediately preceding a national election and
7 days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint.
There, thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in
every legislation. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free
expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing
the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other
opinion takers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if
not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The prohibition imposed by §5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is
only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less
so because it is only for a period of 15 days immediately before a national
election and 7 days immediately before a local election. In fine, §5.4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression. 411 Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 79690-707, 1
February 1989]; also Zaldivar vs. Gonzales [GR 80578] Resolution En Banc,
Per Curiam: 15 concur Facts: [Acquired from 27 April 1988 decision] Enrique
A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought, through a petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, to restrain the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and
hearing of Criminal Cases 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground
that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and
constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect
on 2 February 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent
Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.
Similarly, Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first
petition, prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting
preliminary investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan.
The Supreme Court granted the consolidated petitions filed by Zaldivar and
nullified the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and ordered Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman. [Present case]
Tanodbayan Gonzales allegedly made contumacious acts or statements in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media. In its
Resolution dated 2 May 1988, the Supreme Court required Tanodbayan
Gonzales to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which,
Gonzales was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all
defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment
upon Gonzales which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider Gonzales' acts as
constituting "direct contempt." In the per curiam resolution dated 7 October
1988, the Court found Tanodbayan Gonzalez to be "guilty both of contempt
of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) member of the
bar." Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the
statements made by Tanodbayan Gonzales transcended the permissible
limits of free speech. Held: The "clear and present danger" doctrine is not a
magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis
and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and
which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The "clear and present
danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts.
It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts. Although the prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger
rule is such a limitation; another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of interests test."
The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation'
Still, under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-
interest test" the Corut believes that the statements made by Gonzalez are of
such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such
circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This
conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is
important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court
has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the present case, relate to
threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public
order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to
confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a
country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat
of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far
reaching in its implications for society. 412 Sanidad vs. Commission on
Elections [GR 90878, 29 January 1990] En Banc, Medialdea (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 23 October 1989, Republic Act 6766, entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last 27
December 1989 which was, however, reset to 30 January 1990 by virtue of
Comelec Resolution 2226 dated 27 December 1989. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said RA 6766 and other pertinent
election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition for certiorari dated 20 November 1989, Pablito V. Sanidad, who
claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "Overview" for the Baguio
Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the
Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
2167, which provides that "During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day
before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues." Sanidad alleged that said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution. Issue: Whether the COMELEC, through Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167, restricts Sanidad’s freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason. Held: It is clear from Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what
was granted to the COMELEC was the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may
favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising
space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period. It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who
is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of
other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However,
neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd paragraph of
RA 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted
the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods
are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people
affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times. While the limitation in
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar Sanidad's
freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where
he may express his view. No reason was advanced by the COMELEC to justify
such abridgement. This form of regulation, thus, is tantamount to a
restriction of Sanidad's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. 413
Janet Reno vs. Americal Civil Liberties Union [521 US 884,26 June 1997]
Stevens (J): 6 concur, 1 filed separate opinion to which 1 joined Facts: Two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act) seek to
protect minors from harmful material on the Internet, an international
network of interconnected computers that enables millions of people to
communicate with one another in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts
of information from around the world. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(Supp. 1997) criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or
indecent" messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d)
prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any
message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs." Affirmative defenses are provided for those who take
"good faith, . . . effective . . . actions" to restrict access by minors to the
prohibited communications, §223(e)(5)(A), and those who restrict such
access by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified
credit card or an adult identification number, §223(e)(5)(B). A number of
plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of §§223(a)(1) and 223(d).
After making extensive findings of fact, a three judge District Court convened
pursuant to the Act entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
both challenged provisions. The court's judgment enjoins the Government
from enforcing §223(a)(1)(B)'s prohibitions insofar as they relate to
"indecent" communications, but expressly preserves the Government's right
to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities
prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of §223(d) is
unqualified because that section contains no separatereference to obscenity
or child pornography. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court
under the Act's special review provisions, arguing that the District Court
erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it
is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because it is vague. Issue: Whether
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 places an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) speech. Held: Regardless of whether the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA) is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for
purposes of the First Amendment. For instance, each of the two parts of the
CDA uses a different linguistic form. The first uses the word "indecent," while
the second speaks of material that "in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs." Given the absence of a definition of
either term, this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what
they mean. This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has
been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials. The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special
concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a content based regulation of
speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment
concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the
CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a
criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up
to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal
sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate
even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. The CDA regulates speech
on the basis of its content. A "time, place, and manner" analysis is therefore
inapplicable. It is thus immaterial whether such speech would be feasible on
the Web (which, as the Government's own expert acknowledged, would cost
up to $10,000 if the speaker's interests were not accommodated by an
existing Web site, not including costs for database management and age
verification). The Government's position is equivalent to arguing that a
statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to
publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned leafletting on the
streets regardless of their content-- the Court explained that "one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Also, most Internet
fora -- including chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web -- are
open to all comers. Even the strongest reading of the "specific person"
requirement of §223(d) cannot save the statute. It would confer broad
powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent
of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the would be
discoursers that his 17 year old child -- a "specific person under 18 years of
age," -- would be present. Finally, there is no textual support for the
Government's submission that material having scientific, educational, or
other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's "patently
offensive" and "indecent" prohibitions. Thus, the CDA places an unacceptably
heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute
the sort of "narrow tailoring" that will save an otherwise patently invalid
unconstitutional provision. The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free
speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community. The
ruling of the district court was sustained. 414 Miriam College Foundation Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals [GR 127930, 15 December 2000] First Division, Kapunan
(J): 3 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Following the publication of the
September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school
paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho), the
members of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all
students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair
of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November
1994 informed them that letters of complaint were "filed against you by
members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five
student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and
investigation. Please find enclosed complaints. As expressed in their
complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook specifically
Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j,
page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page
37. You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s
on or before the initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994,
Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room." None of the
students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr.
Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Office of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order 94, Series of 1992,
supposedly had jurisdiction over the case. In a Letter dated 21 November
1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers. In
response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter
to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients' position that said
Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the
Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their
having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists."
Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus
Journalism Act and its implementing rules and regulations." He also
questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly
"had already articulated their position" against his clients. The Discipline
Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the
Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon the students, to wit: (1) Jasper Briones [Editor-in-
Chief of ChiRho, 4th year student]: Expulsion; (2) Daphne Cowper:
Suspension up to (summer) March 1995; (3) Imelda Hilario: suspension for 2
weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (4) Deborah Ligon [4th year student and
could graduate as summa cum laude]: suspension up to May 1995; (5)
Elizabeth Valdezco: suspension up to (summer) March 1995; (6) Camille
Portuga [Octoberian]: graduation privileges withheld, including diploma; (7)
Joel Tan: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (8) Gerald
Gary Renacido [2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer credentials; (9)
Relly Carpio [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; (10)
Jerome Gomez [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials;
and (11) Jose Mari Ramos [Art editor of Chi-Rho, 2nd year student]: Expelled
and given transfer papers. Said students thus filed a petition for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the
Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. On 17 January 1995, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.,
issued an order denying the students' prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order. The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration." Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February
1995 granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a
reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995, the
RTC dismissed the petition. The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda
Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in the Supreme Court through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining
order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995.
On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for disposition. In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, the
appellate court granted the students' petition. The CA declared the RTC
Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and
dismissal, void. Miriam College filed the present petition. Issue: Whether
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the school’s right to
discipline its students. Held: In several cases, the Supreme Court has upheld
the right of the students to free speech in school premises. The right of the
students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The
right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the Court upheld the
right of the students to free expression in the cases of Malabanan vs.
Ramento, Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines, Arreza vs.
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, and Non vs. Dames II, the Court did
not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Provisions of law (such as
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act) should be construed in harmony
with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed,
wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the
fundamental law. A statute should not be given a broad construction if its
validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a
manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At
the same time, however, said provision should not be construed as to unduly
restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with
jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that
the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt
class work or involve Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Further, the
power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations
and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. the Court therefore rule that Miriam College
has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against the students. 415
Babst vs. National Intelligence Board [GR L-62992, 28 September 1984]
Resolution En Banc, Plana (J): 6 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 on leave, 1
concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions Facts: Arlene
Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon, Domini
Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga,
Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and reporters
of various local publications. At different dates since July 1980, some of them
have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected
them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Aside from the
interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio
Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila,
against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres
Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the 28 March
1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by
Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director
Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio
Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for
damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March
1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to prohibit the respondents
(a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and
interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been
the subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB). Issue:
Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their
subsequent interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and
Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of
imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media. Held: Prohibition
will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against
Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The writ of prohibition
is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings
pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before the NIB
or any other respondent. Further, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by
reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that
should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel
cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the
issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the
course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which Babst, et.
al. claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress
when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and
no one among the officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a
libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in
his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And
the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private
right to complain of libel. 416 Espuelas vs. People [GR L-2990, 17 December
1951] En Banc, Bengzon (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concurs in
separate opinion Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Facts: Between June 9 and June 24, 1947, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it
to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely
standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation,
not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made
to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter's supposed wife, stating therein in part that "if
someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was
not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about
this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out
to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about
Julio Guillen and the banditry of Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman
and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to burn
pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I committed suicide
because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high
my brows to the world with this dirty government. I committed suicide
because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people
now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self." Espuelas was charged for
violating Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes those who
shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of
the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community. Espuelas admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter and
caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya,
Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one
Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter
and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was
shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree. Espuelas was,
after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of
the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Espuelas appealed. Issue: Whether sedition laws unnecessarily curtain the
citizen’s freedom of expression. Held: The freedom of speech secured by the
Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without
responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom." So statutes against sedition
have always been considered not violative of such fundamental guaranty,
although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the
citizen's freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. Not to be
restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government and
government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas"
and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However,
let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government
set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty
to the government. Herein, no particular objectionable actuation of the
government was made in the article. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions
are set forth. Instead the article drips with male-violence and hate towards
the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public
servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures Espuelas would burn and
would teach the younger generation to destroy. Analyzed for meaning and
weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating
language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated
suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to
particularize. When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading
the readers but on creating disturbance, the rationable of free speech can
not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty. Although it be argued that the article does not
discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his
men; still, article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but
also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The
"Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer at least to the President,
his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) dirty, Hitlers
and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction
could be upheld. To top it all, Espuelas proclaimed to his readers that he
committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo
all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de
Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary
and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by Espuelas to be
conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free
the government from the administration of Roxas and his men. The meaning,
intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the
findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 417
Elizalde vs. CFI 116 SCRA 93 (1982) 418 Lopez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-
26549, 31 July 1970] First Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result,
1 dissents in separate opinion Facts: In the early part of January 1956, there
appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which Eugenio Lopez
was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a
distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed
the message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane
dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing,
among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities
in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of
killings committed since Christmas of 1995. Losing no time, the Philippines
defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by
Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killermenaced
Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of
the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted
transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report
of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers when
referring to the incident. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then
edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of 15
January 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to he
false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and
clothing being scarce. Then in the 29 January 1956 issue of This Week
Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in
what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a
good turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and
desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing
in its issue of 18 January 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who
suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a
murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried
back to civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The
magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to
be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both
occasions were that of Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa
Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel
Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file, in the library of the Manila Chronicle in
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper
offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs
were inadvertently switched. As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was
brought to the attention of Lopez and Gatbonton, the following correction
was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957:
"While we were rushing to meet the deadline for January 13th issue of This
Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz
of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's Who
feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel
Cruz, who was connected with a story about a murderer running loose on
Calayan Island. We here express our profound regrets that; such an error
occurred." Together with the foregoing correction, Lopez and Gatbonton
published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction
moreover were enclosed by four lines, the type used was bolder than
ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the
attention of the readers to such amends being made. The businessman Fidel
G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his
picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded P5,000 as actual damages,
another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for attorney's fees. That
judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate Court. Lopez and
Gatbonton filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the claim of
freedom of the press negates Lopez’ and Gatbonton’s liability arising from
libel. Held: A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either
in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation,
or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." There was an express
provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from
libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing
for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and
Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article
libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published,
where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." Why libel
law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of
the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of
his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather to be
chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress
this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On
the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to
induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar
moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this
angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or
imprisonment." No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise
of punitive action visited in what otherwise could be characterized as libel
whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting
from the publication of Cruz's picture with the offensive caption as in
complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the
institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted
that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value
the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the
primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the
hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize
what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the
judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly
offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate
information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the
conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored.
However, the correction promptly made by Lopez and Gatbonton would thus
call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be noted that there
was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss arising from the above publication.
It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant
attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being
"more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them." 419
Quisumbing vs. Lopez [GR L-6465, 31 January 1955] En Banc, Paras (CJ): 10
concur Facts: Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and Roberto Villanueva are
the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager respectively of The
Manila Chronicle, a daily newspaper published and circulated in English in the
City of Manila. On 15 July 1949, Norberto Quisumbing filed a complaint
against Lopez, et. al. in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery
of damages in the sum of P50,000 as a result or the alleged libelous
publication in The Manila Chronicle of 7 November 1947, entitled "NBI men
raid offices of 3 city usurers," stating therein that "Raided were the offices of
Norberto Quisumbing, a businessman and broker, at the Trade and
Commerce, and Ngo Seng and Go Pin. at 530 Elcano Street, Binondo." After
answer and trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment
dismissing the complaint from which Quisumbing appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The latter Court, in its decision promulgated on 19 January 1953,
affirmed the judgment of the Court of origin. Quisumbing filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Court. Issue: Whether the newspaper is liable for
libel arising from an article entitled "NBI men raid offices of 3 city usurers."
Held: Basing an action for libel on the headline, oftentimes it is the only part
of the article which is read, makes Quisumbing's position untenable as
reading merely the headline herein, nobody would even suspect that
Quisumbing was referred to. Libel cannot be committed except against
somebody and that somebody must be properly identified. The identity of
Quisumbing is revealed in the body of the news item, but nowhere in the
context is the petitioner portrayed as one charged with or convicted of the
crime of usury.The Court believes that nobody reading the whole news item
would come to the conclusion that Norberto Quisumbing had been accused
or convicted of usury. The headline complained of may fairly be said to
contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that the raid was
conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against
Quisumbing and two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of
the NBI AntiUsury Division that criminal action would be filed in the city
fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved
were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested
the idea that Quisumbing was already charged with or convicted of the crime
of usury. The word "usurer" simply means one who practices usury or even a
mere money lender, but certainly not a usury convict. There is no evidence in
the record to prove that the publication of the news item under
consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was
intention to do harm, and that on the other hand there was "an honest and
high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without self-
seeking motive and with malice towards none." Every citizen of course has
the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but the Court does not
consider that Lopez, et. al., under the circumstances, had violated said right
or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words. 420 Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Noel [GR 76565,
November 1988] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 3
July 1986, 21 persons (Atty. Dimatimpos Mindalano, Atty. Mangorsi A.
Mindalano, Shiek Edres Mindalano, Sultan Guinar Mindalano, Farouk Calipa
Mindalano, Sultan Mahadi Mindalano, Sultan Khalid Mindalano, Sultan Ma-
Amor Mindalano, Dr. Taher Mindalano, Datu Maguidala Mindalano, Sobaida
Magumpara Vda. De Mindalano, Raisha Mindalano Mandangan, Atty. Kimal
M. Salacop, Datu Kamar M. Mindalano, Mayor Raslani Mindalano, Vice-
Mayor Alidadi A. Mindalano, Eng. Rashdi A. Mindalano, Mrs. Paisha
Mindalano Aguam, Datu Azis Mindalano Aguam, Mrs. Moomina Mindalano
Omar, Datu Aminola Mindalano Omar), claiming to be the nearest relatives
of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the
entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint for damages (Civil Case
81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging
the Bulletin Publishing Corp. represented by its President, Martin Isidro and
its Publisher, Apolonio batalla, Ben F. Rodriguez, Fred J. Reyes, Jamil Maidan
Flores, et. al. with libel. The Mindalanos' action was anchored on a feature
article written by Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which appeared
in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of Bulletin
Publishing Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the following
excerpt: "The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized
the feudal nature of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find
yourself confined to a small circle of the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta,
Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more. These are big, royal families. If
you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you better be a
certified bona fide member of one or several of these clans. xxx About the
only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of
consequence in the province was during the American era when the late
Amir Mindalano held some sway. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) That was because Mindalano had the advantage of having
lived with an American family and was therefore fluent and literate in
English. But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings of the transplanted
American public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and
write in English, political leadership again became virtually their exclusive
domain. There must be some irony in that." They alleged that, contrary to
the article, the Mindalanos "belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal Houses
of Lanao del Sur," that the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand
patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a
statement which, they alleged, apart from being absolutely false, "has a
distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that
Bulletin, et. al. had with malice inflicted "so much damage upon the social
standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure" the Mindalano name and
reputation, and thus interposed a claim for the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the
aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00. Reacting to the complaint, Bulletin, et.
al. filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss urging that (a) venue had been
improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order dated 30
October 1986, however, Judge Edilberto Noel (Presiding Judge of Branch VIII
of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi City)
denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed Bulletin, et. al. to file their answer
to the complaint. Bulletin, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Bulletin’s article,
which did not include the late Amir Mindalano as a member of a royal clan,
be considered defamatory. Held: It is axiomatic in actions for damages for
libel that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be
examined and viewed as a whole. In its entirety, the subject article "A
Changing of the Guard" is in essence a popular essay on the general nature
and character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new
political leader in the province of Lanao del Sur. The essay is not focused on
the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained
about, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or alluded
to in the essay. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely
illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of
the article. The language utilized by the article in general and the above
excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character,
matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive
implications or nuances appear detectable at all, however closely one may
scrutinize the above excerpts. There is no evidence of malevolent intent
either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article in the quoted
excerpts. Further, although the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained and appear to be accorded
some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society,
such titles of royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or
acknowledged socially in the national community. No legal rights or privileges
are contingent upon grant or possession of a title of nobility or royalty and
the Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any law conferring such a
title. Thus, the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability.
Assuming for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of being
inaccurate or non-factual) of the description in the Panorama article of Amir
Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house, the Court believes that such a
description cannot in this day and age be regarded as defamatory, as an
imputation of "a vice or defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or
contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is dead" in the eyes of an
average person in our community. The above excerpts complained of do not
disparage ar deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or nobility, neither do they
hold up to scorn and disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners.
There is no visible effort on the part of Bulletin, et. al. to cast contempt and
ridicule upon an institution or tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic
minority group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the language of the
Constitution, whose traditions and institutions the State is required to
respect and protect. What the Mindalanos assert is defamatory is the simple
failure to ascribe to the late Amir membership in a Maranao royal house, the
ascription, in other words, to him of a factual condition shared by the
overwhelming majority of the population of this country, both Maranao and
non-Maranao, Muslim and non-Muslim. In a community like ours which is by
constitutional principle both republican in character and egalitarian in
inspiration, such an Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory.
Furthermore, personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not,
however, automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against
defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a
reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant" in the
community and it is to community standards — not personal or family
standards — that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be
defamatory. Hence, the article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of
legitimate public interest. The neewspaper in the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press have kept well within the generally accepted moral
and civil standards of the community as to what may be characterized as
defamatory. The complaint in the court below failed to state a cause of
action and should have been dismissed by the Judge. 421 Texas vs. Johnson
[491 US 397, 21 June 1989] Brennan (J) Facts: While the Republican National
Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, Gregory Lee Johnson
participated in a political demonstration dubbed the "Republican War Chest
Tour." As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in
speeches made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies
of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The
demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans
and stopping at several corporate locations to stage "dieins" intended to
dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On several occasions they spray-
painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, but Johnson
himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American
flag handed to him by a fellow protestor who had taken it from a flagpole
outside one of the targeted buildings. The demonstration ended in front of
Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with
kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned, the protestors chanted:
"America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." After the demonstrators
dispersed, a witness to the flag burning collected the flag's remains and
buried them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened
with injury, though several witnesses testified that they had been seriously
offended by the flag burning. Of the approximately 100 demonstrators,
Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only criminal offense with
which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation
of Tex. Penal Code Ann. 42.09(a)(3) (1989). After a trial, he was convicted,
sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affirmed Johnson's conviction but the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed holding that the State could not,
consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the flag in
these circumstances. Issue: Whether publicly burning an American flag as a
means of political protest is a part of the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression. Held: The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment
only of "speech," but the Court has long recognized that its protection does
not end at the spoken or written word. While the Court has rejected "the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea," it has acknowledged that conduct may be "sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." In deciding whether particular conduct possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play,
the Court has asked whether "an intent to convey a particularized message
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it." Especially pertinent to the case are
the Court's decisions recognizing the communicative nature of conduct
relating to flags. Attaching a peace sign to the flag, refusing to salute the flag,
Barnette, and displaying a red flag, the Court has held, all may find shelter
under the First Amendment. Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as
readily signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in
"America." The Court has not automatically concluded, however, that any
action taken with respect to the flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing
such action for First Amendment purposes, the Court has considered the
context in which it occurred. Herein, Johnson burned an American flag as
part - indeed, as the culmination - of a political Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) demonstration that coincided with the
convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for
President. The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. At his trial, Johnson explained his
reasons for burning the flag as follows: "The American Flag was burned as
Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful
statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn't
have been made at that time. It's quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had
new patriotism and no patriotism." In these circumstances, Johnson's
burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication," to implicate the First Amendment. Where "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms, the
applicability of O'Brien's relatively lenient standard is limited to those cases
in which "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." In stating, moreover, that O'Brien's test "in the last analysis is
little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions," the Court has highlighted the requirement that the
governmental interest in question be unconnected to expression in order to
come under O'Brien's less demanding rule. The State offers two separate
interests to justify this conviction: preventing breaches of the peace and
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. The Court
hold that the first interest is not implicated on this record and that the
second is related to the suppression of expression. A principal "function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger." It would be odd indeed to conclude both that "if it is the speaker's
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection," and that the government may ban the expression
of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very
disagreeableness will provoke violence. Thus, the Court not permitted the
government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite
a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual
circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." Johnson's expressive conduct does not fall
within that small class of "fighting words" that are "likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." No
reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's generalized expression
of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct
personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. Forbidding criminal
punishment for conduct such as Johnson's will not endanger the special role
played by our flag or the feelings it inspires. Nobody can suppose that this
one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation's attitude towards its
flag. Indeed, Texas' argument that the burning of an American flag "is an act
having a high likelihood to cause a breach of the peace," and its statute's
implicit assumption that physical mistreatment of the flag will lead to
"serious offense," tend to confirm that the flag's special role is not in danger;
if it were, no one would riot or take offense because a flag had been burned.
The flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened,
not weakened, by the Court's holding today. The decision is a reaffirmation of
the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of
the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and
source of our strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the
one immortalized in our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it
survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that
Texas sees reflected in the flag - and it is that resilience that the Court
reasserts today. 422 Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126466, 14 January 1999]
Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: Arturo
Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today,
Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily
newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, Borjal was its President
while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board.
Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the
column Jaywalker. Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil
engineer, businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In
1988 he Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) served
as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the
House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy. During the
congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988
undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who
attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the
transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways
and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective
of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term
land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference
which, according to Wenceslao, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00
would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as
government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual
delegates or participants. On 28 February 1989, at the organizational
meeting of the FNCLT, Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he
wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the
support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles
written by Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker.
The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a
conference" without naming or identifying Wenceslao. Neither did it refer to
the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Wenceslao reacted to the
articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the
"organizer" alluded to in Borjal's columns. In a subsequent letter to The
Philippine Star, Wenceslao refuted the matters contained in Borjal's columns
and openly challenged the latter by saying that he was prepared to relinquish
his position in case it is found that he has misappropriated even one peso of
FNCLT money, and, on the other hand, if he will be able to prove that Borjal
has used his column as a "hammer" to get clients for his PR Firm, AA Borjal
Associates, he should resign from the STAR and never again write a column.
Thereafter, Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC)
against Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused Borjal of using his column as
a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal
Associates. In turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of
Wenceslao not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the
claim that he was using his column for character assassination. Apparently
not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, Wenceslao filed a criminal case
for libel against Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution
dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by
the Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President. On 31
October 1990, Wenceslao instituted against Borjal and Soliven a civil action
for damages based on libel. After due consideration, the trial court decided in
favor of Wenceslao and ordered Borjal and Soliven to indemnify Wenceslao
P1,000,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to
P200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P200,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of
the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral
damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. Borjal and Soliven filed a
motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its
Resolution of 12 September 1996. Hence, the petition for review. Issue:
Whether Borja’s intemperate or deprecatory utterances appear removes
such speech from the protection of free speech, and opens him to liability for
libel. Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked
or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites
have not been complied with in the present case. The questioned articles
written by Borjal do not identify Wenceslao as the organizer of the
conference. The first of the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May
1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that Wenceslao
was the person referred to therein. Surely, there were millions of "heroes" of
the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an
"organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his 9 June
1989 column Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on
Land Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified." Neither
did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of the conference organizer
since these contained only an enumeration of names where Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Wenceslao was described as
Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. The
printout and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any
indication of Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article
entitled "Who Organized the NCLT ?" did not even mention Wenceslao's
name, while the tentative program only denominated Wenceslao as "Vice
Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer. No less than
Wenceslao himself admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that
he was only a part of the organization. Significantly, Wenceslao himself
entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The
former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the
one referred to in the subject articles. His letter to the editor published in the
4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star showed Wenceslao's uncertainty.
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is
himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note
that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from
Borjal but from Wenceslao himself when he supplied the information
through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had Wenceslao not revealed
that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the
public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is
therefore clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case falls.
Further, indisputably, Borjal's questioned writings are not within the
exceptions of Article 354 of The Revised Penal Code for they are neither
private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Article 354 is not an exclusive
list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the
press. Publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature
to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels. The concept of
privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. Public
policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government
have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on
a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. There is
no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
A reading of the imputations of Borjal against Wenceslao shows that all these
necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental
fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his
position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information
about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the
management and coordination of the various activities of the conference
demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are
matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into
account the very public character of the conference itself. Concededly, Borjal
may have gone overboard in the language employed describing the
"organizer of the conference." One is tempted to wonder if it was by some
mischievous gambit that he would also dare test the limits of the "wild blue
yonder" of free speech in this jurisdiction. But no matter how intemperate or
deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the privilege is not to be defeated
nor rendered inutile for. Debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials.
Furthermore, while, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory
words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on
Wenceslao. He must bring home to Borjal the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct. Wenceslao failed to substantiate by preponderant
evidence that Borjal was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on
his reputation, or that the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) articles were written and published without good motives or
justifiable ends. On the other hand, Borjal acted in good faith. Moved by a
sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he
proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public
deception. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but Borjal has not violated that right nor abused his press freedom. 423
Bartnicki vs. Vopper [532 US 514, 21 May 2001] Stevens (J) Facts: During
1992 and most of 1993, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a
union representing the teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School,
engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations with the school board. The
negotiations were " contentious" and received "a lot of media attention,"
according to Anthony F. Kane Jr., then the president of the local union. In
May 1993, Gloria Bartnicki, who was acting as the union's "chief negotiator,"
used the cellular phone in her car to call Kane and engage in a lengthy
conversation about the status of the negotiations. An unidentified person
intercepted and recorded that call. In their conversation, Kane and Bartnicki
discussed the timing of a proposed strike, difficulties created by public
comment on the negotiations, and the need for a dramatic response to the
board's intransigence. At one point, Kane said: "If they're not gonna move for
three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes. To blow off their
front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys. (PAUSES).
Really, uh, really and truthfully because this is, you know, this is bad news.
(UNDECIPHERABLE)." In the early fall of 1993, the parties accepted a non-
binding arbitration proposal that was generally favorable to the teachers. In
connection with news reports about the settlement, Frederick W. Vopper (@
Frederick Williams), a radio commentator who had been critical of the union
in the past, played a tape of the intercepted conversation on his public affairs
talk show. Another station also broadcast the tape, and local newspapers
published its contents. After filing suit against Vopper and other
representatives of the media, Bartnicki and Kane learned through discovery
that Vopper had obtained the tape from Jack Yocum, the head of a local
taxpayers' organization that had opposed the union's demands throughout
the negotiations. Yocum, who was added as a defendant, testified that he
had found the tape in his mailbox shortly after the interception and
recognized the voices of Bartnicki and Kane. Yocum played the tape for some
members of the school board, and later delivered the tape itself to Vopper.
After the parties completed their discovery, they filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. Vopper, et. al. contended that they had not violated the
statute because (a) they had nothing to do with the interception, and (b) in
any event, their actions were not unlawful since the conversation might have
been intercepted inadvertently. Moreover, even if they had violated the
statute by disclosing the intercepted conversation, Vopper, et. al. argued,
those disclosures were protected by the First Amendment. The District Court
rejected the first statutory argument because, under the plain statutory
language, an individual violates the federal Act by intentionally disclosing the
contents of an electronic communication when he or she "knows or has
reason to know that the information was obtained" through an illegal
interception. With respect to the second statutory argument, the District
Court agreed that Bartnicki, et. al. had to prove that the interception in
question was intentional, but concluded that the text of the interception
raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to intent. That issue of
fact was also the basis for the District Court's denial of Bartnicki, et. al.'s
motion. Finally, the District Court rejected Vopper, et. al.' First Amendment
defense because the statutes were content-neutral laws of general
applicability that contained "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free
speech." Thereafter, the District Court granted a motion for an interlocutory
appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). The Court of Appeals accepted the
appeal, and the United States intervened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2403 in
order to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute. All three
members of the panel agreed with petitioners and the Government that the
federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping statutes are "content neutral" and
therefore subject to "intermediate scrutiny." Applying that standard, the
majority concluded that the statutes were invalid because they deterred
significantly more speech than necessary to protect the privacy interests at
stake. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary
judgment for Vopper, et. al. Issue: Whether the government may punish the
ensuing publication of that information, obtained in a manner Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lawful in itself but from a
source who has obtained it unlawfully. Held: §2511(1)(c), as well as its
Pennsylvania analog, is in fact a content-neutral law of general applicability.
"Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral
is not always a simple task. As a general rule, laws that by their terms
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas
or views expressed are content based." In determining whether a regulation
is content based or content neutral, the COurt looks to the purpose behind
the regulation; typically, "government regulation of expressive activity is
content neutral so long as it is "justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.'" Herein, the basic purpose of the statute at issue is to
"protect the privacy of wire, electronic, and oral communications." The
statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted
conversations, nor is it justified by reference to the content of those
conversations. Rather, the communications at issue are singled out by virtue
of the fact that they were illegally intercepted--by virtue of the source, rather
than the subject matter. On the other hand, the naked prohibition against
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech. Unlike the
prohibition against the "use" of the contents of an illegal interception in
§2511(1)(d),10 subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct. It is true that the
delivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given that the
purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of
recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as
such, it is the kind of "speech" that the First Amendment protects. As the
majority below put it, "if the acts of 'disclosing' and 'publishing' information
do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that
category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct." As a general
matter, "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom
can satisfy constitutional standards." More specifically, the Court has
repeatedly held that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need of the
highest order." Accordingly, in New York Times Co. v. United States (403 U. S.
713 [1971]), the Court upheld the right of the press to publish information of
great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party. In so
doing, that decision resolved a conflict between the basic rule against prior
restraints on publication and the interest in preserving the secrecy of
information that, if disclosed, might seriously impair the security of the
Nation. Privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance. The right of privacy does not
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest. One
of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss
of privacy. Hence, a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the
First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. The
months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at
the Wyoming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of
public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that
concern. That debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric
that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California (274 US
at 372), but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection. 424 Cabansag vs.
Fernandez [GR L-8974, 18 October 1957] First Division, Bautista Angelo (J): 9
concur Facts: Apolonio Cabansag filed on 13 January 1947 in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of
Germiniana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. The case was set for
hearing on 30 July 1947. The hearing was postponed to 8 August 1947. On
that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to 25 August
1947. Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: (1) a claim for
damages, (2) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was set for
hearing on 23 March 1948, and (3) alleged contempt for violation of an
agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the
parties on these incidents. Partial hearings were held on various dates. On 9
December 1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an order
suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took down
the notes to transcribe their respective notes and stating that the case would
be set for hearing after the submission of the transcript. From 9 December
1952 to 12 August 1954, no further step was taken either by the court or by
any of the contending parties in the case. On 30 December 1953, when
President Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order 1 creating the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later
superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on 17 March 1954. And on
12 August 1954, Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by
the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC a letter copy of which
he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. Upon receipt of the letter, the Secretary of
Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to transcribe their
notes in Civil Case 9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on
27 August 1954, referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe before whom
the case was then pending informing him that the two stenographers
concerned, Miss Illuminada Abelo and Juan Gaspar, have already been
assigned elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of
Justice informing him that under the provisions of Act 2383 and Section 12 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are not obliged to
transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are
not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside
from the fact that said stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on 1 September 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez filed a motion
before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court
for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to the
effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the careful
maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a
counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt
because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading.
Acting on these charges and counter-charges, on 14 September 1954, Judge
Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing
within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the
above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of
the President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did
not have the slightest idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due
the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to
the PCAC; that there is not a single contemptuous word in said letter nor was
it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the
court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the
same was committed by the judges who previously intervened in the case.
Appearing that the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V.
Merrera, had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to the PCAC,
Judge Morfe, on 29 September 1954, issued another order requiring also said
attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt
for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. After due hearing, the court rendered decision
finding Cabansag and the Merreras guilty of contempt and sentencing them
to pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Cabansag, et. al.
appealed. Issue: Whether Cabansag should be cited for contempt due to the
letter he sent to the Office of the President, the language of which may
undermine the reputation and independence of the Courts. Held: Courts
have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity without
which their administration of justice is bound to falter or fail. This is the
preservative power to punish for contempt. This power is inherent in all
courts and essential to their right of self- preservation. In order that it may
conduct its business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the
impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected.
For, "as important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence
of the judiciary." The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees
the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. However, the freedom of speech and
press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question
are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge
may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends
to make him unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence of the language
concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to
punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. Even if we make a
careful analysis of the letter sent by Cabansag to the PCAC which has given
rise to the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
present contempt proceedings, it was far from his mind to put the court in
ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom
the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way
he did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early
termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in
respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when
he said that he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful
maneuvers of a tactical lawyer"; that the case which had long been pending
"could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has
not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the
stenographic notes"; and that the "new Judges could not proceed to hear the
case before the transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances,
one would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court,
but to opposing counsel whose "tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the
undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to
the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.
The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the
motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is
the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of
action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper
had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme
Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must
cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we
infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or
undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate
grievance. On the other hand, while the conduct of Cabansag may be
justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical
rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle
of our constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants.
Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted
with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue
embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal
course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost
respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had
they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the
unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any
proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their
actuation. But they should be warned that a commission of a similar misstep
in the future would render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary
action. 425 People vs. Castelo [GR L-11816, 23 April 1962] En Banc, Bautista
Angelo (J): 8 concur Facts: In the issue of 19 March 1955 of the Manila Daily
Bulletin an English daily published in the City of Manila while the Monroy
murder case was pending decision, a news story entitled "Foil Extortion Try
on Castelo" was published. In summary, the story states that “Philippine
constabulary agents investigated two society matrons in their attempt to
extort P100,000.00 from Oscar Castelo allegedly to secure his acquittal. The
investigators questioned the matrons and took tape recordings and pictures
while they were negotiating the money. Castelo confirmed the extortion
attempt. The plan was broached to Miss Adelaida Reyes, a friend of Castelo,
who upon being informed thereof reported the matter to the military
intelligence service of the constabulary (G-2). The negotiations took place in
San Juan de Dios coffee shop on Dewey boulevard. There Miss Reyes was told
by one of the matrons that she saw the decision sentencing Castelo but that
they could secure its change to acquittal if Miss Reyes could raise
P100,000.00. The negotiations did not go through because Miss Reyes could
not raise the amount. When Miss Reyes informed Castelo of the plan he
reportedly got mad.” The news story came to the knowledge of Judge Emilio
Rilloraza who was trying the Monroy murder case on 19 December 1955 and
so he issued on that date an order citing Hernando Abaya, who admittedly
was the news editor who wrote the story, to show cause why he should not
be punished for indirect contempt in connection with the publication. A
motion to dismiss the contempt citation having been denied, Abaya filed his
reply to the citation. Thereafter, the contempt proceeding was set for
hearing, after which the court rendered decision finding Abaya guilty of
indirect contempt and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00 payable within 15
days from notice of the decision or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Dissatisfied with this decision, Abaya took the present appeal. Issue: Whether
Abaya's act, in publishing the news story, be considered indirect contempt.
Held: There is nothing in the story which may even in a slight degree indicate
that Abaya's ultimate purpose in publishing it was to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in connection with the Castelo case.
The publication can be searched in vain for any word that would in any way
degrade it. The alleged extortion try merely concerns a news story which is
entirely different, distinct and separate from the Monroy murder case.
Though mention was made indirectly of the decision then pending in that
case, the same was made in connection with the extortion try as a mere
attempt to secure the acquittal of Castelo. But the narration was merely a
factual appraisal of the negotiation and no comment whatsoever was made
thereon one way or the other coming from Abaya. Indeed, according to the
trial judge himself, said publication did not in any way impede or obstruct his
decision promulgated on 31 March 1955. For a publication to be considered
as contempt of court there must be a showing not only that the article was
written while a case is pending but that it must really appear that such
publication does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of
justice. Here, there is no such clear showing. The very decision of the court
shows the contrary. Still, even if it may have that effect, the publication
comes well within the framework of the constitutional guaranty of the
freedom of the press. At least it may be said that it is a fair and true report of
an official investigation that comes well within the principle of a privileged
communication, so that even if the same is defamatory or contemptuous, the
publisher need not be prosecuted upon the theory that he has done it to
serve public interest or promote public good. Thus, under our law, it is
postulated that "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in such proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions", is deemed privileged and not
punishable (Article 354, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code). While the present
case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for
both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of
expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege
in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should
be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of
expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications
can also be invoked in favor of Abaya. 426 People vs. Alarcon [GR 46551, 12
December 1939] En Banc, Laurel (J): 5 concur Facts: As an aftermath of the
decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case
5733 (People s vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al.), convicting the accused therein
except one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory
letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to Federico
Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him
in the issue of that paper of 23 September 1937. The article provides, in part,
that "Fifty-two (52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged
and convicted on a trumped up charge of robbery in band because they took
each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts,
from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These tenants
contend that they have the right to take the palay for their food as the
hacienda owner has the obligation to give them rations of palay for their
main tenance and their families to be paid later with their share of their crop.
But this is not all. When the convicted tenants appealed the case and were
released on bail pending their appeal, court and public officials exerted
pressure upon one of their bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the
tenants, to withdraw his bail for them, and the fifty two tenants were
arrested again and put in jail." On 29 September 1937, the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of that province to cite
Federico Mangahas for contempt. On the same date, the lower court ordered
Mangahas to appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed an
answer,alleging, among others, that “the publication of the letter in question
is in line with the constitutional Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) guarantee of freedom of the press.” On 29 November 1937,
the lower court entered an order, imposing upon Mangahas the nominal fine
of P25, or in case of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this without prejudice to the
action for libel that the public prosecutor believes to be advisable to file
against Luis M. Taruc. Mañgahas appealed from this order to the Court of
Appeals — which later certified the case to the Supreme Court as involving
only a question of law. Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited
Mangahas for contempt inasmuch as the robbery-in-band case is still pending
appeal. Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable
by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with,
and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the
court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision
and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That is the present
case, for here the letter complained of was published after the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga had decided the criminal case for robbery in band, and
after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a
motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein
was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is
that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had
rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by
the questioned publication. If it be contended, however, that the publication
of the questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where
the appeal in the criminal case was then pending, the interrelation of the
different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an
agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its
own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this
last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. 427 In Re Ramon
Tulfo, AM 90-4-1545-0, April 17, 1990 428 Nestle Philippines vs. Sanchez [GR
75209, 30 September 1987]; Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia [GR 78791] En Banc, Per Curiam:
13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of
Filipro Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the
Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in
front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and
egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and
employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up
a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter
disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers
and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long
with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders
had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as
Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order
that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease
immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the
Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution
giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring
Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil
Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in
the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in
the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July 1987 at 10:30 a.m.
and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he
should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time,
the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still recuperating
from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union
leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an
assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court
that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that
the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted
under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the
"Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an
unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area,
and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for
contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they will
abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect,
which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987. Issue: Whether the
respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at
the Supreme Court’s premises. Held: The right of petition is conceded to be
an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such
right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to
shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For
"it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and
juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right
to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced
by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal
interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from
outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore
not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the
right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the individuals
cited, who are non-lawyers, are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of
free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right
amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course
of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of
advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of
their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called
by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to
all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court
to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a
continuing educational program for their members. 429 In Re Atty. Emil
Jurado AM 90-5-2373 July 12, 1990 430 Primicias vs. Fugoso [GR L-1800, 27
January 1948] Resolution En Banc, Feria (J): 5 concur Facts: The Philippine
Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the
Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the
same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following
legislative Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
powers, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots,
affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of
streets, avenues, parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the
abatement of nuisances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants." Under the
above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted
sections 844 and 1119. Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the same
Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And
section 1119 provides that "The streets and public places of the city shall be
kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings
for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other
purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, That the holding
of athletic games, sports, or exercises during the celebration of national
holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day
of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by
the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places, or portions
thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And
provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets
or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from
the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the
streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade
or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or
procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours
prior to the holding of such parade or procession." An action of mandamus
was instituted by Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties against Valeriano Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to
compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, 16 November 1947, for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that
Fugoso refused to grant such permit. Due to the urgency of the case, the
Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in
the petition on 15 November 1947, without prejudice to writing later an
extended and reasoned decision. Issue: Whether the Mayor of Manila may
be compelled to issue a permit to use Plaza Miranda to hold a public
meeting. Held: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This
sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. Herein, as
there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the
City regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or
public places, the provisions of said section 1119 regarding the holding of any
parade or procession in any street or public places may be applied by analogy
to meeting and assembly in any street or public places. The provisions of the
said ordinance are construed to mean that it does not confer upon the
Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where
the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. The Court
cannot adopt the other alternative construction or construe the ordinance
under consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse
to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to
prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of
meetings, parades or Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) processions, because such a construction would make the
ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the
Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and
other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the
Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to
govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed as synonymous with
"suppress" or "prohibit,", the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a
power which it does not have. In view of all the foregoing, the petition for
mandamus was granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection to the
use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the mayor was
ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. 431 Navarro vs.
Villegas [GR L-31687, 26 February 1970] Resolution: 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissented Facts: Navarro requested for a permit to hold a meeting
at Plaza Miranda in the afternoon of 26 February 1970. The Mayor of Manila,
Villegas, instead offered the Sunken Gardens, as an alternative to Plaza
Miranda, as the site of the demonstration. Mayor Villegas has not denied nor
absolutely refused the permit sought by Navarro. Navarro filedthe petition
for mandamus. The Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of
the parties, issued a Resolution without prejudice to a more extended
opinion. Issue: Whether the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the
public places to be used for assembly, i.e. the Sunken Garden, instead of
Plaza Miranda. Held: As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso (80 Phil. 75), the Mayor
possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof
by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of
disorder and maintain public safety and order. The Mayor has expressly
stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause
unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and
has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the
site of the demonstration sought to be held in the afternoon of 26 February
1970. Experiences in connection with present assemblies and
demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving the Mayor's appraisal
that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken
Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as
an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no
means of preventing such disorders. Consequently, every time that such
assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear
and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to
the general detriment of the public. Civil rights and liberties can exist and be
preserved only in an ordered society. Navarro has failed to show a clear
specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant their application for permit
unconditionally. 432 Ignacio vs. Ela [GR L-6858, 31 May 1956] En Banc,
Bautista Angelo (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion Facts: Fernando
Ignacio and Simeon de la Cruz, in their behalf and for the benefit of other
Jehovah's Witnesses in the province of Zambales, filed the petition for
mandamus to compel Mayor Norberto Ela of Sta. Cruz to grant them a permit
to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together
with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them. Mayor
Ela, in his answer, stated that he had not refused Ignacio, et. al.'s request to
hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as in fact he grave them
permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on 27 July 1952, but
they declined to avail of it. Issue: Whether the power exercised by Mayor Ela
is capricious or arbitrary when he prohibited the use of the kiosk in the public
plaza. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The
right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed
by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it
may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
nor injurious to the rights of the community or society", and this power may
be exercised under the "police power" of the state, which is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is true that there is no
law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to
regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk, for the purposes
for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his
broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific duty "to issue
orders relating to the police or to public safety" within the municipality
(section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be
said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the
constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used,
directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23,
Article VI of the Constitution). Herein, the power exercised by Mayor Ela
cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is
located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of
said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of
untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that
kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members.
This was the policy adopted by Mayor Ela for sometime previous to the
request made by Ignacio, et. al.. Mayor Ela never denied such request but
merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of
the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that Ignacio, et. al. were denied
their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to
regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so
considering that the tenets of Ignacio, et. al.'s congregation are derogatory to
those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which Mayor Ela must have
considered in denying their request. 433 Reyes vs. Bagatsing [GR L-65366, 9
November 1983] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 6 concur, 3 concur in separate
opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 voted for the issuance ex-parte of
a preliminary mandatory injunction, 1 on sick leave Facts: Retired Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on 26 October 1983 from
2:00 to 5:00 p.m., starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the
United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open
space of public property, a short program would be held. After the planned
delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on
the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World
Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be
presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who
may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador.
The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. An assurance was made to observe all the necessary steps "to
ensure a peaceful march and rally." Since Reyes had not been informed of
any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally,
on 20 October 1983, he filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The oral argument was heard on 25
October 1983, the very same day the answer was filed. The Court then
deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute resolution was
issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. The last
sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This resolution is without
prejudice to a more extended opinion." Hence the detailed exposition of the
Court's stand on the matter. Issue: Whether Reyes, et. al. can exercise their
freedom of speech, press, or to assemble in front of the US embassy. Held:
The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 31 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Free speech,
like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action
for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom
of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of
a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. There can be no
legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally
would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets
to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
Boulevard. The novel aspect of the case is that there would be a short
program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the
United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. Related to this, the second
paragraph of its Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(to which the Philippines is a signatory) reads: "2. The receiving State is under
a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of
the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." That being the case, if
there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there
would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal
point would be the Embassy. Moreover, Ordinance 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibits the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of
500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other purposes. Even
then, if the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a
defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded
the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. There was
no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the
embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a
condition is satisfied, it does not follow that the Mayor could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of
such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents
itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500
feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated. The high estate accorded
the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less. 434
Ruiz vs. Gordon [GR L-65695, 19 December 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 10
concur Facts: On 21 November 1983, Hector S. Ruiz, as coordinator of the
Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, and in behalf of the
Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino
Justice for All (JAJA), Concern (sic) Citizen for Justice and Peace (CCJP),
Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa (DAMBANA), United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO), personally delivered to Richard Gordon, as City Mayor
of Olongapo City, a letter-application dated 19 November 1983, requesting
for a permit to hold a prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on 4
December 1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it will be finished in the early evening. It
was also requested that the organizations to be allowed to hold a
parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.
The permit was issued on 23 November 1983, granting Ruiz’s request for a
permit to hold a prayer rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City and a
parade/march from Gordon Avenue at 1:00 p.m. of 4 December 1983,
provided that (1) The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and orderly; (2)
Your organization will be responsible for any loss or damage to government
property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; (3) The parade/march
shall proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave., and Magsaysay Drive, through
Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., thence to the Rizal Triangle. Ruiz filed a
petition for mandamus on 25 November 1983 against Gordon. On November
27, the Court resolved to grant Gordon’s plea for dismissal. Ruiz, on 1
December 1983, filed a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 32 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) motion dated November 29 to withdraw petition on the ground
that the permit being sought in the prayer-rally to be held on 4 December
1983 from 1:00 to 6:00 PM has been granted by Gordon. Issue: Whether the
permit applicant should be the active party to determine if a permit has been
issued to it before a petition for mandamus is filed in court. Held: The action
for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble
of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A
party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the
one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a
permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was
designated for the decision on the request, such party or his representative
should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a
copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent
to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and
effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is
sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit. Lately,
several petitions of this character have been filed with the Supreme Court. It
could be due to the lack of knowledge of the guidelines set forth in the
extended opinion. Steps have been taken to send the Regional Trial judges
copies thereof. In the future, therefore, without precluding the filing of
petitions directly with the Supreme Court, the interest of justice and of public
convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level.
435 Malabanan vs. Ramento [GR 62270, 21 May 1984] En Banc, Fernando
(CJ): 10 concur, 3 took no part Facts: Crispin Malabanan, Evilio Jalos, Ben
Luther Lucas, Sotero Leonero and June Lee were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on 27 August 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine
and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested In vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched
toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving
utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes
being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on 9 September 1982, they were informed through a
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building.
The validity thereof was challenged by Malabanan, et. al. both before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages
against Cesar Mijares, in his capacity as the President of GAUF, Gonzalo del
Rosario, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of GAUF; Tomas
B. Mesina, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of GAUF; Atty.
Leonardo Padilla, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel & Security Supervisor
of GAUF; Atty. Fablita Ammay, Rosendo Galvante and Eugenia Tayao, in their
capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of GAUF and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On 20 October 1982, Anastacio D.
Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found Malabanan, et. al.
guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph 146(c) of the Manual for
Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for
one academic year. Hence, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. Issue: Whether the students were properly meted out a year
suspension due to the disruption of classes in GAUF attended by the
students’ concerted activity. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 33 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Held: Malabanan, et.al. are entitled to their rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens
the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of
Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative
of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive
force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which
the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is
personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an
inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part
of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace
merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing
field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he
does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and
without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." It does not follow,
however, that Malabanan, et. al. can be totally absolved for the events that
transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The
rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby,
rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University.
Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. The "concerted
activity went on until 5:30 p.m." The University could thus, take disciplinary
action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure — certainly
not a suspension — could be the appropriate penalty. A one-year period of
suspension is much too severe, While the discretion of both the University
and Director Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of
fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an
element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of the Court
that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough. 436 Arreza vs,
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation [GR L-62297, 19 June 1985] En Banc,
Fernando (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Carmelo A. Arreza, Lonesto G.
Oidem, Jacob F. Meimban, and Edgardo S. Fernando were either leaders or
participants in what the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation referred to
as a rally/demonstration held on 28 September 1982, in front of the Life
Science Building of the University, and are officers and members of the
Supreme Student Council of said university. The demonstration's purpose
was to register the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's
Institute of Animal Science, as those taking courses therein would not be able
to graduate. Other rallies were held on September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the
purpose of sympathizing with the suspension of 5 student leaders who
conducted an illegal assembly on 27 August 1982, causing additional
disturbance on the campus, not only by the disorderly conduct observed but
also by the resulting boycott of classes. Such exercise of the right to
peaceable assembly was visited by the University with a refusal to let Arreza,
et. al. enroll after an investigation of their alleged violation of school rules
and regulations. Arreza, et. al. filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for
a preliminary mandatory injunction to allow them to enroll. Issue: Whether
the students may be denied re-enrollment due to the improper conduct
attributed to them in the exercise of their free speech and peaceable
assembly. Held: If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic
audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 34 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hardly the timid
diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language
of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their
applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during
the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Herein, the
infractions of University rules or regulations by the students justify the filing
of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly-
disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure
of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to
them. 437 German vs. Barangan [GR 68828, 27 March 1985] En Banc, Escolin
(J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part, 1 filed separate opinion, 1
concurs in separate opinion, 5 dissent in separate opinion Facts: At about
5:00 p.m. of 2 October 1984, Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, Tirso Santillan,
Jr., Ma. Luisa Andal, Nieva Malinis, Ricardo Laviña, Cesar Cortes, Danilo
Reyes, Jose Reyes, Josefina Mate, Lourdes Calma, Mildred Juan, Olive
Guanzon, Fernando Cochico, Sherman Cid, Nazareno Bentulan, Roslina
Donaire, Mario Martinez, Beatriz Teylan, Angelina Lapid, Rosemarie Flores,
Daniel Van Soto, Edgardo Mercader, Nelly Agustin, Marily Magcalas, David
Chan, Arsenio Salansang, Nelson De Guzman, Marciano Araneta, Cesar
Meneses, Dionisio Rellosa, Mario Santiago, Severino Santos, Leonora Santos,
Nimfa Doronilla, Florence Guinto, Rosalina Manansala, Percival Ostonal,
Tommy Macaranas, Roger Nicandro,, composed of about 50 businessmen,
students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the
ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacañang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the now familiar
inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised
clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way,
however, they were barred by Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his
superior Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.
When German, et. al.'s protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside
the church proved unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of
the alleged warning given them by Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by
German, et. al. to enter the church in the future would likewise be
prevented, they filed a petition for mandamus to compel Barangan, et. al. to
allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel
Street, Manila; and for a writ of injunction to enjoin Barangan, et. al. from
preventing them from getting into and praying in said church. Issue: Whether
the acts of Gen. Barangan, et. al. violates the rights of German, et. al. to
freedom of religion and locomotion. Held: Gen. Barangan and Maj. Lariosa
assured German, et. al. and the Court that they have never restricted, and
will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at
said church, but maintained, however, that the lastter's intention was not
really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices
of the President of the Republic. The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the
marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of antigovernment slogans
strongly tend to substantiate the militarymen's allegation. There are serious
doubts on the sincerity and good faith of German, et. al. in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion.
While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights
for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code
admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties observe honesty and good faith." Even assuming
that German, et. al.'s claim Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 35 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still
Barangan, et. al.'s reaction to the 2 October 1984 mass action may not be
characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972,
when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacañang gates and
scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J P. Laurel Street and the
streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the
affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have
been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The
reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is
considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and
his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests
transacting business with Malacañang. The need to secure the safety of
heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized.
The threat to their lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the
world. Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem are the gruesome
assassinations, kidnapings and other acts of violence and terrorism that have
been perpetrated against heads of state and other public officers of foreign
nations. Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive
offices within the Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. These offices include communications facilities that link the
central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction
imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive
branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action would certainly
disrupt. In fine, the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street is
allowed under the fundamental law, the same having been established in the
interest of national security. 438 Acosta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 132088, 28
June 2000] Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part Facts:
Everdina Acosta, Noemi Acosta, Elvira Amparado, Rebecca Aquino, Roberto
Arcaya, Eva Arceo, Juliet Arellano, Anita Ascano, Grace Austra, Luisa Aviles,
Susie Aw, Victoria Badillo, Susan Baldemor, Elisa Basa, Nory Batuigas,
Teresita Bautista, Segundina Bermas, Ferminer Boco, Evelyn Bulaong, Sylvia
Bulario, Gilda Bolosan, Josie Bungay, Araceli Cabuse, Teresa Cacho, Rosanna
Cajandinez, Nely Calpito, Olivia Cardines, Thelma Carino, Corazon Carracedo,
Elenita Casauay, Marieta Cauli, Marilou Cayton, Viriginia Chiapoco, Allen
Cipriano, Melinda B. Contreras, Zenaida Corporal, Priscilla Corpuz, Luz Cosio,
Emilia Cruz, Cristina Dela Cruz, Rosalina Dela Cruz, Grace Cunanan, Evelyn De
Castro, Haydee De Valle, Cecilia Del Rosario, Gullermina De La Cruz, Francis
Dingil, Bella Dy, Corazon Estebal, Luz Fajardo, Teresa Frago, Virginia Gacho,
Sabino Gales, Myrna Gallego, Marilyn Garna, Natividad Gavilan, Lolita
Gavino, Marilou Go, Leticia Gomez, Olympio Gonzaga, Ruth Gonzales,
Remedios Havoc, Gregoria Hernandez, Oscar Hidalgo, Bibiano Hugo, Rita
Huerta, Lourdes Hulipas, Romeo Idos, Erlinda Isla, Lita Italia, Matias Jabonete,
Diana Jimenez, Dominador Labaclado, Alma Laguian, Melcy Lalu, Rebecca
Lamalinao, Marita Lamsen, Lourdes Ester Laredo, Teresita Lation, Rosalina
Ledesma, Norma Lecciones, Norma Leyte, Cecilia Lincopines, Ofelia Lizardo,
Venilla Locsin, Adelina Lorenzo, Saturnina Lorenzo, Alejandra Mabaet, Julieta
Madrid, Erlinda Magpayo, Rolando Magsino, Erlinda Mailig, Florenda
Malapaya, Corazon Mallen, Esmeralda Manalang, Merle Manalo, Erlinda
Manega, Shirley Mangahas, Elfrida Marquez, Efigenia Menez, Nilda Nava,
Merly Nery, Rosaminda Oben, Melissa Olaquerra, Enriqueta Olivar, Dolores
Ordinario, Estrella Ortega, Rose Orprecio, Aurora Ostaco, Elvira Pampanga,
Norma Paquiz, Evangeline Pardo, Gloria Parman, Erlinda Pastrana, Lerma
Quirit, Mecelin Quilandra, Mewlin Quillanora, Natividad Ragud, Erlinda
Rante, Eufemia Ramirez, Juditha Raneses, Uldarico Rejaba, Melina Rejuso,
Felisa Renido, Milagros Rey, Redentor Reyes, Resalina Sagun, Zenaida Salazar,
Fe Salima, Shirley Saragon, Purificacion Sari, Elvira Satumbaga, Maribey
Sealmoy, Editha Sinjay, Tita Silvino, Aurora Tolentino, Esperanza Urbiztondo,
Saturnino Yodico, Rodolfo Mariano, Alicia Marinay, Susan Matanga, Patria
Matias, Louelita Mayuna, Lolita Mercado, Eugenia Milla, Cresencia Mirador,
Erma Moral, Raquel Morales, and Dolores Lagrada are teachers from
different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in September and
October 1990, Acosta, et. al. did not report for work and instead, participated
in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the
purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. On the
basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that Acosta,
et.al. participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return-
to-work order issued on 17 September 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
Cariño of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Acosta, et. al. were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave. Acosta, et. al. failed to answer these charges.
Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating
Committees, Secretary Cariño found Acosta, et. al. guilty as charged and
ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Acosta, et. al. appealed
the orders of Secretary Cariño to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
and later to the CSC. In 1995, the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary
Cariño by finding Acosta guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, adn was meted out the penalty of 6 months suspension without
pay; but considering the period of time she was out of service, she was
automatically reinstated to her former position. Following the denial of their
motion for reconsideration, Acosta, et. al. questioned the matter before the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition for certiorari (29
August 1997) and subsequent motion for reconsideration (7 January 1998).
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether the participation
of the public school teachers in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. Held: The character and legality of the mass actions
which they participated in have been passed upon by the Court as early as
1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr.
wherein it ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons." In Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals, it added that "it is an undisputed fact that there was a work
stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was
not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike is not
essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for
any purpose." It is not the exercise by Acosta, et. al. of their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which
they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro
Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other
than the mass actions in question, whereby Acosta, et. al. could petition the
government for redress of grievances. It bears stressing that suspension of
public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that Acosta, et. al. had valid
grievances and noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that will
not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their
righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. 439
Gonzales vs. Kalaw-Katigbak [GR L-69500, 22 July 1985] En Banc, Fernando
(J): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on official leave Facts: Jose
Antonio U. Gonzalez is the President of the Malaya Films, a movie production
outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade; while Maria Kalaw Katigbak and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada are the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television. In a resolution of a sub-committee of the Board of 23
October 1984, a permit to exhibit the film "Kapit sa Patalim" under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. The film in issue was given an adult classification to
serve as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of
Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken
in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on some
women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater
stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing
as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of
excessive violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and the
police. The vulnerable and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 37 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes.
The Board gave Malaya films an option to have the film reclassified to For-
General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare
down the violence in the film. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Gonzales, in behalf of Malaya Films, Lino Brocka, Jose F. Lacaba, and Dulce Q.
Saguisag, stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was
without basis. Then on 12 November 1984, the Board released its decision:
"Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October
1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and
an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-
committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application,
the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withhold
the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied."
On 10 January 1985, Gonzales, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television have the power to classify the movie “Kapit sa Patalim” under the
classification “For Adults Only” and impose conditions to edit the material to
allow it a “General patronage” rating. Held: Motion pictures are important
both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is
considerable. The "importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform." There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and
what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a
diminution of the basic right to free expression. Press freedom "may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment." This is not to say that
such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if
"there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has
a right to prevent.'" Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there
is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are
emasculated. It is, however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua
non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally
basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. To avoid an
unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of the Board is limited to the
classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections,
determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may
require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide
by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed,
rather the presumption is against its validity. The test, to repeat, to
determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right
to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There
should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be
ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the
requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore,
is that where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television
programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as
they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire
production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the
observation of Justice Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no
matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor." The law, however, frowns on obscenity. All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance. There was an abuse of discretion by the Board in the light
of the difficulty and travail undergone by Gonzales, et. al. before “Kapit sa
Patalim” was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut.
Moreover the Board’s perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to
be unduly restrictive. The Court concludes thus that there was an abuse of
discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 38 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) such an abuse
can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. 440 Lagunzad
vs. Soto Vda. de Gonzales [GR L-32066, 6 August 1979] First Division,
Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: Sometime in August
1961, Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business
outfit, the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark
Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which
Lagunzad had purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00.
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises
Padilla sometime between November 11 and November 17, 1951. Padilla
was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (then the minority
party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal
Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder in
People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr
in contemporary political history." Although the emphasis of the movie was
on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his
private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother,
Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. The
movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on 16 October 1961, or at the
very latest, before the November 1961 elections. On 3 October 1961,
Lagunzad received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister
of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation"
of his life. Shown the early "rushes" of the picture, Mrs. Amante and her
sister, Mrs. Gavieres, objected to many portions thereof notwithstanding
Lagunzad's explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr., based on his book "The Long Dark Night in Negros." On 5
October 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, demanded in
writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. Lagunzad
contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested
heavily in the picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition
to the fact that he had to meet the scheduled target date of the premiere
showing. On the same date, 5 October 1961, after some bargaining as to the
amount to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to
P20,000.00, Lagunzad and Soto vda. de Gonzales, represented by her
daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and
Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement." Lagunzad takes the position that he
was pressured into signing the Agreement because of Soto vda. de Gonzales'
demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life
story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference
declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce
the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they were going to
Court to stop the picture." On 10 October 1961, Lagunzad paid Soto vda. de
Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant
to their Agreement but just to placate the latter. On 14 October 1961, the
filming of the movie was completed. On 16 October 1961, a premiere
showing was held at the Hollywood Theatre, Manila, with the Moises Padilla
Society as its sponsor. Subsequently, the movie was shown in different
theaters all over the country. Because Lagunzad refused to pay any additional
amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on 22 December 1961, Soto vda. de
Gonzales instituted the suit against him praying for judgment in her favor
ordering Lagunzad (1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest from the filing of the Complaint; (2) to render an accounting of the
proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty
therefrom; (3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts
claimed; and (4) to pay the costs. By way of counterclaim, Lagunzad
demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being
without any valid cause; that Soto vda. de Gonzales be ordered to return to
him the amount of P5,000.00; and that he be paid P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and P7,500.00 as attorney's fees. On 30 June 1964, the trial
Court rendered a Decision in favor of Soto vda. de Gonzales. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration
having been denied by the Court, Lagunzad filed the Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Initially, or on 16 June 1970, the Supreme Court denied the
Petition for lack of merit, but resolved subsequently to give it due course
after Lagunzad moved for reconsideration on the additional argument that
the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom
of expression, and that the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 39 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Licensing Agreement is a form of restraint on the freedom
of speech and of the press. Issue: Whether the Licensing Agreement infringes
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a
citizen and as a newspaperman, Lagunzad had the right to express his
thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint.
Held: The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. As held in
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections (27 SCRA 835, 858 [1969]), "From the
language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. The prevailing doctrine is that the
clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes
such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle "requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation." Herein, the interests observable are
the right to privacy asserted by Soto vda. de Gonzales and the right of
freedom of expression invoked by Lagunzad. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, the COurt holds that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the
Licensing Agreement entered into by Lagunzad, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern. The court denied the petition for review. 441
Ayer Production Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong [GR L-82380, 29 April 1988]; also
McElroy vs. Capulong [GR L-82398] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur Facts: Hal
McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd., envisioned, sometime in 1987, the filming for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue).
McEleroy discussed this project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban,
who advised that they consult with the appropriate government agencies
and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had
played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie
Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government
agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production. In a letter dated 16 December 1987, McElroy,
informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a
synopsis of it. On 21 December 1987, Enrile replied that "he would not and
will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of
his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation" and further advised McElroy that "in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference
whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to him or
any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them."
It appears that McElroy acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was
deleted from the movie script, and McElroy proceeded to film the projected
motion picture. On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Civil Case 88-151; Branch
134), seeking to enjoin McElroy, et. al. from producing the movie "The Four
Day Revolution." The complaint alleged that McElroy, et. al.'s production of
the mini-series without Enrile's consent and over his objection, constitutes an
obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court
issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the
application for preliminary injunction. On 9 March 1988, McElroy filed a
Motion to Dismiss with Opposition Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 40 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction
contending that the mini-series film would not involve the private life of Juan
Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would
amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Ayer Productions
also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the
mini-series had not yet been completed. In an Order dated 16 March 1988,
the trial court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the McElroy, et.
al. On 22 March 1988, Ayer Productions filed a Petition for Certiorari dated
21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order with the Supreme Court (GR L-82380). A day later, or on 23
March 1988, McElroy also filed a separate Petition for Certiorari with Urgent
Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March
1988 (GR L-82398). By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were
consolidated. Issue: Wnether depiction of Enrile, as part of the events in the
1986 People Power Revolution and not as to his personal life nor his family,
in the film “The Four Day Revolution” requires his prior consent. Held: The
freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to
diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a
universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression.
Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a
principal medium of mass communication for information, education and
entertainment. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned
and to foreignowned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial
activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing
of freedom of speech and of expression. In our community, as in many other
countries, media facilities are owned either by the government or the private
sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be
sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue producing
activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities
available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and
operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of
speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such
constitutional liberties in our country. The counter-balancing claim of Enrile is
to a right of privacy. Our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a
right of privacy. It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope
and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of
privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not
an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been
regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy
cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of
public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is
the right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are
outside the realm of legitimate public concern." Herein, there is a prior and
direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by McElroy, et. al. The Judge has restrained them
from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. The Judge
should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary
Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by Enrile and issuing a
Preliminary Injunction 20 days later; for the projected motion picture was as
yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither Enrile nor
the trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There
was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any
right to privacy that Enrile could lawfully assert. The subject matter of "The
Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that
took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train
of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is
one of public interest and concern, and also of international interest. The
subject relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this country and as
such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of
mass media. The subject matter does not relate to the individual life and
certainly not to the private life of Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is
not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but
it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986. The extent of the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 41 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) intrusion upon the life of Juan Ponce Enrile
that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day
Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that
intrusion may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably
necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Enrile does not claim
that McElroy, et. al. threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any
part of the private life of Enrile or that of any member of his family. The line
of equilibrium in the specific context of the present case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy,
may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion
picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in
depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling
individual (Enrile) and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing
personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into a "matters
of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution"
limits itself in portraying the participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution to
those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of
the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into Enrile's privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even
without a license from Enrile. 442 People vs. Kottinger [GR 20569, 29 October
1923] Second Division, Malcolm (J): 5 concur, 1 dissented in separate opinion
to which 1 joined Facts: On 24 November 1922, detective Juan Tolentino
raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He
found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as
evidenced against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company. The
information filed in court charged him with living kept for sale in the store of
the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures, in violation of section
12 of Act 277. To this information, Kottinger interposed a demurrer based
upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense
and were not contrary to law; but the trial court overruled the demurrer.
Following the presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense,
judgment was rendered finding Kottinger guilty of the offenses charged and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs. Kottinger appealed. Issue: Whether pictures
portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear
and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.
Held: The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of
being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines ("Philippines, Bontoc Woman"; a picture of five
young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines"; "Ifugao
Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines"; "Igorrot Girl, Rice Field
Costume"; "Kalinga Girls, Philippines"; and "Moros, Philippines") None of the
pictures represented posses which he had not observed on various occasions,
and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true
costumes regularly worn by them, according to Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor
in the University of the Philippines. Although the Federal statutes prohibits
the importation of shipment into the Philippine Islands of the following:
"Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten matter,
paintings, illustrations, or objects of obscene or indecent character or
subversive of public order"; there are, in the record, copies of reputable
magazines which circulate freely thru-out the United States and other
countries, and which are admitted into the Philippines without question,
containing illustrations into the Philippines without question, containing
illustrations identical in nature to those in the present case. Publications of
the Philippine Government have also been offered in evidence such as
Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of Science" for October, 1906,
and the Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in
which are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to those
which are now impugned. Tested by the standard set up by the Congress of
the United States, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here
challenged would be held obscene or indecent by any state of Federal court.
It would be particularly unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in
the Philippine than in the United States, or for that matter in the rest of the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) world. The
pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without
attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The
aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the
people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type.
The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in the present case cannot
be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. 443 People vs. Go
Pin [GR L-7491, 8 August 1955] En Banc, Montemayor (J): 8 concur Facts: Go
Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the
Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large number of one-real 16-millimeter
films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or
immoral. At first, he pleaded not guilty of the information but later was
allowed by the court to change his plea to that of guilty which he did. Not
content with the plea of guilty the trial court had the films in question
projected and were viewed by it in order to evaluate the same from the
standpoint of decency and morality. Thereafter, and considering the plea of
guilty entered by the accused, and the fact that after viewing the films the
trial court noted only a slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality
in them, it sentenced Go Pin to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcciconal
and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. Go Pin appealed. Issue: Whether paintings and pictures
of women in the nude are obscene and offensive. Held: Paintings and
pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind are not
offensive because they are made and presented for the sake of art. If such
pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries
for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in
art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here were
used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other
words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being
commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor
importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if
the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the
privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art
and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve
their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid
curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth
who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. 444 People
vs. Padaan, 98 Phil. 749 (1957) 445 Janet Reno vs. Americal Civil Liberties
Union [521 US 884, 26 June 1997] Stevens (J): 6 concur, 1 filed separate
opinion to which 1 joined Facts: Two provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act) seek to protect minors from harmful
material on the Internet, an international network of interconnected
computers that enables millions of people to communicate with one another
in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts of information from around the
world. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1997) criminalizes the
"knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient
under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or
displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Affirmative
defenses are provided for those who take "good faith, . . . effective . . .
actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications,
§223(e)(5)(A), and those who restrict such access by requiring certain
designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult
identification number, §223(e)(5)(B). A number of plaintiffs filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of §§223(a)(1) and 223(d). After making
extensive findings of fact, a three judge District Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 43 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Court convened pursuant to the Act
entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both challenged
provisions. The court's judgment enjoins the Government from enforcing
§223(a)(1)(B)'s prohibitions insofar as they relate to "indecent"
communications, but expressly preserves the Government's right to
investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities
prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of §223(d) is
unqualified because that section contains no separatereference to obscenity
or child pornography. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court
under the Act's special review provisions, arguing that the District Court
erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it
is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because it is vague. Issue: Whether
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 places an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected speech. Held: Regardless of whether the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) is so vague that it violates the
Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage
render it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment. For instance,
each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different linguistic form. The first
uses the word "indecent," while the second speaks of material that "in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs." Given the absence of a definition of either term, this difference in
language will provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two
standards relate to each other and just what they mean. This uncertainty
undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials.
The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two reasons.
First, the CDA is a content based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such
a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious
chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In
addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA
threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each
act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to
remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas,
and images. The CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content. A "time,
place, and manner" analysis is therefore inapplicable. It is thus immaterial
whether such speech would be feasible on the Web (which, as the
Government's own expert acknowledged, would cost up to $10,000 if the
speaker's interests were not accommodated by an existing Web site, not
including costs for database management and age verification). The
Government's position is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban
leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to publish books. In
invalidating a number of laws that banned leafletting on the streets
regardless of their content-- the Court explained that "one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Also, most Internet fora --
including chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web -- are open
to all comers. Even the strongest reading of the "specific person"
requirement of §223(d) cannot save the statute. It would confer broad
powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent
of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the would be
discoursers that his 17 year old child -- a "specific person under 18 years of
age," -- would be present. Finally, there is no textual support for the
Government's submission that material having scientific, educational, or
other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's "patently
offensive" and "indecent" prohibitions. Thus, the CDA places an unacceptably
heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute
the sort of "narrow tailoring" that will save an otherwise patently invalid
unconstitutional provision. The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free
speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community. The
ruling of the district court was sustained. 446 Miller vs. California [413 US 15,
21 June 1973] Burger (J) Facts: Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called "adult"
material. Five unsolicited advertising brochures were sent through the mail in
an envelope Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The brochures
advertise four books entitled "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies
Illustrated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film entitled
"Marital Intercourse." While the brochures contain some descriptive printed
material, primarily they consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly
depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of
sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed. The envelope was
opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not
requested the brochures; they complained to the police. After a jury trial, he
was convicted of violating California Penal Code 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by
knowingly distributing obscene matter, and the Appellate Department,
Superior Court of California, County of Orange, summarily affirmed the
judgment without opinion. Issue: Whether the determination of “obscene”
materials are to be determined through the national or community standard.
Held: Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures
exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more than live sex
and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places. At a
minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual
conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to
merit First Amendment protection. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact
must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. If a state law that regulates obscene material is
thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected
by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review
of constitutional claims when necessary. Thus, no one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these
materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed.
These specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such
materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution.
The inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision
altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then
"hard core" pornography may be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the
passerby, and the consenting adult alike. Under a National Constitution,
fundamental First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not
vary from community to community, but this does not mean that there are,
or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what
appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently offensive." These are
essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse
for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated
for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite
consensus exists. When triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
consider certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to require that
the answer be based on some abstract formulation. The adversary system,
with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has
historically permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of their
community, guided always by limiting instructions on the law. To require a
State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
"community standard" would be an exercise in futility. Thus the Court herein
(a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the
First Amendment; (b) hold that such material can be regulated by the States,
subject to the specific safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that
the material is "utterly without redeeming social value"; and (c) hold that
obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community
standards," not "national standards." 447 Eastern Broadcasting Corporation
vs. Dans [GR L-59329, 19 July 1985] Resolution En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 6
concur, 1 concurs and submits brief statement, 1 concurs in separate
opinion, 1 concurs in dispositive portion, 1 took no part, 2 voted for
dismissal. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 45 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts:
Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground that the radio station was used
to incite people to sedition. A petition was filed by Eastern Broadcasting to
compel the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Ceferino S.
Carreon (Commissioner, National Telecommunications Commission), et. al. to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed
on grounds of national security; alleging denial of due process and violation
of its right of freedom of speech. On 25 March 1985, before the Court could
promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, Eastern
Broadcasting through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a
motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. Eastern Broadcasting alleged that
(1) it has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B.
Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu
including its right to operate and its equipment; (2) the National
Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to
the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to
operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio
transmitter of said station DYRE; (3) in view of the foregoing, Eastern
Broadcasting has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner,
Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any
further. Issue: Whether radio broadcasting enjoys a more limited form Held:
The case has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of
inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions,
the Court issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary
requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by the Court in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before
a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed; (2) it is
necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition
of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government
action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property,
in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849); (3) All forms of media,
whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom
of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule - that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent; (4) the clear and present danger test,
however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users; (5) The clear
and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account. The supervision of radio stations — whether by
government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling; (6) the freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy; and (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses
of the Constitution. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a
certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights
of others.All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of
the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting, more
than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection
from the free expression clause, because: First, broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from
making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot
be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national
security. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found
only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible
to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the
cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic
needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand,
the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or
regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who
happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials
broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of
varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental
capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech
would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is
forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterance. Still, the government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be
informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if
broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special
protection. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 47 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Baldoza vs.
Dimaano [AM 1120-MJ, 5 May 1976] … 1 Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29
December 1986] … 1 Valmonte vs. Belmonte [GR 74930, 13 February 1989] …
2 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [GR 72119, 29 May 1987] … 4 Garcia
vs. Board of Investments [GR 88637, 7 September 1989] … 5 This collection
contains five (5) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
448 Baldoza vs. Dimaano [AM 1120-MJ, 5 May 1976] Resolution of the
Second Division, Antonio (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 1 designated to sit in
Second Division Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9,
1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said
municipality. Dimaano, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has
never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that
although court records are among public documents open to inspection not
only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have
legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be
inspected. He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to
prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of
copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not
motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy
or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. The
case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for
investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal
Mayor Corazon A. Cañiza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve
harmony and cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This
motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation,
he recommended the exoneration of Dimaano. Issue: Whether the rules and
conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books
infringe upon the right of individuals to information. Held: Judge Dimaano did
not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge,
Dimaano allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
Dimaano under certain conditions and under his command and supervision.
It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by Dimaano
were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of
the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly
in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance. The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the
people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are
expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official
acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law.
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order. 449 Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29
December 1986] Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur Facts: Invoking the
people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
[MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La
Cruz, in Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The decision
was concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration /
clarification of the decision on various questions. They suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor
General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile,
the February EDSA Revolution took place, which subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18
of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether laws should be published in the official
gazette before they may be validly implemented. Held: The conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law, presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is
no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes
"the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and
this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and
not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such
law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as
an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published
if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. However, no
publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. 450
Valmonte vs. Belmonte [GR 74930, 13 February 1989] En Banc, Cortez (J): 13
concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda
Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be
borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy
General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his
opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all
those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to
its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper
for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."
On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance
of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell,
Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo
Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul
filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish
Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners
with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information. Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records
pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain
members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa. Held: The pertinent
provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 states that "The right
of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." An informed
citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system
of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the
inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims
and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate
of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art.
XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would
certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is
an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet,
like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters
of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must
be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public
concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte, et. al.
is Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the truth of
reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately
before the 7 February 1986 election through the intercession of the former
First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. In sum, the public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make
the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
However, a second requisite must be met before the right to information
may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information
sought must not be among those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte
has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is apparently
based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. Although it may be true that
when the information requested from the government intrudes into the
privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and
to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in
his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the
GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.
Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke
the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature,
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be
violated. It may be observed, however, the concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering
the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to
closer public scrutiny. In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records may be insured. 451 People’s Movement for Press
Freedom vs. Manglapus, G.R. 48642, September 13, 1988 452 Legaspi vs. Civil
Service Commission [GR 72119, 29 May 1987] En Banc, Cortes (J): 12 concur,
1 on leave Facts: Valentin L. Legaspi made a request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians. The Civil Service Commission denied Legaspi's request. Legaspi
filed a special civil action for mandamus before the Supreme Court, claiming
that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information. Issue: Whether the information sought by Legaspi is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Held: The right to information does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law." The law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that,
in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern. Herein, the information sought by Legaspi is
the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) service eligibles
for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
declares as a State policy that: "Appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination." Public
office being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to
the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. On the
other hand, on whether the information sought is among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee, the
Civil Service Commission has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit Legaspi's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the names of
those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and
licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Legaspi's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the Commission to confirm or deny the
civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. 453 Garcia vs. Board of Investments [GR 88637, 7 September
1989] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 10 concur, 3 took no part Facts:
Proclamation 361 dated 6 March 1968, as amended by Proclamation 630
dated 29 November 1969, reserved a 388-hectare parcel of land of the public
domain located at Lamao, Limay, Bataan for "industrial estate purposes," in
line with the State policy of promoting and rationalizing the industrialization
of the Philippines. PD 1803, dated 16 January 1981, enlarged the area by 188
hectares, making it a total of 576 hectares, reserved for the Petrochemical
Industrial Zone under the administration, management and ownership of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). The Bataan Refining Corporation
(BRC) is a wholly government-owned corporation, located in Bataan. It
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha. Taiwanese investors in a
petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC)
and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the
terms and conditions for the registration of the project was the use of
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical
plant. The petrochemical project was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC
was issued a Certificate of Registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI. BPC was
accorded pioneer status and was given fiscal and other incentives by BOI,
like, (1) exemptions from tax on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire
proceeds of liquidation of investments in currency originally made and at the
exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of
earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of
Representatives approved a bill, introduced by the petitioner, Congressman
Garcia, eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it would
be used as raw material in the petrochemical plant. However, in February
1989, A. T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor
in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter
dated 25 January 1989, advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original
registration certificate of its project by changing the job site from Limay,
Bataan, to Batangas. News of the shift was published by one of the major
Philippine dailies which disclosed that the cause of the relocation of the
project is the insurgency and unstable labor situation in Bataan. The presence
in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the
Pilipinas Shell Corporation was another consideration. The congressmen of
Bataan vigorously opposed the transfer of the proposed petrochemical plant
to Batangas. At a conference of the Taiwanese investors with President
Aquino and her Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Army, the
President expressed her preference that the Bataan petrochemical plant be
established in Bataan. However, despite speeches in the Senate and in the
House opposing the transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed in the BOI
on 11 April 1989 a request for "approval of an amendment of its investment
application for Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
establishing a petrochemical complex in the Philippines." On 4 May 1989,
Congressman Enrique T. Garcia addressed a letter to Secretary Concepcion of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), through BOI vicechairman and
manager Tomas Alcantara, requesting for "a copy of the amendment
reportedly submitted by Taiwanese investors, to their original application for
the installation of the Bataan Petrochemical Plant, as well as the original
application itself together with any and all attachments to said original
application and the amendment thereto." On 21 May 1989, BOI vice-
chairman Alcantara informed Garcia that the Taiwanese investors declined to
give their consent to the release of the documents requested. On 25 May
1989, the BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's
petrochemical project. On 26 June 1989, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in the Court, with a prayer for preliminary injunction. Issue:
Whether Congressman Garcia may be allowed access to the records of the
Board of Investment on the original and amended applications for
registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers containing
its trade secrets and other business and financial information. Held: The
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (Executive Order 226) of 16 July 1987
expressly declares it to be the policy of the State "to accelerate the sound
development of the national economy by encouraging private Filipino and
foreign investments in industry, agriculture, forestry, mining, tourism and
other sectors of the economy." It also requires the "publication of
applications for registration," hence, the payment of publication and other
necessary fees prior to the processing and approval of such applications"
(Art. 7, subpar. 3, Omnibus Investments Code). As provided by the law, the
BPC's application for registration as a "new export producer of ethylene,
polyethylene and polypropylene" was published in the "Philippine Daily
Inquirer" issue of 21 December 1987. The notice invited "any person with
valid objections to or pertinent comments on the above-mentioned
application (to file) his/her comments/objections in writing with the BOI
within one (1) week from the date of this publication." Since the BPC's
amended application (particularly the change of location from Bataan to
Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should have been published so
that whoever may have any objection to the transfer may be heard. The
BOI's failure to publish such notice and to hold a hearing on the amended
application deprived the oppositors, like Congressman Garcia, of due process
and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI.The
provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of the investor's
application for registration in the BOI is implicit recognition that the
proposed investment or new industry is a matter of public concern on which
the public has a right to be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's
application to establish its petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the
inhabitants of that province, particularly the affected community in Limay,
and Garcia as the duly elected representative of the Second District of Bataan
acquired an interest in the project which they have a right to protect.
Garcia's request for xerox copies of certain documents filed by BPC together
with its original application, and its amended application for registration with
BOI, may not be denied, as it is the constitutional right of a citizen to have
access to information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7
of the 1987 Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPC's
applications is not absolute for Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
provides that they may be disclosed "upon the consent of the applicant, or
on orders of a court of competent jurisdiction." As a matter of fact, a xerox
copy of BPC's position paper dated 10 April 1989, in support of its request for
the transfer of its petrochemical plant to Batangas, has been submitted to
the Court as an annex of its memorandum. However, just as the
confidentiality of an applicant's records in the BOI is not absolute, neither is
Garcia's right of access to them unlimited. The Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information. "Under the Constitution, access to
official records, papers, etc. is subject to limitations as may be provided by
law. The law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny."
The trade secrets and confidential, commercial and financial information of
the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security are excluded from
the privilege. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons
AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license. Some Rights
Reserved. Table of Contents Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-
60258, 31 January 1984] … 1 In RE Edillon [AC 1928, 3 August 1978] … 1
Board of Directors of Rotary International vs. Rotary Club [481 US 537, 4 May
1987] … 3 This collection contains three (3) cases summarized in this format
by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First
Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under
Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June
2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine
bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 454 Occena vs.
Commission on Elections [GR L-60258, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Plana (J): 9
concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: Samuel C. Occena filed a
petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be declared as
unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election
of 17 May 1982 "from representing or allowing himself to be represented as
a candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group,
political committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the
barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid
or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is also prayed that
"judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void
ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new
barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties,
political committees, political organizations and other political group." Issue:
Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of
barangay officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law. Held: The
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is
neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and
dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or
curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests (Gonzales vs.
Comelec, 27 SCRA 835; Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a
restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the
circumstances of each case. Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed
although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the
election of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is
narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of political
parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually,
may intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein)
shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment
of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any
barangay office." Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal
campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered
voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to promote
the election of their candidate. There are reasons for insulating the barangay
from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. The
Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and
consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such
as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting
plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members
of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative
supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of
settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle
local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or
arbitration. It would definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge
of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party
loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the
barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome
effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on
the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social
structure. 455 In RE Edillon [AC 1928, 3 August 1978] Resolution En Banc,
Castro (CJ): 11 concur Facts: Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines. On 29 November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution 75-65
in Administrative Case MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) notice. On 21 January 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of
the By-Laws of the IBP. On 27 January 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on 23 February 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him. On 2 March 1976, the Court required
the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on 24 March 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the
case was set for hearing on 3 June 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. Issue: Whether Sections 1,
9, 10 of the Rules of Court 139-A, and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws, constitute an invasion of Edillon's constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Held: An "Integrated Bar" is
a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do
his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The
integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege,
a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. When, therefore,
Congress enacted RA 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as
it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such
Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on 9 January 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through PD 181
dated 4 May 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality
and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads that the Supreme Court
shall have the power to (5) "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar." Thus, when Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were and are subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide
an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. The provisions of
Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. 456 Board
of Directors of Rotary International vs. Rotary Club [481 US 537, 4 May 1987]
Powell (J) Facts: Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit
corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. It is "an
organization of business and professional men united worldwide who
provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all
vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Individual
members belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn,
each local Rotary Club is a member of International. In August 1982, shortly
before the trial in the present case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary
Clubs in 157 countries, with a total membership of about 907,750. Individuals
are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club according to a "classification
system." The purpose of this system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club
includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business,
professional, or institutional activity in the community." Each active member
must work in a leadership capacity in his business or profession. The general
rule is that "one active member is admitted for each classification, but he, in
turn, may propose an additional active member, who must be in the same
business or professional classification." Thus, each classification may be
represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past
service" members may represent the same classifications as active members.
There is no limit to the number of clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who
may be admitted to membership. Subject to these requirements, each local
Rotary Club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new
members. International has promulgated Recommended Club By-laws
providing that candidates for membership will be considered by both a
"classifications committee" and a "membership committee." The
classifications committee determines whether the candidate's business or
profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classification. The
membership committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business and
social standing, and general eligibility." If any member objects to the
candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the club's board of
directors. Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Herbert A.
Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary International, testified that the
exclusion of women results in an "aspect of fellowship that is enjoyed by the
present male membership," and also allows Rotary to operate effectively in
foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores. Although women are
not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, give
speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may
form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin.
Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International. In 1977 the Rotary Club of
Duarte, California, admitted Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary
Freitag to active membership. International notified the Duarte Club that
admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary constitution. After an
internal hearing, International's board of directors revoked the charter of the
Duarte Club and terminated its membership in Rotary International. The
Duarte Club's appeal to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) the International Convention was unsuccessful. The Duarte Club
and two of its women members filed a complaint in the California Superior
Court for the County of Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
the Board's actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Club sought (1) to
enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting women
members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or compelling delivery of the
charter to any representative of International, (2) a declaration that the
board's actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a bench trial, the court
concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a
"business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court
recognized that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business
advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income
tax calculations, or to warrant payment of those expenses by their
employers"; but it found that "such business benefits are incidental to the
principal purposes of the association to promote fellowship and 'service'
activities." The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of these findings and
conclusions, the court entered judgment for International. The California
Court of Appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court denied the Board's
petition for review. Issue: Whether the law allowing inclusion of women as
members of an association deprive the Rotary Club its right of association.
Held: The freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private
relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of
Rights. Such relationships may take various forms, including the most
intimate. The Court has not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this
type of constitutional protection. The intimate relationships to which it has
accorded constitutional protection include marriage, the begetting and
bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with
relatives. Of course, it has not held that constitutional protection is restricted
to relationships among family members. It has emphasized that the First
Amendment protects those relationships, including family relationships, that
presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life." Still, determining the limits of state authority over an individual's
freedom to enter into a particular association unavoidably entails a careful
assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on
a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments." In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently
personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, the Court considers
factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. The relationship among Rotary Club
members is not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants
constitutional protection. The size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer
than 20 to more than 900. There is no upper limit on the membership of any
local Rotary Club. About 10 percent of the membership of a typical club
moves away or drops out during a typical year. The clubs therefore are
instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition
and gradually to enlarge the membership. Many of the Rotary Clubs' central
activities are carried on in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are
required to admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings.
Members are encouraged to invite business associates and competitors to
meetings. The application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not
interfere unduly with the members' freedom of private association. The
Unruh Act does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these
activities; nor to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high
ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace; nor to abandon their
classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of
the community. On the other hand, the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends." For this reason, "impediments to the exercise of
one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association
protected by the First Amendment." Herein, however, the evidence fails to
demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any
significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various
purposes. Indeed, by opening membership to leading business and
professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a
more representative cross section of community leaders with a
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) broadened
capacity for service. Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that
infringement is justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination against women. On its face the Unruh Act makes
no distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public
accommodations laws "plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest
order." The application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not
violate the right of expressive association afforded by the First Amendment.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael
Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons
AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license. Some Rights
Reserved. Table of Contents Estrada vs. Escritor [AM P-02-1651, 4 August
2003] … 1 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive
Secretary [GR 153888, 9 July 2003] … 2 Epperson vs. Arkansas [393 US 97, 12
November 1968] … 3 Engel vs. Vitale [370 US 421, 25 June 1962] … 4 School
District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania vs. Schempp [374 US 203, 17
June 1963] … 5 Stone vs. Graham [449 US 39, 17 November 1980] … 7 Aglipay
v. Ruiz [GR 45459, 13 March 1937] … 8 Mueller vs. Allen [463 US 388, 29 June
1983] … 9 Lemon vs. Kurtzman [403 US 602, 28 June 1971] … 10 Stone vs.
Graham [449 US 39, 17 November 1980] … 12 Wallace vs. Jaffree [472 US 38,
4 June 1985] … 13 Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-5917, 28 January 1955]
… 15 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette [319 US 624, 14
June 1943] … 16 Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [GR
95770, 1 March 1993] … 18 American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-
9637, 30 April 1957] … 19 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries vs. Board of
Equalization of California [493 US 378, 17 January 1990] … 21 Victoriano vs.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union [GR L-25246, 12 September 1974] … 22 Pamil
vs. Teleron [GR L-34854, 20 November 1978] … 24 Torcaso vs. Watkins [367
US 488, 19 June 1961] … 25 This collection contains nineteen (19) cases
summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law
student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law
Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University
School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero
entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He
passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 457 Estrada vs.
Escritor [AM P-02-1651, 4 August 2003] En Banc, Puno (J): 5 concur, 2 filed
separate opinions, 1 filed dissenting opinion, another filed dissenting opinion
to which 3 joined, 2 on official leave Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint dated
27 July 2000, Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding
judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court,
is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of 18 to 20
years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner
and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he
filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated
that "there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation" and challenged
Estrada to "appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper forum."
Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference on 12 October 2000. Escritor
moved for the inhibition of Judge Caoibes from hearing her case to avoid
suspicion and bias as she previously filed an administrative complaint against
him and said case was still pending in the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Escritor's motion was denied. The preliminary conference proceeded
with both Estrada and Escritor in attendance. Estrada confirmed that he filed
the letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor because in his frequent
visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Piñas City, he learned from conversations
therein that Escritor was living with a man not her husband and that she had
an 18-20 year old son by this man. This prompted him to write to Judge
Caoibes as he believed that employees of the judiciary should be respectable
and Escritor's live-in arrangement did not command respect. Escritor, on the
other hand, testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has
been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20
years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known
as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after 10 years of living together, she executed on 28 July 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." Escritor's partner, Quilapio, executed
a similar pledge on the same day. Both pledges were executed in Atimonan,
Quezon and signed by 3 witnesses. At the time Escritor executed her pledge,
her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was
likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife.
During her testimony, Escritor volunteered to present members of her
congregation to confirm the truthfulness of their "Declarations of Pledging
Faithfulness," but Judge Caoibes deemed it unnecessary and considered her
identification of her signature and the signature of Quilapio sufficient
authentication of the documents. Judge Caoibes endorsed the complaint to
Executive Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., who, in turn, endorsed the same to
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On 17 July 2001, the Court, upon
recommendation of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, directed
Escritor to comment on the charge against her. In her comment, Escritor
reiterated her religious congregation's approval of her conjugal arrangement
with Quilapio. Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock
recommended that the case be referred to Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas City for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, investigating judge
Maceda found Escritor's factual allegations credible as they were supported
by testimonial and documentary evidence. He also noted that "(b)y strict
Catholic standards, the live-in relationship of respondent with her mate
should fall within the definition of immoral conduct, to wit: 'that which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community'" He
pointed out, however, that "the more relevant question is whether or not to
exact from Escritor, a member of 'Jehovah's Witnesses,' the strict moral
standards of the Catholic faith in determining her administrative
responsibility in the case at bar." The investigating judge acknowledged that
"religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator and thereby recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against Escritor. After considering the Report and
Recommendation of Executive Judge Maceda, the Office of the Court
Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock and with the
approval of Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, concurred with
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the factual
findings of Judge Maceda but departed from his recommendation to dismiss
the complaint. DCA Lock stressed that although Escritor had become
capacitated to marry by the time she joined the judiciary as her husband had
died a year before, "it is due to her relationship with a married man,
voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary
action." Considering the ruling of the Court in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al. that
"court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice," DCA Lock
found Escritor's defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant
dismissal of the charge of immorality. Accordingly, he recommended that
Escritor be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized with
suspension of 6 months and one day without pay with a warning that a
repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely in accordance with
the Civil Service Rules. Issue: Whether Escritor's right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit
relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.
Held: The case being one of first impression, the claim of religious freedom is
subjected to the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality
stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that Escritor's claim to religious
freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law;
necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the
government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest. In
applying the test, the first inquiry is whether Escritor's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice
and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free
exercise of religion. The burden on Escritor is even greater as the price she
has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but also her
family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands "honorable
before God and men." The second step is to ascertain Escritor's sincerity in
her religious belief. The accused appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the
Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are
strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality
was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation
after 10 years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and 10 years
before she entered the judiciary. In any event, even if the Court deems
sufficient Escritor's evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its
centrality in her faith, the case cannot still be decided using the "compelling
state interest" test. The case is one of first impression, thus the parties were
not aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court's use of
the "compelling state interest" test. To properly settle the issue, the
government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor's stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her
conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's action
would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at Escritor's
claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the "compelling state
interest" test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been
given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's
compelling interest which can override respondent's religious belief and
practice. Thus, the case was remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator. 458 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary [GR 153888, 9 July 2003] 10 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concurs
in separate opinion to which 1 joined Facts: The Islamic Da'wah Council of
the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP), a corporation that operates under Department of
Social Welfare and Development License SB-01-085, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially
to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic
organizations and an active member of international organizations such as
the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Regional
Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and the
World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue
halal2 certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions IDCP carries
out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue
halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. IDCP formulated
in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah
for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications. In that same year, IDCP began to issue, for a fee, certifications
to qualified products and food manufacturers. IDCP even adopted for use on
its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent
Office under Patent 4-2000-03664. On 26 October 2001, the Office of the
Executive Secretary issued Executive Order (EO) 465, series of 2001, creating
the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating the Office on
Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, OMA has
the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. On 8 May 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns
NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin,
a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim
consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those
without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and
therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. OMA also sent letters to food
manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA
lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, IDCP lost revenues after food
manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. IDCP filed a petition
for prohibition, praying for the declaration of nullity of EO 46 and the
prohibition of the Office of the Executive Secretary and OMA from
implementing the subject EO. Issue: Whether the OMA encroached ipon the
religious freedom of Muslim organizatinos to interpret what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption. Held: OMA was created in 1981 through
Executive Order 697 "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the
mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural
community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the
constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make
sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision
found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA
the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like IDCP to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in
effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. There is no compelling justification for the government
to deprive muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in
the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike
EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. 459
Epperson vs. Arkansas [393 US 97, 12 November 1968] Fortas (J) Facts: The
Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or
university "to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals," or "to adopt or use in any such
institution a textbook that teaches" this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor
and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position. On Little Rock, the
official textbook furnished for the high school biology course did not have a
section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the academic year 1965-1966, the
school administration, on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the
school system, adopted and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) prescribed a textbook which contained a chapter setting forth "the
theory about the origin of man from a lower form of animal." Susan
Epperson, a young woman who graduated from Arkansas' school system and
then obtained her master's degree in zoology at the University of Illinois, was
employed by the Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th
grade biology at Central High School. At the start of the next academic year,
1965, she was confronted by the new textbook (which one surmises from the
record was not unwelcome to her). She faced at least a literal dilemma
because she was supposed to use the new textbook for classroom instruction
and presumably to teach the statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so
would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal. She instituted the
action in the Chancery Court of the State, seeking a declaration that the
Arkansas statute is void and enjoining the State and the officials of the Little
Rock school system from dismissing her for violation of the statute's
provisions. H. H. Blanchard, a parent of children attending the public schools,
intervened in support of the action. The Chancery Court held that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
court noted that this Amendment encompasses the prohibitions upon state
interference with freedom of speech and thought which are contained in the
First Amendment. Accordingly, it held that the challenged statute is
unconstitutional because, in violation of the First Amendment, it "tends to
hinder the quest for knowledge, restrict the freedom to learn, and restrain
the freedom to teach." In this perspective, it held that the Act was an
unconstitutional and void restraint upon the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed. It
sustained the statute as an exercise of the State's power to specify the
curriculum in public schools. It did not address itself to the competing
constitutional considerations. Issue: Whether Arkansas law violates the
Constitution by prohibiting the instruction that man, by evolution, came from
lower animals. Held: It is of no moment whether the law is deemed to
prohibit mention of Darwin's theory, or to forbid any or all of the infinite
varieties of communication embraced within the term "teaching." Under
either interpretation, the law must be stricken because of its conflict with the
constitutional prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The overriding fact is that
Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of
Genesis by a particular religious group. The State's undoubted right to
prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right
to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or
doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First
Amendment. It is much too late to argue that the State may impose upon the
teachers in its schools any conditions that it chooses, however restrictive
they may be of constitutional guarantees. Herein, there can be no doubt that
Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of
evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of
Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No
suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its
citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the
law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's "monkey law,"
candidly stated its purpose: to make it unlawful "to teach any theory that
denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to
teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals."
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced
Arkansas to adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's reference
to "the story of the Divine Creation of man" as taught in the Bible, but there
is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the
teaching of a theory which, it was thought, "denied" the divine creation of
man. Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.
Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and
universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined
to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict
with the Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the
mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the
Constitution. 460 Engel vs. Vitale [370 US 421, 25 June 1962] Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Black (J) Facts: The Board of
Education of Union Free School District 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting
in its official capacity under state law, directed the School District's principal
to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence
of a teacher at the beginning of each school day: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us,
our parents, our teachers and our Country." This daily procedure was
adopted on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a
governmental agency created by the State Constitution to which the New
York Legislature has granted broad supervisory, executive, and legislative
powers over the State's public school system. These state officials composed
the prayer which they recommended and published as a part of their
"Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools," saying: "We
believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and women of
good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program."
Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents' prayer was adopted by the
School District, the parents of 10 pupils brought the action in a New York
State Court insisting that use of this official prayer in the public schools was
contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves
and their children. Among other things, these parents challenged the
constitutionality of both the state law authorizing the School District to direct
the use of prayer in public schools and the School District's regulation
ordering the recitation of this particular prayer on the ground that these
actions of official governmental agencies violate that part of the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which commands that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" - a command
which was "made applicable to the State of New York by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the said Constitution." The New York Court of Appeals, over
the dissents of Judges Dye and Fuld, sustained an order of the lower state
courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer
as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools
did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents'
objection. Issue: Whether the New York law adopting the practice of reciting
the Regent’s prayer in public schools violate the (Non)Establishment Clause.
Held: By using its public school system to encourage recitation of the
Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no
doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's
blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious activity. It is a
solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the
Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious. There can
be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the
religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer. The argument to the
contrary, which is largely based upon the contention that the Regents' prayer
is "non-denominational" and the fact that the program does not require all
pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain
silent or be excused from the room, ignores the essential nature of the
program's constitutional defects. Neither the fact that the prayer may be
denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First
Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The New York laws officially prescribing the
Regents' prayer are inconsistent both with the purposes of the Establishment
Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself. 461 School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania vs. Schempp [374 US 203, 17 June 1963]
Clark (J) Facts: [Case 142] The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law
requires that "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without
comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child
shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading,
upon the written request of his parent or guardian." The Schempp family,
husband and wife and two of their three children (who are of the Unitarian
faith and are members of the Unitarian church in Germantown, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
where they, as well as another son, Ellory, regularly attend religious services),
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States are, have been, and will continue to be violated unless this statute be
declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions of the First
Amendment. They sought to enjoin the School District of Abington Township
(Pennsylvania), wherein the Schempp children attend school (the Abington
Senior High School), and its officers and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction of the Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools of the district
pursuant to the statute. A three-judge statutory District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the statute is violative of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and directed that appropriate
injunctive relief issue. Hence, the appeal by the District, its officials and the
Superintendent. [Case 119] In 1905 the Board of School Commissioners of
Baltimore City adopted a rule pursuant to Art. 77, 202 of the Annotated Code
of Maryland. The rule provided for the holding of opening exercises in the
schools of the city, consisting primarily of the "reading, without comment, of
a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." Mrs.
Madalyn Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, are both professed
atheists. Following unsuccessful attempts to have the school board rescind
the rule, the suit was filed for mandamus to compel its rescission and
cancellation. It was alleged that William was a student in a public school of
the city and Mrs. Murray, his mother, was a taxpayer therein; that it was the
practice under the rule to have a reading on each school morning from the
King James version of the Bible; that at the Murrays' insistence the rule was
amended to permit children to be excused from the exercise on request of
the parent and that William had been excused pursuant thereto; that
nevertheless the rule as amended was in violation of the Murrays' rights "to
freedom of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and in
violation of "the principle of separation between church and state, contained
therein." The petition particularized the Murrays' atheistic beliefs and stated
that the rule, as practiced, violated their rights "in that it threatens their
religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and
subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it
pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values,
equating these values with religious values, and thereby renders sinister,
alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners, promoting doubt
and question of their morality, good citizenship and good faith." The Board
demurred and the trial court, recognizing that the demurrer admitted all
facts well pleaded, sustained it without leave to amend. The Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed, the majority of four justices holding the exercise not in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, with three justices
dissenting. Issue: Whether the reading of the bible, even without comments,
at the start of the school day by students violate the (Non) Establishment
clause. Held: The First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (310 US 296, 303 [1940]), it was held
that "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth]
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The
First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws." In a series of cases since
Cantwell the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, and it does so in
the present case. Further, the Establishment Clause forbids not only
governmental preference of one religion over another. As was held in
Everson v. Board of Education (330 US 1, 15 [1947]), "neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." The
wholesome "neutrality" stems from a recognition of the teachings of history
that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental
and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to
the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be
placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment
Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) found in the Free Exercise Clause,
which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance
and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This
the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, the two clauses may overlap; but
still, the distinction between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment
Clause violation need not be so attended. Applying the Establishment Clause
principles in Case 142, the States are requiring the selection and reading at
the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation
of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed
as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to
attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the supervision
and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. Such an
opening exercise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be
so, and thus the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the
Establishment Clause. On the other hand, in Case 119, although the State
contends that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all public
school children without regard to their religious belief, and that its purpose is
not strictly religious as it is sought to be accomplished through readings,
without comment, from the Bible; the place of the Bible as an instrument of
religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of the pervading
religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific
permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as well as the
recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises. None of these
factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible is here used either as
an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the
teaching of secular subjects. Therefore, ib oth cases, the laws require
religious exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation
of the rights of Schempp, et. al. Nor are these required exercises mitigated by
the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental
request, for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality
under the Establishment Clause. Further, it is no defense to urge that the
religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First
Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all
too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, "it is proper
to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." 462 Stone vs. Graham
[449 US 39, 17 November 1980] Per Curiam Facts: A Kentucky statute
requires the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with
private contributions, on the wall of each public classroom in the State.
Stone, et. al. claiming that this statute violates the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, sought an injunction against its
enforcement. The state trial court upheld the statute, finding that its
"avowed purpose" was "secular and not religious," and that the statute
would "neither advance nor inhibit any religion or religious group" nor
involve the State excessively in religious matters. The Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky affirmed by an equally divided court. Issue:
Whether the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school rooms,
procured from private contributions, violate the non-establishment clause.
Held: Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore
unconstitutional. The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian
faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind
us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably
secular matters, such as honoring one's parents, killing or murder, adultery,
stealing, false witness, and covetousness. Rather, the first part of the
Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers: worshipping the
Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and
observing the Sabbath Day. The case is not in which the Ten Commandments
are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like. Posting of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) religious texts on the wall serves no such
educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to
have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate
upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However
desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible
state objective under the Establishment Clause. It does not matter that the
posted copies of the Ten Commandments are financed by voluntary private
contributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the auspices of the
legislature provides the "official support of the State Government" that the
Establishment Clause prohibits. Nor is it significant that the Bible verses
involved in this case are merely posted on the wall, rather than read aloud,
for "it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively
minor encroachments on the First Amendment." Ky. Rev. Stat. 158.178
(1980) violates the first part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, and thus the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 463 Aglipay v. Ruiz [GR 45459, 13
March 1937] First Division, Laurel (J): 5 concur Facts: In May 1936, the
Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be
a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to
denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of Sotto, the Director of Posts publicly announced that the designs of
the postage for printing have been sent to the United States. The said stamps
were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by
Aglipay. Issue: Whether the stamp (containing a map of the Philippines, the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937") violate the
Nonestablishment clause by allegedly promoting the Catholic religion. Held:
Section 13, Article VI, of the 1935 Constitution provides that “no public
money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support
of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium." The
prohibition is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize
the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. Herein, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an
event considered of international importance to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus,
instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the
Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." Thus, while
the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with
an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.
The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because
of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to
mere incidental results not contemplated. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 464 Mueller vs. Allen [463 US 388, 29 June 1983]
Rehnquist (J) Facts: Minnesota, like every other State, provides its citizens
with free elementary and secondary schooling. Minnesota, by a law originally
enacted in 1955 and revised in 1976 and again in 1978, permits state
taxpayers to claim a deduction from gross income for certain expenses
incurred in educating their children. The deduction is limited to actual
expenses incurred for the "tuition, textbooks and transportation" of
dependents attending elementary or secondary schools. A deduction may
not exceed $500 per dependent in grades K through 6 and $700 per
dependent in grades 7 through 12. About 820,000 students attended this
school system in the most recent school year. During the same year,
approximately 91,000 elementary and secondary students attended some
500 privately supported schools located in Minnesota, and about 95% of
these students attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian.
Certain Minnesota taxpayers (Mueller, et. al.) sued in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota claiming that 290.09, subd. 22,
violated the Establishment Clause by providing financial assistance to
sectarian institutions. They named as defendants the Commissioner of the
Department of Revenue of Minnesota and several parents who took
advantage of the tax deduction for expenses incurred in sending their
children to parochial schools. The District Court granted the Commissioner,
et. al.'s motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute was "neutral
on its face and in its application and does not have a primary effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding that the Minnesota statute substantially benefited a "broad class
of Minnesota citizens." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, was not offended by
this arrangement. Issue: Whether the Minnesota law allowing tax deductions
for expenses incurred in children’s education violates the Establishment
Clause inasmuch as allegedly it will provide financial assistance to sectarian
institutions. Held: A State's decision to defray the cost of educational
expenses incurred by parents - regardless of the type of schools their
children attend - evidences a purpose that is both secular and
understandable. An educated populace is essential to the political and
economic health of any community, and a State's efforts to assist parents in
meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this secular
purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry is well educated. Similarly,
Minnesota, like other States, could conclude that there is a strong public
interest in assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both
sectarian and nonsectarian. By educating a substantial number of students
such schools relieve public schools of a correspondingly great burden - to the
benefit of all taxpayers. In addition, private schools may serve as a
benchmark for public schools, in a manner analogous to the "TVA yardstick"
for private power companies. Further, there are several features of the
Minnesota tax deduction particularly significant in determining that the
Minnesota statute does not have "the primary effect of advancing the
sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools." First, an essential feature of
Minnesota's arrangement is the fact that 290.09, subd. 22, is only one among
many deductions - such as those for medical expenses, 290.09, subd. 10, and
charitable contributions, 290.21, subd. 3 - available under the Minnesota tax
laws. Traditionally "legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes," in part because the
"familiarity with local conditions" enjoyed by legislators especially enables
them to "achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden." The Minnesota
Legislature's judgment that a deduction for educational expenses fairly
equalizes the tax burden of its citizens and encourages desirable
expenditures for educational purposes is entitled to substantial deference.
Other characteristics of 290.09, subd. 22, argue equally strongly for the
provision's constitutionality. Most importantly, the deduction is available for
educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children
attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private
schools or sectarian private schools. The State's provision of a forum
neutrally "available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious
speakers" does not "confer any imprimatur of state approval," so here: "the
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index
of secular effect." Although the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Establishment Clause extends beyond prohibition of a state
church or payment of state funds to one or more churches, its prohibition
does not extend to the type of tax deduction established by Minnesota. The
historic purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the sort of
attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of
individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the
neutrally available tax benefit at issue. Furthermore, the Minnesota statute
does not "excessively entangle" the State in religion. The only plausible
source of the "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance," necessary to run afoul of this standard would lie in the fact that
state officials must determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a
deduction. State officials must disallow deductions taken for "instructional
books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or
worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship." 465 Lemon vs. Kurtzman [403 US 602, 28 June 1971] Burger (CJ)
Facts: [The Rhode Island Statute] The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act
was enacted in 1969. It rests on the legislative finding that the quality of
education available in nonpublic elementary schools has been jeopardized by
the rapidly rising salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated
teachers. The Act authorizes state officials to supplement the salaries of
teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools by paying
directly to a teacher an amount not in excess of 15% of his current annual
salary. As supplemented, however, a nonpublic school teacher's salary
cannot exceed the maximum paid to teachers in the State's public schools,
and the recipient must be certified by the state board of education in
substantially the same manner as public school teachers. In order to be
eligible for the Rhode Island salary supplement, the recipient must teach in a
nonpublic school at which the average per-pupil expenditure on secular
education is less than the average in the State's public schools during a
specified period. The State Commissioner of Education also requires eligible
schools to submit financial data. If this information indicates a per-pupil
expenditure in excess of the statutory limitation, the records of the school in
question must be examined in order to assess how much of the expenditure
is attributable to secular education and how much to religious activity. The
Act also requires that teachers eligible for salary supplements must teach
only those subjects that are offered in the State's public schools. They must
use "only teaching materials which are used in the public schools." Finally,
any teacher applying for a salary supplement must first agree in writing "not
to teach a course in religion for so long as or during such time as he or she
receives any salary supplements" under the Act. Certain citizens and
taxpayers of Rhode Island brought the suit to have the Rhode Island Salary
Supplement Act declared unconstitutional and its operation enjoined on the
ground that it violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment. The District Court concluded that the Act violated the
Establishment Clause, holding that it fostered "excessive entanglement"
between government and religion. In addition two judges thought that the
Act had the impermissible effect of giving "significant aid to a religious
enterprise." [The Pennsylvania Statute] Pennsylvania has adopted a program
that has some but not all of the features of the Rhode Island program. The
Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act was passed
in 1968 in response to a crisis that the Pennsylvania Legislature found existed
in the State's nonpublic schools due to rapidly rising costs. The statute
affirmatively reflects the legislative conclusion that the State's educational
goals could appropriately be fulfilled by government support of "those purely
secular educational objectives achieved through nonpublic education." The
statute authorizes the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to
"purchase" specified "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools.
Under the "contracts" authorized by the statute, the State directly
reimburses nonpublic schools solely for their actual expenditures for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. A school seeking
reimbursement must maintain prescribed accounting procedures that
identify the "separate" cost of the "secular educational service." These
accounts are subject to state audit. The funds for this program were
originally derived from a new tax on horse and harness racing, but the Act is
now financed by a portion of the state tax on cigarettes. There are several
significant statutory restrictions on state aid. Reimbursement is limited to
courses Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
"presented in the curricula of the public schools." It is further limited "solely"
to courses in the following "secular" subjects: mathematics, modern foreign
languages, physical science, and physical education. Textbooks and
instructional materials included in the program must be approved by the
state Superintendent of Public Instruction. Finally, the statute prohibits
reimbursement for any course that contains "any subject matter expressing
religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect." The Act
went into effect on 1 July 1968, and the first reimbursement payments to
schools were made on 2 September 1969. Some $5 million has been
expended annually under the Act. The State has now entered into contracts
with some 1,181 nonpublic elementary and secondary schools with a student
population of some 535,215 pupils - more than 20% of the total number of
students in the State. More than 96% of these pupils attend church-related
schools, and most of these schools are affiliated with the Roman Catholic
church. Associations of persons resident in Pennsylvania declaring belief in
the separation of church and state; and other citizens and taxpayers of
Pennsylvania, including Lemon (a parent of a child attending public school in
Pennsylvania) brought an action in the District Court to challenge the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute. The District Court held that the
Act violated neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clause. Issue:
Whether the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the
Establishment clause Held: In the absence of precisely stated constitutional
prohibitions, the Court must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection:
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such
tests may be gleaned from cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion." Inquiry into the
legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes affords no
basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion. On
the contrary, the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to
enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures
meant anything else. A State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining
minimum standards in all schools it allows to operate. As there is nothing
here that undermines the stated legislative intent; it must therefore be
accorded appropriate deference. Still, its hould be determined whether the
government entanglement with religion is excessive. The Court thus must
examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority. Herein, both statutes
foster an impermissible degree of entanglement. The church schools involved
in the Rhode Island program are located close to parish churches. This
understandably permits convenient access for religious exercises since
instruction in faith and morals is part of the total educational process. The
school buildings contain identifying religious symbols such as crosses on the
exterior and crucifixes, and religious paintings and statues either in the
classrooms or hallways. Although only approximately 30 minutes a day are
devoted to direct religious instruction, there are religiously oriented
extracurricular activities. Approximately two-thirds of the teachers in these
schools are nuns of various religious orders. Their dedicated efforts provide
an atmosphere in which religious instruction and religious vocations are
natural and proper parts of life in such schools. The parochial schools
constituted "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church."
The various characteristics of the schools make them "a powerful vehicle for
transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation." This process of
inculcating religious doctrine is, of course, enhanced by the impressionable
age of the pupils, in primary schools particularly. In short, parochial schools
involve substantial religious activity and purpose. The substantial religious
character of these church-related schools gives rise to entangling church-
state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid. Although
the District Court found that concern for religious values did not inevitably or
necessarily intrude into the content of secular subjects, the Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) considerable religious
activities of these schools led the legislature to provide for careful
governmental controls and surveillance by state authorities in order to
ensure that state aid supports only secular education. The dangers and
corresponding entanglements are enhanced by the particular form of aid that
the Rhode Island Act provides. Teachers have a substantially different
ideological character from books. In terms of potential for involving some
aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is
ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not. The Court cannot
ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses
to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-
college education. The conflict of functions inheres in the situation. A
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be
inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her
personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the
First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church. There is another area of
entanglement in the Rhode Island program that gives concern. The statute
excludes teachers employed by nonpublic schools whose average per-pupil
expenditures on secular education equal or exceed the comparable figures
for public schools. In the event that the total expenditures of an otherwise
eligible school exceed this norm, the program requires the government to
examine the school's records in order to determine how much of the total
expenditures is attributable to secular education and how much to religious
activity. This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content
of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that the
Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive
government direction of church schools and hence of churches. There is
danger that pervasive modern governmental power will ultimately intrude on
religion and thus conflict with the Religion Clauses. The Pennsylvania statute
also provides state aid to church-related schools for teachers' salaries. The
complaint describes an educational system that is very similar to the one
existing in Rhode Island. Reimbursement is not only limited to courses
offered in the public schools and materials approved by state officials, but
the statute excludes "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the
morals or forms of worship of any sect." In addition, schools seeking
reimbursement must maintain accounting procedures that require the State
to establish the cost of the secular as distinguished from the religious
instruction. The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of
providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school. The history
of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that such
programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of
control and surveillance. The government cash grants provide no basis for
predicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls will not
follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to inspect and
evaluate a church-related school's financial records and to determine which
expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an intimate and
continuing relationship between church and state. The potential for political
divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggravated in these two
statutory programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations and the
likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow. The
Rhode Island District Court found that the parochial school system's
"monumental and deepening financial crisis" would "inescapably" require
larger annual appropriations subsidizing greater percentages of the salaries
of lay teachers. Although no facts have been developed in this respect in the
Pennsylvania case, it appears that such pressures for expanding aid have
already required the state legislature to include a portion of the state
revenues from cigarette taxes in the program. 466 Stone vs. Graham [449 US
39, 17 November 1980] Per Curiam Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: A Kentucky statute requires the posting of
a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on
the wall of each public classroom in the State. Stone, et. al. claiming that this
statute violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, sought an injunction against its enforcement. The state trial
court upheld the statute, finding that its "avowed purpose" was "secular and
not religious," and that the statute would "neither advance nor inhibit any
religion or religious group" nor involve the State excessively in religious
matters. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky affirmed by
an equally divided court. Issue: Whether the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school rooms, procured from private contributions,
violate the non-establishment clause. Held: Kentucky's statute requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in public school rooms has no secular
legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional. The pre-eminent
purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly
religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in
the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine
themselves to arguably secular matters, such as honoring one's parents,
killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and covetousness. Rather,
the first part of the Commandments concerns the religious duties of
believers: worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the
Lord's name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day. The case is not in which
the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where
the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history,
civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like. Posting of religious texts
on the wall serves no such educational function. If the posted copies of the
Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the
schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the
Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private
devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment
Clause. It does not matter that the posted copies of the Ten Commandments
are financed by voluntary private contributions, for the mere posting of the
copies under the auspices of the legislature provides the "official support of
the State Government" that the Establishment Clause prohibits. Nor is it
significant that the Bible verses involved in this case are merely posted on the
wall, rather than read aloud, for "it is no defense to urge that the religious
practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First
Amendment." Ky. Rev. Stat. 158.178 (1980) violates the first part of the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test, and thus the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution. 467 Wallace vs. Jaffree [472 US 38, 4 June 1985] Stevens (J)
Facts: Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County, Alabama. On 28 May
1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of three of his minor children; two of
them were second-grade students and the third was then in kindergarten;
which named members of the Mobile County School Board, various school
officials, and the minors' three teachers as defendants; alleging that (1) they
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an
injunction restraining the board, etc. and each of them from maintaining or
allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms
of religious observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of
the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution," (2) that two of the children
had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination "from the
beginning of the school year in September, 1981"; (3) that the teachers had
"on a daily basis" led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; (4) that
the minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer group class
members if they did not participate; and (5) that Ishmael Jaffree had
repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the devotional services be
stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute.
On 4 June 1982, the Jaffrees filed an amended complaint seeking class
certification, and on 30 June 1982, they filed a second amended complaint
naming the Governor of Alabama and various state officials as additional
defendants. In that amendment the Jaffrees challenged the constitutionality
of three Alabama statutes: 16-1-20 (enacted in 1978, which authorized a 1-
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) minute period
of silence in all public schools "for meditation"), 16-1-20.1 (enacted in 1981,
which authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer"),
and 16-1-20.2 (enacted in 1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing
students" in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God, the Creator and Supreme
Judge of the world"). On 2 August 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on Jaffree's motion for a preliminary injunction. A week after the
hearing, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction. At the
preliminary-injunction stage of the case, the District Court distinguished 16-
1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing
wrong" with 16-1-20, but that 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both invalid
because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the part of the State of
Alabama to encourage a religious activity." After the trial on the merits, the
District Court did not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power
to establish a state religion if it chooses to do so. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both
16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. The US
Supreme Court has already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with
respect to 16-1-20.2 (Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 US 924 [1984]). On the other
hand, the Jaffreys have not questioned the holding that 16-1-20 is valid.
Hence, the constitutionality of 16-1-20.1 was left for the resolution by the
Supreme Court. Issue: Whether 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a period of
silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a law respecting the
establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. Held:
The First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to
interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. Until the
Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, the First
Amendment's restraints on the exercise of federal power simply did not
apply to the States. But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any
State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that
Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power
to legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the Congress'
power. This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary proposition
of law time and time again. When the Court has been called upon to construe
the breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the criteria
developed over a period of many years. Thus, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612 -613 (1971), it was held that "Every analysis in this area must begin
with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over
many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated
by this case. No consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a
statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. For even though a statute
that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion,
the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. In applying the purpose
test, it is appropriate to ask "whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion." Herein, the answer to that question is
dispositive. For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous
affirmative answer, but it also reveals that the enactment of 16-1-20.1 was
not motivated by any clearly secular purpose - indeed, the statute had no
secular purpose. The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to
engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during
the schoolday. The 1978 statute already protected that right, containing
nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer during
a silent minute of meditation. Only two conclusions are consistent with the
text of 16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of state
endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted for no
purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but a meaningless or
irrational act. The Alabama legislature enacted 16-1-20.1, despite the
existence of 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's
endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each
schoolday. The addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the State
intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement
is not consistent with the established principle that the government must
pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 468 Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals [GR
L-5917, 28 January 1955] En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 5 concur Facts: Upon
the death of Mons. Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente (IFI) since 1902, Mons. Santiago A. Fonacier was elected
Obispo Maximo, on 14 October 1940, in accordance with the constitution of
the church. The latter's successor should have been elected by the Asamblea
Magna of the Church on 1 September 1943. However, due to the
circumstances brought about by the Pacific War, it was agreed, on 16
December 1941, by the Bishops stationed in Manila and neighboring
provinces that Mons. Fonacier should hold over as Obispo Maximo of the IFI,
for the duration of the emergency created by the year. After the liberation of
the Philippines, and on 1 September 1945, an attempt was made to convene
the Asamblea Magna for the purpose of electing the Obispo Maximo, but
owing to lack of quorum, the Bishops present agreed that Mons. Fonacier
would continue for another year, or until 1 September 1946. On 2 September
1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops) of the
IFI convened and approved the designation of bishops to their respective
bishoprics. In that meeting Mons. Alejandro Remollino was assigned as
bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that the latter notified the
priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Mons. Fonacier wrote him a
letter dated 18 September 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of
his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he
(Fonacier) had approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council as
provided for in the constitution. To this letter Bishop Remollino replied
explaining his side and adding that he was ready to defend his stand on the
matter before the courts of justice. In view of this attitude, Mons. Fonacier
ordered the expulsion of Bishop Remollino from the church and also of
Bishop Manuel Aguilar whom Mons. Fonacier suspected to be the instigator
of certain acts of insubordination and defamation against him. On 1
December 1945, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges against Mons. Fonacier
as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the Supreme
Council of Bishops, held on 21 January 1946, which decreed the forced
resignation of Mons. Fonacier, and to the Asamblea Magna or Asamblea
General of the church, held on 22 January 1946. This body approved the
forced resignation of Mons. Fonacier and elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca
as Supreme Bishop to succeed Mons. Fonacier. When notified of his removal
as Obispo Maximo and required to turn over all the funds, documents and
other properties of the church to his successor, Mons. Fonacier refused. The
case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the IFI,
represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against
Mons.Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an accounting of his
administration of all the temporal properties he has his possession belonging
to said church and to recover the same from him on the ground that he had
ceased be the Supreme Bishop of said religious organization. On 1 September
1946 the Asamblea Magna convened and elected Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes,
Jr. as Obispo Maximo. On the same date Mons. Fonacier and some of his
followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected Mons Juan Jamias as their
Supreme Bishop. Thus two factions of the IFI were created. Thus, Bishop
Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was made a co-plaintiff in a supplementary
complaint. The faction under Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. according to the
statement of the Director of National Library, issued on 22 May 1947, had 19
bishops and 252 priests while the faction under Mons. Juan Jamias had 10
bishops and only 40 priests. Thus on 23 June 1947, the Secretary of Public
Instruction promulgated an order to the effect that for administrative
purposes, Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was recognized as sole head of the
IFI and the applications of priests of said church for permits to solemnize
marriages would be granted if it were shown thereon that they recognized
Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as the Obispo Maximo of said church. The Supreme
Court, however, denied the power of the Secretary to stop the Fonacier
group from obtaining licenses to solemnize marriages. On 22 January 1948,
the bishop and priests under Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., had increased from 252
to 293 while those under Mons. Jamias were only 64 and Mons. De los Reyes,
Jr. was duly registered as "corporation sole for the administration of the
temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, pursuant to the provisions
of Articles 154-164 of the Corporation Law." On 17 May 1950, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and
legitimate Supreme Bishop of the IFI, and ordering Mons. Fonacier to render
an accounting of his administration of the properties and funds of the church
"from the time he began occupying the position of Secretario de Economia
Temporal thereof until the present time." Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) When the case was taken to the Court of
Appeals, the latter found the decision of the Court of origin in accordance
with law and the evidence and affirmed the same in toto. The case was
elevated to the Superme Court by virtue of a petition for review interposed
by Mons. Fonacier. Issue: Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the ouster of certain bishops of the IPI, to
determine the proper faction to hold the church’s property, and/or pass
upon matters involving the church’s amendment of its constitution, etc. Held:
Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it
professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not
be followed by the civil courts. In some instances, not only have the civil
courts assumed the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals
and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions
to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of
the church. Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a member without notice
or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a
property right is involved. Where there is a schism which leads to a
separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to
the use of the property must be determined by ordinary principles which
govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is
that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must
control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the
congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then
those who adhere in the acknowledged organism by which the body is
governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in choosing to
separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the
authority of the government body, can claim no rights in the property from
the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation.
Herein, the properties of the IFI are held by a religious congregation, and that
the numerical majority is on the side of the faction of Mons. de los Reyes, et.
al. where the number of its bishops and priests, as of 22 January 1948, were
293 as against 64 of Mons. Fonacier's group. On the other hand, the
amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by Mons. Fonacier, having to do
with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the
church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. 469
West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette [319 US 624, 14 June
1943] Jackson (J) Facts: Following the decision by the US Supreme Court on 3
June 1940 in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (310 U.S. 586 , 60 S.Ct.
1010, 127 A.L.R. 1493), the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to
require all schools therein to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics,
and in the Constitutions of the United States and of the State "for the
purpose of teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and
spirit of Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the organization and
machinery of the government." The Board of Education was directed, with
advice of the State Superintendent of Schools, to "prescribe the courses of
study covering these subjects" for public schools. The Act made it the duty of
private, parochial and denominational schools to prescribe courses of study
"similar to those required for the public schools." The Board of Education on
9 January 1942, adopted a resolution containing recitals taken largely from
the Court's Gobitis opinion and ordering that the salute to the flag become "a
regular part of the program of activities in the public schools," that all
teachers and pupils "shall be required to participate in the salute honoring
the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute
the Flag be regarded as an Act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
accordingly." The resolution originally required the "commonly accepted
salute to the Flag" which it defined. Objections to the salute as "being too
much like Hitler's" were raised by the Parent and Teachers Association, the
Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the Federation of Women's Clubs.
Some modification appears to have been made in deference to these
objections, but no concession was made to Jehovah's Witnesses. What is
now required is the "stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep the right hand
raised with palm turned up while the following is repeated: "I pledge
allegiance to the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which
it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Failure to
conform is "insubordination" dealt with by expulsion. Readmission is denied
by statute until compliance. Meanwhile the expelled child is "unlawfully
absent" and may be proceeded against as a delinquent. His parents or
guardians are liable to prosecution, and if convicted are subject to fine not
exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days. Certain citizens of the
United States and of West Virginia, including Barnette, et. al., brought suit in
the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated
asking its injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulations
against Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses are an unincorporated body
teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superiod to that of laws
enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal
version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says: "Thou shalt not
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under
the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them." They
consider that the flag is an "image" within this command. For this reason
they refuse to salute it. Children of this faith have been expelled from school
and are threatened with exclusion for no other cause. Officials threaten to
send them to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles.
Parents of such children have been prosecuted and are threatened with
prosecutions for causing delinquency. The District Court restrained
enforcement as to the Witnesses and those of that class. The Board of
Education brought the case to the US Supreme Court by direct appeal. Issue:
Whether compulsion in saluting the flag, as employed herein, is a permissible
means for its achievement. Held: In connection with the pledges, the flag
salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some
system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.
Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to
knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The
State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns and maces,
uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix,
the altar and shrine, and clerical reiment. Symbols of State often convey
political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones.
Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of
acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee. A
person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one
man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn. The compulsory
flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego
any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the
prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent
by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning. It is now a
commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is
tolerated by the Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only
on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here the
power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining
passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that
would justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the compulsory
flag salute, the Court is required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the
individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to
compel him to utter what is not in his mind. Struggles to coerce uniformity of
sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country
have been waged by many good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a
relatively recent phenomenon but at other times and places the ends have
been racial or territorial security, support of a dynasty or regime, and
particular plans for saving souls. As first and moderate methods to attain
unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-
increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater,
so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no
deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from
finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public
educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems
trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was
designed to avoid these Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) ends by avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the
American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of its authority. We
set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies
those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority. Thus,
the limitations of the Constitution are applied with no fear that freedom to
be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the
social organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine
is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free
minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State
as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is
not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow
of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
the Court. The action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. 470 Ebralinag vs.
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [GR 95770, 1 March 1993]; also
Amolo vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [GR 85887] En Banc,
Grino-Aquino (J): 10 concur, 2 concur is separate opinions, 1 on leave, 1 took
no part Facts: 43 students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo
Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan
Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary
School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan
Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando,
Cebu, were expelled (23 October 1990) upon order of then Acting Division
Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso. Said students in the towns of Daan
Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province (GR 95770,
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent) were expelled for refusing to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required
by Republic Act 1265 (11 July 1955), and by Department Order 8 dated 21
July 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. This prompted
some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education
Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. 25 students who were
similarly expelled (high school and grade school students enrolled in public
schools in Asturias, Cebu [GR 95887, Amolo vs. Director Superintendent])
because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division
Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more
children of Jehovah's Witnesses. On 31 October 1990, the students and their
parents filed the Special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
Prohibition alleging that the Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, et.
al. acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public
education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that
those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God." They feel bound by
the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21." They
consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against
official control. They stress, however, that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior
that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. On 27 November
1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the Division Superintendent
to immediately readmit the students to their respective classes until further
orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and
Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents
in the cases. Issue: Whether the students, who belong to the Jehovah’s
Witness sect, should be expelled (following the holding in the case of
Gerona) for not saluting the flag in accordance with RA 1265. Held: Religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship
of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare. The sole justification for a
prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the students
from the schools is not justified. By exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the
school population" will not shake up our part of the globe and suddenly
produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes." After all, what the students seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn
not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive
training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism,
respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and
duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values as part of the curricula.
Expelling or banning the students from Philippine schools will bring about the
very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious
group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities. Moreover, the expulsion of members
of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all."
While it is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the
laws of the land; when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interests"
intervenes. Exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give
them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard
must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not
be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if
they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, such conduct cannot possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent." Thus, although the Court upholds the students' right under our
Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their
religious beliefs, it hopes, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our
country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and
cherish the Philippine flag. 471 American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-
9637, 30 April 1957] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Second Division, Felix (J): 7 concur, 1 concur in result Facts: The
American Bible Society, is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November 1898. The
City of Manila, is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act 409, (Revised
Charter of the City of Manila). In the course of its ministry, the Society's
Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel
portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On 29
May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the
Society that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since
November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society to secure, within
3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953,
in the total sum of P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the
City under protest the said permit and license fees, giving at the same time
notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the
legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being collected,
which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to the
present action. After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. The Society appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
certified the case to the Supreme Court for the reason that the errors
assigned involved only questions of law. Issue: Whether the City Treasurer
may impose permit fee upon the religious organization before the latter may
distribute and sell bibles with the City of Manila. Held: Article III, section 1,
clause (7) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of religious profession
and worship. Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to its Creator. It has reference to one's
views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of
reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will. The
constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. A tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities is
different from a tax on property used or employed in connection with those
activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of
delivering a sermon. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power
to control or suppress its enjoyment. The power to impose a license tax on
the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal
fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the
activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied
and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise. Such is the inherent vice and evil of a flat
license tax. Dissemination of religious information cannot be conditioned
upon the approval of an official or manager. The right to enjoy freedom of
the press and religion occupies a preferred position as against the
constitutional right of property owners. Herein, Section 27 (e) of
Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) -- which exempts corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes, Provided however, That the income of whatever kind and
character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under the Code -- does not apply to the Society
as its act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious in nature.
Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannot as well be applied to the Society, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs. The fact that the price of the bibles and other religious pamphlets are
little higher than the actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean that
it is already engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
“merchandise” for profit. Lastly, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Ordinance 3000 of the City of Manila, which requires the
obtention of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the
businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, is not applicable to
the Society, as its business, trade or occupation is not particularly mentioned
in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is
required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper
supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing the sanitation,
security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged
in the business of the Society. 472 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries vs. Board of
Equalization of California [493 US 378, 17 January 1990] O'Connor (J) Facts:
California's Sales and Use Tax Law requires retailers to pay a sales tax "for the
privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail." The use tax, as a
complement to the sales tax, reaches out-of-state purchases by residents of
the State. It is "imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this
state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer," at the same
rate as the sales tax (6 percent). Although the use tax is imposed on the
purchaser, it is generally collected by the retailer at the time the sale is
made. Neither the State Constitution nor the State Sales and Use Tax Law
exempts religious organizations from the sales and use tax, apart from a
limited exemption for the serving of meals by religious organizations. During
the tax period from 1974 to 1981, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious
organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit corporation and
recognized as such by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and by the California State
Controller pursuant to the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Laws of the State of
California. The Ministry's constitution and bylaws provide that it "is called for
the purpose of establishing and maintaining an evangelistic outreach for the
worship of Almighty God." This outreach is to be performed "by all available
means, both at home and in foreign lands," and "shall specifically include
evangelistic crusades; missionary endeavors; radio broadcasting (as owner,
broadcaster, and placement agency); television broadcasting (both as owner
and broadcaster); and audio production and reproduction of music; audio
production and reproduction of preaching; audio production and
reproduction of teaching; writing, printing and publishing; and, any and all
other individual or mass media methods that presently exist or may be
devised in the future to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ." From 1974
to 1981, the Ministry conducted numerous "evangelistic crusades" in
auditoriums and arenas across the country in cooperation with local
churches. During this period, it held 23 crusades in California - each lasting 1
to 3 days, with one crusade lasting 6 days - for a total of 52 days. At the
crusades, the Ministry conducted religious services that included preaching
and singing. Some of these services were recorded for later sale or broadcast.
It also sold religious books, tapes, records, and other religious and
nonreligious merchandise at the crusades. The Ministry also published a
monthly magazine, "The Evangelist," which was sold nationwide by
subscription. The magazine contained articles of a religious nature as well as
advertisements for the Ministry's religious books, tapes, and records. The
magazine included an order form listing the various items for sale in the
particular issue and their unit price, with spaces for purchasers to fill in the
quantity desired and the total price. Appellant also offered its items for sale
through radio, television, and cable television broadcasts, including
broadcasts through local California stations. In 1980, the Board of
Equalization of the State of California informed the Ministry that religious
materials were not exempt from the sales tax and requested that the latter
to register as a seller to facilitate reporting and payment of the tax. The
Ministry responded that it was exempt from such taxes under the First
Amendment. In 1981, the Board audited the Ministry and advised the latter
that it should register as a seller and report and pay sales tax on all sales
made at its California crusades. The Board also opined that the Ministry had a
sufficient nexus with the State of California to require the latter to collect and
report use tax on its mail-order sales to California purchasers. Based on the
sales figures for the Ministry's religious materials, the Board notified the
Ministry that it owed sales and use taxes of $118,294.54, plus interest of
$36,021.11, and a penalty of $11,829.45, for a total amount due of
$166,145.10. The Ministry did not contest the Board's assessment of tax
liability for the sale and use of certain nonreligious merchandise, including
such items as "T-shirts with JSM logo, mugs, bowls, plates, replicas of crown
of thorns, ark of the covenant, Roman coin, candlesticks, Bible stand, pen and
pencil Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sets,
prints of religious scenes, bud vase, and communion cups." The Ministry filed
a petition for redetermination with the Board, reiterating its view that the tax
on religious materials violated the First Amendment. Following a hearing and
an appeal to the Board, the Board deleted the penalty but otherwise
redetermined the matter without adjustment in the amount of $118,294.54
in taxes owing, plus $65,043.55 in interest. Pursuant to state procedural law,
the Ministry paid the amount and filed a petition for redetermination and
refund with the Board. . The Board denied the Ministry's petition, and the
latter brought suit in state court, seeking a refund of the tax paid. The trial
court entered judgment for the Board, ruling that the Ministry was not
entitled to a refund of any tax. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Issue: Whether
the State's imposition of sales and use tax liability on its sale of religious
materials contravenes the First Amendment's command, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Held: The
Free Exercise Clause "withdraws from legislative power, state and federal,
the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof
by civil authority." Indeed, "a regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so,
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Issue:
Whether the tax imposed on the Ministry acts as prior restraint to the free
exercise of religious beliefs. Held: Unlike flat license taxes, which operate as a
precondition to the exercise of evangelistic activity, the registration
requirement herein and the tax itself do not act as prior restraints - no fee is
charged for registering, the tax is due regardless of preregistration, and the
tax is not imposed as a precondition of disseminating the message. Thus, the
tax at issue in the present case is akin to a generally applicable income or
property tax, which may constitutionally be imposed on religious activity.
Collection and payment of the tax does not violate the Ministry's sincere
religious beliefs. California's nondiscriminatory Sales and Use Tax Law
requires only that the Ministry collect the tax from its California purchasers
and remit the tax money to the State. The only burden on the Ministry is the
claimed reduction in income resulting from the presumably lower demand
for the Ministry's wares (caused by the marginally higher price) and from the
costs associated with administering the tax. To the extent that imposition of
a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money the
Ministry has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not
constitutionally significant. Though the Court does not doubt the economic
cost to the Ministry of complying with a generally applicable sales and use
tax, such a tax is no different from other generally applicable laws and
regulations - such as health and safety regulations - to which the Ministry
must adhere. Finally, in no sense has the State "conditioned receipt of an
important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or denied
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs. The Ministry has never alleged that the mere act of paying
the tax, by itself, violates its sincere religious beliefs. In fine, the collection
and payment of the generally applicable tax in the present case imposes no
constitutionally significant burden on the Ministry's religious practices or
beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause accordingly does not require the State to
grant the Ministry an exemption from its generally applicable sales and use
tax. Although it is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate,
even if generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's
religious practices (the burden of a flat tax could render itinerant evangelism
"crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is
exacted town by town"), no such situation appears in the present case. 473
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union [GR L-25246, 12 September
1974] En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 22 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: Under Section 4(a), paragraph
4, of Republic Act 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On 18 June
1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875, as follows: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization." Benjamin
Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed
shop provision which reads "Membership in the Union shall he required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by
this Agreement." The collective bargaining agreement expired on 3 March
1964 but was renewed the following day. Being a member of a religious sect
that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union in 1962, and when no
action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on 3 September 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter
to separate Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in
turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless Victoriano could achieve
a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Victoriano to file
an action for injunction (Civil Case 58894) in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Victoriano. In
its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to RA
875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties
during the pre-trial conference, the trial Court rendered its decision on 26
August 1965, enjoining Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing Victoriano
from his present employment and sentencing the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union to pay Victoriano P500 for attorney's fees and the costs. From this
decision, the Union appealed directly to the Supreme Court on purely
questions of law. Issue: Whether a "closed shop provision" in a collective
bargaining agreement is to be considered violative of religious freedom.
Held: Both the Constitution and Republic Act 875 recognize freedom of
association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as
Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act 875 provides that employees shall have
the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual
aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools
of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at
least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains
the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both
the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it
would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association. The right to refrain from joining
labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Peace Act is, however, limited.
The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is
withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have
agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop
arrangement, Republic Act 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". RA 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment
or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of
the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
RA 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom
of association. 474 Pamil vs. Teleron [GR L-34854, 20 November 1978] En
Banc, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 4 concur in separate opinions, 3 dissent in
separate opinions Facts: Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected
to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Thereafter, he
was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by Fortunato R.
Pamil, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on the
Administrative Code provision, which providest that "In no case shall there
be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit
did not prosper as Judge Victorino C. Teleron, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (Branch III) sustained the right of Father Gonzaga to the
office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was
impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then
elevated to the Supreme Court Tribunal by Pamil. Issue: Whether an
ecclesiastic or a priest may be elected as a public official. Held: The
challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares
ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so
exclude them is to impose a religious test. Torcaso v. Watkins, an American
Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there involved
was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution prescribing that
"no religious test ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any office
or profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the
existence of God." Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary
to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to
the office of notary public in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he
would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals
but prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the state
court decision. It could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by
Justice Black: "this Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally
invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot
be enforced against him. The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it
was lack of belief in God that was a disqualification. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for
a public office. There is thus an Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision
relied upon by Pamil and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid
argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test,
and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It
suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its validity. Thus, the
view that the Administrative Code provision is inoperative by virtue of the
mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the present Charter,
failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force. The
attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be
given full force and application. 475 Torcaso vs. Watkins [367 US 488, 19 June
1961] Black (J) Facts: Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland
Constitution provides that "no religious test ought ever to be required as a
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God." Torcaso was appointed to the
office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland but was refused a
commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God. He then
brought the action in a Maryland Circuit Court to compel issuance of his
commission, charging that the State's requirement that he declare this belief
violated "the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States." The Circuit Court rejected these federal constitutional
contentions, and the highest court of the State, the Court of Appeals,
affirmed, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing and
requires declaration of belief in God as a qualification for office without need
for implementing legislation. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether Torcaso may
be denied his office unless he declares his religious beliefs. Held: When our
Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people "securely beyond the
reach" of religious test oaths brought about the inclusion in Article VI of that
document of a provision that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." Not
satisfied, however, with Article VI and other guarantees in the original
Constitution, the First Congress proposed and the States very shortly
thereafter adopted our Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment. That
Amendment broke new constitutional ground in the protection it sought to
afford to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly. With
these, neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force
a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.
The fact that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly
be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden
by the Constitution. This Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutionally invades Torcaso's freedom of belief and religion and
therefore cannot be enforced against him. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 )
Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005
Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Salonga vs.
Hermoso [GR L-53622, 25 April 1980] … 1 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR
L-62100, 30 May 1986] … 1 Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September
1989] … 2 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94284, 8 April 1991] … 4 Lorenzo
vs. Director of Health [GR 27484, 1 September 1927] … 5 This collection
contains five (5) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M.
Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year
2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September
2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated
from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately
after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
476 Salonga vs. Hermoso [GR L-53622, 25 April 1980] En Banc, Fernando (CJ):
9 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave Facts: This is not the first
time Jovito R. Salonga came to the Supreme Court by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to
travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella (GR L-49130), the case became
moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the
petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a
matter of fact, had been granted. Herein, in the motion to dismiss of the
Solicitor General dated 21 April 1980, it was stated that the certificate of
eligibility to travel had been granted Salonga. A xeroxed copy was enclosed.
Held: The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid
the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional
right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the
address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the
American Newspaper Publishers Association on 22 April 1980, he emphasized
anew the respect accorded constitutional rights. The freedom to travel is
certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing
affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted was "partial to the claims of
liberty." Burdick and Willis, both of whom were equally convinced that there
be no erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received
from President Marcos the accolade of his approval. It would appear,
therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel
Processing Center, the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be
sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of
eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the
granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to
travel being in any way responsible for any delay. 477 Caunca vs. Salazar, 82
Phil. 851 (1940) 478 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May
1986] En Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Ricardo L. Manotoc,
Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having
transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men,
he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the
former corporation. Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock
broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, Manotoc, who was then in
the United States, came home, and together with his costockholders, filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities,
Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to
the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case 001826, "In the Matter of the
Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners"), was granted and a
management committee was organized and appointed. Pending disposition
of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then Commissioner of
Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on 4 February
1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division. When a Torrens
title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to
be a fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against
Manotoc and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding
criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399 and 45400,
assigned to Judge Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545, raffled off to
Judge Pronove). In all cases, Manotoc has been admitted to bail in the total
amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. On 1
March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his
desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing,
both Judge Camilon and Judge Pronove in their orders dated 9 March 1982,
and 26 March 1982, respetively, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) denied the same. It appears that Manotoc likewise wrote
the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or withdrawal of
the latter's memorandum dated 4 February 1980, but said request was also
denied in a letter dated 27 May 1982. anotoc thus filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul
the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October
1982, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack
of merit. Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, Manotoc filed the
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Pending resolution
of the petition, Manotoc filed on 15 August 1984 a motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. On 20 September 1984, the Supreme Court in a
resolution en banc denied Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad
pendente lite. Issue: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. Held: A court has the power to
prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon
Manotoc to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As held in
People v. Uy Tuising (61 Phil. 404 [1935]), "the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to
the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused
from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of
the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The
effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record,
and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the
accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of
his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation
of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full
authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the
sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of
the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact,
this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country,
for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in
the first place, if it were otherwise. The constitutional right to travel being
invoked by Manotoc is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution states that "the liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health." The order of the
trial court releasing Manotoc on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the constitutional provision. 479 Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR
88211, 15 September 1989] En Banc, Cortes (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in
separate opinion, 5 dissent in separate opinions, 1 on leave Facts: In February
1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon
C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of
Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led
by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful
plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with
mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer
awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the
country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of
"people power" and also clearly reinforced the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's
presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the
government. On 28 August 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of
people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed
sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same
— a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian
supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization that
civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military. But the
armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided
elements in the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr.
Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and the secessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos,
to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are virtually
free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these
groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only
through resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they
been successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the country. Nor are the
woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the
economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after
Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating
the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses has remained elusive. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, Marcos'
petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the court to order Raul
Manglapus as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Catalino Macaraig as Executive
Secretary, Sedfrey Ordonez as Secretary of Justice, Miriam Defensor Santiago
as Immigration Commissioner, Fidel Ramos as Secretary of National Defense,
and Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff, to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Issue:
Whether Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode, in light of the attendant circumstances in the present case.
Held: The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the
right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to
enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of
the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state" separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country." On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
"right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." which rights may
be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of
others." as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which
one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would therefore be inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof. On
the other hand, the Constitution declares among the guiding principles that
"the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and
that "the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy." Admittedly, service and
protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. Thus, in the
exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in
directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view,
in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to
consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. Faced
with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote
their welfare and advance the national interest. Since the persons who seek
to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose
door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars
believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered, the
constitutional guarantees must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interests, as such are neither absolute nor inflexible. The
President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and
lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and
common knowledge of the state of the economy, the Court cannot argue
with that determination. 480 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94284, 8 April
1991] Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur Facts: On 14 October
1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the
Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January
1988, or more than 2 years after the filing of the Information, the People of
the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and
to issue a holddeparture Order against Silverio on the ground that he had
gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling
opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Silverio's passport or to
deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent
Silverio from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial
Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985,
"the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in
Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court." Silverio's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. Silverio's Certiorari
Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990.
Hence, the Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990. Issue: Whether the right
to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
Held: Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are
not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health"
and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in
the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates
of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. Article III,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to
carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such Court or officer. Herein, Silverio is facing a criminal charge.
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) He has posted
bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the
Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders
and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed
to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the
country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
481 Lorenzo vs. Director of Health [GR 27484, 1 September 1927] First
Division, Malcolm (J): 6 concur Facts: Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging that his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila
was in violation of his constitutional rights. Lorenzo was confined in said
hospital in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the
Administrative Code. The trial court sustained the law authorizing the
segregation of lepers, and denied the petition for habeas corpus, by requiring
the trial court to receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or is not a
contagious disease. Lorenzo appealed. Issue: Whether the Administrative
Code provision on the confinement of lepers violative of the latter’s
constitutional rights on freedom of travel. Held: The Philippine law pertaining
to the segregation of lepers is found in article XV of chapter 37 of the
Administrative Code. Codal section 1058 empowers the Director of Health
and his authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and detained,
isolated, or confined, all leprous persons in the Philippine Islands." In
amplification of this portion of the law are found provisions relating to arrest
of suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic procedure,
confirmation of diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of
hospitals, detention camps, and a leper colony, etc. Section 1058 of the
Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate
exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public
health. It was placed on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave
health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly
constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause
one afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that
compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the
disease is supported by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the
segregation of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the local
Legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized
measures to control the dread scourge. It would require a much stronger
case than the present case for the Court to sanction admitting the testimony
of expert or other witnesses to show that a law of this character may possibly
violate some constitutional provision. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )