1.

Frivaldo v Comelec
174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer 
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of
Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation because
apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was forced to be
naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the Philippine elections, he has
effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that
it is in the nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He
lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did
not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his
participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve
as governor when he owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as
in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

2. Labo v Comelec
176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship – Labo
Doctrine 
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo
warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was
naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian.  Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not
make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became
an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an
Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the
event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he
needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It
cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that
when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the
will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would
Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would
be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.

3. COQUILLA VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:07 PM

G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he
took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved
in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on
the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only
resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On
July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on
May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
“two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.  In the case at bar,
what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy.  This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
 4. DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the COMELEC was Section
40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides that those sentenced by final judgement for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2)
years after serving sentence are disqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by the
COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted probation by
the MTC. 

Issues: 
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability. 

Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal
effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which already
declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a),
subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

5. Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.  It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.  That is
of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.  The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative
of our courts.  The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.  No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings.  In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national.  A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

6. Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-
2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.

“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can
pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the
three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

7. Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his
Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted
by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said
petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one
year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and
failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency
requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of
origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim
that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying
at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly
held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a
particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of
making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in
San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and
national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not
prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will
respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to
breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

8. Arsenio Latasa v Comelec and Romeo Sunga

Facts: Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992,
1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He
stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny
petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner
countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will
be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration
was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the
proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of
Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted. 

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:

Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

Held: 

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does
not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. 

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official
has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.
An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after
the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of
what is fair and just.

9. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

259 SCRA 296, 1996

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of
Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O.
Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before
the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private
respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand
theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility
under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez. 

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that
Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. 
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” 

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a
promulgated judgement of conviction.
10.