Citing Tañada v. Hon.

Tuvera, the SC also reiterated that requirement of

publication is indispensable in order to give effect to the law, unless the law

itself has otherwise provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers

to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the

completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette. Nevertheless, this

does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with –

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or

extended . . . It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication

may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would

offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws

that are supposed to govern it.

The Court also cited those covered under the indispensible rule of publication
–

[a]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be

published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days

after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers.

It is important to note that publication “must be in full or it is no publication

at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the

laws” (Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig v. Military Shrine

Services, G.R. No. 187587, 5 June 2013, C.J. Sereno).

G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of

Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

B virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land for military
reservation. ( Fort Bonifacio) . President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423,
which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition and at the bottom of Proclamation No.
2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this
time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with
the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems and prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan,
from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the
subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s
facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a
Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with
regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on
October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when
the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look
into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally,
she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in
the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on
the field of the legislature.

CA- reversed and set aside the decision.

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for
Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

No.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a
different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide
that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any
legal force and effect.

G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity

as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Facts:

The respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,thru its vice president applied for the refund or
credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered
losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate
income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
amount of ₱26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

Revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support
its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,it filed a petition for review in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. It invoked Section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. The CTA found that respondent filed its
final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that
date.

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and
nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the
filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was
filed beyond the reglementary period.

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of
the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap
year.

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April
14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of
730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds
and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns. Hence, the claim
should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return. how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled
that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of

thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according
to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-
year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April
14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.

G.R. No. 183449               March 12, 2012

ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated September 21, 2007 and 1 

May 19, 2008  of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410 which dismissed the
2 

petition for review filed by petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time, and denied
reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack one the elected Punong Barangay,
while in the performance of his duties.

Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as evidenced by an extract thereof.

On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for forgiveness during the confrontation
at the Barangay because of the disturbance he made to the barangay captain and to the community
because some people were in panic as he was bringing a bolo, and not for attacking the Barangay
Captain.

MTC issued its Judgment inding petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault.
7

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order dated May 4, 2007.
10 

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for extension of time to file petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21,
2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition
for review on June 5, 2007.

On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition outright for
being filed out of time. In so ruling, the CA said:

As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 4, 2007, Thus, the 15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition
for review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday) considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May
19, 2007. It appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007 (Monday) and not
from May 19, 2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19,
2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time, the extension
should be counted from the last day which is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

Issue : WON the petition for review is filed out of time.

Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the CA
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; that based on such provision, if the last day to
file a petition falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day
of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a
Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the next working day which was May
21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21,
2007 to file the petition and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. Nonetheless, petitioner asks for
liberality in the interest of justice taking into consideration the merit of his petition claiming that his
conviction was not supported by the evidence on record. Moreover, he claims that his petition for
review was filed with the CA on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA dismissed the same on
September 21, 2007 for being filed out of time. He prays that the CA resolutions be reversed and set
aside and the CA be directed to give due course to his petition and to resolve the case on the merits.

We grant the petition.

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which
the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included.
If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in
the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February
29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal
Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads:

Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of
filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which
case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;

Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so
that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the
next working day and not from the original expiration of the period.

NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that
Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an
extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision
no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted
from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday.

In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for extension was within the period
provided by law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional
period of 30 days within which to file the petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have
filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act
required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for
review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day
for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for
extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file
his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion
for extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for
review for being filed out of time.

We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on our
clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to
the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. Thus, counting
14 

15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5,
2007 was already two days late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit
the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
1âwphi1

Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA
issued its Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out
of time. There was no showing that respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was
prejudiced by reason of such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in
the petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting petitioner of direct
assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioner’s liberty. We do not find anything on
1

record that shows petitioner's deliberate intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had
filed the petition for review within the extended period sought, although erroneously computed.
These circumstances should have been taken into consideration for the CA not to dismiss the
petition outright.

We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not automatically
warrant the dismissal thereof. And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late,
16 

where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the
stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. 1

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
18 

substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
19 

on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. 20

G.R. No. 174238               July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Anita filed two (2) estafa against respondent spouses William for issuing to her two PBC
checks worth ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan,but dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner also filed against respondents two (2) cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22

The RTC of Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of
the crime. Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its
on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of
₱600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 with
damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b)
of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied in its Order9 dated June 5, 2006.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue –

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under
BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify
both the accused (respondents herein)?10

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as
it must be given only prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls within the
following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is deemed
instituted with the latter—

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution of
the civil aspect of the case;

(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a
timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on
the civil aspect of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused
amounting to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to
Article 3111 of the Civil Code; and
 (6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 2912 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22
proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted
the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.13

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus,
during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil
liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is
consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civil liability arising
from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted
with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the
complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping.15 Prior to the judgment
in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to
have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the
exclusion of the other.16

The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as
regards the civil liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court
declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with
the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.17

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal
of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such
civil action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada
ruling.

With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the
question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed
estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also
allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?

Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply
even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.18

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated
in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to
recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to
appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP
Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.19

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for
the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order
to attain this objective.20

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without
a remedy to recover from respondents the ₱600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could
prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and
Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner
had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP
Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor
during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor
failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the
accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with
the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing
rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to
respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the
reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability
of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are
constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.22 But this
rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.23 Tested against
these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to

keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations
as members of the Bar.24 Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more
conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not
only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the
proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he
failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining
remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the
dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to
prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it
was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned
amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently
evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and
application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best
way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should
not be barred by technicalities.For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so, we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES

CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS
CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and
WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A.
PELINDARIO, respondents.

 Facts :

Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in
their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet
surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine
Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario.

NBI Senior applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine
seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films ; and,
television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other
machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition,
showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in the premises
above described.On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI, Search
Warrant was issued/

The search warrant was served andIn the course of the search of the premises
indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes
of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private
complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials,
accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties accomplished by
the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to registered
owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.

On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court.

A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was later denied for lack
of merit /

A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted
the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in this manner:

It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from

which the pirated films were allegedly copies (sic), were never
presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants
in question. The orders of the Court granting the search warrants and
denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were,
therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside. (p.
13, Appellant's Brief)5

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents'
motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had theretofore issued, to
the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly
challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive application of the ruling in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,  in dismissing petitioners' appeal
6

and upholding the quashal of the search

 II

We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of
the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on
August 19, 1988,  that for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a
36

search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the
master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirate copies is necessary.

Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th
Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence of probable cause. At the
time of the issuance of the search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century
Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3,
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing
law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of the law on
probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied,
since the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling,
which had supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private
respondents' motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant for failure
of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the
search warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. 38

Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the
trial court in resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal of the
search warrant, on this renovated thesis:

And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th
Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among others
that the master tapes or copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with
the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former.

34670493

Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that "(j)udicial
decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines."

Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent

source of law; it cannot create law.  While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or
40

interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they
are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the
Philippines.  Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
41

statute
itself.
42
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in
anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted films
in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the
meaning of probable cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.

Therein it was ruled that —

The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the
effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants
is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial

similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted
films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search
warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from
his affidavit  and his deposition,  did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based
51 52

on said complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the
private respondents' video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as
attorney-in-fact, stated in his affidavit  and further expounded in his deposition  that he
53 54

personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his clients
to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.

Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar,
a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.),
who was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings.  The 55

records clearly reflect that the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were
straightforward and stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed
none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case
exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially
and correctly convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.

There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the
search warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners' witnesses —
 NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar — did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their respective testimonies and that said
witnesses' claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by which
these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact without basis.  The difference, it must be pointed
56

out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners'
witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes seized
were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones not have they shown that they were given
any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for
sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive
surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners' witnesses sufficient to
enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding matters discovered

Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court
followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination
personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and,
(3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly
attached to the records.

G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976

J. AMADO ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976

ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO,
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO
ARANETA, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for J. Amado Araneta.

Mariano Aguilar and Alfonso A. Doronila for Alfonso Doronila and A. Doronila Resources
Development, Inc.

BARREDO, J.:

Two separate but related petitions, that in G.R. No. L-34882 being for certiorari and prohibition
against the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of said court in refusing
to dismiss the appeal of private respondents from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
a civil action between the private parties herein, notwithstanding allegedly that the record on appeal
of said private respondents, Alfonso Doronila et al. does not show on its face, in violation of Section
6 of Rule 41 and Section 1 of Rule 50, that their appeal was made on time, and that in G.R. No. L-
35643 being also one for certiorari and prohibition against the same Court of First Instance of Rizal
for having issued a writ of execution of the decision, the finality of which is in issue in G.R. No. L-
34882, said Court of First Instance having assumed that because of the restraining order of this
Court in said G.R. No. L-34882 enjoining the appellate court from enforcing its resolutions refusing to
dismiss the appeal of the Doronilas and from further acting on said appeal until further orders, the
result was that the judgment of said trial court could already be executed.

In connection with the second petition (G.R. No. L-35643), on November 23, 1974, counsel for
therein private respondent J. Amado Araneta f filed a motion for dismissal of the petition upon the
ground basically that said private respondent "would prefer to wait for the finality of the decision
before availing of the execution thereof." The Doronilas opposed such dismissal, unless it is coupled
with a final injunction of this Court against the questioned execution orders of the trial court.
Accordingly, said petition may be disposed of without elaborate discussion.

As regards the first petition (G.R. No. L-34882), it appears that in Civil Case No. 9856 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, an action filed by J. Amado Araneta for specific performance of an exclusive
option to buy granted by him to Alfonso Doronila, for himself and for A. Doronila Resources
Development Corporation, over two big parcels of land situated in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, at a total price of P13,071,215.00, and for damages, the said court, after due trial,
rendered on April 28, 1971 a decision the dispositive part of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendant Alfonso Doronila to clear the cadastral survey of

Montalban, Rizal, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7924 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, of all liens and encumbrances, including the mining claims of
Republic Cement Corporation and Silangan Mining Association, and the claim of
Cesario C. Bandong over the 13.6420 hectares thereof;

2. Ordering defendant A, Doronila Resources Development, Inc. to clear the San

Mateo, Rizal property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42999, Register of
Deeds of Rizal, of squatters within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, and
thereafter, within thirty (30) days, to execute in favor of plaintiff, a deed of sale of said
properties, free from all liens and encumbrances upon the payment of
P4,071,215.10, minus the P40,000.00 option money, in accordance with the option
contract dated February 10, 1966;

3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P63,448.00 as actual damages and
P7,242,250.00 for damages arising from unrealized profits, with legal interest, from
the filing of the complaint;

4. Dismissing the counterclaim, with costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED. (Pp. 168-169, Rec. on Appeal )

From this judgment, the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but in the said
appellate court, J. Amado Araneta moved to dismiss said appeal. Acting on that motion, the Court of
Appeals resolved as follows:
 Plaintiff Appellee, J. Amado Araneta, filed before us a motion to dismiss appeal of
defendants-appellants on the ground that the record on appeal does not show on its
face that the appeal was perfected on time. Acting upon said motion to dismiss, this
Court in its resolution dated January 27, 1972, required the defendants appellants to
comment thereon within 10 days from notice. On January 26, 1972, defendants-
appellants thru counsel filed a manifestation asking for a 20-day period within which
to file an answer, which manifestation was favorably granted by this Court in its
resolution dated January 28, 1972.

On February 10, 1972, defendants-appellants filed their answer alleging among

others that they filed their appeal on time. In support thereof, they submit a copy of
notice of the trial court (Annex A, Answer) giving them an additional ten day period
within which to file their amended record on appeal.

An examination of the record shows that on April 28, 1971, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of J. Amado Araneta, copy of which
was received by the defendants appellants on May 14, 1971. As a consequence,
defendants-appellants immediately filed on May 31, 1971, a notice of appeal and an
appeal bond in the amount of P120.00. However, due to some deficiencies, the
original record on appeal was ordered amended. So that it was only on June 22,
1971, that the amended record on appeal was filed by the defendants-appellants. On
July 19, 1971, the trial judge approved the amended record on appeal, thus —

It appearing that the defendants have already included the motion to

dismiss, opposition filed thereto and the resolution of the court
thereon, in the amended Record on Appeal filed by the defendants,
and for want of any further objection on the part of the plaintiff, AS
PRAYED FOR, the amended record on appeal filed by the
defendants is hereby approved. (R.A. p. 172).

From the foregoing data submitted by the defendants-appellants, we could

reasonably infer that the approval was perfected on time, not to mention in this
connection that plaintiff did not object to the approval of the record on appeal. The
statement of the trial court that 'for want of any further objection on the part of the
plaintiff', is of vital significance which cannot just be ignored, especially, since, as in
this case, the supreme interest of justice is at stake, considering that the subject
matter of the appeal consist of big parcels of land, with an aggregate are of 21, 549,
183 square meters, excluding 8 mineral rights and claims of limestones, shale, etc.

WHEREFORE, considering that the paramount interest of justice would be best

served if we allow the parties to litigate the facts in issues, the instant motion to
dismiss appeal is hereby denied. (Pp. 33-35, Record.)

And when Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing resolution, the motion was denied thus:

Acting upon plaintiff-appellee's 'Motion for Reconsideration' filed on March 9, 1972 of

the is Court's resolution dated February 24, 1972 denying the motion to dismiss
appeal; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the motion for reconsideration. The instant
case can well be an exemption to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the
cases cited by the appellee because of the nature of the issues involved in this
litigation. (p. 46, Record.)
In the present petition with Us, Araneta maintains that under this Court's rulings in Valera vs. Court
of Appeals, 37 SCRA 80, Reyes vs. Carrascoso, 38 SCRA 311, Dominguez vs. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 316, The Director, Bureau of Building and Real Property Management vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 SCRA 317, De Guia vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 333, Imperial Insurance Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 97, Luzon Stevedoring vs. Court of Appeals, and other cases of similar
vein, the respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of the Dornilas, there being
no showing on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when their original record on appeal
was filed, hence said amended record "fails to show on its face that their appeal was perfected
within the period fixed by the rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50.

Under date of July 29, 1976, however, with commendable candidness, Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales,
counsel for Araneta, filed a manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal rulings of this Court
in Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228, Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475
and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 262, cited by the Dornilas in their motion in this Court
of May 3, 1976, but also of Our decisions in Heirs of Serafin Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA
309, Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 322 and Krueger vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 50,
which abandoned the strict line pursued in the earlier cases cited by him, albeit insisting just the
same that the impugned resolution of the Court of Appeals is erroneous in the light of the following
observations:

As may be seen, Berkenkotter and Pimentel and subsequent cases have

overruled Valera vs. Court of Appeals, Reyes vs. Carrascoso, and other cases
adhering to the strict construction of material data rule.

But Berkenkotter and Pimentel were promulgated only on September 28, 1973 and

June 25, 1975 respectively, hence, it can only operate prospectively and will not
affect previous cases appealed before that date, relying on the old doctrine.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial

decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of
the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that construed law purports to
carry into effect.

At the time of Liceria's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the

time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle
without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Court's interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code — formed part of our jurisprudence and,
hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by
the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof. (People vs. Licera, L-39990, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA
270, 272, 273)
 Therefore, Berkenkotter and Pimentel cannot retroactively affect the present case,
whose appeal was perfected on June 21, 1971.

Leaving aside for the moment, the well thought of issue thus rather ingeniously raised by
distinguished counsel, it is Our considered opinion that in the particular case on hand, the omission
in the Doronila amended record on appeal of any reference to the date of the filing of their original
record on appeal is not fatal, even from the point of view of the former rule of strict "literal adherence
to the 'material data rule'", to borrow Justice Munoz Palma's expression in Krueger, supra. For here,
there is no dispute that within seventeen days, from May 14, 1971, when Doronila's co-counsel was
served with the decision to May 31, 1971, the date the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed,
the Doronilas already clearly manifested their determination to appeal from the evidently onerous
decision which ordered them not only to comply with the option given them by Araneta but to
additionally pay over P7.8 M to their adversary for actual damages and unrealized profits, so much
so that when an objection was filed to their original record on appeal, they lost no time in amending
the same by inclusion of the papers referred to in the objection without waiting for any corresponding
order of the court. 
1

Now under the rules (Sec. 7 of Rule 41), unless the court fixes a period for the filing of the amended
record on appeal, the same may be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the order for
amendment. We take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily, appellants are given not less than said
period of ten days within which to comply with an order to amend the record on appeal and that it
would take at least one week before the court can consider and rule on the objection of appellee
plus another one week to issue and serve the corresponding order. So, assuming that the Doronilas
filed their original record on appeal as early as May 31, 1971, which is already rather extraordinary,
since generally, the record on appeal is filed some days later, they still had a total of 24 days from
May 31 to make a timely appeal by filing their amended record on appeal. In other words, their
reglementary period would have expired on June 24, 1971. And since the Doronila amended record
on appeal was filed on June 22, 1971, it is almost Beyond question that their appeal was perfected
on time. Surely, matters of judicial notice constitute part of whatever data is required under Section 1
of Rule 50 and Section 6 of Rule 41. And taking the circumstances of judicial notice already referred
to together with the absence of any further objection in the Part of Araneta to the amended record on
appeal in Question as well as the failure of Araneta to alleged Categorically that the original record
on appeal of the Doronila was filed out of time or to deny that it was filed within the reglementary
period, We are persuaded that the amended record on appeal here in dispute sufficiently complies
with the requirements of the rules.

It may be added here that when Araneta objected to the original record on appeal. It was only on the
ground of omission of certain papers therein, not for its being out of time. Under the omnibus motion
rule, "he objection of untimeliness was waived by Araneta and it is reasonable to assume that he
would not have raised such a clearly jurisdictional fatality if in fact the original Doronila record on
appeal had been filed out of time. Since the Purpose of the strict rule of literal compliance with the
"material data rule" is to avoid debate on the timeliness of the appeal, and there is here no occasion
for such debate, such timeliness being a matter no longer disputable by Araneta, it should follow that
the amended record on appeal may be read in the sense that the order of the court approving the
same includes the finding that the original thereof had been filed on time. We hold that thus read,
said amended record on appeal sufficiently complies with the rules. (Berkenkotter supra, and
subsequent rulings analogous thereto.)

Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that the same is not applicable to matters
involving controversies regarding the application of the Rules of Court, if only for the reason that it is
within the power of this Court to excuse failure to literally observe any rule to avoid possible injustice,
Particularly in cases where, as here, the subject matter is of considerable value and the judgment
being appealed from, at least the portion thereof sentencing the Doronilas to Pay over P7.2 M of
supposedly unrealized profits., is by its very nature, reasonably open to possible modification, if not
reversal. Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in substantive law may not be applied
retroactively, specially when prejudice will result to the party that has followed the earlier law. That
principle does not obtain in remedial law. 2

WHEREFORE, the petitions in the above two cases are hereby dismissed, without any
pronouncement as to costs, and the appeal of the Doronilas in CA-G.R. No. 49139-R, subject of the
petition in G.R. No. L-34882, may now proceed in its regular course, and the orders of execution
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 9856 is hereby set aside and its enforcement is in
consequence enjoined permanently.

OPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA 

DECISION

532 Phil. 414

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape
committed as follows:

On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
one Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute
minor, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment,
appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-

year old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the victim and appellant's
daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.

Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he no

longer wanted to use his father's surname describing him as "masama" for
raping his (Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep
in the same bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling.
Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling while their father, appellant, and
Rowena slept together in one bed.

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister
Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's
buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying.
He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father.
Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told
his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what
he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to
report what had transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel
executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname
Mateo.[2]

Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual
intercourse with her and even touched her breasts against her will. She was
only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was
hurt by what appellant did to her. She consistently declared that she does
not love her father and wants him to be punished for what he did to her. [3]

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital Health Services testified that she received a letter request
from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an examination on Rowena.
While she was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed
that Rowena was deaf and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate
her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to conduct a physical examination and,
based thereon, she submitted her medico-legal report.

Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a

"contusion hematoma" on her left cheek, which was compatible with her
claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had an "ecchymosis"
or "kissmark" at the antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-
genital injuries suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show
any sign of sexual abuse, when it was opened up, the following were
discovered: "markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa
navicularis and markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic
urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal
notch with attenuation." Further, the labia was "very red all throughout,
with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red
perineum."[4] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the
recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have
happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal
attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch. [5]

For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto
Quiachon.

He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by

their barangay chairman. He did not know then the reason for the
invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters of
his deceased live-in partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn
that his daughter Rowena had accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he
was taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He suffered hypertension and
was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he was taken to the Pasig
City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech
handicap. He denied raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda
and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a
grudge against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to
support them. His common-law wife died of cancer and her relatives were
allegedly all interested in his house and other properties. The said house
was being leased and they were the ones getting the rental income. Further,
the nephew of his deceased partner was sending financial support of
US$100 a month for his child.

According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his
son Rowel was already hostile to him because he was closer to his
daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason why his children,
Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense.[6]

After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and

defense, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its
Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under
Articles 266-A and B[8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended
party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages,
PI00,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death
penalty imposed on appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005,

affirming with modification the decision of the trial court. In affirming
appellant's conviction, the CA held that there was no justification to make a
finding contrary to that of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
the witnesses. The CA particularly pointed out that the trial court, after
having "meticulously observed" the prosecution witness Rowel and
complainant Rowena, had declared that "their narration palpably bears the
earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material points involved. When
the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by
rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by an inconsistency or contradiction
as in the present case, the same must be given full faith and credit." [12]

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena

recounting the bestial act perpetrated by appellant on the latter were
corroborated by physical evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her
medico-legal report.

On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare
denial. On this matter, it applied the salutary rule that denial is not looked
upon with favor by the court as it is capable of easy fabrication.
Consequently, the CA held that appellant's bare denial could not overcome
the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including Rowena,
the victim herself.

The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as
rape against her father because "it is very unlikely for any young woman in
her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration against her own father,
undergo a medical examination of her private parts, and subject herself to
the trauma and scandal of public trial, put to shame not only herself but her
whole family as well unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek
justice for the wrong committed against her."[13]

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the
supreme penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated
September 10, 2001, the prosecution and the defense agreed on the
following stipulation of facts:

1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;

2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and
3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]

According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority

and her relationship to the offender were alleged in the Information and
were duly proved during trial. These circumstances, i.e., minority of the
victim and her relationship to appellant, are special qualifying
circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death.

The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with respect to the
damages awarded to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal
portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No.
120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon him the
DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Quiachon, the amount
of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as
exemplary damages.

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15,
2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were
required to submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the
Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer be filing a
supplemental brief. Similarly, appellant, through the Public Attorney's
Office, manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the
conviction of appellant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3)
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that
in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime
of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial consideration in
a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of
complainant's testimony.[17]

Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of

witnesses, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. [18]

In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the record
that would impel this Court to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court unless these were reached arbitrarily or when the trial court
misunderstood or misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.[19]

In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to
the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The trial court observed that Rowel
and Rowena "never wavered in their assertion that accused sexually abused
Rowena. Their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in
accord with the material points involved."[20] Further, the trial court
accorded great evidentiary weight to Rowena's testimony. It justifiably did
so as it characterized her testimony to be "simple, straightforward,
unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or
contradiction."[21]

Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were

corroborated by Dr. Guialani's medico-legal report: [22]

Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm

noted at the left mandibular area of the
PERTINENT PHYSICAL left cheek compatible with the
FINDINGS/PHYSICAL disclosed slapping of the cheek by her
INJURIES father; 2x2 cm ecchymosis (kissmark)
noted at the antero-lateral border of
the left breast
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
Tanner 2
Pubic hair - none
Labia majora - no evident sign of
EXTERNAL GENITALIA
injury at the time of examination
Labia minora - no evident sign of
injury at the time of examination
URETHA
Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus
AND
and periurethral area
ERIURETHRAL AREA
PERIHYMENAL
AREA Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area,
AND and pale fossa navicularis
FOSSA NA VICULARIS
Tanner 2
Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted
HYMEN at 5 o 'clock with attenuation of the
hymenal rim from 5 o 'clock to 7 o
'clock; very hyperemic hymen
PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum
Whitish, foul-smelling discharge,
DISCHARGE
minimal in amount noted
IE AND SPECULUM EXAM Not indicated
No evident sign of injury at the time of
ANAL EXAMINATION
examination;
 REMARKS
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
None
COLLECTED
LABORATORY Requested a) Urinalysis
EXAMINATION b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
IMPRESSIONS
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)

For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and

competence to appear in court.

Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and

ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border of the left breast show clear
evidence of Physical Abuse.

Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings
were consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual abuse. Specifically, her
internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse such as: "markedly
hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly
hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-
hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation."
Further, Rowena's labia was "very red all throughout, with hymenal notch
with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum." [23] All
these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic
penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day
before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation
sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[24] Dr. Guialani,
likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute.

Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple

denial of the charge against him must necessarily fail. The defense of denial
is inherently weak. A mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a self-serving
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[25]

All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping
his daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information
and their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts
during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death
on appellant.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on

June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2
thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case
pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given
retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.[28]
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following

prevailing jurisprudence,[29] correctly awarded the following amounts:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00
as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without
proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in light of the
presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because
of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is
still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court
declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364,
the Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of
P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty would have been imposed
prior to R.A. No. 9346.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25,

2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on
the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346.

SO ORDERED.
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco for Petitioner.

Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. TAXATION; AD VALOREM MINING TAXES ON CEMENT; BASED ON ACTUAL MARKET

VALUE OF QUARRIED MINERALS. — The collectible ad valorem tax on cement under
Sections 243 and 246 of the Tax Code is based on the actual market value of the
quarried minerals, like limestone and shale, and not on the selling price of the cement
produced.

2. ID.; AD VALOREM MINING TAXES; NATURE AS TAX ON PRIVILEGE OF MINING. —

The ad valorem tax on mining is a tax not on the minerals, but upon the privilege of
severing or extracting the same from the earth, the government’s right to exact the
said impost springing from the Regalian theory of State ownership of its natural
resources.

3. ID.; MINERAL PRODUCTS; NATURE OF, FOR AD VALOREM TAX. — The inclusion of
the term mineral products is intended to comprehend cases where the mined or
quarried elements may not be usable in its original state without application of simple
treatments, such as washing, or cutting them into sizes, which process does not
necessarily involve the change or transformation of the raw materials into a composite,
distinct product.

4. ID.; CEMENT NOT CONSIDERED MINERAL PRODUCTS FOR PURPOSES OF AD

VALOREM TAX. — While cement is composed of 80% mineral, it is not merely an
admixture or blending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. It is the result
of a definite process, the crushing of minerals, grinding, mixing, calcining, cooling,
adding of retarder or raw gypsum. In short, before cement reaches its saleable form,
the minerals had already undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process.
This could not have been the state of "mineral products’ that the law contemplates for
purposes of imposing the ad valorem tax. While the selling price of cement may reflect
the actual market value of cement, said selling price cannot be taken as the market
value also of the minerals composing the cement. And it was not the cement that was
mined, only the mineral composing the finished product.

DECISION

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition filed by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (CEPOC) for review of the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (in CTA Case No. 708) denying its claim against
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for refund of the sum of P476,208.50,
representing alleged overpayments of ad valorem taxes for the period of from January
1, 1957 to June 30, 1959, on the ground that said court erred in upholding the
assessment and collection thereof based on the selling price of the cement petitioner
produced and not on the value of the limestone and shale it quarried and used in the
production of the cement.

There is no controversy as to the fact that for the period of from April 16, 1957 to July
20, 1959, for the cement it produced and sold, petitioner was assessed and paid ad
valorem taxes in the total sum of P502,975.28; that its demand for refund of alleged
overpayment having been denied, petitioner filed on October 15, 1959, a corresponding
petition in the Court of Tax Appeals against the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and that after due hearing, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision on
June 21, 1961, declaring the collection of the ad valorem tax based on the selling price
of cement to have been made in accordance with Section 243 in relation to Section 246
of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 1 provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 243. Ad valorem taxes on output of mineral lands not covered by lease. — There
shall be assessed and collected on the actual market value of the annual gross output
of the minerals or mineral products extracted or produced from all mineral lands, not
covered by lease, an ad valorem tax payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue, in
the amount of one and one-half per centum of the value of said output.

"Before the mineral products are removed from the mines, the Collector of Internal
Revenue or his representative shall first be notified of such removal on a form
prescribed for the purpose.

"SEC. 245. Time and manner of payment of royalties or ad valorem taxes. — The
royalties or ad valorem taxes, as the case may be, shall be due and payable upon
removal of the mineral products from the locality where mined. However, the output of
the mine may be removed from such locality without the prepayment of such royalties
or ad valorem taxes if the lessee, owner or operator shall file a bond in the form and
amount and with such sureties the payment of such royalties or ad valorem taxes, . . .

"SEC. 246. Definitions of the terms ‘gross output’, ‘minerals’ and ‘mineral products’ —
Disposition of royalties and ad valorem taxes. — The term ‘gross output’ shall be
interpreted as the actual market value of minerals or mineral products, or of bullion
from each mine or mineral lands operated as a separate entity without any deduction
from mining, milling, refining, transporting, handling, marketing, or any other
expenses: Provided, however, . . . The word ‘minerals’ shall mean all inorganic
substances found in nature whether in solid, liquid, gaseous, or any intermediate state.
The term ‘mineral products’ shall mean things produced by the lessee, concessionaire
or owner of mineral lands, at least eighty per cent of which things must be minerals
extracted by such lessee, concessionaire, or owner of mineral lands. Ten per centum of
the royalties and ad valorem taxes herein provided shall accrue to the municipality and
ten per centum to the province where the mines are situated, and eighty per centum to
the National Treasury." (Emphasis supplied.)

Herein petitioner contends that the collectible ad valorem tax should be based on the
actual market value of the quarried minerals that were used in the production of
cement; whereas, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue maintains that, as the
cement produced by petitioner consists of 80% minerals, the same is a mineral product
pursuant to the definition given in Section 246 of the Tax Code, and the ad valorem tax
should be based on its selling price.

It is noteworthy that under Section 242 of the same Code, with respect to leased
mineral lands, the lessee shall pay to the government, not only rentals for the use of
the land, but also royalty, on the minerals extracted therefrom. These imposts are
levied "for the privilege of exploring, developing mining, extracting and disposing of the
minerals" from said land. With respect to mineral lands not under lease. Section 243
governs, and imposes ad valorem tax on the actual market value of the gross output of
the minerals or mineral products extracted therefrom. Both sections 242 and 243 are
under Title VI of the Tax Code which refers to Mining Taxes. As under Section 242, the
rentals and royalties collectible from the lessees and concessionaires of the leased lands
are for the privilege of mining and extracting minerals therefrom, so it may be said that
the ad valorem tax imposed by Section 243 upon those extracting minerals and mineral
products from lands not under lease, is also for the same purpose, i.e., the privilege of
mining and extracting minerals from said lands. In other words, ad valorem tax is a tax
not on the minerals, but upon the privilege of severing or extracting the same from the
earth, the government’s right to exact the said impost springing from the Regalian
theory of State ownership of its natural resources.

There can be no question that quarried minerals have their own market value. The
dispute here arose, however, from the construction given to the term mineral products,
which was defined in Section 246 of the Tax Code, as "things produced by the lessee,
concessionaire, or owner of mineral lands, at least eighty per cent of which things must
be minerals extracted by such lessee, concessionaire or owner of mineral lands."
Respondent argues that since the portland cement produced by petitioner 2 consists of
8% minerals quarried from its mines, such cement falls within the definition of a
mineral product and the imposable ad valorem tax should be based on its selling price
which is its actual market value.

This line of argument suffers from two infirmities: First, while cement is composed of
80% minerals, it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw materials, as lime,
silica, shale and others. It is the result of a definite process — the crushing of minerals,
grinding, mixing, calcining, cooling, adding of retarder or raw gypsum. In short, before
cement reaches its saleable form, the minerals had already undergone a chemical
change through manufacturing process. This could not have been the state of "mineral
products" that the law contemplates for purposes of imposing the ad valorem tax. It
must be remembered that, as aforestated, this tax is imposed on the privilege of
extracting or severing the minerals from the mines. To our minds, therefore, the
inclusion of the term mineral products is intended to comprehend cases where the
mined or quarried elements may not be usable in its original state without application of
simple treatments, such as washing, or cutting them into sizes, which process does not
necessarily involve the change or transformation of the raw materials into a composite,
distinct product. Secondly, respondent cannot use the selling price of the product in this
case as gauge of its actual market value. The cement here is manufactured by
petitioner itself out of materials quarried from its mines. While the selling price of
cement may reflect the actual market value of cement, said selling price cannot be
taken as the market value also of the minerals composing the cement. And it was not
the cement that was mined, only the minerals composing the finished product.

Anent respondent’s contention, however, that the taxes collected and paid two years
before the filing of the action in the Court of Tax Appeals are barred by prescription, the
same must be sustained. By specific provision of Section 308 of the Internal Revenue
Code, action for recovery of tax payments erroneously or illegally collected must be
filed within 2 years from such payments. As the action in this case was instituted only
on October 16, 1959, over payments made prior to October 15, 1957 are no longer
refundable.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals under review is hereby modified,
by holding petitioner entitled to the refund of the corresponding overpayments of ad
valorem taxes made after October 15, 1957. No costs. So ordered.
Intestate Estate of Claro Bustamante, deceased. JOSEFA MENDOZA, Petitioner-
Appellant, v. TEODORA CAYAS, Oppositor-Appellee.

Miguel Tolentino for Appellant.

Saturnino D. Ramirez for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. NATURAL CHILDREN; ACKNOWLEDGMENT UNDER CIVIL CODE OF 1989;

REQUISITES. — Under the Code of 1889 (Arts. 131, 135, 136), an acknowledgment or
recognition in order to confer any rights to the natural child, must indispensably appear
either as a record of birth, in a will (testament) in a public document, or in a final
judgment rendered in an action brought to compel recognition. A private document and
evidence of acts indicating possession of status of a natural child do not per se
constitute a legal and operative acknowledgment and do not confer upon the child any
of the rights (to paternal surname, support and succession) granted by Article 134 of
the Code. At most, they constitute grounds upon which the child might have based an
action to compel recognition.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION TO COMPEL RECOGNITION; WHEN TO BE COMMENCED. —

Under article 137 of the Code, the action to compel recognition must be commenced
during the lifetime of the natural parent, unless the latter does while the claimant was a
minor, or unless a document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered after the
parent’s death.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENT OF RECOGNITION PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN. — These

terms, as used in article 137 of the old Civil Code of 1889, do not include documents
that the claimant once possessed and subsequently lost or mislaid, and the period for
the filing of the action to compel recognition cannot be counted from rediscovery of the
lost writing.

4. SUBSTANTIVE LAW; RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DISTURBING VESTED RIGHTS NOT

PERMITTED. — The new Civil Code cannot be retroactively applied to disturb already
vested rights.

DECISION

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the petition of
Josefa Mendoza to be declared the acknowledged natural daughter of the late Claro
Bustamante and seeking the appointment of an administrator of his estate.

Born in 1893, allegedly begotten out of wedlock by Claro Bustamante, widower, and
Paula Mendoza, single, the claimant Josefa Mendoza was supported and reared by said
Claro Bustamante and was openly introduced as his daughter to his acquaintances.
Shortly before his death in March 1929, Claro delivered to Josefa a private document
(Exhibit G) signed by him and attesting that she was his natural daughter. This
document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the second world war in 1941; then, in the
confusion caused by the hostilities, she lost the paper, and did not find it again until
1953. In the meantime, Claro Bustamante’s widow by a second marriage, Teodora
Cayas, and his legitimate son, Nicasio Bustamante, had extrajudicially partitioned his
estate, composed of lots 1776, 1777, 1778 and 1806 of the Naic Friar Lands.

On May 6, 1953, the natural child, Josefa Mendoza, instituted these proceedings against
Teodora Cayas and Monica Nazareno (heir of the late Nicasio Bustamante), for the
judicial administration and settlement of the estate of her natural father, Claro
Bustamante, and for the recovery of her corresponding share therein as his
acknowledged natural child; but the defendants-oppositors resisted her claims, alleging
that she was never duly acknowledged, and that her action for acknowledgment was
instituted too late. The court below having sustained the defense, Josefa Mendoza
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified the case to us because only
questions of law are involved.

The first question to be decided is whether appellant Josefa Mendoza was properly
recognized by Claro Bustamante as his natural daughter. The Court below correctly
ruled that she was not. Having been born in 1893, her recognition had to be governed
by the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which abolished the implied recognizations permitted
by the Law XI of Toro. 1 Under the Code of 1889 (Arts. 131, 135, 136), an
acknowledgment or recognition, in order to confer any rights to the natural child, must
indispensably appear either in a record of birth, in a will (testament), in a public
document, or in a final judgment rendered in an action brought to compel recognition.
Appellant Josefa has none of these in her favor; all that she was able to show was a
private (not public) document (Exhibit G) and evidence of acts indicating possession of
status of a natural child of Claro Bustamante. These document and acts do not per se
constitute a legal and operative acknowledgment, and do not confer upon appellant any
of the rights (to paternal surname, support and succession) granted by Article 134 of
the Code. At most, they constituted grounds upon which Josefa might have based an
action to ask the Court to compel her father (or his heirs) to grant her recognition. 2

But, and here lies the second issue in this appeal, the action to compel recognition is
expressly conditioned by law upon its being commenced during the lifetime of the
natural parent, unless the latter dies while the claimant was a minor, or unless a
document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered after the parent’s death
(Art. 137).

"Articulo 137. Las acciones para el reconocimiento de hijos naturales solo podran
ejercitarse en vida de los presuntos padres, salvo en los casos siguientes:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. ° Si el padre o la madre hubiesen fallecido durante la menor edad del hijo, en cuyo
caso este podra deducir la accion antes de que transcurran los primeros cuatro años de
su mayor edad.

2. ° Si despues de la muerte del padre o de la madre apareciere algun documento de

que antes no se hubiese tenido noticia, en el que reconozcan expresamente al hijo.

En este caso, la accion debera deducirse dentro de los seis meses siguientes al hallazgo
del documento." cralaw virtua1aw library

Has appellant brought herself within the rule thus expressed? The trial Court decided
that she has not, and the record amply sustains the ruling.

In the first place, there is no doubt that appellant Josefa Mendoza never brought action
against the late Claro Bustamante to compel her recognition as his natural child. Hence,
she now is debarred from instituting such proceedings against his successors in
interest, unless she comes under any of the two exceptions declared in Article 137 of
the Civil Code of 1889. Josefa Mendoza does not come under the first exception,
because she was already 36 years old when her father died in 1929 (she was
admittedly born in 1893). She avers coming under the second exception, because the
lost document of recognition was only rediscovered in 1953. Even so, she had full
knowledge of its existence for 12 years, from 1929, when her father delivered it to her,
down to 1941, when she first mislaid it. The second exception of Article 137 requires
that the document of recognition should be previously unknown ("de que antes no se
hubiese tenido noticia"); and such terms do not include documents that the claimant
once possessed and subsequently lost or mislaid.

Assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last paragraph of Article 137 was
repealed by the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) in force in 1929, still, ten years
being the maximum period of limitation of actions fixed by said Act, Josefa Mendoza’s
time limit to institute proceedings for her recognition expired in 1939, at the latest.
During all these ten years she had the document (Exhibit G) in her hands, but she
made no move to sue upon it. Her laches and delay can lead to only one conclusion:
her action is now barred. It has been barred at least since 1939; and the new Civil
Code of 1950 cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the vested rights of the
appellees who have held the property as owners for the last fifteen years (Art. 2253).
Once more, vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt: the laws aid the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So

ordered.
RIVALDO VS. COMELEC
Good Law

EN BANC G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996 JUAN G. FRIVALDO, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND RAUL R. LEE, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 123755. JUNE 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JUAN G.

FRIVALDO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon--

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast
in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755.

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary Injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,[1] promulgated on December 19,1995[2] and another
Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 1996[3] denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition[4] with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution[5] granting the petition with the following disposition:[6]

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc[7] affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes[8].dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.

51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo

73,440

RaulR.Lee

53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo

1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition[9] praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order[10] dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29,
1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,[11] docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred
that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,[12] the Vice-Governor-- not Lee -- should
occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution[13] holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the
office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT

the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered
the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold
the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."

On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution[14] promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":[15]

"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution[16] of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from
running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a
citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution[17] of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution[18] of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.-- A verified

petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing

bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991[19] expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a

qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications.--(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court[20] as a non-citizen, it is therefore

incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).

Under Philippine law,[21] citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654[22] and during the oral
argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that
the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-
Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision
from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No.
725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he--not Lee--should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor
of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since,
clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since
at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for
purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."[23]

This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-- based on the copy
furnished us by Lee-- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."[26]

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative

enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words,
the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress--once created--to
deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said
so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court
by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common
sense as well.

Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on
June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June
29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his
application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"[27] the Solicitor General explained
during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there
were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation[28] filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo
have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded
up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all,
the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725[29] itself requires very little of an applicant, and even
the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to
promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time
entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino
who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province
prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary
only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space,
wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to
his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654[30] which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in
said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date
thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant
for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we
shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be

elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,[31] and

the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995--the very day[32] the term of office of governor (and
other elective officials) began--he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that
time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation
that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose
for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the
"elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs.
Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,[33] if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that
our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance
to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing
the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at
the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument[34] to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the
official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter." And, under the law[35] a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter--much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the
law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration--not the actual voting--is the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern--and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized--and Lee has not disputed--that he "was
and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."[36]

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8,1995.[37]
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code[38] gives any voter, presumably including
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can
be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it
is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.
And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G.
Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the
afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such
time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,[39] "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions[40] to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,[41] curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,
[42]
 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and
adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative
statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and
to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes.[43]
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail
of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status"
and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women--the right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor
of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General[44] argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization
and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and
thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."[45] It is obvious to
the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions
not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty
of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to
P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that
if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it
will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."[46] This is all the more true of P.D.
725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted
therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect,
but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed
to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
being-- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of
any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,
then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo--having already renounced his
American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-
making body intended right and justice to prevail.[47]
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.[48] The
fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect
of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his
being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a
situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17,
1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification-- whether
at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated--i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"[49] We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship--long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship
but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."[50]

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:[51]

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.[52]

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by
this Honorable Court."[54] Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds
that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:[55]

"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However,
there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the
May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented
on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995,
not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,[56] we held:

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary
period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a
quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution[57] has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice

it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.[58] Thus,
in Mentang vs. COMELEC,[59] we ruled:

"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,[60] "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,[61] Lee is "a second placer, xxx
just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo[62] case, as follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed
by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office
of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in
the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Lee--should be proclaimed, since in
losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people"
of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship
and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he--not Lee--
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond
the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads
as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.-- A verified

petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc[63] on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.-- Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (Italics supplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;[64] viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to
register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such
abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995
elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were
the subjects of such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement
with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that
Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated
on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6
of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely
directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No.
120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due
course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present
case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And
we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here,
we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid
but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no
inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation
has changed his political status--not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans.
It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens--not
who are the citizens of other countries.[65] The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact
that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or
whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two
previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the
rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should
be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice
Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken
up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it
can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the
context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon
the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable
assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting
him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship
retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment
of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,[66] for in case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted)."[67]

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic[68] to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the
1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's
gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he
opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but
beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be
applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989

ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late

WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.

Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.

The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in reality a very simple question
from the viewpoint of the Solicitor General. We agree with the latter. There is actually only one issue
to be resolved in this action. That issue is whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred
in dismissing the petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of action.

Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.

But first the facts.

On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the
Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A.   As he left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son,
1

Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976, with the Philippine Revenue
Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A.  2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the
decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978.  This assessment
3

was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the
estate .   The protest was denied by the Commissioner on July 7, 1978.  No further action was taken
4 5

by the estate in pursuit of that protest.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit
Court of Oregon   Ward Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the
6

herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines.
7

Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.   The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary
8

administrator.   As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on
9

June 4, 1980. 10

On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in the
amount of P72,948.87.  This was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and
11

Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980. 12

While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the
allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978.  He said that this
13

liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory.

The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed on August 13, 1980,
against the second assessment of P72,948.87.  On this understanding, he filed on September 15,
14

1981, a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment.  15

The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner stressed, no answer was
filed during a delay of 195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a
letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982.  This cancellation was notified to the Court of
16

Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic. 17

The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984.  The petitioner then came to
18

this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the shares of stocks left by the
decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property; (2) whether the said stocks
should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the
appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic.

We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.

In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
wrote as follows:

Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary Administrator Philex
Building cor. Brixton & Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila

Sir:
 This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, who died a
resident of Oregon, U.S.A. on March 14, 1976. It appears that two (2) letters of
demand were issued by this Bureau. One is for the amount of P96,509.35 based on
the first return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87, based on the second
return filed.

It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on February 9, 1978
on the basis of the estate tax return filed on September 16, 1976. The said
assessment was, however, protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but was denied
on July 7, 1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the same
has become final.

In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid assessment for
P96,509.35 within fifteen (15) days upon receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts
Division, this Bureau, BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. The
assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby
cancelled.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner  19

It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for P72,948.87 that the
petitioner had been deprived of a cause of action as it was precisely from this assessment that he
was appealing.

In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition questioning the assessment of July 3,
1980, was "premature" since the protest to the assessment had not yet been resolved.  As a matter
20

of fact it had: the said assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The
respondent court was on surer ground, however, when it followed with the finding that the said
cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic. There was really no more assessment to
review.

The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3, 1980, had the effect of
canceling the first assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the
second assessment did not have the effect of automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first
assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had
no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.

The petitioner is clutching at straws.

It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of P72,948.87, the
Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only based on the
estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this Office for final determination of the correct
estate tax due from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after said investigation will be
assessed and collected later."   It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can
21

supersede an earlier assessment which had clearly become final and executory.

The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the
first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based
were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused
from compliance therewith because of their ignorance?

If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to
claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws
in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner
is indeed difficult to find.

But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first assessment is already final
and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was made on
February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no
further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment
has become final and executory.

In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its denial. In his motion
with the probate court, the respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a letter dated January 29,
1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor Graham thru the aforesaid foreign law firm informed claimant that
they have paid said tax liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and Puno, Philippine law firm of 313
Buendia Avenue Ext., Makati, Metro Manila that initiated the instant ancillary proceedings" although
he added that such payment had not yet been received.  This letter was an acknowledgment by the
22

estate of the validity and finality of the first assessment. Significantly, it has not been denied by the
petitioner.

In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its
validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals.
What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July
7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it
received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the
first two issues he now raises without basis in the present petition.

The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should be considered
conjugal property or belonging to him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. So too is the time at
which the assessment of these shares of stock should have been made by the BIR. These questions
were not resolved by the Court of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to act on the
petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had already been cancelled. The assessment being no
longer controversial or reviewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to rule on the
petition except to dismiss it.

If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the computation of the estate
tax, as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the original assessment
has long become final and executory. If that assessment was not challenged on time and in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was — was committed not by the
respondents but by the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now
complain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered,

G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006

ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT
LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G.
Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-
respondent, Barbership Management Limited. 
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while
petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner
experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had
a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a
brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19,
1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21,
1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician,
Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 days,
he is being declared permanently, totally disabled."
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by
accepting the amount of US$13,200. Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the
Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila,
acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the
insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A.
Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Wether or not Petitioner's claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely
because he was permanently disabled and in financial constraints is valid.
HELD:
Petition Denied. 
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release
thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate
consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his
consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the
validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld

.R. No. L-41171               July 23, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-

HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-55000               July 23, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR N. BORROMEO,

MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B.
MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-62895               July 23, 1987

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding Judge of
the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator
of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-63818               July 23, 1987

DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of

VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON.
JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and
NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA
O. BORROMEO, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-65995               July 23, 1987

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and JOSE CUENCO

BORROMEO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc.
No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu.

G.R. No. 41171

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in
Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the
province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all
his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided
shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked
by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo
who acted as witnesses.

Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court
held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery.

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will was
affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19
SCRA 656).

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before
the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo.

The following petitions or claims were filed:

1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a petition
for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed against
said petition.

2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration as heir.
The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition.

3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon
Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre,
Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and
determination of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme
Borromeo.

4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda Borromeo

Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo
represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.

When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following facts were
established:

1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having predeceased the
former), were survived by their eight (8) children, namely,

Jose Ma. Borromeo

Cosme Borromeo

Pantaleon Borromeo
 Vito Borromeo

Paulo Borromeo

Anecita Borromeo

Quirino Borromeo and

Julian Borromeo

2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his brothers and
sisters predeceased him.

3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:

a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939

b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of Vito Borromeo.
He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an
only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.

c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.

4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B.
Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following children:

a. Anecita Ocampo Castro

b. Ramon Ocampo

c. Lourdes Ocampo

d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and

e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.

5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following
children:

a. Marcial Borromeo

b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife, Remedios Alfonso, and
his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam

c. Asuncion Borromeo

d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.

e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.

 f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.

The last three died leaving no issue.

6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following
children:

a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949

b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following children:

aa. Federico Borromeo

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)

cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.

dd. Jose Borromeo

ee. Consuelo Borromeo

ff. Pilar Borromeo

gg. Salud Borromeo

hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948

d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946

e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:

aa. Maria Borromeo Atega

bb. Luz Borromeo

cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp

dd. Rosario Borromeo

ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz

On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the
following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:

1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo

2. Judge Crispin Borromeo

 3. Vitaliana Borromeo

4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

5. Salud Borromeo

6. Asuncion Borromeo

7. Marcial Borromeo

8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo

The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into
4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared
intestate heirs.

On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an
agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the
trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and
manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that
40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall
be taken and paid from this segregated portion.

On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the
forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the
declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a
forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of
an acknowledged natural child.

Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated
April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.

Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support
his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate.
He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed
by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo,
Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground
that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that
respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having
been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and
that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who
signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.

In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of
respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a claim
for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's
estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent under
the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs
which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement
was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after
there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the
approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to partition the estate
(August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was
brought out.

It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights"
executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because
there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make
acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one
from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs
were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the
same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation
within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil
Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he
is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of
the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in
the waiver document itself.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of
hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary
rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of
the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was
executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses
jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate
is distributed to those entitled to the same.

The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs,
who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the
death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less,
time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession
of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in
accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order
to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.

In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J.,
311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).

The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a
proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to
all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash
and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested
or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the
heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent
recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent
been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to
mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the
estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the
respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated
consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the
respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in
turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment
and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15,
1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower
court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several parties
came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying
the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.

In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby
SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 55000

This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver document earlier
discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified this case to this Court as the
questions raised are all of law.

The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also question the
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.

The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar
Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any hereditary right in the intestate estate of
the deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on
April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.

They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of waiver of hereditary right
in the present case because there was no object, which is hereditary right, that could be the subject
matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab
initio but was inexistent.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any formal pleading filed
by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to
the parties concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the
lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite pleading.
This resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the
validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise
of jurisdiction.

The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato
Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance
and by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that moment on became
vested in Fortunato Borromeo.

It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a
person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required
is that he is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the
waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of
their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.

On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim
because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee
asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors
to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and setting the same
for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the
inheritance involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the
question.

The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this
case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of
Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be validated. The
essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary
rights, are not found in this case.

The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate
heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967,
some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the respondent.

The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the
deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of
reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.

Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement because the trial court's
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.

The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 62895

A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of some of the
heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar
motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the
fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the estate
since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.

Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid
motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of
Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.

Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to compel the
petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not
lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the petition on
May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28,
1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for
inventory and accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that
under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or
matter within three months from the date of its submission.

The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already been resolved
when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents previously set in his court in an
order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same
order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of
the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of
Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be
segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.

According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R.
No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the
following circumstances:

1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to segregate the 40%
reserved for attorney's fees;

2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9
of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed by the heirs representing the 5/9
group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);

3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his accounting; and

4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of notices of lis
pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate.

Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to some of the declared
heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this
Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to
render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of several properties.

The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.

Considering the pronouncements stated in:

1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court dated
December 24, 1974;

2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos
from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the
case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
 3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from further acting on
any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the affirmation of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.

the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the call and bank
deposits of the petitioner, as co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by
this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate speed.

G.R. No. 63818

On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for
inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P.
Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants
alleged, among others, the following:

x x x           x x x          x x x

6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the production of the
certificates of title and to deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the
ready inspection of interested buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order
of October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various motions for
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as owners they cannot be
deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the
motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for production of
titles.

7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident involving Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and
Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which
the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among others, Atty.
Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from
the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being
declared in contempt of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his
profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and suspension.
Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al.,
who, together, continued to harass administrator

x x x           x x x          x x x

9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the Hon. Presiding
Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.

10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the
sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein
movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell their distributive shares under the terms and
conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has become
apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which
seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the
other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected until
 the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein
movants beg for an entirely independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said
incidents.

11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of this proceeding,
including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein movants. Incidents which may
create this impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)

The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court.

In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the following:

x x x           x x x          x x x

16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state herein that
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing the sale initiated
by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.

17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot be legally done
without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco
P. Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale that
proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present income of
the so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to
say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the
courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos.

x x x           x x x          x x x

20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun motion of Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in the court below which smack
of harassment against the herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents,
petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following
circumstances:

(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated by Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.

(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-
distributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great
disappointment of respondent.

(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly intended to
harass and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him
into acceding to the proposed sale.
 (d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by failing to resolve
the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin
Borromeo. Similar claims by the other lawyers were resolved by respondent after
petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)

On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.

A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on April 11, 1983.
Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case
of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.

The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge Francisco P.
Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest
reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the
judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others concerned.

The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that
Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the entire estate for
P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the
judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add
that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to pay the
attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been
unreasonable because his orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to
give an accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They claim
that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of this Court
directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232.
And finally, they state that the disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the
records of the case.

Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. countered that Judge
Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet
Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as
rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to February
1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order
to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio
Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty.
Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the
projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.

On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner Domingo L.
Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an inventory when he has already
filed one to account for cash, a report on which the administrators had already rendered: and to
appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also prayed
that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his
wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir
distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of
Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.

On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Managert of the
bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu.
and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.

On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial
Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by
filing a motion for relief of the administrator.

On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to
private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners" copies of the titles
in the court presided order by Judge Burgos.

Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose
Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court.

All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the date
of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the private respondents' motion for
reconsideration and the motion to quash the subpoena. 1avvphi1

It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or
disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the
past twelve years, he had not done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to
sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million
pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.

The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more specifically, the
insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs
objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided
at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:

... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must
hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to
his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit
himself from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but
when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in
favor or of either partly or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts
of Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to
disqualify himself "That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of
justice is lived up to.

In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound reasons. As Earlier
stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the
issue itself has become moot and academic.

G.R. No. 65995

The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this petition and No. 63818. They also pray
that all acts of the respondents related to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the
respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void and without force
and effect whatsoever.

The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the
distributed properties already titled in their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending
inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.

The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R requires only
the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants who were individually hired by their
respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be legally charged against their respective
clients and not against the estate.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one and barred by res
judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to
expedite the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution,
which was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate
Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it granted the petition for certiorari and
or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which was
appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).

We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but
of the individual heirs who individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the
Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market
value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.

Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we
grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, —

(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24, 1974,
declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order
dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;

(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document valid is
hereby SET ASIDE;

(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P.
 Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic.
The judge who has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall
immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that
the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court
directing the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall
be implemented:

(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to restrain Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:

(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate the close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner-
administrator of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983;
and

(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market value of the
estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby
DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired
them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which
should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired
from the estate as beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18176            October 26, 1966

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.

Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee.
Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea,
summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved
that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the
reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City
Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose
of determining whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no
such collusion, the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a
marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A
reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the
appeal.
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is
erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have
jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in
actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1

The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant,
which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile
and Domestic Relations.3

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the
filing of the complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
service of summons by publication.5

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds
the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage
tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place
of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines,
domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that
defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not
deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects
two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a
judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and
the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over
the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in,
or a national of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the
lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties
herein.

As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in
Pusan Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub; that they lived together from
November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as
attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police
clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was
necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India
and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she
joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he
then noticed that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B;
that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not
unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March
15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean,
adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later
on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to
another person prior to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A
is not signed. It merely purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the
record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the
entry therein concerning defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant
was a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than
hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the contents of
Exhibit B, defendant did not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she
admitted having previously lived with several other men, adding, however, that she had no
impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous marriage.

Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish defendant's qualification
to contract marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the entry in said document to the
effect that defendant was married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that Korean
laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is identical to
the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to
the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited before with other men, there was no
impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have
been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage
certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data on whether any of the contracting parties
had been previously married; whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce;
and, if there had been such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely
irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that
defendant had had no previous marriage?

Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence
are given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate
to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the
defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in
1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us
believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more
than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he
did not read.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 178551               October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-

KUWAIT Petitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February
11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on
March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented
by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that
there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular
employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay
her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by
Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal,
the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity
extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance
rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.

In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they
cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a
private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
"Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of
June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract
specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative
to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect
to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that
the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any
document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held
liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not
acquired over it.

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of
Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that
its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign
principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between
the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such
agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad
was enacted. (emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which
they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to
the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged;
they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the
Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not
pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of
the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation
Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to
changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from
Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus
the subject certifications read:

xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to
be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it
may serve. (emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following
the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185582               February 29, 2012

TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties
from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a
1 

foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution dated 21
2 

November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed Resolution, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Award against respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and
3 

existing under the laws of the Philippines, on the ground that petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue.
4  5
 The Antecedents

On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of

U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No.
ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"), and five (5) Philippine tuna
6 

processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the
"sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), pertinent provisions of
7  8 

which read:

1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619,

Philippine Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting
licenses under those patents, and collecting royalties.

The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to practice the
processes claimed in those patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia,
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with Licensor.

xxx

4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree to the establishment

of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of California, in order
to implement the objectives of this Agreement.

5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the United States, which will
be used exclusively to deposit funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be
obligated to spend in connection with the implementation of this Agreement.

6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor. Licensor shall be
assigned one share of TPI for the purpose of being elected as member of the board of
directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors according to their
respective equity shares. 9

xxx

The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated 15 January 2003
10 

and an Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 July 2003.

11 

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford,
withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted
12 

the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, United States and won the case against respondent. Pertinent portions of the award
13 

read:

13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the Parties, pursuant to the
terms of this award, the total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is
the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX
DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
 (A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments, RESPONDENT
KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS
($229,355.90) which is 20% of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]

(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the

objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum
of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS
AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;] and 14 

(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT,

RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx

xxx 15

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The petition
was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.

At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court denied the motion for
16 

lack of merit, respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the
17 

reconsideration of the order denying the motion. Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding
18 

"[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the motion." Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz
19 

of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to
sue in the Philippines. 20

Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the
order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award.

Issue

The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition
on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene
in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed the petition. Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a foreign corporation established in the
State of California" and "was given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent"
and "was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties"
in the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it does not have a license to do business in the
Philippines.

There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has been doing business in the
Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by the concerned government agency of the Republic
of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from "five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,]
Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz
Seafoods, Inc. and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real situation, TPI cannot be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative
agency of the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff TPI should be dismissed
for it does not have the legal personality to sue in the Philippines. 21

The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the
subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
22 

Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in
1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the
23 

enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the following:

In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a ground not found in the
[Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this
reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to
clarify whether the Philippines’ international obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as
a means of dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in
the relevant laws. 24

Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one
hand, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model
Law on the other?

In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and applicability of
the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus, in Koruga
v. Arcenas, Jr., this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code and applied the New
25 

Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:

Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with
similar antecedents, we ruled that:

"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the
New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the
dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail
– generalia specialibus non derogant." (Emphasis supplied) 26

Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, this Court held:
27 
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and
regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform.
As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant. 28

Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case
as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System
in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other
Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their
disputes." It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application
29 

for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. 30

Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant
petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New
York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.

In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 incorporated the New York

Convention in the Act by specifically providing:

SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York Convention shall govern the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.

xxx

SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may
oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the
procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under
Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional
trial court.

It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:

Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. International

commercial arbitration shall be governed by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(the "Model Law") adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on June
21, 1985 xxx."

Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to
sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the
affirmative.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that
were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:

Article V

1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
 (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or

(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or

(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or

(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:

(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or

(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.

Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the
recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which was
31 

promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the
court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition are
enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral
32 

awards or arbitrations in instances where "the place of arbitration is in the Philippines," it is

33 

specifically required that a petition "to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and
enforceability of such arbitration agreement" available to the parties before the commencement of
34 

arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary
question upholding or declining its jurisdiction" after arbitration has already commenced should state
35 

"[t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or
be sued." 36
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award, we
deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do
business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract
containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it
becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby
the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider
is the

wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset
Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
37 

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles
here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it
must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts. 38

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it
is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly observed that
the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award, petitioner may still
39 

seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes
substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement. 40

Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may
seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.

II

The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.

First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that petitioner TPI improperly raised a
question of fact when it posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be considered "doing
business" in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the
foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.

Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Resolution dated 21 November 2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule 45. 41

Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts, which,
under ordinary circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the case, we opt to relax the rules
42 

following the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang, to wit:

43 

[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts] generally applies to cases
involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts. A strict application of this rule may
44 
be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where
the issues are not factual but purely legal.  In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate
1âwphi1

say so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of
a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright. 45

Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised should be seriously
considered. Surely, there is a need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide the bench and
46 

the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy
of the State embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to actively promote party
autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements
to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial
justice and declog court dockets. xxx

Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the foreign arbitral award, we leave
its determination to the court a quo where its recognition and enforcement is being sought.

Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of origin a copy of the motion for
time to file petition for review on certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court. We, however,
47 

find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:

26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s "Motion for Time to File a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45" is a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by respondent
Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
61.

27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner
TPI’s motion was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 January
2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61. 48

All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

ellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678            June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

Violet Kennedy (2nd wife)  Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1st wife)

 Legitimate Children:                                      Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis                                            Amos Bellis, Jr.                              
George Bellis (pre-deceased)                         Maria Cristina Bellis       
Henry A. Bellis                                              Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
 Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
 By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman
 By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
 August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as
follows:
1.    $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2.    P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis
3.    remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
 July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
 September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
 People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
 Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

 Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
 The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
 In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.  Apply Philippine laws.
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
 G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968

 TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.

TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.

 Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.

Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.

 FERNANDO, J.:

 Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the County
Trust Company of New York, United States of America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah
Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine
corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the
lower court, then presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18,
1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator,
dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the administration
and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates
covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to
issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either
the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court."1

 From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator,
the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The challenged order represents a
response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific
problem, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies, with
full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and significance.

 The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two
stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased.2 Then came this portion of the appellant's brief:
"On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator,
and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute
arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary
administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the
order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an
order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in
the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or]
considered as lost."3
 It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial"
as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock
certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator,
the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...."4

 It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be
declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe
certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its
appeal.

 As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged order
constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by the
wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court
decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?

 As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the
realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance,
if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned
or tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude
such a solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by
indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations.

 It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the
judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus
dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of the
domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted,
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance
through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of
March 15, 1963.

 Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what
was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified.
Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of
what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have
entailed, insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete
paralysis of judicial authority.

 1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary
administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her
estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court
made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether principal
or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country
where it was granted," the corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or
country has no power over property in another state or country."6

 It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier
case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of
his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
 administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration
is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile,
property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual
debts or to be distributed among his heirs."7

 It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject
to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be
considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

 Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue8 finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines,
the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not
even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it
were so minded.

 2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion for
the legality of the challenged order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose
to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It
would assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as
lost the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased
Idonah Slade Perkins, ..."9 More specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court
could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his
Honor the trial Judge knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said
stock certificates are in existence and are today in the possession of the domiciliary
administrator in New York."10

 There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly does
not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal, persistently
adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of
appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines,
there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the
appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law
on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

 Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend
on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus
far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant
would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a
mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.

 It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not
correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in
such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to borrow from
Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have
played an important part in its development."11
 Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were devices
to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive."12 Some of them have
persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted
child, the constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if" today."13 He
likewise noted "a class of fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of
thought, but which at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have brought it to
the light."14

 What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as such
played in the law. There should be then on the part of the appellant a further refinement in
the catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for
the employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial
order being disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that
this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.

 3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its
invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the
event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or
certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or
certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]."15

 Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law.
It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in
question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is
concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law
and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

 It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to

which, however, the judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and deemed
applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be
accorded such a high estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but
yield to its alleged controlling force.

 The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the
appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us.
Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such
apprehension of a possible court action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far,
nothing in the circumstances as they have developed gives substance to such a fear.
Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful
exercise of judicial authority.

 4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with
implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.

 We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.
As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person,
owing its existence through creation by a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the
statutory language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth
 College decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law."18

 The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is not in
fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of
fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain
specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its
charter."19 Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an association of
human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter neatly.20

 There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote

from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
recognition and concession."21 A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a
creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to
law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher
priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience
to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do
so.

 As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of
persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than
the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to enforce its
right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty
under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.

 To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer
upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to
argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to
contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at
will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.

 5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,22 it was shown that in a
guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under
guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the
deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by
its main office in the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of
such order, the Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions
"final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to
examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States
court."23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.

 In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of the
opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when
made on claims property submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the
present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a
great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in
accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the
exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the Veterans'
Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing
 actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the
findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our
courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere
subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."

 It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and
conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our
jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or
caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of
the bench or the honor of the country.

 Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant
Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the
validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to
it that it does not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing
attest to the necessity of negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.

 That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is
always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It
does not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the just
solution obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its
correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For through the appealed order, the
imperative requirement of justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity and honor
maintained.

 WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court
of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

 KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING

CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners, v. MINORU
KITAMURA, Respondent.

 DECISION

 NACHURA, J.:

 Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution2 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.

 On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants

Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure
 projects of foreign governments,3 entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura,
a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on
April 1, 1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.6

 When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department

of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time
for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of
the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project.7 Respondent was named as the project manager in the
contract's Appendix 3.1.8

 On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's

general manager for its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged
by the company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.9

 Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent,

through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and
demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that respondent's contract was for a fixed term that
had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal
of the ICA.10

 As he was not able to generate a positive response from the

petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000
Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11

 For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been
perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
 nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-
termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles
of lex loci celebrationis  and lex contractus.12

 In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved

Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain
Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project.13

 On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular

Government v. Frank14 that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance,15 denied the motion to dismiss.16 The
trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the appellate
court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the
petition on procedural grounds'for lack of statement of
material dates and for insufficient verification and certification
against forum shopping.19 An Entry of Judgment was later
issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000.20

 Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA,

on September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary period,
a second Petition for Certiorari  under Rule 65 already stating
therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper
verification and certification. This second petition, which
substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21

 Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court

rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision22 finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the
case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the
written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the
 trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex
loci solutionis.23

 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently

denied by the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.24

 Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of

denials, petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the appellate
court:

 A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.

 B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAWS.26

 The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is

whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in
civil cases for specific performance and damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
or forum non conveniens.

 However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of

the procedural matters raised by the respondent.

 Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's

decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing
of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827
 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first
one) and the instant Petition for Review thereof.

 We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.

60205 on account of the petition's defective certification of
non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without
prejudice.27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the
said case due to defects in the formal requirement of
verification28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates.29 The
dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the
petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the
appropriate verification and certification as they, in fact did
and stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed
period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.31

 The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence

of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the
dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words,
the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar
another action involving the same parties, on the same subject
matter and theory.32

 Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice

and has no res judicataeffect, and even if petitioners still
indicated in the verification and certification of the
second certiorari  petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds,33 petitioners are no longer
required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-
forum shopping in the instant Petition for Review of the
second  certiorari  petition, the status of the aforesaid first
petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the
certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not
constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present
case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings, considering that the
evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no
longer present.34
 The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that
petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on
behalf of Nippon, the certiorari  petition filed with the CA and
not the instant petition. True, the Authorization35 dated
September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
second certiorari  petition and which is also attached to the
instant Petition for Review, is limited in scope its wordings
indicate that Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and
act on behalf of the company only in the petition filed with the
appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the
instant Petition for Review .36 In a plethora of cases, however,
this Court has liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its
application whenever a satisfactory explanation and a
subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been
made.37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained
their misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply38 an
updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the
company in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as
sufficient compliance with the Rules.

 However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment

to the defect in the verification and certification. As respondent
pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not
authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The
aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the
subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by
Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the
company's board of directors. In not a few cases, we have
ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of
directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can bind the
corporation, in the absence of authority from the
board.40 Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the
petition only on his behalf and not on behalf of the other
petitioner, the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v.
Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter that demands strict observance of the
Rules.42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to
 effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and
effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.43

 Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly

filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of
their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot
be the subject of the extraordinary Petition
for Certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file
an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised
in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.

 This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the

case.

 Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum,

petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil
case for specific performance and damages filed by the
respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into
and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and
written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners
posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the
parties46 following the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule in Private International Law.47

 The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but

different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate
court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial court,
petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient
forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will
determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that
of Japan, following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While not abandoning this
stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners
on certiorari  significantly invoked the defense of forum non
conveniens.50 On Petition for Review before this Court,
petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained
 the forum non conveniens  defense, and introduced their new
argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the]
most significant relationship rule.51

 Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this

petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as
explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We
only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to
emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws
principles.

 To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,

three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1)
Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will
the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be
enforced?53

 Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct

concepts.54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori  will often coincide,
the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the
necessary "significant contacts" for the other.55 The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56

 In this case, only the first phase is at issue jurisdiction. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

 Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to

validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the
defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over
 the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.57 In
assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are
actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

 Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is

conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law.58 It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in
its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show
that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted
to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.61

 In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do

not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil
Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is
one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly
cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as
grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the
"state of the most significant relationship rule."

 The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

 Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the

ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a contract is
made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus  means the "law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed."65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract66 and it may pertain
to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the
"state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to
the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract,
 the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties.68 This rule
takes into account several contacts and evaluates them
according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved.69

 Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference

to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of law.70 They determine which
state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues
of a conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.

 Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law

rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out
any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, first there should exist a
conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict
of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign country is
invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case,
the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.73

 It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a

foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other State or
States.74 The court's power to hear cases and controversies is
derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not
limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other
formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided
by foreign sovereigns.75
 Neither can the other ground raised, forum non
conveniens,76 be used to deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to
dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does
not include it as a ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.78 In this
case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires
a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense.79

 Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to

entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the
grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied
the petitioners' motion to dismiss.

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review

on Certiorari is DENIED.
 .R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008

 RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

 DECISION

 TINGA, J.:

 Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against
petitioner with the trial court.

 As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:

 Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
 Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
and mudflows.3

 On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s
money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent
elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997.
The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.

 On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for

damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner
Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in
the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case
that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI
and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

 In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign

corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied
combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the
said companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the
written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special
Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.11

 On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on
Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent
opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter
Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13

 In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The
trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be
admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled
that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.15

 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion was opposed by
respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion.
Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13
 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further
proceedings.20

 On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision21 denying the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
the assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22

 The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the
allegations in the complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving
petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the
deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way
or the other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as
defendants in the case had indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented
by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover,
the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to
desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum
non conveniens.

 Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.

 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE

COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24

 Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino
Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the
case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing
of the instant petition and that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of
respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court
resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.

 The instant petition lacks merit.

 Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a
valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely,
the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence
to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate
the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

 Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in

judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that
the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element,
the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
 intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have the power to enforce its decision.28

 On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is filed.29

 Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil
Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

 As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance
in court.32

 That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of
law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.33 The
choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the
foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

 Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.35

 Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its
conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts
because their findings are binding on this Court.

 Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause
of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
allegation in the pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause
of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded.37
 The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one
company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation.
On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:

 x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents
produced in the hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to
mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

 Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that
Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of
defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust
International ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already
submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon
International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined
into one company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at
all) may be held liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid
commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise.38

 As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI
and RUST merged together requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-
blown trial on the merits can afford.

 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.

 G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998

 ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

 BELLOSILLO, J.:
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as
well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
 On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly
remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly
on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites
in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
 On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib)
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the
ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent.
 Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was
not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with
 Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.
 Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to
the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other
spouse,   hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
1

marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws.
 The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was
properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in
accordance with PD No. 1083   or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for
2

reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with
this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge
of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22
August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.
 In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a
motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are shari'a court.
But in places where there are no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case
could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
 Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court
and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of
the action.
 Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,   Regional Trial Courts have
3

jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations.   Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of
4

marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the

principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.   There should be no question by now that what
5

determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.   In the
6

complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it

was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in
her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she
was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in
her Motion for Reconsideration.
 Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of
the complaint.   Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
7

allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the

ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.  8
 Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit
pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083,   which provides —
9

 Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines.
 (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
 (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and
legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and
custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr),
betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and
divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and
other applicable Muslim laws.
 As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with
the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is
applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
 Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not
divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129
which provides —
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court —
Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings until terminated.
 SO ORDERED.

 G.R. No. 193902               June 1, 2011

 ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.

 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

 G.R. No. 193908

 ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,

vs.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.

 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 G.R. No. 194075

 SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.

 DECISION

 NACHURA, J.:

 These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D.
Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by
petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.

 Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

 On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge
Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

 A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce
by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court,
1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992,
as follows:

 DECREE OF DIVORCE

 This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de
Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein
complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as
provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

 When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they
have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.

 This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both
the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to
their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and
between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.

 WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage
between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is
hereby confirmed dissolved.
 Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.

 (signed)

 HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL

 Presiding Judge3

 Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites
in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties
of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony
before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos’ first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

 Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on
October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which
vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights
thereto.

 As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:

 1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum
amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other
things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously
married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos’ first marriage, solemnized before
the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the
celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage
was bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should
forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive
custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her
inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.

 2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed
on October 25, 2004.

 3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal from service and disbarment
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the
administrative cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed
CA Decision, Pacasum’s appeal from the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative case was still
pending resolution.

 Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted
a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4
 Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie
evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5 Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.6

 Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutor’s February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting
City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos’ motion for
reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.7

 Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the
City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005.8 Posthaste,
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing
the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.9

 In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a
resolution granting Pacasum’s Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and
April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.10 Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus
Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold
in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of
Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of
Justice.11 Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of
Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006.12

 Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise
denied.

 On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines:

 From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to
the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage
due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de
Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos]
has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was
entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their
marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-
marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband
Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being
unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into
by them under PD 1083.

 Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December
28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of
the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under
PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and
 jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the
Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of
combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between
the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and
unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos]
and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.

 Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

 "Application

 The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."

 Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce
proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a Circuit
Court.

 Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:

 "Jurisdiction – The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

 xxxx

 2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married
in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:

 a) Marriage;

 b) Divorce recognized under this Code;

 x x x x"

 The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or
other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari’[a] Court is
valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.

 Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which
were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.

 In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this
Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of
marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has the
exclusive original jurisdiction.

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of
motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
 The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

 SO ORDERED.13

 On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme
Court of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments.14

 In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of
Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.15

 Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged.
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in
Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on
Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-
12305 ought to be dismissed.16

 On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos’ Motion to Quash
the Information. Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.17

 Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the
December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the
CA dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to
assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:

 A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As

such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly
void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction.
Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must
clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as
to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

 Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope.
It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as
one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as
opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction.

 xxxx

 In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos’] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and
[w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos’]
[M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the
 denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City’s] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash is erroneous, such
error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.18

 Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA’s dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition
for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.

 We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA
Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and
superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for
her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.

 Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:

 1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites;

 2. Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio
did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;

 3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos’ divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their

marriage ties;

 4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce
proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a Circuit Court."

 5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and

 6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No.
1083 because it is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

 For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition, raises
a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and
who entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.

 We impale the foregoing issues into the following:

 1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari; and

 2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s separate factual findings that
Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
 As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.19

 The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—acts which courts have no
power or authority in law to perform.20

 The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory
order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.21

 Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.22

 However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari

is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of
a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when
the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened
and substantial justice";23 (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the
cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in
the consideration thereof."25 The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.

 Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error
of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to quash.

 First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of

judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof.

 Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The
provision reads:

 SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

 (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of
a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
 judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate.

 The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:

 (1) The former judgment or order must be final;

 (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

 (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and

 (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action.26

 The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state
that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits.
The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it
found that the Shari’a Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of
Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.

 Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and
recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos’
divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos
presented the following evidence:

 1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized

the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:

 1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize
the marriages among Muslims;

 2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers
of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam)
Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;

 3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos
came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq
by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Shari’a Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and,
after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of
[C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;

 4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim
personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
 5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Circuit Court was housed, was
razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments
of the Shari’a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;

 6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact;
and

 7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may
serve.

 2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce
agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.

 3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of

Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s divorce
agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in pertinent part:

 1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;

 2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan
was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then
the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit Court;

 3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old
Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;

 4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr.
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former
wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the
wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1083;

 5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire
that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;

 6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.

 From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage
are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

 True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under
the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:

 The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b),
BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District
Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested
jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is
 nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide
cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.30

 Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges
on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and
the CA.

 The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had
litigated the validity of

 Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had successfully
shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos
and De Guzman.

 Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.

 In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its
policies."

 Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction
over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

 Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:

 TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

 Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

 (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the
former shall prevail.

 (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of
local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.

 (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall
be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

 In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal
laws expound thereon:
 The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this
Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict
between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general
application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in
the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the
Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second
provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and
another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to
carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.31

 On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:

 TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

 Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

 Article 13. Application. –

 (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

 (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

 xxxx

 Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

 Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.

 xxxx

 Section 3. Subsequent Marriages

 xxxx

 Article 29. By divorcee.

 (1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an ‘idda of
three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the
time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.

 xxxx

 Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
  Section 1. Nature and Form

 Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of
reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

 (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

 xxxx

 Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

 (1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife
during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal
relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one
repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed ‘idda.

 (2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right
to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of cohabitation without need
of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become
irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).

 xxxx

 Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:

 (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with this Code;

 (b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;

 (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this Code;

 (d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq
has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected
before its consummation;

 (e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance
with Article 67; and

 (f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and
liquidated.

 For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali’s Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

 If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely
 ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will
apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law,
that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when
the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32

 Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.33
1avvphi1

 It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an

Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.
194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

 SO ORDERED.