CASE #8
head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares
Ramos vs Ramos
G.R. No. 168464
Jan. 23, 2006
Facts:
Petitiomer Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are
the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The
spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in
1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos
in 1946, with whom she had five children, one of whom is
respondent Rolando.
The Bureau of lands awarded as stated that Susana Bueno Vda. de
Ramos and her children have sufficiently established their right of
preference over the land except the one hectare Cemetery site, on
the basis of their continuous occupation and cultivation and their
valuable improvements introduced thereon. The land in question
shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare
portion in the northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved
as barrio cemetery site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated
to SUSANA BUENO VDA DE RAMOS. She was ordered by the Bureau
of Lands to file an application for homestead.
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a
soldier, wherever he was assigned, Susana's father, George Bueno,
and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and
possession of the subject land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land
to petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her brother,
Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings. The partition
was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of
Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her
knowledge that respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her
share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land.
After settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of
inheritance, possession and damages with a petition for preliminary
mandatory injunction.
On July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that
petitioner was deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of
her share of Lot No. 204. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be
considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may
entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the possession thereof
Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.  Lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. 
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one
of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes. Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one
issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the
of land in the country.  To be qualified, the applicant must show that
he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality
where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth
of the land applied for. 
Zenaida's argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents
had perfected their title over the land and that they could validly
convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance.
However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioner
has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for
homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaida's family's right of
preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation
of the land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of
an appropriate application for its registration which indicates that as
of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed. 
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother
cannot be given effect, nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida,
because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not
belong to her. The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the
partition of the property among Zenaida, Alexander, and Rolando
and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the land
which she did not own. For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor
Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana.
Their claim evidently relies on the provision of the Section 105 of the
Public Land Act.
The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of
an applicant, grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her
lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation of the land, she
failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested
right that Eusebio or Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains
part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio and Rolando
cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land
because the same cannot be considered as adverse, open, public,
peaceful and to the exclusion of all.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and
rightfully belongs to the State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none
of the parties obtained a defensible title to the property which can
be upheld by the Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is
different from the issue of its ownership. Petitioner argues that her
petition may be treated as an accion publiciana and not merely an
action for recovery of inheritance.
An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to
possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
title. 
We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of
land she claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing of
the homestead application. Moreover, Zenaida presented tax
declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-
interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and
again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.  They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government.
All told, petitioner Zenaida's uncontested and verified application for
a homestead patent coupled with her open and notorious
occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to
possess the land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by the
law in such possession.
Petition partially granted.
CASE #9
G.R. No. 134209            
January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CELESTINA
NAGUIAT, Respondent.
Facts:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of
land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. Applicant [herein
respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said
parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID
Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria
Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge,
said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein
petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of
applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
The trial court ruled in favor of Naguiat. CA affirmed.
Petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding
respecting the length of respondent’s occupation of the property
subject of her application for registration and for not considering the
fact that she has not established that the lands in question have
been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and
disposable property.
Issue:
Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status
of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain
Ruling:
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not
necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse
covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated
in Heirs of Amunategui -
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State – the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act,
the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public
domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the
court. Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from
the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying
the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence
the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the
classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of
public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point to
stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral
lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and
disposable lands need an express and positive act from the
government.
Petition is granted.
CASE #10
G.R. No. 163766             June 22, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CANDY MAKER, INC.,
as represented by its President, ONG YEE SEE,* Respondent.
Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a
parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation
of12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker,
Inc. as applicant, filed anapplication with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for
registration of its alleged title over the lot.The CENRO of Antipolo
City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable
zone. On theother hand, the Land Registration Authority
recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it
is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable
and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the
LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lotsubject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since
it is consideredpart of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, it’s
jurisdiction.
Issue:
1. whether the property subject of the amended application is
alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so,
2. whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence
to prove its ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D.
1529.
Ruling:
We find and so rule that the property subject of this application was
alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July 18, 1966.
However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable
title over the property.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A.
No. 1942, reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, nay apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting
the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945;"
thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter
VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession, and occupation by the applicant himself
or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove
the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. The presumption is that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of
the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The statute
of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and
occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant
from the government, whether express or implied. It is
indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State. The
rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945" lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to
the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest
thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open
and notorious possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through
acquisitive prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, the
Court declared that:
x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,’ this provision
of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code.
This article states that ‘x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of
things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not
acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo
titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith
of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just
title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of
ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources stating that the land subject of an application is
found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land
classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real
character of the land subject of the application.
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim over the land. Actual possession consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would actually exercise over his own property. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership; such possession
is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State.
CASE #11
Saad Agro-Industries vs RP
G.R. No. 152570            September 27, 2006
Facts:
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application
for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with
an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga,
Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No.
1434, while the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said
lot. Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries,
Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and
reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No.
0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of
the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free
patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous,
following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the
timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was
made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter- complaint with the Regional
Executive Director of the Forest Management Sector, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City,
about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction
of dikes within the area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease
Agreement. On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-
intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of
respondent. However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the
complaint and were thus declared in default.
Trial court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject lot is inside the timberland block
Ruling:
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious
controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation
committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of
the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the
original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate
of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-
interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud
and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free
patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as
grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should
never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being
adequate.
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for
reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over the
alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has deprived
the State of the claimed property.
The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those
of the appellate court are more in accord with the law and
jurisprudence.
Reliance on Section 13 of P.D. No. 705 is highly misplaced. P.D. No.
705 was promulgated only on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after
the free patent and title were awarded to Orcullo. Article 4 of the
Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided." Thus, even assuming for the nonce that
subject parcel was unclassified at the time Orcullo applied for a free
patent thereto, the fact remains that when the free patent and title
were issued thereon in 1971, respondent in essence segregated said
parcel from the mass of public domain. Thus, it can no longer be
considered unclassified and forming part of the public forest as
provided in P.D. No. 705.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of
the timberland or forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961.
However, at the hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial court denied
admission of the map for the purpose of showing that the subject lot
falls within a timberland reserve after respondent had failed to
submit either a certified true copy or an official publication thereof.
The Court observes that the document adverted to is a mere
photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue print as
insisted by respondent. A mere photocopy does not qualify as
competent evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map.
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule
holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The
Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its
citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and
privileges at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every
respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior
advantage. This is so because when a sovereignty submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and
rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to
the claims and rights of the private parties under similar
circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders
the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show
that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve.
Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao, Cebu testified that
they personally saw the subject lot and that it falls within the
timberland or forest reserve. Ultimately, however, the basis of their
declaration is the L.C. Map which respondent failed to present in
accordance with the rules on admissibility. Two foresters in fact
testified that the subject lot was a mangrove area. The foresters
who conducted the survey may have been competent and their
techniques reliable; nevertheless, the observation that mangroves
grow in the subject lot is not conclusive as to the nature of the land
at present or at the time the free patent and title were issued.
Assuming that the area is covered by mangroves when they
surveyed it, there is no proof that it was not planted with trees and
crops at the time Orcullo applied for free patent. Respondent was
also unable to establish that the subject lot has "very deep and
muddy soil" or are "mudflats," such that it is unsuitable for fruit and
non-fruit bearing trees. As it is, a mere declaration from the said
officers, without any other supporting evidence, is not sufficient to
establish that the area in question is part of the forest reserve.
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is
admissible in evidence, still the land in question can hardly be
considered part of the timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No.
2961, which purports to be the "correct map of the areas
demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D.
No. 705 as amended" was made only in 1980, nine (9) years after
Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court, finding that the disputed
land was classified as timberland 25 years after private individuals
had commenced their continuous possession and cultivation thereof
in good faith, declared that they have the better right. The Court
held:
While the Government has the right to classify portions of public
land, the primary right of a private individual who possessed and
cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification
must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events
which could not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the
Government, in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for
itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made.
Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification
was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself
and through her predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed
the subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded to her
and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In fact, it appears
that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title was
regular and in order. To declare the land now as forest land on the
authority of L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only in 1980, and opinions
based on the said map, would unduly deprive petitioner of their
registered property.
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present
Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court
has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic
foundation of the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in applying
this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim or
right by the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount
considerations of fairness and due process must be observed.
CASE #12
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EMETERIA G.
LUALHATI, Respondent.
Facts:
On August 12, 2004, respondent Emeteria G. Lualhati filed with the
RTC of Antipolo City an application for original registration covering
Lots 1 and 2 described under Plan Psu-162384, situated in C-5 C-6
Pasong Palanas, Sitio Sapinit, San Juan (formerly San Isidro),
Antipolo, Rizal, consisting of an area of 169,297 and 79,488 square
meters, respectively. Respondent essentially maintains that she,
together with her deceased husband, Andres Lualhati, and their four
children, namely: Virginia, Ernesto, Felicidad, and Ligaya, have been
in possession of the subject lands in the concept of an owner since
1944.
In support of her application, respondent submitted the blueprint of
the survey plan and the tracing cloth plan surveyed at the instance
of Andres Lualhati and approved by the Director of Lands in October
1957, the certified true copy of the surveyor’s certificate, the
technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2, Tax Declaration No. 26437
issued in the name of Andres Lualhati, which states that the tax on
the properties commenced in 1944, the real property tax register
evidencing payment of realty taxes on the subject properties from
1949 to 1958, certifications from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV, City Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Antipolo City, that no public land
application/land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are
the lots embraced by any administrative title, and a letter from the
Provincial Engineer that the province has no projects which will be
affected by the registration.
Moreover, respondent presented several witnesses to prove her
claim, the first of which was respondent herself.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court failed to consider
certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account, will
justify a different conclusion. First, petitioner posits that respondent
did not present any evidence to show that the land sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable land of public domain. Second,
petitioner asserts that respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence proving her claim of possession and occupation over the
entire portion of the subject properties.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain;
2. Whether or not she he and her predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership
Ruling:
While it is true that this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, and not of fact, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45, when the findings of fact are devoid of support by the evidence
on record, or when the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, this Court may revisit the evidence in
order to arrive at a decision in conformity with the law and evidence
at hand. In the instant case, the evidence on record do not support
the findings made by the courts below on the alienable and
disposable character of the lands in question.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision, applicants for
registration of title must prove that: (1) the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2)
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the
inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
To support her contention that the lands subject of her application is
alienable and disposable, respondent submitted certifications from
the DENR-CENRO stating that no public land application or land
patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots
embraced by any administrative title. Respondent’s reliance on the
CENRO certifications is misplaced.
In the oft-cited Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, it has been held that it
is not enough for the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to certify that a certain parcel of
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable
and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land
alienable and disposable.
Thus, as it now stands, an application for original registration must
be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records, in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable.
In similar regard, the evidence on record likewise fail to establish
that respondent, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the properties under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership.
Moreover, as petitioner aptly points out, respondent failed to
provide any other proof of acts of dominion over the subject land
other than the fact that she, together with her husband and
children, planted fruit-bearing trees and constructed their home
thereon considering the vastness of the same. As enunciated development under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1627 also
in Republic v. Bacas, et al.: dated 28 September 1981.

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed.
and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and Issues:
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
1. Whether or not substantially establish that the subject parcel of
While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with
land is alienable and disposable;
other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of
land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or
2. Whether or not the respondents were able to sufficiently prove
other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim
that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in possession of
of title thru acquisitive prescription.
the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
CASE #13
Ruling:

G.R. No. 210341               July 1, 2015

To reiterate, under Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  vs. JOSEFINO O. ALORA
Section 14. Who May Apply — The following persons may file in the
and OSCAR O. ALORA, Respondents.
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
Facts:
representatives:
On 6 May 1969, spouses Pedro and Rafaela Alora sold a parcel of
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
land with an area of 12, 710 square meters, located in Barangay San
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna to their sons Josefino 0. Alora and Oscar
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
0. Alora (respondents) for ₱5,000.00.  The parties to the sale
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
executed a Deed of Conveyance dated 8 May 1969.
1945, or earlier.
On 6 June 2010, respondents filed a verified application for
xxxx
registration of title before the RTC, which was docketed as LRC Case
No. SPL-0697-10. Oscar, who was in the United States, authorized
Thus, applicants for registration must prove the following: (1) that
his brother Josefino to represent him in the proceedings, under a
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
Special Power of Attorney dated 26 November 2010.
the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
In the application, respondents claimed that they purchased the
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
parcel of land, and that they had no knowledge of any mortgage or
encumbrance or any person having any interest over the same
In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down
property. They further claimed that they had been planting crops on
on November 23, 2010, when the rule on strict compliance was
the parcel of land from 1969 to 2010.
already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the
respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the
The approved plan showed six lots which respondents in tended to
RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South
develop as a commercial property.
CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.
The respondents further claimed that they paid all taxes on the
In the instant case, the RTC Resolution was issued on 3 July 2012,
property and registered the Deed of Conveyance with the Registry of
after the promulgation of Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. Thus,
Deeds and Assessor’s Office, and had traced back the tax
following our ruling in Republic v. San Mateo, the rule requiring
declarations of their predecessors-in-interest from 1935. The parcel
certification from the DENR Secretary should be applied. It is
of land originally belonged to Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and was
important to emphasize that the more recent case of Republic v.
transferred to Pedro Salandanan. Subsequently, Salandanan
Spouses Castuera, decided on 14 January 2015, applied the rule in
conveyed the property to Pedro Alora, respondents’ father.
Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. without any qualification.
Oandasan testified that as chief of CENRO, his professional duties
CASE #14
included issuing certifications as to the status of lands. He also
claimed that the subject parcel of land is alienable and disposable
[ GR No. 195990, Aug 05, 2015 ]
under BFD Land Classification No. P004 released on 28 September
1981, and that he was able to secure a land certification mark 304 HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION
from the NAMRIA which bears a certification stating that the areas CORPORATION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH
set aside are alienable and disposable for cropland and fishpond
Facts:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and
Concepcion Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their death, were the
original owners of a parcel of land with an area 236,638 square
meters located in Sitio Simpak, Brgy. Lala, Municipality of
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The respondents claim that they own
a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based
on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation in favor of respondent
Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist
(PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the subject property
by introducing improvements thereon through the construction of a
church building, and later on, an elementary school. On the date the
Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo were not
the registered owners of the property yet although they were the
lawful possessors thereof. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-642 covering the entire
property was issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to
Concepcion Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953.
In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and
their six children, namely, Abnera, Benia, Castillo, Dilbert, Filipinas
and Grace caused the extrajudicial partition of the property.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Lanao del Norte issued a new
certificate of title under the names of the heirs on 13 January 1954.
On 30 July 1992, Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision
of the entire property including the portion occupied by PUMCO-
SDA. It was at this point that respondents brought to the attention
of Concepcion that the 5,000 square-meter portion of the property
is already owned by respondent PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of
Donation she executed together with her husband in their favor in
1937. When Concepcion, however, verified the matter with the
Register Deeds, it appeared that the donation was not annotated in
the title. The absence of annotation of the so-called encumbrance in
the title prompted petitioners not to recognize the donation claimed
by the respondents. The matter was left unresolved until Concepcion
died and the rest of the owners continued to pursue their claims to
recover the subject property from the respondents.
A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the
petitioners were allowed by respondents to harvest from the
coconut trees planted on the subject property but a
misunderstanding ensued causing respondents to file a case for
qualified theft against the petitioners.
On 19 June 2000 or around six decades after the Deed of Donation
was executed, petitioners filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Document, Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages
against PUMCO-SDA before the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation awarded to respondents by
the Gozo spouses is valid
Ruling:
A careful scrutiny of the records, reveals a significant fact that at the
time the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the inalienable
public domain. It was only almost after two decades later or on 5
October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of
the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing an
original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such conferment of
title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land
which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII,
Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and not the Courts. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains as an unclassified
land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, all public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
alienable public domain. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable
that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, remains to this day the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. The
following provisions under Title I, Chapter II of the Public Land Act,
as amended, is very specific on how lands of the public domain
become alienable or disposable:
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the Batasang Pambansa or the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, may from time to time declare what public lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act. x x x x
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government,
nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the President may, for
reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open
to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend
their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act
of the Congress.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural; (b) Residential,  commercial,  industrial,  or  for  the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to
similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for townsites and for public
and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and
in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code, the President delegated to the DENR
Secretary the power to determine which of the unclassified lands of
the public domain are (1) needed for forest purposes and declare
them as permanent forest to form part of the forest reserves; and
(2) not needed for forest purposes and declare them as alienable
and disposable lands.
Per the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural land is
granted after compliance by an applicant with the conditions and
requirements laid down under Title II, Chapter IV of the Public Land
Act, the most basic of which are quoted below:
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years,
or the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four
hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of any
gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land
since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States, may
enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain.
SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the
Director of Lands, if he finds that the application should be
approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession
of the land upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as
entry fee. Within six months from and after the date of the approval
of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead,
otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land.
SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land
applied for until at least one-fifth of the land has been improved and
cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall
not be less than one nor more than five years, from and after the
date of the approval of the application. The applicant shall, within
acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the
land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same and has
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the
approval of the application, and shall make affidavit that no part of
said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has
complied with all the requirements of this Act, then, upon the
payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.
It is clear under the law that before compliance with the foregoing
conditions and requirements the applicant has no right over the land
subject of the patent and therefore cannot dispose the same even if
such disposal was made gratuitously. It is an established principle
that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non
habet. It is true that gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a
thing or a right but the term right must be understood in a
"proprietary" sense over which the possessor has jus
disponendi. This is because in true donations there results a
consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his
assets. 
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was
effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject
property was part of the public domain and is outside the commerce
of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the ownership of the
property was vested by the State to the Spouses Gozo by virtue of its
issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by
the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the
donation of the subject property which took place before 5 October
1953 is null and void from the very start.
As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That which
is a nullity produces no effect. 
CASE #15
GR. No. 197472
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander
Raymond Alpuerto of the Naval Base Camillo Osias, Port San
Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Petitioner,  vs. REV. CLAUDIO R.
CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by
vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities,
established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island,
San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has
been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in
the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under
his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to
support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of the
public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000
hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the
Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and
the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana,
Cagayan as marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the
entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48
hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San
Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him, some members of the
Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and
lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island
when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men,
through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When
he sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine Naval
Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with
drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his
men were constrained to leave the area.
Issues:
1. Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory
injunction
2. Whether or not the subject parcels of land had been segregated
from the military reservation
Ruling:
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from
a final injunction.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a
mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a
particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction." "It
may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an
incident in the main action."
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction." A preliminary injunction
does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted
facts. Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or injustice
until the rights of the parties are settled. "It is usually granted when
it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between
the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or
destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can
be had on the merits of the case." A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or
final order. For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at
least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any
substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply stated, the applicant
needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in his complaint. On the other hand, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final injunction. A final
injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary
mandatory injuction. It is issued when the court, after trial on the
merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or
acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is
only after the court has come up with a definite pronouncement
respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right,
based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final
injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant
injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be
established by the applicant with absolute certainty.
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must
be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right."  Thus, it is
necessary that the Court initially determine whether the right
asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required
necessary that such right must have been established by him with length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the
absolute certainty. public domain.

Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner  is one of
the two concepts of possession provided under Article 525  of the
Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession,  this kind of
possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription.  As
correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an
owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.  In the same
manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be
respected in his possession.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove
that, before the proclamation, the subject lands were already
private lands. They merely relied on such ‘recognition’ of possible
private rights. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev.
Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the
subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance
of a final injunction.

It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which

are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession.  The following cannot be appropriated and hence,
cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common
things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his
asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that
the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain

belong to the State. Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly
under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons." To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion
of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when
Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be
considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot
be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession
under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’
claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of
the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or
no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor
since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had
been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had
to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable
land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and
settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential
Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance
because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to
acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens
system. Without first determining the nature and character of the
land, all other requirements such as length and nature of possession