Labo Jr.

vs COMELEC and Lardizabal

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent

Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto questioning
petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian
citizen, having married an Australian citizen. Records also showed petitioner’s oath
and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not denied;
petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only
a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous.

Issue:

Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?

Ruling:

NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. All of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection
with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution provides that, “Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia

was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is
a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact
that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may
have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he
has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be

reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate
of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act
of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.
GR No. 161434, March 3 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ)
filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections.  In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and
cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. 
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe,
who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates
that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902,
there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939,
governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of
the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando
Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of
whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate. 
CHIONGBIAN VS. DE LEON ET AL, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

82 Phil. 771 (1949) (Constitutional Law – Citizenship)

FACTS:  Herein petitioner is a son of a Chinese citizen who has been elected
into office before the adoption of the Constitution, wherein said petitioner was
still a minor. Respondents seeks to cancel petitioner’s registration certificates
of vessels and rescind the sale of vessels from the same on the ground that
the latter is allegedly not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified to
operate and own vessels of Philippine registry.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD: Yes, because the petitioner, aside from the fact that he was a minor at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution,  follows the citizenship of his
father who having been elected to public office before the adoption of the said
Constitution became a Filipino citizen as provided by the sam
 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:
FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that
she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to
day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA
POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her
marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe
then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s

deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February
3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB ,

she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements
as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using
her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural
born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a

vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she
satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in
her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she
was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and
circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born-

citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention,
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural
born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born

citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and
supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency

because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent
of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
oy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961.

In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary

visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period
of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to

confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words.

She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she
is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized

here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,

Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies

during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.

As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon
to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or
business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof
that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation
obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial

or administrative case.

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein

as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Mercado v. Manzano (Case Digest)
 MissIdea  Uncategorized  September 1, 2014 1 Minute

Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts:Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging

that respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual
citizens cannot run for public office.

 Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows
the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.

COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born

because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners
assail this. 

Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?

Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual
allegiance.

Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence,
resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.

On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person

simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.

In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he
forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status
as dual.

The Court  stressed that participating in the election is an express

renunciation of American citizenship.
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in

view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in

Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in
the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost
or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine

citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990,
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through

repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam

with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said
election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an

American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however

reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost

their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces
of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
.R. No. 195649 : July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. Respondents.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in
the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado,
therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or
affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the
reversal of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented
his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six
times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the
efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of

the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his
Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and
thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed,
respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact
that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of
Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be
presented as public documentsof a foreign country and must be "evidenced
by an official publication thereof."Mere reference to a foreign law in a
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American
citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local
elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)requires those who have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any
and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when

read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Codewhich
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office
must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino
who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport
which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its
national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to
allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a

situation of doubt.

POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective
positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive

declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or
that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he

acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also
indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used
his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados

renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his
U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete
and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person
to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of
an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without
a country".On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have
more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a
Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also
possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will

not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.They are accorded not
only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless
it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found

that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his
American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc,
which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which
agreed with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those
occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his
Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010,
31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June
2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines
using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that
his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the
travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado
also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April
2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and
upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado
claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The
records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that
he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010,
and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension

of the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado
obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent
wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that

only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for
public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public
office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards
continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the
prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due
time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of
Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial
Law Dictator’s agent abroad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He

claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated
that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop
his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.