State of West Bengal v.

Anwar Ali Sarkar is one of the landmark

cases of the judicial scenario in India. The said case dealt with West
Bengal Special Courts Act, Construction of the said Act, Article 14
of constitution of India, empowerment of State government of
discretion, Reference to preamble test of equality before law,
necessity for speedier trial, and reasonable ground for
discrimination.

State of Bengal appealed in Supreme Court of India to overrule the

judgement given by High Court of Calcutta. The issue raised by the
petitioner was constitutional validity of West Bengal Special Courts
Act (X of 1950) which was entitled as “An Act to provide for the
speedier trial of certain offences”. The applicant challenged it on the
grounds of Article 14. Also, section 5(1) of the act was
constitutionally challenged as it was submitted that the said section
gives arbitrary power and authority to the state government to refer
any ‘case’ or ‘class of cases’ to Special Courts without a reasonable
classification. The issue also included inclusion of any individual
‘case’ besides the ‘class of cases’.

The Supreme court however, dismissed the appeal and held the act
bad on the grounds that the Act do give arbitrary power to the state
government and it may happen that they may use this power being
prejudiced or under sway of emotion or in their own interest and
hence, the act does violates equality before law and equal protection
of laws.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Special Courts were introduced in West Bengal under section 3

of the West Bengal Special Courts ordinance, 1949, (Ordinance No.
3 of 1949) which was replaced in March, 1950, by the West Bengal
Special Courts Act, 1950, (West Bengal Act X of 1950), for the
speedier trials of some cases which were to be referred to Special
Courts by the State Government.

B. A case, the Special court tried under a notification under section

– 5 of the said Act, and Mr. Anwar Ali and 49 others were tried for
various offences alleged to be committed by them in the course of
raiding a factory, known as Jessop Factory, as an armed gang, and
were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonments.

C. The accused applied in High Court under Article 226 of

Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the
conviction and sentence on the ground that the Special Court had no
jurisdiction to try the case as section – 5 of the said act is
unconstitutional and void under Article 13(2) of constitution of
India, as it denied to the respondent, equal protection of laws
enjoined by Article 14 of constitution of India.
D. The High court by a full bench consisting of the Chief Justice and
four other judges quashed the conviction and directed the trial of the
respondent and the other accused people according to law. Hence the
appeal.

COURT’S DECISION

The Supreme Court held that Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special
Courts Act contravened Article 14 and was void since it conferred
arbitrary power on the Government to classify offences or cases at
its pleasure and the Act didn’t lay down any policy or guideline for
the exercise of discretion to classify cases or offences at its pleasure
and the act didn’t lay down any policy or guidelines for the exercise
of discretion to classify cases or offences. The procedure laid down
by the Act for the trial by the special courts varied substantially from
the procedure laid down for the trial of offences generally by the
criminal procedure court.

The differentia which is the basis of classification and the object of

the Act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there must
be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the
Act which makes the classification. It is only when there is no
reasonable basis for a classification that legislation making such
classification may be declared discriminatory. Thus, legislature may
fix the age at which persons shall be deemed contempt to contract
between themselves but no one will claim that competency. No
contract can be made to depend upon the stature or colour of the hair.
Such a classification will be arbitrary.

Law doesn’t include administrative directions or instructions issued

by the government for the guidance of its officers.

There can be no discrimination both in substantive as well as

procedural law.

RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTA

“… When an act gives power which may and can offend against a
provision or provisions of the Constitution, such an act is ultra vires
though it could be administered so as not to offend against the
Constitution”

“Reasonable Classification” was the test applied by Harries C.J, and

it was held that, although the need for a speedier trial than what is
possible under the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure might form the basis of a reasonable classification, but as
it vest in the State government an absolute and arbitrary power to
refer to special courts for trial of “any cases, which must include an
individual case, “whether or not the duration of such case is likely to
be long”, and hence was regarded violative of Article 14 of
constitution.

Das Gupta J., supported the ruling of Harries C.J on the grounds
that though the preamble clearly states the main object of the act, but
however, general expressions used in the language of provisions of
the act would impute to the legislature an intention to confer an
arbitrary power of reference which would be inconsistent not only
with the constitutional prohibition against discrimination, which the
legislature must be taken to have been aware of when it deliberately
re–enacted the provisions of the old Ordinance. Also, the discretion
vested in State Government in selecting cases for reference to a
special court may not be subject to judicial review and may, in that
sense, be absolute.

Article 14 secures all persons within the territories of India against

arbitrary law as well as arbitrary actions of law. This is further made
clear by defining “law” in Article 13 as including, among other
things, any “order” or “notification”, so that even executive order or
notifications must not infringe Article 14. Also, reasonableness of
classification comes into question only in those cases where special
legislation affecting a class of persons is challenged as
discriminatory. Nor could it arise when executive orders or
notifications directed against individual citizens are assailed as
discriminatory.

Fazl Ali J. stated – The framers of the act have merely copied the
provisions of Ordinance of 1949 which was promulgated when there
was no provision similar to article 14 of the present Constitution.
Moreover, the framers of the Criminal Procedure code also were
alive to the desirability of having a speedy trial in certain classes of
cases, and with this end in view they made four different sets of
provisions for the trial of four classes of cases, these being provisions
relating to summary trials, trial of summon cases, trial of warrant
cases and trial of cases triable by a court of session. Broadly
speaking, their classification of offences for the purpose of applying
these different sets of provisions was according to offences, though
in classifying the offences fit for summary trial the experience and
power of the trying magistrate was also taken into consideration.

But, the impugned act has completely ignored the principle of

classification followed in the Code and it proceeds to lay down a new
procedure without making any attempt to particularize or classify the
offences or cases to which it is to apply. Indeed sect – 5 of the act,
which is the most vital section, badly states that the “Special Court
sball try such offences or classes of offences, as the state government
may, by general or special order in writing direct”. And as already
stated, the act is a verbatim copy of the earlier Ordinance which was
framed before the Constitution came into force, and article 14 could
not have been before the minds of those who framed it because
Article 14 was not in existence.

Mahajan J stated – It is no classification at all in the real sense of

term as it is not based on any characteristic which are peculiar to
persons or to cases which are to be subject to special procedure
prescribed by the act. The mere fact of classification is sufficient to
relieve the statute from the reach of the equality clause of Article 14.

Persons concerned in offences or cases needing so called speedier

trial are entitled to inquire ‘Why are they being made the subject of
a law which has short circuited the normal procedure of trial; Why
has it grouped them in that category and why has the law deprived
them of the protection and safeguards which are allowed in the case
of accused right under the procedure mentioned in the Criminal
Procedure Code; What makes the legislature or the executive to think
that the cases need speedier trials then those of others like them.

The act has left this matter entirely to the unregulated discretion of
the provincial government.

Das J. – There is no dispute that the question of validity of section 5

of the impugned act has to be determined in the light of provisions
in Constitution of India. A comparison between the language of those
sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the impugned act
will clearly show that the Act has gone beyond the provisions of the
Code and the Act cannot by any means be said to be an innocuous
substitute for the procedure prescribed by the Code. The far –
reaching effect of the elimination of committal proceedings cannot
possibly be ignored merely by stating that warrant procedure under
the code in a way also involves a committal by the trial Magistrate,
namely to himself, for the warrant procedure minimises the chances
of the prosecution being thrown out at the preliminary stage.

The object of the Act as recited in the preamble of the Act cannot be
the basis of classification and this section 5(1) gives an uncontrolled
and unguided power of classification which may well be exercised
by the state government capriciously or “with an evil eye and an
unequal band”

Section-6 of the Act which lays down that the Special Courts may
take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed
to it for trial, and that in trying the accused it has to follow the
procedure for trial of warrant cases by Magistrate. In warrant case,
the entire proceeding is before the same Magistrate and the before
the same officer who frames the charge hears the case finally. In a
Sessions case, on the other hand, the trial is actually before another
Judge, who was not connected with the earlier proceeding. It was
also clear the committal before the Sessions Judge actually hears the
case; there is generally a large interval of time which gives the
accused ample opportunity of preparing his defence. He cannot have
the same advantage in a warrant case even if adjournment is granted
by the Magistrate after the charge is framed. This is one of the
matters upon which the normal procedure has been departed from in
the Special Courts Act.

It is stated that it is only when speedier trial is necessary that the

discretion should be exercised. The word used here is “speedier”
which a comparative term is and as there may be degrees of
speediness, the word undoubtedly introduces an uncertain and
variable element.

“It matters not how lofty and laudable the motives are. The question
with which I charge myself is, can fair minded, reasonable, unbiased
and resolute men, who are not swayed by emotion or prejudice,
regard this with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair,
regard it as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of
liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the
conditions which obtain in India today? I have but one answer to that.
On that short and simple ground I would decide this case and hold
the Act bad”.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar was decided
by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the favour of Anwar Ali
Sarkar, deciding the West Bengal Special Courts Act void, on the
grounds that the act was violating the Article 14 of Constitution of
India as the Act gave arbitrary, uncontrolled, unguided power to the
State Government which could be used unreasonably and biasedly,
and also restricted equal protection of laws. The Act failed to provide
a reasonable classification between “cases”, “classes of cases”,
offences” and “classes of offences”.

Also, it was held that classification of cases as already done in the

Code of Criminal Procedure was reasonable and such reasonableness
didn’t meet the classification as done in the impugned Act.
Moreover, the Code already provided the classification of cases
which are to be provided with speedy trial and no adequate need was
seen of the Act.

The State Government had revised the Act which was enacted in
1949 and exact provisions were revised in the Act. This was seen as
the State Government deliberately ignored the holding of arbitrary
power of reference.
Suggestions

The West Bengal Special Courts Act though gave an arbitrary power
to the State Government to refer cases to special court, but it didn’t
reduce the judicial power or authority of judges. So, even if the cases
had arbitrarily referred to the Special Courts, the justice would be the
same as the judiciary was not taken under the control of State
Government.

Fault on the behalf of State Government was also seen as they

without any modification in the earlier ordinance, re-enacted the Act,
without taking into consideration that Ordinance was passed prior
1950 and therefore could be lacking many provisions of Constitution
of India.

The case had many aspects and The Hon’ble Supreme Court left no
doubt over the scope of Article 14 in dealt case. Not with a complete,
but with a majority, and reasons for the conclusions, greatly observed
the case quashing the appeal of State of West Bengal.