REPORT
Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant
INTEREST CATEGORIES
Nuclear seismic risk,
design, and qualification
Nuclear component
reliability
KEYWORDS
Earthquakes
Seismic effects
Seismic qualification
Electrical equipment
Mechanical equipment
Equipment anchorage
EPRI NP-5223s-M Rev. 1
10448176
SUMMARY
Equipment (Revision 1)
Generic equipment ruggedness spectra (GERS) provide utilities with
seismic capacities of equipment needed for safe shutdown of a
nuclear power plant. These spectra can be used directly in the resolu-
tion of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, "Seismic Qualification of
Equipment in Operating Nuclear Plants" and in performance of plant
seismic margin evaluations. This revision updates the original 1987
report with clarifications and new information.
BACKGROUND In response to USI A-46, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group
(SQUG) has developed generic seismic capabilities for a broad range of classes of
nuclear power plant equipment by using experience from past earthquakes. These
capabilities are given in terms of a bounding ground-motion spectrum anchored at
.3 g. GERS, however, are formulated from shake-table data and are for comparison
with demand at the base of the equipment under evaluation. The GERS are gener-
ally at substantially higher levels of seismic excitation than the earthquake experi-
ence data but are in some cases applicable to a narrower range of equipment
parameters. The combination of ruggedness data from past earthquakes and from
shake-table tests provides a powerful tool for assessing seismic capabilities of
equipment in operating nuclear plants.
OBJECTIVE To use past qualification test data to establish the generic seismic
ruggedness of nuclear power plant safe shutdown equipment.
APPROACH For the original report, researchers collected data on shake-table
qualification tests from utilities, manufacturers, and test laboratories. From the
seismic test levels in each class for which enough data were available, they con-
structed a generic equipment ruggedness spectrum. The team also derived inclu-
sion rules specifying the type of equipment to which each spectrum applied and
developed field checklists and cautions for applying the spectra in plant evalua-
tions. For this revision, they included changes, new work, and clarification and
resolution of several technical issues.
RESULTS The report presents GERS for 15 classes of electrical and mechani-
cal equipment needed for safe shutdown, including batteries on racks, battery
chargers, inverters, motor control centers, and switchgear. It also describes the
engineering principles for GERS construction. The spectra, which include revi-
sions to the original GERS, indicate that equipment installed in older nuclear
plants can perform its safety-related functions at substantial levels of seismic
excitation.
EPRI report NP-5223-M, revision 1, provides an overview and summary of the test
procedures. Report NP-5223-SL, revision 1, presents the test results in detail, pro-
vides discussion on issues and their resolutions, and includes all ruggedness
spectra.
Electric Power Research Institute
 EPRI PERSPECTIVE The ongoing NRC peer review process of the
overall SQUG methodology for resolution of USI A-46 has resulted in
modification of the GERS since the publication of the original report in
May 1987. This revision incorporates changes, new work, clarification,
and resolution of several technical issues. Also, since May 1987, the sub-
ject of relay functionality has become increasingly complex and has
required substantial additional testing and ruggedness evaluation. For
this reason the GERS for relays, included in the original report, have
been removed from this revision and are presented separately in EPRI
report NP-7147. The development of GERS is part of a comprehensive
program by EPRI and SQUG to resolve USI A-46. Other major related
studies developed by EPRI are Equipment Anchorage Guidelines (report
NP-5228, revision 1) and Relay Functionality Procedures (report NP-7148).

PROJECTS
RP1707-15, RP2925-2
Project Manager: R. P. Kassawara
Nuclear Power Division
Contractor: ANCO Engineers, Inc.

For further information on EPRI research programs, call

EPRI Technical Information Specialists (415) 855-2411.

10448176
 Generic Seismic Ruggedness of
Power Plant Equipment
(Revision 1)
NP-5223-SL, Revision 1
Research Projects 1707-15, 2925-2

Final Report, August 1991

Prepared by
ANCO ENGINEERS, INC.
9937 Jefferson Boulevard
Culver City, California 90232-3591

Principal Investigator
K. L. Merz

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND

LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN
ACCO~NT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY
COSPONSOR, THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW, NOR ANY PERSON ACTING
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Palo Alto, California 94304
ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS REPORT:
ANCO ENGINEERS, INC. EPRI Project Manager
R. P. Kassawara

Nuclear Seismic Risk Program

Printed on Recycled Paper Nuclear Power Division

10448176
 NOTICE: This report contains proprietary information that is
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Copyright © 1991 Electric Power Research Institute. Inc. All rights reserved.

10448176
 PREFACE

This report is a revision (Rev. 1) to NP-5223, Generic Ruggedness of Nuclear Power

Plant Equipment, published in May 1987. Revision 1 replaces the original report
which should be discarded.

The work done to formulate Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) has been in
support of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) effort to resolve U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A46. The
project has been ongoing and has had continuous review and improvement by SQUG and
the USNRC with new issues being raised and resolved since May 1987. This revision
of the report incorporates changes, new work, clarification, and resolution of
several technical issues. Also, since May 1987, the subject of electrical relay
functionality has become increasingly more complex and has required substant i a~
additional testing and GERS formulation. For this reason, GERS for relays (included
in the original version of this report) have been removed and are presented fully in
a separate EPRI report (NP-7147).

iii

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10448176
 ABSTRACT

This report updates the results of a program with the overall objective of demon-
strating the generic seismic adequacy of as much nuclear power plant equipment as
possible by means of collecting and evaluating existing seismic qualification test
data. These data are then used to construct "ruggedness" spectra below which
equipment in operating plants designed to earlier earthquake criteria would be
generically adequate. The report gives the methodology for the collection and
evaluation of data which are used to construct a Generic Equipment Ruggedness
Spectrum (GERS) for each equipment class considered. Associated with each GERS are
inclusion rules, cautions, and checklists for field screening of in-place equipment
for GERS applicability. A GERS provides a measure of equipment seismic resistance
based on available test data. As such, a GERS may also be used to judge the seismic
adequacy of similar new or replacement equipment or to estimate the seismic margin
of equipment reevaluated with respect to earthquake levels greater than considered
in the original design. Twenty-one equipment classes have been considered to date,
resulting in fifteen finalized GERS. GERS for relays (included in the original
version of this report) are now covered in a separate report. In addition to the
presentation of GERS, this report addresses the applicability of GERS to equipment
of older vintage, methods for estimating amplification factors for evaluating
devices installed in cabinets and enclosures, and how seismic test data from related
studies relate to the GERS approach.

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10448176
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people provided technical input to this report during its development. The
author and EPRI especially appreciate the efforts of the following individuals:

Senior Seismic Review and EPRI Consultants

Advistory Panel (SSRAP)
J. Betlack
P. Ibanez W. Schmidt
R. Kennedy, Chairman G. Shipway
A. Schiff K. Skreiner
W. von Riesemann R. Vasudevan
L. Wyllie Brookhaven National Laboratory

Seismic Qualification Utility C. Hofmayer

Group Steering Committee K. Bandyopadhyay

H. Hanneman Westinghouse Electric Corporation

w. Metevia (NATD)
D. Ostrom
N. Smith, Chairman D. Rygg
J. Thomas w. Cesarski
C. Geis
R. Miller
M. Ahmed
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory S. Channarasappa
Commission
N. Anderson
T. Y. Chang
P.Y. Chen
P. T. Kuo
T. Marsh
J. Stewart

USNRC Consultant

D. Kana

At ANCO, J. Endler, G. Howard, J. Stoessel, W. Walton, K. Yeh, and G. Yessaie parti-

cipated in the data collection and evaluation effort. c. Smith was co-author of the
original report.

Dr. George Sliter was EPRI Project Manager during the development of the basic
concepts and methodology used to construct GERS. Much of the original report text,
which has been retained in this revised report, reflects his critical review.

vii
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10448176
 CONTENTS

Section
-----
INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1 Background 1-1
1.2 Historical Approach to Equipment Qualification 1-3
1.3 Philosophy of an Experience-Based Generic Approach 1-3
1.4 Project Objectives 1-5
1.5 Approach and Scope 1-6

2 METHODOLOGY 2-1

2.1 Data Base Structure and Description 2-1

2.2 Collection Procedure 2-3
2.3 Evaluation Procedure 2-6
2.4 Equipment Class Definitions 2-18
2.5 Test Director Interviews 2-18
2.6 Equipment Vintage 2-21
3 OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRA 3-1
3.1 Batteries on Racks 3-4
3.2 Battery Chargers 3-5
3.3 Distribution Panels 3-5
3.4 Electrical Penetration Assemblies 3-6
3.5 Inverters 3-7
3.6 Manual Control Switches 3-7
3.7 Motor Control Centers 3-8
3. 8 Switches 3-10
3.9 Switchgear 3-11
3.10 Transformers 3-13
3.11 Transmitters 3-14
3.12 Contactors and Motor Starters 3-14
3.13 Data Summaries 3-15
4 SCREENING AMPLIFICATION FACTORS 4-1
4.1 Background 4-1
4.2 Mounting Point Amplification 4-2
4.3 Dynamic Correction Factors 4-3
4.4 Example: Motor Control Centers 4-5
4.5 Example: Flexible Panels 4-10
4.6 Conclusions 4-13
5 OVERVIEW OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRA 5-1
5.1 Air-Operated Valves 5-1
5.2 Motor Valve Operators 5-3
5.3 Solenoid-Operated Valves 5-3
5.4 Data Packages 5-4

ix

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Section Page
6 REFERENCES 6-1
APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS A-1
APPENDIX B TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS B-1
APPENDIX C GERS PACKAGES C-1
APPENDIX D DATA PACKAGES D-1
APPENDIX E ACRONYMS E-1

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 SUMMARY

In 1980, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) designated the seismic
qualification of equipment in operating plants to be an unresolved safety issue.
Subsequently, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) sponsored a study to
investigate the seismic adequacy of equipment using historic earthquake data. The
initial SQUG study, which considered eight specific classes of conventional power
plant equipment, showed that a substantial number of equipment items were undamaged
and remained functional after experiencing earthquakes. The general approach has
been described as one based on "experience" data, since it incorporates information
gained from experience with actual earthquakes. The SQUG study has been expanded to
include about twenty classes of equipment.

The large amount of information collected during seismic qualification testing of

nuclear power plant equipment is another type of experience data. In 1984, the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated a project to collect and evaluate
this test data. The principal goal of the project was to establish the generic
ruggedness level for each equipment class for which data could be obtained. The
program deliverables are 1) seismic ruggedness spectra for each identified equipment
class, 2) inclusion rules and cautions for each equipment class, and 3) field
checklists for screening of equipment for class applicability.

The methodology involves data collection from utilities, test labs, and other
sources. Some data was obtained via data exchange with the USNRC Component
Fragility Program. The collection process showed that there are extensive test data
available with relatively high input motion levels which can be reviewed and
summarized without significant difficulty.

The collection procedure consists of certain information being extracted from test
reports and evaluated in a computerized data base. This information includes
equipment description, test anchorage information, representative Test Response
Spectra (TRS) data, and the results of functional tests (if performed), including
failures (if any). Code numbers are assigned to protect proprietary interests.

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Data for a given class of equipment are evaluated in the following manner. The data
base is accessed to aggregate data corresponding to specific parameters of interest.
The spectral data are standardized to 5% spectral damping, and the TRS are weighted
according to whether they are biaxial or single-axis excitation and random or
narrow-banded input motions. The similarity of the equipment represented by the
test data is established and subclasses are defined, as required, which are
sufficiently similar. The final step of the evaluation is to construct a Generic
Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for the specified subclass of equipment. The
GERS is defined as the response to input motion at the base or support point for
which equipment of a given class has been demonstrated, on the basis of test
experience, to have sufficient ruggedness to perform as required.

Associated with each GERS are inclusion rules which define the characteristics of
the equipment included in the class and covered by the GERS. In general, the
inclusion rules will specify the characteristics (weight, size, etc.) of the
equipment comprising the data base and, perhaps, limitations on the manner in which
the equipment is installed.

The GERS provides a measure of equipment capability based on available test data.
Therefore, it can be used to screen a particular equipment item that 1) satisfies
specific inclusion rules, and 2) has a Required Response Spectrum (RRS), including
margin, that is enveloped by the GERS. It does not address 1) the issue of in-plant
anchorage capacity or 2) any plant specific situation which could affect equipment
performance during an earthquake (e.g., impact of nearby structures). Inspection
checklists are provided which include cautions concerning equipment anchorage.
Guidelines for anchorage adequacy have been developed in another EPRI project (EPRI
Report NP-5228).

The present report, a revision of a previously published EPRI report, addresses

issues of equipment vintage, resolves certain data conflicts with related studies,
presents equipment GERS, and recommends screening amplification factors for devices
in cabinets and enclosures.

The original report included some test data and GERS for relays. Since that time, a
substantial relay testing effort has been needed to develop additional GERS and to
address issues of vintage and operabi 1 i ty. The resu 1t i ng GERS for sever a 1 re 1ay
classes, including those published in the original report, have been published in a
separate EPRI report (NP-7147).

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The following is a list of equipment classes for which data have been compiled:

Electrical Equipment

Batteries on Racks*
Battery Chargers*
Contactors and Motor Starters*
Inverters*
Electrical Penetration Assemblies*
Distribution Panels* (Switchboards, Panelboards)
Motors
Motor Control Centers*
Manual Control Switches*
Transformers*
Switches*
Transmitters*
Switchgear*
Control Panels
Instrument Rack Components
Automatic Transfer Switches

Mechanical Equipment

Motor Valve Operators*

Air-Operated Valves*
Solenoid-Operated Valves*
Safety Relief Valves
Chillers

For equipment classes marked with an asterisk, GERS were developed from existing
test data. Certain equipment classes have insufficient data to construct GERS. The
available data for safety relief valves, motors, and chillers are presented as data
packages. Although these data are not extensive enough for GERS construction, they
can be referenced to support a technical judgment that these components are
substantially rugged when compared to typical seismic input motions.

The GERS developed to date have peak spectral amplitudes which are in the nominal
range from 1.5 to 10 g (when normalized to five percent spectral damping) for
electrical equipment, and 9 to 20 g for mechanical equipment. These ruggedness
levels equal or exceed the amplitude of typical moderate earthquake floor spectra
for many plants. Therefore, it is expected that these GERS would be adequate to
screen almost all equipment within these classes as sufficiently rugged in all
plants except those with very high floor spectra.

The use of GERS for components mounted in cabinets or on panels requires knowledge
of in-equipment response spectra. Review of test data suggests amplification
factors for electrical cabinets and enclosures. These effective broad-band amplifi-

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cation factors are appropriate for screening of devices in plant evaluations which
utilize broad-band spectra for device GERS and are not to be confused with peak
amplification factors occurring at narrow-band frequencies. Screening amplification
factors of 3.0 for components mounted in motor control center cabinets and 6.0 for
flexible panel or door mounted components are considered appropriate use in plant
evaluation. The use of such factors results in a considerable savings of effort as
explicit computation or estimation of cabinet or panel natural frequencies, modes
shapes, and damping are not required.

Due to the importance of the generic ruggedness data to the resolution of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) unresolved safety issue (USI A-46) concerned
with seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants, GERS have been
extensively reviewed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG), USNRC, and
the Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP, an independent review group).
The main issues raised during the review process were concerned with vintage (can a
GERS based on recent test data be applied to older model equipment?) and cabinet
amplification (how can a component GERS based on in-equipment mounting point input
be used with floor spectra which define input at the equipment base anchor points?).
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), as a part of the USNRC Component Fragility
Program, has also been involved in compiling independent test data bases. Review of
recent reports, issued by BNL, identified several apparent data conflicts with
previously established GERS which were resolved in the review process.

Several test directors were interviewed to obtain additional insight into the
applicability of test data to older plants, and also to gather information on
potential failure modes, anchorages, and modifications to equipment during or as a
result of testing. An independent review was conducted by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation who compared GERS results to proprietary test data. Review comments
were provided which clarified the vintage issue for certain equipment classes,
resulting in modification of GERS levels for those equipment classes. These review
comments and interviews have also influenced the inclusion rules and inspection
checklists associated with the GERS.

The data and results contained herein are not to be utilized as a substitute for
satisfying formal seismic qualification of equipment which might be required under
individual power plant licensing agreements. Formal qualification of equipment
would be in accordance with the provisions of IEEE-323 (which encompasses aging and
IEEE-344 seismic qualification) and would require documentation under established
quality assurance procedures. Given sufficient development, the experienced-based

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generic approach could also become a cost-effective alternative method for future
seismic qualification of power plant equipment.

The data and GERS information presented in this report are to be utilized for those
situations where verification of sufficient seismic ruggedness for an existing
equipment item is adequate to preclude the need for formal unique seismic qualifi-
cation of that equipment item. The GERS can be used, for example, as the basis for
judging the seismic adequacy of equipment in older plants not designed for current
qualification standards (USI A-46) or for estimating the seismic margin of equipment
in plants that are being reevaluated with respect to earthquake levels greater than
the original design basis criteria.

In general, the application of GERS to judge the adequacy of new equipment is not
appropriate since the GERS are based upon data for equipment manufactured prior to
1985. Verification by a manufacturer that the newly purchased equipment item is the
same (identical manufacturing specifications and dynamic similarity) as the specific
prior equipment model covered by the GERS would be necessary on a case-by-case basis
to apply a GERS to a new equipment item.

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10448176
 Section 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

In December 1980, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) designated "Seismic
Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants," as Unresolved Safety Issue (US!)
A-46. The basic concern was that the seismic resistance provided in existing
nuclear power plant equipment for seismically induced loads and performance of their
intended safety functions was unknown due to significant changes in design criteria
and methods for the seismic qualification of equipment, which have occurred since
commercial nuclear power plants were first introduced.

The NRC developed a plan for resolving US! A-46 in the Spring of 1981. Study tasks
were selected on the basis of their potential for providing reasonable alternatives
to current requirements for seismic qualification. It was recognized that a utility
always has the option to requalify equipment using procedures required for new
plants. However, only alternative procedures that provide some advantage over
current requirements are likely to be used. A key element of the approach was to
take advantage of experience on the performance of equipment in actual seismic
events and of experience gained by previous equipment qualification tests and
analyses.

In 1982, a group of utilities formed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)
to address this seismic verification issue in a generic manner. SQUG sponsored a
study which investigated the seismic adequacy of equipment using historic earthquake
experience data. The SQUG Pilot Program reviewed the performance of eight classes
of power plant equipment during actual earthquakes. The study [1] concluded that
equipment found in older nuclear plants was also found in several non-nuclear plants
or industrial facilities that had experienced significant earthquakes. It was
demonstrated that the equipment was undamaged and was functional after experiencing
earthquakes. Thus, the SQUG proposed that, on a generic basis, the eight classes of
equipment examined in the Pilot Program were sufficiently rugged for seismic motion
levels less than or equal to the historic earthquake motion levels, so long as
certain conditions were met. Principal among these was that operability during
earthquakes be evaluated and that adequate equipment anchorage be demonstrated.

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An independent panel of experts (Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel, SSRAP)
was jointly appointed by the USNRC and SQUG and asked to review the proposed generic
approach. After extensive review, the SSRAP agreed that, with certain caveats
(restrictions), the equipment in the nuclear power plants need not be further tested
or specifically (traditionally) reviewed for seismic adequacy [2].

The SSRAP [2] has recommended the extension of the general approach to other
equipment classes using additional data. SQUG initiated further work to increase
the eight classes of equipment to about twenty classes. SSRAP also recommended that
test data be included to further demonstrate the seismic adequacy of equipment and
to specifically address the issue of functionality during a seismic event, if such
functionality is required to bring the plant to a safe hot shutdown condition.

In 1984, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated a research effort to
support nuclear utility seismic verification efforts. EPRI's research program has
several projects. This project is evaluating test data for determination of generic
equipment ruggedness. Another project is developing methods for evaluation of
equipment anchorage [3]. Additional work is directed at examining the performance
of equipment anchorages in earthquakes [4] and the functionality criteria for relays
and other electrical/mechanical devices [5].

The product of this project is a Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for
each equipment class. The GERS is defined as the response to input motion at the
base or support point for which eauipment of a given class has been demonstrated, on
the basis of test experience, to have sufficient ruggedness to perform as required.
These GERS will be used to screen and evaluate equipment for a USI A-46 evaluation.
They complement evaluations of seismic adequacy based on SQUG earthquake experience
data [6].

Although the primary motivation for this work is the evaluation of seismic adequacy
of equipment in older ooerating Plants as discussed above, the work can be useful
for two other purposes:

1. As part of its program for Individual Plant Examination for External

Events (IPEEE), the USNRC will reauire an evaluation of all U.S.
nuclear power plants for earthquakes larger than the SSE design level
(seismic margin). The generic evaluation of equipment ruggedness
described in this report could contribute greatly to such an evalua-
tion.

2. Traditi~nally, the seismic qualification of equipment has been

accomplished by equipment-specific testing or analysis in accordance
with industry standards [7]. With sufficient development, the

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 experience-based generic approach could become a cost-effective alter-
native method for qualifying new or replacement equipment [12,13].

1.2 HISTORICAL APPROACH TO EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION

Attention was first paid to seismic qualification of nuclear power plant equipment
in the 1960s, when the first plants to be installed in seismic areas were designed.
The early equipment was qualified by various approaches, including analysis,
sinusoidal tests, sine-beat tests, and other methods.

Impetus to more standardized approaches was provided by the Institute of Electrical

and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), when it issued draft guidelines for seismic
qualification of electrical equipment in the early 1970s. These guide 1 i nes were
eventually issued as IEEE Standard 344-75 [7].

Initially, each equipment item was qualified by testing to specific requirements for
each plant. Equipment of identical or similar types was qualified repeatedly for
use at other sites or to meet changing regulatory requirements.

As a result, a number of manufacturers and utilities initiated "generic" qualifi-

cation programs, i.e., attempted to qualify equipment to "broadened" soectra with
sufficiently high amplitudes so that the equipment would then be qualified for more
than one plant or location.

1.3 PHILOSOPHY OF AN EXPERIENCE-BASED GENERIC APPROACH

As the data base of equipment qualified by testing has grown, it has become apparent
that "generic" seismic aualification* in a broader sense is feasible [12,13]. In
other words, by establishing and observing certain specified "similarity" rules
regarding the use of a specific category of equipment, no additional aualification
effort may be necessary for equipment which meets the "rules" for inclusion in a
category. Under IEEE-344 guidelines, an equipment item can be qualified by
reference to qualification of an identical or Sll!lil~!: item tested or analyzed to

* Here the word qualification is not meant to imply formal seismic qualification but
rather verification of sufficient seismic ruggedness for an equipment item to ore-
elude the need for formal unique seismic qualification of that equipment item.
Formal qualification of an equipment item would be in accordance with the provi-
sions of IEEE-323 (which encompasses aging and IEEE-344 seismic qualification) and
would require documentation under established quality assurance procedures.

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levels that envelope the required response spectrum of the item to be qualified.
Thus, generic consideration is the first characteristic of the new approach.

The second characteristic of the new approach is the use of "experience" data. This
has been used for many years to qualify equipment for military shock environments.
)

In the latest version of IEEE Standard 344 [13], there is a section on the use of
experience data. There are three types of experience data which have been used or
are being considered for use:

• operating experience

• historical earthquakes

• testing

The SQUG approach described above is tantamount to generic qualification based on

experience data from historical earthquakes. Implementation of a generic experience
approach on a broader scale requires that a number of specific issues be addressed.
These are outlined as follows:

1. Not all essential equipment types are covered in the classes of equip-
ment being examined in the SQUG study of earthquake data. Can more
classes be defined and treated, using existing test data?
2. The SSRAP position agrees that the various cl asses of equipment are
adequate up to certain moderate (0.3-g ZPA) ground motions [2]. Can
the spectral limits be increased by using test data?

3. Relay functional performance during the seismic event is specifically

excluded from the SSRAP position. This must be separately addressed.
What is the best generic approach to this?

4. The SSRAP has cal led for a walk-through to inspect equipment under
review. The details of the walk-through, its scope, level of effort,
and general procedures need to be defined.

5. The SSRAP has called special attention to the issue of proper equip-
ment anchorage. How this can be determined by a walk-through and
simple evaluation procedure must be established. Guidelines and
training for walk-through teams need to be established.

The use of historical earthquake data has been informative, and it is expected that
test data wi 11 augment the hi stor i ca 1 earthquake data in sever a 1 ways. This can
best be seen by considering the attributes of the two approaches. The attributes of
earthquake data are:

• Real earthquake motions are involved.

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 • Field mounting/anchorages are typical of actual installations.

• Naturally aged equipment forms the data set.

• For nuclear plant equipment that is also found in non-nuclear facilities

(refineries or conventional power plants), the information base is
large.

• Equipment has been subjected to realistic operational conditions.

• The data includes the effects of actual interfaces to connecting equip-

ment or systems.

Test data offer a somewhat different set of attributes. Because of this, the two
methods complement each other:

• Tests involve relatively high levels of simulated earthquake input

motions that are me~sured and documented.

• Test methods incorporate a number of conservative aspects.

- Floor Required Response Spectra (RRS), used as test input

criteria, are conservative.
- Over-testing is common (to "envelope" the RRS).

- Broad-band Test Response Spectra (TRS) are typically used.

- Generally, the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) of TRS is several
times greater than that of the RRS.
• Documented functional tests are normally included.

• Some failure mode information is available.

• Some fragility test data exist (from tests to failure).

• Some artificially aged equipment (thermally aged, irradiated) has been

tested.

Because of these attributes, it is believed that test data can provide additional
information which will be beneficial in resolving USI A-46, particularly in showing
that many equipment items are sufficiently rugged to perform satisfactorily.
Besides broadening the coverage to include additional equipment types, this EPRI
project is expected to provide evidence of equipment ruggedness under higher levels
of input motion and to address equipment operability during a seismic event.

1.4 PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The objective of this project is to establish generic ruggedness levels for as many
types of nuclear power plant equipment as possible based on available qualification

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test data. The program deliverables are 1) ruggedness levels for each identified
equipment class, 2) inclusion rules for each equipment class, and 3) field
checklists and cautions for screening of equipment.

1.5 APPROACH AND SCOPE

The study approach involved the identification, collection, and aggregation of

existing qualification and fragility test data into a computerized data base.
First, the sources of test data were identified, then test data were extracted from
the available test reports and collected into a structured data base. Once the data
had been collected, they were aggregated into sets for which a Generic Equipment
Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) was eventually constructed. Test Directors were
interviewed to gain added insight.

Table 1-1 lists equipment of interest (items required for hot shutdown) as defined
by SQUG/USNRC [6]. For the EPRI study, equipment was classified as mechanical,
electrical, or relays. A separate classification scheme was developed for relays.
Due to both the diversity of relay types in plant control circuits and the
importance of relay logic in nuclear plant hot shutdown control circuits, relays are
the subject of a separate EPRI report [14). GERS for several relay classes are
presented in that report. Circuit breakers were not considered as a separate class
since they are included as components in other classes. The specific equipment
classes covered by this Final Report include:

• Batteries on Racks • Contactors and Motor Starters

• Battery Chargers • Switches
• Inverters • Manual Control Switches
• Motor Valve Operators • Transmitters
• Electrical Penetration • Instrument Rack Components
Assemblies • Solenoid-Operated Valves
• Distribution Panels • Air-Operated Valves
• Switchgear • Safety Relief Valves
• Transformers • Automatic Transfer Switches
• Motor Control Centers • Chillers
• Control Panels • Motors

The intent of this report is to describe the methodology used and present all GERS
developed. This revised report is written to be self-contained, and includes all
information in the first version of the report [NP-5223, 1987] as well as several
issues identified by subseqent formal industry review.

This report supersedes NP-5223, dated May 1987. Section 2 presents the methodology
used in the study. Section 2.1 describes test data sources, Section 2.2 describes

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 Table 1-1

TYPICAL HOT SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST FOR USI A-46

Mechanical Equipment

1. *Vertical pumps and motors

2. * Horizontal pumps and motors
3. Motor-operated valves
4. Air-operated valves (including solenoid valves)
5. *Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC: such as fans,
blowers, chillers, filters, etc.)
6. *Pumps (turbine driven, diesel driven, and reciprocating positive
displacement type)
7. *MSIVs (Main Steam Isolation Valves)
8. *Pilot-operated safety/relief valves
9. *Spring-operated safety/relief valves
10. *NSSS mechanical equipment (Control Rod Drive Mechanisms)
11. *PO~Vs (Power Operating Relief Valves)
12. *Air compressors and air accumulators
13. *Heat exchangers, tanks (anhorage review only)
14. *Atmospheric steam dump valves

Electrical Equipment

1. Low-voltage switchgear
2. Metal-clad switchgear
3. MCCs (Motor Control Centers)
4. *Transformers (unit substation type)
5. *Motor-generator sets
6. Distribution panels
7. Batteries and battery racks
8. Battery chargers
9. Inverters
10. *Diesel generators and associated equipment
11. Electrical penetration assemblies
12. Transformers (other than unit substations)
13. *Automatic transfer switches
14. *Remote shutdown panels

Instrumentation
1. Transmitters (pressure, temperature, level, flow)
2. Switches (pressure, temperature, level, flow)
3. *Resistance temperature detectors and thermal couples (RTDs and T/Cs)
4. Relays
5. *Control panels and associated components
6. *Instrument racks and associated components
7. *Instrument readouts (displays, indicators such as meters, recorders,
etc.)
8. *Neutron detectors

* Classes for which GERS have not been developed.

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the procedures used to collect test data, and Section 2.3, the methodology for
evaluating test data, culminating in construction of a GERS. Section 2. 3 a 1so
includes a general discussion of "inclusion rules," which define which specific
equipment items are included in a specified equipment class. Section 2.4 defines
the equipment classes, while Section 2.5 describes the Test Director interviews.

Sections 3 and 5 present GERS based on the data collected and evaluated. The GERS
are divided into three groups for convenience. Section 3 includes electrical
equipment, while Section 5 describes the GERS for mechanical equipment.

Since the GERS developed for panel or enclosure mounted devices are based on the
device mounting point input motion, a simple approximate method is needed to convert
the base input motion (floor motion) of a cabinet or panel to the mounting point of
the device on a panel or cabinet. In Section 4, effective broad-band amplification
factors are derived for use as device screening amplification factors for both motor
control center (MCC) enclosures and control panels/switchgear doors.

Some equipment listed in Table 1-1 is not addressed in this work, either because it
was judged to be inherently rugged, or because sufficient test data could not be
found, or was proprietary. While the set of GERS contained in this report has been
subjected to industry review, some may be modified as additional data and informa-
tion come to light.

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 Section 2

METHODOLOGY

This section describes the procedure for obtaining the Generic Equipment Ruggedness
Spectrum (GERS). The GERS may be viewed as an equipment characteristic, since it
characterizes the input motion at the base or support point for which equipment
items of a given class have demonstrated, on the basis of test experience, to have
sufficient ruggedness to perform as required.

The steps for obtaining a GERS are to locate the data, collect it, and evaluate it.
These steps are described in the sections which follow.

2.1 DATA BASE STRUCTURE ANO DESCRIPTION

Data Availability

A key element of the approach is the availability of existing test data which is
complete and adequate for the purpose of constructing GERS. Large amounts of data
are available. Test data are owned either by manufacturers, A/Es, or utilities and
reside either in their files or in those of the test laboratories. Test data are of
varying degrees of quality depending on date of test performance and institutional
variations in procedure and experience. In the past, some organizations have been
reluctant to pool data for proprietary or economic reasons. Consequent 1y, an
approach to data collection was developed which observed proprietary restrictions
where necessary, while still obtaining the needed information. Code numbers were
assigned for manufacturers, model numbers, and test labs as required to protect
proprietary information. The test lab providing the information retains a key that
defines the manufacturers, in the event the information is required for review or
audit purposes.

Data are available principally in two forms: 1) test reports or 2) Seismic

Qualification Review Team (SQRT) report forms. Both types have been used to gather
the information contained in this report.

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Data sources have included:

• test laboratories,
• utilities,

• vendors,

• other institutions such as national laboratories and architect-

engineering firms, sources of military test data, and

• EPRI's Equipment Qualification Data Bank (operated by NUS Corporation

[8].

The general types of information required are equipment description (type, size,
weight, etc.). Information is also collected concerning the year of testing, type
of test (e.g., biaxial, sine, etc.), the test spectra, physical modifications (if
any), failure mechanism (if any), and operational requirements and performance.

This project demonstrated that it is possible to review utility test report files
and extract such data for generic purposes. The emphasis on generic review, carried
out at various locations, allowed access to sufficient equipment test reports
without undue proprietary difficulties or costs.

Utilities were an especially useful source of data, and virtually all of the
utilities contacted provided assistance. Readily available data were acquired by
visiting a utility and extracting the data from test reports, or data were obtained
from test labs. Typically, this was done by collecting the required information in
a computerized data base format. Some of the data were extracted by Wyle
Laboratories, Inc., under subcontract to ANCO.

Additional data was provided by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), under a

cooperative agreement. BNL was collecting data for a NRC seismic fragility data
base (Reference 10). Any data collected by EPRI which was useful to BNL was
exchanged, and BNL data useful to EPRI's project was made available. Some of the
data collected by BNL was under contractual restrictions and thus unavailable to
EPRI.

Data Requirements

In a traditional qualification test approach, one specific test can qualify one
specific item (for that given spectrum). In the SQUG approach, an entire class of
equipment is judged as rugged by using a large number of data points based on
historic earthquakes, recognizing that there may not be a data point matching each

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possible member of the class. The rationale behind the SQUG approach is that if
there is sufficient and adequate data, and if the equipment types in the class are
carefully selected, then minor variations between equipment types cannot result in
wide variations in ruggedness. Also, within conservative bounds, all the equipment
types in the class are adequate because, typically, a large number of data points
show satisfactory performance.

Engineering judgment is required to assess how many data points are required and to
define the inclusion rules (rules for membership in the class or "club" of equip-
ment). The more restrictive the rules, the smaller the number of data points
required. (In the extreme--one data point might specifically cover a one-member
club.) The more data points, the larger the allowable club can be.

The library of historical earthquake data used by SQUG has anywhere from 50 to 500
pieces of data per equipment class. As there was some uncertainty as to the input
during the historical earthquakes, it was felt that a large number of data points in
different earthquakes was helpful in offsetting this uncertainty. In addition,
equipment details (model number, year of manufacture, etc.) were not known with
certainty, thus a large data sample tended to account for class diversity. With
test data, the uncertainty is less since the input motion amplitude and the
equipment condition are known, so fewer data points are required--experience showed
that 5 to 10 were sufficient.

2.2 COLLECTION PROCEDURE

Figure 2-1 outlines the data collection process. Data are extracted from a test
report or SQRT Form. These are first reviewed by an equipment qualification
engineer to determine if the data are suitable for inclusion in the data base. The
initial screening criteria are:

• Does the equipment item match the specifications of one of the hot
shutdown list classes? (Table 1-1)

• Does the report adequately describe the equipment and test procedures?

• Does the report include test response spectra (TRS) and all other
necessary information?

If, in the reviewing engineer's judgment, the test report meets the requirements for
inclusion in the data base, certain data are extracted and entered into a computer
file, where they are organized in "fields" for subsequent manipulation and
accessing. Appendix A contains a description of the fields used.

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 Obtain Test
Report

Review Data
for Suitability and
Completeness

Reject Data if Incomplete

or Unsuitable

Accept

Assign Code
Numbers

Select
Representative
Spectra

Enter in
Data Base

Check & Edit

Store on Disk

Transmit to
EPRI Data Bank

Figure 2-1. Data Collection Process

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Under the cooperative agreement with Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), EPRI and
BNL established a common data format (see Appendix A) for data collection. Selected
data collected by BNL[10] was also incorporated in the EPRI data base.

The data base fields provide a basic description of the equipment item and summarize
the information available. The data base includes information concerning:

• equipment descriptors;

• size, weight, and manufacturer/model code number;

• year of testing;

• type of tests and test documentation;

• anchorages used during testing;

• number of subcomponents tested (if detailed in the test report);
• quantification of available TRS;

• any exceptions or comments related to performance during testing; and

• any failures.

In this report, the term "exception" refers to a variation that results from
problems with test fixtures, test procedures, or test methods. Test organizations
also use the term "anomalies" to describe these variations in order to distinguish
them from actual equipment failures. The term "failure" refers to inability to meet
the acceptance criteria during or after a dynamic test. In most instances, a
failure wi 11 be equipment malfunction and not structural failure. Any failures
involving the structural integrity of an equipment item or subcomponent are noted in
this report.

The spectra reported in the data base are generally TRS. The only time TRS would
not be used is if they were not available, or if they could not be used due to
proprietary considerations. In either of these situations, the Required Response
Spectra (RRS) would be used instead given that the test report or equipment file
indicated that the test level enveloped the RRS.

In test reports, the TRS are shown either as graphs or as discrete ordinate values
of spectral acceleration. The TRS data are stored in the data base as discrete
values at selected frequencies. The data base also includes the spectral damping
value, TRS type (SSE or OBE), and test direction. Since some test specimens may
contain subcomponents tested at the same time and which may also be of interest in

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the data file. they are also included in the data base along with the corresponding
in-equipment TRS.

Equipment is classified by evaluating design details and materials which affect

dynamic response and ability to resist seismic loads. Equipment types which have
similar operating principles and design features, but differ mainly in size, could
be classified in the same subclass. If there are significant differences, a
different classification (i.e., a subclass) would be used. The final result is to
identify low-diversity sets of data, or "clubs," appropriate for the equipment items
that are included.

In all cases, code numbers were assigned to the manufacturer and model and, in some
cases, the source of the test data.

In a typical test report, there are multiple TRS, since at least five DBE tests and
one SSE test are performed in one direction, then repeated for a second direction.
There may be slight variations in amplitude for different inputs in the horizontal
and vertical directions. A representative SSE TRS (and DBE TRS) was selected for
each input direction. Selection was based on the reviewing engineer's judgment.
The selected spectra are termed ~resentative spectra, since they are representa-
tive of the ten to twenty separate TRS typically found in a test report. Only the
selected representative horizontal and vertical spectra are included in the data
base.

After all the information has been entered into the data base, it is reviewed and
independently checked for accuracy with respect to test report information. Once
the data have been collected and checked, they are stored on magnetic media. At
project conclusion, all data base files will be transmitted to EPRI's Equipment
Qualification Data Bank.

2.3 EVALUATION PROCEDURE

The procedure for evaluating test report data is shown in Figure 2-2. The data base
permits distinguishing between horizontal or vertical TRS. Typically there was
little difference in amplitude between horizontal and vertical TRS. In a few tests,
the vert i ca 1 TRS amp 1 i tudes ranged between O. 60 to 1 . 20 ti mes the hor i zonta 1 TRS
amplitudes. In all cases, horizontal TRS have been used in constructing a GERS.
Thus, the GERS presented in this report are considered valid for combined
horizontal/vertical input motions when the vertical motion is at least two-thirds of
the horizontal motion. GERS which deviate from the above rule are identified on a

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 Access Data Base

Aggregate Data Records

in a Set

Standardize TRS
Damping to 5%

Narrow Band or
Single Axis Test?

Yes Weighting Factor

for Test Procedure

Evaluate Diversity
of Data Set

High Define Subclass to

Reduce Diversity

Construct GERS

Describe Inclusion
Rules and Checklists

Figure 2-2. Evaluation Procedure

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case-by-case basis. It should be noted that studies based on earthquake experience
data [1,2] used the horizontal ground response as the reference anchor motion.

Aggregation

Aggregation is the grouping of data records into sets that will eventually be used
for GERS specification. The data base is accessed to aggregate data by specific
fields in order to create a suitable "club" of equipment items. The quantity of
data required will vary. In aggregating the data, consideration is also given to
whether or not the test specimens were aged, as well as to the response level for
which functionality (operability) was demonstrated. If fragility test data are
available, they are also included and noted. In most cases, a data set will
encompass test results from five to fifty items.

Standardization at 5% Damping

TRS are reported with various damping values. Since the objective of the current
study is to develop a GERS for a given equipmel")t class, several TRS need to be
compared. To al low this comparison, all TRS are standardized at 5% spectral
damping. For random multi-frequency tests, the amplitudes are modified by a factor
related to the square root of the ratio of damping values. Each spectral amplitude
(in units of g), is multiplied by the factor shown below:

Spectral Weighting
Damping Value Factor

5% 1.00
2% 0.63
1% 0.45

The justification of this procedure and those procedures used for damping standardi-
zation with other types of test motions is described in Appendix A.

Weighting TRS With Respect to Test Procedure

The selected basis for evaluation of test procedures is the IEEE-344 (Reference 7)
norm of biaxial/random input motion. In order to provide a comparison of single-
axis and/or narrow-band (i.e., sinusoidal) input motion, a weighting of TRS data is
necessary.

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The following are the weighting factors which are used:

Weighting
Test Procedure Factor
Biaxial/random, IEEE 344-1975 1.0
Narrow-banded 0.7
Single axis 0.7
Narrow-banded and single-axis 0.5

The justification for these factors is given in Appendix A.

Evaluation of Diversity

In the course of evaluating the data, the qualification engineer identifies those
aspects of the equipment that establish the "diversity" of the equipment class.
Diversity is defined as those factors which could cause the dynamic response and
operational characteristics of equipment items in a given class to differ from each
other. These include parameters such as weight, size, manufacturer, operating
principle, etc.

Diversity considerations are the prime determinant of the "specific equipment type"
data base field. The goal of the classification process is to establish subclasses
having little diversity so test results from different sources and manufacturers/
mode 1s can be combined. A "low diversity" class would be expected to exhibit
similar dynamic behavior even though different manufacturers and models were
involved.

Construction of the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS)

The GERS is defined as the response to input motion at the base or support point for
which equipment of a given class have been demonstrated, on the basis of test
experience, to have sufficient ruggedness to perform as required.
In general, a GERS can be constructed for various levels of performance criteria.
Some possible levels of interest are:

• Functionality both during and after earthquake motion--this is

sometimes denoted as "operability." Thus, a GERS for "operability"
demonstrates ruggedness both during and after motion. For example, a
functionality GERS for a relay assures that it functions properly
(without chatter) during motion and is operable after the motion.
• Functionality after earthquake motion--this is sometimes denoted as
"survivability." Since a component that can operate after the motion
is not necessarily able to operate during, a GERS for "survivabi 1ity"
demonstrates ruggedness only after motion.

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 • "Structural integrity" means that some minor (acceptable) level of
structural damage (not gross deformation or fracture) does occur. A
GERS for structural integrity does not assure functionality as defined
above. Converse 1y, demonstration of funct i ona 1i ty does not assure
structura 1 integrity; for example, a component can experience gross
deformation or even, in certain cases, fracture and still be able to
operate during and/or after the motion.

Almost all of the test data evaluated in this project are for functionality during
and after a seismic event, without violation of structural integrity (any exception
to this will be noted).

The predominant natural frequencies of the equipment examined in this project are
less than 33 Hz. Moreover, the failure modes identified in the study appear to be
associated with dynamic behavior characterized by frequencies less than about 33 Hz.
Thus, the reader is cautioned about drawing conclusions from the ZPA values shown in
the GERS. Most of the test data encountered in the project are the results of
broad-band input motions which have significant energy content within the range of
1-33 Hz. The GERS ZPA is an enve 1ope of test ZPA va 1ues ( actua 11 y asymptotes of
successful test response spectra in the high frequency range). As such, they repre-
sent a combination of the peak acceleration of test input motion content less than
33 Hz and high frequency content greater than 33 Hz which is due to rattling in both
a specimen and the shake table bearings plus table resonance effects. It should be
noted that a 1-g input at 33 Hz is associated with displacement less than 0.01 in.,
while a 1-g input at 7 Hz is 0.2 in. Thus, it is the peak acceleration of the lower
frequency motion content that is of concern; however, in a typical test report,
there is insufficient information to identify the portion of the GERS ZPA associated
with the low-frequency content of the test input motion. The GERS presented herein
should not be used to judge equipment ruggedness above 33 Hz. Test input motions
often have significant energy content above 33 Hz; however, they must be reviewed in
a case-by-case basis if ruggedness for input with spectral content greater than
33 Hz is of interest.

The following examples provide a brief introduction to GERS construction for a given
performance criterion. The examples begin with the simple case of "the club of
one," which is an example where an upper bound of test data could be justified as a
basis of GERS construction. The next example is a case of moderate diversity (i.e.,
dissimilar items) where the lower bound of test data must be considered as a basis
of GERS construction. The general case of low diversity is considered as the third
example, and several guidelines for GERS construction are presented.

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"The Club of One"

First, consider the case where a single item (a single model) made by one
manufacturer is to be evaluated. One or more qualification tests may have been
performed on this item. If only one qualification test were performed, the
representative test spectrum selected for that item would be a GERS since any of the
same model would be qualified for input motion equal or less than this spectrum.

In the case shown in Figure 2-3*, the same item has been subjected to three separate
TRS during three independent qualification test programs. Functional performance
has been acceptable during and after all tests. Structural integrity has been
maintained during all testing. Since the goal is to determine the ruggedness of the
item at as high a level as possible, the representative SSE test spectra would be
examined first. For this case, assuming no modal coupling, the envelope of the
highest representative SSE spectra in the data base, for which no failures have been
noted, would establish the GERS. Note that during one test program, the item was
qualified for a low-level, site-specific spectrum. The low-level spectrum does not
affect GERS construction.

It must be recognized that the presence of modal coupling, variable RMS severity
over a given bandwidth or certain nonlinear response characteristics may preclude
the construction of a composite of several independent TRS. For narrow-band
(single-frequency) input motions, this concern is valid. However, for broad-band
(multi-frequency) random input motions, all response modes are excited simultaneous-
ly which allow modal interaction to be accounted for. Most of the test data
encountered in the pilot program is the result of broad-band input motions. Narrow-
band input, when encountered, is downward weighted to account for the possibility of
modal interaction and RMS bandwidth effects.

The issue of frequency content in test (or analysis) waveforms has been identified
as a concern only recently. The requirement, that the Fourier transform or power
spectrum density (PSD) of the test waveform be compatible with the amplified portion
of the TRS, was added to IEEE-344 in 1987 [18]. If PSDs of the test input motions
that created the test response spectra used to construct the GERS were available,

* In Figure 2-3, the vertical dashed line identifies a frequency of 33 Hz. Hori-
zontal lines to the right of the vertical dashed line represent the amplitude of
the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) for each of the test spectra. The ZPA is an
asymptote of a test response spectrum in the frequency range greater than 33 Hz.
As such, it represents either the peak acceleration of the input motion with
spectral content less than 33 Hz or the high frequency (> 33 Hz) spectral content
of the input motion.

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 7
TRS: 5% Damping

6 --•-- TRS #1
TRS #2
GERS
--
Cl

s::
5

.....0
+>
tO
~ 4
.....
QJ

QJ
u
u
cc
.....tO 3
~
+> ~
u I
QJ ,-·--·
Q.
V') 2

1 Low-Level
Site-Specific ,
TRS
0 .___ _.........._..___.___._..........................._ ___._ _....___.
1 10 33 ZPA
Frequency (Hz) (33-100 Hz)

Figure 2-3. 11
Club of One" Example

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they would not have power distributed over a broad bandwidth. A GERS does not
necessarily represent a broad-band test response spectra that an equipment class can
be subjected to. A GERS should be interpreted as a bound to which floor response
spectra, with a limited frequency bandwidth, are to be compared.

For GERS development, the baseline for data evaluation is conformance to

IEEE-344-1975 [7]. The A-46 issue centers around the concern that the first
generation of nuclear plants did not have the same level of qualification effort as
the second generation of plants which utilized IEEE-344-1975 as the basis of
equipment seismic qualification. For IEEE-344-1975 test qualification, the basic
acceptance criteria was that the TRS envelop the RRS (usually a broadened floor
response spectrum). As a practical matter, al 1 actual floor response spectra wi 11
have a frequency bandwidth much less than the implied GERS bandwidth. This will be
true even for most basemat spectra due to soil-structure interaction.

A Class of Several Items With Moderate Diversity

Next, consider an equipment class with a wide range of manufacturers, sizes,

configurations, and internal operating components. This would be identified as a
case of moderate diversity. Figure 2-4 represents data for which no failures have
been noted during tests of five items of differing models and manufacturers. In
this case, representative SSE spectra are obtained from the data base, and the GERS
would be constructed as the heavy-line spectrum which provides the lower envelope of
the representative spectra at all frequency points. This could be called a
"screening" GERS. If the resulting screening GERS is being biased downwards by a
particular TRS, then the item corresponding to the TRS could be excluded from the
class (i.e., a reduction in diversity) and a higher GERS constructed. For the case
shown in Figure 2-4, the dotted line is the GERS if Item 5 is excluded from the
class. (Item 5 would have its own "Club of One" GERS in this case.)

Note that the TRS for Items 3 and 5 show dips in the spectral response around 10 Hz.
As a practical matter, either GERS in Figure 2-4 could be simplified by constructing
a straight horizontal line (plateau) between about 5 and 20 Hz. Judgment would be
used to establish how much greater the GERS in the region could be with respect to
the dip around 10 Hz. For example if the equipment had a frequency near 10 Hz, the
GERS plateau should be constructed at a level not greater than the spectral
acceleration at the bottom of the dip. If the natural frequency were significantly
different from 10 Hz, engineering judgment could be used to construct the GERS
plateau near the top of the dip.

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 7
TRS: 5% Damping
Items Dissimilar
--TRS
6 -GERS
······· ··· GERS

--
O'I

C:
5
Representative Spectra for:

Items 1 &2
0
.,...
+.I
ltl 4 Item 3 ~GERS for
s.. Items 1-4
cu
,-
.cu I
u
u
< 3
,- Item 5
ltl
s..
+.I
u
cu
C.
V) 2

ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 2-4. Moderate-Diversity Example

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A Low-Diversity Class of More Than One Item

The most general case, however, would be a class of equipment that includes several
manufacturers and models but has items that are essentially similar in dynamic
behavior, mechanical design, internal components, operating principle, etc. This is
the most common situation encountered in this project. Each item has its own set of
test data, broad-band, multi-frequency input motion has been used and some failures
may have occurred.

In this case, the representative spectra (SSE) for the tests without failures are
combined and an upper envelope constructed. An upper envelope could be selected as
a GERS (see dashed curve in Figure 2-5) since the effects on ruggedness of
differences in models are inconsequential when there is low diversity (i.e., the
low-diversity case could be argued as being very close to a club of one). In
general, a GERS would be constructed to conform to these guidelines:

• The GERS will be equal or less than the envelope of the TRS of tests
without failures ("success data").
• As a practical matter, GERS are constructed with a maximum of four or
five straight line segments. One of the segments is usually a plateau
representing the peak amplified spectral acceleration. The plateau is
constructed below the envelope of success data. If TRS for several
models and manufacturers are available in a given equipment class, the
plateau is constructed beneath the lowest of these TRS. This
introduces a conservative bias appropriate for a generic determination
of ruggedness.

• In general, the GERS is constructed with as high an amplitude as

possible in accordance with engineering judgment concerning the number
of manufacturers represented, number of different mode 1s, number of
items tested, the range of natural frequency noted for the items
tested, etc. Particular attention is given to regions near the natural
frequencies of the equipment class.
• Next, the TRS for the tests with fai 1ures are combined and a lower
envelope constructed. The GERS based on success data is checked to
ensure that it generally is beneath the lower envelope of test spectra
that produced failures. In certain cases, the GERS may be reduced in
certain frequency regions to account for the failure data. In some
cases, however, the failure test spectra can have regions of lower
spectral amplitude that are not likely to have affected the failure
mode. Thus, on a case-by-case basis, a GERS may be greater than
certain portions of the lower envelope of failure data.

Figure 2-5 is an example showing the construction of a GERS for a set of equipment
judged to be members of a low-diversity class. The upper envelope of success test
data is indicated. No tests with failures exist. For this case, four GERS segments

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 7
TRS: 5% Damping
All Items Similar --TRS
6 - - GERS

- 01

C:
5

0
.....
rtl
s... 4
.....
Q)

Q) 1___________ _
u
u
IC(
.....rtl 3
.....s...
u
Q)

~ 2

0
1 10 33 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 2-5. Low-Diversity Example

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are selected, as indicated in Figure 2-5. For this example, equipment natural
frequencies may have been observed at 5 and 20 Hz; note that the plateau region of
the GERS provides a conservative estimate of equipment ruggedness at these
frequencies. The ZPA of the GERS is constructed to not exceed the TRS amplitude
within the high frequency region (about 20 Hz and greater).

A Class of High Diversity

If a class has high diversity (dynamically dissimilar items), a lower bound

screening GERS would penalize items with the greatest ruggedness. Therefore,
classes with high diversity could be subdivided into subclasses with low to moderate
diversity, and a .GERS could be established for each subclass, using the procedure
described above.

Procedures for constructing GERS are illustrated further by the results presented in
Sections 3, 4, and 5.

GERS as a Measure of Ruggedness

The GERS correspond to an envelope level beneath which the equipment performed its
function satisfactorily. GERS are constructed so as to encompass the successful
test data and yet exclude the known failure data. The broad conclusion is that an
item of equipment judged to be within a GERS class would experience no failure if
subjected to earthquake (or test) motions lower than the GERS. Due to the inherent
nature of a generic approach, it should be noted that some individual equipment
items are actually qualified to levels higher than those represented by these GERS.
Reference 2 discusses the issue of required margin between seismic demand and GERS
leve-1.

Inclusion Rules and Checklists

Each GERS for a given equipment class is associated with a set of inclusion rules
for "club" membership. These rules define the characteristics of the equipment
included in the club and subject to the GERS. In general, the inclusion rules
specify the characteristics (size, weight, type of construction, etc.) of the items
which were tested and form the data base. The GERS packages in Appendix C contain
descriptions of the characteristics of each item so membership in that class can be
established.

In addition, checklists have been developed which will allow a screening of

equipment for applicability during plant walk-down. The checklists contain cautions

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related to potential failure modes, mounting conditions to be verified, subcomponent
attachments guidelines, and so on. Since GERS establish capacity levels above the
bounding spectrum level [2] associated with earthquake experience, GERS must also be
associated with the caveats developed from actual earthquake experience [2] in
addition to test experience caveats.

2.4 EQUIPMENT CLASS DEFINITIONS

In order to define the equipment in operating plants which would be addressed by USI
A-46, the SQUG identified the equipment types necessary for achieving and
maintaining safe hot shutdown assuming loss of off-site power under an assumed no
LOCA condition. This equipment list, shown in Table 1-1, has been reviewed by
SQUG/USNRC and is the recommended generic equipment list for experience-based
qualification studies. Some of the generic equipment classes on the recommended
SQUG/USNRC hot shutdown list are specific types, while some classes are broad groups
of many different types of power plant equipment. Since qualification testing
programs deal with single equipment items rather than entire systems, some of the
SQUG equipment classes required further definition for this EPRI study. Table 2-1
lists the candidate equipment classes for the EPRI test data program. In general,
the SQUG/USNRC equipment classification has been followed. Subclasses and
subcomponents for which data has been collected are indicated in Table 2-1. Some
equipment classes have been identified as not recommended for inclusion in the EPRI
program; while in other cases, additional equipment classes have been added to the
SQUG 1 ist (Table 1-1). Some items were not included due to either lack of data
availability or because they were judged to be inherently rugged.

In addition, relays have been given special consideration due to the complexity of
subclassification of relays. In general, they are classified by general type
(auxiliary or protective) and operating principle (solid-state, hinged armature,
etc.). Considerable project effort, including testing of older vintage relays, has
been devoted to the construction of relay GERS and resolution of relay issues. Due
to the importance of relays in operating plant hot-shutdown control circuits, a
separate report [14] has been prepared to address the work on relays. Herein, GERS
issues associated with relays are not addressed.

2.5 TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEWS

This task involved meeting with several persons responsible for planning and
conducting seismic qualification tests, for the purpose of learning whether
additional information about equipment seismic performance, above and beyond what

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 Table 2-1

EQUIPMENT CLASSES CONSIDERED FOR EPRI PROJECT

Mechanical
MOTOR-VALVE OPERATORS (motor operators, valves with operators)
AIR-OPERATED VALVES (pneumatic operators, valves with operators)
SOLENOID VALVES
[HVAC (fans, blowers, chillers, dampers)]
[HORIZONTAL PUMPS AND MOTORS]
[PUMPS (turbine and diesel-driven)]
[MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES]
[PILOT-OPERATED S/RVs]
SPRING-OPERATED S/RVs
[PORVS]
[NSSS MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT] (CRDMs)
[VERTICAL PUMPS AND MOTORS]
[AIR COMPRESSORS]

Electrical
SWITCHGEAR (medium-voltage, metal-clad switchgear <5,000 V, low-voltage metal-
enclosed switchgear <600 V, auxiliary/protective relays, auxiliary devices)
MANUAL CONTROL SWITCHES
MOTORS
MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (low-voltage MCC <600 V, motor starters, contractors, cir-
cuit breakers, fusible switches, auxiliary/protective relays, panels, trans-
formers, auxiliary devices)
MOTOR STARTERS AND CONTACTORS
BATTERIES AND RACKS (lead acid storage batteries, rack with batteries, battery
cells)
BATTERY CHARGERS (single-phase, three-phase, <600 V transformer, controls/
protective relays)
DISTRIBUTION PANELS (AC/DC panel boards, switchboeards, circuit breakers,
switches, <600 V)
ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES
TRANSFORMERS (dry type, <600 V, other than unit substation)
AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCHES
[TRANSFORMERS] (unit substation type, 5,000 V/600 V)
[MOTOR GENERATOR SETS]
[DIESEL GENERATORS AND AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT] (engine, generator, turbo charger,
intercooler, lube pump, water pump, air-start valve, <10,000 kW)

Instrumentation
TRANSMITTERS (pressure, level, flow, temperature)
SWITCHES (pressure, level, flow, temperature)
CONTROL PANELS (and associated components)
INSTRUMENT RACK COMPONENTS (gauges, indicators, etc.)
[RTDs AND T/Cs]
[NEUTRON DETECTORS]

Relays
AUXILIARY (hinged armature. industrial, socket, rotary, lockout, pneumatic
timing)
PROTECTIVE (induction disk, plunger, telephone)

[]=Insufficient test data available, inherently rugged, or proprietary data.

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was in test reports, might be obtained through interviews. Also, it was of interest
to see if their experience might suggest additional items for the GERS checklists.

The interviews focused on five major topics:

• test anchorages,

• effects due to test procedures themselves (e.g., fatigue due to

repeated SSE input motions),

• equipment modifications made during testing,

• added insight into failure modes, and

• equipment modifications following tests.

It was of interest to learn if most test specimens passed the tests in their
original condition, or if extensive modifications were required to satisfy test
conditions. The concern has been expressed by regulatory personnel that some items
might have failed a test, been withdrawn, modified, and retested successfully. If
true, the implication is that older plants might have equipment of a different
"vintage" than that which had been tested and placed in the database.

The interviews addressed the questions in Table 2-2. Three test di rectors were
interviewed. They represented the viewpoint of the test directors from a test
laboratory, a manufacturer, and an engineering firm. Some differences in their
replies resulted from different philosophies. Certain vendors tested to qualify
existing products, while others tested during the design phase and used the test
data to develop seismically qualified designs.

The comments of the interviewees reflected a change over time as test procedures
became better defined and more rigorous. A major milestone in this respect was
1975, when IEEE-344 came into widespread use.

A transcript of each interview is provided in Appendix B. The following summarizes

the results.

Generally speaking, the interviews did not cast any doubts on the validity or
usefulness of the test data. It was believed that test reports adequately document
test specimen modifications, failures, and other issues of concern, and these in
turn were addressed by manufacturers. The equipment tested is considered by the
test directors to be generally representative of equipment in plants.

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The following general observations resulted from the interviews:

• Test anchorages were almost always bolted or welded. There were no

failures of anchors. However, in early designs (pre-1975) sheet metal
cabinet bases were sometimes inadequately sized for lateral loads and
ripped or cracked. In those cases design changes were made.

• Effects due to testing (i.e., fatigue) are generally not an issue.

Test specimens as a general rule are not installed in plants, but one
test director felt there may have been a few instances in early plants
where the item tested had been installed.

• Modifications during tests were almost always to improve the test setup
or were of a minor nature (tightening loose screws, for example). There
were a few instances where modifications were made; where possible this
experience has been reflected in the inspection checklists. For
example, test experience has shown that the base anchorage for MCCs
must utilize the MCC base channels for attachment. Base anchorage
details that induced bending of sheet metal were generally unaccept-
able.

• Failure modes were typically relay chatter or short circuits, if

electrical, and sheet metal damage if mechanical. These types of
failures are accounted for by GERS construction based on test results.
Isolated examples of cracked castings and ceramic insulators failing
occurred. These have been taken care of by product redesign. Some
grossly undersized bolts failed in shear. This issue is covered by the
anchorage guidelines [3]. A failure of an electrical system during
testing was cited in the interviews. This was caused by a loose part
falling down and causing a short circuit. This is also addressed by
checklists.

In summary, the interviews brought up some of the problems of seismic qualification

and the lessons learned. Generally, however, they confirmed the usefulness of test
data as a source of information on equipment ruggedness. It was the opinion of the
persons interviewed that the test reports document the essential details.

2.6 EQUIPMENT VINTAGE

As noted previously, the primary motivation for this work is the evaluation of
equipment in older operating plants (designed and constructed in the period
1960-1972). However most of the test data collected and evaluated to date was
generated in test programs which were conducted after 1972. For plants that were
built and operating prior to 1972, it must be demonstrated that the equipment
subjected to seismic tests is seismically similar both in structure and function to
the equipment in the older operating plants. For some classes of equipment, the
changes in equipment design have been relatively minor over the past twenty-five
years. While for other equipment classes, equipment design changes have occurred
over this period of time and, in some cases, have been influenced by performance

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shortcomings noted in seismic test programs. For certain equipment classes, an
assessment of the nature of the changes has been made to determine if any
significant effects on seismic ruggedness have occurred. If this effect was judged
significant during the review process (involving the USNRC, SSRAP, and SQUG/EPRI),
a consensus was reached as to a reduced spectral level which would account for
vintage and other uncertainty in equipment ruggedness.

A major manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) has reviewed their seismic

qualification testing program conducted on power plant equipment which was initiated
in 1959. As a result of a series of tests conducted at increasing levels, certain
modifications were found to be necessary to qualify certain classes of equipment at
increased levels. While the specific test levels and details are proprietary, the
manufacturer has quantified the test results into generic test levels (effective
broad-band test spectra) along with the modifications required to achieve that
level. The modifications identified are also sufficiently generic to be applicable
to other manufacturers equipment. It is assumed that other manufacturers have made
similar modifications to achieve seismic qu~lification at increased test levels.

It should be noted that a "forward" vintage issue exists for all GERS. The GERS
represent the ruggedness of equipment tested and manufactured within the general
period 1970-1985. A GERS should not be used for ruggedness verification of a
post-1985 manufactured equipment item or component unless similarity to the product
design and configuration represented by the GERS is established.

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 Section 3

OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRA

The data evaluation procedures described in the previous section have been applied
to electrical equipment from the 1ist shown in Table 2-1 for which data were
available. The detailed GERS "packages" have been written as stand-alone documents
and are included in Appendix C. The complete GERS package contains a description of
the equipment for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a particular item
belongs in the crass covered by the GERS. The test data base used to construct the
GERS is also described, as are any exceptions or failures observed during testing.

The general format for Test Response Spectrum (TRS) data (see Appendix A) and GERS
presentation is a response spectrum plot of spectral acceleration (linear ordinate
scale, units in g) as a function of frequency (log abscissa scale, units in Hz) over
the range of 1 to 33 Hz. A vertical dashed line identifies a frequency of 33 Hz.
Horizontal lines to the right of the vertical dashed line represent the amplitude of
the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) for each of the test spectra and GERS. The test
data base includes both horizontal and vertical TRS, however, GERS construction was
primarily based upon horizontal TRS data. The vertical TRS in the data base for
each equipment class was reviewed and compared to the horizontal TRS. The maximum
level of concurrent vertical motion allowed is noted in each GERS package.

The GERS packages also include certain inclusion rules to define equipment types or
sizes which are covered by the GERS, and check 1i sts of items to note on a p 1ant
walk-through survey, in order to verify that the GERS is applicable in a specific
situation. It should be noted that certain implicit assumptions are associated with
the use of GERS. In some cases the checklists included in the GERS packages remind
the user of these assumptions, however in all cases it is assumed that the
installation, adjustment, calibration, and maintenance of the equipment have been
properly done in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements. In addition, it
is assumed that the equipment base anchorage has been evaluated [3], that internal
components are mounted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, that
door or access panel latches or screwdriver operated fasteners are secure, that no
loose parts or wires are present which could cause a short circuit, and that all
wiring is properly insulated to prevent contact shorts.

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Table 3-1 summarizes the results shown in this section. In the paragraphs which
follow, a brief overview of the results for each equipment class is described.
Refer to Appendix C for the detailed GERS packages. GERS for the following items
were not developed: automatic transfer switches, control panels, instrument rack
components, and motors. These equipment classes are also briefly described in the
following. Refer to Appendix D for the detailed data packages.

Several equipment items were excluded from this effort because they were judged to
be inherently rugged, or because data were either not available or were limited by
proprietary considerations. The items classified as inherently rugged were motor-
generator sets and motor-driven pumps. Test data were not available for unit
substation transformers and large diesel generators. Generally speaking these items
are too large for shake table testing and have been qualified by analysis or other
means. Finally, certain items, such as control rod drive mechanisms, in-core
instrumentation (including neutron detectors and compensated ionization chambers),
and other reactor equipment, are specific to particular proprietary designs and test
data is available only from the NSSS supplier.

The great bulk of available test data is for equipment tested after 1975. The
plants to which we wish to apply GERS have equipment generally installed prior to
1975. SSRAP [2] has expressed concern that pre-1975 (approximate date) equipment
may be less seismically rugged than post-1975 equipment due to possible design
changes after 1975 intended to upgrade test performance. The following equipment
c 1asses were judged by SSRAP [ 2] to have a vintage issue due to poss i b 1e design
changes over the past two decades.

• Battery Chargers

• Inverters

• Switches

• Transmitters

The possible vintage issues for these four classes are discussed in the following
subsections. Other equipment classes were judged based on test data and
manufacturer interaction to not have significant design changes which could affect
seismic ruggedness.

Brookhaven National Laboratory {BNL) fragility studies [10] in support of seismic

margin reviews consulted proprietary data not available to others, including ANCO
and EPRI. These data have suggested that certain equipment (motor control centers,

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 Table 3-1

TYPICAL RUGGEDNESS LEVELS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

5% Spectral
Amplitude* ZPA*
Description 3-16Hz (g) 19.L
Batteries on racks 4.0t 2.0t

Battery chargers 2.0 1.3

Contactors and motor starters 4.5 2.5

Distribution panels
- Panelboards 2.5t 1.5t
- Switchboards 3.5 2.5

Electrical penetration assemblies 4.0-5.0 4.0

Inverters 2.8 2.0

Manual control switches 10.0 4.0

Motor control centers 1.5 1.0

Switches 3.0 1.5

Switchgear
- low-voltage 1.8 1.0
- medium-voltage 1.8 1.0

Transformers 3.0 1.5

Transmitters 10.0 4.0

* Valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion at the equipment base,
unless otherwise noted.

t Valid for concurrent vertical motion which is two-thirds of the horizontal motion.

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 contactors and motor starters, switchgear, and distribution panels) may have lower
ruggedness (due to both additional test data and knowledge of post-1975 design
changes) than indicated by earlier studies issued for review. These conflicts have
been noted by SSRAP [2] and cautions have been included in Reference 2 which may
limit the use of GERS for certain equipment classes.

The following equipment classes with GERS issued for review had data conflicts with
studies [10] published by others:

• Motor Control Centers

• Distribution Panels
• Contactors and Motor Starters

• Switchgear

In addition, review by a major manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation)

identified conflicts with proprietary test data on molded case circuit breakers,
switchgear, motor control centers, and transformers.

The review issues for all of the above identified classes are discussed in the
following subsections.

3.1 BATTERIES ON RACKS

This data set includes lead-acid battery cells and their supporting racks with rail
restraints. They are fabricated by three different manufacturers. This class
1
covers virtually all stationary lead-acid battery cells used in power plants.

Rows or groups of cells containing lead-calcium plates housed in plastic jars are
supported on two-step or single-tier racks and are interconnected by flexible bus
connectors. The racks have longitudinal braces and must be anchored to a supporting
structure. Both artificially-aged and naturally-aged cells were included in the
test data base. Failures consisted of cracking of artificially-aged plastic jars
during testing.

The GERS for batteries on racks has a spectral amplitude of 4 g with a 2 g ZPA,
-however, the GERS may be applied only to batteries with a service life of ten years
or less. For application details refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

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3.2 BATTERY CHARGERS

Battery chargers fulfi 11 an important function in power plants by float charging

lead-acid batteries used for emergency power. The equipment in this class includes
chargers with capacities of up to 600 amps. These units use solid-state technology
(silicon-controlled rectifiers) to rectify alternating current to direct current.
They also contain circuit breakers, transformers, and various alarm and control
circuits as major components. Virtually all battery chargers used in power plants
for charging of stationary battery sets are included in this equipment class.
Failures observed during seismic testing were electrical in nature and caused by,
for example, an internal short or a fuse blowing. Subsequent review [2] of these
equipment classes has indicated that additional caveats are necessary to insure that
the GERS are not applied to equipment of early vintage. It must be verified that
the power controls of the units uti 1 i ze si 1icon-control led rectifiers (SCR) as
opposed to non-solid-state controls. The support of heavy internal components, such
as transformers, should be inspected to insure that an adequate load path exists
between the transformer supports and the cabinet anchorage. Some cabinet design
changes were made due to results obtained in early shake table testing programs.
The GERS checklist for these equipment classes includes items to insure that the
above concerns are addressed. The GERS for battery chargers is 2.0 g with a 1.3 g
ZPA. For application details, refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.3 DISTRIBUTION PANELS

Distribution panels, which are also referred to as switchboards or panel boards, are
NEMA-type floor and wall enclosures containing circuit breakers and fused disconnect
switches. Panelboards are wall-mounted enclosures containing numerous molded case
circuit breakers. Switchboards also contain numerous molded case circuit breakers
but are free-standing, floor-mounted enclosures. This class includes low-voltage
distribution panels rated at 600 VAC or 250 VDC. They are used to distribute
electrical power from the plant distribution system to individual loads or branch
circuits which are connected to the distribution panel's circuit breakers or
switches.

For preliminary GERS issued for review, both panel boards and switchboards were
lumped together and denoted as "distribution panels" (following References 6 and 15
notation) for GERS construction. Initial data showed the same ruggedness levels.
Reference 10, however, considered panelboards and switchboards separately and
assigned different fragility levels to each class.

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The GERS levels for distribution panels (both types) was initially set at 5.0 gin
earlier studies issued for review. The additional limited BNL data given in
Reference 2 for switchboards did not conflict with this GERS level. However, the
BNL data base contains several instances of spurious breaker trip in panelboards
during tests at less than the 5.0-g spectral level. The spurious trips were
associated with four specimens from three manufacturers. In one specimen, the
tripping unit was a 20-amp breaker and in the other units, the tripping units were
100 amp or greater.

It should be noted that the same breaker units can be mounted in either panelboards
or switchboards. According to Reference 10, the difference in test response between
switchboards and panelboards is due to differences in buss bar configuration and
support in free-standing and wall-mounted units.

The BNL study indicates two basic fragility levels for panelboards (1) "recoverable"
and (2) "unrecoverable". The recoverable level is at the 2.5-g spectral level and
is associated with the spurious tripping of feeder breakers (not main breaker). An
unrecoverable level is associated with the loosening of terminals or misalignment of
a shunt trip which required "certain adjustments in order to reset the breaker"
which occurred at the 3.2-g spectral level. Thus, it would appear that the BNL data
identifies a generic fragility level for molded case circuit breakers as mounted in
panelboards. Based on these results, a separate GERS level of 2.5 g for panelboards
has been specified. Since there is a basic similarity between panelboard and
switchboard components, it was judged that a reduced GERS level of 3.5 g for
switchboards would be reasonable to account for similarity issues and a limited test
data base.

To be covered by the GERS, a distribution panel must contain only circuit breakers
and switches, not relays or motor starters. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC)
review has identified a certain specific molded case circuit breaker model as
sensitive to vibration. This breaker model has been excluded from the GERS. For
application details refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES

Electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) are devices used to pass electrical power
or electrical signals through containment building walls in power plants. In
addition to electrical insulation, they are required to provide a pressure barrier
to maintain the integrity of the reactor containment. Typically they consist of one
or more electrical conductors passing through an insulating module which in turn is

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sealed in a steel flange or pipe welded into the containment. The class of
electrical penetration includes those consisting of a pressurized design with a
header plate and internal modules, suitable for low- and medium-voltage service.
This c 1ass does not inc 1ude EPAs with meta 1-to-g 1ass sea 1s, potted or canister-
types, or gasketed-types.

Approximately one-third of the EPAs used in power plants are included in this
category. There were no failures in the tests, other than anomalies associated with
the test setup. However, for the purpose of this project, these were considered
failures. The GERS that resulted is approximately 4-5 g with a 4 g ZPA. For
application details refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.5 INVERTERS

Inverters are electronic devices for changing direct current to alternating current
and are used in conjunction with stationary batteries to provide emergency power in
power plants. This equipment class includes units rated up to 5,000 kva, either
single or three-phase. These units utilize solid-state circuitry and include
circuit breakers, transformers, frequency control circuitry, and alarm and power
control circuits. The range of devices in the data base is representative of those
found in power plants. In all the tests examined, no failures of any kind were
noted.

Subsequent review [ 2] of these equipment c 1asses has indicated that add it i ona 1
caveats are necessary to insure that the GERS are not applied to equipment of early
vintage. It must be verified that the power controls of the units utilize silicon-
controlled rectifiers (SCR) as opposed to non-solid-state controls. The support of
heavy internal components, such as transformers, should be inspected to insure that
an adequate load path exists between the transformer supports and the cabinet
anchorage. Some cabinet design changes were made due to results obtained in early
shake table testing programs.

The GERS is 3 g with a 2 g ZPA. The GERS checklist for these equipment classes
inc 1udes items to insure that the above concerns are addressed. For application
details, refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.6 MANUAL CONTROL SWITCHES

Manual Control Switches are multi-contact rotary control or transfer switches which
are utilized in many power plant control circuits. The switches have various
combinations of normally open or normally closed contact configurations and may have

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either a maintaining or spring return operation after a manual activation. The
equipment class is restricted to five models; however, seismic ruggedness of other
models may be established by similarity analysis [24]. The rotary operating
mechanism and contact design of the five models in the equipment class are very
resistant to vibration. Seismic qualification testing of the switches has not
produced any failures. The basic design of the switches has remained unchanged for
at least 20 years.

The GERS for control switches is 10.0 g with a 4.0 g ZPA. For application details
refer to the GERS packages in Appendix C.

3.7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

Motor control centers are steel enclosures containing various sizes of motor
starters (contactors and control relays), circuit breakers, auxiliary relays,
disconnect switches, transformers, and panelboards. They may also contain indicator
lamps and meters. The units in this equipment class are low voltage (up to 600 VAC
or 250 VDC). They are assembled in sections typically 90-in. high, 20-in. wide, and
20-in. deep; six or more sections may be ganged together. Weight per section ranges
from 200 to 800 pounds depending on the contents.

In earlier studies issued for review, the GERS level for "function after" was set at
the 4.0 g spectral level. This GERS represented an input level which is slightly
higher than the input level for which some of the MCCs in the GERS data base began
to experience "minor" structural damage. Here, the term "minor" refers to damage
such as local weld cracking, sheet metal deformation, and the fracture of a single
internal mounting bolt, which occurred in three of the data base tests. Although
the MCCs in these tests were able to function after the test input motions, the GERS
was conservatively set at the 4.0 g spectral level to cover the eventuality that
higher input levels could possible cause damage that might affect functionability.

However, Reference 10 (Brookhaven National Laboratory, BNL) contains test data from
a test in which "all four corners broke away from the base" at a 5% spectral level
of approximately 2.5 g*. According to the initial GERS, this MCC should have had

* The method of reporting test results differs between the present study and
Reference 10. Reference 10 uses 2% damped spectra averaged over the range 4-16 Hz
Average Spectral Acceleration (ASA) to indicate the test input level. For GERS
construction, 5% damped spectra are used. For the discussion here, a factor of
0.63 was used to convert the BNL ASA values to comparable GERS values. This
factor was obtained by the relation ~2/5 (see Section 2).

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performance which would have allowed "function after". The test failure, which must
be considered as "major" was associated with a cabinet/external channel bolt detail
in which both bolt size and sheet flexibility were contributing factors in that the
failure mode involved both broken bolts and deformed sheet metal flanges. While the
specific detail dimensions are proprietary, it has been determined that a
reinforcing angle doubler was included in the detail and that 5/16 in. mounting
bolts were utilized. It should be noted that this detail was a seismic
"improvement" and thus this test identifies a vintage issue.

WEC has reviewed their seismic qualification testing program conducted on various
MCC configurations. While the specific test levels and details remain proprietary,
WEC has quantified the test results for review purposes. Minor damage to the
enclosure, at the base, was seen to initiate at the 2.5 g spectral level. Signifi-
cant enclosure damage occurred at approximately the 3.5 g spectral level. Based on
their (~EC) test experience with qualification of other manufacturers' MCC
configurations, they recommended that the 2.5 g spectral level be considered as a
generic limit to prevent unacceptable base damage.

It is apparent that there is a great diversity of MCC enclosure structure details

and, in particular, in the base attachment details. While some MCC configurations
allow direct transfer of the seismic shear and overturning forces to the structure
anchorage through a stiff base structure, other MCC configurations have very
flexible base load paths. Rather than attempt to quantify the differences in MCC
dynamic test behavior, the "function-after" GERS level has been set at the damage
threshold bound of 2.5 g. For this spectral level, the minimum MCC base structure
attributes can be defined. The MCC base anchorage must uti 1ize base structural
channels. For those MCC with a bolted connection between the MCC frame or enclosure
and external (i.e., separate) base channels, each section must have four internal
bolts that are at least 3/8-in. diameter. Any sheet metal in the load path must be
reinforced.

The GERS level for "function during" is set at the 1.5-g spectral level. This GERS
represents an input level for which contact chatter does not occur during the input
motion. The MCC GERS level for "function after" is chosen to accommodate those
tests where "minor" base damage does not affect post-test function. Here, the term
"post-test" means that the motor starters were functional during post-test
functional checks. It is not intended to imply that a change-of-state did not occur
for motor starters during a test with input levels greater than 1.5 g. If a change
of state occurred, it was reset and the post-test functional tests conducted. Thus

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"function after" must be interpreted as "function after with reset as necessary".
This means that any plant evaluation must demonstrate in accordance with established
procedures (Reference 5) that manual reset of motor starters by operators is
feasible ( both system tolerance of changed state and operator availability for
manual reset) following a seismic event if the "function after" GERS level is
utilized.

Reference 10 (BNL) identified several tests with changes of state for starters which
would require manual reset. Auxiliary contacts were found to change state at the
same level as normally closed (NC) contact chatter, i.e., 1.3 g. Main contacts were
found to change state at an input level of 1.6 g. It should be noted that only one
test in the original GERS data base required reset due to change of state of a motor
starter.

It was also observed in Reference 10 that as test levels increased, NC auxiliary

contacts chattered before normally open (NO) auxiliary contacts. This was also
observed in the GERS data base. A motor control circuit contains a variety of
components (relays, contactors, auxiliary interlock contacts) which can be wired in
numerous ways to accomplish the control objectives. In a given test the deter-
mination of the component which caused main contact chatter or change of state is
often not possible. The test spectral level associated with contact chatter is not
known with sufficient precision to distinguish between 1.3 g and 1.6 g. For the
reconciliation of the MCC GERS with the BNL report, the 1.5-g level will be
associated with both NO and NC auxiliary contact chatters, main contact chatter, and
change of state. Relay chatter is also associated with this level. Thus, the 1.5-g
level is the "function during" GERS level for relay, NO/NC auxiliary, and main
contact chatter. However, above this level, main contact change of state is
possible and reset must be considered.

3. 8 SWITCHES

Switches are a simple but diverse class of devices which open or close contacts
under a change of environment conditions (e.g., pressure, temperature, level, or
flow). They are composed of electrical contacts and mechanical components such as
diaphragm, bourdon tube, bimetallic elements, floats, etc. The activation
mechanism depends on the application. For example, a pressure switch may be
actuated by a bourdon tube, piston, or diaphragm, when the pressure reaches a
setpoint. These switches weigh up to fifty pounds, but most are a few pounds and
have their largest dimension less than 12 inches. Subsequent review [2] identified
vintage concerns for this equipment class due to their extreme diversity and

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operational similarity to relays (as indicated by an USNRC generic letter for the
A-46 issue, Reference 15).

A survey of several switch manufacturers has indicated that some switch models have
had design changes over the past twenty years which affect seismic performance while
other switch models have had no significant design changes. This divided survey
response was expected and, in fact, is one reason why the GERS for this equipment
class was originally set at 3.0 g due to contact chatter in some models above that
spectral level. Switches are an equipment class for which early test data (circa
1970) was available. The 3.0 g spectral level reflects the seismic performance of
models prior to any design changes to enhance seismic resistance. Further, the GERS
for switches has been restricted to specific manufacturer/models which were used to
construct the GERS. If a specific model is not listed, the switch ruggedness would
have to be addressed by other means such as using specific testing, system analysis
exclusion, or replacement by a qualified component.

Many switches have adjustable setpoints. Fragility testing has shown that setpoint
differentials (difference between switch setting and standard operating conditions)
should be greater than ten percent of standard operating values of temperature,
pressure, level, or flow.

Refer to Appendix C for application details. Note that switch GERS are at the
component mounting point and any panel or rack amplification must be separately
accounted for.

3. 9 SWITCHGEAR

Two types of switchgear are included in this class, and two GERS have been
developed. They are low voltage, metal enclosed switchgear rated at up to 600 VAC,
and medium voltage, metal clad switchgear housed in steel enclosures and rated at
voltages up to 5,000 VAC. These devices typically consist of several draw-out
circuit breakers, bus bars, auxiliary and protective relays, transformers, switches,
and meters. This equipment class covers virtually all low- and medium-voltage
switchgear used for overcurrent protection in primary (normally 4,160 .VAC) and
secondary (normally 480 VAC) distribution systems in power plants. However, medium-
voltage circuit breaker units which must be jacked up to engage into the connected
position are excluded from the class.

The functionality of switchgear is governed by the control, protective, and

associated auxiliary relays. In many tests, the standard 2-ms chatter failure

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criterion was utilized. Due to this conservative failure criterion, many relays
were found to be unacceptable when mounted on switchgear enclosures. However, in
other tests the switchgear was considered as a complete subsystem where chatter can
be tolerated without loss of switchgear function. The primary function of
switchgear is to either connect or disconnect a main power circuit to protect the
remainder of the circuit against overcurrent, overvoltage, undervoltage, phase
reversal, etc., or to switch circuits upon command. As long as the switchgear can
accomplish its primary function, the occurrence of minor chatter in a control,
protective, or associated auxiliary relay is not a relevant concern. Thus, in
contrast to control circuits where short duration (> 2 ms) relay chatter is
considered a failure to "operate", switchgear fails only by a non-commanded change
of state. In order to cause switchgear loss of function, relay chatter must have
significant duration (usually greater than the period of one AC cycle or> 16 ms).
Recent IEEE guidelines for seismic testing of switchgear have recognized this
chatter tolerance in switchgear. It should be noted that, in some cases,
switchgear-mounted relays are used for control of other components outside the
switchgear. For these situations, the 2-ms chatter criteria is applicable.

Reference 10 has compiled switchgear fragility test data obtained from proprietary
sources. Review of Reference 10 indicates that switchgear did not trip for a 2.5-g
spectral level given that relays with low ruggedness are excluded. This study has
also indicated that breaker racking and positioning systems have affected secondary
breaker contact operation during tests. Further, for medium-voltage switchgear,
some mounting problems with internal components has been observed in a few tests.
Since specific design changes were made to address these test results, they identify
vintage issues.

WEC has reviewed their seismic qualification testing program conducted on low- and
medium-voltage switchgear which was initiated in 1959. As a result of a series of
tests conducted at increasing levels, certain modifications were found to be
necessary to qualify the switchgear at increased levels. While the specific test
levels and details are proprietary, WEC has quantified the test results into two
generic test levels (effective broad-band test spectra) along with the modifications
required to achieve that level. The modifications identified are also sufficiently
generic to be applicable to other manufacturers' switchgear. It is assumed that
other manufacturers have made similar modifications to achieve seismic qualification
at increased test levels.

Two GERS levels have been established for both switchgear classes. Each level
requires that certain conditions exist before application of the GERS to switchgear.

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For medium-voltage switchgear, a GERS level of 1.8 g (5% damping, 4-16 Hz) may be
achieved without modification if potential transformers, when present in switchgear
units, are checked for restraints. A GERS level of 2.5 g may be achieved provided:
(1) the medium-voltage breaker unit has acceptable vertical restraint, and (2) arc
chutes have side-to-side restraint. For low-voltage switchgear units, a GERS level
of 1.8 g may be achieved provided that there are side-to-side restraints for the
breaker to prevent secondary contact deformation. A GERS level of 2.5 g may be
achieved provided: ( 1) base frame reinforcement brackets are installed in the
outside corners of the outer low-voltage switchgear cabinets in a lineup, (2) the
low-voltage breaker unit has acceptable vertical restraints, and (3) the low-voltage
breaker has the side-to-side restraints required to achieve the 1.8 spectral test
level.

For use of switchgear GERS, a screening of relays is required to insure that certain
low ruggedness relays are not present (Reference 5 contains a list of low ruggedness
relays). Additional screening of switchgear relays is to be accomplished in
accordance with the guidelines given in Reference 5. If system analysis indicates
that a switchgear mounted relay is critical, then a complete screening evaluation of
that relay is necessary (see Reference 5 for screening evaluation procedures). This
will be usually only for relays used to control components outside the switchgear or
which cause lockout.

For application details refer to the GERS packages in Appendix C.

3.10 TRANSFORMERS

This equipment class includes dry-type transformers ranging from 7 .5 to 225 kva,
with either single- or three-phase ratings at 120/480 VAC. They are housed in
NEMA-type enclosures which are either floor- or wall-mounted, an can weigh up to
2,000 pounds. This covers virtually all the low-voltage dry-type transformers used
in power plants.

A single failure was observed in the tests in the data base. This occurred with a
700-lb transformer, where the coil supports broke, causing the coil layer spacers to
come out and resulting in a short circuit. This situation was corrected by
installing an additional support. WEC review has indicated that insufficient
clearance between bare copper bus or cable and the transformer enclosure is another
source of short circuit during test. A 3/8-in. minimum gap between any bare copper
conductor and the enclosure is required.

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The GERS for dry-type transformers is 3. O g with a 1 . 5 g ZPA. For application
details refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.11 TRANSMITTERS

Transmitters are primarily electronic signal conditioners (without vacuum tubes)

which may also incorporate transducers (e.g., pressure sensor). The electrical
signal is transmitted to a remote location where the signal might be used for visual
indication, as control input to a trip unit that changes state at a predetermined
level, or as an input to a controller. This equipment class includes four types of
transmitters, i.e., pressure, temperature, flow, and level. Transmitters can weigh
any where from a few pounds up to about forty, but most weigh only a few pounds and
have their greatest dimension less than twelve inches.

Subsequent review [2] identified vintage concerns for this equipment class due to
their extreme diversity and knowledge of certain units with known low seismic
ruggedness. The common types of transmitters use strain gages, force-balance
mechanisms, or differential capacitance as the means of sensing the displacement of
a diaphragm, bellows, or bourdon tube. Each manufacturer has a unique design which
has remained unchanged over the past twenty years. A survey of several transmitter
manufacturers has confirmed that any design changes over the past two decades have
not affected the seismic performance of the various transmitters.

The GERS for transmitters has been restricted to specific manufacturer/ models which
were used to construct the GERS. If a specific model is not listed, the seismic
ruggedness would have to be addressed by other means such as specific testing,
system analysis exclusion, or replacement by a qualified component. The listed
transmitters are rugged to the 10.0 g GERS level as supported by test data. The
design of the listed units has been invariant over the past twenty years. It should
be noted that often these devices are mounted in locations which cause them to
sustain the operating vibration of the lines which they monitor. Thus, while not
explicitly designed for seismic environments, a certain level of dynamic ruggedness
is provided in the device designs to account for operational dynamic environments.

The GERS for transmitters has been updated to reflect the above concerns. Refer to
Appendix C for application details. Note that transmitter GERS are at the component
mounting point and any panel/rack or line amplification must be included.

3.12 CONTACTORS AND MOTOR STARTERS

Contactors and motor starters are the primary functional components of MCC. They
consist of a molded body of plastic or bakelite type material, a coil and magnet

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assembly which moves the movable set of main contact points, and a movable and fixed
set of contact points. They are frequently supplied with auxiliary contacts which
are used for interlocks to hold in the contacts or for signal purposes. The may
have from one to four poles, i.e., sets of contact points, and may be designed for
either motor or non-motor loads. For main contact ratings up to 100 amps, the size
is less than 7 in. x 10 in., and weights are less than 10 lb.

Reference 10 discusses the chatter of auxi 1iary contacts and presents a 1 imited
summary of test data. Based on review of data discussed in Reference 10, the GERS
for contactors and motor starter for both main contact chatter and normally
open/normally closed auxiliary contacts have been set at 4.5 g. For application
details, refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

3.13 DATA SUMMARIES

3 • 13 . 1 Motors

Motors are the primary electrical component of pumps, fans, compressors and valves.
AC induction motors account for approximately 90 percent of the motor population in
a plant. The majority of the motors are in the 1-150 hp range and are powered and
controlled from motor control centers.

Certain equipment classes have been judged by SSRAP [2] to have inherent seismic
ruggedness due to operational vibration environment levels. Among the electrical
equipment classes is motors. For this class, insufficient seismic test data is
available to construct GERS. However, limited data is available which can be useful
in quantifying this judgment and assessing if any additional efforts are warranted.
A data summary for motors is presented in Appendix D.

3.13.2 Automatic Transfer Switches

Automatic transfer switches are used to protect critical electrical loads against
loss of power by providing for the automatic transfer of the load from the normal
source of power to an alternate source. The switch automatically retransfers power
to the norma 1 source when power is restored. Transfer switches contain circuit
breaker-type contacts which are motor- or solenoid-actuated and which are controlled
by energized relays.

This equipment class includes units ranging in size from 125 VDC, 2-pole types to
3-pole, 120-480 VAC types. They can be either floor- or wall-mounted with weights
up to 2,000 pounds. This class covers basically all types currently used in power
plants for critical power continuity.

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The GERS for automatic transfer switches was not established due to limited data.
The available data is given in Appendix O.

3.13.3 Control Panels

Control pahels (also referred to as relay panels, control boards, or relay boards)
are steel enclosures containing a variety of component parts including circuit
boards, power supplies, transformers, switches, meters, indicating lights, special-
purpose electronics, and relays. Both floor- and wall-mounted types are included.
These are low-voltage units rated at 600 VAC or 250 VAC. This equipment class
covers a wide range of control panels used in virtually all power plants for
critical control functions.

In general, the functionality of control panels is limited by relay chatter in the

deenergized state. The tests demonstrated other mechanical anomalies, such as loose
mounting screws, doors opening or slapping, and broken wires. These have been
addressed by the checklist.

GERS for control panels was not established due to diversity of panel types and
construction. A generic cabinet could not be defined. The available data is
presented in Appendix O.

3.13.4 Instrument Rack Components

Every power plant has a great variety of instrument racks which are either floor- or
wall-mounted. They include components of the following types: power supplies,
pressure gages, meters, monitoring recorders, square root extractors, controllers,
multiplex units, control/logic units, and formettes.

Instrument racks may also have relays and switches; these components are covered by
separate GERS and are not included in this instrument rack component data.

Four failures occurred in the large number of tests included in the data base. Two
of these were mechanical in nature (a broken meter movement and components which
separated from the rack but remained functional), while two were electrical in
nature (a coil failed a high potential test after the seismic testing and a signal
was lost).

The GERS for instrument rack components was not established due to both diversity of
rack components and the difficulty in rack physical definition. The available data
is given in Appendix 0.

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 Section 4

SCREENING AMPLIFICATION FACTORS

The use of GERS for screening purposes in relay* evaluations of older plants
requires the comparison of relay GERS to mounting point response spectra. At best,
only rough estimates of floor spectra (base input to an enclosure or panel) are
available. Since at the outset of a relay evaluation, the specific location of a
given relay within an enclosure is, in general, unknown, a simple approximate method
of estimating the mounting point response is desirable. Based upon review of test
data and judgmental evaluation of narrow- and broad-band response comparison,
conservative single value amplification factors are recommended in this section for
MCC and flexible panel example applications.

4. 1 BACKGROUND

For most equipment, the demonstration of the capability to withstand substantial

seismic motion, without loss of functionality after the motion, is sufficient.
However, for certain classes of equipment, such as relays, operability during
seismic motion must also be demonstrated. Due to the importance of relays in
operating plant hot-shutdown control circuits, relays have received emphasis in the
resolution of the A-46 issue. Relay GERS provide seismic response spectra for which
a class or subclass of relays has functioned properly during formal shake table
qualification tests or during EPRI-sponsored relay testing (14] conducted to both
resolve relay vintage issues and to develop seismic data for relays for which
qualification data did not exist.

EPRI has also established a project [5] to develop the methodology for evaluation of
relay seismic functionality of operating plants. The availability of component GERS
allows a systematic evaluation of those relays or other devices that are required to
operate during an earthquake (15]. At the outset of a relay evaluation, several
thousand relays might be identified in control circuits associated with plant hot-
shutdown. In order to reduce the number of relays requiring evaluation, a screening
procedure is needed to eliminate from further consideration those relays which

* Also other devices (e.g., switches) whose function is to close or open electrical
contacts for control purposes.

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either have demonstrated seismic ruggedness or which have non-essential or redundant
control functions.

To screen relays on the basis of ruggedness, the GERS must be compared* to an input
response spectrum ( seismic demand) . However, s i nee the GERS deve 1oped for re 1ays
are based on input motion at the mounting of the relay, a simple approximate method
is needed to convert the base input motion (floor motion) of the panel or enclosure
to that of the relay. The enclosure filters or modifies the input motion such that
peak amplification occurs over a narrow frequency range centered at the panel or
enclosure natural frequencies. The resulting response spectrum for a device
mounting point reflects this narrow-band amplification. Typically, the highest
amplification occurs high in the enclosure or near the center of a panel. In
general, neither the panel or enclosure natural frequency nor the specific location
of a relay on a panel or within an enclosure is known at the start of a plant relay
evaluation. Thus, a detailed response analysis is not possible. The simplest and
most direct method for estimation of mounting point response spectrum is to multiply
the input floor response spectrum by a cabinet amplification factor that is the same
for all frequencies. Due to the complex nature of actual cabinet dynamics, the use
of a single generic frequency independent factor must involve the use of judgment
and have conservatism.

Herein, screening amplification factors are proposed for evaluating relays located
either in MC enclosures or on flexible panels. These factors are best estimates
based on 1) a review of test data and 2) a judgmental evaluation. It is intended
that these factors be consistent with the degree of judgment and conservatism used
for GERS construction.

4.2 MOUNTING POINT AMPLIFICATION

The issue of in-equipment amplification is a complex one that has been addressed by
a variety of approaches (11,16,17,18]. Amplification of motion at a given point in
a cabinet is a function of the natural frequencies/mode shapes of the cabinet, the
frequency content of the· input motion, the effective damping of the cabinet (which
is also a function of the input motion level), height of the point above the base,
and location of the point (i.e., on the frame of the cabinet or on a panel with
localized response). Due to the diversity of cabinet configurations and device
(relay) types, an quantitative study of in-equipment amplification will be
statistical in nature (18].

* The issue of margin between mounting point seismic demand (input motion) and GERS
is addressed in Reference 2.

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Amplification can also be considered as either kinematic or operational [17]. A
kinematic amplification factor would be associated with the ratio of measured in-
cabinet motion to measured input base motion. The correct measure of this kinematic
amplification would be a frequency dependent transmissibi 1 ity ratio of measured
response acceleration to measured input acceleration (i.e., a transfer function
between output and input motion). It is important that the transmissibi 1 ity be
measured at qualification test input levels and not during low-level preliminary
resonant searches. Most qualification test reports provide only response spectra of
the test input motion. A few test reports are available which also include test
response spectra for various cabinet locations. Thus, the available data requires
the estimation of a transmissibility (or apparent TRS amplification) by the ratio of
in-cabinet response spectra to the base input response spectra (shake table input
spectra).

Consider a device subjected to two separate shake table tests. In the first test,
the device was directly mounted to the shake table (i.e., rigidly mounted, not
cabinet mounted) and the input motion (broad-band) determined that caused the device
to malfunction. In the second test, the device was mounted within a cabinet and the
input motion (broad-band) to the cabinet base determined that caused the device to
malfunction also. An operational amplification factor is the ratio of the rigidly-
mounted input motion to the cabinet-mounted input motion (i.e., a ratio of non-
cabinet mounted device fragi 1ity to cabinet mounted fragi 1 ity). This measure of
amplification brings into play both the response and failure mechanism of the relay.
Here, again, the test data would be in the form of response spectra with only
limited existing data available. However, since we are fundamentally concerned with
device function, the operational amplification factor is the preferred basis for
definition of a screening amplification factor. In most cases, however, where such
data is not available, the kinematic amplification will, by default, become the
basis for definition of a screening amplification factor.

4.3 DYNAMIC CORRECTION FACTORS

Part of the reason why there is a difference between a kinematic and operational
amplification factor is due to the difference in frequency content and
directionality of the base input motion compared to the in-equipment motion. Base
input test response spectra tend to have broad-band frequency content and are multi-
axial inputs. Measured in-equipment spectra show that the values of peak kinematic
amplification occur over a particular narrow-band frequency range, and at locations
with high localized response. Since most control devices are mounted on vertical

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panels within or on an enclosure, the in-equipment response is dominant in the
direction normal to the panel surface. The in-plane motion (both vertical and
horizontal) of the panel is not significantly amplified.

The peak values of narrow-band amplified mounting point response cannot be compared
directly with the broad-band type of inputs used in multi-axis relay testing which
form the basis of relay GERS. The IEEE relay testing standard [19] selected a
broad-band input to the relay mounting point as the preferred test method based on
simplicity in testing procedure. The IEEE standard acknowledges that this broad-
band input produces a severe overtest. For complex devices such as relays, a
narrow-band input is judged to be less severe from a fragility standpoint than a
broad-band input with the same maximum spectral ordinate, due to the absence of
multi-mode response [11], variab~e RMS severity over the bandwidth of test spectra
[20], and the lack of interaction of nonlinear responses in the narrow-band case.
Recent studies [21,22,12,20) have concluded that a constant correction factor can be
applied to narrow-band data to produce an approximately equivalent broad-band
result. Reference 21 recommends that the modal interaction correction factor be
within the range of 0.7 - 0.85 for most applications. Reference 20 suggests that an
RMS bandwidth correction factor would lie in the range of 0.68 - 0.81 for MCC and
switchgear type panels. Conservatively, this bandwidth factor can be approximated
as 0.85.

Since a panel mounted device experiences local narrow-band amplification which is

essentially unidirectional, the use of equal strength multi-axis test inputs
introduces an additional test conservatism. The IEEE seismic qualification standard
[13] identifies a simple panel mounted device as one case where single axis testing
may be justified. However, in the interest of test simplicity, the relay testing
standard [19] adopted biaxial multi-axis testing as the baseline procedure. A
recent study [22] has concluded that a factor of 1/1.2 is a reasonable choice of
reduction factor to account for cross-axis coupling when comparing dominantly
single-axis test data to multi-axis test data.

In the absence of data supporting an operational amplification factor, an overal 1

reduction factor of 0.85 x 0.85/1.2 ~ 0.6 is judged to be sufficiently conservative
to weight the narrow-band, single-axis, kinematic peak amplification factors to
obtain effective broad-band, multi-axis amplification factors.

The methodology adopted for the development of all GERS (Section 2) utilized
biaxial/random input motion as the norm for evaluation. Data from tests using
narrow-band single-axis inputs was discounted by a weighting factor of 0.5 in order

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to compare to biaxial broad-band inputs [a weighting factor of O. 7 was used for
narrow-band inputs and a weighting factor of 0.7 (1/1.4) was used for single-axis
inputs]. Thus, there is an implicit factor of conservatism when comparing the
broad-band relay GERS to narrow-band in-equipment spectra. The use of 0.5 for GERS
construction and 0.6 for amplification is conservative, resulting in lower GERS but
higher amplified response or demand estimates.

The IEEE relay test standard [19] indicates that narrow-band testing may be used as
an option to simulate a more realistic input (i.e., cabinet) environment. This
option is seldom used in qualification testing due to the additional effort (in-
creased number of individual test runs). For this testing, a broad-band background
input with a superimposed narrow-band (1/3-octave band) input is utilized. The EPRI
relay testing conducted to date [14] has used both broad-band, multi-axis, input
motions and narrow-band, single-axis, input motions (including a broad-band
background input motion). These tests have shown that the narrow-band spectral
level is at least 1.7 times the broad-band spectral level necessary to cause the
same relay chatter duration for a number of different relay types and models (note
1/1. 7 a; 0.6). An example of these test results is shown in Figure 4-1, which
compares the sequence of six narrow-band inputs and the single broad-band input
level, which caused the same chatter level. This indicates that testing of a relay
with a multi-axis broad-band input imposes a penalty or degree of conservatism.

4.4 EXAMPLE: MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

4.4.1 Operational Amplification

In the case of MCC, an operational amplification factor can be estimated. Reference

17 has concluded that sufficient data is available [10] to define an operational
amplification factor for motor starter auxiliary contact chatter. Reference 10 has
shown that, based on a statistical analysis, the "median average" (numerical average
of spectral ordinate within the frequency band 4-16 Hz) spectral level (2% damping)
for auxiliary contact chatter is 9.1 g for input motion to the starters only and 3.0
g for input at the MCC base with starters mounted in the cabinet, considering a wide
range of MCC types and tests. Thus, an apparent operational amplification factor of
approximately 3.0 is appropriate based on auxiliary contact chatter [17]. This same
operational amplification of 3.0 is also supported by the GERS developed indepent-
ently for MCC and motor starters. The broad-band GERS for motor starter auxiliary
contacts is established at a spectral level (5% damping) of 4.5 g (4-16 Hz) while
the MCC broad-band GERS is es tab 1 i shed at a spectra 1 1eve 1 of 1 • 5 g. Thus a
screening amplification factor of 3.0 is recommended for relay evaluation in MCC.

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 Broadband Input

lndlvldual
.F Narrowband
--
z
c:a
10
~ Input

...<S!
a:
w
..I
w
<J
<J
<
..I
<
...<J
a: 5'1 Damping

w
Q.
Cl>

5 10 50 100
FREQUENCY (Hz)

Figure 4-1. Comparison of broad-band and narrow-band test (inputs

that cause the same relay chatter duration [14].

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4.4.2 Kinematic Amplification

To approach amplification from a kinematic basis, the ratio of Test Response Spectra
(TRS) for a representative sample of MCC enclosures were computed from qualification
test data. The TRS ratios for an example MCC are shown in Figure 4-2 as a function
of frequency. (For comparison, the effective broad-band factor of 3.0 derived from
operational considerations is shown.) The maximum value of these TRS ratios provides
an estimate of the peak narrow-band kinematic amplification factors (transmissibi-
lity) at each location. In the following discussion, we call this simply the peak
amplification factor. The peak amplification factor for several locations on a
limited sample of tested MCCs in the EPRI data base is presented in Figure 4-3.
Each of these points represents the maximum narrow-band kinematic amplification
factor estimated from the ratio of the TRS at the measurement location to the base
input TRS over the frequency range 2-20 Hz.* Review of Reference 16 indicates MCC
peak kinematic amplification within the range of 2-5 (2-15 Hz frequency range).
Reference 18 reports a median value of 4.8 for peak kinematic amplification (TRS
ratios) which is consistent with the MCC data base reviewed herein.

It should be noted that the number of locations (and hence the peak amplification
value) are entirely a function of transducer placement in a particular test. If all
the data is viewed as a sample, only the extreme values (maxi-max) of peak TRS ratio
from each test are relevant. Review of the distribution (Figure 4-3) of this data
(selecting the two extreme values of peak amplification from each test) suggests
that a representative median value of maxi-max kinematic amplification is in the
range of 5.0 to 6.0. A median based estimate of amplification is consistent with
the use of median-centered in-structure response spectra (Reference 2). Additional
factors of conservatism to account for variance in seismic demand are discussed in
Reference 2. The presentation of the data in the format of Figure 4.3 is only to
provide a guide for judgmental evaluation and is not meant to imply statistical
confidence in the data. If we judge that a factor of 5.5 is a reasonable best
estimate, then the effective (broad-band, multi-axis) comparison amplification
factor of 3.3 (0.6 x 5.5) would be appropriate if the screening factor was selected

* Rattling and bucket banging induce significantly higher frequency (> 20 Hz)
amplification in some MCC configurations. If all relays which have high frequency
sensitivity (demonstrated susceptibility to actuation from minor impacts such as
bumping) are screened out as being unacceptable, as recommended in Reference 2,
then we are concerned only with amplification within the less than 20 Hz range.

4-7
10448176
 I. ..,
20"
uv,.> I

0 0

90"

Unit 1 ( - )
_ a____
Unit 2 ( - )
l
MEASUREMENT LOCATIONS ON MCC

Apparent TAS AmplHlcatlon:

TAS I TRS
loc. baae
10

! a
•
a:
C

I a
I
t
<
Effective broad-band
(I)
screening factor
...
a: 4

o+---------,----r----,---,-------1
5 10 20 30 100
Frequency, Hz

Figure 4-2. Example TRS Ratio for MCC

4-8
10448176
 -- Peek
Ampllllclllon

A
1ctor
Al

Approximate Median of Maxima

7 T II
6

5 /

ID
Number of MCC 4
Locations 3

2
l 1 •
ALL TESTS

MAXIMA J
I

1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8

Peak Amplification Factor

Figure 4-3. Distribution of Peak Amplification Factors for MCC

4-9
10448176
based on kinematic test data only. Thus, given that operational MCC amplification
data was not available, an effective screening factor only 10% higher than
recommended for MCC enclosures would result.

4.5 EXAMPLE: FLEXIBLE PANELS

The bulk of power plant control relays are mounted within (or on) panel enclosures.
These panels may be referred to as relay panels, control boards, relay boards or
control cabinets. Many of these panels are custom made rectangular floor-mounted
enclosures with frame and "flexible" panel construction similar to switchgear
enclosures. Benchboards or control panels found in power plant control rooms (NSSS
supplied) which have significant panel stiffner patterns are not considered to be
flexible panels. A typical flexible panel is 90-in. high and 30-in. to 72-in. deep
with single or double door access. Individual flexible panels or doors are 24-in.
to 48-in. wide with 1/8 in. or less panel thickness, with only minimal panel
stiffners (typically light gage angles). Unlike MCC enclosures which have a
flexible cantilever or shear beam response mode, flexible control panels and
switchgear are box structures with the response dominated by local panel or door
response modes.

4.5.1 Operational Amplification

Unfortunately, due to both the greater diversity of relay types present in control
panels and the fact that chatter is tolerated in switchgear tests (the bulk of data
available is from switchgear tests), the definition of an operational amplification
factor, which would be valid for a wide range of relay models and be associated with
a given chatter threshold, is not feasible.

4.5.2 Kinematic Amplification

For simple screening of relays, the precise location of the relay on the panel or
door wi 11 be unknown, thus the relay must be assumed to be located at the most
highly amplified point. It should be noted that the natural frequency of the
flexible panels in the data base was within the range of 8-16 Hz and the widest
panel was 36 in. An example of a minimally stiffened door TRS ratio is shown in
Figure 4-4. Note that amplification varies significantly with location on the panel
and again has the narrow-band, single-axis characteristic. The peak kinematic
amplification factor for several locations on a limited sample of tested switchgear
panels and doors in the EPRI data base is presented in Figure 4-5. Each of these

4-10
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 28" 38" 38"

90"

0 _j
MEASUREMENT LOCATIONS ON TEST PANEL

Apparent TRI Ampllflc 1tlona:

TRSloc. / TRSba ae
10

Effective bro10-b1nd

••
.2
a:
C:
1cr1enlng factor

-•
.2
.2 •
=
a.
E
C

:. .
2

0 -+-----.----.. . .---..-----.---.-----~
5 20 30
10 100
Frequency, Hz

Figure 4-4. Example TRS Ratio for Panels

4-11
10448176
 -- Peek
Ampllllcatlon

A
actor
"1

Approximate Median of Maxima

Number of Panel
Locations
5
4
3

2
1 DALL TESTS

• MAXIMA

1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14
Peak Amplification Factor

Figure 4-5. Distribution of Peak Amplification Factors for Flexible Panels

4-12
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points represents the maximum narrow-band amplification factor (' 20 Hz)* obtained
from the ratio of the TRS at the location to the base input TRS. Review of the
distribution of this data (again selecting the two extreme values of peak
amplification from each test) suggests that a representative median value of maxi-
max kinematic amplification is in the range 9.0 to 10.0. All of the amplification
factors reviewed had the narrow-band, single-axis dominant response characteristic,
thus a weighting factor of 0.6 is appropriate for comparison to broad-band GERS. If
we judge that a factor of 10.0 is a reasonable median estimate, an effective
(broad-band, multi-axis) comparison median amplification factor of 6.0 (10.0 x 0.6)
would be appropriate based on kinematic test data.

Thus for the evaluation of flexible panel and door mounted relays, a screening
amplification factor of approximately six is considered to be appropriate for panels
up to 36 in. in width (extrapolation to wider panels may be possible but the data
base was limited to widths 36 in. or less).

4.6 CONCLUSIONS

The use of GERS as a screening criteria for plant relay evaluations requires the
knowledge of in-equipment response spectra at the mounting point of the relay within
an enclosure or on a flexible panel. Review and evaluation of test data, coupled
with judgment, has suggested effective amplification factors to be used as floor
spectra multipliers for estimation of mounting point spectra. These effective
broad-band amplification factors are appropriate for screening of relays in plant
evaluations which utilize broad-band spectra for relay GERS and are not to be
confused with peak amplification factors occurring at narrow-band frequencies. For
MCC enclosures, a screening amplification factor of 3.0 is recommended, while for
flexible panels, such as cabinet doors, a screening amplification factor of 6.0 is
recommended. The factor of six for flexible panels is meant to be a worst case
situation for relay screening purposes. In many cases, an in-equipment spectra can
be determined by rational analytical procedures which would reflect a lower
frequency dependent, peak kinematic amplification factor. This peak factor, in any
case, would still need a dynamic correction to compare the narrow-band, dominant
single-axis response to multi-axis, broad-band relay GERS.

* ibid, Reference 2.

4-13
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10448176
 Section 5

OVERVIEW OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRA

This section contains GERS for mechanical equipment components. The approach and
methodology is the same as that used for the electrical components described
previously. Compared to electrical equipment classes, there are fewer mechanical
equipment classes included in the data base.

Several mechanical equipment classes 1isted in Table 2-1 were excluded from this
effort because they were judged to be inherently rugged, or because data were either
not available or were limited by proprietary considerations. Those items classified
as inherently rugged include horizontal pumps, air compressors, and some HVAC
components (fans, blowers). Most importantly, there is a long operating experience
with most mechanical components in conventional power plants on both land and ships,
where they have been subjected to operational vibrations and a variety of dynamic
forces. This operating experience adds to the confidence in the inherent ruggedness
of these mechanical components. Components for which test data are limited or not
available include vertical pumps and motors, power/pilot relief valves, turbine and
diesel-driven pumps, main-steam isolation valves, and large fans. Generally
speaking, these items are too large and massive for shake table testing and have
been qualified by analysis or other means. Finally, certain items, such as control
rod drive mechanisms and other reactor equipment, are specific to particular
proprietary designs and test data are not publicly available.

Table 5-1 summarizes the results shown in this section. In the paragraphs which
follow a brief overview of the results for each equipment class included in the data
base is described. The detailed GERS packages have been written as stand-alone
documents and are included in Appendix C. GERS for spring-operated safety-relief
valves and chillers were not established. Refer to Appendix D for the detailed data
packages.

5.1 AIR-OPERATED VALVES

Air-operated valves, included in this class, have pneumatic diaphragm-type

actuators. These operators, like the electric motor operators described below, are
designed to operate the five major types of valves. Valves tested range in size
from 12- to 40-in. high with weight in the range of 50 to 500 pounds. The valves

5-1
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 Table 5-1
TYPICAL RUGGEDNESS LEVELS FOR MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT

5% Spectral
Amplitude* ZPA*
Description 3-16 Hz (g) 19L
Air-Operated Valves 7.0 4.5

Motor Valve Operators 20-22t 6.0t

Solenoid-Operated Valves 9.0 3.5

* Valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion at the attachment point
of the valve to the piping system unless otherwise noted.

t Valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion at the attachment point
of the operator to the valve.

5-2
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included in this class are 1imited to pipe sizes of 3-in. diameter or less and
operate at pressures of 2,500 psi or less. The main components of the operator are
a solenoid valve, limit switches, and a pressure regulator.

Three failures were observed in the tests contained in the data base. During
testing with high amplitude, high-frequency input motion (30 g at 100 Hz), one valve
failed to operate, and in another, the solenoid valve failed. The third failure
involved deenergized chatter of a pilot solenoid valve.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC) has reviewed their air-operated valve

qualification program. While the specific test details and data are proprietary,
they have concluded that above a 7-g spectral level there could be sufficient
deflection for some air-operated valve models that could result in binding during
valve operation.

The GERS for air-operated valves is 7.0 g with a ZPA of 4.5 g. Note that in this
case, the GERS is the response to input motion at the point where the valve is
attached to the piping system. For application details refer to the GERS package in
Appendix C.

5.2 MOTOR VALVE OPERATORS

This equipment class includes electric-driven motor valve operators which are
designed to operate the five major types of valves (gate, globe, plug, ball, and
butterfly). They range in size from 150 up to 3,500 pounds. The operator consists
of a metal housing which encloses 1 imit switches, a torque switch, an electric
motor, clutch, gears, and bearings. The valve operator is attached to the valve and
supported off of the piping system. This class covers virtually all valve motor
operators used in power plants.

No failures are reported in the test data base.

The GERS for motor valve operators is 20 to 22 g, with a ZPA of 6.0 g. It should be
noted that the GERS in this case is the response to input motion at the point where
the operator is attached to the valve. For application details refer to the GERS
package in Appendix C.

5.3 SOLENOID-OPERATED VALVES

Solenoid-operated valves are a combination of two principal components, a solenoid

actuator and a valve body with an orifice in which a disc or plug is positioned to

5-3
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control flow. The equipment in this class range in weight from a few pounds to
forty-five pounds. The valves included in the data base are intended for pipes with
a diameter of 1 in. or less and design pressures less than 600 psi. These valves
are commonly found in small process air lines or are used as pilots for other types
of valve actuators.

The data base contains reports of two failures. One concerned a valve which failed
to operate in a test program with high level, high frequency input (300 g at 100
Hz). The second case involved deenergized chatter of a valve.

WEC has reviewed their solenoid valve qualification program. This review has
identified a certain specific valve model with a slightly lower test level than
other models. This valve model number has been listed with an outlier GERS value.

The GERS for solenoid-operated valves is 9 g with a minimum ZPA of 3.5 g. For
application details refer to the GERS package in Appendix C.

5.4 DATA PACKAGES

5.4.1 Safety-Relief Valves

Safety relief valves provide a means for emergency relief of pressure in small bore
piping systems. Operation occurs when the system pressure exceeds a setpoint,
causing the valve to open. Normally it is restrained by a spring set to open at a
specified pressure. This equipment class includes safety-relief valves with
diameters of 6 inches or less and weighing up to 1,600 pounds.

In the test data base, there are no failure of valves reported. Tests indicate that
the closer the inlet pressure is to the setpoint, the lower the seismic input
required to pop the valve.

The GERS for safety-relief valves was not established due to insufficient data. The
available data is given in Appendix D.

5.4.2 Chillers

Chillers provide chilled water for HVAC systems and equipment which utilize chilled
water for cooling. In plant environments, the critical HVAC requirements are
usually associated with those locations (such as control rooms) which contain both
operating personnel and electrical or control equipment. Sizes might range from 10
tons (1 ton= 12,000 BTU) for small package units to 1,000 tons for large units. A
100-ton unit would be the nominal size for power plant applications.

5-4
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The GERS for chillers was not established due to insufficient data. The available
data is given in Appendix D.

5-5
10448176
10448176
 Section 6

REFERENCES

1. Yanev, P.I. and Swan, S.W., "Pilot Program Report Summary: Program for the
Development of an Alternate Approach to Seismic Equipment Qualification,"
prepared for Seismic Qualification Utilities Group by EQE Incorporated, San
Francisco, California, September 1982.

2. Kennedy, R.P., et al., "Use of Past Earthquake Experience Data to Show

Seismic Ruggedness of Certain Classes of Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants,"
Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel, 1991.

3. Czarnecki, R.M., "Seismic Anchorage Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Equipment,"

EPRI Report NP-5228, URS Corp./John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers, San
Francisco, California, December 1986.

4. Smith, P.O., et al., "Compilation of Earthquake Data on Equipment Anchorage,"

prepared for Electric Power Research Institute by EQE Incorporated, San
Francisco, California, June 1986.

5. Betlack, J., Carritte, R., and Schmidt, W., "Procedures for Evaluating Nuclear
Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", EPRI Report NP-7148, MPR Associates,
1991.

6. Chang, T. Y., "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Nuclear Power

Plants," NUREG 1030, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 1985
(also see attachment dated August 1985.)

7. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, "Guide for Seismic

Qualification of Class I Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations," IEEE Standard 344-1975.

8. Bell, G.L. and Pope, P.G., "Equipment Qualification Data Bank (EGDB) User's
Manual," Rev. 3, NUS Corporation, Clearwater, Florida, September, 1984.

9. Smith, C.B. and Merz, K.L., Electric Power Research Institute, "Seismic
Equipment Qualification Using Existing Test Data," EPRI Report NP-4297, ANCO
Engineers, Inc., October, 1985.

10. Bandyopadhyay, K., et al., "Seismic Fragility of Nuclear Power Plant Components
(Phases I, II, and III)", NUREG/CR-4659, Vols. 1, 2, and 3, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, June 1986, December 1987, and February 1990.

11. Kana, D.D. and Pomerening, D.J., "Correlation of Methodologies for Seismic
Qualification Tests of Nuclear Plant Equipment," SwRI-6582-002, prepared for
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Southwest Research Institute, San
Antonio, Texas, June 1983.

6-1
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12. Kana, D. and Pomerening, D., "Similarity Principle for Equipment Qualification
by Experience," NUREG/CR-5012, Southwest Research Institute, July 1988.

13. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, "IEEE Recommended Practice

for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations," IEEE Standard 344-1987.
14. Merz, K.L., "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays," EPRI Report NP-7147, ANCO
Engineers, Inc., 1991.
15. Chang, T.Y. and Anderson, N.R., "Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of
Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating
Plants", USNRC NUREG-1211, February 1987.

16. Holman, G., "Amplification of Input Motion in a Motor Control Center During
Seismic Fragility Testing", In Proceedings, Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety
Meeting, NUREG/CP-0091, Vol. 3.

17. Smith, P., "Operability-Based Amplification in Electrical Cabinets," paper

submitted for publication, 1988.

18. Bandyopadhyay, K., et al., "Dynamic Amplification of Electrical Cabinets,"

NUREG/CR-5203, Brookhaven National Laboratory, June 1988.

19. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, "Seismic Testing of

Relays, ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.98-1987.

20. USNRC Letter· (L. Marsh), dated 12 May 1989, to SQUG (N. Smith) transmitting
Technical Evaluation Report prepared by Southwest Research Institute, February
1989.

21. Kana, D. and Pomerening, D., "Determination of Modal Interaction Correction for
Narrow-Band Fragility Data", In Transactions of the 9th International
Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, JK Panel Session
(NUREG/CP-0088), July 1987.
22. Kana, D. and Pomeren i ng, D. , "A Framework for Qualification of Equipment by
Safety Margin Methodology," SwRI 8608-001, for EG&G Idaho, November 1985.

23. Horstman, N.G., et al., "Summary of the Seismic Adequacy of Twenty Classes of
Equipment Required for the Safe Shutdown of Nuclear Plants," prepared for SQUG
by EQE, Incorporated, July 1986.

24. "Generic Qualification of Rotary Hand Switches," EPRI Report NP-3095, May 1983.
25. "Correlation Between Aging and Seismic Qualification for Nuclear Plant
Electrical Components," EPRI Report NP-3326, December 1983.

26. "Seismic Ruggedness of Aged Electrical Components," EPRI Report NP-5024,

January 1987.

27. "Equipment Operability Under High-Frequency Excitation," EPRI Report NP-3946,

April 1985.

6-2
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 APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS

10448176
This appendix presents the background for certain key steps in the procedures deve-
loped for collection and evaluation of data used in obtaining a GERS. Discussed is
the specific computerized data base structure, selection of TRS data, and TRS stan-
dardization and weighting.

A.1 DATA BASE STRUCTURE

Given a test report that has met the initial screening requirements, certain data
are extracted and entered into a computer file structure, organized into "fields"
for subsequent manipulation and accessing. The data base fields provide a basic
description of the equipment item and summarize the information available. The data
base includes information concerning: the equipment descriptors; the size, weight,
and manufacturer/model code; the type of tests and test documentation; the anchor-
ages used during testing; the number of subcomponents tested (if any); the number of
TRS available; and any exceptions or comments related to performance during testing.

The general format of the data base is shown in Tables A-1 through A-3. The format
of each data field entry is unrestricted. This free format approach al lows the
evaluation engineer to accommodate a wide range of variance in test report content.
Certain information is requested and a desired format indicated; however, the eval-
uation engineer may adjust the format as required. An example data base file for an
equipment item is shown in Tables A-4 through A-6.

A.2 SELECTION OF TEST RESPONSE SPECTRA DATA

The evaluation engineer selects representative spectra for inclusion in the data
base. For an item that was qualified using multi-frequency, biaxial input motions
(IEEE 344-75 norm, Ref. A-4), a complete qualification test program will involve at
least five OBE tests and one SSE test for each plane of biaxial excitation. Thus,
a total of ten OBE horizontal and ten OBE vertical TRS are available as well as
two SSE horizontal TRS and two SSE vertical TRS. In general, the TRS of a repeated
test wi 11 be within a 10% band. Since the goal of the program is generic, the
difference in horizontal equipment orientation cannot be relevant; thus, the eval-
uation engineer must examine the set of TRS and choose the horizontal TRS which has,
in his judgment, the lowest spectral acceleration values over the test frequency
range. In a similar manner, the lowest vertical TRS is chosen. Thus, in general,
the data base contains representative TRS for both an OBE and SSE in a horizontal
and vertical direction (four TRS minimum). However, while a complete qualification
test will involve both OBE and SSE tests, often only the SSE TRS are included in
test reports as plotted data. In this case, the data base will contain only a
representative horizontal and vertical SSE TRS (two TRS minimum).

A-2
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 Table A-1
EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTOR FILE

Data Base Fields

FORM IO: (sequential file identifier)
GENERIC CLASS: (hot shutdown equipment)
SPECIFIC EQUIP TYPE: (includes functional & application data)
MANUFACT STANDARDS: (if known)
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: (coded name/number code)
SIZE LXWXH (IN): (envelope dimensions)
WEIGHT (LBS):
CG (IN): (elevation from base)
SOURCE OF INFO: (test lab, util., SQRT form)
TEST ORGANIZATION: (name or code if proprietary)
TEST PLAN: (reference document no.)
TEST REPORT: (reference document no.)
EVIRON QUAL: (description, natural or artificial aging, sequence of aging and
seismic/hydrodynamic testing)
TEST DATE: (month/yr)
INPUT DIRECTION: (single axis; biaxial: vect/indep.; triaxial: 2 or 3 indep.)
EQUIP TEST ORIEN: (s/s, f/b; 45 degree)
TEST TYPE: [description, e.g., sine, sine beat, multifrequency random, duration
(sec), total no. of SSE & OBE runs, hydrodynamic or SRV if conducted]
FUNCT MONITORED: (description)
ACCEPT CRITERIA: (description)
EXCEPTIONS: (description; accept. criteria not met, test deviations, failure
mechanisms, etc.)
RESONANT SEARCH: [frequency/damping s/s: (Hz/%) f/b: (Hz/% v: (Hz/%)]
TESTING MOUNTING: (floor or wall)
BOLT DESCRIP: [no., size, material, spacing@ depth: (in) width: (in)]
WELD OESCRIP: [no., size length, spacing@ depth: (in) width: (in)]
BASE/FRAME DAMAGE: (description, structural damage)
APPEND SIMULATED: (description, conduit entry)
NO. OF SUBCOMP: (no. of subcomponents)
NO. OF TRS: (no. of TRS files)
COMMENTS: (additional information on any of the above fields; descriptive
narrative of exceptions, failures, special anchorages, unique test fixtures
and test procedures, availability of time histories, FFT, PSO, etc.)

A-3
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 Table A-2
SUBCOMPONENT DESCRIPTOR FILE

Data Base Fields

FORM ID: (sequential file identifier linked to equipment file)

NO. SUBCOMPONENTS: (no. of same type)
GENERAL SUBCOMP TYPE: (result of aggregation)
SPECIF SUBCOMP TYPE: (include functional data)
MANUFACTUR STANDARDS: (if known)
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: (code)
SIZE LXWXH (IN): (envelope)
WEIGHT (LBS):
LOCATION (ELEV-IN): (height above base)
MOUNTING TYPE: (panel, size of screws, etc.)

A-4
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 Table A-3

TRS FILE

Data Base Fields

FORM ID: (sequential file identifier linked to equipment file)
TRS TYPE: (QBE, SSE, Fragility, SRV, Hydrodynamic)
TRS DIRECTION: (vertical, horizontal - f/b/ or s/s if fragility data)
TRS LOCATION: [base, in-equip/elevation (in)]
TRS DAMPING: (%)
1.0 HZ: (spectral acceleration, g)
2.0 HZ:
3.2 HZ:
4.0 HZ:
5.0 HZ:
6.3 HZ:
8.0 HZ:
10.0 HZ:
12.5 HZ:
16.0 HZ:
20.0 HZ:
31.5 HZ:
PK1 (HZ): [TRS maxima, (g/Hz)]
PK2 (HZ):
ZPA: (>50 Hz asymptote)

A-5
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 Table A-4
EXAMPLE EQUIPMENT DATA BASE FILE

FORM ID: BAT001

GENERIC CLASS: Batteries
GENERAL EQUIP TYPE: Rack with stationary batteries
SPECIFIC EQUIP TYPE: 26 Vdc/2-step rack with rails/3 frames per rack/13 lead acid
cells/7 cells top row/6 cells lower row/rigid connectors/polystyrene spacers between
cells
MANUFACT STANDARDS: NEMA
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: X/various
SIZE LXWXH (IN): 44.5 X 80 X 60 (est.)
WEIGHT (LBS): 4883
CG (IN): Rack, 450 lb; 2211 lb top row; 2222 lb lower row
SOURCE OF INFO: ANCO ref. file; Utility XYZ
TEST ORGANIZATION: test lab y
TEST PLAN: Y TP #541/4212/ES (9/75)
TEST REPORT: Y Report #43450-1 (12/76)
ENVIRON QUAL: XB-21 batteries were thermally aged and XB-1440 batteries were 25
years old
TEST DATE: 12/76
INPUT DIRECTION: biaxial/indep.
EQUIP TEST ORIEN: f/b, s/s
TEST TYPE: random multifrequency, 30-s duration
FUNCT MONITORED: Voltage output before, during, after; 20 amp resistive load
ACCEPT CRITERIA: No abnormal voltage or spurious operation, no structural failure
EXCEPTIONS: Battery XB-21 jar cracked & leaking after 1 SSE
RESONANT SEARCH: s/s: 11.0/10 f/b: 13.0/10 V: 29.0/10
TEST MOUNTING: rack: floor mount
BOLT DESCRIPT: 12, 1/2-13 grade 5, Depth: 4@ 12 Width: 3@ 32
WELD DESCRIP: NA
BASE/FRAME DAMAGE: none
APPEND SIMULATED: none
NO. OF SUBCOMP: 3
NO. OF TRS: 3
COMMENTS: Generic qualification program; RRS chosen as envelope of 8 plants. XB-27
not subjected to s/s input, XB-21 jar crack due to accelerated thermal aging causing
reduction in plastic (jar) tensile and impact strength; rack mounted accelerometer
on top restraint rail, f/b direction; double rails

A-6
10448176
 Table A-5
EXAMPLE SUBCOMPONENT DATA BASE FILE

FORM ID: BATOOlSC

NO. SUBCOMPONENTS: (2)
GENERAL SUBCOMP TYPE: Battery cell
SPECIF SUBCOMP TYPE: Lead calcium cell/21 plates/1545 amp-hr@ 8-hr rate; thermally
aged
MANUFACTUR STANDARDS: NEMA
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: X/XB-21
SIZE LXWXH (IN): 8.88 X 14.13 X 22.63
WEIGHT (LBS): 270
LOCATION (ELEV-IN): CG@ 44 in. (est.)
MOUNTING TYPE: Rail restraint
NO. SUBCOMPONENTS: (2)
GENERAL SUBCOMP TYPE: Battery cell
SPECIF SUBCOMP TYPE: Lead calcium cell/20 plates (est.)/1440 amp-hr@ 8 hr
MANUFACTUR STANDARDS: NEMA
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: X/XB-1440
SIZE LXWXH (IN): 13.19 X 14.13 X 22.63 (EST)
WEIGHT (LBS): 249 (est.)
LOCATION (ELEV-IN): CG@ 19 in. (est.)
MOUNTING TYPE: Rail restraint
NO. SUBCOMPONENTS: (11)
GENERAL SUBCOMP TYPE: Battery cell
SPECIF SUBCOMP TYPE: 2 ea. lead calcium cell/15 plates/1100 amp-hrs@ 8 hr rate;
2 ea lead calcium cell/29 plates/2100 amp-hrs@ h-hr rate; 2 ea. lead calcium cell/
39 plates/2100 amp-hrs@ 8-hr rate; 3 ea. lead plates/1900 amp-hr@ h-hr rate; lead
calcium cell/27 plates/2000 amp-hr@ h-hr rate
MANUFACTUR STANDARDS: NEMA
MANUFACTURER/MODEL: X/XB-15, XB-29, XB-39, XB-25, XB-27, XB-11
SIZE LXWXH (IN): 7.63, 13.19, 13.19, 10.63, 13.19, X 14.13 X 22.63
WEIGHT (LBS): 210, 367, 438, 325, 350
LOCATION (ELEV-IN): CG@ 44 in. (est.) for XB-15, XB-11, XB-29, XB-27; CG@ 19 in.
(est.) for XB-39, XB-25
MOUNTING TYPE: rail restraint

A-7
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 Table A-6
EXAMPLE OF TRS DATA BASE FILES

FORM ID: BAT001TRS2 FORM ID: BAT001TRS1

TRS TYPE: SSE TRS TYPE: SSE
TRS DIRECTION: vert TRS DIRECTION: horz
TRS LOCATION: base TRS LOCATION: base
TRS DAMPING: 1 T.RS DAMPING: 1
1.0 HZ: .8 1.0 HZ: 2 .1
2 .0 HZ: 1.8 2.0 HZ: 4.8
3.2 HZ: 7.9 3.2 HZ: 7.2
4.0 HZ: 13.2 4.0 HZ: 10. 7
5.0 HZ: 12.0 5.0 HZ: 13 .5
6. 3 HZ: 11.8 6.3 HZ: 14. 5
8.0 HZ: 9.2 8.0 HZ: 11.8
10.0 HZ: 9.5 10.0 HZ: 7.0
12.5 HZ: 9.6 12. 5 HZ: 8.5
16.0 HZ: 9. 7 16.0 HZ: 9. 2
20.0 HZ: 7.5 20.0 HZ: 13.8
31.5 HZ: 6.0 31 . 5 HZ : 10 . 0
PK1(HZ): 13.2 PK1(HZ): 14.5/6.3
PK2(HZ): 9.7/16 PK2(HZ): 13.0/20
ZPA: 3.0 ZPA: 4.2

FORM ID: BAT001TRS3

TRS TYPE: SSE
TRS DIRECTION: horz
TRS LOCATION: in-equip; 44 in
TRS DAMPING: 1
1.0 HZ: 2 .1
2.0 HZ: 4.8
3.2 HZ: 9.5
4.0 HZ: 13.0
5.0 HZ: 15.0
6.3 HZ: 18. 5
8.0 HZ: 11.0
10.0 HZ: 8.5
12. 5 HZ: 12 . 5
16. 0 HZ: 17 . 0
20. 0 HZ: 16. 5
31 . 5 HZ : 19 . 0
PK1(HZ): 18.5/6.3
PK2(HZ): NA
ZPA: 7 .5

A-8

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If TRS at internal equipment locations are included in the test reports, they are
included in the data base at the discretion of the evaluation engineer.

Each selected spectrum is represented by 12 acceleration ordinate values conforming

to frequency abscissae of 1.0, 2.0, 3.2, 4.0, 5.0, 6.3, 8.0, 10.0, 12.5, 16.0,
20.0, and 31.5 Hz. The choice of these specific values was influenced by several
factors:

• The need to impose a reasonable limit on the quantity of data collected

and stored:
• The need to adequately represent the data over the frequency range of
interest:
• The desire to perform some "smoothing" of the TRS data which are often
highly variable: and
• The fact that some test laboratories only calculate and report TRS at
these frequencies (i.e., one-third octave values).

The ZPA value is also recorded, as well as the maximum TRS ordinates and associated
frequency values.

A.3 STANDARDIZATION OF TRS DATA TO CONSISTENT DAMPING LEVEL

Test Response Spectra are reported with varying spectral damping values. Depending
upon the test specification, TRS may be reported for spectral damping levels ranging
between 1/2% to 5%. Since the objective of the current study is to develop generic
ruggedness spectra for a given equipment class, several TRS will need to be
appropriately compared. The first step of this process is to insure that all TRS
are standardized to the same damping level. The choice of a specific damping level
is arbitrary since a test input motion may be specified by a RRS associated with any
damping level. The SSRAP has utilized 5% damping in their evaluation of the SQUG
historical data. IEEE Standard 344-1975 also recommends a value of 5%, if none is
specified. Thus, it is recommended that all TRS obtained during the current study
be normalized to a spectral damping level of 5% for evaluation purposes. The raw
data obtained from the test reports and entered into the EQDB will not be altered,
however. The data base will be maintained for the damping values originally
indicated by the reviewing engineer.

The method of standardization used to compare TRS for damping values less than 5%
wi 11 depend upon the type of test input motion used. For random mu 1ti -frequency
input motions, a TRS may be standardized by the following expression:

A-9
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 (A-1)

where SAij is the spectral acceleration associated with the damping ratio Bj at
frequency fi. This relation is based upon the fact that the response of a simple
oscillator to white noise input is inversely proportional to the square root of the
damping ratio. Since some test reports include spectra for a range of damping
values, the validity of Equation A-1 as a conservative method of standardization
may be checked. Figure A-1 compares an actual TRS associated with 5% damping with
a standardized (according to Equation A-1) 2% damped TRS extracted from a test
report which included both TRS for the same test run.

In the high frequency region, the use of Equation A-1 may result in values of nor-
malized spectral acceleration which are less than the ZPA of the TRS. Since this
is not a rational result, the normalized spectral acceleration is restricted in the
high frequency region by:

SAi 2 ' ZPA (A-2)

where the high frequency region is defined, in general, as frequencies greater than
the frequency associated with the maximum spectral ordinate.

For sine dwell and sine sweep testing, TRS are not usually plotted. For this study,
the TRS will be estimated by:

where Ai is the input acceleration amplitude for frequency, fi, and 8 2 is the chosen
value of damping for normalization.

For sine beat testing, the amplification of an input motion by the system under test
depends upon both the damping and the number of cycles per beat. For this study,
the TRS will be estimated by:

SA.1 2 = (af) A.1 (A-4)

Figure A-2 shows amplification factors (af) for sine beat tests [A-3].

A.4 WEIGHTING OF STANDARDIZED TRS DATA

The basis for evaluation of a test procedure is the IEEE-344 norm of biaxial/random
input motion. For equipment test programs that utilize single-axis testing and/or

A-10
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 8 -----...----.---,.--,--.-,....,...,----..,....-....------

-Cl

s:: 5 Actual
....
0 TRS 2%
.µ
n:,
Damping
~
a,
,-
a, 4
u
u
<(
,-
n:,
~
.µ 3
u
a,
0..
V)

2
SAS = 1.02/.05 X SA
= 0.63 SA
1

0 '-----'--_.___,_..................,j...,_...__ _.i....._.i........1
1 10 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)
Figure A-1. Example comparison of actual TRS
to standardized TRS

A-11

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 Il
.
Ii
I
}
r
b

s 10 IS

t. percanl GI critic,1 <ll~inc)

Figure A-2. Vibration magnification at sine-beat

quasi-resonance (Reference A-3).

A-12
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narrow-band (i.e., sine dwell or sine beat) input motions, a qualitative weighting
of TRS data is necessary in order to provide comparison to TRS data for equipment
tests that utilize biaxial/random input motion.

Narrow-Band Input

The response of a system {equipment item) to narrow-band input is predominantly at

the forcing frequency of the narrow-band {sine) input. Thus, no cross-coupling of
modal response can occur. A simple qualitative weighting parameter is used for
this case:

{A-5)
where the parameter a is a combined weighting factor which is utilized to account
for both the absence of multi-mode response and the variance of RMS response in
narrow-band testing. References A-1 and A-2 suggest that a value of a 1= 0.7 - 0.85
be utilized for multi-mode interaction. Reference A-5 suggests that a value of
a 2 = 0.7 - 0.85 be utilized to account for variable RMS severity. A combined value
of a= a 1a 2 = 0.7 is utilized in this study.

Single-Axis Input

Assuming that equal horizontal and vertical input motions are used in biaxial test-
ing, then each input direction contributes 0.707 of input motion amplitude to the
biaxial vector resultant motion. Thus, for single-axis testing, a qualitative
weighting procedure would be:

{A-6)

where y is the directional weighting factor utilized to account for the absence of
simultaneous biaxial input. A value of y = 0.7 is utilized in this study.

Note that the weighting factors a and y are independent. For the case of narrow-
band, single-axis input, the weighting factor is {ay).

A.5 REFERENCES

A-1. Kana, D., et al, "A Research Program for Seismic Qualification of Nuclear Plant
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment," NUREG/CR-3892, Southwest Research
Institute, Aug. 1984.
A-2. P. Ibanez et al, "A Comparison of Experimental Methods for Seismic Testing of
Equipment," Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1973.

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A-3. Fischer, E.G. and Wolff, F.H., "Comparison of Fatigue Effects in Simulated and
Actual Earthquakes," Experimental Mechanics, pp. 531-538, December 1973.
A-4. Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Guide for Seismic Qualifi-
cation of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,
IEEE Standard 344-1975.
A-5. Kana, D. and Pomerening, D., "Similarity Principle for Equipment Qualification
by Experience," NUREG/CR-5012, Southwest Research Institute, July 1988.

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 APPENDIX B
TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

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This appendix describes interview with three test directors, Mr. George Shipway
(B.1), Mr. Gerald J. Endler (B.2) and Mr. Paul IMl'lez (B.3). The results of the
interviews are summarized in Section 2.5.

B.1 TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEW NO. 1

Interview with Mr. George Shipway, Wyle Laboratories, March 21, 1986. Mr. Shipway
has been responsible for overseeing much of Wy le' s seismic test work for the past
twenty years. Wyle has performed a large number of seismic qualification tests for
manufacturers and utilities.

B.1.1 Test Anchorages

Were any revised?

Base Anchors:
In the early days of testing, say 1968-1970, many items had sheet metal
bases. These would tear and had to be reinforced to survive the tests.
Component Anchors:
Equipment based on special designs was better than "off-the-shelf" types
where there was competition between multiple vendors and a consequent
"cutting of corners" to reduce production costs. For heavy components, it
was sometimes necessary to reinforce panels where they were mounted, to
avoid mechanical problems.
Any problems encountered?
Commercial grade cabinets and Motor Control Centers (MCC) were often not
designed for seismic loads. Sheet metal sections, particularly in cabinet
bases, would sometimes crack or tear. This began to change around the
mid-1970s with the impact of IEEE-344 on testing practices.
Standard practices used?
In our laboratory, we follow IEEE-344 guidelines unless requested to do
otherwise by the client. We used grade 8 bolts. There has been a roughly
equal division between bolted and welded connections in our tests.
Any indications that equipment was installed differently from test conditions?
Generally we have no knowledge of how the equipment was later installed in
the field.

B.1.2 Effects of Testing

Any fatigue effects?
Fatigue effects were not common. It is generally believed that IEEE-344
leads to overtesting, since five OBEs and two SSEs are given, typically in

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 two directions. Thus if fatigue was a problem, it would appear during the
tests. In the early days, up to the mid-70s, some items were tested and
then installed, but this practice diminished later on, for fear that the
fatigue life may have been shortened but more important because of
radiation and temperature aging. The OBEs were important where structural
considerations mattered, but typically were unimportant for functional
considerations, which were dominated by the SSE part of the tests.
Effects due to simulated appendages, mounting conditions, etc.
Appendages were not often simulated. Interaction with other components
was seldom simulated. For example, back entry cables into electrical
enclosures were not tested, not examined. There is language in a pending
revision to IEEE-344 which says that "interfaces shall be simulated."
Other observations?
Just the concern that there is no certain way to insure that equipment
is installed in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements, and that
manufacturer's installation guidelines adequately reflect the "as-tested"
conditions.

B.1.3 Modifications During Tests

Were any contemplated?
We should define modifications. We generally followed the IEEE-344 guide-
lines, which, loosely paraphrased, state that normal and obvious
"maintenance" which would be done in a plant should be done during
testing. This means bolts obviously loose would be tightened, etc.
Excluding "maintenance" items, other modifications occurred occasionally,
i.e., in 10% of the tests. Examples might be to reinforce a panel, or
stiffen a cabinet.
Any made?
See above. In a few instances, we could look at an object brought in for
testing and see that it had a flimsy sheet metal base. We'd tell the
customer, "that isn't going to make it." Then we'd suggest some ways to
beef up the base so it would pass, they'd modify the item, and then we'd
test it. I must stress that this was in the very early days, before much
testing had been done.
What was the effect?
Generally it was to stiffen support points.
Production revisions as a result?
There were a few that we knew about, but they were rare. There may have
been others we do not know about. One examp 1e, of which we had a few
cases, was where the object failed the initial tests. The tests were
cancelled, and later the customer returned with a modified item which was
then tested and a report issued. This may have happened in 2-3% of the
tests we did.

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Are the modifications documented?
We always documented any modifications we made or that were made with our
knowledge. This is in the test reports. There may be cases where the
customer has taken our test report, added their own interpretation, and
issued a summary to their customer. Of course, we have no way of tracking
theses cases. There were a few cases where the customer did his own
performance monitoring, and we simply provided the seismic excitation. We
have no way of confirming or denying the performance in these cases.
Again, this was not common and occurred where the product had some special
performance requirement, or possibly required special instrumentation.

B.1.4 Special Insights Into Failure Modes

Electrical failures?
By far the most common were Cijses of relay chatter.
Mechanical failures?
The most common were cases of structural rigidity and survivability,
bases, mounting points, etc. as described above.
Other?
None that come to mind. There may have been a few. I know of no aging-
related failures. That· is, no seismic test items that failed seismic
tests because they had been aged. Lots of items failed age tests, but
this is a different story.
Most Common types?
Relay chatter, followed by mechanical problems with support points.

B.1.5 Equipment Modifications Following Tests

Any known?
These were principally strengthening structural support points, as
described above, and replacing relays which chattered.
Changes to support points?
This would be a major category. Before the advent of seismic design
knowledge, support points were designed principally for vertical loads
and did not have sufficient lateral resistance.
Other?
None come to mind.
Any instances of items failing tests being substituted by another which sub-
sequently passed?
A few, as mentioned above. However these were generally predictable. I
don't think there are a lot of examples which would lead one to worry that

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 there is a lot of equipment in older plants which has been tested and
subsequently been redesigned for the newer plants, and therefore we should
worry about it. There may be a few instances of this, but I believe it is
relatively rare.

8.2 TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEW NO. 2

Interview with G. J. Endler, March 20, 1986. Mr. Endler's comments reflect his ex-
perience performing seismic qualification tests for a wide variety of air filtration
equipment while in the employ of the Farr Company. Both mechanical and electrical
components were tested. As this interview demonstrates, some vendors used testing
in combination with design to come up with qualified products. (This typically
involved testing of prototypes, rather than final production models.) Farr Company
was in a different position from manufacturers with standard products who were
trying to get those products qualified, since each of Farr's systems was uniquely
designed. ( Farr had a few products, such as HEPA and carbon filters, which were
"standard" components.

B.2.1 Test Anchorages

Were any revised?
Remember, these comments are from the perspective of a manufacturer who
was testing products. It was routine to redesign and reinforce bases.
This came about because of suppliers who didn't recognize the significance
of seismic design requirements in the early '70s. It took about five
years to get this corrected, by sending components which didn't make it
back to the suppliers. After that, they met our requirements.
Any problems encountered?
There are two categories here: base anchors and component anchors.
Base Anchors:
There were two principal types of problems. Bolts failed in shear, or
thin sheet metal sections (11 gauge or less) had to be reinforced. Any
components with vibration isolation bases were modified to get rid of the
isolators.
Component anchors:
These were principally panels in cabinets, for example control panels, to
control electric heaters containing relays, contactors, etc. It was nec-
essary to stiffen panels inside the box (panels supporting the compo-
nents). These were panels 34 in. x 34 in. to 60 in. x 60 in. (Hoffman
boxes).
Standard practices used?
Most of the connections were bolted, some large system bases were welded
to embedded steel in concrete.

B-5
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Any indications that equipment was installed differently from test conditions?
In our situation, we installed the equipment in approximately 60% of the
plants, and provided the anchor bolts. In these instances, the equipment
was installed properly. In the remaining cases the utility or the A/E
installed the equipment, and typically fol lowed our installation
recommendations, although they may have used different style anchor bolts.

B.2.2 Effects of Testing

Any fatigue effects?

Once designs were final, there were no observed fatigue problems. If they
occurred, it was usually within 1-3 OBEs (not common).
Effects due to simulated appendages, mounting conditions, etc.
Typically did not simulate interactions with other equipment. In some
case, (test of a transformer), the device failed due to a simulated
external electrical connection, which caused a fatigue failure of a
cooling connection.
Other observations?
None.

B.2.3 Modifications During Tests

Were any contemplated?
Modifications were uncommon--perhaps 10 to 20% of the tests, at most.
Any made?
Usually to replace a failed component with a more rugged version.
What was the effect?
Improved product reliability.
Product revisions as a result?
We learned that certain manufacturers made more rugged components. If
tests revealed problems with certain manufacturers' components, they were
changed to more rugged ones from another manufacturer and the item was
retested. The substitute components were then used in all production
models.
Are the modifications documented?
They were documented in "production and engineering work orders."

B-6
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B.2.4 Special Insights Into Failure Modes
Electrical failures?
The most common was relay chatter.
Mechanical failures?
Shear fa i 1ure of bo 1ts, usua 11 y due to using the wrong grade or under-
sized. Sheet metal shear or tear, followed by vibrating panels. Our
approach was to discover these problems in testing, fix them, retest, and
then go into final production. Defects of this type never went into the
field.
Other?
An unexpected failure was in MCC, when the spark shields dropped out of
the contactors and interfered with the contactor/relay operations.
Most common types?
See above.

B.2.5 Equipment Modifications Following Tests

Any known?
As was mentioned above, our tests were made on prototypes. When tests
revealed the need for product changes, these were incorporated in the
final design and in products which went in the field. The prototypes that
were tested were not installed in service.
Changes to support points?
See above. Changes to mounting bolts and stiffening of panels were the
main types of changes.
Other?
In a few cases relays were switched to types which did not exhibit chatter
in the operating seismic frequencies.

Any instances of items failing tests being substituted by another which sub-
sequently passed?
See above. There were instances of purchased components installed in
large systems (relays or small electrical components) which failed. These
were replaced with more rugged types, retested, and then qualified.

B.3 TEST DIRECTOR INTERVIEW NO. 3

Interview with Dr. P. Ibaf\ez, May 14, 1986. Dr. Ibanez's comments reflect his
experience performing seismic qualification tests for a wide variety of electrical
and mechanical equipment while in the employ of the ANCO Engineers, Inc. As a con-

B-7
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sulting engineering company, ANCO performed seismic qualification testing, and also
performed research aimed at increasing seismic ruggedness of various types of
safety-related equipment, and did fragility testing where test levels were deliber-
ately increased to levels where failures occurred.

B.3.1 Test Anchorages

Were any revised?
None were ever revised in approximately 100 tests.
Any problems encountered?
Only in one test, which was an emergency light fixture tested with toggle
bolts holding it to a plaster board support. The bolts pulled through the
plaster board, which was replaced with a steel plate. The same toggle
bolts were used and the object passed. The test report stipulated that
the light was to be installed with a steel plate.
Standard practices used?

Most of the connections were bolted, a few were welded. In some cases we
designed the anchors, in others the customer specified them (bolt sizes
and locations, etc.).
Any indications that equipment was installed differently from test conditions?
Not from our tests. I (PI) know of one instance where this was the case,
where we were called in to evaluate the problem. It was a government
nuclear facility, where MCCs and switchgear-type cabinets had been
installed on metal base plates different than those used in qualification
tests. In-situ tests demonstrated adequacy of the as-built supports.

B.3.2 Effects of Testing

Any fatigue effects?
Fatigue was sometimes a problem, especially where several tests were run
to match spectra.
Effects due to simulated appendages, mounting conditions, etc.
We had limited experience with this. On a few occasions masses were added
to cabinets to simulate equipment.
Other observations?
None.

B.3.3 Modifications During Tests

Were any contemplated?

B-8
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 Yes
Any made?
1. In one series of tests on electrical penetrations, a pressure gage
broke off, due to fatigue of a long slender pipe nipple. The nipple
was shortened, the gage replaced, and the test completed successfully.
This is considered a test set-up problem, not a failure of equipment.
2. In a test of a safety parameter display computer, a loose part (a
screw) fell down on a power connection and shorted, causing the system
to malfunction. The test was stopped, the screw was removed, and the
test repeated, with the computer passing.
What was the effect?
1. Loss of pressure in the EPA.
2. Lost of power.
Product revisions as a result?
No. See Item B.3.5 for a product modification example.
Are the modifications documented?
Yes. The examples described above are in the test reports.

B.3.4 Special Insights Into Failure Modes

Electrical failures?
I could not say any one type was most common. We observed relay chatter
and electrical shorts, as stated above.
Mechanical failures?
I described these previously.
Other?
An unexpected failure was the case of the loose screw, described above.
Most common types?
See above.

B.3.5 Equipment Modifications Following Tests

Any known?
In tests on an outdoor high-voltage disconnect, the equipment passed the
tests without damage or failure. Post-test inspection revealed a hairline
crack in a casting ( in a right angle sharp corner). To correct the
problem, the manufacturer agreed to redesign the casting to provide a
fillet radius to reduce stress concentration at the sharp corner.

8-9
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Changes to support points?
ANCO has done extensive testing of cable trays. These were not qualifi-
cation tests but rather were part of a research program to push fragility
limits to higher levels. The test program showed that detailing of
supports was critical in that careful attention to details often permitted
higher levels of response to be achieved without failure. Examples
include such things as use of strut rather than threaded rod; use of two
clips per strut; location of braces; choice of manufacturer for such items
as locknuts. Minor changes in the connections between trays and trapezes
made dramatic improvements in ruggedness.
Other?
No.
Any instances of items failing tests being substituted by another which sub-
sequently passed?

There was the instance of a new lightning arrestor being tested after the
first one failed during a 130% over-test. The retested arrestor passed a
105% test.

8-10
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 APPENDIX C

GERS PACKAGES

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 GERS PACKAGES

This appendix contains fifteen GERS packages for the electrical equipment, and
mechanical equipment classes identified in the report, Sections 3 and 5. The GERS
package for each equipment class is a separate stand-alone document which may be
accessed using the following index:

Equipment Identification
Air-Operated Valves AOV.4 C-3

Batteries on Racks BAT.4 C-9

Battery Chargers BC. 4 C-18

Contactors and Motor Starters CON.3 C-24

Distribution Panels DSP.8 C-30

Electrical Penetration Assemblies EPA.3 C-37

Inverters INV.4 C-43

Manual Control Switches SWT.1 C-48

Motor Control Centers MCC.9 C-52

Motor Valve Operators MOV.5 C-63

Solenoid-Operated Valves SV.3 C-68

Switches PS.5 C-73

Switchgear MVS/LVS.7 C-80

Transformers TR.4 C-95

Transmitters PT.4 C-99

C-2
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 GERS-AOV.4

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
AIR-OPERATED VALVES

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

December 1990

C-3
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 GERS-AOV.4
12/1/90

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for air-operated valves is presented

and discussed in the following sections.

It should be noted that the GERS, in this case, is the response to input motion at
the attachment point of the valve to the piping system.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is air-operated valves with
spring-opposed diaphragm-type pneumatic actuators which are designed to operate both
gate and globe valves. They range in size from 12 to 40 in. in height (pipe center-
line is reference position) with weight up to 400 to 500 lb. The valves within this
class are for 3 in. or less diameter pipe size with design pressures less than 2,500
psi. A pneumatic actuator generally consists of a reinforced rubber diaphragm
enclosed in a steel housing. The valve stem and diaphragm are in contact with one
another so that any diaphragm movement results in valve movement. A solenoid valve
controls the admission of high pressure air (100 to 150 psi) to the diaphragm
housing. A return spring supplies sufficient counter-force to close or open the
valve when air pressure is not pushing on the diaphragm. Depending on whether the
return spring pushes the diaphragm upward or downward, and also whether the fluid
flows upward or downward through the valve seat, the actuator is cal led "air-to-
close" or "air-to-open". The yoke of this class of pneumatic actuator is an
integral part of the unit which is directly bolted to the valve bonnet. The valve
body, bonnet, and yoke material is carbon steel. The active components of the
actuator are the solenoid valve, limit switches, and a pressure regulator, all of
which are yoke-mounted appurtenances. The preferred mounting position of the valve
is with the actuator vertical and above the valve body. This equipment class covers
virtually all air-operated diaphragm valves used in small bore power plant piping
systems.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

3.1 Qualification Testing

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data for seven sets of tests conducted on either valves with

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attached air operators (5 tests) or on the active components of the operators (2

tests). The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1973. Six different
models from three manufacturers are represented in the data. Operators ranged in
weight from 200 to 350 lb.

Tests have been performed with random, independent biaxial or single-axis input
motions, or single-axis sine dwell tests. Vibration aging sine sweep tests are
usually conducted at 0.75 g input levels from 5 to 100 Hz for durations up to 90
minutes. For seismic qualification, however, the common practice used by the valve
industry is static load testing of a valve and operator for an effective accelera-
tion level (applied force divided by valve/actuator weight). Valve operability is
demonstrated during the static load application. This procedure is justified when
the natural frequency of the valve/actuator combination is 33 Hz or greater. Since
it is demonstrated that the valve/actuator is rigid for seismic excitation, the
assembly is qualified by separate dynamic tests of the active components (solenoid
valve, limit switches, and pressure regulator). Two of the data base tests are of
this type. While IEEE-382 recommends dynamic testing of entire valve actuators,
very few tests of pneumatic actuators are conducted. The test data base contains
five tests of complete valve/actuator assemblies. Two of these tests used indepen-
dent biaxial inputs while three used single-axis inputs. Valve function was checked
both during and after the test motion. The test reports indicated that the valve
components were aged, however details were not discussed.*

Three failures were noted in the data base tests. Functional valve failure was
noted in one biaxial test and a solenoid valve failure was noted in another biaxial
test of the pilot solenoid only. Both of these tests were conducted in a military
program using input motions which contained high frequency content (e.g., 30 g at
100 Hz). Oeenergized chatter of a pi lot solenoid valve was noted during another
test conducted as part of a sine input fragility test program.

3.2 NSSS Supplier Review

A major supplier (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) of nuclear plant air-operated

valves has conducted a review of their valve qualification program. While the

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

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specific test levels and details are proprietary, this review has indicated that the
subsequent reevaluation of many valves, originally qualified based on static testing
(i.e., an assumed natural frequency greater than 33 Hz), has shown that the valves,
as installed, have natural frequencies within the 12-16 Hz range. The lowest static
test level for these air-operated valves that have turned out to be flexible is
approximately 7 g.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) used to construct the GERS. Both success and failure data are
compared in Figure 1. The Required Response Spectrum (RRS) suggested in IEEE-382 as
being an envelope of the requirements of most of the U.S. nuclear plants has been
included in Figure 1 for comparison. The GERS is lower in the low frequency range
(< 16 Hz) and higher in the high frequency range(> 16 Hz) when compared to the RRS
of IEEE-382. This high frequency region of the GERS conforms with the single fre-
quency (sine) test level of 4.5 g suggested in IEEE-382. (It should be noted that
this 4.5 g level is often used as a static-load level in valve qualification). The
7 g GERS level accommodates the lowest static test load noted for flexible valves
(< 16 Hz). The separate tests conducted on active valve components are also
included in Figure 1. These are the TRS for qualification of rigid valve operators.
The GERS is the response to input motion at the attachment point of the valve to the
piping system. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was equal
to the horizontal input motion; thus the GERS presented is valid for equal vertical
and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to air-operated valves, the following criteria must be verified.

• The GERS is for the attachment point of the valve to the piping system,
however, the valve/pipe interface is not covered by the GERS. A sepa-
rate evaluation must assure that the valve and operator will not impact
on surrounding structures and components as a result of pipe flexibi-
lity.

• The valve actuator and yoke must be supported by the pipe without inde-
pendent brace or structure support unless the valve and adjacent pipe
are immediately supported or braced to a common structure.
• The air-operated gate or glove valve must have a spring-opposed
diaphragm-type pneumatic actuator.

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• The nominal pipe size of the valve must be within the range of 1-3 in.

• The valve body, bonnet, and yoke must all be carbon steel. Cast iron
components are not covered by the GERS.

• The overall height of the valve (pipe centerline to top of the diaphragm
housing) does not exceed 40 in.

• The air supply line is not covered by the GERS.

C-7
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 28 GERS-AOV.4
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28
Sin• DweN
D •-•n•rolaeo Cll1tter
24

22
AIR
OPERATED II
VALVES
20 •• •
Solenolo 111 V1lv• Functlonel F1llur•

--
at

z
18
on Yoke
Mounting
J-------
,' I
• I' I
2
... I
I\
\ I
I

18 I 'I
C
CIC I -
...
Ill
Ill I
I
I S0l1no1o Valve F1llur•

u 14
u
C
...
C 12
...u
CIC

Ill I GERS
A, 10 I
I
co
'·~
I •
IEEE 382

8
I \
•
4 I
·-1--.
I
I

ZPA
Diaphragm
FREQUENCY (HZ) Housing

Solenoid
Valve
Pressure
Regulator
Yoke Limit
Switch
Valve Body

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS to TRS Data

C-8
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 GERS-BAT.4

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
BATTERIES ON RACKS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

August 1986

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for stationary batteries (lead-

calcium type) on racks is presented and discussed in the following sections. Lead-
antimony batteries are not included within this equipment class.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is storage battery sets of
the lead-calcium type supported on racks with rail restraints. Each battery set
consists of multiple lead-acid cells (nominal 2 volts each) interconnected by rigid
bus connectors. Each cell contains several lead-calcium plates and is housed in a
plastic jar. Rows or groups of cells are connected by flexible bus connectors. The
racks have either two-step or single-tier configuration with longitudinal x-braces
and must be anchored to a supporting structure. The validation of anchorage ade-
quacy requires an independent evaluation. The racks have rail restraints and there
are snug-fitting spacers between the cells and, if needed, shims between the cells
and rails. This equipment class covers virtually all stationary lead-acid battery
cells used in power plants. The checklist, given in Section 5, can be used to
screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a wide range of stationary lead-calcium storage
batteries. Seventeen OBE/SSE qualification tests conducted on lead storage bat-
teries supported on racks with rail restraints are included in the data base. The
ear 1i est test in the data base was conducted in 1972. Rack configurations repre-
sented in the data base are two-step, multi-cell and single-tier, three-cell racks.
Thirty-five different models distributed among the three major manufacturers are
represented in the data set. In total, over 150 separate cells were subjected to a
rack-mounted seismic environment. The individual cell weight was within the range
of 150 to 550 lb. Included in the data are generic test programs conducted by each
of the three manufacturers to qualify their cel 1/racks to sufficiently high input
levels and eliminate the need for any additional qualification effort for specific
nuclear applications. Both bolted and welded rack anchorage were utilized to attach
the racks to the shake table in the test programs. Tests were performed with both

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new and aged specimens. Both artificial (thermal) and natural (actual service) aged
specimens were tested. However, all manufacturers have had difficulty with
artificially aged cells failing prematurely (cracking and intermittent voltage
output) due to material degradation caused by accelerated aging procedures which use
excessively high temperatures. Thus, in some cases, naturally aged cells were
removed from service and utilized in the test programs. The minimum age of
naturally aged cells in the test programs was ten years. No naturally aged cell
weighed more than 450 lb.

Tests were performed using random, independent, biaxial inputs. The vertical/
horizontal input ratio was within the range of 1 .0 to 0.67 for· the frequency band 3
to 100 Hz with an average ratio of approximately 0.80. The natural frequencies of
the battery/rack systems were measured and found to be within the range of 8-12 Hz
(horizontal) and 20-30 Hz (vertical). Acceptable battery performance was defined
for all tests to be the ability to deliver rated current voltage during or after
the tests without intermittent output. In a typical test, voltage and current for
an artificial load was monitored. Post-test discharge capacity was required to be
at least 80% of rated capacity as specified in applicable industry standards for
battery performance (IEEE Standard 535).

Performance exceptions and damage noted in the tests were limited to propagation of
existing (i.e., prior to test) jar cracks, a flame arrester that cracked in cell
shipment, cracking of artificially aged plastic jars, intermittent voltage output,
and failure to achieve post-test 80% capacity for artificially aged cells. The
exceptions concerned with pre-test defects were not considered as failures; however,
the issue of artificially aged specimens developing cracks, demonstrating inter-
mittent voltage output, and not meeting post-test capacity cannot be evaluated
without further information. For purposes of constructing a GERS, the exceptions
associated with artificially aged cells are considered failures. A failure in one
test showed the importance for proper placement of spacers and shims between indi-
vidual cells and between cells and racks to prevent independent motion of the cells.
In this test, a gap between two cells and an adjacent spacer allowed a cell to shift
and locally crush the spacer. The cell then impacted the restraints, which resulted
in intermittent voltage output.

A recent USNRC sponsored seismic test program utilized batteries removed from actual
nuclear pl ant service. The age of these battery ce 11 s was ten years or greater.

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These tests were conducted using, independent, triaxial inputs. Because the ratio
of vertical-to-horizontal motion was much higher than used in qualification testing,
these data were not included in the qualification test data base. The test results
from this test program are discussed in the attached appendix.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

The seventeen TRS in the qualification data base were used to construct the GERS.
Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for which the test batteries performed satisfactorily. No cell
weighed more than 450 lb within this group of successful tests. While some manu-
facturers have qualified their batteries to 15-and 20-year life, one manufacturer
has batteries qualified to only a 10-year life. Thus, to apply the battery GERS to
all manufacturers, the service life of the battery cells must be limited to ten
years or less. Figure 2 compares the GERS to TRS data for which failures occurred.
The GERS shown in Figures 1 and 2 is lower than the envelope of satisfactory data
and accommodates the failure data. As discussed in the attached appendix, the test
results from the USNRC research program are not in conflict with the GERS. The
vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was equal to or greater than
two-thirds of the horizontal input motion; thus the GERS presented is valid for
concurrent vertical motion which is two-thirds or less of the GERS levels indicated.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to stationary batteries, the following criteria must be verified.

• The battery cells are lead-calcium, weighing 450 lb or less. For cells
which weigh more than 450 lb, it may be possible to demonstrate simi-
larity of cell construction to cell models from the same manufacturer
which weigh 450 lb or less.

• The battery eel ls have been in service for ten years or less. For
batteries which do not meet this age criterion, it may be possible to
demonstrate a greater service life depending upon the manufacturer and
model (review of manufacturer's submittals is sufficient).

• The batteries are supported on two-step racks or single-tier racks

which have longitudinal x-braces as supplied by the battery manufac-
turer (review of manufacturers' submittals is sufficient). The bat-

C-12
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teries are restrained by double side and end rails, symmetrically

placed with respect to the cell center-of-gravity.*

• There are snug-fitting crush-resistant spacers between the ce 11 s and

the rails are snug against the cells (with shims, if needed).

• The rack must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be eva-
luated.

* For racks which do not meet the rack criteria exactly (for example, a custom-made
rack or a rack with single rails), it may be possible to utilize engineering
judgment and/or analysis to demonstrate equivalency to rack in the data base.
The evaluation must demonstrate, for example, that a custom rack has a natural
frequency which is within (or greater than) the range of frequencies noted for
racks in the data base. For racks with single rails, the evaluation must demon-
strate that a single rail wi 11 hold the cells in place preventing significant
movement of one eel 1 relative to an adjacent eel 1. If an analysis is conducted
the GERS may be assumed to be at the battery center-of-gravity and for screening
purposes compared to the calculated amplified rack motion instead of the floor
required response spectrum.

C-13
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 GERS-BAT.4
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TRS : 5'1ft DAMPING
STATIONARY BATTERIES
9 ON RACKS

Q
8 w
I-
fl)
w
a:
w ...w
fl) I-

7
a:
:)
I-
Q ......
fl)

0 w
0 :I! 0
...< ...0 ...0
:)
z
z 8 < ci ci
Q :I! z z
I-
<
a: w 1 3
...ww 5
0
0
<
...< V
X
1
8
8
12
a: 4
l-
ow
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3 X 3 8
V 2 8
w 1 3
V 2 8

2
V 4 12

X 2 12

V 3 24
w 1 3
w 2 8

15 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (Hz) (33-100 Hz)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS with TRS data: success data

racks with stationary batteries.

C-14
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 GERS-BAT.4
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10
TRS: 5'11, DAMPING
STATIONARY BATTERIES
ON RACKS
9
.......
-c -c
.,
a., Q)
VI
.--
•r-
Q) n:,
I- LL.
8 VI
s.. .-- VI VI
a., a., .-- .--
s.. -c .-- .--
.,u
::, 0
:E: u
a., Q)
u
.....!:it
-
n:, ~ ~ ~
7 ~ 0 0 0

z
::,
i::
n:,
. 0 0
0
E :E:
0
z: z: z:
.::<
a: 8 w 4 12/12
..,w
w
(,)
w 5 15/13
() w 2 6/2
1 8/1
..,< 5 V
<
a:
~
() X 1 2/1
w 4
a.
(I)

X 1 8/1
2

0 .___ _....__..................,j............1..1....&....--....- ....~

1 5 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (Hz) (33-100 Hz)

A- Jar Cracking/Post-Test Capacity Less than 80% (Artificially Aged Cells)

B- Intermittent Output
C- Jar Crack
D- Spacer Crushing
E- Jar Cracking (Artificially Aged Cell)

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS with TRS data: failure data for racks with
stationary batteries.

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APPENDIX

A detailed review of the following three reports concerned with seismic-fragi 1ity
testing of lead-calcium batteries has been conducted.

1. NUREG/CR-3293, SAN084-1737, Sept. 1984, "Test Series 1: Seismic-

Fragility Tests of Naturally Aged Class 1E Gould NCX-2250 Battery
Cells".
2. NUREG/CR-4095, SAN084-2628, March 1985, "Test Series 2: Seismic-
Fragility Tests of Naturally-Aged Class 1E Exide FHC-19 Battery
Cells".
3. NUREG/CR-4096, SAN084-2629, March 1985, "Test Series 3: Seismic-
Fragility Tests of Naturally-Aged Class 1E C&O LCU-13 Battery Cells".

These tests were conducted using independent, triaxial inputs with ratios of verti-
cal to horizontal motion which were much higher than used in qualification testing.
It should be noted that these tests were research-oriented to identify possible
aging mechanisms which might affect the seismic performance of battery cells. The
results of this research program were not included in the qualification data base
used to construct the GERS.

The EPRI GERS for batteries on racks has been compared to all test data (both single
cell and multi-cell on racks) generated by Ontario-Hydro (OH) (test conductor for
tests reported in the above reports). This comparison was made to assure that none
of the OH tests gave results that conflict with the conclusions about ruggedness one
would draw from the GERS based on qualification test data.

This review indicated that only two of the tests conducted by OH gave results that
were in apparent conflict with the GERS, in that cells in these two tests had per-
formance problems with horizontal TRS levels lower than the battery GERS level
within certain frequency ranges. Both of these tests involve three batteries sup-
ported on the same rack used for each test series. We wi 11 briefly review the
results of these two tests in the following.

In one rack test (OH Series 2), the three cells provided uninterrupted power during
the test sequence which involved increasing test input levels. These three cells,
when subjected to capacity tests after the final (highest) input level, did not
have the standard acceptable capacity level of 80% or greater. For this test, the
following is noted:

C-16
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1. The horizontal TRS had levels as low as 3 g, however, the "average"

input TRS level of this test was approximately 4 g within the 3 to
30 Hz range, which is equivalent to the battery horizontal GERS level.

2. The vertical input TRS level was not recorded; however, an accelero-
meter located on a battery cell indicates that the vertical input
level was at least twice the horizontal input level.

In the other rack test, only two of the three cells were electrically active during
the test. One cell failed electrically (voltage drop) during a high level input.
For this test, the following is noted:

1. While the test was conducted on a triaxial table, there is a consider-

able difference between the two horizontal input motions. The hori-
zontal TRS levels within certain frequency ranges differ by a factor
of 2. It would appear that this test is effectively a biaxial test
and not a triaxial test. While one input TRS had levels as low as
2 g, the average TRS level of the higher input direction is approxi-
mately 4 g, or equivalent to the battery horizontal GERS level.
2. Within the range of 15 to 30 Hz, the recorded vertical input level
is a factor of 2 greater than the higher horizontal input level.
3. Spacers (between the cells) were not used during this test.

It is concluded that the results of the two OH tests, are actually not in conflict
with the GERS. A major contributing factor for the difference in test results, in
our opinion, is that the OH tests had vertical input motion a factor of 2 greater
than the horizontal motion while qualification tests usually have vertical motions
which are approximately 2/3 of the horizontal motion. This is not to say that the
OH data is invalid and could not be used to construct a GERS. Such an alternative
GERS would be approximately 3 g within the frequency range from 4 to 33 Hz. Associ-
ated with this GERS would be a vertical GERS with a 6-g level from 12 to 33 Hz.
However, such a GERS would not represent seismic motion expected in nuclear power
plant structures.

C-17
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 GERS-BC.4

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR

BATTERY CHARGERS

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

February 1991

C-18
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for stationary battery chargers

(solid-state type) is presented and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is battery chargers suitable
for float charging of lead-acid storage battery sets. Units included range from
25- to 600-amp capacity with either single or three-phase voltage ratings of 24-250
volts d.c. and 120-480 volts a.c. All of the units utilize solid-state technology
(silicon-controlled rectifier, SCR) in both the main circuits and the power
controls. Major components are protective circuit breakers, transformers, power
supply, SCR, filter, and various alarm relays, and control circuits. All are
housed in NEMA-type floor or wall enclosures. The units must be anchored to a
supporting structure. The validation of anchorage adequacy requires an independent
evaluation. Virtually all battery chargers used in power plants for float charging
of lead-acid storage battery sets are included within this equipment class. The
checklist, given in Section 5, can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
descriptions, and test data covering a wide range of stationary battery chargers
(solid-state type). Ten qualification tests on sixteen different models from three
manufacturers ( C&D, PCP, and Exide) which represent the range of uni ts found in
actual power plants are included in the data base. It should be noted that in some
tests several models were tested at the same time. The earliest test in the data
base was conducted in 1974. Some of the units tested had cabinet design
modifications based on results from earlier shake table test programs. Both floor-
and wall-mounted configurations were tested with weights ranging from 150 to 4,300
pounds. The largest wall-mounted unit tested was under 600 pounds. All units were
mounted within NEMA-type metal enclosures with either welded or bolted anchorage.
In general, the aging status of components was not included in the test reports
abstracted.*

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

C-19
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The tests were performed using random, independent, biaxial or triaxial inputs.
Acceptable performance was defined, for all tests, to be the ability to function
without intermittent voltage output, both during and after the tests. Monitoring
during testing included relay contact chatter. Equipment natural frequencies
ranged from 8 to 20 Hz.

Exceptions noted in five items during four separate tests were limited to intermit-
tent operation, a DC breaker trip, post-test surge suppressor blow-out, an indica-
tor lamp filament failure causing a fuse to blow with resultant alarm contact
change of state (relay chatter also occurred), and an internal wire contact short.
The last exception was due to improper wiring (bare wire without insulation) during
manufacture and is not considered relevant since normal utility acceptance inspec-
tion procedures would have indicated incorrect wiring. (The bare wire was taped
and the qualification test continued.) The intermittent operation, breaker trip,
surge-suppressor, and blown fuse exceptions were considered failures for the pur-
pose of constructing a GERS.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Nine TRS in the data base were selected to construct the GERS. Figure 1 compares
the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standardized to 5% damping)
for which the test battery chargers performed satisfactorily. No battery charger
weighed more than 2,850 lb within the group of successful tests. Figure 2 compares
the GERS to TRS for which intermitent output occurred, breaker trip occurred, post-
test surge suppressor failure, and for the blown fuse failure noted above. The
GERS shown in Figures 1 and 2 is lower than the envelope of satisfactory data and
accommodates the failure data. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is
based was equal to or greater than the horizontal input motion; thus the GERS pre-
sented is valid for concurrent vertical and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to stationary battery chargers, the following criteria must be
verified.

• The charger must be a solid-state unit with SCR power controls (C&D,
PCP, or Exide) wall- or floor-mounted within a NEMA-type enclosure
(review of manufacturer's submittals is sufficient).

C-20
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• Charger size and capacity must be within the following range: 24-250
vdc, 120-480 vac, 25 to 600 amps; and weight in the range of 150 to
2,850 lb with wall-mounted units limited to 600 lb or less (review of
manufacturer's submittals or charger nameplate is sufficient).
• The charger must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be eva-
luated.
• In addition to the anchorage evaluation, the charger base support
details must be reviewed and evaluated to assure that the anchorage
forces can be transferred by the enclosure base. Base channel supports
require particular attention.

• The attachment of heavy internal components, such as power transformers,

must be inspected to insure that an adequate load path exists between
the component supports and the cabinet anchorage. In general, such
heavy components should be located in the lower half of the enclosure
height and either supported from the base or a rear panel. If cutouts
are adjacent to support points for heavy internal components, a separate
evaluation is required.

• All door latches or screwdriver operated door fasteners must be secured.

C-21
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 GERS-BC.4
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7 ------.---r-~~--r-r-ir-r-----.---.--------,

Battery Chargers TRS: 5% Damping

5
,.... ,_, ,...,Ul
QJ
co
._, ,_,QJ "C
::, 0
.l,J ::;::
§4
-~ (.)
<ll l+-1
.l,J

,_,<ll
l+-1
::,
i::
<ll
0

0
.
,...,QJ ::;:: z
QJ
(.) 3
~ N 1
,..., N 3
,_,<ll
.l,J
(.) X 1
~2
Cl)
X
X ~
N 3
V 1
1

0 ___ __
1
__,
10
___........._
..__................................................ __._ __ ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

~
LU
Figure 1. Comparison of GERS with ruggedness TRS data: success data
for battery chargers.

C-22
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 GERS-BC.4
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7
Battery Chargers TRS: 5% Damping

6
Cl)
,... rl
QJ
,...QJ "Cl
;:I 0
.µ ;:;:::
u
5 Cll
4-1
4-1
0
'""'
oO ;:I
'-' Intermittent Blown i:::
Cll 0
i:::
0
Voltage Output Fuse ;:;::: z
·.-l
.µ
,...Cll 4
QJ
rl
QJ
u
u
~
rl
3
N 1
,...Cll
.µ
u N 1
QJ
0..
U)
2 N 2

GERS

0
1 10 ZPA
Frequency (Hz) (33-100) Hz

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS with TRS data: failure data for

battery chargers.

C-23
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 GERS-CON.3

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
LOW-VOLTAGE CONTACTORS AND MOTOR STARTERS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

June 1988

C-24
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for low-voltage contactors and motor
starters is presented and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is contactors and motor
starters including both AC and DC types, with ratings of 115 to 600 volts and 10 to
100 amperes. Contactors may have from one to four poles, i.e., sets of contact
points, and may be designed for either motor or non-motor loads. They consist of a
molded body of plastic or bakelite type material, a coil and magnet assembly which
moves the movable set of main contact points, and a movable and fixed set of con-
tact points. They are frequently supplied with auxiliary contacts which are used
for interlocks to hold in the contacts or for indicator lamp operation. Auxiliary
contact configurations can include either normally open or normally closed con-
tacts. For main contact ratings up to 100 amps the size is less than 7 in. x 6 in.
x 10 in., and weights are less than 10 lb. Motor starters are referred to by NEMA
size number. Normal mounting is by bolting through a base to a metal panel.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base consists of test data for contactors and motor starter typical of
those installed in nuclear power facilities. Four manufacturers and fourteen
models are presented. Motor starters included NEMA Sizes 1 through 4. In some
cases, tests were performed on contactors mounted directly on the table and in
other cases the data are for starters i nsta 11 ed in equipment enclosures during
motor control center qualification tests. Most of the tests were performed with
independent biaxial input motion. Three tests used independent triaxial input
motion while one test ut il i zed a uni axial sine sweep. Both aged and unaged com-
ponents have been tested, and in one case the test spectrum represented combined
seismic and hydrodynamic loads.

A recent USNRC-sponsored research project has compiled motor starter fragility

test data obtained from proprietary sources. The published results of this study
provide an additional data base tor identification of contact level chatter levels.
It should be noted that since the study was conducted with the objective of obtain-
ing fragility statistics and not the demonstration of a ruggedness level for a

C-25
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 GERS-CON.3
6/1/88

given class of equipment. Thus, the method of reporting* results differs from the
methodology adopted for the establishment of a generic ruggedness level. The study
indicated that normally closed auxi 1iary contacts usually chatter at lower test
levels than normally open contacts and that main contacts chatter at high test lev-
els than auxfliary contacts. However, the average 5% spectral levels assocfated
with each type of contact chatter are within the range of 4-5 g.

Both main and auxiliary (when present) contacts were monitored during the tests.
The parameters which were monitored include contact chatter and dropout (loss of
contact continuity). Tests were performed in both the de-energized and energized
states. Acceptable performance was defined to be no contact dropout or contact
chatter.

Both main contact and auxiliary contact chatter was observed for the de-energized
state in several tests, with auxiliary contact chatter occurring at a lower input
level than the input level at which main contact chatter or momentary dropout
occurred. In all the tests there were no instances of mechanical damage to contac-
tors or starters. All items were functional following the testing.

Auxiliary contact chatter would or would not be considered a malfunction, depending

on the specific installation and function of the contactor. If the auxiliary con-
tacts were simply connected to an indicator lamp there would be no possible disrup-
tion of the load. On the other hand if the contacts were wired as interlocks to
seal in the coil energizing circuit, there is a possibility of load interruption.
Depending on the specific case, a separate appraisal would be required to determine
if this was acceptable.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS for main contacts to the horizontal Test Response
Spectra (TRS), standardized to 5% damping. These are TRSs at the base of the con-

* The USNRC study used a single parameter denoted as Average Spectral Accelera-
tion (ASA); which represented frequency dependent spectra (2% damped) averaged
over the range 4-16 Hz to indicate the test input level. For GERS construc-
tion, frequency dependent spectra (5% damped) are used.

C-26
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 GERS-CON.3
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tactor or starter. Figure 2 compares the GERS for auxiliary contacts to the TRS.
The GERS level of 4.5 g applies to either main contacts or normally open/normally
closed auxiliary contacts. Both success data (no chatter) and failure data
(chatter) are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

As can be noted from a comparison of Figures 1 and 2, main contacts tend to chatter
at a higher input level than do auxiliary contacts, but there is not sufficient
information in the database to identify differences between normally open and nor-
mally closed auxiliary contacts. The GERS spectral level of 4.5 g represents the
average spectral level from the USNRC study with sufficient precision for GERS
construction.

The vertical TRS, in all tests on which the GERS is based, is equal to or greater
than two-thirds of the horizontal input motion; thus the GERS shown in Figures 1
and 2 are valid for concurrent vertical motion which is two-thirds or less than the
GERS levels indicated.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply these GERS to low-voltage contactors or starters at their mounting points,

the following criteria must be verified.

• Contactors must be of the low-voltage type (<600 volts), and have

contact ratings less than 100 amps.
• Motor starters must be NEMA Size 1, 2, 3, or 4.
• The unit must be secured to a metal panel by mounting bolts or brackets
in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

C-27
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 GERS-CON.3
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14
ITRS: 5% Damp in
13
I
12

11

10

,..._
9 I Sine
00
Dwell
'-' 8
i::
0
o,-l

'Ill"' 7
'QJ"'
.-I
QJ 6
tJ
;J
.-I 5
Ill

''tJ""''
QJ
4
0.
CJ)

0
1 5 10 20 30 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)

Chatter

No Chatter

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS for contactor and starter main

contacts with TRS data.

C-28
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 GERS-CON.3
6/1/88

14 I
iI . ~RS: 5% Damping
I
\
13 \
I \
I
12 ; \
i i
11 I

I\
- co
.......
i:::
10

9
I \
\
0
,pf
,j.J
QI 8 I
M
QI I
a1u 7 I
~
~ 6
QI
M
,j.J

~ 5
0. --- - -
fl.I

4
I -·-·-·-·-

3 f
I ----

1 5 10 20 30 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)

Chatter

No Chatter

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS for starter and contactor auxiliary

contacts with TRS data.

C-29
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 GERS-DSP.8

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
DISTRIBUTION PANELS
(SWITCHBOARDS AND PANELBOARDS)

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

February 1991

C-30
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for distribution panels is presented

and discussed in the following sections. An attached appendix discusses a test data
base compiled by another organization.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment classes covered by the GERS presented here are switchboards and panel-
boards which are also referred to as distribution panels or load centers. These
units consist of individual molded-case circuit breakers and fused disconnect
switches housed in NEMA-type floor and wall enclosures. Units are low voltage rated
at 600 VAC (480 VAC nominal) or 250 voe. The distribution panel receives its
electrical power from the plant distribution system and distributes this power to
each of the circuit breakers and fused disconnect switches by an internal arrange-
ment of vertical and horizontal bus bars. The various external branch circuits and
devices receive power from the distribution panel by field-run electric cable. The
units in this equipment class should not contain motor starters or relays. Floor-
mounted (free-standing) distribution panels are denoted as switchboards (NEMA
Standard Publication No. PB2). The typical floor enclosure is 90-in. high, 36-in.
wide, and 20-in. deep. Wall-mounted (either flush or surface mount) distribution
panels are denoted as panelboards (National Electrical Code NFPA/ANSI No. 70).
Wall-mounted enclosures vary in size, with a nominal maximum dimension being 48-in.
high and 24-in. wide. Panelboards range in depth from 6 in. to 19 in. nominal size
with a typical depth being less than 12 in. The units must be anchored to a
supporting structure. The validation of anchorage adequacy requires an independent
evaluation. The checklist, given in Section 5, can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment description information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a wide range of both switchboards and panel-
boards. Twelve qualification tests, on twenty-one (14 panelboards, 7 switchboards)
different configurations, with weights ranging from 200 to 600 lb, from seven
manufacturers which represent the range of units found in actual power plants, are
included in the data base. The earliest test in the data base was conducted in
1974.

C-31
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A11 switch or circuit breaker uni ts were mounted within wa 11- or fl oar-mounted
NEMA-type metal enclosures with either welded or bolted anchorage. Some of the
test reports abstracted indicated that aged components were included in the units
tested.*

Eleven tests were performed using biaxial independent inputs. One test was
conducted using biaxial sine and sine-beat inputs. Several tests included both
panelboards and switchboards in the same test configuration. Acceptable
performance was defined for all tests to be the ability to function without
intermittent electrical discontinuity both during and after the tests for both
energized and deenergized conditions. Only one panelboard test indicated breaker
trip during a side-to-side input. No exceptions or failures were noted for
switches or circuit breakers during the rest of the tests included in the data set.
A base weld crack was noted after the conduct of one test series. This crack was
caused by fatigue due to repeated test motions.

A recent USNRC-sponsored research project has compiled switchboard and panel board
fragility test data obtained from proprietary sources. The published results of
this study provide an additional data base for identification of distribution panel
failure modes. The general results of the study are discussed in the attached
appendix. While the data is not directly accessible due to proprietary
restrictions, the summary results show that breakers are more susceptible to trip
in panelboards than in switchboards. This is apparently due to the difference of
bus bar configuration and support in floor- and wall-mounted units.

Manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) review of circuit breaker

qualification programs has indicated that the following molded case circuit breaker
is sensitive to vibration: Westinghouse "Quicklag" Type E circuit breakers. It is
recommended that this specific breaker be excluded from GERS coverage.

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic testing documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

C-32
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 GERS-DSP.8
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4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for which the test distribution panels performed satisfactorily.
Twelve TRS from the data base were used to construct the GERS. Several of the TRS
are for panelboards and switchboards tested together. For this equipment class two
GERS levels are specified. One GERS is for switchboards (floor-mounted distribution
panels) while the other is for panelboards (wall-mounted distribution panels). The
GERS shown in Figure 1 accommodate the test data of several manufacturers over the
frequency range of 1 to 33 Hz. A panelboard test that experienced a breaker trip is
indicated in Figure 1 by the dashed TRS. The fact that the TRS dips under the GERS
in a narrow frequency range is a servo-hydraulic test machine (and test setup)
characteristic and as such does not reflect a deficiency of the tested panels within
this narrow frequency range. The test-induced fatigue crack was not considered a
failure for GERS construction. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is
based was equal to or greater than two-thirds of the horizontal input motion; thus,
the GERS presented is valid for concurrent vertical motion which is two-thirds or
less of the GERS levels indicated.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to distribution panels, the following criteria must be verified.

• The distribution panel must contain only circuit breakers and

switches which are mounted within wall- or floor-mounted NEMA-type
enclosures. A switchboard must be free-standing and be designated as a
switchboard by the manufacturer*.

• Distribution panels shall not contain Westinghouse "Quick lag" Type E

circuit breakers (review of manufacturer's submittals and parts lists is
sufficient).

• The distribution panel must be anchored and the installed anchorage

must be evaluated.

• All door latches or screwdriver-operated door fasteners must be

secured.

* For panels which contain an occasional relay or motor starter, the GERS applies
to the remainder of the unit but does not apply to these components. These com-
ponents require a separate evaluation.

C-33
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 GERS-DSP.8
2/1/91

7
C/)
Distribution TRS: 5% Damping i:i::: ...:,
i:.:r i:.:r
Panels ®- Sine i:i::: Cl
:::>
6 )(- Sine-beat H
u ~
I
<
~
~
0
:::>
'"'
c.!l
'-'
5
~ 0
:z
i:=
0
Base Weld . ~ GERS-
'"cc
.j,J
Crack \\ ;Switchboard E 1
1-1
QI
.-I
QI
cJ
4 ( E 1
cJ A 3
<
.-I E 3
cc
1-1
.j,J
cJ D 2
QI anelboard
Ao H 3
C/) 2 Breaker
Tri
C 1
C
2

0 '-----'---..J..-.....J...---1..-'-~~'----..J..---'-'---'
1 10 ZPA I
Frequency (Hz) (33-100 Hz)

. .
qi

iiiiil~
"
~~
liii
liii
liii
liii
liii
liii
liii
liii
. [~
=si
II
.. Ii ..
liii
liii
•.
•
liii

\.

Panelboard
wall-mounted
\
Switchboard
Floor-mounted
Figure 1. Comparison of GERS with ruggedness data: operability for
distribution panels.

C-34
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 GERS-DSP.8
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APPENDIX

A detailed review of the following report concerned with the seismic fragility of
panelboards and switchboards has been conducted.

"Seismic Fragility of Nuclear Power Plant Components"

NUREG/CR-4659; BNL-NUREG-52007 Vol. 1, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, June 1986; Vol. 2, December 1987; and Vol. 3,
February 1990

The above report documents the fragility data collected to date in a USNRC sponsored
study conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The objective of the study
was to quantify the fragility of selected equipment for use in margin studies and
probabilistic risk assessments.

The purpose of the review was to reconcile the distribution panel GERS levels with
the reported BNL results. It should be noted that BNL gained access to various
data sources under proprietary restrictions, thus the data cannot be directly
reviewed. BNL uses 2% spectra averaged over the range 4-16 Hz (ASA) to indicate
the test input level. For GERS construction, 5% spectra are used. For the
discussion below, a factor of O. 63 was used to convert the BNL ASA values to
comparable GERS values.

Panel boards are distinguished from switchboards as being wal 1-mounted enclosures
containing numerous molded case circuit breakers. Switchboards also contain
numerous molded case circuit breakers but are floor mounted. In preliminary GERS
studies, both panelboards and switchboards were lumped together, denoted as
distribution panels, and given a GERS level of 5.0 g. The BNL study, however,
considered panelboards and switchboards separately and assigned different fragility
levels to each class. The additional limited BNL results for switchboards did not
conflict with the GERS level of 5.0 g. However, the BNL data base contains several
instances of spurious breaker trip in panelboards during tests at less than the 5.0
g spectral level. The spurious trips were associated with four specimens from
three manufacturers. In one specimen, the tripping unit was a 20 amp breaker and
in the other units, the tripping units were 100 amp or greater. It should be noted
that the same breaker units can be mounted in either switchboards or panelboards.

The BNL study indicates two basic fragility levels for panelboards (1) "recoverable"
and (2) "unrecoverable". The recoverable level is at the 2.5 g spectral level and

C-35
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 GERS-DSP.8
2/1/91

is associated with the spurious tripping of feeder breakers (not main breaker). The
unrecoverable level is associated with the loosening of terminals or misalignment of
a shunt trip* which required "certain adjustments in order to reset the breaker"
occurred at the 3.2 g average spectral level. Thus, it would appear that the BNL
data identifies a generic fragility level for molded case circuit breakers as
mounted in panelboards. Based on these results, a separate GERS level of 2.5 g for
panelboards has been specified. Since there is a basic similarity between
panelboard and switchboard components, it was judged that a reduced level of 3.5 g
for switchboards would be reasonable to account for similarity issues and a limited
test data base.

The BNL study provides the fol lowing explanation for the difference in behavior
between switchboards and panelboards:

"In spite of the high dynamic response in the low frequency range, switch-
boards appear to perform better electrically. None of the switchboards in
the data base experienced breaker tripping, in spite of mounting weld
damage; whereas, about one-third of the panelboards exhibited breaker trip
or a similar malfunction, even at a lower level. This apparent inconsis-
tency was discussed with experts from manufacturing companies who were
actively involved in developing and testing their products. The gist of
their explanations is as follows:"

"In both cabinets, the branch circuit breakers are mounted on the
electrical bus bars. In a switchboard, the bus bars have shorter spans,
larger cross-sections and more tie bars, and usually run horizontally.
In a panelboard, the vertical busses are supported only at the top and
bottom. Thus, although the wall-mounted panelboards are structurally
stiffer than the free-standing switchboards, the circuit breakers are
subjected to a higher dynamic response of the internal bussing system.
In addition, most breakers are more sensitive to high frequencies.
Therefore, a switchboard usually acts as a vibration isolator by filtering
the critical higher frequency content of the input, whereas, a panelboard
amplifies the vibration input which critically affects the performance of
the circuit breakers."

* An accessory which can be attached to certain molded case breakers which allows
remote tripping of the breaker.

C-36
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 GERS-EPA.3

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

November 1989

C-37
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 GERS-EPA.3
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for Electrical Penetration Assemblies

(EPAs) is presented and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is electrical penetration
assemblies suitable for low- and medium-voltage service. The specific type of EPA
considered uti 1izes a pressurized design with nozzle, header plate, modules, and
attached junction box. However, the nozzle (containment penetration) is not
supplied by the manufacturer of the EPA. In some cases, the junction boxes may be
supplied by another vendor. The low-voltage (600 V) EPAs are used for signal,
control, and low-voltage power applications while the medium-voltage EPAs are used
for power only.

The following EPA types are not included in this equipment class:

• EPAs with metal-to-glass seals;

• potted- or canister-type EPAs; and
• gasketed-type EPAs.
EPAs have two safety-related functions. One is to deliver rated current and
voltage. The second function is to ensure containment integrity. EPAs in this
equipment class have redundant double seals in each module to maintain containment
integrity. The indication of any pressure in the zone between the seals provides
positive confirmation that the pressure boundary has been maintained. Thus, even
if an EPA has a loss of pressurization, containment integrity will not be violated
with one of the seals remaining intact.

Approximately one-third of EPAs used in power plants are included in this equipment
class. The checklist given in Section 5 can be used to screen for outliers.
Sufficient seismic test data for other EPA types was not located during the data
collection effort.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data for ten sets of tests conducted on thirteen items manu-

C-38
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 GERS-EPA.3
11/1/89

factured by three vendors. The earliest test in the data base was conducted in
1974. The size range of equipment in the data set is from 12-inch nominal iron
pipe (ips) to 18-inch ips with overall test setup lengths ranging up to 16 feet. A
typical test setup consisted of a rigid pipe nozzle, a steel header plate with
epoxy modules and conductors, and a sheet metal junction box.

Tests were performed using random, independent biaxial inputs. Horizontal tests
were done in the direction of the longitudinal axis and perpendicular to the longi-
tudinal axis. Electrical continuity, insulation resistance, and pressure were
monitored during and checked after testing. The nozzle, flange, and modules are
typically stiff and exhibit no resonances below 10 Hz. In some cases, the junction
boxes had resonances below 10 Hz. All tests were performed on specimens which had
been artificially aged for both thermal and radiation effects for an equivalent
forty year life.

Three exceptions occurred during the tests. In one case, a test fixture used in
the test set-up (tube plus pressure gage) failed, resulting in a loss of pressure.
The test fixture was corrected and t'1e EPA successfully completed the test. In
another case, large displacements of the sheet metal junction box were observed in
one test setup which utilized a non-standard configuration. The junction box was
then supported as it would be in the specific plant for which the qualification
effort was being conducted, and the tests were successfully completed. Both of
these exceptions cannot be fully evaluated without further information, thus are
considered as failures for the purpose of GERS construction. In the third case,
some intermittent operation (1 millisec) occurred in a RF circuit under test. This
was found to be due to the test setup (a loose connection). It was corrected, eli-
minating the problem, and thus, is not considered relevant.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal or vertical Test Response Spectra
(TRS) (standardized to 5% damping) for which the test EPAs performed satisfac-
torily. The ten TRS in the data base were used to construct the GERS. Figure 2
compares the GERS to the TRS for which pressure gage failure occurred and for junc-
tion box deformation noted above. The GERS shown in Figures 1 and 2 is lower than
the envelope of satisfactory data and accommodates the failure data. The vertical
TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was approximately equal to the horizon-

C-39
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 GERS-EPA.3
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tal input motion. To remain conservative, the lower of either the horizontal or
vertical values were selected for GERS construction; thus, the GERS presented is
valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to electrical penetration assemblies (excluding junction boxes

and nozzles), the following criteria must be verified.

• Determine that the size and type of the medium- or low-voltage EPA match
the requirements for this equipment class.
(1) Size: 12- to 18-in. ips, overall lengths to 16 ft.
(2) Type: pressurized design with steel nozzle, header plate, and
modules.
• Ensure that the EPAs are not:
(1) EPAs with metal to glass seals,
(2) Potted- or canister-type EPAs, or
(3) Gasketed-type EPAs
• Inspect the as-installed configuration of the attached external cables
and assure that they cannot transfer loads to clamps, connectors, or
splices.
• Junction boxes require a separate evaluation.

C-40
10448176
 GERS-EPA.3
Electrical Penetration TRS: 5% Damping 11/1/89
Assemblies
12

-O ')

i::: s..
VI
.-
.....
0 QJ
s..
:::s
QJ
"C
0
+-'
C'tl +-' ::.:
s.. u
QJ C'tl 4-
4- 0
QJ
u
u
:::s
i:::
C'tl 0
.
c:( ::.: z:

C'tl
p 3
s..
+-'
u
QJ
Cl..
V)
z 2
z 2

z 1

5 10 20 30 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

LINER CABLE SUPPORT

PLATE TUBE

OUTSIDE
INSIDE CONTAINMENT
CONTAINMENT
nr--l.
I \,
.r-~~~ NOZZLE, SCHEDULE 80
STEEL PIPE

:I.ii
: ti I MODULE

Ul....J
ENCLOSURE BOX - BOTH
ENDS OF NOZZLE

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS with TRS data: success data

for electrical penetration assemblies.

C-41
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 GERS-EPA.3
11/1/89

Electrical Penetration TRS: 5% Damping

Assemblies
12

O') 10
i::
.....0
+>
n:l
s.. 8 Junction Box s..
VI
,.....
QJ
,..... Deformation QJ
s..
QJ
"C
QJ :::, 0
u
u Pressure Gage +>
u
::E:
c(
6 Failure n:l
4-
4-
0
,.....
n:l
s..
:::,
i::
n:l 0
.
+> ::E: z:
u
QJ
-
Q.
(/) 4 z 2

0 ...__ _.....__.....___.__.__._.........._._.-,----".'-'.--...__ _
1 5 10 20 30 zA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS with TRS data: failure data for

electrical penetration assemblies.

C-42
10448176
 GERS-INV.4

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
INVERTERS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

June 1988

C-43
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for inverters (solid-state type) is

presented and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is de to ac inverters

suitable for providing ac power from stationary lead-acid battery sets. Units
included range from 0.5 - 15 KVA capacity with either single-or three-phase voltage
ratings of 120 volts d.c. and 120-480 volts a.c. All of the units utilize solid-
state technology (si 1 icon-controlled rectifier, SCR), and have protective circuit
breakers, transformers, frequency control circuitry, various alarm relays and SCR
power control circuits as major components. All are housed in NEMA-type floor
enclosures. The units must be anchored to a supporting structure. The validation
of anchorage adequacy requires an independent evaluation. This equipment class
covers virtually all 120 VDC inverters used in power plants for critical power
supply. The checklist, given in Section 5, can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a wide range of inverters (sol id-state type).
Eight tests on different models with weights ranging from 300 to 2,000 lb from
three manufacturers (Elgar, Solid-State Controls, Staticon) which represent the
range of units found in actual power plants are included in the data base. The
earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1974. Some of the units tested had
cabinet design modifications based on results from earlier shake table test
programs. All units were mounted within floor-mounted NEMA-type metal enclosures
with either welded or bolted anchorage. Some of the test reports abstracted
indicated that aged components were included in the units tested.*

Six sets of tests were performed using biaxial independent inputs, one test used
triaxial independent inputs and another test included in the data set utilized vec-

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

C-44
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 GERS-INV.4
6/1/88

tor biaxial sine dwell testing at the equipment resonance frequencies. Equipment
natural frequencies ranged between 12 and 23 Hz.

No exceptions or failures were noted during the tests included in the data set.
The data collection effort was unable to locate any inverter tests for which
malfunction was noted. Acceptable performance was defined for all tests to be the
ability to function without intermittent output both during and after the tests.
Monitoring of the alarm cfrcuits (relay contacts) was performed during the tests
with no chatter noted.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS)
(standardized to 5% damping) for which the test inverters performed satisfactorily.
The eight TRS in the data base were used selected to construct the GERS. Since the
sine dwell tests were only at discrete frequencies, only single points are plotted
in Figure 1. This sine dwell data demonstrates high-frequency ruggedness. One of
the random biaxial tests was conducted for site-specific qualification at a very
low level: this test was judged not to be useful as ruggedness data. The proposed
GERS shown in Figure 1 accommodates the test data of several manufacturers over the
frequency range of 1 to 33 Hz. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is
based was equal to or greater than the horizo~tal input motion: thus the GERS pre~
sented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to inverters, the following criteria must be verified.

• The inverter must be a solid-state unit with SCR power controls (Elgar,
Solid-State Controls, Staticon) mounted within a floor-mounted•
NEMA-type enclosure (review of manufacturer's submittals is
sufficient).
• Inverter size and capacity must be within the fol lowing range: 120
voe, 120-480 VAC, o.s to 15 KVA; and weight in the range of 300 to
2,000 lb (review of manufacturer's submittals or inverter nameplate
is sufficient).
• The inverter must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be
evaluated.
• In addition to the anchorage evaluation, the inverter base support
details must be reviewed and evaluated to assure that the anchorage

C-45
10448176
 GERS-INV.4
6/1/88

forces can be transferred by the enclosure base. Base support members

require particular attention.
• The attachment of heavy internal components, such as power
transformers, must be inspected to insure that an adequate load path
exists between the component supports and the cabinet anchorage. In
general such heavy components should be located in the lower half of
the enclosure height and either supported from the base or a rear
panel. If cutouts are adjacent to support points for heavy internal
components, a separate evaluation is required.

• All door latches or screwdriver operated door fasteners must be secured.

C-46
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 GERS-INV .4
6/1/88

7 V)
s.. ,-
a., a.,
Inverters TRS: 5% Damping s..
::s
-c
0
.µ :::.::
u
6 rtl
4-
4-
0

~Sine
::s
C
rtl 0
.
D:el l ~ ~

O'l 5 AA 1
C
0
.,....
.µ
rtl
s..
a.,
4
,-
a.,
u
u
c:(
3
rtl
s..
.µ
u
a.,
c.. G 2
(/)
2
G 1
AA 1
1 G 1
T 1
L 1
0
1 10 ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS With TRS Data: Operability for Inverters

C-47
10448176
 GERS-SWT.1

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
MANUAL CONTROL SWITCHES

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

May 1988

C-48
10448176
 GERS-SWT.1
5/15/88

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for manual control switches (rotary
type) is presented and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is five models of manual
control switches which uti 1ize a multi-contact design. These models are manufac-
tured by either General Electric or Electroswitch, and are referred to by their
catalog identification: SB-1, SB-9, SBM, Series 20, or Series 24. Each model uses
a cam on a rotary shaft to open or close each contact stage. The shaft is held in
each position by a positive roller latch.

All of the above switches are bolted directly to vertical panels and range in
weight from 5 to 12 lb. Both AC and DC contacts are available, rated at 24 voe to
500 voe and 115 VAC to 550 VAC. They are categorized as control or transfer
switches and are present in many plant control circuits. The switches of this class
are used by virtually all utilities. It should be noted that the basic switch
design and materials used have remained unchanged for at least 20 years. Thus, the
vintage of models considered within the equipment class is not a concern.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The types of data for this switch subclass consist of the Standard Response Spectra
(SRS) (ANSI/IEEE C37.98/501) and sine-dwell data. The switches may have either a
maintaining ( locked or unlocked) or spring return operation as well as various
combinations of normally open (NO) or normally closed (NC) contact arrangements.
The test data covers testing conducted during all operational states on models with
several different contact configurations.

Fragility testing of switches is conducted in accordance with ANSI/IEEE C37.98/501.

This standard requires biaxial, random testing of individual switches (a sample of
two is recommended) to establish the malfunction level of the switch. The procedure
for establishing an SRS from the fragility test data is described in the document.
Aging of switches is accomplished in accordance with IEEE-323.

The first data set consists of the Standard Response Spectra (SRS) for three generic
models of GE switches (SB-1, SB-9, and SBM) and the two Electroswitch models (Series

C-49
10448176
 GERS-SWT.1
5/15/88

20 and 24). These SRS represent the manufacturer's interpretation of ANSI/IEEE

C37.98/501 for establishing the SRS ZPA from the fragility test response spectra
obtained for each model. In general, the fragility data is considered proprietary
by the manufacturer and thus is unavailable for comparison to the SRS.

The second data set consists of uniaxial sine sweep test data conducted on early
(approximately 1970 vintage) GE switches. These tests were proof tests conducted
to specified input levels and not fragility tests.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

The SRS (5% damping) for GE or Electroswitch models is considered to be a GERS for
each operational state. Figure 1 gives the GERS for the three generic GE models
and the two Electroswitch models with different types of multiple contact
configurations.

Since the vertical TRS for the switches was equal to the horizontal input motion,
the GERS presented are valid for concurrent vertical and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to multi-contact control switches, the following criteria must
be verified.

• The switch must be a GE SB-1, SB-9, SBM, or an Electroswitch Series 20

or 24.
• For other models of rotary hand switches, it may be possible to demon-
strate seismic ruggedness by similarity analysis*.

* "Generic Qualification of Rotary Hand Switches," EPRI NP-3095, Electric Power

Research Institute, May 1983.

C-50
10448176
 GERS-SWT.1
18 5/15/88
Control Switches I,. DAMPING
11 Series 20,24 -·-·-
14
SB-1, -9, SAM (;:-:7,c
18
r-·-·-·-·,
12 GERS·, \

..."z
0 11 i .
...2 10 I
C
rr 8
I GERS
_,
Ill
I .
Ill
u 8
i
u
C
_,
C
...u
rr
7

8 I
I X-fs:: ~e~l-
\
--x
\.
'\',-·-·-·-
Ill i
A.
ID
6
i
4 I
3 /
I.
2

o'---....1..-....1........L-'-'.....i..........__ _ _ _...__.._
1 6 10 20 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

MOVING CONTACT ARM

SB Switch

HANDLE

SBM Switch
ESCUTCHEON PLATE CONTACT BLOCKS

Figure 1. GERS for Control Switches

C-51
10448176
 GERS-MCC.9

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR

MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

(LOW VOLTAGE)

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

February 1991

C-52
10448176
 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for Motor Control Centers (low
voltage) is presented and discussed in the following sections. An attached appendix
discusses a test data base compiled by another organization.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is Low Voltage Motor Control
Centers (MCC) which are steel enclosures containing various sizes of motor starters
(contactors and overload relays), circuit breakers, disconnect switches, control or
distribution transformers, and panelboards. They may also have indicator lamps and
meters. Relays, when present, will be either industrial, socket, or pneumatic
timing types.

The fundamental purpose of an MCC enclosure is to house the controls which turn
motors on and off. Other components might also be located in MCCs for convenience
such as light panels, HVAC heater controls, etc. The primary unit of motor control
is a motor starter which consists of a contactor and motor running overcurrent
protection.

A starter may be denoted as either full voltage or reduced voltage and either
reversing or non-reversing. The most common application for most motors however,
will be a full-voltage (FVR or FVNR) starter. In these cases, the motors will have
high starting currents and torques. To prevent damage in case of a locked rotor,
overload protection is provided by the overload relays. These devices, which are a
component of every starter, are not to be confused with control relays (such as the
types indicated above), since the overload relays are in reality a mechanical fuse.
In some models of overload relays, a eutectic alloy is used which melts under the
overload condition.

A contactor consists of a coil, armature, main contacts, and auxiliary contacts.

The auxiliary contacts are accessories which may or may not be added to the con-
tactor. The auxiliary contacts (also referred to as electrical interlocks) are used
for seal-in and other signal functions. Another device, a mechanical interlock
(mechanical linkage) may also be present which is usually associated with a revers-
ing starter.

Cable or conduit enclosure entry can be from the bottom, top, or side. Units are
low voltage rated at 600 VAC (480 VAC nominal) or 250 voe. Typical low-voltage

C-53
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 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

NEMA nominal enclosure section sizes are 20 inches wide, 20 inches deep, and 90
inches high. They are fabricated of 14 gage or heavier steel sheets and supported
on channels at the bottom. The base channels are either integral with the MCC frame
or are external members connected by internal bolts to the MCC frame. Multiple MCC
sections may be grouped together to make widths to 120 inches or greater. The units
must be anchored at the base to a supporting structure. The validation of anchorage
adequacy requires an independent evaluation. This equipment class covers virtually
all low voltage MCCs used in power plants for critical motor control. The checklist
given in Section 5 below can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a wide range of MCC for fifteen separate tests.
The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1974. Forty vertical MCC sec-
tions with weights ranging from 200 to 800 pounds (per section) from ten manufac-
turers which represent the range of units found in actual power plants are included
in the data base. The units tested involved both single- and multi-section MCC
units (up to six sections). Two of the tests included valid data; however, they do
not meet the class inclusion rules. One of these tests had a top brace attachment
(i.e., not entirely base-mounted), and the other MCC unit was housed in a non-
typical (larger) enclosure. All units were mounted within NEMA-type metal enclo-
sures with either welded or bolted anchorage.

Twelve tests were performed with random, independent, biaxial input motions. One
test used random, independent, triaxial input motion, while two additional tests
utilized single-axis sine-beat inputs. The test results span the entire range of
possible success and failure. Failure modes were contact chatter, starter change
of state, and minor structural base damage. (An example of minor structural damage
is a single broken bolt or a cracked weld.) In one test series involving four MCC
sections, the equipment fragility limits were sought. In some cases, the tests were
performed on MCCs in which artificially aged components had been installed, while in
others, the components were new. Contact status and chatter duration was monitored
during most tests. Tests were typically performed in a deenergized state and then
repeated with the circuits energized. Some tests included an intentional state tran-
sition during input motion. Hi-pot tests, under- and over-voltage relay functionali-
ty, and circuit breaker functionality were checked before and after the tests.

c,.54

10448176
 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91
Relay (not overload) contact chatter was also noted in some tests. Control relays
are included in test MCC enclosures, since a qualification test considers al 1
possible special configurations that may be furnished by a given manufacturer.
However, the presence of a relay in a normal power plant MCC enclosure circuit is
not a common occurrence. Control relays might be used in a special ground detection
system, or to convert a DC control signal to an AC contactor coil voltage, or to
introduce some timing function.

A recent USNRC-sponsored research project has compiled MCC fragi 1ity test data
obtained from proprietary sources. The published results of this study provide an
additional data base for identification of possible MCC failure modes. While the
data cannot be reviewed due to proprietary restri6tions, the results confirm that
the functionality of MCCs is limited by main contactor and auxiliary contact
chatter. The direct consequence of contact chatter is starter change-of-state
which requires a manua 1 reset. The USNRC-sponsored study a 1so identified a weak
internal base channel connection detai 1 that al lowed "all four corners" of a MCC
enclosure "to break away" during a test input. This damage was accounted for in
the GERS and associated checklist reported below.

A major manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) has reviewed their seismic

qualification testing program conducted on various MCC configurations. While the
specific test levels and details remain proprietary, the manufacturer has quantified
the test results for review purposes. Minor damage to the enclosure, at the base,
was seen to initiate at the 2.5 g spectral level. Based on their test experience
with qualification of other manufacturers' MCC configurations, they recommended that
the 2.5 g spectral level be considered as a generic limit to prevent unacceptable
base damage.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for all of the twelve TRS used to construct the GERS. Both the
energized and the deenergized data from successful tests are compared in Figure 1.
For this equipment class, two basic GERS levels are specified; (1) "function during"
and (2) "function after". The "function during" GERS conservatively accommodate the
low bound of data base TRS for which contact chatter and contactor change of state
was noted in a wide spectrum of cabinet and starter types as shown in Figure 2. The
function during GERS level (1.5 g) is associated with either normally open or closed

C-55
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 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

auxiliary contact chatter*, main contact chatter, control relay chatter, and
contactor change-of-state. Contactor change-of-state is conservatively assumed to
be a consequence of auxiliary contact chatter when the auxiliary contacts are used
for contactor seal-in (only normally open contacts are used for seal-in). For MCC
base inputs greater than the "function during" GERS level, reset of the contactors
may be necessary.

The GERS level for MCC "function after" is set at the spectral level which is the
low bound of known "major" structural damage that has been documented. Any MCC may
use this GERS level as long as an inspection of the internal mounting configuration
satisfies certain caveats given in the following section.

The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was approximately equal to
the horizontal input motion. Thus, the GERS presented is valid for concurrent
vertical and horizontal motion.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to Motor Control Centers, the following criteria must be
verified.

• The MCC must be a low voltage unit with a floor-mounted NEMA-type

enclosure with an average weight per vertical section that does not
exceed 800 pounds (review of manufacturer's submittals is sufficient).

• The MCC must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be evaluated.

• The base anchorage must utilize MCC base structural members (as supplied
by the manufacturer) for attachment (base structural members are
either channels integral with MCC frames or external channels connected
by internal bolts). Base anchorage details that induce significant
bending of sheet are not acceptable.

* Normally closed auxi 1 iary contacts usually chatter at lower test levels than
normally open contacts, however the spectral levels associated with contact
chatter are not known with sufficient precision to make a distinction between
chatter spectral levels for the two types of contacts.

C-56
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 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

• In order to utilize the "function after" GERS, the internal load

transfer path from the anchorage to the MCC (base) frame must be
inspected in addition to the required anchorage evaluation. MCC base
channels with bolted anchorage that have less than four bolts per MCC
section require a separate evaluation for stiffness. If internal
mounting bolts (connection of MCC frame to external base channels) are
present, there must be four bolts per section, and they must be at
least 3/8-in. diameter. Any sheet metal cabinet components used for
anchorage must have reinforcement. Excessive eccentricities in the
internal load path which allow significant bending of sheet metal
require a separate evaluation for adequacy and stiffness.

• Any MCC which does not meet the load path evaluation criteria must be
considered as an outlier and separately evaluated for adequacy and
stiffness.

• Cutouts in cabinet sheathing are less than 6-in. wide and 12-in. high
in the lower half of the cabinet height.

• All door latches or screwdriver operated door fasteners must be

secured. Drawout buckets must have positive latches.

• In order to utilize the "function during" GERS, relays with low rugged-
ness must be excluded. All relays must have a GERS greater than 4.5 g
within the amplified spectral region. (Here the term relays does not
include contactors and other starter components.)

• Auxiliary contacts of contactors require a separate evaluation if they

are used for external control or lockout signals.

• If the "function during" GERS limits for MCCs are exceeded by certain
plant floor response spectra, the capability for reset of starters
must be demonstrated in accordance with established procedures
(Reference 5*). (In general, both system tolerance of the changed
state and operator availability for manual reset must be shown.)

* Reference 5: Betlack, J., Carritte, R., and Schmidt, W., "Procedures for
Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," EPRI Report
NP-7148, 1991.

C-57
10448176
 1r------,----,----.--,--,.-..---..---~-----~---,----------
Sine Beat

&

.
z
2
,c
a:
4

...ww
""...
,c

.
,c
a: 3

n
I
u,
(X)
"w
IL
"' I J •
.., ------V
I
I
GERS (Function after)
w/Reaet a Load
Path EvetuaHon

GERS (Function durtng)

Main Contact Chatter
Relay Chatter
Contactor Change of S•te
Auxlhry Conte ct Chatter

0 .__ _ ___._ __.__ _..__.._..J.......J.....J....J...J----...J..--...L...J...../

1 & 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (Hz)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS With Ruggedness Data: Function During and After for MCC G')
rn
;:o
U)
NI
........ 3:
1-'r)
,n
\.0 •
.... \.0

10448176
 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

Minor Structural
Damage: Chatter (E)
6 .. DAMPING

I
'
/\
I
I I
8 I
Energized. No Chatter /I ', ~ - - -

De-Energized, Chatter / \ I x-Slne Beat

I \ ,I Minor Structural Damage
( Minor Strutturol I/ I\ ,r- __ I
Damage: Chatter (D~) \ / --1
6
I \ I I Cornare Broke Away
\
,
/', I /
f ' I
, I /
z Chatter (DE)
,/' \ ,,.. Main cobt1ct Chatter
2 GERS (Function after)
.. 4
< I ,..'\ w/Reeet & Load Path Evaluation
a:
.,w I ----"' \
GERS (Function during)
w
u Main Contact Chatter
u
< Relay Chatter
~
.
a:
u
w
3 Conta,::tor C henge of State
Auxlllery Contact Chatter

.,
IL

0 L.._ _ _ _.....__ _......._ _ . _......._._.._.._.._._ _ _ _ _....__ _ ~~

1 10 20 30 ZPA

FREOUENC Y (Hr)

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS With Failure Data: Function During and After for MCC

C-59
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 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

APPENDIX

A detailed review of the following report concerned with the seismic fragility of
MCCs has been conducted.

"Seismic Fragility of Nuclear Power Plant Components";

NUREG/CR-4659; BNL-NUREG-52007 Vol. 1, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, June 1986; Vol. 2, December 1987; and Vol. 3,
February 1990

The above report documents the fragility data collected to date in a USNRC sponsored
study conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The objective of the study
was to quantify the fragility of selected equipment for use in seismic margin
studies and probabilistic risk assessments.

The purpose of the review was to reconcile the MCC GERS levels given in earlier GERS
studies with the reported BNL results. It should be noted that BNL gained access to
some of the data under proprietary restrictions, thus the test reports cannot be
directly reviewed by others. BNL uses 2% spectra averaged over the range 4-16 Hz
(ASA) to indicate the test input level. For GERS construction, 5% spectra are used.
For the discussion below, a factor of 0.63 was used to convert the BNL ASA values to
comparable GERS values (0.63 = ¥2/5; see report, Section 2).

MCC Motor Starter Chatter and Change of State

The BNL report identified several tests with changes of state for starters which
would require consideration of manual reset. Auxiliary contacts were found to
change state at the same level as contact chatter, i.e., 1.3 g. Main contacts were
found to change state at an input level of 1.6 g.

It was also observed that as test levels increased, normally closed (NC) auxiliary
contacts chattered before normally open (NO) auxiliary contacts. A motor control
circuit contains a variety of components (relays, contactors, auxiliary interlock
contacts) which can be wired or interconnected in numerous ways to accomplish the
control objectives. Thus, in a given test, the determination of the component
which caused main contact chatter or change of state is often not possible. The
spectral levels associated with contact chatter are not known with sufficient
precision to distinguish between the various types of chatter occurring in the
spectral range 1.3-1.6 g. For the reconciliation of the MCC GERS with the BNL

C-60
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 GERS-MCC.9
2/1/91

report, the 1.5-g level will be associated with auxiliary contact chatter, main
contact chatter, and change of state. Relay chatter is also associated with this
level. Thus, the 1.5-g level is the "function during" GERS level for relay,
auxiliary, and main contact chatter. However, above this level, main contact
change of state is possible and reset must be considered.

MCC Structural Adequacy

For previous GERS, the GERS level for "function after'' was set at the 4.0 g spectral
level. This GERS represented an input level which is slightly higher than the input
level for which some of the MCCs in the GERS data base began to experience "minor"
structural damage. Here the term "minor" refers to local weld cracking, sheet metal
deformation, and the fracture of a single internal mounting bolt. The BNL data base
also has these observed localized minor damage modes which do not limit the ability
of an MCC unit to function after a seismic event (allowing, of course, for reset of
starters which may have changed state).

However, the BNL data base contains a test in which "all four corners broke away
from the base" at an average spectral level of approximately 2.5 g. The test
failure, reported by BNL, was associated with an internal mounting bolt detail in
which both bolt size and sheet flexibility were contributing factors. While the
specific detail dimensions are proprietary, sufficient verbal information has been
obtained during the review to allow the sketch of a similar detail shown in Figure
A-1 to be drawn. This sketch provides a walkdown team with an example unacceptable
detail to judge the stiffness and adequacy of given MCC internal load path. It
should be noted that a reinforcing angle doubler is included in the detail.

The GERS level for function after is set at 2.5 g to accommodate this test result.
A load path inspection is required to determine if an MCC base detail utilizes
internal mounting bolts.

To insure that a detail, similar to the above test detail, would not pass a field
evaluation, GERS caveats have been added to insure that internal mounting bolts
(connection of MCC frame to external base channel) if present, must be at least
3/8-in. diameter and that any associated sheet metal anchor components must be
reinforced.

C-61
10448176
 5/16" ¢ bolt & nut
enclosure side
& lip
('")
I
O"I angle
N

L ~s"
1· .3 ..

~
7ga channel

Figure A-1. Example of Unacceptable Internal Load Path Detail

G)
IT1
;;c,
(/)
NI
-3:
......
('")
-('")
I.O •
...... I.O

10448176
 GERS-MOV.5

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR

MOTOR VALVE OPERATORS

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

February 1991

C-63
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 GERS-MOV.5
2/1/91

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for motor valve operators is present-
ed and discussed in the following sections. It should be noted that the GERS, in
this case, is the response to input motion at the attachment point of the motor
operator to the valve body or yoke.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is electric-motor-driven

valve operators which are designed to operate the five major types of valves (gate,
globe, plug, ball, and butterfly). They range in size from 150 lb up to 3,500 lb. A
valve operator consists of a metal housing, which connects to the valve body by a
flange or yoke and contains limit switches, a torque switch, an electric motor, a
clutch, gears, and bearings. For this class of equipment, the motor controls (re-
versing starter, overload relays, and push-button station) are located in a remote
location (usually a motor control center). For some valve configurations, the valve
actuators are mounted on secondary reducers resulting in the actuator being eccen-
tric and cantilevered from the valve body. For these configurations, a special
seismic bracket supplied by the manufacturer is required. The preferred mounting
position of the valve operator is with the motor horizontal and the 1 imit switch
compartment horizontal or vertical up as specified by the manufacturer. These posi-
tions will insure the proper distribution of lubricants through the internal working
component of the units. This equipment class covers virtually all motor valve
operators used in power plants.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data for fourteen aualification tests conducted on either the
motor operator alone (12 tests) or the motor operator attached to a valve (2 tests).
The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1972. Nineteen different models
distributed among the two major manufactuers (Limitorque and Rotork) are represented
in the data. Ooerators tested ranged in weight from 150 lb to 3,750 lb. Included
in the data are generic test programs conducted by the manufacturers to qualify
their operators to sufficiently high input levels and eliminate the need for any
additional qualification effort for specific nuclear applications. Tests are

C-64
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 GERS-MOV.5
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typically performed on units which have been artifically aged to an equivalent life
of forty years. Tests have been performed with random, independent, biaxial input
motions, or single-axis sine beat or sine dwell tests. Both vibration and seismic
tests are typically done. The valve operator is actuated under load before, during,
and after the tests. For seismic qualification, the common practice used by the
valve industry is to consider the valve and operator as separate items. Valve
operability is usually demonstrated by static load application when the natural
frequency of the valve actuator combination has been shown to be rigid (i.e., 33 Hz
or greater) for seismic excitation. Valve operators are usually qualified
separately in accordance with IEEE-382. It should be noted that certain valve
standards (ASME 816.41) have required the valve and actuator to be tested together.
For the :najority of the tested models, the operator was mounted directly to the
shake table and single-axis sine beat testing at specific natural frequencies below
33 Hz (or, in some cases, only at natural frequencies below 33 Hz or at 33 Hz if
none exist) was performed. The tests which had the operator mated to a valve used
random, independent, biaxial inputs to the valve body. One test was performed with
the valve pressurized, and the other was pressurized at an elevated temperature. In
all cases, the operators tested were functional during and after the test motion*.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for which the test valve operators performed satisfactorily. The
GERS, in this case, is for the attachment of the valve operator to the valve body or
yoke. The low bound of the sine beat test data was used for GERS construction in
order to cover the wide range of motor operator sizes tested. The biaxial random
tests conducted on both valve operators and valves with operators are included in
Figure 1, along with sine dwell test data. The TRS data from the valve tests are
measured spectra at the operator base. The GERS have been reduced by approximately
10% to account for possible field added items such as stem protectors The vertical
TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was equal to the horizontal input
motion; thus the GERS presented is valid for equal vertical and horizontal motion.

* The only exceptions noted in some high-level fragility tests were instances of
limit switch "dropout" (chatter) caused by improper finger tension. Thus, as with
GERS for all equipment types, it is assumed that the equipment has been properly
adjusted for operation in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

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5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to motor valve operators, the following criteria must be
verified.

• Valve operators shall be manufactured by either Limitorque or Rotork.

• The GERS is for the attachment point of the valve operator to the valve
body or yoke. The valve, to which the operator is attached requires a
separate evaluation.*

• The valve actuator and yoke must be supported by the pipe without
independent support unless the valve and adjacent pipe are immediate
supported or braced to a common structure.
• The motor axis must be horizontal and the limit switch compartment must
be horizontal or vertical up (definition of orientation directions pro-
vided in manufacturer's submittals).

• The motor controls (reversing starter, overload relays, and push-button

station) must be remotely located and separately evaluated.

• Side-mounted valve actuators attached to secondary reducers must have

seismic brackets as supplied by the manufacturer (review of manufac-
turer's submittals is sufficient).

• It is recommended that any loose or missing valve-to-operator bolts be

retightened if encountered during a walkdown.**

* Such an evaluation must assure valve operability and that the valve operator
wi 11 not impact on surrounding structures and components as a result of pipe
fl ex i bi l i ty .

** A tightness check of operator bolts is not required.

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40

Sine
Beat

30
en

C:
0
~
"'...
CIJ
CIJ
u
u
< 20
....."'...
u
CIJ
a.
V') Sine
/ Dwell

10

Valve

~,w,

l0
Frequency (Hz)
ZPA
(33-100 Hz)
A,~~t'
,,,,,
Yoke .
..
·'Equipment
Base for
GERS
Figure 3-6. Comparison of GERS with ruggedness TRS
data: operability for valve motor operators.
" .. ·\....
(~l],-'''"
Figure 3-6. Comparison of GERS with ruggedness TRS data:
operability for valve motor operators.

C-67
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 GERS-SV.3

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

December 1990

C-68
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for solenoid valves is presented and
discussed in the fol lowing sections. It should be noted that the GERS, in this
case, is the response to input motion at the mounting or attachment point of the
valve to the line or piping system.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is solenoid valves. The
solenoid valve is a combination of two basic functional units: 1) a solenoid
actuator (electro-magnet) with its plunger (or core) and 2) a valve body containing
an orifice in which a disc or plug is positioned to stop or allow flow. The valve
is opened or closed by movement of the magnetic plunger which is drawn into the
solenoid when the coil is energized. Solenoid valves can be either 2-way, 3-way or
4-way valves. In the direct acting 2-way solenoid valve, the solenoid acts directly
on the valve plug stem to open or close the valve. Three-way solenoid valves are
principally used in power plants as pi lot valves to alternately apply pressure to
and exhaust pressure from a diaphragm valve actuator. Four-way solenoid valves are
often used for controlling double-acting pneumatic or hydraulic cylinders. Both
normally open or normally closed de-energized operating configurations are used.

The valves range in size from a few pounds to forty-five pounds and utilize either
forged brass or steel construction. The valves within this class are for 1-in. or
less diameter pipe size with design pressures less than 600 psi. These valves are
commonly found in small process air lines (e.g., diesel air start line), instrument
air lines, or used as a pilot for other types of valve actuators (e.g., air-operated
diaphragm valves). In larger sizes, the solenoid operation is used directly on
globe valves in smal 1 bore piping systems (fluid or air). The preferred mounting
position of the valve is with the actuator housing vertical and above the valve
body. This equipment class covers virtually all solenoid operated valves used in
small bore power plant piping or process air systems.

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3.0 TEST DATA BASE

3.1 Qualification Tests

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data for nine qualification tests conducted on numerous 2-way,
3-way, and 4-way valves representing three manufacturers. The earliest test in the
data base was conducted in 1973. In most tests, various models of the same manu-
facturer were subjected to a common input motion. The brass or steel test specimens
range in weight from 5 to 41 lb, and generally have an overall length less than 12
in. (pipe centerline is reference position).

Tests have been performed with both random, independent biaxial input motions and
single or biaxial axis sine dwell tests. A test valve was deemed qualified, if
during and after the test, upon application and removal of normal rated voltages
and supply pressure, it responded promptly to pressurize the sealed volumes or to
exhaust sealed volumes. In some cases, the test reports indicated that the valves
were aged.* The aging included temperature, radiation, and cycling.

Two failures were noted in the data base tests. Functional valve failure was noted
in one biaxial test. This test was conducted in a mi 1itary program using input
motions which contained high-frequency content (e.g., 30 g at 100 Hz). Deenergized
chatter of a solenoid valve was noted during another test conducted as part of a
sine input fragility test program.

3.2 NSSS Supplier Review

A major supplier (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) of nuclear plant solenoid-

operated valves has conducted a review of their qualification program. This review
has identified the following solenoid valve model as qualified only to a ZPA level
of 3.5 g: ASCO Type 206-381.

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition the component being tested.

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4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to horizontal or vertical test response spectra (TRS)
(standardized to 5% damping). The nine TRS in the data base were selected to con-
struct the GERS. Both success and failure data are compared in Figure 1. The GERS
was constructed to accommodate the data. The single biaxial failure TRS drops below
the GERS in the region less than 7 Hz due to test machine limitations, not due to
lack of solenoid valve ruggedness in this region. In general, solenoid valves are
affected by the frequency content of input motions greater than 10 Hz. The high-
frequency region of the GERS (denoted ad GERS1) conforms with the single frequency
(sine) test level of 4.5 g suggested in IEEE-382. (It should be noted that this
4.5 g level is often used as a static load level in valve qualification). The GERS
denoted as GERS2 has a 3.5 g ZPA which is only applicable for a single-valve model.
The GERS is the response to input motion at the attachment point of the valve to the
piping system. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was equal
to the horizontal input motion, thus the GERS presented is valid for equal
concurrent vertical and horizontal motion.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to solenoid valves, the following criteria must be verified.

• The GERS is for the attachment point of the valve to the piping or
mounting bracket. The valve/pipe interface is not covered by the GERS.
A separate evaluation must assure that either the valve mounting bracket
attachment is attached in accordance with the manufacturer's recommend-
ations or that the valve will not impact on surrounding structures and
components as a result of pipe or instrument line flexibility.
• ASCO Type 206-381 solenoid valves must utilize the GERS with 3.5 ZPA.

• The nominal pipe size of the valve must be 1 in. or less.

• The valve body is either forged brass or steel construction.

• The solenoid housing must be oriented in accordance with the manufac-

turer's recommendations for the specific m9del.

• The overal 1 height of the valve (pipe centerline to top of solenoid

housing does not exceed 12 in.

• In the case where the solenoid valve is a pi lot valve in a valve

assembly, this GERS does not cover the main valve. The GERS would be
for the point of attachment of the pilot valve to the main valve.

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~ ©@
28
~ 51,0AMPING •. ®

24
~ De-energized
Chatter
Sine
Dwell
SOLENOID
VALVES
22

• •
20 ••
18
....
:!
z
0
j;:
C
18 Functional
a: Failure
"'..,
Ill
(J
(J
14 •
C
..,
C
...u
a: 12
GERS 1
"'CII
Q.

10

.
2

II 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS to TRS Data

C-72

10448176
 GERS-PS.5

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
SWITCHES
(PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, FLOW)

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

March 1990

C-73
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for switches is presented and

discussed in the fol lowing sections. It should be noted that the GERS, in this
case, is the response to input motion at the mounting or attachment point of the
switch and not at the base of a cabinet/rack or pipe support.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is switches, of which four
types are included: pressure, temperature, level, and flow. Each of these switches
is composed of a mechanical activating system and a microswitch. The activating
system depends on the application of the particular switch. For example, pressure
(fluid or gas) switches operate in such a way as to open or close an electrical
contact at a predetermined pressure set point. The actuating system is a Bourdon
tube, piston, or diaphragm which actuates a piston which opens or closes a
microswitch when the pressure reaches the set point (either increasing or decreasing
in pressure). Operating ranges can be from a few psi to hundreds of psi.
Activating systems for other types of switches range from a bimetalic element for a
temperature switch, a force-balance motor measuring force applied to a flow element
for a flow switch, to buoyant force on a float for a level switch. Switches that
have mercury for their actuating mechanism are not included in this equipment class.
Such switches have inherently low seismic ruggedness.

In general, switches range in weight from a few pounds to fifty pounds, however, the
majority of switches in power plants weigh only a few pounds. The largest physical
dimension of a switch is usually less than twelve inches. These switches are
components found in control systems where they are often used in indication and
alarm circuits.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/des-
cription, and test data for ten sets of tests conducted on numerous switches
representing over eight manufacturers. The earliest test in the data base was
conducted in 1970. In most of the tests, various models of the same manufacturer
were subjected to a common test input motion. The test specimens ranged in weight
from 2 to 45 pounds.

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Tests were performed using biaxial random multifrequency as well as single axis
sine-dwell input motions. The early tests were primarily sine dwell. The primary
function monitored during the test was chatter of switch contacts. Successful
operation of the switches was assumed if there was no mechanical or electrical
failure during and after the seismic tests. The results of test program (EPRI
Reports NP-5024 and NP-3326) investigating the effects of aging on seismic
performance are also included. It should be noted that a correlation between aging
and seismic test levels was established in these studies. An additional data set
consists of the results of a separate EPRI fragility test program conducted using
both switches and relays which had not been previously tested. These switches were
submitted for test by various utilities from plant spare part stocks.

Four exc£ptions occurred during the tests. In two cases, evidence of switch contact
chatter was observed during the test. This occurred primarily for pressure
differentials near the setpoint of each switch. Many switches have adjustable set-
points. However, seismic tests are usually conducted using the factory pre-set
(nominal) value and the range of adjustibility is checked after the test conduct to
insure that the unit setpoint can still be adjusted. For the EPRI fragility test
program, the effect of switch setpoint was specifically investigated for two
pressure switches. It was determined that setpoints (either increasing or
decreasing pressure setpoints) within 10% of a constant line pressure would chatter
while if the line pressure was greater (or less than) the setpoint pressure by a
margin exceeding 10% of the line pressure, chatter was not observed for the same
input level. In another test, the housing of the switch inside a differential
pressure switch fractured during the test. In addition, continuous contact chatter
was recorded on the contacts of the same pressure switch. In a fourth case, the
aged switches chattered at lower test levels than unaged switches. In all cases,
the switches functioned after the test conclusion.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS

Figure 1 compares the GERS to horizontal or vertical test response spectra (TRS)
(standardized to 5% damping) for which the test switches performed satisfactorily.
The ten TRS in the data base were used to construct the GERS. Figure 2 depicts the
TRS of the tests for which switches fa i 1ed. The proposed GERS is be 1ow a 11 three
of the failure TRS. The GERS accommodates the test levels used in both early test
programs and recent seismic aging studies. Figure 3 shows the results of the EPRI

C-75
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fragility tests. For function during, the use of the GERS is restricted to the
members of the switch data base used to construct the GERS (see list of models
given in the following section). Based upon review of test results, it is judged
that switches, in general, have inherent seismic ruggedness for function after (no
permanent damage up to 7g). The use of the function during GERS is conservative
for function after considerations, thus need be not restricted to the data base
list for function after. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS was based
was approximately equal to the horizontal input motion. To remain conservative,
the lower of either the horizontal or vertical values were selected for GERS
construction: thus, the GERS presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and
horizontal motion.

5. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to switch components at the switch mounting point, the following
criteria must be verified:

• The component is either a pressure, temperature, level, or flow switch.

• Due to the wide diversity of switches, a switch must be one of the
following manufacturer/models in order to apply the GERS for function
during: Allen-Bradley 836, Ashcrof 8420, Barksdale D2N, D2H, DIT, 82T;
Pressure Controls A17-1: Detroit 222; Yarway 821N; Barton 393, 386,
289, E41 N; Robertshaw 83035, 83482, 83843, 83846; S-0-R 4N6, 5N, 6N,
12N: Dwyer 1620,1630: Meletron 2122: Peeco HT.

• For function during applications, setpoint differentials should approx-

imately exceed 10% of standard system operating values of temperature,
pressure, level or flow.

• For other models of switches, it may be possible to demonstrate seismic

ruggedness by similarity analysis.

• For function after, the GERS may be applied to all models.

• Since switches are sensitive to system perturbations, the effect of

seismic induced system changes (i.e., pressure, flow, and level
variation) should be evaluated.

• The switch does not use a mercury based actuating system.

• All mounting bolts are in place.

C-76
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 0
N I TRS Damping: 5%

- r-
co
I I ""'
...""u
"
...m
H

...."' ....0
g
~ "' 0
~ ~
o?,
z
0
I I 4

H
..... "'
-<
I
...,~
...,..,
u
I
I
N
u -<

..,<

~~
~
.....
...,
u
I WW
R
1
2
I
,, y
0
p,, -<
u,
Sine
n Dwell- --,I R 2
I
.......
....... co I l\ 1- -
I
"' I- I // I \ \ I
I
I
~ \._
"'
t~ "" 1-----1 .. ·:i.J~-
N Li / / GERS/ I WW 1
" "I VAR(9) 29
WW

0 V I
5
I I I I I I
10 20
I
lj------1
30 ZPA
Frequency (Hz) Ci")
fTl
;;c,
WV>
......._ I
,_. "'Cl
......... (/)
Figure 1. Comparison of GERS With TRS Data: Success Data for Switches I.O •
O<Jl

10448176
 GERS-PS.5
3/1/90

0
N
TRS Damping: 5%

....00

~
~
z
0"
""
,-. ....
~
«I
,-l
«I
u
UN
< ....
...QI .,
~ ... a
...u ""...
QI
,-. :,
u
t.:o
0.. ....
ell ....:,cu ....0
ij 0
.E :z:
KK 3
00
Contact
j Bounce

I
I Chatter
(EPRI)
I
I
I
I WW
Q,K 30
1
I

5 20
I
10 30 ZPA

Figure 2. Comparison of GERS With TRS Data: Failure Data for Switches

C-78
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 GERS-PS.5
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Allen-Bradley 836, Detroit 222

No Chatter - Setpoint Differential >10%

10.0
O')

i:::
....+>
0

11:l
s..
Q)
.-
Q)
u
u
~ 1.0
.-
11:l
+>
u
Q)
0.
(,/')
5% Damping

O.lL-~~..____.~..__.......................~~~-------...._------~~
1.0 10.0 100.0

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 3. EPRI Fragility Test Program Data

C-79
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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR

SWITCHGEAR
(MEDIUM VOLTAGE, METAL CLAD)

(LOW VOLTAGE, METAL ENCLOSED)

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

February 1991

C-80
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for both medium-voltage switchgear

(metal clad) and low-voltage switchgear (metal enclosed) is presented and discussed
in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is power switchgear which
has two subclasses: (1) metal clad medium voltage switchgear and (2) metal enclosed
low-voltage switchgear.

2.1 Medium-Voltage Switchgear

Metal clad medium-voltage switchgear are housed in steel enclosures containing

several truck-mounted drawout type circuit breakers, bus bars, auxiliary/protective
re 1ays, transformers, switches, and meters. . Uni ts are medium voltage rated at
5,000 VAC. Circuit breakers which must be jacked up to engage (vertical lift) into
the connected position are not included in this class. Typical switchgear enclosure
(ANSI C37.20) nominal section sizes are 30-inches wide, 60-inches deep, and
90-inches high. They are fabricated of 12 gage or heavier steel sheet and framed
with angles or other formed members, with anchorage provisions included in the base
frame. A typical installation of medium-voltage switchgear in a plant would consist
of several "lines" of switchgear consisting of 10 to 20 "frames" or cubicles. Both
the width and weight of a cubicle can vary considerably. Widths can range between
24 inches to 42 inches. Some cubicles can be essentially empty, while other
cubicles can house very heavy circuit breaker units.

The units must be anchored to a supporting structure. The validation of anchorage

adequacy requires an independent eva 1uat ion. This equipment class covers most
medium voltage switchgear used in power plants for overcurrent protection in primary
voltage (normally 4160 VAC) distribution systems. The checklist given in Section 5
can be used to screen for outliers.

2.2 Low-Voltage Switchgear

Meta 1 enc 1osed 1ow-voltage switchgear are housed in stee 1 enc 1osures containing
several drawout-type circuit breakers, bus bars, protective/auxiliary relays, and
meters. Units are low-voltage rated at 600 VAC or 250 VDC. Typical switchgear

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enclosure (ANSI C37.20) nominal section sizes are 20- to 30-in. wide, 60-in. deep,
and 80- to 90-in. high. They are fabricated of 14 gage or heavier steel sheet and
framed with angles or other formed members, with anchorage provisions included in
the base frame. Several sections may be grouped together to make widths to 60 in.
or greater. The units must be anchored to a supporting structure. The validation
of . anchorage adequacy requires an independent evaluation. This equipment cl ass
covers most low-voltage switchgear used in power plants for overcurrent protection
in secondary low-voltage (normally 480 VAC or 125 VDC) distribution systems.
Special design or custom switchgear is not included in this class. To exclude
specially-designed switchgear the class is limited to three manufacturers. The
checklist given in Section 5 can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

3.1 Medium-Voltage Switchgear

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
descriptions, and test data covering a wide range of medium voltage switchgear for
ten tests. The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1974. Tests are
usually conducted on three- and four-frame units (termed "composites") which house
typical circuit breakers, bus, auxiliary controls, potential transformers, etc. The
weights of these test specimens range between 7,500 to 10,000 pounds with widths
that range between 90 to 120 inches. At least one frame usually houses controls and
is, thus, very lightly loaded. In general, a single cubicle which houses a circuit
breaker can weight between 3,000 to 5,000 pounds, depending upon the size of the
breaker.

Eight tests were performed with random, independent, biaxial input motions. Two
tests involved sine beat testing while an additional test included sine dwell tests.
Contact status and chatter duration was monitored during most tests. Tests are
typically performed in a non-operate state and then repeated with the breaker in
operation. Hi-pot tests, relay functionality, and circuit breaker functionality are
checked before and after the tests. Breaker trip is usually the primary safety-
related function. Relay chatter and minor structure base damage were noted in some
tests.

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3.2 Low-Voltage Switchgear

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
descriptions, and test data covering a range of low-voltage switchgear for four
multiple-unit tests. The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1974.
Seven vertical switchgear sections with weights ranging from 1,000 to 1,600 lb from
three manufacturers which represent the range of units found in actual power plants
are included in the data base. The uni ts tested involved both two- and three-
sect ion line-ups and weighed from 3,000 to 5,000 lb. All units were mounted within
ANSI-type metal enclosures with either welded or bolted anchorage. All units tested
were new and some of the test reports abstracted indicated that aged components were
included in the units tested.

Four tests were performed with random, independent, biaxial input motions. Contact
status and chatter duration was monitored during most tests. Tests are typically
performed in a non-operate state and then repeated with breaker operation. Hi-pot
tests, relay functionality, and circuit breaker functionality are checked before
and after tests. A breaker trip caused by a base weld failure occurred in one test
run. Relay chatter and minor structural base damage were noted in some tests.

3.3 Chatter Tolerance

The functionality of switchgear is governed by the controlling protective and

associated auxiliary relays. Relay chatter in switchgear tests is a common
occurrence. In many tests, the standard 2-ms chatter failure criteria was utilized.
Due to this conservative failure criteria, many relays were found to be unacceptable
when mounted on typical switchgear enclosures. However, in other tests, the switch-
gear was considered as a complete subsystem where chatter can be tolerated without
loss of switchgear function. The primary function of switchgear is to either
connect or disconnect a main power circuit to protect the remainder of the circuit
against overcurrent, overvoltage, undervoltage, phase reversal, etc., or to switch
circuits upon command. As long as the switchgear can accomplish its primary
function, the occurrence of minor chatter in a protective or associated auxiliary
relay is not a relevant concern. System arguments (i.e., chatter does not affect
switchgear function) and exclusion of certain relays (with known low ruggedness)
from safety circuits are used to qualify switchgear units. Excessive relay chatter
or a relay change of state (i.e., lockout or seal-in) which causes the circuit
breaker to operate improperly is the functional failure mode of concern. It should

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be noted that all data base switchgear units that were dynamically tested functioned
in post-test operation, including those units that sustained minor base damage.

IEEE standard C37.81 for seismic qualification of power switchgear assemblies iden-
tifies the primary functional performance test criteria for switchgear to be associ-
ated with circuit breaker change of state. Accessories and control components may
malfunction if (1) the primary switching function of the switchgear is not affected
and (2) any circuit specifically identified in pretest criteria is not affected.

3.4 Switchgear Relay Screening Criteria

If a relay is associated with direct control and operation of the switchgear, only
limited relay screening is required to insure that known low ruggedness relays are
not present. For this purpose, review of parts lists is sufficient. No additional
screening of relays is required unless a system analysis indicates that an identi-
fied relay is essential to other equipment. This is usually only for relays used to
control components outside the switchgear or which cause lockout of a safety-related
system. The evaluation procedure for relays associated with switchgear is detailed
in Reference 5. As a minimum requirement, all relays screened using these GERS must
be documented in the relay evaluation report. These relay screening criteria also
apply to jack-up or vertical lift breakers since the exclusion of such breakers from
the switchgear class considered here is due to known mechanical (non-relay) modifi-
cations that are required for adequate seismic ruggedness.

3.5 Additional Test Data Base

A recent USNRC-sponsored research project has compiled switchgear fragility test

data obtained from proprietary sources. The published results* of this study
provide an additional data base for identification of possible switchgear failure
modes. It should be noted that the study was conducted with the objective of
obtaining fragility statistics and not the demonstration of a ruggedness level for
a given class of equipment. While the data is not directly accessible due to

* "Seismic Fragility of Nuclear Power Plant Components"; NUREG/CR-4659; BNL-NUREG-

52007, Vo 1 . 1 , June 1986; Vol . 2, December 1987; and Vo 1 . 3, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, February 1990.

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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91

proprietary restrictions, the study results confirm that the functionality of

switchgear is not limited by relay contact chatter as long as relays with low
ruggedness are excluded. This study has al so indicated that breaker racking and
positioning systems have affected secondary breaker contact operation during tests.
Further, some mounting problems with internal switchgear components has been
observed in a few tests. Since specific design changes were made to address these
test results, they identify vintage issues. However, if specific checks are made
for the presence of limit stops which prevent relative motion between medium-
voltage breaker units and their enclosure frames, no conflicts exist between the
BNL data base and the GERS levels for switchgear.

3.6 Manufacturer Review

A major manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) has reviewed the seismic

qualification testing program conducted on their low- and medium-voltage switchgear
which was initiated in 1959. As a result of a series of tests conducted at
increasing levels, certain modifications were found to be necessary to qualify the
switchgear at increased levels. While the specific test levels and details are
proprietary, the manufacturer has quantified the test results into two generic test
levels (effective broad band test spectra) along with the modifications required to
achieve that level. The modifications identified are also sufficiently generic to
be applicable to other manufacturers switchgear. It is assumed that other
manufacturers have made similar modifications to achieve seismic qualification at
increased test levels. For medium-voltage switchgear, a maximum spectral test
level of 1.8 g (5% damping, 4-16 Hz) may be achieved without modification if
potential transformers, when present in switchgear units, are checked for
appropriate restraints. A maximum spectral test level of 2.5 g may be achieved
provided: (1) the medium-voltage breaker unit has acceptable vertical restraint,
and (2) arc chutes have side-to-side restraint. For low-voltage switchgear units,
a maximum spectral test level of 1 .8 g may be achieved provided that there are
side-to-side restraints for the breaker to prevent secondary contact deformation.
A maximum spectral test level of 2.5 g may be achieved provided: (1) base frame
reinforcement brackets are installed in the outside corners of the outer low-
voltage switchgear cabinets in a lineup, (2) the low-voltage breaker unit has
acceptable vertical restraints, and (3) the low-voltage breaker has the side-to-
side restraints required for the 1.8 spectral test level.

C-85
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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
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Concerning switchgear relays, the program test results were consistent with the
screening criteria discussed above.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the switchgear GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS)
(standardized to 5% damping) data for low-voltage switchgear. Figure 2 compares
the switchgear GERS to the horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standardized to
5% damping) for medium-voltage switchgear.

Two GERS levels have been established for both switchgear classes. Each level
requires that certain conditions exist before application of the GERS to switch-
gear. To utilize the GERS level of 1.8 g spectral acceleration for medium-voltage
switchgear, potential transformers (if present) must be checked for restraint to
prevent relative motion between contacts. To apply the 1.8 g GERS level to low-
voltage switchgear, an inspection of the breaker must shown that sufficient side-
to-side constraint of the drawout breaker exists to prevent excessive relative
motion between secondary contacts located on the drawout breaker and the switchgear
frame.

If an additional inspection of medium-voltage switchgear indicates that the breaker

units are (1) restrained to prevent vertical uplift and (2) have side-to-side
restraints for the arc chutes, then the GERS level may be increased to 2.5 g
spectral acceleration. Similarly, the GERS level for low-voltage switchgear may be
increased to the 2.5 g level, provided that an inspection indicates that (1) the
breaker units are restrained to prevent vertical uplift and (2) base frame
reinforcement is present in the outside corners of the outer cabinets of a
low-voltage switchgear lineup.

These GERS represent test levels for which relay chatter (if chatter occurred) or
other component behavior has not caused breaker malfunction, given that certain
specific relays, which are known to be sensitive to vibration and which have caused
breaker trip in switchgear tests, are not present. For switchgear, a limited
screening of relays is required to insure that certain low ruggedness relays are
not present (Reference 5 contains a list of these relays). Additional screening of
switchgear relays is to be accomplished using the guidelines given in Reference 5.
If system analysis indicates that certain switchgear mounted relays are essential
to other equipment, then a complete screening evaluation of those relays is
necessary (see Reference 5 for screening evaluation procedures).

C-86

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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91

The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS is based was approximately equal to
the horizontal input motion. Thus the GERS presented is valid for concurrent
vertical and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to switchgear, the following criteria must be verified.

• The medium-voltage switchgear must have a voltage rating less than or

equal to 5,000 V and be housed within a floor-mounted ANSI-type
enclosure with an average weight per vertical breaker section that
does not exceed 5,000 lb (review of manufacturer's submittals is
sufficient). The breakers are truck-mounted and are not a jack-up or
vertical-lift type.

• The low-voltage switchgear must have a voltage rating less than or

equal to 600 V and be housed within a floor-mounted ANSI-type enclosure
with an average weight per vertical section that does not exceed
1,600 lb (review of manufacturer's submittals is sufficient).

• Low-voltage switchgear units must be manufactured by either ITE (Brown

Boveri), Westinghouse, or General Electric.

• Switchgear GERS do not apply to specially-designed switchgear such as

those used for reactor trip.

• The switchgear must be based anchored and the installed anchorage must
be evaluated.

• All door latches or screwdriver operated door fasteners must be

secured.
• Trunion mounted potent i a 1 transformers (if present in medi um-vo 1tage
switchgear) require sufficient restraint* to prevent relative motion
between contacts. Any example of a restraint bracket for a potential
transformer in Westinghouse switchgear is shown in Figure 3.

• Low-voltage switchgear must have sufficient side-to-side restraint* to

prevent relative motion between secondary contacts on the breaker and
cabinet. An example of a side-to-side restraint used in Westinghouse
switchgear is shown in Figure 4.

* The demonstration of sufficient side-to-side restraint requires a general judgment

that motion of the breaker or component as an independent rigid body is limited by
the presence of stops or brackets that do not allow secondary contacts to
disengage or be damaged.

C-87
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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91

• To utilize the 2.5 g GERS level for medium-voltage switchgear, an

inspection must show: (1) sufficient arc chute side-to-side restraint
to prevent arc chute movement, and (2) sufficient vertical restraint**
to prevent breaker uplift. Where the original design does not provide
for this restraint, it can be provided by one of several alternative
restraint configuration. Examples of these additional restraints used
in Westinghouse switchgear are shown in Figure 5.

• To utilize the 2.5 g GERS level for low-voltage switchgear, an

inspection must show: ( 1) sufficient vertical restraint* to prevent
breaker up 1ift, and ( 2) the outside base frame corners of the outer
switchgear cabinets in a 1 ineup have certain enhancements to improve
their seismic ruggedness. For Westinghouse type switchgear, the
outside base frame corners of the outer switchgear cabinets in a
1 ineup should be reinforced (Figure 6). For other switchgears, the
manufacturers (GE, ITE) should be consulted to determine what
enhancements, if any, should be included in their switchgear cabinets
to give them adequate ruggedness for seismic purposes and then check
whether these enhancements have been included on their equipment.
• Preliminary screening of relays which control essential switchgear
operation is required in all switchgear to insure that low-ruggedness**
relays are not present.

• Additional screening evaluation of relays associated with switchgear

is to be accomplished in accordance with the specific guidelines given
in Reference 5. It should be noted that all relays screened using
these GERS must be documented in the relay evaluation report. In
general, a complete screening evaluation is required only if the
system analysist indicates that a relay is essential to other
equipment or will cause an unacceptable lockout of equipment function.

• For the use of the 2.5 g GERS level for Westinghouse medium-voltage
switchgear, the "Y" relay (anti-pump) shall not be a Beaver Type Z.

* The demonstration of sufficient vertical restraint requires a general judgment

that the upward rigid body motion of the breaker unit is limited by the presence
of stops or brackets that do not allow the draw-out breaker wheels to lift off
guides.

** Reference 5: Betlack, J., Carritte, R., and Schmidt, W., "Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", EPRI Report NP-7148, 1991.

C-88
10448176
 1-------------------------------
Minor Structural Damage: Breaker Trip

LOW VOLTAGE
6 GERS (vertical and side-to-side restraint
SWITCHGEAR
plus base frame reinforcement)

5
.....a
....
z
Q
I-
< 4
a:
w
.J
w
(J
(J I , I , ~
--------
("') <
I \ \
' ' I

I
00 .J
U) < 3
a:
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(J
w
CL
en

GERS (side-to-side
restraint only)
G')
rr,
0 _ _ _ _......._ _....__....._.....................__.._._...__ _ ___.._ _......_ :::0
Vl
1 5 10 30 ZPA I
20 3:
FREQUENCY (HZ) <
Vl
-......
N'-.

I-'<
Figure 1. Comparison ofi TRS Data -..... Vl
U) •
...... '.I

10448176
 7 ~

Weld Cracks
8
Sine Beat

Sine Dwell

5
GERS (potential transformer restraint,
-a arc chute side-to-side restraint, and
.... breaker vertical restraint)
z
...<Q 4
er
w
.J
w
0
0
("') <
I .J
I.O <
0
...er0
w
Q.
a,

0
r II
Minor Structural Damage

G)
rn
5 10 20 ZPA :::0
(/)
FREQUENCY (HZ) I
3:
transformer restraint only) <
(/)
N......_
Figure 2. Comparison of TRS Data
......_'
,_.<
........ (/)
I.O •
,_. -....i

10448176
 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91

CONTACTS

FRONT VIEW SIDE VIEW

Note: The Potential Transformer (PT) shown is housed within a separate

compartment and is mounted on cradle which rotates about a yoke
when the compartment door is opened, disengaging the PT contacts.
The cradle rests on the yoke pin under gravity loading only. To
prevent displacement of the cradle, the cradle retainer is added
to restrain the yoke pin.

Figure 3. Example Potential Transformer Restraint

C-91
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 GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91

~
-~
I , SECONDARY
' CONTACTS

RESTRAINING
BRACKET

CRADLE

RESTRAINING PLATE

Note: As rolled in on wheel supported on cradle (supported by

enclosure), the restraining plate is engaged into the
restraining bracket at the same time the secondary and
main contacts are engaged.

Figure 4. Example of Side-to-Side Restraint for Low-Voltage Switchgear

C-92
10448176
 SIDE ARC CHUTE BLOCKS CELL SIDE BLOCK
GERS-MVS/LVS.7
2/1/91
i I :c:
I Ii~~~~
II_~;~

CELL SIDE BLOCK

SECTION A-A

[[

BREAKER UPPER
COMPARTMENT
WELD
\
\
\
SIDE _
SHEET\
/\ ARC CHUTES

' CELL BLOCK

"
",.,.
•!
.,.
... 'I 1
-+--~~ BREAKER
,I
,,;
--·+--··,
I
I 'I'
r-'"------.:n=::.~t,
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:
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:
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: ' ENCLOSURE
, r .• ,• , :- ~ ~ • ••

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I I
l
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l
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!! : 1 : : UNIT
II
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I I
,
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I
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i • =~::;::i:~====*====t;:;_3.:s:.:::~:=:::;;:=:1.=

.::~.
.··:R:\T:~:L OF 4l
~F,...LOO-R-ST-EEL PLATE
ill,·-~r-4;~~;;-;;;~~---in11- BREAKER HOLD
_____
I C'EEL t!J._____
• : DOWN CLIPS

WELD

Figure 5. Example Arc Chute and Uplift Restraints for Medium-Voltage

Switchgear

C-93
10448176
 r--- VERTICAL RESTRAINT GERS-MVS/LVS.7
I / "- BRACKET 2/1/91
POSITIONER / ,

,~n'
\J~ BREAKER UNIT

1- . T~OLE WHEEL

! \
L_ ,_· ___J_J
I '

SWGR
FRAME

OUTER CORNER BASE FRAME

CLIP ANGLE REINFORCEMENT

LINEUP PLAN

Figure 6. Example of Vertical Restraint and Base Frame Reinforcement

for Low-Voltage Switchgear

C-94
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 GERS-TR-4

GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
DRY-TYPE TRANSFORMERS

Prepared for

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

December 1990

C-95
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 GERS-TR.4
12/1/90
1.0 INTRODUCTION

A generic equipment ruggedness spectrum (GERS) for dry-type transformers is present-

ed and discussed in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by GERS presented here is dry-type transformers. Units
included range from 7.5 to 225 KVA capacity with either single- or three-phase vol-
tage ratings of 120-480 volts a.c. These transformers are housed in NEMA-type metal
enc 1osures which can be either wall -mounted or floor-mounted. The units must be
anchored to a supporting structure. The validation of anchorage adequacy requires
an independent evaluation. This equipment class covers the range of dry-type trans-
formers used in power plants. The checklist, given in Section 5, can be used to
screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a range of transformers used in typical nuclear
power plants. Six tests on eight different models with weights ranging from 180 to
2,000 lb from six manufacturers are included in the data base. The earliest test
in the data base was conducted in 1974. All units were mounted within wall- or
floor-mounted, NEMA-type metal enclosures with bolted anchorages. The test reports
indicate that all units tested were exposed to thermal aging and radiation, for
some units, prior to the seismic simulation. The tests were performed using inde-
pendent biaxial inputs. The range of natural frequency for the transformer units
was 8 to 16 Hz.

The functionality of the equipment was determined by monitoring the input and the
output vo 1tages to the transformer. The transformers were energized at 90% of
their rated electrical loads during the seismic simulation test. The transformer
performance was acceptable if there was not any electrical malfunction or structural
failure during the test.

In five out of six tests, there were no malfunctions. However, in testing a 700 lb
transformer, the input current increased momentarily. In addition, coil layer spa-
cers came out and the coil support angle of the transformer broke away from the
support bracket and shorted during the test. The transformer was repaired and an

C-96
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 GERS-TR.4
12/1/90
additional support angle was installed. Subsequently, the repaired transformer was
qualified for a lower input motion level.

Manufacturer (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) review has indicated that relative

motion between bare copper bus or cable connections to the coil/core and the
enc 1osure can cause short circuit. A 3/8-in. minimum clearance between any bare
conductor and the enclosure is recommended.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

Figure 1 compares the GERS to the horizontal test response spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for which the test transformers performed satisfactorily. The
six TRS in the data base were used to construct the GERS. Two of the random multi-
frequency biaxial tests were conducted for site-specific qualification at a very low
level. Thus, these sets were judged not to be useful in constructing the GERS. The
TRS for which failure occurred is also included in Figure 1. The GERS is lower than
the envelope of satisfactory data and accommodates the failure data. The vertical
TRS in all tests, on which the GERS is based, is equal to or greater than the hori-
zontal input motion. Thus, the GERS presented is valid for concurrent equal
vertical and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to transformers, the following criteria must be verified:

• The transformer must be a dry-type unit mounted.within a wall- or floor-

mounted NEMA-type enclosure (review of manufacturer's submittals is
sufficient).

• Transformer size and capacity must be within the following range:

120-480 VAC, 7.5 to 225 KVA; and weight in the range of 180 to 2,000 lb
(review of manufacturer's submittals or transformer nameplate is
sufficient).

• The enclosure must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be

evaluated.

• The internal supports must provide positive attachment of the transform-

er components (a force transfer path for seismic loads is necessary).

• The clearance between any bare conductor and the enclosure must be at
least 3/8 in.

C-97
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 GERS-TR.4
12/1/90

D 0

0
~,-.

0
-~

12 DRY-TYPE 5 .. DAMPING
TRANSFORMERS

10
.....ca
....
z
2
I-
C 8
a:
w
~
w
0
0
C
~ 8
C
a:
I-
0
w
Q.
(I)
GERS

5 10 20 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS With TRS Data

C-98
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 GERS-PT.4

GERS EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS SPECTRUM

FOR
TRANSMITTERS (PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, FLOW)

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Cul°ver City, California

June 1988

C-99
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 GERS-PT.4
6/1/88

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (GERS) for transmitters is presented and

discussed in the following sections. It should be noted that the GERS, in this
case, is the response to input motion at the mounting attachment point of the
transmitter and not at the base of a cabinet/rack or pipe support.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class covered by the GERS presented here is transmitters, of which
four kinds are included: pressure, temperature, level, and flow. Transmitters are
used in power plants to transmit signals, which measure plant operating conditions,
to control panels for use by safety systems, plant control systems, alarm systems
and operator displays. Transmitters contain the electronic circuitry and signal
conditioning necessary for the particular transducer being monitored. Some
transmitters are designed for remote rack or control panel mounting while other
transmitters are mounted adjacent to the transducer. The term transmitter is also
used for the transducer/signal conditioner combination when the transducer and
signal conditioner are integral. This is the usual case for fl ow, pressure and
level transmitters. Temperature transmitters are usually remote from the trans-
ducer. In general, transmitters range in size from a few pounds to about forty
pounds, however, the majority of the transmitters weigh only a few pounds. The
largest physical dimension of a transmitter is usually less than 12 inches.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data for thirty-two sets of tests conducted on numerous
transmitters representing over twelve manufacturers. The earliest test in the data
base was conducted in 1970. Each manufacturer is represented by several different
models of transmitters. The test specimens ranged in weight from 2 to 40 lb.

Tests were performed using biaxial, random multi-frequency, single-axis sine dwell
and sine beat input motions. The early tests were primarily sine dwell. The
function monitored during the test depends on the type of transmitter tested. For
example, in testing a differential pressure transmitter, the electrical output was
monitored both during and after the input motion for intermittent output or signal

C-100
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 GERS-PT.4
6/1/88

drift. Some of the test reports indicate that the transmitters were artificially
aged (thermal as well as radiation) prior to testing.* The results of a test
program investigating the effects of aging and seismic performance are also
included.

Three exceptions occurred during the tests. In one of the tests, the transmitter
could not be made operative after the test. Post-test inspection indicated inter-
nal corrosion damage. In addition, after the test, the mounting bolts required
tightening. In another test, a crack was noted in an internal component assembly.
During another test, the transmitter deviated from calibration zero by 2%. The
acceptable 1imit was noted as 0.1% in the test criteria. In al 1 cases, the
transmitters functioned after the test. Calibration errors did not exceed 2%; the
nominal post-test acceptance criterion in most tests is a calibration error less
than 5%.

4.0 GENERIC EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS

Figure 1 compares the GERS to horizontal or vertical Test Response Spectra (TRS)
(standardized to 5% damping) for which the test transmitters performed satisfac-
torily. Thirty TRS from the data base were used to construct the GERS. The two
tests not considered were sine-beat tests that did not define the frequency range
tested.

Figure 1 also depicts the TRS of the tests for which transmitters failed. The pro-
posed GERS is well under the two highest of the failure data. Figure 1 indicates
that the GERS accommodates a third failure TRS for frequencies greater than 8.0 Hz.
The fact that the TRS dips under the GERS is only a test machine limitation and as
such does not reflect a deficiency of the tested transmitters in the lower fre-
quency range. In general, transmitters do not exhibit dynamic sensitivity for fre-
quencies lower than 20 Hz as demonstrated by several TRS in Figure 1. The GERS
also accommodates the sine sweep test levels used in early test programs and recent
seismic aging studies (EPRI Report NP-5024).

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

C-101
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 GERS-PT.4
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The vertical TRS in all tests on which the GERS was based was approximately equal
to the horizontal input motion. To remain conservative, the lower of either the
horizontal or vertical values were selected for GERS construction; thus, the GERS
presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

5.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this GERS to transmitter components at the transmitter mounting point, the
following criteria must be verified:

• The component is a pressure, temperature, level, or flow transmitter.

• Due to the diversity of transmitters, a transmitter must be one of the
following manufacturer/models in order to apply the GERS for function
during: Foxboro E96, E13, E916; Devar 18-119; Rosemount 1151, 1152, 442;
Robertshaw 161; Love 48, 54, 8100, 1106; Kepco PCX; Travis PS, P24.
• For other models of transmitters, it may be possible to demonstrate
seismic ruggedness by similarity analysis. (The units must be mechani-
cally similar to one of the above models.)
• Since transmitters are sensitive to system perturbations, the effect
of seismic induced system changes (i.e., pressure, flow, and level
variation) should be evaluated.
• Vacuum tubes are not utilized as internal electrical components.
• All external mounting bolts (transmitter to bracket and bracket to
support) are in place.

C-102

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 GERS-PT .4
6/1/88
2er--~~;;~;;;;::;;_~_::;;
__; ;: ; ; ___
: ; ~-~-;::::__;;;::;;;;_:;;::::_~~-,
Internal
28 5'lfi DAMPING X @ Sine Dwell
Component
Creek
••--~IC Sine Sweep
24

Poat Teat Pallure

22
Callbratlol'I Error

20
I
I
18
I

....""
Q
\®l ©
z \ I
...<Q 18
' I
a: ' I
w
.J
w
\1
(.) 14 i
(.)
<
.J
<
...
a:
(.)
12 -
w
a.
fl)

10

0 _ _ _ _ _ _.............._.............1-,.1...1.,1_ _ _.__J.J,.J

1 5 10 20 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. Comparison of GERS With TRS Data

C-103
10448176
10448176
 APPENDIX D

DATA PACKAGES

10448176
 DATA PACKAGES

This appendix contains six data packages for those equipment classes which do not
have sufficient data for GERS construction. Each data package is a separate stand-
alone summary of available data which may be accessed using the following index:

Equipment Identification Page

Automatic Transfer Switches ATS.D D-3
Chillers CHLO D-7
Control Panels CP.D D-11
Instrument Rack Components IRC.D D-16
Motors MTR.D D-20
Safety Relief Valves SRV.D D-24

D-2
10448176
 ATS.D

EQUIPMENT.RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR

AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCHES

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

September 1986

D-3
10448176
 ATS.D
9/10/86

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for automatic transfer switches is presented and discussed
in the following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is automatic transfer switches which
protect critical electrical loads against loss of power continuity by providing the
automatic transfer of the load from the normal to alternate source of power. The
switch automatically retransfers power back to the normal source when it is
restored. The transfer switching is accomplished by circuit breaker type contacts
operated by motor driven or solenoid operated mechanisms and control led by relay
(energized) circuits monitoring the voltage sources. Units included range from
2-pole (d.c.) with a rating of 125 Vdc to 3-pole (a.c.) with a voltage rating of 120
to 480 Vac. These units are usually mounted in NEMA-type wall-mounted enclosures,
although in some cases, the units will be mounted in floor-mounted motor control
center sections. Weights can range from 150 lb for small single units to 2,000 lb
for units housed within a separate enclosure. Nominal enclosure dimensions are 40
in. in height, 30 in. in width, and 8 in. in depth. The units must be anchored to a
supporting structure. The validation of anchorage adequacy requires an independent
evaluation. This equipment class covers virtually all transfer switches used in
power plants for critical power continuity. The checklist, given in Section 4.0,
can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a range of automatic transfer switches. Four
tests on five different models with weights ranging from 150 to 2,000 lb from three
manufacturers are included in the data base. The earliest test in the data base
was conducted in 1974. Three units were directly panel-mounted (bolted) while two
units were attached to a test fixture in wal 1-mounted NEMA-type metal enclosures
with bolted anchorage. Equipment natural frequencies ranged from 14 to 33 Hz.

D-4
10448176
 ATS.D
9/10/86

Some of the test reports abstracted indicated that aged components were included in
the units tested.*

Four sets of tests were performed using biaxial independent inputs. Acceptable
performance was defined for all tests to be the ability to transfer power sources
both during and after the tests. No exceptions or failures were noted in any of
the tests included in the data set. Monitoring of the alarm circuits (relay con-
tacts) was performed during the tests with no intermittent voltage output noted.
The data collection effort was unable to locate any data on transfer switch tests
for which malfunction was noted.

Figure 1 compares the four horizontal Test Response Spectra (TRS) (standardized to
5% damping) for which the test transfer switch performed satisfactorily. One of
the random biaxial tests was conducted for site-specific qualification at a very
low level; this test was judged not to be useful as ruggedness data. The vertical
TRS in all tests was equal to or greater than the horizontal input motion; thus the
data presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

4.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to automatic transfer switches, the following criteria must be
verified.

• Transfer switch size must be within the following range: 120 Vdc,
120-480 Vac, and weight in the range of 150 to 2,000 lb (review of
manufacturer's submittals or switch nameplate is sufficient).
• The enclosure must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be
evaluated.

• All door latches or screwdriver operated door fasteners must be secured.

- -
* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the
seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic test documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

D-5
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 ATS.D
9/10/86

28

AUTOMATIC 541& DAMPING

24
TRANSFER
SWITCHES

22

20

18

--
z
Q
18

...2< 14
a::
...
w
w
()
() 12
...<<
...a::
()
w 10
CL
(I)

8 /P iJJ
00,

i2 Q
C,
~ j
!
~ i.
I
pp 1

R 2

EE 1
PP 1
5 10 20 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. Comparison of TRS Data

D-6
10448176
 CHL.D

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR
CHILLERS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

June 1988

D-7
10448176
 CHL.D
6/1/88

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for chillers is presented and discussed in the following
sections. Due to the normal operating vibration inherent in rotating machinery, a
chiller has sufficiently ruggeded construction which should preclude any concerns
about the ability of a chiller unit to survive a seismic event, given that anchorage
(or lateral restraint) adequacy is validated. Although the data is insufficient for
constructing a GERS, it is presented to provide additional evidence of inherent
seismic ruggedness for chiller configurations.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is chillers (centrifugal liquid)
which provide chilled water for HVAC systems and equipment (such as compressors)
which utilize chilled water for cooling. In plant environments, the critical HVAC
requirements are usually associated with those locations (such as control rooms)
which contain both operating personnel and electrical or control equipment. Chillers
are rated in terms of refrigeration tons (ton= 12,000 Btu/hr). Sizes might range
from 10 tons for small package units to 1,000 tons for large units. A 100-ton unit
would be the nominal size for power plant applications. Local unit controls
(switches, relays, indicating meters, etc.) are usually housed within a control
panel which is i ntegra 1 with the unit. The evaporator, condenser, and compressor
are welded to a supporting steel skid which is typically mounted on (and restrained
by) vibration isolators (neoprene rubber type).

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a test conducted on a 85-ton centrifugal liquid
chiller weighing approximately 10,000 lb with envelope dimensions of 16-ft long,
4-1/2-ft wide, and 6-ft high. The unit was a standard commercial design mounted on
neoprene rubber isolators which were in turn bolted to a retaining plate anchored
to the shake table. The control panel was mounted with small rubber isolators with
thru-bolts (commercial grade) to cantilever brackets welded to the evaporator/
condenser tanks. All local controls, including approximately twenty industrial
type control relays were mounted in the panel.

Low level sine sweep inputs (1-35 Hz) were conducted to identify any resonant fre-
quencies of the chiller unit. No frequencies less than 16 Hz were noted.

D-8
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 CHL.D
6/1/88

The test sequence was conducted using biaxial independent multifrequency inputs.
The chiller unit was operated during the sequence of seismic input motions. A
total of twelve QBE level tests were conducted followed by four SSE level inputs.
The unit continued to operate without interruption during and after all test input
motions. The only anomalies noted were loose isolator lock nuts after the third
QBE and a single broken control panel mounting bolt after the second SSE. The nuts
were retightened and did not loosen during the remaining tests. The broken bolt
was replaced and the testing completed without recurrence.

Figure 1 shows the TRS achieved during the SSE input motions. The vertical TRS in
all tests was equal to or greater than the horizontal input motion; thus the data
presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

4. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to chillers, the following criteria must be verified.

• The chiller unit must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be
evaluated.

• Any vibration isolation incorporated in the chiller or appendage mount-

ings must be evaluated for restraint of lateral (horizontal) seismic
loads.

• All mounting bolts including appendages and bolts associated with vibra-
tion isolation mounts must be checked for tightness.

D-9
10448176
 CHL.D
6/1/88

7 .----,r--,--,---,r,r--,--,,..,.---""'T""---,.-.....---,----

5% DAMPING
6
CHILLERS

3
z
0
H
4
~
<zl
,-l
<zl
u
~

~
H
3
u
...""
<zl

5 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. TRS for Chillers

D-10
10448176
 CP.D

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR
CONTROL PANELS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, Cal;fornia

December 1986

D-11

10448176
 CP.O
12/1/86

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for control panels is presented and discussed in the
following sections.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is control panels which are also
referred to as relay panels, control boards, or relay boards. These units are
steel enclosures containing a variety of component parts including circuit boards,
power supplies, transformers, switches, meters, indicating lights, special-purpose
electronics, and relays. Units are low-voltage rated at 600 VAC or 250 voe. The
typical floor-mounted enclosure (section) is 90-in. high, 30- to 48-in. wide, and
30- to 72-i n. deep. Due to the large amount of components present, each sect ion
can have substantial weight ranging from 700 lb for shallow panels to 3,000 lb for
deep panels. These enclosures are often custom made with thicker gage panels and
heavier frames than found in typical low-voltage NEMA-type enclosures. Multiple
sections may be grouped together to make widths 120 in. or greater. Smaller panels
may be wall-mounted. These wall-mounted panels vary in size, with a nominal dimen-
sion being 60-in. high, 24- to 30-in. wide and 10- to 20-in. deep. The weight of
wall-mounted panels is usually less than 700 lb. The units must be anchored to a
supporting structure. The validation of anchorage adequacy requires an independent
evaluation. This equipment class covers a wide range of control panels used in
power plants for critical control functions. The checklist given in Section 4.0
can be used to screen for outliers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment descriptive information, test methods/
description, and test data covering a wide range of control panels. Eighteen dif-
ferent configurations with weights ranging from 700 to 13,000 lb from ten manufac-
turers which represent the range of units found in actual power plants are included
in the data base. The earliest test in the data base was conducted in 1974. The
units tested involved both single- and multi-section control panel units (up to six
sections). All units were mounted within metal enclosures with either welded or
bolted anchorage.

Five tests were performed with random, independent, biaxial input motions. Five
tests used random, independent, triaxial input motion, while two additional tests

D-12
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 CP.D
12/1/86

utilized sine-beat inputs combined with random biaxial inputs. The remaining six
tests used dependent biaxial random inputs. A common qualification practice used
by several manufacturers is to perform the dynamic testing with the components
simulated by dummy weights. The dynamic response of the panel is mapped and then
the individual components are qualified with the input motion which envelops the
measured panel response. Six of the data base panel tests were conducted in this
manner. For these six tests only the panel structural integrity was qualified.
The remaining tests were conducted on complete energized (and deenergized) panels.
The test results span the entire range of possible success and failure. Failure
modes are relay chatter, mounting screws loose, doors opening or slapping, and bro-
ken wires. In one test, a loose washer (debris) caused a short. The problems
associated with door latches and cables being unsupported were repaired and the
panels requalified.

In general, the functionality of control panels are limited by relay chatter in the
deenergized state. Thus, the issue of control panel function during a dynamic
event is governed by the ruggedness of the relays present. It should be noted that
all control panel units functioned in post-test operation, excluding the unit which
shorted due to the loose washer.

Figure 1 compares the horizontal test response spectra (TRS) (standardized to 5%

damping) for the eighteen tests in the base. Both the energized and the
deenergized data are compared in Figure 1. The vertical TRS in all tests was
approximately equal to the horizontal input motion. Thus, the data presented is
valid for concurrent vertical and horizontal motion.

4.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to control panels, the following criteria must be verified:

• The control panel must be a low-voltage unit with a wal 1- or floor-

mounted enclosure with an average weight per vertical section that does
not exceed 60 lb/in. of depth panel (review of manufacturer's submittals
is sufficient).
• The control panel must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be
evaluated.
• All door latches must be secured with locking devices.
• The support of internal cables and bundled wires must be visually in-
spected and wire harnesses or standoffs installed if large deformation
of cable bundles can be induced by manual inspection.

D-13
10448176
 CP.D
12/1/86

CONTROL PANELS TRS: 5% Damping

X - Sine Beat
Ii SI - Structural Integrity
Test Only

"'
Cl/
,:::,
.,
::,

·-
'ii
1

~
I (Fan)
.,"'...
u
Cl/
C. 3
V,

D
5 10 20 30 ZPA
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 1. Comparison of TRS Success Data

D-14
10448176
 CP.D
12/1/86

7,---------------------------,
CONTROL PANELS TRS: 5% Damping

/\
6 ,_ / \ ~ Relay Chatter(E&DE) ~

I \ t\,) r' I
/1
~
\I
Wire Chafing
5 ... I \ / \I \ Loose Screws

I \// \ / ~ \ D;rs

Cl/
"'
::, I
\ I I\ \ ,,
+' 4 ...
I\_ / ,' \_ \ ,' \ I
I I\ \ I I ", -" \ I
I I\ V ,/ __ ~ T,---
I \ I"v~,' \_
, I- -- -
f
/ I"'
J '., \ \/
W''J I -----
,
,1y1 \. .- . . . '-,
\ Loose Washer
1
2 ... // )

vi / /-- - __/ ',,

/// ~Chatter(DE) '. _ _ I
1 ..., Wires
7 / I
V I
I
0 L___ _ _.i._ l_..1...I_ . L . _ _
1_.i._l_L_'.L'_J..._.J,,1_1._•.1..•J.._ ,_.,_,_,__I_ _ _-=-=-~
5 10 20 30 ZPA
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 2. Comparison of TRS Failure Data

D-15
10448176
 IRC.D

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR
INSTRUMENT RACK COMPONENTS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

September 1986

D-16
10448176
 IRC.D
9/10/86

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for instrument rack components is presented and discussed
in the fol lowing sections. It should be noted that the data, in this case, is the
response to input motion at the mounting or attachment point of the components and
not at the base of a rack.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is instrument rack components of
which the following are included: power supplies, square root extractors, monitor-
ing recorders, pressure gages, indicators and meters, controllers, multiplex units,
control/logic units, and formettes. Other typical instrument rack components are
switches, transmitters, and relays. These components have been addressed in sepa-
rate data compilations. Every plant has a great variety of instrument racks which
can be either floor- or wall-mounted. In general, these racks are custom-made for
the particular plant and are usually braced frames made from angles or more
commonly, unistrut. Some racks include a steel-plate face for panel-mounting of
components. Others may have individual electrical enclosures attached for mounting
of components. The components indicated above are all electrical components except
for the pressure gages. These electrical components usually contain circuit-board-
type electronics.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

Due to the great diversity of rack configurations and components, a common qualifi-
cation practice used by several suppliers is to perform the dynamic testing on a
typical rack with the components simulated by dummy weights. The dynamic response
of the rack is mapped and then the individual components are qualified with the
input motion which envelops the measured rack response. Very few tests are con-
ducted on racks with the components attached.

The data base includes basic equipment description information, test methods/
description, and test data for sixteen sets of tests conducted on numerous com-
ponents representing various manufacturers. The earliest test in the data base was
conducted in 1970.

Tests were performed using biaxial random multi-frequency as well as single-axis

sine-dwell input motions. The primary function monitored during the test was out-

D-17
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 IRC.D
9/10/86

put continuity. Successful operation of the component was assumed if there was no
mechanical or electrical failure during and after the seismic tests. Some of the
test reports indicate that the components were artificially aged prior to testing.*

Four exceptions occurred during the tests. In one case, a meter movement was found
to be inoperative following the test. In another test, the windings of a formette
failed a post-seismic hi-pot test. In a third case, the output signal of a com-
ponent was lost and in the fourth test the component mounting was damaged but the
components were still functional.

Figure 1 compares the horizontal or vertical test response spectra (TRS) (standard-
ized to 5% damping) for which the test components were subjected. The vertical TRS
in all tests was based approximately equal to the horizontal input motion. Thus,
the data presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

4.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to instrument rack components, the following criteria must be
verified.

• The component is a power supp 1y, square root extractor, monitoring

recorder, pressure gage, indicator meter, controller, multiplex unit,
control/logic unit, or formette.
• All mounting bolts and screws are utilized and tight.
• The support of internal wire loop and bundled wires must be visually
inspected and wire harnesses or standoffs installed if large displace-
ment of wire bundles can be induced by hand inspection.

* The aging of components is often conducted in separate programs prior to the

seismic qualification test effort. Thus, the seismic testing documentation often
does not describe the aged condition of the component being tested.

D-18
10448176
 IRC.D
9/10/86

Sq. Rt. Extractor (Lon of SlgneO

21,---~---------------------.......--------------r:~...:::::.....,
©
ll
Component Mounting Loo••
21
(Lon of SlgneO
ll

x - Sine Dwel (Succen)

INSTRUMENT 5'4 DAMPING
24 @ - Sine Dwell (F1llure)
RACK
- - Sine Sweep
COMPONENTS
Meter Inoperative

Formette Poat-THt
! Functional Feb•
z
s
C
a:
_,
Ill
Ill
CJ
CJ
_,C
C
...a:CJ
Ill
L
Ill

5 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. Comparison of TRS Data

D-19
10448176
 MTR.D

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR
MOTORS

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by
ANCO Engineers, Inc.
Culver City, California

June 1988

D-20
10448176
 MTR.D
6/1/88

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for motors is presented and discussed in the following
sections. Due to the normal operating vibration inherent in rotating machinery, a
motor has sufficiently rugged construction which should preclude any concerns about
the ability of a motor to operate after a seismic event, given that anchorage ade-
quacy is validated. During start/ stop cycles, motor components experience large
and varying forces. Most motor manufacturers maintain that winding starting forces
are in excess of seismic force levels. In order to withstand these forces and main-
tain proper shaft alignment and rotor-to-starter clearances, motors are designed to
be structurally rigid. Motors generally do not have natural frequencies less than
33 Hz and are usually qualified for seismic loads by static analyses which assume
rigid body response to the dynamic seismic loads. Although the data is insufficient
for constructing a GERS, it is presented to provide additional evidence of inherent
seismic ruggedness for induction motors.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is motors (AC induction) which are
the prime movers for a variety of power plant equipment such as pumps, fans, com-
pressors, and valves. AC induction motors account for approximately 90 percent of
the motor population of a plant, ranging in size from fractional horsepower (hp)
ratings to several hundred hp. The majority of the motors are in the 1-150 hp
range and are powered and controlled from motor control centers.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes equipment descriptive information, test methods/description,

and test data for seven motors ranging from 10 hp to 500 hp. One test program was
conducted to determine the fragi 1ity level of motors subjected to weapon induced
ground shock (SAFEGUARD) and consisted of multifrequency biaxial inputs (reported
in EPRI Report NP-3946). Another test program was conducted to seismically qualify
motors for the trans-Alaska pipeline. In this test program, the response due to
impact and operation including motor start-up, steady-state operation, and shutdown
were monitored for a number of different motor configurations. No modes were found
below 33 Hz. It was concluded that the motors acted as rigid bodys for base inputs
less than 33 Hz. Shake table proof tests were conducted using a single frequency

D-21
10448176
 MTR.D
6/1/88

sine dwell. A recent third test program conducted as part of a seismic-aging corre-
lation study (EPRI Report NP-5024) tested four motors using triaxial multifrequency
inputs.

A belt drive was included in on the SAFEGUARD test configuration. The test level
was increased until belt slippage occurred. A loose oil fill cap, cracked support
bracket, and an oil leak from a bearing were noted in the Trans-Alaska pipeline
test. For the EPRI test, an elastomeric mounting bushing became loose. It should
be noted that all motors were operated during a test without interuption. The
above noted exceptions had no effect on motor function.

Figure 1 shows the TRS achieved during the test input motions. The vertical TRS in
all tests was equal to or greater than the horizontal input motion; thus the data
presented is valid for concurrent equal vertical and horizontal motion.

4.0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to motors, the following criteria must be verified.

• The motor unit must be anchored and the installed anchorage must be
evaluated.
• Any vibration isolation incorporated in the motor mountings must be
evaluated for restraint of lateral {horizontal) seismic loads.
• All mounting bolts and bolts associated with vibration isolation mounts
must be checked for tightness.

D-22
10448176
 MTR.D
6/1/88

14

13
5% DAMPING
MOTORS
12
EPRI
11
(loose elastomeric mounting
bushing, but motor func-
10 tion)

~ 9 SINE DWELL
'-'
:z;
...
0
8 (loose oil fill cap,..-~~+---
~
fzl
cracked bracket,
bearing oil leak,
..:I
fzl
tJ 7 but motor func-
~ tion)

j 6

reen s SAFEGUARD (belt slipage,

but motor function)
4

l 5 10 20 30 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. TRS for Motors

D-23
10448176
 SRV.D1

EQUIPMENT RUGGEDNESS DATA

FOR

SAFETY RELIEF VALVES

(SPRING-OPERATED)

Prepared for
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Palo Alto, California

Prepared by

ANCO Engineers, Inc.

Culver City, California

June 1988

D-24
10448176
 SRV.D1
6/1/88

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Equipment ruggedness data for safety relief valves (spring-operated) is presented

and discussed in the following sections. Due to the forces experienced in opera-
tion, the valve construction is extremely rugged. Since many spring-relief valves
are essentially rigid bodies for seismic loading (i.e., no resonances less than
33 Hz), these valves are often qualified by test application of static loads equiva-
lent to inertia loads and operation is verified during static load application. The
force levels during discharge greatly exceed any external seismic inertial loads
which should preclude any concerns about the ability of a safety relief valve to
operate after a seismic event. Although the data is insufficient for constructing a
GERS, it is presented to provide additional evidence of inherent seismic ruggedness
for safety relief valves. It should be noted that the data, in this case, is the
response to input motion at the mounting or attachment point of the valve to the
piping system.

2.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

The equipment class for the data presented here is safety relief valves which are
spring-operated. They range in size from 12 to 60 in. in height with weight up to
1,600 lb. The valves in this class have pressure ratings in the range 15 to 2,500
psi with a nominal inlet diameters of 3/4 in. to 6 in. The valves of this class
usually have open yokes. A safety relief functions only if a plant transient causes
a system pressure to exceed a specified pressure. For function, the system pressure
pushes against the valve disc which is held shut by the force of a spring or bellows
until the valve setpoint is reached. The self-actuating setpoint is established by
an adjusting screw in the valve bonnet which sets spring tension. As the valve disc
begins to lift, the disc area exposed to system pressure increases, thus increasing
the opening force and causing the valve to "pop" open. After blowdown, the safety
valve resets at a pressure below the setpoint pressure. The rating of a valve is
the factory pre-set (nominal) setpoint pressure. A safety valve may have a lever to
permit manual or remote operation of the valve. The preferred mounting position of
the valve is with the yoke and spring vertical and above the valve body.

3.0 TEST DATA BASE

The data base includes basic equipment description information, test methods/
description, and test data for tests conducted on a series of different valves from

D-25
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 SRV.01
6/1/88

two major manufacturers. The test specimens ranged in weight from 50 lb to 1,550 lb
with nominal setpoints between 15 and 2,500 psi.

Tests were performed with random, independent biaxial axis input motions, single-
axis sine dwell tests, and biaxial sine dwell and sine beat tests. Two of the tests
used both biaxial random and single-axis sine dwell. However, these tests were not
qualification tests but rather research fragility tests. Only low-pressure valves
( 15 and 60 psi ) were tested in the research program but the tests are unique, in
that the effect of inlet pressure and setpoint pressure differential on valve opera-
tion was investigated. In general, it was shown that the vertical direction was the
most sensitive input direction and that the closer the inlet pressure was to the
setpoint, the lower the vertical input required to "pop" the valve. The fragility
test program also noted that the rattling of a free handle could cause a premature
momentary release and thus recommended that the handles of relief valves be fastened
down.

The remaining tests in the data base were qualification tests conducted using sine
inputs on 1,200 psi or greater valves. All valves qualified had natural frequencies
greater than 24 Hz. No stress-related failures were noted in the data base. No
functional valve failures (fail to open or close) were noted in the qualification
tests.

Figure compares the horizontal test response spectra (TRS) (standardized to 5%

damping) contained in the data base. The vertical TRS in all tests on which the
data is based was equal to the horizontal input motion; thus the data presented is
valid for equal vertical and horizontal motion.

4. 0 CHECKLIST

To apply this data to safety relief valves, the following criteria must be verified.

• The safety relief valve must be spring operated.

• The nominal pipe size of the valve inlet must be 6 in. or less.
• The valve yoke and spring must be vertical and above the valve body.

• Unrestrained manual lifting levers must be fastened down (using twisted

wire for example). This does not apply to lifting levers that are used
for remote operation.

D-26
10448176
 SRV.Dl
6/1/88

38
X XX
(1,500 psi valves)
34
SAFETY-RELIEF VALVES
32 5'11, DAMPING

30 J (1,200 psi valve)

I
28 I
Sine Dwell~
I
28 (1,200 psi valve) ) I
X I
24 I
.....
~ 22
z -------------------K
Q
I-
<
a:
w
.J
w
20
I
I

I
(J 18
(J
<
.J
<
a:
18
I-
SINE SWEEP/ -.c._,/
(J DWELL
w
·o. 14 (<2,soo psi
0) valves)
x (1,200 psi valve)
12
)(.Ji..____,..:___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

10

0
1 5 10 20 ZPA
FREQUENCY (HZ)

Figure 1. TRS Data for Safety-Relief Valves

D-27
10448176
10448176
 APPENDIX E
ACRONYMS

10448176
 ACRONYMS

A/E Architect/Engineering Firm

ANCO ANCO Engineers, Inc.

BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory

CROM Control Rod Drive Mechanism

EPA Electrical Penetration Assembly

EPRI_ Electric Power Research Institute

EQDB Equipment Qualification Data Base (operated for EPRI by NUS)

EQE EQE, Inc.
GERS Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectrum (Spectra)

HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning System

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

LATA Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc.

LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident

MCC Motor Control Center

MPR MPR Associates, Inc.

NEMA Nation~l Electrical Manufacturer's Association

NSS Nuclear Steam Supply System

NUS NUS Corporation

OBE Operating Basis Earthquake

RF Radio Frequency

RRS Required Response Spectrum (Spectra)

RTD Resistance Temperature Detector

SQAC Seismic Qualification Advisory Committee

SQRT Seismic Qualification Review Team

SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Group

SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake

SSRAP Senior Seismic Review Advisory Panel

TAP Task Action Plan

E-2
10448176
TRS Test Response Spectrum (Spectra)

URS/Blume URS/Blume, Inc.

USNRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

USI Unresolved Safety Issue

WEC Westinghouse Electric Corporation
ZPA Zero Period Acceleration

E-3
10448176
10448176