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Polysemy and Homonymy PDF
Polysemy and Homonymy PDF
A CONTINUUM OR NOT?
by
A Thesis
Department of Linguistics
at Carbondale
December, 1995
Chapter 1
Introduction.
1.0 Introduction.
Bloomfield stated that we can pursue the study of language without
reference to any psychological doctrine, and that to do so safeguards
our results and makes them more significant to workers in related
fields.
(Bloomfield 1933: vii)
Chapter 2
"The sentence
... My sister is the Ruritanian Secretary of State.
is unspecified4 (general, indefinite, unmarked, vague,neutral)
with respect to whether my sister is older or younger than I am,
whether she acceded to her post recently or some time ago,
whether the post is hers by birth or by merit, whether it has
indefinite tenure or will cease at some specific future time,
whether she is right-handed or left-handed, and so on."
(Zwicky and Sadock 1975: 2)
based on the assumption that they are quite different phenomena and
a vast gulf is fixed between them. Ullmann (1959: 62-63) outlines a
view held by many linguists of how polysemy comes about:-
“The frontiers of verbal significations are often fluid, even
though the core may be perfectly clear and unmistakable ... Even the
most rigidly defined terms of scientific discourse are not wholly
immune from ... minor shifts, which are completely dependent
on the context. ... By divergent semantic development these minor
shifts may crystallise into major ones. The word will then be said to
possess ‘several meanings’ the interrelatedness of which is fully
grasped, but which are so remote from each other as to make the
symbol unserviceable in isolation.”
2.3.1.1 Arbitrariness.
Signifiant Signifié
SIGNIFIED
SIGN
SIGNIFIER
Thought/Reference
Symbol Referent
‘spider’
ΛΥΚΟΣ ΛΥΚΟΣ
Sense Sense
2.3.1.2 Motivation.
2.4 What the words and lexemes are, and how this is useful for a
consideration of polysemy and homonymy.
Whether the noun giving, or, even more problematically, the series
gift (both noun and verb), gifted, are perceived as belonging to the
same lexeme or more than one depends on how the individual speaker
decides they have been derived.
Word-forms are assigned to the same lexemes on the basis of
morphological linkage; whether by dint of their connectedness by
inflexional (as per above) and/or morphological means. The set
gave, given, give, giving, and gives is formed inflectionally with the
inflexional suffixes/infixes, or by suppletion; -a-, -n, ø, -ing, and -s
respectively.
A diachronic understanding of this problem is that pronouns,
auxiliary verbs, and other grammatical markers having been bleached
of meaning by grammaticalisation, cease "to reflect external relations"
(Ullmann 1959: 36), are therefore non-lexemes. This is where the
distinction between words and lexemes can be seen to be useful,
insofar as we may state that pronouns, auxiliary verbs, and other
grammatical markers are still words, but they, being partially or fully
bleached of semantic content are not complete lexemes and are at
least partly de-lexicalised, having largely formal, i.e. syntactic
function.
This has not been satisfactorily resolved as these definitions rely
upon the idea of sufficient characteristics. Even an apparently easily
definable word such as ‘chair’ is problematic when we look for
features shared between pouffes, ladder-back stools, Orkney basket
seats, and pillows stuffed with beans. We might get away with a
functional definition of of ‘chair’; even this might prove impossible
with pronouns, auxiliary verbs, and other grammatical markers.
A more satisfactory way to resolve this is to consider words in terms
of degrees of prototypicality. Pronouns, auxiliary verbs, and other
grammatical markers may be considered as approximating less closely
to the prototype of a semantically rich word than a word such as 'chair'.
One distinction that needs to be made, but is often overlooked,
in connection with studies of what forms constitute forms of a
lexeme, is the distinction between morphological and/or phonological
change and semantic change. The coining of a verb from a noun may
require the development of inflected forms to fulfill all the
requirements of a verb paradigm; therefore both morphological
and/or phonological change and semantic change take place.
Diachronic phonological change, often reflected in orthography, does
not of necessity indicate semantic change. Diachronic morphological
16
List A List B
1. give 1. gift
2. give 2. gift
3. gave 3. gifts
For example:-
Homophones;
dyer [daˆ.|], and dire [daˆ.|], (in some dialects,
and/or when spoken at certain speeds)
Homographs;
read [®id], and read [®´d] ,
17
If it is held that each list contains two words then words are being
equated with word-types (formally identical word-tokens; whether
phonologically and/or graphically are similar tokens); members 1.
and 2. of both lists being formally identical both phonologically and
graphically.
Chapter 3
3.0 This chapter consists of an introduction to some of the basic
concepts of Cognitive Grammar, with special reference to Polysemy
and Homonymy. It also examines how specific Cognitive linguists
have tackled the concepts of Polysemy and Homonymy.
with, or via other meanings with those with which they are more
distantly related.
Lakoff (1986: 79) points out that stereotyping is also a source
of prototypicalisation through a process of metonymy. One of a
number of senses of a form (a subcategory of the categorial cluster of
meanings attached by speakers to that form) becomes recognised
within a speech community as the prototypical sense; the sense that
over-arches all other senses of the form, that are perceived, in some
way, to be subordinate to it. This does not necessarily mean that the
sense that is socially determined as the prototype is in any way the
direct diachronic descendent of the archetypical sense.
Cognitive Grammar, while superficially appearing to be about
language alone, is staking a claim to an overarching account of the
whole of human cognition; an encyclopaedic view of meaning that
needs involve all sorts of areas that have for some time been excluded
from the study of semantics - social setting for one.
A6
A2
A3
A1
A8
A7
A primary objection to this model relates to the chirality of the
spokes of the prototype wheel; they appear to be determined quite
arbitrarily by the linguist who draws up the diagram.
A7
A2
A8 A3
A1
A6
If one assumes that the structure of the radial set extends into
three dimensions this poses the problem of multiple isomers. But, as
25
A6
A2
A3
A1
A8
A7
The possibilities for analysis by individuals are endless, and
owing to the possibility that each sense of a term might have multiple
connections (even between what, under other circumstances, are felt
to be two distinct prototypical meanings of homonyms), an idea dealt
with in the section on pathological homonymy. Therefore it would
seem that in some cases one could travel along a multiplicity of paths
26
Iberian
3.3 Prototypicality.
c b
d forca-fourque-furca-fork a
b c
a d
Where the circle represents (rather badly; it should have vague and
indefinable boundaries rather than a sharp, black line)) the domain of
the polysemous cluster forca-fourque-furca-fork , and the segments
represent the intersection of the four dialect/languages’ individual
35
B2
A2
A4
B6
B3
A1 A3 B5 B1
A5 B7 B4
At time ø.
As speakers face increasing difficulty analysing:-
1. Which cluster senses A3, A5, and B4 belong to, (because
"etymologically related concepts are too far apart to be
recognized as nuances of a single prototypical category"
(Geeraerts 1990: 50))they may;
A B
B2
A2
A4
B3 B 6
B4
A1 B5 B1
A5
B7 A 3
A B
B2
A2
A4
B6
B3
A1 B5 B1
B7
C
A3
B
A5 4
1.3 Merge the two clusters together, (because what were once
senses of "distinct categories are now seen as nuances of a
single category" (Geeraerts 1990: 50))
A2
A1
A4 B3
B2 B5
B7
A3
B4
B1
A5
B6
B2
A2
A4 B6
B3
A1 B5 1
B7
A3
A 5 B4
B2
A2
A4
B6
B4 A 1 B7 B3 B1
A5
B5 A3
For example; there are two words pig, one descended from Old
English *pigga/*picga (='a swine') and the other from Old English *pyg
(='an earthenware pot/jar'). It is seemingly logical to assume that the
latter word is somehow connected with the word pig used for a lump
of metal (they are similarly shaped), when in fact, diachronically they
are derived from totally different roots.
An examination of the cluster/clusters fork in chapter 4
attempts to explain the data available in terms of these types of
reanalysis.
Reanalyses of the types 1.3 and 2.1 involve processes of
polysemisation which appear to run counter to the tendency to avoid
pathological polysemy.
specify when the lexical route should be the fastest [i.e. ease of
categorisation]. The condition we chose was how tightly
clustered the category was. This notion is far from being
rigorously defined, but the intuitive idea seemed fairly clear ...
Initially, it seemed that the category parts of the body was
fairly well defined. But when we started to consider whether
the liver, a fingernail, or an eyebrow was a part of the body,
we began to realize that it was not so clear cut. So it might be
the case that only a fairly standard set of "core" items would be
listed as members of this category, with items such as liver not
being listed at all..." (Forster 1989: 129) [Forster's emphasis]
Black, White, Blue, Yellow, Red, Green, Brown, +/- Grey, Purple, Orange.
Outwith which there is the sort of vague, fuzzy boundary one expects
at the edge of a cognitive category, inhabited by the ivory, peach,
apricot, coffee colours of Forster, as well as the more-or-less nonce
terms such as squashed-parrot-green, upchucked-cheese, and so on.
Almost all of the types of terms mentioned by Forster carry with them
an implicit standard colour which they are merely adjectivally
modifying. The category of standard colours would seem very tight,
that category that includes the category of standard colours and the
secondary colours is looser, and so on. Forster is setting the
boundaries on his number names and his colour names categories
which may not be psychologically universal, and appear highly
subjective. It would be instructive to know whether Forster includes
terms such as score, dozen, baker's dozen, long-hundred, and
milliard in his number names category.
Forster falls to pieces over his core terms; attempting to use this
as a scientifically verifiable way of setting boundaries. Forster's
choices about what are, and what are not, core terms can be seen to
be highly pragmatic (that is, pragmatic insofar as they make his work
appear somewhat neater and tidier than it really is) and subjective.
This is no reason to belittle Forster's work, but rather a reason to
realise just how vague and ill-defined cognitive categories are, and the
perils of trying to crystallise them in some way.
The long-standing controversy is unresolvable if language is
viewed only synchronically. If we are happy to accept naive native-
speaker intuition (instant folk etymology) as the only test of whether
two words are homonyms or parts of a polysemic cluster, this will
result in us only ascribing homonymy to phonologically convergent
forms; rather than semantically divergent forms.
One response (advanced but not supported by Geeraerts
47
Though birds are animate, they are not in class I with other
animate beings. Birds are believed to be spirits of dead human
females, and so are in class II."
(Lakoff 1987: 94)
the image), every creak and groan of the ship affecting them
emotionally as might the rheumatism of a wife.
Bulgarians find this ascription of femininity to what to them
appear distinctly unfeminine objects as distinctly odd (Snezha
Tsoneva-Mathewson Personal Communication).
These words are categorised as feminine because of
relationships with the speakers that are felt to be different to those
of, say, a chair, a stone, or a pencil; that is to say that cognitively they
are regarded as different. It seems that speakers include things in
categories less by dint of obvious, concrete features, than by
reference to how they affect the speaker; how immediate, how
relevant they are to the speaker, how cognitively salient.
A point that is worth making here is with regard to a diachronic
element to categorial inclusion. While many English speakers still
speak of ships as 'she' very few have the type of relation with a ship
that gave rise to its categorisation as feminine. While the cognitive
salience for ascribing femininity to ships may have been lost the habit
persists; there being no pressing reason to recategorise ship.
Nevertheless recategorisation of 'ship' is going on; predictably as a
neuter object - just as with the trend to regularise verbs that do not
conform to the ø, -ed, -ed pattern of tense formation - there is no
longer a justification for making an exception of it.
This may account for a lots of the apparent examples of
NO COMMON PROPERTY categories; the speakers of a language have
forgotten why their ancestors classified things thus but felt no reason
to reanalyse the state of affairs. What was cognitively salient to our
grandparents may have no significance at all to us.
Lakoff (1987: 95-7) outlines ways in which categorisation is
organised in human language in terms of CENTRALITY, CHAINING,
EXPERIENTIAL DOMAINS, IDEALISED MODELS, SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE (SPECIALISED
is a better way to put this), THE OTHER (a category for that what does
not fit in all the other categories), NO COMMON PROPERTIES, and
MOTIVATION.
Endnotes.
Motor Movements,
"Inseparable from the perceived attributes of objects are
the ways in which humans habitually use or interact with
those objects." (33)
4.0 Introduction.
1225 N1
1250
1275
1300
1325
1350
1375
1400
1425 N4
1450
1475
1500
1525 N2
1550 N5 V1
1575 N3
1600 N8
1625 N6 N7
1650 N9 V3
1675 V4
1700 N10 V5
1725
1750
1775
1800 N11
1825 N12
1850 N13
1875 N15 N14 N16
1900
1925
1950
1975 N17
4.1.2 Legend.
V1 to farrow 1532
V3 to give birth (of humans) 1660
“The bed that Pope Joan pigged in” (OED)
V4 to huddle together in a disorderly fashion 1675
V5 to hang many skins together (gloving jargon) 1688
N11 (a police officer, 1800), reflects how criminals feel about people
who stand in the way of them. The short-lived form, N15 (an
informer, 1874), expresses similar sentiments to N11.
N6, a sixpenny bit (1622) would seem to be a pejorative
extension.
N7, N8, and N9 (a billet of unspecified metal, lead, and iron
respectively (1589-1647) are forms used as technical terms in the
foundry trade, formed by a supposed resemblance between these
metal lumps and swine.
N12, a block of salt (1825), is formed on the same basis as N7,
N8, and N9; as was N14, a bundle of hemp (1860).
N13, a piece of fruit (1843) can only be explained with respect
to the fact that swine have been traditionally fed on left-over scraps
from their owners’ tables; including, no doubt, bits of apples and so
on.
N16, a wild swine (1889) is a simple extension of the term to
embrace non-domesticated swine.
N17, used pejoratively of something (1975) is an extension from
its use as a pejorative term for humans.
pig1 1550
N2 N4
V1 N1
N10
pig1 1750 N7
N5 N6
N9
N8
N2
V1
V3
V4
V5
N16
N11
N10
N5
N9
N2
V1
V3
pig1
V4
V5 present
57
1350
1375
1400
1425 pig2
1450 N1
1475
1500 N2
1525 N4
1550
1575
1600
1625
1650
1675
1700
1725
1750
1775
1800
1825 N6 N3 N5
1850
N3
pig2 1880
N5
N2
N1
N6
N4
4.2.1 How Monosemous was the Term Pig 1 in the Tenth Century?
One of the most glaring problems with this is the written record;
there is no particularly good reason to suppose that pig 1 circa 1970
had any more senses ascribed to it than*pigga circa 970 beyond the
written usages that have survived.
At the price of appearing pedantic it should be pointed out that
the animal central to our cluster has changed significantly since 970
(this can be validated by inspection of illustrations of pigs in
illuminated manuscripts); today's English pigs do not have backward
curving tusks that project above the lip, to pick only the most glaring
difference. Even the prototypical sense of the word pig (pig 1 N2) has
a number of contemporary applications; it being applied without
discrimination to a Gloucester Old-Spots and a Tamworth (breeds of
porcus ).
It may also be that pig 2 is ultimately derived from pig 1.
assumption that all of the senses are derived from a common form
within English) it is beset with problems:-
1000 N1
1025
1050
1075
1100
1125
1150
1175
1200 N7
1225
1250
1275
1300 N2
1325
1350
1375 N9
1400 N16* N12
1425 N11
1450 N4
1475
1500
1525
1550
1575
1600 N3 N13 N10
1625 N8
1650 N20
1675
1700
1725
1750
1775 N18¶
1800 N5 N6
1825
1850 N14 N19 N17
1875 N15
1900
1925
1950
1975
2000
Conclusion
REFERENCES
BLOOMFIELD, LEONARD. 1933. Language. New York: Henry Holt.
BRENTARI, DIANE, GARY N. LARSON and LYNN A. MACLEOD., eds. 1992
66
___________________________________________________________
Definition of Terms
The terms U.S. ENGLISH, AUSTRALIAN ENGLISH, NEW ZEALAND ENGLISH, and other
non-English types of ENGLISH are dependent for their definition on the
Second Oxford English Dictionary.