National Territory

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Article II, Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is
the protector of the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national
territory.
Article II, Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
Article V, Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Article VI, Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not
less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article VI, Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article VII, Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Article VII, Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be
elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the
President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
Article VII, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Article X, Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.
Article X, Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Article XII, Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.
Article XVI, Section 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall
undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of
the State.
UNCLOS III, Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil.
1) The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with Article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2) This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.
3) This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
4) The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of
the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over
such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, ET AL., vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,ET AL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA 9522)
adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960
(UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation
passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted
by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length,
and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah
and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case
or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as
the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the
United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area
drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare
RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither
infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA
9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of
the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to
the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific
interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any
treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the
time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure
the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of
their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article
56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522
because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features
are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
NATIONAL TERRITORY
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area. 27 Petitioners add
that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about
15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the
configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under
UNCLOS III, belie this view. 1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust
the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory
renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded
both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total
maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as
shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime area

Extent of maritime area
using RA 3046, as
using RA 9522, taking
amended, taking into
into account UNCLOS
account the Treaty of
III (in square nautical
Paris’ delimitation (in
miles)
square nautical miles)
Internal or
archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic Zone 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive
economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do
not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall
be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal
effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.31
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that
any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing
during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside
our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of
international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim
them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we]
call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking
circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating
archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and
1avvphi1
in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones
including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as
amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical
miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that
"The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of
baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system.
This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North
Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines
of Sabah:
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal
waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic waters" under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of
the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over
such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the
political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical
highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent
passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the
right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights
through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all
the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to
their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. 46 Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond
the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x." 49 Article II provisions
serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II
as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions
petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence fishermen
(Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the
Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the
exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 54 We
have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative
of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very
steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is
recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180110
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER AND ASSESSOR OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated May 30, 2007 and Resolution dated October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82264, which both
1 2
denied the appeal of petitioner against the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Below are the acts of the case.

NATIONAL TERRITORY
Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing international
telecommunications services. As such provider, Capwire has signed agreements with other local and foreign
3
telecommunications companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN) (which connects Australia, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines); the BruneiMalaysia-Philippines Cable
Network System (BMP-CNS), the PhilippinesItaly
(SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The agreements provide for co-ownership and other
4
rights among the parties over the network. 5
Petitioner Capwire claims that it is co-owner only of the so-called "Wet Segment" of the APCN, while the landing stations or
terminals and Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly owned by the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Corporation (PLDT). Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in inten1ational, and not Philippine, waters.
6 7
Capwire claims that as co-owner, it does not own any particular physical part of the cable system but, consistent with its
financial contributions, it owns the right to use a certain capacity of the said systern. This property right is allegedly reported in
8
its financial books as "Indefeasible Rights in Cable Systems." 9
However, for loan restructuring purposes, Capwire claims that "it was required to register the value of its right," hence, it
engaged an appraiser to "assess the market value of the international submarine cable system and the cost to Capwire." On 10
May 15, 2000, Capwire submitted a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties at the Provincial Treasurer's Office,
Batangas City, Batangas Province, for the Wet Segment of the system, stating:
System Sound Value

APCN P203,300,000.00
BMP-CNS p 65,662,000.00
SEA-ME-WE-3 CNSP P7,540,000.00
GP-CNS P1,789,000.00
Capwire claims that it also reported that the system "interconnects at the PLDT Landing Station in Nasugbu, Batangas," which
is covered by a transfer certificate of title and tax declarations in the name of PLDT. 11
As a result, the respondent Provincial Assessor of Batangas (Provincial Assessor) issued the following Assessments of Real
Property (ARP) against Capwire:
ARP Cable System Assessed Value

019-00967 BMP-CNS P52,529,600.00
019-00968 APCN P162,640,000.00
019-00969 SEA-ME-WE3-CNS P: 6,032,000.00
019-00970 GP-CNS P: 1,431,200.00
In essence, the Provincial Assessor had determined that the submarine cable systems described in Capwire's Sworn Statement of
True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property, a determination that was contested by Capwire in an exchange of letters
between the company and the public respondent. The reason cited by Capwire is that the cable system lies outside of
12
Philippine territory, i.e., on international waters. 13
On February 7, 2003 and March 4, 2003, Capwire received a Warrant of Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale, respectively, from
the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Batangas (Provincial Treasurer). 14
NATIONAL TERRITORY
On March I 0, 2003, Capwire filed a Petition for Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of Warrant of Levy, Notice of Auction
Sale and/or Auction Sale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. 15
After the filing of the public respondents' Comment, on May 5, 2003, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for
16
failure of the petitioner Capwire to follow the requisite of payment under protest as well as failure to appeal to the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals (LBAA), as provided for in Sections 206 and 226 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local
Government Code. 17
Capwire filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was likewise dismissed by the RTC in an Order dated August 26,
18 19
2003. It then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. 20
On May 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the appeal filed by Capwire and affirming the
order of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA's decision states:
1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated May 5, 2003 and August 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch II of Batangas City, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 21
The appellate court held that the trial court correctly dismissed Capwire's petition because of the latter's failure to comply with
the requirements set in Sections 226 and 229 of the Local Government Code, that is, by not availing of remedies before
administrative bodies like the LBAA and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). Although Capwire claims that it
22
saw no need to undergo administrative proceedings because its petition raises purely legal questions, the appellate comi did not
share this view and noted that the case raises questions of fact, such as the extent to which parts of the submarine cable system
lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authorities, the public respondents. Further, the CA noted that Capwire failed
23
to pay the tax assessed against it under protest, another strict requirement under Section 252 of the Local Government Code 24
Hence, the instant petition for review of Capwire.
Petitioner Capwire asserts that recourse to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, or payment of the tax under protest, is
inapplicable to the case at bar since there is no question of fact involved, or that the question involved is not the reasonableness
of the amount assessed but, rather, the authority and power of the assessor to impose the tax and of the treasurer to collect it. It25
contends that there is only a pure question of law since the issue is whether its submarine cable system, which it claims lies in
international waters, is taxable. Capwire holds the position that the cable system is not subject to tax.
26 27
Respondents assessors and treasurers of the Province of Batangas and Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas disagree with
Capwire and insist that the case presents questions of fact such as the extent and portion of the submarine cable system that lies
within the jurisdiction of the said local governments, as well as the nature of the so-called indefeasible rights as property of
Capwire. Such questions are allegedly resolvable only before administrative agencies like the Local Board of Assessment
28
Appeals. 29
The Court confronts the following issues: Is the case cognizable by the administrative agencies and covered by the requirements
in Sections 226 and 229 of the Local Government Code which makes the dismissal of
Capwire's petition by the RTC proper? May submarine communications cables be classified as taxable real property by the local
governments?
The petition is denied. No error attended the ruling of the appellate court that the case involves factual questions that should
have been resolved before the appropriate administrative bodies.
In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to require the taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies
and pay the tax under protest before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the assessment itself is alleged to be
illegal or is made without legal authority.
30
NATIONAL TERRITORY
For example, prior resort to administrative action is required when among the issues raised is an allegedly erroneous
assessment, like when the reasonableness of the amount is challenged, while direct court action is permitted when only the
legality, power, validity or authority of the; assessment itself is in question.JI Stated differently, the general rule of a
prerequisite recourse to administrative remedies applies when questions of fact are raised, but the exception of direct court
action is allowed when purely questions of law are involved. 32
This Court has previously and rather succinctly discussed the difference between a question of fact and a question of law. In
Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., it held:
33
The Court has made numerous dichotomies between questions of law and fact. A reading of these dichotomies shows that labels
attached to law and fact are descriptive rather than definitive. We are not alone in Our difficult task of clearly distinguishing
questions of fact from questions of law. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that: "we [do not] yet know of any other
rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion."
In Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the PI., the Court ruled:
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
We shall label this the doubt dichotomy.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled:
x x x A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.
For the sake of brevity, We shall label this the law application and calibration dichotomy.
In contrast, the dynamic legal scholarship in the United States has birthed many commentaries on the question of law and
question of fact dichotomy. As early as 1944, the law was described as growing downward toward "roots of fact" which grew
upward to meet it. In 1950, the late Professor Louis Jaffe saw fact and law as a spectrum, with one shade blending
imperceptibly into the other. Others have defined questions of law as those that deal with the general body of legal principles;
questions of fact deal with "all other phenomena xx x." Kenneth Culp Davis also weighed in and noted that the difference
between fact and law has been characterized as that between "ought" questions and "is" questions. 34
Guided by the quoted pronouncement, the Court sustains the CA's finding that petitioner's case is one replete with questions of
fact instead of pure questions of law, which renders its filing in a judicial forum improper because it is instead cognizable by
local administrative bodies like the Board of Assessment Appeals, which are the proper venues for trying these factual issues.
Verily, what is alleged by Capwire in its petition as "the crux of the controversy," that is, "whether or not an indefeasible right
over a submarine cable system that lies in international waters can be subject to real property tax in the Philippines,"35 is not
the genuine issue that the case presents - as it is already obvious and fundamental that real property that lies outside of
Philippine territorial jurisdiction cannot be subjected to its domestic and sovereign power of real property taxation - but, rather,
such factual issues as the extent and status of Capwire's ownership of the system, the actual length of the cable/s that lie in
Philippine territory, and the corresponding assessment and taxes due on the same, because the public respondents imposed and
collected the assailed real property tax on the finding that at least a portion or some portions of the submarine cable system that
Capwire owns or co-owns lies inside Philippine territory. Capwire's disagreement with such findings of the administrative
bodies presents little to no legal question that only the courts may directly resolve.
Instead, Capwire argues and makes claims on mere assumptions of certain facts as if they have been already admitted or
established, when they have not, since no evidence of such have yet been presented in the proper agencies and even in the
current petition. As such, it remains unsettled whether Capwire is a mere co-owner, not full owner, of the subject submarine
NATIONAL TERRITORY
cable and, if the former, as to what extent; whether all or certain portions of the cable are indeed submerged in water; and
whether the waters wherein the cable/s is/are laid are entirely outside of Philippine territorial or inland waters, i.e., in
international waters. More simply, Capwire argues based on mere legal conclusions, culminating on its claim of illegality of
respondents' acts, but the conclusions are yet unsupported by facts that should have been threshed out quasi-judicially before the
administrative agencies. It has been held that "a bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal conclusion
and a wish of the pleader, and such a legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life, has no standing in any
court where issues must be presented and determined by facts in ordinary and concise language." Therefore, Capwire's resort to
36
judicial action, premised on its legal conclusion that its cables (the equipment being taxed) lie entirely on international waters,
without first administratively substantiating such a factual premise, is improper and was rightly denied. Its proposition that the
cables lie entirely beyond Philippine territory, and therefore, outside of Philippine sovereignty, is a fact that is not subject to
judicial notice since, on the contrary, and as will be explained later, it is in fact certain that portions of the cable would
definitely lie within Philippine waters. Jurisprudence on the Local Government Code is clear that facts such as these must be
threshed out administratively, as the courts in these types of cases step in at the first instance only when pure questions of law
are involved.
Nonetheless, We proceed to decide on whether submarine wires or cables used for communications may be taxed like other real
estate.
We hold in the affirmative.
Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has recently declared
in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer exempted from real prope1iy
37
tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. To the extent that the
equipment's location is determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish
between submarine cables used for communications and aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so
that both pieces of property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and
communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing
stations, but both may be classified under the term "machinery" as real property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the
38
simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner's business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that
are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such, as "waters" is classified as an immovable
under Article 415(8)39 of the Code. A classic example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal
property but, if it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is considered
real property. Besides, the Court has already held that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
40
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property." 41
Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption for its lines and cables from real property
taxation, then this interpretation applies and Capwire's submarine cable may be held subject to real property tax.
Having determined that Capwire is liable, and public respondents have the right to impose a real property tax on its submarine
cable, the issue that is unresolved is how much of such cable is taxable based on the extent of Capwire's ownership or co-
ownership of it and the length that is laid within respondents' taxing jurisdiction. The matter, however, requires a factual
determination that is best performed by the Local and Central Boards of Assessment Appeals, a remedy which the petitioner did
not avail of.
At any rate, given the importance of the issue, it is proper to lay down the other legal bases for the local taxing authorities'
power to tax portions of the submarine cables of petitioner. It is not in dispute that the submarine cable system's Landing Station
in Nasugbu, Batangas is owned by PLDT and not by Capwire. Obviously, Capwire is not liable for the real property tax on this
Landing Station. Nonetheless, Capwire admits that it co-owns the submarine cable system that is subject of the tax assessed and
being collected by public respondents. As the Court takes judicial notice that Nasugbu is a coastal town and the surrounding sea
falls within what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) would define as the country's territorial sea
(to the extent of 12 nautical miles outward from the nearest baseline, under Part II, Sections 1 and 2) over which the country has
sovereignty, including the seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of the submarine cable system lies within
Philippine territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the said local taxing authorities. It easily belies Capwire's
42
contention that the cable system is entirely in international waters. And even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile
vicinity of the territorial sea but further inward, in Prof Magallona v. Hon. Ermita, et al. this Court held that "whether referred
43
to as Philippine 'internal waters' under A1iicle I of the Constitution or as 'archipelagic waters' under UNCLOS Part III, Article
44
NATIONAL TERRITORY
49(1, 2, 4),45 the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath." Further, under Part VI, Article 7946 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly
has jurisdiction with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in support of other installations and structures under its
jurisdiction.
And as far as local government units are concerned, the areas described above are to be considered subsumed under the term
"municipal waters" which, under the Local Government Code, includes "not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands,
forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general
coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with
the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it." Although the term "municipal waters" appears in the Code in the
47
context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a fee by local governments, its inclusion in the Code's Book II
48
which covers local taxation means that it may also apply as guide in determining the territorial extent of the local authorities'
power to levy real property taxation.
Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over such part of the subject submarine cable system lying within Philippine jurisdiction
includes the authority to tax the same, for taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes of sovereignty, and such
49
authority has been delegated by the national legislature to the local governments with respect to real property. taxation.
50
As earlier stated, a way for Capwire to claim that its cable system is not covered by such authority is by showing a domestic
enactment or even contract, or an international agreement or treaty exempting the same from real property taxation. It failed to
do so, however, despite the fact that the burden of proving exemption from local taxation is upon whom the subject real
property is declared. 51 Under the Local Government Code, every person by or for whom real property is declared, who shall
claim tax exemption for such property from real property taxation "shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor
within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in support of such
claim." Capwire omitted to do so. And even under Capwire's legislative franchise, RA 4387, which amended RA 2037, where
52
it may be derived that there was a grant of real property tax exemption for properties that are part of its franchise, or directly
meet the needs of its business, such had been expressly withdrawn by the Local Government Code, which took effect on
53
January l, 1992, Sections 193 and 234 of which provide: 54
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals
and educational institutions, arc hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
xxxx
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration of otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit or
religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and
government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or
generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed
by, all persons, whether natural or .iuridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations arc hereby
withdrawn upon the cffectivity of this Code. 55
Such express withdrawal had been previously held effective upon exemptions bestowed by legislative franchises granted prior
to the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Capwire fails to allege or provide any other privilege or exemption that were
56
granted to it by the legislature after the enactment of the Local Government Code. Therefore, the presumption stays that it
enjoys no such privilege or exemption. Tax exemptions arc strictly construed against the taxpayer because taxes are considered
the lifeblood of the nation.
57
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated May 30, 2007 and Resolution dated October 8.
2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et al. Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT et al , Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship
USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long reef
exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie
Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. 1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City,
Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine
reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for
internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an
important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-
going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. 2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park
3
(TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and
penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting
body of the TRNP.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the
Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 6,
4
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign
5
Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F.
del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." By March
6
30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry
G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno
S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F.
Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense),
Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant),
collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative
and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
(Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to
the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian
grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines,
duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume responsibility for prior
and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in
particular.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an
additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines
and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against
erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S.
personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other States, and
damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of
evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the
Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of all cases,
wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans,
including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the
Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local Government
Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under
Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light
of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and accountability
such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their
provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which
follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of
TRNP;
NATIONAL TERRITORY
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces
Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and equitable
under the premises. (Underscoring supplied.)
7
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and
8
motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders,
respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli
as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3)
the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
10
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and
"calls for more than just a generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
11
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest. 12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
13
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
1âwphi1
environment. 14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens
have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
NATIONAL TERRITORY
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. (Emphasis supplied.)
15
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the
Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction
over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is 17
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
18
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in
the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S.
349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has
not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. (Emphasis supplied.)
19
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of
20
local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law
then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par
NATIONAL TERRITORY
in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. (Emphasis supplied.)
21
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction.
22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air
23
Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually
dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed
by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against
the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot
be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure
imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. 24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
25
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs.
Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State
within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Emphasis26
supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding
of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by
this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained
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that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be
gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States
v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. 27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the
sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international
law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was
28
opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle
of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary
29
principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
30
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high
seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. 31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS
and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.32
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
33
exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial
sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign
warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's
leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted
against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part
XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the
succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the
revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI
implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton,
each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for
the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress
continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international institutions.
Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate
consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th
Congress. 34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will
"recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the
rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President
Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of
the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and
"if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates
that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this
case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly
owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on
navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS,
as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a
maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights;
works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms
sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its
sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea
Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized
the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone. 35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
"international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by
its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect
and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
NATIONAL TERRITORY
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be
liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under
Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the
US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort
claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
"common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The 36
invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs
disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such
as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the
filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental
law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment
granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty
in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;
NATIONAL TERRITORY
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on
the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage
operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court.
But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat
adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by
the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the
extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following
provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are
encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled
the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of
court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled
date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following
purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain
under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent
decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance with law
at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
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The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground
about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million
restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral
reef damage caused by the grounding. 38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team
which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha,
based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation
options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental
organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained
under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation
expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of
which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of
common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
41
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of
the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail
42
the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, ET AL., vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,ET AL, Respondents.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the Threshold Issues

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

Extent of maritime area

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

G.R. No. 180110

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., Petitioner,

Below are the acts of the case.

telecommunications companies covering an international network of

rights among the parties over the network. 5

its financial books as "Indefeasible Rights in Cable Systems." 9

System Sound Value

ARP Cable System Assessed Value

Philippine territory, i.e., on international waters. 13

2003. It then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. 20

Hence, the instant petition for review of Capwire.

In Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the PI., the Court ruled:

We shall label this the doubt dichotomy.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled:

We hold in the affirmative.

purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property." 41

January l, 1992, Sections 193 and 234 of which provide: 54

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et al. Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT et al , Respondents.

p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;

motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9

Respondents' Consolidated Comment

The Court's Ruling

expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

local courts, as follows:

or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

We are not persuaded.

(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;

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