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DPM
29,3
352
Received 10 December 2018
Revised 1 July 2019
22 July 2019
Accepted 22 July 2019
Disaster Prevention and
Management
Vol. 29 No. 3, 2020
pp. 352-364
© Emerald Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/DPM-12-2018-0384
Of locals and insiders
A “localized” humanitarian response to the
2017 mudslide in Mocoa, Colombia?
Erin Hedwig Christina Kuipers
Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies,
Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen,
Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Isabelle Desportes
International Institute of Social Studies,
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands, and
Michaela Hordijk
Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies,
Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen,
Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Purpose – Through the case of the response to the 2017 Mocoa mudslide, the purpose of this paper is to
contribute to a deeper understanding of why and how humanitarian response should be locally led,
particularly in more complex contexts such as those affected by conflict.
Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on qualitative data collected during a four-month
period in 2017, with a focus on the immediate April 2017 emergency phase which presented the largest
diversity of local, national and international actors.
Findings – The study has found that competing legitimacy claims between the state and non-state response
blocs led to tensions and confrontations between disaster response actors and consequently a problematic
response process and outcome. The institutional map that was plotted based on locally perceived actor
legitimacies indicates a local state-led response would have better served the broader goals of humanitarian
support, development and peacebuilding.
Practical implications – These findings have significant implications for the understanding of how the
locally led response should be understood. Better alignment with local needs and feasibilities requires a
differential outlook on what is to be understood as “local.” This study puts forward the insider/outsider lens
as a tool to identify the actors who possess local trust and legitimacy and are thus best suited to bridge the
elements of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding triple nexus.
Originality/value – This study gives a voice to state actors, which was largely absent in previous studies.
Keywords Development, Conflict, Colombia, Humanitarian aid, Disaster response, Localization,
Peacebuilding, Conflict disaster nexus
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In the early morning of April 1, 2017, the city of Mocoa, Colombia, suffered a massive
mudslide when torrential rains led three smaller rivers to burst their banks, releasing a
giant flow of water, mud and rocks that destroyed half the city. Soon after, Mocoa was
“flooded” again, but this time by the large diversity of Colombian and international
humanitarian entities that came to provide disaster relief in addition to the already present
local and international actors. All major actors heavily criticized how the disaster was
handled, also attributing mishaps to the context in which the disaster occurred. Mocoa is
located in Putumayo, one of the poorest departments in Colombia and has been strongly
marked by the Colombian civil conflict. The disaster occurred at a time of transition, four
months after the historic peace agreement (Acuerdo de Paz) that formally ended over forty
years of civil conflict on November 24, 2016. Against this backdrop, we argue that the
disaster has reshuffled the cards for both state and international actors. It provided the 2017 mudslide
Colombian state with an opportunity to prove its capacities and legitimacy toward its in Mocoa,
rural “peripheral” citizens, and the international actors with a chance to reaffirm the need Colombia
for their continued presence after the peace accord. The disaster response, therefore, offers
an exemplary case of what the United Nations (UN) termed the “triple nexus” (UN General
Assembly, 2016a), showcasing the entanglement of humanitarian aid with intentions of
development and peacebuilding. 353
Drawing on a case study of the response to the Mocoa mudslide, this paper seeks to
provide a deeper understanding of why and how humanitarian response should be locally
led, particularly in complex contexts, such as those affected by conflict. Though the active
role and importance of local actors in disaster preparedness (Staupe-Delgado et al., 2018) and
humanitarian response (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005; Ramalingam et al., 2013) has been noted
before, “localization” as a buzzword has gained serious traction over the last few years, not
least following the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. There, around 50 central
humanitarian aid donors and providers agreed to the “Grand Bargain” (UN General
Assembly, 2016b, p. 10), a package of reforms to increase funding toward local actors and
collaborative efforts between local and international humanitarian actors. Their objective is
a more locally rooted humanitarian response that leverages the responsibilities and
capacities of states, civil society and affected communities, and in which international actors
primarily play a supporting role.
However, policy and, to some extent, academic debates are still largely uninformed
regarding three major issues. First, policy debates often favor “local” over “non-local”
responses without providing nuances regarding the multiplicity of local actors (Fabre, 2017).
Second, state institutions and their own involvement, perceptions and preferences
concerning humanitarian response are often absent (Kahn and Cunningham, 2013;
Van Brabant and Patel, 2017). Third, critics have argued that the localization debate does
not give adequate importance to the variety of humanitarian contexts and needs for
differing approaches (Aneja, 2016). Only few academics examine how “localization” works
in practice, and even fewer study conflict-affected contexts.
This paper seeks to address these three gaps. It focuses on the providers of aid
whose “localness” is often debated. Taking an actor-oriented approach within the
humanitarian arena (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010), we argue for a broader understanding
of what makes a humanitarian actor able to best operate locally. We deploy the insider/
outsider lens to capture relations and bonds of trust between actors in the humanitarian
arena of Mocoa.

2. Qualifying and interrogating “the local”

The localization process intends to give greater (financial) recognition and visibility to the
long present efforts and achievements of local actors. It is embedded within a broader
paradigm shift which has been called for, and has to a lesser extent occurred, within
international humanitarian circles (Barnett, 2011, p. 164; Spiegel, 2017; Hilhorst, 2018).
A shift toward what Hilhorst (2018) labels “resilience humanitarianism,” extends the moral
obligation of humanitarian actors to a broader mandate that blurs the boundaries with
development and poverty alleviation, and combines humanitarianism, development and
peacebuilding under a triple nexus.
While the role of local actors is not the only issue at stake within the shift to triple nexus
thinking, it is a major one and that for two main reasons. First, local actors are generally the
“first responders” to a crisis and know best about the context, needs, and most effective ways
to prevent and alleviate suffering (Ramalingam et al., 2013). There is increased recognition
that many recurring problems faced during humanitarian interventions can be attributed to
poor adaption to local circumstances. Especially during large-scale responses, international
DPM donors are often unaware of national structures and capacity. Regularly, parallel structures
29,3 are set up inside and outside of government involvement, facilitating duplication of efforts and
encouraging competition and coordination mishaps (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005; Clarke and
Dercon, 2016). Second, local actors remain in their area, whereas international responders will
leave. Putting local actors at the forefront eases the transition from relief to reconstruction and
bridges the divide between humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding (Aneja, 2016;
354 De Geoffroy and Grunewald, 2017; Fabre, 2017; Van Brabant and Patel, 2017). This is
especially the case since lack of local participation can undermine post-conflict reconstruction
processes (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005).

2.1 Who are the local actors?

A key question entangled with the localization debate is, “who are the local actors”?
Localization policies often refer to those with easily identifiable roles, such as
representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) (Wall and Hedlund, 2016).
Newer policy documents have adopted a wider definition of local responders (UN General
Assembly, 2016b; Fabre, 2017) – with Van Brabant and Patel (2017) noting that this also
cultivates confusion. The World Development Report 2015 (p. 152, cited in Wall and
Hedlund, 2016) thus mentions “charities, civil society groups, faith-based organizations,
volunteer groups, private sector, communities and diaspora bodies.”
Three additional major shortcomings underpin the identification of local actors. First,
policy documents generally glance over the multiplicity of both state and civil society actors.
The “local” label is tied to those originating from and operating in a geographically defined
area, and national and local state actors are frequently lumped together into one typology
(UN General Assembly, 2016b; Fabre, 2017). Yet national and local government authorities
widely differ when it comes to capacities or interests (Wall and Hedlund, 2016). Regarding
civil society actors, local or national NGOs may opt to change their identity and affiliate
themselves with international alliances.
Second, state actors are generally underrepresented in policy discourse, especially in
fragile and conflict-affected settings. When state structures are mentioned, it is rather
from a normative perspective, highlighting the social contract between a state
and its citizens (Harvey, 2013). The perspectives of states themselves are often absent,
justified by the fact that government authorities did not wish to participate in the
studies (Kahn and Cunningham, 2013). Concerning practice, Zyck and Krebs (2015, p. 5)
illustrate how UN-based coordination systems frequently bypass state structures with a
telling statistic: “one recent review of 29 UN-led Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs)
found that roughly two-thirds included donor personnel, but only one included national
government representatives.”
Third, it can be questioned whether local actors are, by definition, always and equally
appropriate to lead a humanitarian response. Humanitarian actors – local or international – do
not operate in a vacuum; they are subject to social and political processes (Hilhorst and Jansen,
2010). Leaving state authorities sole in charge can be problematic in conflict settings
especially, when they are both perpetrators of violence and gatekeepers of humanitarian
support (cf. Cosgrave et al., 2010 for Pakistan; Desportes et al., 2019 for Ethiopia). Likewise,
civil society actors can display varied levels of neutrality (De Geoffroy and Grunewald, 2017).
Local actors, unlike their international partners, can less easily withdraw from the complexity
of their context; they very much are the context. As stated by a Myanmar local NGO staff
(cited in De Geoffroy and Grunewald, 2017, p.1), “[w]hile the international community is
guided by deadlines and guidelines, local actors here are caught between front lines and ethnic
lines.” Studies have underscored the importance of a context-specific approach to localization
(Zyck and Krebs, 2015; Wall and Hedlund, 2016), yet policy discourse fails to conclusively
address these nuances.
 These knowledge gaps of multiplicity, state involvement and contextuality justify a 2017 mudslide
closer look at which traits local actors are attributed that make them valuable in in Mocoa,
humanitarian response - and how this plays out specifically in more complex conflict- Colombia
affected contexts.

2.2 Attributes of local actors: legitimacy and trust

Local actors are often said to have “inherent proximity and contextual knowledge” (Dixon 355
et al., 2016, p. 111), and their “local ties” (De Geoffroy and Grunewald, 2017, p. 20) can lead to
greater acceptance and program ownership. Unpacking these characteristics reveals that
local actors constitute more than simply being the first responders or knowing the local
context; they are also assumed to inherently possess the legitimacy and trust needed to
engage with the surrounding population. Local legitimacy refers to the extent to which
humanitarian action is perceived to be right and appropriate by those in the area of
humanitarian intervention (Whalan, 2017). Its importance in humanitarian response is
undisputed; building trust with local communities is instrumental for gaining local
acceptance and access to the area (Egeland et al., 2011).
The particulars of trust and local legitimacy are interesting to explore in
conflict-affected settings, precisely because the co-incidence of disaster and conflict
makes for a crisis where authority, legitimacy and capacity are put to the test all-around
(Pelling and Dill, 2010). Conflict often amplifies actor multiplicity. Social power relations
are fluid and unstable, and legitimacies are challenged when state authorities are
contested or absent (Von Billerbeck and Gippert, 2017). The perceived legitimacy of state
actors is convoluted. For example, local authorities may only have the trust of certain
community groups, whereas national authorities may be perceived as entirely illegitimate
(Gizelis and Kosek, 2005; Gippert, 2016). Local actors may find that taking sides helps
them in gaining and maintaining the trust needed to deliver aid (Smits and Wright, 2012),
thus compromising their neutrality as a humanitarian actor. In other cases, both national
and local state actors may be viewed as illegitimate or distrustful, and international
actors present competing legitimacy claims, e.g. because they have been trustfully and
credibly running programs in the area for several years (Egeland et al., 2011; Van Brabant,
2010; Gippert, 2016).

2.3 From the local/international to the insider/outsider lens

The aforementioned examples show that attribution of legitimacy and trust is closely
related to the insider-outsider dynamics found in conflict-settings. Anderson and Olson
(2003) define insiders as those who experience the conflict and personally live with its
consequences. Insiderness can be defined in relative terms, whereby one actor may be more
an insider or outsider than another (Anderson and Olson, 2003; Van Brabant, 2010).
Both legitimacy and trust are needed to obtain “insider status” in conflict-affected settings.
Including insider-outsider dynamics in the localization processes could connect the
humanitarian realm to the broader aims of development and peacebuilding. Nexus
thinking emphasizes the interlinkages between immediate relief, stabilization of political
situations, and promoting sustainable improvements; it advocates for more involvement
of development and political actors (Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and
Protection, 2018). In post-tsunami Aceh for example, collaboration between aid and state
helped facilitate peace talks between rebel groups and the Indonesian Government
(Gaillard et al., 2008; Waizenegger and Hyndman, 2010). When communities know that
actors will remain in the area and will have to live with the consequences of their own
programs, humanitarian programs earn trust (Gippert, 2016) and cultivate more
sustainable improvements.
DPM 3. Methodology
29,3 This case study is part of the “When disasters meet conflict” research project[1]. The paper
builds on qualitative interviews with key humanitarian actors, conducted by the first author
between September and December 2017 in Bogotá. By that time, many actors involved in the
Mocoa response had retreated to their national headquarters. A ten-day field visit to Mocoa
allowed for direct insight of the context and interaction with community members and
356 Mocoa-based NGOs (Mocoa NGOs). Data collection focused on perceived relationships,
legitimacies, challenges and opportunities during the disaster response, as well as broader
post-Acuerdo de Paz dynamics. These themes were partly derived from our literature review
and further adjusted as exchanges with our research participants progressed.
Following identification of key actors via reports and referral sampling, in-depth,
individual qualitative interviews were conducted in English or Spanish with 26 disaster
response actors, aiming to equally cover all key actor types (see Table I). We distinguish
between international NGOs (INGOs) and Mocoa-based NGOs. To our knowledge, no
Bogotá-based Colombian NGOs were involved in the Mocoa response. Similarly, there
seemed to be no involvement of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
in the response, despite media reports stating otherwise. Our inquiries into FARC
involvement were overwhelmingly dismissed by our research participants, including
community members, as rumors.
Data collection was complemented by secondary sources, such as official and internal
humanitarian reports and news articles.

4. Situating the research: the triple nexus in Colombia

For half a century, Colombia has been amidst a conflict between government and several
guerilla groups. Violence and human rights abuses have been an inseparable part of the
conflict, occurring both within and outside of the context of combat. Resultantly, much of
the population has been forcibly displaced and suffers high levels of poverty and social
vulnerability (Wisner and Gaillard, 2012).
The conflict has eroded state structures. Inaccessibility of the rural departments have
created pockets of state weakness and facilitated a plurality of opposing forces to
structurally undercut state control in poorer and remote parts of the country. State efforts
to reclaim its legitimacy through decentralization by granting regional and local
governments more budgetary autonomy and political power on paper have, in practice,
left local authorities incapacitated and vulnerable to corruption and clientelism
(Eaton, 2006; Isbester, 2011, p. 221). Illustrating this perceived gap between state levels,
some speak of the “two Colombias”: one urban and modern, the other rural and backward
(Wylie, 2013). A plurality of international aid agencies has over the years built a
permanent presence in the conflict-ridden areas of Colombia, providing support in areas
where government services are absent.

Actor category Participants

National government officials based in Bogota 5

Local government officials based in Mocoa 2
Mocoa NGO staff 3
International NGO staff 4
United Nations Offices staff 4
Mocoa community members 5
Table I.
Member of a research institution, Colombian or foreign 3
Overview of study
participants and Total 26
interviewees Source: Authors, 2017
Following years of intermittent negotiations, the 2016 establishment of the Colombian 2017 mudslide
Acuerdo de Paz has marked the beginning of a transitional period toward peace. Both state in Mocoa,
and aid actors have since entered a phase of transitional justice, repatriation, and Colombia
peacebuilding. However, peace has proven to be fragile and uncertain, violence and forced
displacement have continued to uproot daily life in Colombia. As such, Colombian research
participants generally preferred to speak of post-Acuerdo rather than post-conflict.
As regional capital, Mocoa has received the largest number of conflict internally 357
displaced persons (IDPs) in the department of Putumayo; the population increased from
40,000 to approximately 100,000 inhabitants over the last 20 years. Various civil society
actors cater to the IDP population. Several UN agencies and I/NGOs have established
permanent offices in Mocoa. The pressures of housing shortage and unplanned
urbanization led many people to build informal settlements near the riverbanks.
Consequently, nearly half of the disaster-affected population was also a victim of the
armed conflict and referred to as doble afectadas by our humanitarian participants.
Although numbers slightly differ across institutions, reports set the Mocoa mudslide
death count to 332 people, injury of 398, total of flood-affected houses to 1,462 and more
than 22,000 people affected (Equipo Humanitario Colombia, 2017a; Unidad Nacional para
la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres, 2017).
A significant number of state and non-state actors (local, national and international)
came to Mocoa’s aid following the mudslide. The National Committee for
Disaster Management – consisting of approximately ten different national government
institutions – was mobilized from Bogotá and arrived in Mocoa the very next day.
Concurrently, an array of international organizations and UN agencies left their Bogotá
country offices and made their way to Mocoa to reinforce the already strong local presence
of international aid actors and smaller local non-state actors. State and non-state actors
organized themselves into separate coordination mechanisms, further referred to as the
two “blocs.” The state response mechanism was formalized in a physical coordination
point called Puesto de Mando Unificado (PMU), which integrated national and local
government structures. The Equipo Local de Coordinación (ELC) operated around
thematic clusters and became the formal space for multi-cluster coordination between UN
agencies and any I/NGOs who wished to join.
In the first 18 days of operation, the National Committee reported that nine official
shelter camps had been set up, hosting 4,561 people. Furthermore, they established
temporary education facilities, placed numerous water purification plants and water
tanks, administered tens of thousands of vaccinations, and distributed aid kits. The ELC
reported the presence of four additional informal shelter camps where the ELC had
provided food (Equipo Humanitario Colombia, 2017b). According to the Multi-Cluster/
Sector Initial Rapid Assessment Report (MIRA) (April 6, 2017), the food cluster provided
food, hygiene and aid kits, industrial stoves, cash transfers and one soup kitchen hosting
1,500 people; the Water Sanitation and Hygiene cluster provided water tanks and hygiene
kits; the Early Recovery cluster assisted with debris removal and environmental risk
reduction measures.
Notably, a locally led response is ingrained in Colombian disaster policies since 2012.
Law 1523 (Ley 1523) provides the institutional and legal framework for disaster management.
It emphasizes the local government’s primary responsibility for disaster preparedness and
response, with national government providing support.
Regarding international non-state actors in Columbia, their focus has shifted from
humanitarian to development assistance and peacebuilding. International participants
expressed concerns that humanitarian funding will be reduced as Colombia gains
post-conflict status, despite the continued existence of conflict-induced issues like mass
displacement (Dickinson, 2017).
DPM 5. Findings
29,3 This section first describes the competing legitimacy claims between the state and non-state
response blocs and links these to the response processes and outcomes as experienced by
the actors. Second, it juxtaposes actors’ self-perceived legitimacies with local perceptions of
trust and legitimacy. Third, an institutional “insider” map is plotted following local
perceptions of trust and legitimacy, which yields suggestions as to how a locally led
358 response in Mocoa could have been achieved.

5.1 Competing legitimacy claims

A considerable accumulation of resources and capacities notwithstanding, all
interviewees were critical of how the disaster was handled. The interviews revealed
that response challenges stemmed from competing legitimacy claims between the two
state and non-state response blocs, which led to tensions, confrontations and,
consequently, a problematic response.
All actors considered their involvement in the response as legitimate. The state actors in
the National Committee considered themselves the primary actors mandated to respond and
felt they had sufficient expert knowledge and capacity to independently organize the
response. Through its disaster assistance, the government attempted to re-affirm its
legitimacy in the conflict-affected area, as reflected in media pieces and the following
interview statement:
What we are trying to do is regaining the trust of the general people to the national government,
that we are not stealing anything, and we are really doing our job (National government officer,
October 10, 2017).
In contrast, the international actors within the ELC put forth various reasons to legitimize
their involvement in the response. Some used the humanitarian mandate to legitimize their
involvement, stating that they had a moral obligation to respond. Others claimed that, due to
the urgency of the situation, their knowledge and experience was more important than their
mandate. The international actors who had already been in Mocoa for a long time
considered it their responsibility to help the community members with whom they felt they
had developed a “bond of trust.” As stated by one INGO official (December 6, 2017):
[our INGO] has been based here in Putumayo for more than ten years. So we were not an unknown
actor here in Mocoa, […] we were the first to arrive and the community recognized us.
Both state and non-state actors contested each other’s legitimacy in the response. Many
international actors condemned the national government’s approach, claiming it was
misguided in its assessment of the population’s needs. Most non-state actors felt that, by
favoring material aid over psychosocial aid, the National Committee had neglected the
”human factor” and failed to meet its responsibility as a moral actor. By contrast, state
officials shared the opinion that the international organizations should have stepped back in
the response because the country was “already in the processes of peace” (October 27, 2017)
and therefore no longer in need of international humanitarian assistance. Encapsulating a
sentiment shared by many interviewed national government staff, one state official
exasperatedly said (October 10, 2017):
The main challenge for us is not the response, because we have the mechanisms. But the NGOs,
United Nations, international organizations, they all want to be a part of it. So still, as we say, “in
this moment we don’t need you”, they do it and they ask for funding in their own headquarters. […]
They don’t ask us if we have it covered; they just think we don’t have it covered.
The competition between the state and non-state response blocs had problematic
consequences, one being ill-coordinated aid. Interviews with non-state actors revealed that
they experienced the National Committee as authoritative, actively limiting its cooperation 2017 mudslide
with the non-state actors in the ELC and restricting non-state actors’ participation in in Mocoa,
the PMU. One UN staff member recalled (October 19, 2017) how, during a meeting with the Colombia
National Committee, their agency had disapproved of certain undesirable situations in
the shelter camps and was consequently forced to leave the PMU. The respondent then
hastened to highlight the need for diplomacy to keep “good relations” with the government.
Smaller local actors, both state and non-state, were also squeezed out in the competition 359
between the two response blocs. Although Las Asociaciones de Juntas de Acción Comunal
( JACs – local collectives) attempted to play a role, their initiatives were largely suppressed
by the government response mechanisms and they were not granted any seat in the PMU.
Departing from Ley 1523 stipulations, local government structures were absorbed by the
National Committee and exhibited little power or decision-making. This move was heavily
criticized by international organizations, who contended the “local voice” (UN official,
October 31, 2017) was taken away in the decision-making process. Non-state actors were
often entirely excluded. The officer of a smaller Mocoa NGO (December 5, 2017) recalled
how, on one occasion, their organization had already started collecting donations and aid
distribution but was forced to halt its activities at the request of the National Committee,
who saw these activities as “the responsibility of the state.”
Overall, many local non-state actors felt their (local) qualities had been side-lined and
ignored in the response coordination. They further expressed they were not strong enough
to influence decision-making in that regard. Some Mocoa NGOs chose to join the ranks of the
ELC. Although one Mocoa NGO indicated they preferred to stay out of the “UN circus”
(November 29, 2017), they also admitted that being part of the “circus” was necessary to
prove their relevance to donors and other actors in the field. Other NGOs decided to work in
the margins of the humanitarian arena, trying to complement aid in places where needs had
not been sufficiently met by neither the national nor the international blocs. As told by a
Mocoa NGO staff member (December 5, 2017), this included afro and indigeneous
communities and other less advantaged households which “the government never attended
to because they did not know them.”
As a result of the lack of inclusive coordination, some activities were duplicated by the
two blocs, and others left entirely unattended. Several UN participants reported they had
observed aid delivery to the same families twice, while others were left without assistance.
Needs assessments were also carried out separately by both the National Committee and the
ELC, resulting in repeat visits from different organizations and separate management of
shelter camps, frustrating many disaster victims. One community respondent recounted
how they were caught between the bureaucracies of different camps:
All this time we have been in the shelter where they are supposed to give us food and shelter, but
we have not received anything from aid remittances, nothing at all […]. I went to [an INGO food
distribution point] but because they saw me wearing the blue ribbon that indicated I belonged to
[the government’s] shelter, they did not give us anything because we would be given food in
[government shelter]. We also asked [another INGO] for help because we did not have anywhere
else to go. 39 families were there, and we were last, and they told us that there was nothing left
(December 7, 2017).
This shows the overall lack of coordination demonstrated by the National Committee and
ELC. Consequently, many community members indicated they were “led from pillar to
post,” often confused about where they could go to get the aid they needed.

5.2 Local perceptions of legitimacy

Juxtaposing the actors’ self-perceived legitimacy with how they were perceived by the
community participants and Mocoa NGOs yields three interesting findings. Interviews with
DPM community members revealed that, first, international actors’ legitimacy claims did not
29,3 match the perceptions of interviewed community members and Mocoa NGOs. Second, they
recognized multiplicity across state actors. Third, most legitimacy and trust was attributed
to the local government.
Concerning the first finding, community participants’ accounts supported the long-
present international actors’ claim on local credibility and trust. However, it also became
360 clear that these international actors attributed themselves more local trust and legitimacy
than they were given by the affected community. In response to the questions “who helped
you?” and “which organisations did you see?,” most community participants had to be
explicitly asked about the role of the international actors, after which they overall
acknowledged the international support and displayed a positive attitude toward these
actors but indicated minimal interaction. One community member (December 5, 2017) also
supposed that internationals mostly communicated with the government.
Second, in relation to the question “Who helped you?,” most community members
directly volunteered reflections on the National Committee, specifically addressing how they
felt the state had failed to come to their aid. Despite the community participants’ and Mocoa
NGOs’ lack of trust toward the state, their focus and expectations regarding service delivery
were nonetheless directed at this same actor. This suggests that, although the community
members and Mocoa NGOs attributed some externality toward the state, they
simultaneously perceived it as an actor that failed to meet its duties as “insider.” They
perceived the state as an external actor who had “swooped in to impose the law” (December
5, 2017). Yet, community participants also singled out some state actors as more trustful
than others. For example, both the Defensoría del Pueblo (i.e. the Ombudsman’s Office of
Colombia) and the Red Cross were largely exempt from negative criticism. Amongst others,
one community participants (December 7, 2017) recounted how she was pleased that the
Defensoría had taken action following some community complaints.
Though deemed absent in terms of resources and capacities, the disaster victims viewed
the local government as highly legitimate, as reflected in the following quote:
The most serious was that our governor and our mayor were put aside, everything was directed at
the national level; something irregular in front of the law, because the law is very clear and says:
“the mayor has to assume all the orientation of the reconstruction plan”. But our boss pitifully
dedicated himself only to repeat what the National Government said (Community respondent,
December 5, 2017).
This shows how community participants were angry at the national government and the
National Committee for not upholding Ley 1523 and taking over leadership from those who
should have been the rightful local government community “bosses.”

5.3 Mapping insiderness

Revisiting the trust and legitimacy attributed to the international, national and local actors by
the interviewed community participants, we have interpreted the latter’s “insider status” in
Mocoa as institutional map (Figure 1), whereby an actor’s position toward the center
symbolizes attributed insiderness. The local government was attributed most local trust and
legitimacy compared to all other actors and is accordingly placed at the center. On the left side,
the National Committee cluster of state actors was placed outside of the circle, not including
the Defensoría and Red Cross who were more trusted than other state actors. On the right side,
the international actors arriving from Bogotá were distinctly perceived as outsiders. Those
already situated in Mocoa prior to the landside are placed further toward the insider circle.
Based on this map, recommendations can be made regarding a locally led response that
is not limited to the emergency phase and takes into account the broader conflict-context
and consequent goals of the triple nexus.
 National Committee Humanitarian Team (ELC) 2017 mudslide
UNOCHA UNICEF in Mocoa,
UNWOMEN Colombia
UNGRD Diakonessenhilfe

UNHCR

Cruz Roja
Alianza Mujeres
Tejedoras de Vida
UNDP 361
ACH
Local
government
Mercy Corps
Defensoría
del Pueblo
JAC Figure 1.
Diócesis
An institutional map
OZIP Casa Amazonia based on the locally
perceived trust and
legitimacy, or
“insider-status” of the
different actors
participating in the
Mocoa response

6. Conclusion
This study set out to contribute to a deeper understanding of why and how humanitarian
response should be “localized,” particularly in conflict-affected settings. It focused on the
immediate humanitarian response, leaving out the recovery and reconstruction phase.
Additional research on the latter would be very relevant as it likely uncovers a different
constellation of local, national and international actors, policies and power relations.
The case of Mocoa calls attention to the added value of the broader mandate of the
humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus and confirms the value of the locally led
response to bridge the different elements of the nexus (Aneja, 2016; De Geoffroy and
Grunewald, 2017; Fabre, 2017; Van Brabant and Patel, 2017). However, it also highlights the
nuances of the locally led approach in complex contexts, which are still inconclusively
handled in the current policy discourse.
In Colombia, the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding elements of the nexus
remain largely separate domains. Though not yet embedded in written policies and
programming, our interviews highlighted how some actors showed elements of nexus
thinking. The national government’s response to the Mocoa mudslide was closely entwined
with the national peacebuilding agenda.
Our findings evidence that most international actors in Mocoa have not yet taken up the
more “supportive role” assigned to them in the Grand Bargain call for localization. Such a
supportive role is not necessarily at odds with the “moral obligations” of humanitarian
actors. Would the international actors have put their capacities at service of strengthening
the “local actors,” the disaster response could have strengthened peacebuilding and
development efforts in the region. We found the set-up of parallel structures, a duplication
and sometimes even obstruction of other actors’ efforts instead.
Examining Mocoa through the insider-outsider lens, we obtained a more nuanced
understanding of locality and provided insights into the previously identified knowledge
and policy gaps of contextuality, state involvement and multiplicity of disaster response
actors. First, the findings showed how a conflict setting can reshuffle the “local”
characteristics of legitimacy and trust (Pelling and Dill, 2010). The situation of Mocoa
exhibited a reversal of roles, whereby some INGOs displayed a higher degree of insiderness
than most national state actors. Second, this study has given a voice to state actors.
It showed the attempt of national state actors to “regain trust and do their job,”
DPM hence demonstrated a state which recognized the humanitarian response’s potential in
29,3 addressing complementary development and peacebuilding goals. Third, though local and
national government were opposites in terms of local trust and capacity, they were
considered one bloc by the other actors. The findings demonstrated the significant gap
between local and national state actors in terms of trust and legitimacy, and capacities.
The national state actors still suffered from lack of local trust and legitimacy. The local state
362 actors were trusted and had the law on their side, but they sorely lacked resources and
capacity to act. Overlooking this multiplicity had very practical consequences. It resulted in
underuse of local government’s strengths and has implications for long-term goals of
peacebuilding and development.
Critically engaging with the localization concept, these findings have significant
implications for understanding how a locally led response should be realized. For the case of
Mocoa specifically, putting the local government at the center of the response, supported by
both international and national actors, could have significantly contributed to strengthening
the bonds between local and national state authorities, building the legitimacy of the
national state in this particular periphery, and bridging the elements of the triple nexus.
Overall, our findings call attention to the original goals of the humanitarian turn toward
localization, including better alignment with local needs. The contextualization of locality is
much more related to who is locally perceived as having trust and legitimacy, rather than
formal positions, mandates, or geographical demarcation. Engaging with the question,
“are local actors, by definition, always and equally appropriate to lead a humanitarian
response?,” it becomes clear that localization processes encompass much more than the
redirecting of funds, as focused on in the Grand Bargain. It demands a more differential
view and local determination of who the “local” actors are.

Note
1. The 2015–2020 project “When disasters meet conflict” is funded by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research NWO, VICI scheme Grant No. 453-14-013.

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Corresponding author
Erin Hedwig Christina Kuipers can be contacted at: ehc.kuipers@gmail.com

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