European

Community and Union Law

and Domestic (Municipal) Law
Giorgio Gaja

Content Product: Max Planck

type: Encyclopedia entries Encyclopedia of Public
Article last updated: July International Law [MPEPIL]
2013

Subject(s):
EC Law
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
under the direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 A. Approach Taken by Member States’ Courts
1 As a result of the entry into force of the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
(→ European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC]; → European [Economic] Community [‘EC’];
→ European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]), Member States were subjected to a number of
obligations. Many further obligations were added by acts taken by the Communities’ institutions.
Member States were clearly required under the Treaties to comply with all those obligations
irrespective of the existence of any conflicting national legislation.

2 In the absence of specific constitutional provisions ensuring → compliance, the courts of most
Member States referred to some more general provisions concerning treaties and sometimes
stretched their interpretation in order to assert the primacy of EC law over national legislation. One
may take as examples a German Federal Constitutional Court order of 9 June 1971 (2 BvR 225/69
[1972] 7 EuR 51) and the judgment of the French Court of Cassation in Administration des
Douanes v Société Cafés Jacques Vabre ([24 May 1975] [1975] 102 Clunet 801), which based the
primacy of EC law on Art. 24 German Basic Law and Art. 55 French Constitution respectively.

3 In various Member States this solution was later facilitated by amendments to their constitutions.
For instance, an amendment to Art. 23 (1) German Basic Law that was adopted in 1992 provided for
the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union ([1992] BGBl I 2086). In other Member
States, such as the United Kingdom, primacy of EC law was achieved by a general provision that
required interpretation of municipal law consistently with EC law. As was stated in the United
Kingdom’s European Communities Act 1972 ([1972] c 68), ‘any such provision (of any such extent)
as might be made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one
contained in this Part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing
provisions of this section’, which referred to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and their secondary legislation.

4 While, as we shall see, the European Court of Justice has based primacy of EC law on a different
premise, the approach taken by national courts in grounding primacy on their respective municipal
law does not generally entail any significant consequence in practice. Whether according to the
ECJ or to most of the Member States’ courts, provisions of EC law that are directly applicable or
have direct effect are to be applied by national courts and held to prevail over other provisions of
municipal law (see also → Treaties, Direct Applicability). The reluctance with which some national
courts considered the direct effect of directives was overcome a long time ago.

5 However, basing primacy of EC law on a provision of municipal law may raise the question
whether primacy should be denied when acts adopted by EC institutions are considered to be ultra
vires. An affirmative answer was given, for example, by the Danish Supreme Court in a judgment of
6 April 1998 (Hanne Norup Carlsen v Statsminister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen Højesteret [1998] 132
Ugeskrift vor Retsvæsen A 801).

6 Moreover, if primacy of EC law rests on a provision of a national constitution, one may have to
reckon with other, possibly conflicting, constitutional provisions, especially those pertaining to the
protection of fundamental rights. For this reason, a possible limitation to the primacy of EC law was
envisaged by both the German and the Italian Constitutional Courts (most recently in a German
Federal Constitutional Court order of 7 June 2000 [Bananenmarktordnung 102 BVerfGE 147], and in
an Italian Constitutional Court judgment of 21 April 1989 [Spa Fragd v Amministrazione Finanze
Stato (1989) 34 Giurisprudenza Costituzionale I 1001]). However, neither court has so far found
such a conflict to exist.

7 With regard to relations between provisions of European Union (‘EU’) law and municipal laws
before the → Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, Member States’ courts took a
similar approach to the one adopted in respect of EC law. Also in the areas of → European Common
Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, national courts

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 have considered compliance with EU law on the basis of the relevant provisions of their respective
municipal laws. However, the fact that EU provisions enacted in those areas did not have direct
effect limited the occasions on which national courts have had to consider their impact on
municipal legislation.

8 When a provision of EU law (adopted before the Lisbon Treaty) was given effect in a Member
State on the basis of a constitutional provision, the question of possible conflicts with other
constitutional provisions could arise. This question was discussed before the Constitutional Tribunal
of the Republic of Poland, which held in a judgment of 27 April 2005 that a (later amended)
constitutional provision prohibiting the extradition of nationals prevailed over the EU framework
decision on the → European arrest warrant (for a German translation of the judgment see
Auslieferung eines polnischen Staatsbürgers aufgrund eines europäischen Haftbefehls [2005] 40
EuR 494).

B. Approach Taken by the European Court of Justice

1. Former EC Law and Domestic Law

9 The ECJ has consistently ignored constitutional or other provisions of municipal law and taken a
different approach from that of Member States’ courts. In its landmark judgment in the → Costa v
ENEL Case (1964) the ECJ said that

the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed,
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the
Community itself being called into question. The transfer by the States from their domestic
legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.
(at 594)

10 The ECJ thus asserted the primacy of EC law over any provision pertaining to Member States’
laws, including constitutional provisions. This is viewed as a necessary consequence of the
creation of an entity that was given sovereign rights and to that extent is placed on a higher level
than any individual Member State. Moreover, it clearly serves to prevent the uniform application of
EC law from being jeopardized in one or more Member States.

11 The implications of the primacy of EC law over Member States’ laws were expounded by the
ECJ in the 1978 Simmenthal judgment. In the view of the ECJ,

every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent
to the Community rule. Accordingly, any provision of a national legal system and any
legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of
Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law
the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national
legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from having full force and
effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community
law. (paras 21–22)

12 In Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.′90 Srl the ECJ noted that it could not ‘be inferred from
the judgment in Simmenthal that the incompatibility with Community law of a subsequently adopted
rule of national law has the effect of rendering that rule of national law non-existent’ (para. 21).

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 Although the operative part of the judgment in Simmenthal may appear to refer to all the possible
conflicts of national laws with EC law, it is clear from the reasons that the ECJ only intended to
consider those provisions of EC law that are directly applicable or have a direct effect, since only
in that case would a national court be in a position to apply EC law instead of national legislation.

13 Member States’ administrative authorities may find themselves in a position similar to that of
national courts. In the 1989 Fratelli Costanzo judgment, the ECJ said that when the provisions of an
EC directive have direct effect and conflict with national legislation, ‘all organs of the administration,
including decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply those provisions’
(para. 31).

14 In view of the variety of procedural rules that govern the activity of national courts, the ECJ has
sought to ensure some minimum guarantees for the correct application of EC law in all the Member
States. In the 1990 Factortame judgment the ECJ, after referring to its Simmenthal judgment, added
that ‘the full effectiveness of Community law would be just as much impaired if a rule of national law
could prevent a court seized of a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim relief in
order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights
claimed under Community law’ (para. 21). The conditions for granting interim relief are left to the
municipal provisions of the Member State concerned, with the proviso that ‘those criteria cannot be
less favourable than those applying to similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must
not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the interim judicial protection of rights
conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)’ (Case C-432/05 Unibet [London] Ltd and
Unibet [International] Ltd v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271 para. 82).

15 The question whether a national court is required to apply EC law on its own motion was
considered by the ECJ in the 1995 Peterbroeck judgment. The ECJ held that

Community law precludes application of a domestic procedural rule whose effect, in

procedural circumstances such as those in question in the main proceedings, is to prevent
the national court, seized of a matter falling within its jurisdiction, from considering of its
own motion whether a measure of domestic law is compatible with a provision of
Community law when the latter provision has not been invoked by the litigant within a
certain period. (para 21)

16 The obligation of Member States concerning compliance with EC law does not include ensuring
primacy of EC law over a judicial decision that is → res iudicata according to the applicable
procedural law. The ECJ said in the 2006 Kapferer judgment that

[i]n order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound
administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive
after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for
in that connection can no longer be called into question … Therefore, Community law does
not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a
decision, even if to do so would enable it to remedy an infringement of Community law by
the decision at issue. (paras 20–21)

17 Thus, while a remedy for the infringement is required by EC law, it need not involve discarding
a judicial decision that has become definitive. An exception to this rule was carved by the ECJ in
the 2007 Lucchini judgment when the ECJ held that

Community law precludes the application of a provision of national law, such as Article
2909 of the Italian Civil Code, which seeks to lay down the principle of res judicata in so far
as the application of that provision prevents the recovery of State aid granted in breach of
Community law which has been found to be incompatible with the common market in a
decision of the Commission which has become final. (para. 63)

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 18 In Olimpiclub (2009) the ECJ stated that the final judgment of a national court was not affected
by EC law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and further noted that the
Lucchini judgment provided an exception because it

concerned a highly specific situation, in which the matters at issue were principles
governing the division of powers between the Member States and the Community in the
area of State aid, the Commission of the European Communities having exclusive
competence to assess the compatibility with the common market of a national State aid
measure. (para. 25)

19 On the contrary, an administrative measure, even if no longer subject to appeal, has to be

discarded when it conflicts with a supervening provision of EC law that is directly applicable or has
direct effect. In the 1999 Ciola judgment the ECJ referred to a provision of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (‘EC Treaty’) which was considered to have direct effect and said: ‘all
administrative bodies, including decentralized authorities, are subject to that obligation as to
primacy, and individuals may therefore rely on such a provision of Community law against them’
(para. 30). The ECJ concluded that

a prohibition which is contrary to the freedom to provide services, laid down before the
accession of a Member State to the European Union not by a general abstract rule but by a
specific administrative decision that has become final, must be disregarded when
assessing the validity of a fine imposed for failure to comply with that prohibition after the
date of accession. (para. 34)

20 All the decisions quoted above relate to the primacy of provisions of EC law which are directly
applicable or have direct effect. With regard to provisions that do not possess that character and
thus may be applied only when implemented through national legislation, according to the ECJ
Member States’ courts are required to interpret national legislation with a view to harmonizing it with
EC law. In respect of legislation conflicting with provisions of a directive, this requirement was
stated in general terms in the 1990 Marleasing judgment. The ECJ held that

the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by
the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the [EC] Treaty [later Art. 10 EC Treaty;
replaced, in substance, by Art. 4 (3) TEU] to take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the
authorities of member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. It
follows that, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted
before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do
so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to
achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of
Article 189 of the [EC] Treaty [later Art. 249 EC Treaty; now Art. 288 TFEU]. (para. 8)

21 The Member States’ obligations to cooperate with the EC institutions under Art. 10 EC Treaty
(replaced, in substance, by Art. 4 (3) TEU) have later been invoked by the ECJ in order to require
Member States’ courts to interpret national legislation consistently with provisions of EC law other
than those included in directives. An example in point is the judgment in the Hermès case (Case C-
53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603).

22 Should compliance with obligations under EC law not be attained through the interpretation of
national legislation consistently with EC law, the adoption of legislative measures will be required
from the Member State concerned. There are no specific indications in the ECJ’s case law about
how this should be achieved. Moreover, the ECJ has not accepted the suggestion that national
legislation, even when it is inconsistent with EC law that is not directly applicable and does not have
direct effect, should be discarded by Member States’ courts as a matter of EC law. In any case, the
suggested remedy would only rarely prove adequate in order to ensure compliance, because of

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 the need of specific implementing measures.

2. Former Second and Third Pillar EU Law and Domestic Law

23 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ did not assert the primacy over Member
States’ legislation of provisions of EU law relating to Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (the so-called second and third pillars). However, it is
clear that in these areas a transfer of powers occurred from Member States to the EU similar to the
one that took place earlier through the establishment of the European Communities. Thus the
reasoning sustaining primacy of EC law as developed in the 1964 Costa v ENEL judgment could
have been extended to EU law. Moreover, the ECJ took a clear step in the direction of asserting
primacy when it considered whether national courts are under an obligation to interpret national
legislation, as far as possible, consistently with EU law.

24 The obligation for Member States’ courts to interpret national legislation consistently with a
framework decision enacted within the third pillar was asserted by the ECJ in the 2005 Pupino
judgment. The ECJ said that ‘[w]hen applying national law, the national court that is called upon to
interpret it must do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework
decision in order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 34 (2) (b) EU’
(para 43). The ECJ thus found a legal basis other than Art. 10 EC Treaty, which was not applicable
to acts adopted within the third pillar. The ECJ then added:

[T]he principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation
of national law contra legem. That principle does, however, require that, where necessary,
the national court consider the whole of national law in order to assess how far it can be
applied in such a way as not to produce a result contrary to that envisaged by the
framework decision. (para. 47)

25 With regard to acts adopted within the second and the third pillars, the requirement of
interpreting national legislation consistently with EU law represented the most significant implication
of primacy. Given the absence of direct effect that characterized those acts, the only alternative to
harmonizing interpretation would in practice have been the adoption of legislative measures by the
Member State concerned.

3. EU Law and Domestic Law after the Lisbon Treaty

26 Art. I-6 of the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed 16 December 2004
[2004] OJ C310) stated that the ‘Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in
exercising competence conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States’. This
statement of the primacy of EU law applied to the latter what the ECJ had previously maintained with
regard to the relations between EC Law and domestic law.

27 Although, because of its symbolic significance, a similar text was not included in the Lisbon
Treaty, its content does not appear to be controversial. In its ‘Declaration concerning Primacy’, the
Lisbon Conference recalled that, ‘in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of
the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties
have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law’.
The Lisbon Conference attached to the Final Act an opinion of the Council Legal Service dated 22
June 2007 which carried the following sentence: ‘The fact that the principle of primacy will not be
included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the
existing case-law of the Court of Justice.’

28 In Winner Wetten (2010) the ECJ (Grand Chamber) applied all the rules of EU Law which were
directly applicable or produced direct effects as stated in Simmenthal, with regard to EC
regulations. The Court held that:

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial
practice which might impair the effectiveness of Union law by withholding from the national
court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the
moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent
directly applicable Union rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with the
requirements which are the very essence of Union law (para. 56).

In the same judgment the ECJ added that ‘[r]ules of national law, even of a constitutional order,
cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of Union law’ (para. 61). This was
meant to include ‘a provisional suspension [by a national court] of the ousting effect which a
directly applicable rule of Union law has on national law that is contrary thereto’ (para. 67).

C. Assessment
29 When a provision of EU law is directly applicable, or has direct effect without having been
properly implemented, primacy of EU law is understood as requiring national authorities to apply the
provision of EU law instead of any conflicting provision of municipal law. Should, on the contrary,
the provision of EU law not be directly applicable nor have direct effect, the choice of the way to
ensure primacy of EU law is left to the legal system of each Member State subject to the
requirement of interpreting national legislation consistently with EU law.

30 As was noted above, primacy of EC law and, to a large extent, also that of all parts of EU law
has been accepted in substance by national courts, albeit generally on the basis of the
perspective of the relevant constitutional provisions. This approach may lead to the consequence
that EU provisions, contrary to the assumption of the ECJ, are not necessarily considered by
national courts as prevailing over provisions in national constitutions. However, these conflicts
have so far had a limited impact on the application of EU law.

Select Bibliography
E Suy Les rapports entre le droit communautaire et le droit interne des États membres
(Uga Heule 1964).
College of Europe Droit communautaire et droit national: Semaine de Bruges 1965 (De
Tempel Bruges 1966).
C Constantinidès-Mégret Le droit de la Communauté Économique Européenne et l’ordre
juridique des États membres (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence Paris 1967).
WJ Ganshof van der Meersch ‘Le droit communautaire et ses rapports avec les droits des
États membres’ in WJ Ganshof van der Meersch (ed) Droit des Communautés européennes
(Larcier Bruxelles 1969) 41–79.
M Waelbroeck Traités internationaux et juridictions internes dans les pays du Marché
Commun (Bruyant Bruxelles 1969).
M Zuleeg Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften im innerstaatlichen Bereich
(Heymann Köln 1969).
F Capotorti (ed) Il primato del diritto comunitario e i giudici italiani (Angeli Milano 1978).
J Weiler ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 YBEurL
267–306.
B de Witte Retour à Costa: La primauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit
international (European University Institute San Domenico 1983).
O Jacot-Guillarmod Le juge national face au droit européen (Helbing & Lichtenhahn Bâle
1993).
C Haguenau L’application effective du droit communautaire en droit interne: Analyse
comparative des problèmes rencontrés en droit français, anglais et allemand (Bruylant

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 Bruxelles 1995).
AM Slaughter A Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds) The European Court and National Courts:
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context (Hart Oxford 1998).
B de Witte ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P Craig and G de
Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (OUP Oxford 1999) 177–213.
FC Mayer Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung: Das Maastricht-Urteil des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts und die Letztentscheidung über ultra-vires-Akte in
Mehrebenensystemen; eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung von Konflikten zwischen
Gerichten am Beispiel der EU und der USA (Beck München 2000).
KJ Alter Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule
of Law in Europe (OUP Oxford 2001).
U Everling ‘From European Communities to European Union: By Convergence to Consistency’
in A von Bogdandy PC Mavroidis and Y Mény (eds) European Integration and International
Co-ordination: Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
(Kluwer Law International Alphen aan den Rijn 2002) 139–57.
M Nettesheim ‘EU-Recht und nationales Verfassungsrecht: Deutscher Bericht für die XX.
FIDE-Tagung 2002’ in Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen (ed) XX Congress London
30 October–2 November 2002 vol 1 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law
London 2002) 81–241.
Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen (ed) XX Congress London 30 October–2
November 2002 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law London 2002–03) vols
1–2.
GC Rodriguez Iglesias ‘Quelques réflexions sur la singularité des rapports du droit
communautaire avec d’autres ordres juridiques’ in G Vandersanden (ed) Mélanges en
hommage à Jean-Victor Louis vol 1 (Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles Bruxelles 2003)
389–407.
K Lenaerts and T Corthaut ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU
Law’ (2006) 31 ELR 287–315.
C Richards ‘The Supremacy of Community Law before the French Constitutional Court’ (2006)
31 ELR 499–517.
R Schütze ‘Supremacy without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of
Community Pre-emption’ (2006) 43 CMLRev 1023–48.
A Tizzano ‘La protection des droits fondamentaux en Europe: La Cour de justice et les
juridictions constitutionnelles nationales’ (2006) Revue du droit de l’Union européenne 9–21.
U Wölker ‘Die Normenhierarchie im Unionsrecht in der Praxis’ (2007) 42 EuR 32–56.

Select Documents
Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839.
Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629.
Case C-2/08 Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl
[2009] ECR I-07501.
Case C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR
I-4153.
Case C-119/05 Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v Lucchini SpA
[2007] ECR I-6199.
Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame [1990]
ECR I-2433.
Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517.
Case C-234/04 Rosmarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick GmbH [2006] ECR I-2585.
Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgerneisterin der Stadt Bergheim [2010] ECR I-
8015
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (signed 13 December 2007, entered
into force 1 December 2009) [2008] OJ C115/1.
‘Declaration concerning Primacy’ 17th Declaration annexed to the Final Act of the
Intergovernmental Conference which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon (signed 13 December
2007) [2008] OJ C115/344.
Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN. CO.GE.′90 Srl [1998] ECR I-
6307.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:
Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018