United

Nations Commission on
Human Rights/United Nations
Human Rights Council
Beate Rudolf

Content Product: Max Planck

type: Encyclopedia entries Encyclopedia of Public
Article last International Law [MPEPIL]
updated: September 2008

Subject(s):
Indigenous peoples
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
under the direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum.

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Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 A. Development
1 For almost 60 years, the → United Nations (UN)Commission on Human Rights (‘UNCHR’) was the
central UN body charged with furthering respect for → human rights worldwide. Despite its
achievements, the UNCHR met with considerable criticism because of its politicization and
application of double standards. In order to create a more credible and more efficient body, it was
replaced by the UN Human Rights Council (‘UNHRC’) in 2006.

1. Commission on Human Rights

2 One of the central purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for human rights,
see → United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’). According to Art. 68 UN Charter, the UN Economic
and Social Council (→ United Nations, Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]) is to set up
‘functional’ commissions for this end, and it did so in 1946 by creating the UNCHR. Initially
consisting of 18 Member States elected by the ECOSOC, the UNCHR’s membership grew in four
steps, reaching 53 in 1990. Despite the recommendation of the UN Preparatory Commission and the
1946 ‘nucleus commission’, States, not independent experts, were to be members of the UNCHR. A
major reason for this decision was that States feared a UNCHR of independent members would
interfere with their internal affairs (see also → Domaine réservé). In particular, there were concerns
that it would deal with individual complaints against States (→ Human Rights, Individual
Communications/Complaints) or that it would enforce human rights, eg by evaluating country
situations. These considerations had already caused the vague wording of the powers of the
ECOSOC to ‘make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of,
human rights’ (Art. 62 (2) UN Charter), without explicitly stating that they included preparatory
activities, such as studies, investigations, or the analysis of individual complaints.

3 For this reason, the UNCHR began its work cautiously, concentrating on standard-setting, ie
elaborating legal instruments that might become binding either as → treaties or as → customary
international law through acceptance and application by States. It drafted fundamental human
rights standards, eg the → Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), → International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and → International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966) so as to help the ECOSOC exercise its power under Art. 62 (3) UN
Charter to ‘draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly’. As it considered itself a
technical, not a political body, it left contested points to be resolved by the UN General Assembly
(‘UNGA’; → United Nations, General Assembly). With respect to monitoring the Member States’
respect for human rights, the UNCHR introduced a system of voluntary State reports (→ Human
Rights, State Reports). It was abandoned in the late 1960s because the UNCHR was not allowed to
criticize individual States. Until 1967, the UNCHR also considered that it had ‘no power to take any
action’ concerning individual complaints submitted to the UN. The Communist States were afraid of
being scrutinized with respect to civil and political rights; for Western States, the motivation was
fear of being criticized for racial discrimination (→ Racial and Religious Discrimination) and the
living conditions in their colonies (see also → Colonialism). Therefore, the UNCHR merely took note
of individual complaints, but only in closed session and without taking further action.

4 The enlargement of the UNCHR in 1966, which provided → developing countries with a majority,
led to the creation of two new mechanisms: the public procedure under UN ECOSOC Res 1235
(XLII) of 6 June 1967 and the confidential procedure pursuant to UN ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) of 27
May 1970. The confidential procedure permitted the UNCHR to examine individual complaints. The
public procedure opened the way to public consideration of country situations. Thus, the standard-
setting activities, which characterized the first phase of the UNCHR, began to be complemented by
more serious monitoring activities.

5 In the late 1970s, under pressure from → Non-Governmental Organizations (‘NGOs’; see also
→ Human Rights, Role of Non-Governmental Organizations), the role of the UNCHR changed

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 significantly: on the one hand, it became an energetic actor in its own right with respect to drafting
human rights treaties and non-binding declarations (see also → Soft Law). It drew up, inter alia, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(→ Torture, Prohibition of) or the Convention on the Rights of the Child (→ Children, International
Protection), and Declarations that were adopted by the UNGA, such as the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (UNGA Res
36/55 [25 November 1981]; see also → Religion or Belief, Freedom of, International Protection),
Declaration on the Right to Development (UNGA Res 41/128 [4 December 1986]; see also
→ Development, Right to, International Protection), Declaration on the Rights of Persons
belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNGA Res 47/135 [18 December
1992]; see also → Minorities, International Protection), Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (UNGA Res 47/133 [18 December 1992]; see also
→ Disappearances), and the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (UNGA Res 53/144 [9 December 1998]).

6 On the other hand, during the late 1970s the UNCHR also took up monitoring of the human rights
situation within UN Member States (see also → Fact-Finding). Thus, it began to consider, in public
debate, particularly serious human rights situations basing itself on the reports of independent
experts that it had installed. Their mandates were either country- or theme-specific (see also
→ Special Rapporteurs of Human Rights Bodies). Although these mechanisms greatly improved the
UNCHR’s ability to monitor the respect for human rights, they were criticized for their selectivity.
They could only be instituted with the support of a majority of the UNCHR and a majority was also
necessary for a country-specific resolution. Thus, powerful or well-connected human rights
violators managed to escape international control. As a result of the disappearance of the East-
West confrontation (see also → Cold War [1947–91]), the UNCHR increased its thematic
mechanisms considerably during the 1990s. It also extended them to economic, social, and cultural
rights, which had become a particular concern of the developing countries. At the same time, the
recurrent financial problems of the UN hampered the activities of the special mechanisms by
reducing the number of on-site missions, cutting the support staff for mandate-holders, and limiting
the length of their reports, thus reducing their information value (see also → United Nations
Budget).

7 At the turn of the millennium, the UNCHR came under attack from States and NGOs for various
reasons: first among them was the UNCHR’s selectivity with respect to countries targeted by
country-specific mandates and resolutions. For that reason, numerous States and human rights
NGOs demanded higher standards for UNCHR membership and accountability of UNCHR members.
They considered that the UNCHR also lost its credibility by permitting countries to remain a member
even when they were under UNCHR scrutiny for serious human rights violations. Other States
argued that the UNCHR’s credibility was tainted by its confrontational approach, and they called for
abandoning open criticism of States, especially by terminating country-specific activities and a
stricter control of mandate-holders. In contrast, others suggested focusing on more effective
implementation of existing standards (see also → Human Rights, Domestic Implementation). The
issue of membership quickly became the focal point of the debate. The High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (see also
→ United Nations, Secretary-General) proposed universal membership to be supported by a small
advisory council of independent experts. As this idea did not gain sufficient support, Kofi Annan
suggested creating a permanent UNHRC significantly smaller than the UNCHR so as to be able to
have more focused debate. It should consist of States to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the
UNGA as a means of excluding the worst human rights violators. Finally, it should submit all States
to a ‘peer review’ to evaluate their fulfilment of their human rights obligations so as to avoid
selectivity.

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 2. Human Rights Council
8 The UN World Summit 2005 followed the proposal to replace the UNCHR by a UNHRC. Yet it left
the decisive questions, such as its membership, elections, and mandate, to subsequent
negotiations, which took place until March 2006. The resulting UNGA Resolution 60/251 of 15 March
2006 could not be adopted by → consensus as envisaged, but was put to a vote at request of the
United States of America (‘US’) (see also → International Organizations or Institutions, Voting
Rules and Procedures). It received a majority of 170 States, with four States voting against it (Israel,
Marshall Islands, Palau, US), and three abstaining (Belarus, Iran, Venezuela). Elections to the
UNHRC took place within the UNGA in May 2006, and it first convened in June 2006.

B. Status and Role within the UN

1. Commission on Human Rights

9 The UNCHR was a functional commission of the ECOSOC pursuant to Art. 68 UN Charter and
thus, as a subsidiary body, de iure subordinate to it (see also → United Nations Committees and
Subsidiary Bodies, System of). De facto, the ECOSOC did not exercise control over the contents of
the UNCHR’s activities as it did not conduct a debate over the UNCHR reports. Only UNCHR
decisions with financial implications had to be approved by the ECOSOC, yet were endorsed on a
regular basis. In contrast, the UNGA also discussed issues that fell within the powers of the UNCHR,
but there was no structured exchange.

10 In March 2006, the ECOSOC decided to dissolve the UNCHR in view of the establishment of the
UNHRC by the UNGA (UN ECOSOC Res 2006/2 [22 March 2006]). As Art. 68 UN Charter considers a
functional commission of the ECOSOC on human rights to be mandatory, this course of action
constitutes a change in the UN Charter outside the provisions for a Charter amendment (see also
→ United Nations Charter, Amendment; → United Nations Charter, Interpretation of). It is justified
by the fact that the ECOSOC and the UNCHR serve to support the UNGA in discharging its functions
under Art. 13 (1) (b) UN Charter of ‘assisting [States] in the realization of human rights’, and that
both act under the authority of the UNGA in this field (Art. 60 UN Charter). Consequently, if the latter
finds that a supportive body, by its very structure, does not fulfil its role, it may cease to avail itself
of that body. For the parent body (here ECOSOC), it is then only consequential, and hence within its
implied powers, to dissolve the subsidiary body (→ International Organizations or Institutions,
Implied Powers).

2. Human Rights Council

11 UNGA Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 created the UNHRC as a body directly subordinate
to the UNGA. Thus, its status was enhanced as compared to that of the UNCHR so as to increase its
political weight. The legal basis for the approach is Art. 22 UN Charter in conjunction with Art. 7 (2)
UN Charter empowering it to establish subsidiary organs. The UNHRC is obliged to report to the
UNGA on its activities. The future will show to what extent the UNGA exercises control over the
UNHRC. If the UNHRC is to become the focal point for human rights protection within the UN system
as intended, it must have considerable freedom of action.

12 While the UNHRC was created as a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, UNGA Resolution 60/251 of
15 March 2006 provides for a review of its status after five years with a view of upgrading it to a
principal organ. This change would necessitate a revision of the UN Charter. If approved, the
election of States to the UNHRC would require a two-thirds majority of the UNGA, thus rendering it
more difficult for human rights violators to be chosen.

C. Organization and Functions

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 1. Organization

(a) Commission on Human Rights

13 As the parent body, the ECOSOC elected the members of the UNCHR. The 53 seats were
apportioned to the five regional groups so as to achieve a geographical balance (African group:
15; Asian: 12; Eastern European: 5; Western European and Others: 10; Latin America and the
Caribbean: 11). Block voting and the practice of presenting a number of candidates equal to the
vacant seats permitted serious human rights violators to be represented in the UNCHR. Membership
was for a period of three years, and was renewable. The permanent members of the UN Security
Council (→ United Nations, Security Council) managed to sit on the UNCHR continuously, with rare
and short interruptions. All Member States could participate in the sessions as observers, and did
so extensively. NGOs were also admitted as observers, making the UNCHR sessions the main forum
for → civil society organizations within the UN system (see also → International Organizations or
Institutions, Observer Status).

14 The UNCHR held one regular session of six weeks per year at a time different from the
ECOSOC. Special sessions for emergency situations, authorized in 1990, were convened five times,
concerning the former Yugoslavia (see also → Yugoslavia, Dissolution of), → Rwanda, East Timor,
and the occupied Palestinian territories (→ Palestine). The agenda of the UNCHR contained a
multitude of issues that were not prioritized, rendering a thorough debate impossible. Numerous
working groups met before and during the UNCHR session. The most important subsidiary body of
the UNCHR was the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
renamed Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1999 (→ United
Nations, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights). It served as a think-
tank preparing studies and drafting normative instruments, which often became the basis of
subsequent UNCHR activities. Other significant instruments of the UNCHR were the special
procedures. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (→ Human Rights, United
Nations High Commissioner for [UNHCHR]) served the UNCHR as a secretariat.

(b) Human Rights Council

15 The UNHRC consists of 47 members elected by majority vote of the UNGA. The ballot is secret,
so as to discourage human rights violators from standing for election. The geographical distribution
of the seats increased the weight of the African and Asian groups (13 each; Eastern Europe: 6;
Western European and Others: 7; Latin America and the Caribbean: 8). Membership in the UNHRC
can be renewed only once so as to avoid having permanent members. Despite the criticism that
led to the creation of the UNHRC, there are no substantive preconditions for membership. Instead,
Member States must take a candidate’s human rights record into account in the election. Some
States followed the proposal of the UNHCHR and of NGOs to make specific commitments, such as
the ratification of a certain human rights treaty, and to publish a platform of objectives they intend
to pursue during their term. Human rights advocates hope that this will become established
practice. In the case of gross and systematic violations of human rights (→ Gross and Systematic
Human Rights Violations), membership in the UNHRC can be suspended by a majority of two thirds
of the UNGA members present and voting. All members of the UNHRC are to be submitted to a
universal periodic review during their term, in which their respect for human rights is scrutinized.
This procedure is intended to enhance the legitimacy of the UNHRC. Other Member States may sit
on the UNHRC as observers, and NGO participation established by the UNHRC is also to be
continued.

16 The UNHRC is designed as a standing body, with at least three regular meetings during the
year and the right to hold special sessions. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and the special procedures were provisionally continued during the UNHRC’s first
year until the agreement on an ‘institutional package’ in UNHRC Resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007,

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 which found the endorsement of the UNGA. It creates the Human Rights Council Advisory
Committee, sets up a ‘complaint procedure’, regulates the selection and qualification of office-
holders within the special procedures, and delineates the universal periodic review.

2. Functions

(a) Commission on Human Rights

17 The functions of the UNCHR comprised the promotion and the protection of human rights.
Promotion denotes activities aimed at improving the human rights situation in the future, eg by
education, research, and technical advice. For the latter, the UNCHR made use of the ‘advisory
services’ of the UNHCHR. Promotion also included standard-setting: the UNCHR either drafted non-
binding resolutions containing human rights norms, or treaties, which acquired binding force for
States only through ratification. It shared this function with the UNGA. Protection referred to
activities monitoring States’ → compliance with human rights. They ranged from receiving
complaints about alleged violations and fact-finding to adopting conclusions on the existence of a
violation and recommendations for redressing them. As the UNCHR had no power to impose binding
sanctions, publicity of such protection activities became a crucial tool for it (‘shaming a violator into
compliance’; see also → Public Opinion).

18 Among the protection activities of the UNCHR, the confidential procedure, by which individual
complaints were examined, had the least tangible impact. This was due to its confidentiality; only
the names of the countries under consideration and the discontinuance of a consideration were
published. Further reasons were a cumbersome procedure involving both a working group of the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and of the UNCHR before the
UNCHR itself could take action in form of a resolution, and the limited purpose of the confidential
procedure: it merely aimed at establishing the existence of a ‘consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights’ (UN ECOSOC Res 1503 para. 1) within a State, but not at
ensuring redress for victims individually (see also → Human Rights, Remedies).

19 In contrast, the public procedure developed into a complex system of ‘special procedures’
publicly dealing with country situations, specific thematic problems, and individual complaints.
Under this procedure, the UNCHR could ‘study…situations which reveal a consistent pattern of
violations of human rights’ (UN ECOSOC Res 1235 para. 3) and consider them in open session.
Although the resolution emphasized situations in colonial and other dependent countries, it applied
to all countries. In the beginning, ‘pariah States’ such as South Africa during the → apartheid or
Chile under the military dictatorship were targeted. At a later stage, most country mechanisms
pertained to African or Asian States, such as → Sudan, Somalia (see also → Somalia, Conflict),
Myanmar, or Cambodia (see also → Cambodia Conflicts [Kampuchea]). Thematic mechanisms were
instituted to circumvent the opposition of States targeted by a proposed country mechanism. The
first example is the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, which was created
in view of this pervasive human rights violation in Argentina after the military coup. These
procedures also dealt with individual complaints, not only as a source of information but also with
the aim of resolving the cases brought to their attention. For that reason, the rapporteurs and
working groups entered into a dialogue with the State concerned to clarify the facts and, if they
revealed a human rights violation, to put an end to it. Some mechanisms, such as the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention (→ Detention, Arbitrary), developed a quasi-judicial procedure that
ends with a finding of whether a human rights violation took place. Other mechanisms, eg the
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (see also → Women, Rights of, International
Protection), were less rigorous, restricting themselves to noting whether the State replied in a
satisfactory way. By ‘urgent actions’, the special procedures contacted → governments to protect
victims in pressing and ongoing cases of serious human rights violations. The wide range of
available sources of information, including reports by NGOs, provided the special procedures with
up-to-date information and permitted them to serve as an early warning mechanism for the UN

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 system. To gain first-hand information, the special procedures undertook on-site visits to individual
countries. In recent years, joint missions by several mechanisms became more common. However,
all visits depended on the → consent of the State concerned. On the basis of these activities, the
special procedures not only submitted factual reports to the UNCHR, but also made country-
specific and general recommendations. The latter included even draft proposals for international
instruments. Thus, these charter-based bodies not only complemented the protective function of
the treaty bodies that monitor the implementation of the universal human rights treaties, but they
also contributed to the standard-setting function of the UNCHR.

(b) Human Rights Council

20 The UNHRC took over all functions of the UNCHR. UNGA Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006
expressly entrusted it with the responsibility for ‘promoting universal respect for the protection of all
human rights’ (para. 2). Therefore, the UNHRC must continue providing advisory services to States.
The resolution also provides for UNHRC recommendations to the UNGA for the further development
of human rights law. Thus, the UNHRC has the task of contributing to UN standard-setting by
drafting non-binding instruments and submitting draft treaties to the UNGA. In addition, the UNHRC
has a protective function: it is charged with addressing ‘situations of violations of human rights,
including gross and systematic violations’ (para. 3), and with making recommendations on them.
Consequently, the UNHRC may also respond to individual cases of alleged human rights violations.
Moreover, the UNHRC must review periodically the ‘fulfilment by each State of its human rights
obligations’ (para. 5 [e]). Hence, it has to monitor all States’ compliance with human rights through
permanent and, if necessary, ad hoc procedures. It is this last obligation to continuous monitoring
that distinguishes the UNHRC most clearly from the UNCHR. It aims at enhancing the credibility of
the UNHRC by ensuring that its members do not escape international control and by preventing
selectivity.

21 The UNHRC emphasized its promotional functions by its first resolutions recommending to the
UNGA a Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (UNHRC
Resolution 2006/1 [29 June 2006]) and a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNHRC
Resolution 2006/2 [29 June 2006]; see also → Indigenous Peoples). In its standard-setting function,
it will be supported by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee consisting of 18 independent
experts. The latter will provide expertise through studies and research, but only on request of the
UNHRC; in this respect it is weaker than its predecessor body, the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.

22 So far, the UNHRC could devote only little time to exercising its protective functions because it
first had to set up its structures in this regard. It did, however, consider the reports within the
confidential procedure and decided to discontinue consideration of Kyrgyzstan. This procedure is
replaced by the new ‘complaint procedure’, which largely resembles the confidential procedure,
with the notable exception that the complainant will now be informed of the outcome of the
procedure. The UNHRC also held special sessions, eg during the ‘summer war’ between Israel and
Lebanon in 2006 (see also → Arab-Israeli Conflict) or on the situation in Darfur. The system of
special procedures was largely retained against attempts to use the task of rationalizing the system
for weakening it. The UNHRC discontinued only two country mechanisms (relating to Belarus and
→ Cuba) and postponed the decision on the continuation of each of the others individually to the
time of their regular consideration. It also created a code of conduct for the mandate-holders
(UNHRC Res 5/2 [18 June 2007]). Information from NGOs continues to be among their permissible
sources of information. However, the UNHRC did not adopt any measures to improve States’
cooperation with these procedures and the follow-up on their recommendations. The universal
periodic review will be carried out in a public meeting by a working group consisting of all members
of the UNHRC. It will be based on a State report, information contained in reports of treaty bodies
and special procedures, and submissions from national human rights institutions and NGOs. Yet,
only States can actively participate in the ‘interactive dialogue’ before the working group. A State

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 will be evaluated on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, treaties ratified by it,
and its voluntary commitments. The review began in 2008 and shall ensure that UNHRC members
are reviewed during their term of office.

D. Evaluation
23 The UNCHR significantly contributed to reducing the States’ reserved domain (Art. 2 (7) UN
Charter), particularly through its protection activities. Its legacy is to have set up monitoring
mechanisms independent of a State’s consent, and to have integrated NGOs into its work. Its
shortcomings, especially its politicization, were less due to a structural flaw than to the motive of
many of its members not to further human rights, but to shield themselves against international
control. Likewise, the deficit in effective follow-up is not attributable to a lack of creativity of the
mandate-holders, but to a lack of political will of States to co-operate with them.

24 Therefore, it is too early to evaluate the success of the reform that brought the UNHRC into
being. Although the mode of choosing the UNHRC members is promising, the real test lies in the
willingness of States to overcome political and regional loyalties and to vote according to the
human rights records and commitments of candidate States. Consequently, the true challenge is
carrying out a universal periodic review that leads to a candid appraisal of a State’s human rights
record. In the same vein, the yardstick for measuring whether the UNHRC will serve human rights
better than the UNCHR lies in its ability to improve the system of special procedures by ensuring
sufficient financial and political support for their activities and by strengthening the follow-up on
their recommendations.

Select Bibliography
H Tolley, The UN Commission on Human Rights (Westview Press Boulder 1987).
JA Pastor Ridruejo ‘Les procédures publiques spéciales de la Commission des Droits de
l’Homme des Nations Unies’ (1991) 228 RdC 183–271.
EH Riedel ‘Commission on Human Rights’ in R Wolfrum (ed) United Nations: Law, Policies and
Practice (CH Beck München 1995) vol 1, 117–26.
B Rudolf, Die thematischen Berichterstatter und Arbeitsgruppen der UN-
Menschenrechtskommission (Springer Berlin 2000).
B Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (2nd ed OUP Oxford 2002).
M Abraham, A New Chapter for Human Rights. A Handbook on Issues of Transition from the
Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council (International Service for Human
Rights Genève 2006).
P Alston ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN
Human Rights Council’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185–224.
N Ghanea ‘From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step
Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 695–705.
PG Lauren ‘“To Preserve and Build on its Achievements and to Redress its Shortcomings”:
The Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council’ (2007) 29
HumRtsQ 307–45.
P Scannella and P Splinter ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Promise to be fulfilled’
(2007) 7 HRLRev 41–72.
P Alston (ed) The United Nations and Human Rights (2nd ed OUP Oxford 2012).

Select Documents
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(adopted on 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.

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Symbiosis Law School; date: 15 March 2018
 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2
September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(adopted 20 December 2006, not yet entered into force) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 1,
408.
UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Report on the 61st Session’ (14 March 2005–22 April 2005)
ESCOR [2005] Supp 3.
UN ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967) ESCOR 42nd Session Supp 1, 17.
UN ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) (27 May 1970) ESCOR 48th Session Supp 1A, 8.
UN ECOSOC Res 2006/2 (22 March 2006) ESCOR [2006] Supp 1, 15.
UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council’ (18 September 2006–13 December 2006) GAOR
62nd Session Supp 53.
UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council’ (19 June 2006–11 August 2006) GAOR 61st
Session Supp 53.
UNHRC ‘Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ UNHRC
Resolution 2006/1 (29 June 2006) UN Doc A/HRC/1/L.2.
UNHRC ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ UNHRC Resolution 2006/2 (29 June
2006) UN Doc A/HRC/1/L.3.
UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1.
UNHRC Res 5/2 (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/2.
UNGA ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 211.
UNGA Res 36/55 (25 November 1981) GAOR 36th Session Supp 51, 171.
UNGA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 53, 186.
UNGA Res 47/133 (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207.
UNGA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 210.
UNGA Res 53/144 (9 December 1998) GAOR 53rd Session Supp 49 vol 1, 261.
UNGA Res 60/251 (15 March 2006) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 3, 2.

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