UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Martin A. Armstrong Plaintifé ave Civil Action No: 09-972 (HHK) Harley Lappin, et al Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons Defendants 6 MOTION FOR BAIL OR A ORDER DIRECTING THE CHANGE IN CUSTODY TO HOME CONFINEMENT TO ENABLE ACCESS .T0 THE COURTS AND TO REVIEW DISCOVERY ON COMPUTER CD-ROM (130 DISKS) THAT THE BOP REFUSES TO ALLOW PRINTING ANY DOCUMENTS FROM SUCH DISKS ‘THAT HAS BEEN DENIED FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS AND TO EARN INCOME TO HIRE COUNSEL oR IN THE ALTERNATIVE ORDER THE DEFENDANT TO INMEDTATELY TAKE ARMSTRONG TO SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL TO RECEIVE” URGENT MEDICAL ATTENTION TO PREVENT HIM FROM GOING BLIND AND SUFFERING MUSCLE DAMAGE BY A STAFF INFECTION THEY REFUSE TO ADDRESS I, Martin A. Armstrong, pro se, on remand from the Court of ‘Appeals, entered August 6th, 2010, respectfully move for bail or a change in custody to enable!the movant (herein "Armstrong") to earn income, review discovery denied by the Defendant (herein "BOP") claiming that printing anything from a computer represents a major security risk, and to seek medical attention urgently needed denied by the BOP, or in the alternative, to at least direct the BOP to immediately take Armstrong to Saint Francis Hospital to be treated for what he has been told is a staff infection that continues to be ignored by Dr Lopez at Fort Dix Camp that Armstrong believes is a policy to save money that has recently resulted in the death of one inmate here, Mr. Johnson, who complained he was not feeling well, was also ignored, and died of a major heart attack.CHANGE IN LAW DECIDED JUNE 24, 2010 The Supreme Court has just handed down a major decision that has indeed overturned the entire Second Circuit line of cases on the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act going back to inception. Based upon the holding of Morrison et al v National Australia Bank, Ltd, 561 US ~ (6/24/10), the "Conduct & Effects Test" that has been used also in criminal charges is now squarely overruled. This voids both the civil contempt and civil case without any doubt. The Morrison decision has impact also upon the imprisonment directing the lower courts to use STRICT CONSTRUCTION of statutes. Currently, the BOP refusts to release Armstrong after more than 10 years on a 5 year sentence because they REFUSE to provide credit for 7.5 years of imprisonment oa a civil contempt that was vacated when 18 USC §3585(b) provides NO SUH exception. Under STRICT CONSTRUCTION the BOP has absolutely ho authority to deny that credit sua sponte. 18 USC §3585(b) Credit for prior custody. A defendant “shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences ~ (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence. (emphasis added) Under the STRICT CONSTRUCTION, there is NO exception for civil contempt within §3585(b). This is further confined by the fact that the BOP simply MUST have statutory authority to imprison anyone for any reason. 18 USC §4001(a) Limitation on detention; control of prisons No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress. The Bureau of Prisons MUST have statutory authority that states contempt is the exception to §3585(b). Without that, there is NO authority to imprison Armstrong. 2Even when a civil contempt was imposed in a SEC case, upon indictment, the contempt was vacated because the district court viewed it unconstitutional for one court to coerce an indicted defendant regarding the sane transactions pending @ criminal trial, Tankersley v Fisher, VL 275878 (ND Fla 2008). In Ochoa v US, 819 F2d 66, (2d Cir 1987), the court declined to give credit for a civil contempt but only because that preceded the criminal contempt. Ochoa has been overruled by the Supreme Court about 5 years later: "Under the new law, a defendant may receive credit both for this time [related to the offense] and for time spent in official detention in connection with ‘any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed." US v Wilson, 502 US 329, 117 LEd2d 593, 602 (1992) Moreover, there is a serious problem with contempt insofar as 18 USC $401 authorizes criminal contempt ONLY for in court misbehavior, US v Crispo, 306 F3d 71, 79 (2d Cir 2002)(18 USC §1503 "provided that all other contempts, or those that occurred outside of the presence of the court, could only be punished by indictment and trial.") citing Nye v US, 313 US 33, 44-49 (1941). Since the order is merely a turnover order and not misconduct within a courtroom, it is an indirect contempt covered by 18 USC §1509, Nevertheless, contempt is not a criminal felony and remains purely a misdemeanor, US v Galante, 298 F2d 22 (2d Cir 1962). Even the Sentencing Commission regards contempt as a misdemeanor in the criminal history S4A1.2(c). Misdemeanors are confined to 6 months unless there is a trial by jury Gheff v Schnackenberg, 384 US 373 (1966) and a statutory maximum of 1 year, 18 USC 53559, irrespective that $401 has no time limit, contempts are not felonies. The criminal prosecution conceded the civil contempt in the parallel case was being used to compel the turnover of assets for a criminal restitution. AVEXANDER SOUTHWELL AUSA: "'So to be clear, in the event of a conviction, ve wit rncauests your Honor, that there be an order of contribution reinbursing ultilmately HSBC, who basically made good and paid out these losses for vhatever reasons that they did. They conpensated the victims «.. We frankly think that there is money available, which is part of the reason why Mr Armstrong has been held in civil contempt..." (Tr; 6/24/05 SDNY 99-Cr~997: pl1-12)Justice Scalia speaking for a unanimous court in Morrison, has squarely now rejected LIBERAL construction of statutes holding the lover courts to the strict democratic principle defined by the Separation of Powers that courts are not to expand statutes to enable the government to travel down that path of arbitrary Justice against which the Revolution was fought. Courts may not "extend [statutes] to admirable purposes it might be used to achieve." Id./Slip at 21. Hence, the court is now bound by the Constitution to follow the STRICT CONSTRUCTION principle. ‘The Morrison decision has overruled the entire foundation of any action against Armstrong by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFIC") holding the Securities Exchange Act :in no way reached the standing to bring any civil action against Armstrong. Speaking of. the Securities Exchange Act: “When a statute gives no clear indication of en extraterritorial application, it has none," os eae Td. /Morrison, Slip at 6 Clearly, 18 USC §3585(b) is no different. It too is silent regarding denying credit for any confinement post-indictment. The BOP simply refuses to provide such credit and civil contempt is not inherert but an equitable remedy as Judge Posner Pointed out in Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988, 894 F2d 881, 884 (7th Cir 1989)(It is still an equity procedure). As such under Article IIT EQUITY cannot supersede legal rights, Judiciary Act 1789 §16, Therefore, even the Rule of Lenity bars such a liberal construction of §3585(b). While a civil contempt related to the offense one is indicted for must be credited pursuant to §3585(b)(1) and in Armstrong case the turnover of any asset was for the purpose of a criminal restitution that would be part of a sentence, the fact that Armstrong was given full credit for everything paid from ANY parallel civil action toward a potential criminal restitution leaving Armstrong owing NO restitution. It is inconsistent for the BOP to deny credit. Additionally since the contempt was POST-INDICIMENT, §3585(b)(2) requires credit for "ANY" time in’ prison Post~indictment not otherwise credited.DELIBERATE FRAUD UPON THE COURTS Aside from the fact that ALL equitable jurisdiction is confined to the known Practices as they stood in 1789, Grupo Mexicano y Alliance Bond Fund, 527 US 308, 318-19 (1999) and NEVER could equity EVER invade a parallel criminal case nor could a receiver EVER assist a criminal prosecution circumventing the grand jury, Blum v State of Naryland, 56 LRA 322, 9% Md 375, 51 A 26 (1902)(coLlecting English case lev), in the instant case, the receiver committed outright FRAUD upon the court based upon the transcripts of the court proceedings, to maintain imprisonment of Armstrong to force a settlement. On January 7th, 2002, Republic National Bank pled guilty criminally through its securities division agreeing to nake everyone whole returning the money it had stolen in return for ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY for all directors involved. The receiver admitted those terms, but then verbally engaged in # constructive amendment of the civil complaint and criminal indictment claiming there vas a new fraud prior to doing business with Republic to justify keeping Armstrong in prison for ANOTHER 5 years, while NEVER superseding Armstrong either civilly or criminally providing notice of such allegation that was UNCONSTITUTIONAL, RECEIVER ALAN COHEN: Lossess that occurred in the Prudential period and at the period at Republic prior to the first false NAV] letter are not embraced within the restitution by HSBC because obviously they weren't in the predisposition period, they weren't involved in it, and in the period brfore the false NALV] there is no as description of criminal liability. (99-Civ-9667 SDNY; Tr 1/7/02, pl7, L1-4) The fraud was suppose to be the false NAV (Net Asset Value) letters written by the bank ~ NOT ARMSTRONG! Therefore, there could be NO fraud prior to and this is why Armstrong was NEVER indicted or civilly charged for such conduct for the Receiver KNEW what he was doing and the 30P refuses to provide even ctedit at all. MORRISON & THE CIVIL ALLEGATIONS The application of Morrison to a criminal case cannot be questioned. The same Conduct & Effects Test is used and the Supreme Court has previous made it clear that the same statute cannot be used differently in a civil and criminal context. 5“[T]f a statute has criminal application, 'the rule of lenity gpplies' to the court's interpretation of the statute ... ‘Ublecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal of noncriminal context." Clark v Martines, 543 US 371, 160 Led2d 734, 746 (2005) ‘The Supreme Court has emphatically rejected ANY extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act to transactions taking place overseas not involving American listed securities or domestic transactions. "(Wle reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad..." Td./Slip at 20 ‘The Suprene Court has rejected ANY extraterritorial application of either Securities or Commodities law based upor. STRICT CONSTRUCTION eliminating the LIBERAL expansive view to expand US law to the entire world as if thie vas an imperial empire, in the Morrison decisicn. "Tt is our function to give the statute the effect its language Suggests, hovever modest. that may bey not to extend it to admirable uurposes it might be used to achieve.” Purp misht be used to achieve.” 15 jets at 21 The Suprene Court has made it explicit that "if §10(b) is not extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b-5." The Morrison decision also states that §30(b) only applies to transactions "abroad that might conceal a domestic violation to escape on a technicality." Id./Slip at 15. Judge Bork made that very point "that Congress was concerned with extraterritorial transactions only if they were part of a plan to harm “American investors or markets." Zoslsch v Arthur Anderson & Co, 824 F2d 27, 31-32 (DC Cir 1987). The Zoelsch decision made it clear that the SEC NEVER at any time has promulgated any rules under §30(b).. The Morrison decision now binding upon this Court as well, made it very clear that "In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that §10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not." Id./at 16, ‘The Supreme Court then makes it perfectly clear:“UWle think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only decsptive conduct 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national secur- ities exchange or any security aot so registered." 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)." Id./Slip at 17 ‘The allegations from the start vere that Armstrong wholly owned a registered Japanese broker-dealer, Crevale, he purchased from Bank Palace in Paris at the request of the Japanese government as part of a bailout just as Bank of America was asked to buy Merrill Lynch back in 1995, Because the alleged transactions were private notes sold EXCLUSIVELY in Japan by the broker-dealer with each note being individually approved by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, there was NEVER and such jurisdiction under §30(b) of the Exchange Act (15 USC §78dd(b)). The Morrison Court cited the DC Circuit Court who disagreed with the Second Circuit decided by Judge Bork as the corect interpretation. "(Elven aside from this presumption, it is quite clear that the Securities Echange Act of 1934 had as its purpose the protection of American investors and markets. ... That is the inference to be drawn from [§]30(b) as well, for it states that the statute does not apply to persons transacting business in securities abroad unless the Securities and Exchange Commission issues rules and regulations making the statute applicable to such persons because that is 'necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion’ of the statute, That rather clearly implies that Congress vas concerned with extraterritorial transactions only if they were part of a plan to harm Anerican investors or markets.” Zoelsch v Arthur Anderson & Co, 824 F2d 27, 31-32 (DC Cir 1987) Both the Zoelsch Court and the Second Circuit admitted that "[nlo rules have " Fidenas AG v Compagnie Int'l, 606 F2d 5, 9 (2d Cir 1979), Under §32(a) of the Exchange Act, Armstrong could not even been promulgated by the SEC under §30(b) be criminally prosecuted under §30(b) without notice and rules being promulgated, Pursuant to §32(a) of the 1934 Act (15 USC S78f£), Congress prohibited criminal Prosecution of anyone for securities fraud UNLESS they were aware of the RULES Promulgated by the SEC, which has declined to do so under §30(b) covering all extraterritorial application of the entirs Exchange Act. 7The Supreme Court in Morrison has completely rejected the extraterritorial application of US law to overseas transactions using STRICT CONSTRUCTION and ending the LIBERAL interpretation to expand the US into some imperial worldwide Power. The government has been ignoring the presumption against extraterritorial application and has sought to enforce laws even when they have no impact upon American investors or markets. The Morrison decision explicitly limited the application of S10(b): "Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase of sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States. This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange and all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners ... occurred outside the United States. Petitioners have therefore failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on this ground." Td./Slip at 24 Even the Third Circuit held that the Exchange Act applied to "foreigners outside the United States only if the prescribed conduct within this country directly caused the loss." Straub v Vaisman & Co, Inc, 540 F2d 591, 505 (3rd Cir 1976). This also has been overruled for it is no longer the CONDUCT, nor the EFFECT, but where the "purchase or sale of any security"-takes place or if such a security is “registered on a national securities exchange” in the United States. Id./Slip at 17. Tt is the Conduct & Effects Test that is squarely overruled in ALL contexts be it civil or criminal. FACTUAL RECORD THE CASE AT BAR ‘The Securities & Exchange Conmission ("SEC") and the Conmodity Futures Trading Commi: fon ("CFTC") based their allegations upon "documents we obtained from the Japanese through a translator. We haven't, in fact, been able to talk to the Japanese investors..." (Trs 9/13/99; SDNY pli, L10-21), Judge Kaplan in the SDNY asked "What's the evidence that it is false?" The SEC replied: "Dhat their strategies were extrenely risky, that they lost a billion dollars in foreign currencies in yen and in index trading. They apparently were not hedged." (Tr} 9/13/9 + SDNY pl3-14). 8The importance of the presumption is demonstrated by the fact the SEC & CFIC do NOT understand international transections cross-currencies. They stated they needed a receiver BECAUSE there were "significant yen positions in late August [1999], in the hundreds of millions." (¢9-Civ-9667; Tr: 9/13/99, p6, L13-15), O'KEEFE [CFTC Counsel]: We would urge for at least those open Positions that an impartial, and independent receiver needs to be appointed to make the decisions on those positions rather than Mr. Armstrong." (99~Civ-9667; Tr: 9/13/99, p7, L14~17) They indeed seized al1 accounts and positions and liquidated the yen vhich they thought was speculation but was the HEDGE losing probably more than $100 million. Of course, Armstrong is blamed for EVERYTHING they did because in white collar cases courts also UNCONSTITUTIONALLY allow a presumption that all was was "intended" to be the object of the fraud, This has been rejected countless times in death cases that courts CANNOT presumed 1st Degree murder shifting the burden to the defendant there was no premeditated act. In fraud, it is as if someone goes in to rob a bank and the teller gives him $200 but then he is charged with "intending" to rob the entire money on deposit in the bank and all its branches. The Government even admitted directly in the Criminal Complaint that the notes were UNSECURED and thus this verifies that no accounts in the United States ever belonged to any alleged noteholder. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT [5] c. Some of the notes are issued in the name of the purchasers and cthers are issued in the name of Cresvale~Tokyo as a nominee for the Purchaser. Sone of the notes pay fixed and others pay. variable rates of interest. Although all of the documents I have reviewed to date indicate that the notes are unsecured, repayment of some of the notes are guaranteed by PEL. Since the allegation was that Armstrong wholly owned the broker-dealer in Japan, they failed to realize the significance that the majority of the notes were NEVER issued but were book entries in capan in "Street Name" never leaving Japan and were fully insured there just as US brokers have SIPIC in America.Further evidence that nothing took place in the United States in what. has risen to a Keystone Cop adventure, is that the CFIC even admitted that all such sales and solicitation took place in Japan since obviously it was the Registered Japanese broker-dealer that made solicitations at meetings in Japan, obtained all approvals fron the Ministry of Finance for each note, sold the portfolios of Japanese stocks that were PURCHASED with the notes, converted the yen to dollars, and sent the proceeds to the PROPRIETARY ACCOUNTS in Philadelphia. To top it off, most notes were NEVER actually issued to the noteholder but remained fully insured in Japan on the books of the broker-dealer as book entries in street name. This is all verified by the documents filed by the government and the CFIC admitted everything took place in Japan. O'KEEFE [CFTC COUNSEL[: Our focus is slightly different. Ir focuses on the fact that futures trading is done in those accounts at Republic that you have heard about afte: the notes were solicited in Japan. So our focus is on what happened to the money after it got to the United States. After it got to the United States, your Honor, it was commingled at jeast as early as November 1997, on the books of Republic, And they were commingled for a variety of purposes at the direction of Mr. Armstrong. (99-Civ-9667,9: Tr; 10/14/99, p33, 16-14) The Executive is NEVER satisfied and constantly exercises a "hydraulic Pressure inherent within each of the branches to exceed the outer limits of its power." Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 727 (1886). Instead of protecting Americans, they waste resources to expand powers far beyond the territory as if they had imperial global powers, This in itself denies Due Process of Law for it has become impossible to know that conducting transactions entire offshore under the full regulation of another sovereign government, that the United States can supersede international law and the laws of any other government at sheer will. “We a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot. known the Scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority." NY y Benton, 453 US 454, 459-60 (1981) loIn reality, Republic National Bank ("Republic") was responsible for their own staff were illegally trading in the accounts in Philadelphia involving the President of Republic New York Securities ("RNYS") William Rogers. Upon the fact that money was missing, Armstrong went to local counsel to file suit against Republic. Armstrong informed the criminal court: "ARMSTRONG: T contacted my lawyers the following day on August 29... 1999 to send a letter [from Richard Altman [counsel]. I went to him, I explained what happened, I told him I wanted to file suit against Republic, He sent a notice, I believe to Dov Schien [President of Bank], asked for a reply back by September 1, or we would file suit. On September 2, the FBI came into the office, I think it was the wnd or 3rd. (99-Cr-997; TR 4/10/07, p48-49) Republic rushed to the government telling them that Armstrong CONSPIRED with their OWN staff to hide trading loss from the Japanese as if the accounts were their property and trading belonged to thm, This structure vas not true, and Armstrong vas criminally charged before enyone ever bothered to even contact the alleged noteholders to verify what Republic had told them was true. Consequently, at the bail hearing in Trenton presided over by Judge Freda Wolfson on September 13, 1999 the Government admitted they had not a single complaint from any Japanese noteholder and that the entire foundation for the allegations based upon newspapers. Furthermore, "There are no defaults. There aré no complaints." (Tr; 9/13/99, pl5, 19°22) (Trenton, NJ). Judge Wolfson granted bail for the Government presented nothing to show that there was even a cas2. The NY Office of the US Attorney was acting solely upon information provided to them by Republic. The SEC Likewise admitted that: "We haven't, in fact, been able to talk to the Japanese investors (99Civ-96675 Tr: 9/13/99 p11, L10-21: SDKY). Had the Government simply stopped and verified what the bank had told them, they would NEVER have filed civil nor criminal complaints since NO account in the United States belonged to any such Japanese noteholder, ‘and neither did ANY trading pass to a noteholder as their Property. The Government conceded in §5c of the criminal complaint that there were two notes (1) a fixed rate note meaning we borrowed yen and owed interest so there is ABSOLUTELY NO POSSIBILITY that any trading in the United States vas for their uubenefit direct, indirectly, generally, or specifically; (2) the variable rate note was a PURCHASE of a TOXIC portfolio that had declined 40-60% in value consisting of Japanese stocks. We issued a note at the FACE VALUE (original cost 100%) and we took the portfolio as OUR property just as one buys a house. However, the title Passed to the Corporate Defendants since under Japanese law the noteholder would * have been required to report the loss upcn the sale of the portfolio BUT DID NOT because WE sold OUR portfolio that NO LONGER belonged to the Japanese. We sold it for Japanese yen, converted that to dollars at the broker-dealer, and sent now the dollars to Philadelphia. Each and EVERY note required pre-approval by the Japanese Ministry of Finance so NO sales took place in the United States NOR could have any execution of some scheme took place in America since everything was in Japan. There vas NO solicitation and NO execution of anything by use of mails or wires in the United States since everything took place at meetings in Japan in Japanese by the broker-dealer. The Criminal plea states it was alleged agents’ in Japan and NOT Armstrong from the United States. ARMSTRONG: Among the things that were represented to investors by my agents in Japan on my behalf and with my knowledge when the invest- ments were solicited was that investor's money would be held in accounts at Republic New York Securities, and my agents also told investors that their monies in those accounts would be separate and Segregated from Republic's own accounts and would not be available to Republic for its ovn benefit. (99-Cr-997; SDNY Tr: 8/17/06, p20, L7-14) ‘The Government dropped all previous allegations of "commingling" and a "Ponzi Scheme" realizing that the accounts were NOT their property and there was NEVER any Such promises of segregation, only that we would not leave funds available for the bank to take and lend out overnight in the REPO market that has proven dangerous vith the failure of Leham Brothers for example. The Governnent further acknowledged that Solicitations took place at meetings in Japan in Japanese by the broker-dealer. So there Was not even any use of mails or wires in such solicitation. 12‘THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICIT HOLDINGS EFFECTING JURISDICTION UNDER THE MORRISON DECISION Circuit Judge Posner made it very clear that "[iJissues thus are treated as jurisdictional when the Constitution, statutes, or rules evince a purpose to Limit judicial power whether or not a party objects to its exercise." Troelstrup v Index Futures Group, 130 F3d 1274, 1276 (7th Cir 1997). "A court does not have the power by judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction over matters beyond the scope of the authority granted to it by its creators." Stoll v Gottlieb, 305 US 165, 171 (1938). ‘The Morrison 561 US - decision may have only addressed the issue presented as a failure to stato a claim, but that failure is based on the fact that the courts have been attempting to stretch US law beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That is simply UNCONSTITUTIONAL on many levels including the Separation of Powers, Article I, §1, Article III, and several grounds under the Due Process Clause. "Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitutional's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's ‘dominant’ character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn." Soldal v Cook County, 506 US 56, 70 (1992)(UNANIMOUS DECISION) Consequently, it would be a denial of due process for the government and the court NOT to address each and every clain presented. Chief Justice Narshall made it clear that there IS NO DISCRETION to avoid issues presented under Due Process and Article III., "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Cohen v Virgina, 19 US 264, 404 (1821) Due Process is the right to be heard. That CANNOT be satisfied if the federal Sovernment picks what it wants to address and ignores the other issues presented, That itself violates Due Process of Law. 13a.) THE MORRISON DECISION IMPLICITLY INCLUDES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ARTICLE I, §1 AS A JURISDICTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURAL RESTRAINT Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause of Habeas Corpus was a "structural" prohibition because it is found directly in the Constitution AND not within the later Bill of Rights, and thus it coutd NOT be altered by even Congress outside the Amendatory process presented to the people, Bounediene v Bush, 558 US - (2008), Likewise, we are dealing here with a Structural right that is fundamental to the very soul of the United States - the Separation of Powers that Protects our DEMOCRACY by restricting the enactment of las to the PEOPLE through their elected representatives barring UNELECTED Judges and Executive Attorneys from constructively amending the Constitution by engaging in subjective interpretations to further personal povers. We are either @ nation of laws, by the people, or we are a nation of unlimited tyrannical’ power subjugating the people without their consent to laws wholly crafted in the minds of unelected officials. Article I, §1 made it perfectly clear with NOT A SINGLE EXCEPTION the structural rights of the PEOPLE, All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Ever since United States y Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US 32 (1812), it has been Jong established that federal courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction and expressly do NOT posses the Constitutional authority to create common law legislation. As the Morrison Court pointed out, "the Second Circuit believed that, because the Exchange Act is silent as to the extraterritorial application of §10(b), it was left to the court to ‘discern’ whether Congress would have wanted the statute to apply." Id./Slip at 6. "The criticisms seem to us justified, The results of judicial- speculation-made-law-diving what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritorialty.” Morrison, Id./Slip at 12 14‘The Separation of Powers imposes a STRUCTURAL FUNDAMENTAL restraint upon courts that prohibits them from any LIBERAL interpretations of a penal statute that expands the government's powers to bring charges. When a statute applies BOTH civilly and criminally, then the RULE OF LENITY applies in both contexts and ANY ambiguity MUST default to the citizen. "Courts may not prescrible] greater punishment than the legislature intended" Rutledge v US, 517 US 292, 134 Led2d 419, 425-26 (1996) for that would undermine the principles of a DEMOCRACY, This doctrine is also express implicitly is the prohibition against any constructive crimes, "There are no constructive offenses." McNally v US, 483 US 350, 360 (1987)., citing Fasulo v US, 272 US 620, 629 (1926). "Tt is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment, and that no act, however,wrongful, can be punished under such 2 statute unless clearly within its terms. "There can be no constructive offenses, and, before a man can be Punished, his case muct be plainly and unmistakably within the statute," Todd v US, 158 US 278, 282 (1895)(citations omitted) Therefore, statutes having civil and criminal application must be consistently interpreted. Thus, Morrison in the criminal context, is failure to state a crime, "[WJe must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context." Clark, 160 Led2d at 746. As Chief Justice Marshall stated about the Rule of Lenity, which produces the same result, "[i]t is the legislature, not the court, which ia to define a crime, and ordain its punish~ ment." US v Wiltberger, 18 US 76, 95 (1820). }.) THE MORRISON DECISION IMPLICITLY INCORPORATES ARTICLE TIT CONSTRAINTS FOR NOT EVEN CONGRESS CAN EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUDICIARY BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL CONFINEMENT OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION Chief Justice Marshall made it as crystal clear as possible regarding the delegation of jurisdiction to courts. 15"If the consitution does not confer on the court, or on the federal judiciary, the power sought to be exercised, it is in vain that the Act of Congress purports to confer it." Gohen v Virginia, 19 US 264, 324 (1821) Obviously, the question has been resolved by the Morrison Court that the Securities Exchange Act did NOT legislete extraterritorial application of the securities laws, The next question that emerges : Could Congress even make any acts in other sovereign lands criminal in the United States when not directed at the United States territory or its citizens? The answer to this is NO. It would be in vain for a court to disagree and attempt to find extraterritorial application of any legislation concerning acts in foreign lands not directed at the US markets or citizens, The American Revolution fundamentelly changed the very practice of any "jurisdiction" that was previously exercised by the Court of England and thus extraterritorial jurisdiction was expressly prohibited to the extent that not even Congress could create such jurisdiction tin conflict with international law. For the very foundation of law was altered from personal jurisdiction where only the sovereign of one's birth had the power to punish for any crime committed anywhere in the world, which was replaced with the doctrine of ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL jurisdiction, Thus, Japan. cannot prosecute a Japanese company operating in New York against Anerican citizens any more than the United States can prosecute an American company for acts in Japan. Each nation has EXCLUSIVE territorial jurisdiction over acts in its own borders. Justice Frankfurter thus explaine "By the Constitution a government is ordained and established ‘For the United State of America’ not for countries outside of their limits ." Reid y Covert, 354 US 1, at 60 (1957)(J.Frankfurther concurring in result) 16There were numerous cases concerning the application of the Constitution to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Phillippines prior to any statehood in the case of Hawaii. It was consistently held that the jurisdiction of the Executive and courts did NOT extend to territories since the Constitution ONLY applied to the UNION. Article IIT and the Sixth Amendment "do not apply to territory belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into the Union." Hawa: Mankichi, 190 US 197 (1895); Dorr v US, 195 US 138 (1904) "We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the Tight to acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in Article 4, §3, to whatever other limitations it may be subject, the extent of which must be decided as questions arise, does not require that body to enact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its ovn force, carry such right to territory so situated.” Balzac v People of Porto Rico, 258 US 298, 305 (1926) Af the Constitution has no force outside the actual Union of the United States and has no force even over owned territory, it cannot possibly have any force over making acts in other sovereign nations crimes in the ‘US: "The Constitution did not mean to confer @ new power or jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within the territory." Galpin v Page, 85 US 350 (1874). "The coucts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 US 66, 123 (1825). "Acts of Congress do not ordin~ arily apply outside our borders." Sale v Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 155, 125 Led2d 128, 146 (1993). Indeed, prior to the Constitution, one vas the "subject" of the king and if you committed a crime in another country, you were sent back in chains to your "sovereign" whose subject you were. Consequently, it was the American Revolution that rejected this type of jurisdiction and adopted the principle of ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. v7The American Revolution altered fundamentally forever what jurisdiction was all about. The doctrine of ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION controls. Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Indesendence and included the injury "For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses." In so doing, the king removed one from the place where the crime was alleged to have taken », place and thus eliminated the right to put on a defense by denying access to witnesses and to confrontation when the accuser was in America. This was a denial of a fair trial and thus Due Process of Law that was prevented both by Article III and by the Sixth Amendment. The Jurisdiction over the "SUBJECT" of the king was abandoned with the American Revolution and Jurisdiction holding ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION otherwise the United States could not prosecute any terrorist case and would be forced to send all terrorists back to their country of origin. There vas to some extent consular jurisdiction, but this was limited. For example, an American ship in a foreign poet had consular jurisdiction over all passangers. In Ross v McIntyre, 140 US 453 (1891) an American committed murder on board an American ship in the harbor of Yokohama, was tried by a consular tribunal in Japan and sentenced to death. Ross was a member of the crew which placed him within the scope of consular jurisdiction. But the court pointed out, "[i]f Ross had been @ passenger on board ... or if, residing in Yokohama, he had come on board temporarily and had then committed the murder, the question of jurisdiction would have been very different." Id./140 US at 473. As Justice Frankfurter explained regarding jurisdiction: "The emergence of the nation-state in Europe and the growth of the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty changed the nature of extraterritorial rights. No longer were strangers to be denied the advantages of local law. Indeed, territorial sovereignty meant the exercise of sovereignty over all residents within the borders of the state, and the system of extraterritorial consular jurisdiction tended to die out among Christian nations in the 18th and 19th Centuries.” Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 60 (1957)(concurring in result) 18Te was made perfectly clear in Ross v NcTntyre, 140 US 453 (1891) that if the act took place within Japan rather than on the high seas, there would have heen no crime under the law of the United States. Constitutionally, Morrison dictates the same result. The Constitution reflects our American Revolution that ended the principle that a citizen was the property of their sovereign. Any attempt by’ courts or the executive to prosecute crimes within other sovereign nations and not the high seas, is patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL and is outside the scope of ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION embodied within the Constitution including, but not Limited to, Article IIT. We certainly would not tolerate Japan charging two American banks in New York with violating their laws when not directing any marketing at Japan. ‘The expansive abuse in the case at bar violated International Lav and the principle doctrine ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. “[T]he jurisdiction of the nation within its ovn territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute ... All exceptions, there- fore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself, The Exchange v M'Faddon, 11 US 116, 156 (7 Cranch) (1812) Therefore, "[nJo law has any effect, of its own force beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.” Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163 (1895). "Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to‘limits over which the lavmaking power has jurisdiction." Sandberg v McDonald, 248 US 185, 195 (1918). "Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so vholly futile is not to be attributed to Congress." Sandberg, 248 US at. 196 ‘The SEC was ONLY given territorial jurisdiction for Congress withheld Say extraterritorial subpoena power in tie 1934 Act, 15 USC §78u(b). "The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless & contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 19Jurisdiction of the United States.” Foley Brothers vy Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (1949); EOC v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 248 (1991). Additionally, the "Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take Jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, tut it requires an act of Congress to confer it." Kline v Burke Construction, 260 US 226, 234 (1922). Armstrohg contends that this is a Article ITI jurisdictional question. "Congress may not expand the Jurisdiction of the Federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 491 (1983). Congress cannot “Eehinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, éven create jurisdiction over registered foreign broker-dealers selling notes in foreign currencies to non-Americans in other sovereign lands. Unless there is a ©.) THE MORRISON DECISION ALSO IMPLICTLY INCORPORATES ARTICLE ‘TIL DIVERSITY JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS THAT DENTES JURISDICTION TO ‘twG ALTENS Just as ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION prohibits the United States and all three of its branches from enacting lavs government transactions carried out in other sovereign nations not targeting the United States markets or its citizens rectly, it is also hornbook law that Article IIT jurisdiction was Limted to “citizens of different States." “the presence of aliens on two sides of a case destroys diversity Jurisdiction." Yebezolana de Fonento v Ventera Sales Corp, 629 Fad 786,790 (2d Cir 1980) ~stezolana de Fomento v Ventera Sales Corp, Tt is clear that in the instant case, two foreign corporations were on hoth sides of the contracted private notes. Under the ancient doctrine that the king interjected himself into private disputes on the theory that it violated or disturbed his "peace" required two subjects in dispute. In the case at bar, the 20corporations on both sides of the contracts were foreign and there could be no standing for the US Government in any capacity to interject itself into a wholly foreign transaction that could not be supported in the United States by either Party since not even a consent can create Article III jurisdiction. “That even if a corporation organized under the laws' of a foreign nation maintains its principal place of business in a state, and is considered a citizen of thet state, diversity is nonetheless defeated if another alien party is present on the otherside of the litigation." Int'l Shipping v Hydra Offshore, 875 F2d 338, 391 (2d Cir 1989) ‘The government in no possible incarnation had any standing under Article III to file any action civil or criminal between two aliens. 4.) THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW CLAUSE FORBIDS HOLDING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS LIABLE IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN THEY HAVE NOT TARGETED THE US MARKETS OR CITIZENS AS A CONSUMER OF ANY OF THEIR PRODUCTS it is fundamental to the Due Process Clause that one cannot be held liable in the United States for any product that it did not market to the US Markets and American citizens. "We have held it a denial of due process of law vhen a state of the Union attempts to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on slight connections." Lauritzen v Larsen, 345 US 571, 590 (1953) "A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to Full Faith and credit elsewhere." Worldwide Volks wagen v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291 (1980), “The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.'" Burger King v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 471-472 (1985) "Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that 1s authorized by Article TIT ... and the statutes enacted by Congress..." 2Bender v Williamsport Area School District, 475 US 534, 541 (1986). The Supreme Court has made it very clear that the Due Process Clause itself forbids any such extraterritorial application of US Law without American markets being targeted. "Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over . an out-sf-state defendant who has not ‘consented to suit there, this 'Fair Warning’ requirement [of due process] is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litiga— tion results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities, chus the forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if iit asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state and those products subsequently injure forum consumers." Burger King v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 472-473 (1985) (quotations, cites & footnotes omitted) In Asahi Metal Industry v Superior ‘Court, 480 US 102 (1987), it was squarely rejected that there was any jurisdicticn when Asahi Metals merely manufactured a valve stem and sold it in Taiwan to a tire company who incorporated that valve into its tires it sold in the United States. It was made clear that Asahi Metal had taken no steps to sell its product into the US forum and thus it could not be subject to US action. "The Due Process Clause ... limits the power ... to exert personal jurisdiction over a aonresident defendant. The constitutional touchstone of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due Process remains whether the defendant purposefully estab- lished minimum contacts in the forum state ... [T]hato minimum contacts must have a basis in some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws ... Jurisdiction is proper where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a sub- stantial connection with the forum state." Asahi Metal Industry v Superior Court, 480 US 102, 109 (1987) 22Tn the instant case, the two foreign corporations entered into contracts in Japan and they required individual approval by the Japanese Ministry of Finance CMO"). No solicitation took place in the United States, and the contracte could NOF have been entered into anywhere but Japan since they required Japanese MOF approval. They vere thus executed cofiplete in Japan. There is not even an allegation that Armstrong used nails or telephone vires to solicit from the United States for it was Cresvale that conducted all such transactions in meetings conducted in Japanese. There was no Fair Warning by the United States that such transactions vould have even been subject to regulation especially when the SEC never bothered fo promulgate any rules under §30(b) of the 1934 Act. Furthermore, Armstrong could not be held criminally lable unless he was given prior notice of such rules by the SEC pursuant to §32(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 USC S78££(a), Consequently, Armstrong was denied Due Process of Law and therefore, any such “judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to Full Faith and credit elsevhere." Worldwide Volkswagen v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291 (1980), ©+) THERE WAS NEVER ANY INPERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER ‘THE CORPORATIONS APPERREZE ALL ASSETS AND PREVENT THE HIRING OF COUNSEL TO ENTER aN APPEARANCE 10 EVEN DEFEND RENDERING THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL The Supreme Court made it perfectly clear that "[h]istorically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of ge ee ote renttontoc) a judeecne) serenely) pia et Int'l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). In the instant case, neither the SEC nor the CFTC bothered to try to serve the foreign corporations and in fact moved to seize the internal management by petitioning equity to appoint a receiver outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court violating Article ITT from the outset. All equitable jurisdiction is confined to the known Jurisdiction as it stood 23in 1789, Grupo Mexicano v Alliance Bond Fund, 527 US 308, 318-19 (1999), which had just been handed down 3 months before this action began against the same district court. NEVER at common law did a equity receiver EVER have jurisdiction outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, for "the court of chancery has no power directly to affect property out of the bounds of its jurisdiction." Booth v Clark, 58 US 322, 333 (1855), The Booth decision remains the seminal controlling decision regarding equity receivers and it made i: crystal clear that the court "can give him" absolutely no pover “upon principle of comity, a privilege to sue in a foreign court or another jurisdiction." Id./58 US at 338, The seminal decision on comity among nations further warns "[nJo law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived." Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163 (1895), Surely, the claimed power of the SEC and CFIC to seek a receiver over a foreign corporation illustrates their arrogance of international law and their desire to subjugate the entire world as if there were endowed with some imperial power. It would be ABSURD if Japan seized General Motors, installed a receiver, and usurped its internal management taking it to Tokyo. This would create international discord if there was no such restraint or comity and the global economy would collapse in economic trade wars. Where Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2) authorize service upon a foreign corporation "in a place not within any judicial district of the United States," they made no such effort to even try to serve the corporations. Consequently, the FROvP make it explicit, that there can be no such judgment that has eny validity whatsoever. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 (a) Preliminary Injunction (2) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. 24Without question, a corporation CANNOT be represented pro se or by any officer. A corporation can ONLY be represented by a lawyer,Rowland v California's Men's Colony, 506 US 194 (1993), Therefore, it is impossible that the corporate defendants EVER entered an appearance NOR was it possible for then to ever consent to anything, They vere completely and UITERLY deprived of Due Process of Taw and this in turn deprived the court of any jurisdiction whatsoever. "It has long been the rule that a valid judgment court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Kulko v Superior Court 436 US 84, 91 (1978), Failure to obtain "jurisdiction of both subject and person” + may be entered only by a renders the court's actions in the "clear absence" of all jurisdiction, Bradley v Fisher, 80 US 335, 352 (1872). "The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” Insurance Co of Ireland v Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 US 694, 701 (1982) =aSurance Co of Ireland v Compagnie Des Bauxites, "No judanent of a court is due process of law, if rendered without Jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party." Old Wayne Mutual Life Asso'n y McDonough, 204 US 8, 15 (1907). "[W]hen a court has no judicial’ power to do vhat 4 purports to do ~ when its action is not mere error but usurpation of pover" it As completely unlawful, DeBeers Consol. Mines v US, 325 US 212, 217 (1945), The SEC knew precisely vhat it was doing and the record shows their requests: HEYL [SEC COUNSEL]: We want the assets to be frozen with a reasonable carve-out for living expenses and no money for attorney's fees. (99-Civ-9667 SDNY: Tr 9/13/99, p24~25) later, Armstrong was denied even reasonable living expenses. He was denied funds even to sustain life itself ~ NOTHING! When counsel entered an appearance, they did so ONLY for Armstrong, not the corporations, "Martin Unger. I represent Martin Armstrong.” (TR; 10/13/99, p3, 116-17), 25The district court is retroactively disgorging counsel Armstrong hired Personally, made it very clear that they NEVER represented the corporations, Justifying his action stating that the lawyers "were hired to represent Martin Armstrong inidividuelly..." SEC y Princeton Economie Int'l, Ltd., 8&4 FSupp24 : 443, 447 (SDXY 2000). Former counsel Martin Unger has even supplied an affidavit confirming that he did not and never once previously répresented the corporations. (Exhibit A). Armstrong respectfully submits that there can be no valid lawful Judgment against the corporations, and that the receivership was entirely without Article TIT equitable jurisdiction,.This was a SUBSTANTIAL and deliberate violation of Article IIT to violate SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, for the receivership was then used to displace the Grand Jury, invade -he parallel criminal Proceeding preventing Be emo clepecdylerial eighes am) eer ee ett ee Fourth Amendment ALL of Armstrongs property and evidence to prepare any defense. Never at common law could a equity receiver’ EVER gather evidence displacing the grand jury and feeding that to a parallel criminal prosecution at the King's Bench. The SEC and CFIC knew precisely vhat they were doing. They eliminated the application of the FRCrimP superseding them with equity. The Supreme Court of Maryland was so confronted with a similar abuse of process and reviewed this question collecting ell the authorities of English cases and made it clear that NEVER could a equity Fecelver assist @ criminal prosecution, Blun v State of Maryland, 56 LRA 322, 94 Md 375, 51 A 26 (1902). £.) THE CORPORATIONS VERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THE COURT AT THE REQUEST OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSTITUTING A JUDICIAL TAKING 2 VIOLATION OF JHE FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING CLAUSE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT There can be no question that the Constitution that prohibits the taking of private property applies to the Judiciary, although this has not yet been decided, "The question of vhether courts, as oppose! to legislative bodies, can ever 'take' a en oe he Ei ceatecninese tclent mcareet ee ee settled issue of law." Corporation of the ?res: ding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 26Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v Hodel, 830 Fld 374, 381 (DC Cir 1987); noting: Hughes v Washington, 389 US 290, 296-97 (1967)(J.Stewart concurring); Robinson v Atizoshi, 441 FSupp 559 (D.Haw 1977) aff'd 753 F2a 1468 (Oth Cir 1985), ‘The SEC and CFIC engaged in an illegal Taking of private property, the entire usurpation of a foreign corporation and it's internal management, This violated the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause in addition to Article III. "[I]£ the record discloses that the lower court was without Jurisdiction [the reviewing] court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it." US v Corrick, 298 US 435, 440 (1936) Such issues may even be challenged "collaterally" Ex Parte Nielsen, 131 US 176, 182 (1889). Since the Securities Law "$27 of the 1934 Act does not provide @ basis for personal jurisdiction," Leroy v Great Western United Corp, 443 US 173, 180 (1979). The SEC knew the law, and d: iberately never served the corporations Fo prevent entering any appearance, and then illegal seized the corporations in violation of the Fourth Amendment that "applies in a civil context" Soldal v Gook County, 506 US 56, 121 Led2d 450, 462 (1992), that also violated the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause to prevent and defense whatsoever. “Certain wrongs affect more than a single right, and accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are elleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's ‘dominat' character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn." Soldal v Cook County, 506 US 56, 70 (1992) ‘The ONLY court having any jurisdiction over the internal management of a corpor= ation, is the court of the sovereign where the coprporatin was chartered."Tt has long been settied ...[{courts will] decline to interfere ... or control by injunction +++ the management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the lavs (of another sovereign] ... leav[ing] controversies as to such matters to the courts of «+. the domicle." Rogers v Guaranty Trust Co, 288 US 123, 130 (1933), 2£.) BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL CHARGES CAME FIRST, THE SEC WAS NEVER AUTHORIZED 7O FILE APTER A CRIMINAL CASE BEGINS AND THUS BECAUSE THE SEC SOUGHT TO TMPRISON ARMSTRONG WITHOUT ANY LIMITATION TO COMPEL SETTLEMENT OF ‘The SEC and CFIC knew well the law and set out from the beginning to deprive Armstrong of ALL his constitutional rights on every possible front. The used "the corporate personality [which] is a fiction" Int'l Shoe, 326 US at 316, to pretend that equity could be used to supersede all constitutional rights to a fair trial in any forum, despite the fact that equity has no such pover Judiciary Act 1789, S16, ‘The SEC knew again the law and its ovn statutes. Clearly, 15 USC §78u(4)(1) does not authorize either (1) the US Attorney feeding evidence to the SEC using a grand Jury to further a civil action, SEC v Healthsouth Corp, 261 FSupp2d 1298, 1312, n.23 (ND Ala 2003); US v Scrushy, 266 FSupp2d 1134, 1140 (ND Ala 2005), nor (2) the filing of @ civil action using equity to supersede ‘the grand Jury. For 15 USC §78u(4)(1) only authorizes the SEC to transmit evidence to the US Attorney to " institute" a: Criminal action, not to replace the grand jury post~indictment. There vas no standing that could be created by Congress to file parallel civil actions AFTER a criminal case begins. In the instant case, the SEC filed ONLY after Armstrong was already in custody to prevent him from appearing at eny civil action to explain the corporate structure and the nature of the notes. The SEC then used this civil action Post~indictment to supersede the FRCrimP summoning Armstrong twice to depositions that is Prohibited under FRCrP 15(e), They again misrepresented the law informing the court that it should take an "adverse inference" to support their injunction because post~indictment Armstrong asserted his Fifth Amendment Privilege to remain silver in an adversary ~situation and his his statutory right to equal Protection for all defendants in criminal proceedings with no exceptions whatsoever 18 USC $3481, The district court granted the injunction upon advice of the SEC Stating "I do draw an adverse inference from his refusal to 28testify." SEC y PET, 73 FSupp2d 420, 423 (SDNY 1999). ‘The SEC knew what it was doing for the Supreme Court made it clear that an adverse inference in a civil case is only possible when there are "[nJo criminal proceedings .-. pending Raxter vy Palnigiano, 425 US 308, 317 (1976). The SBC knew the lew that indicted defendants cannot even be given Partial immunity and forced to testify against their will, US v Cassese, 622 F24 26 (24 Cir 1979), Obey the law is NOT something the SEC appears willing to do sua sponte. ‘The SEC argued that because Arnstrong was a officer of a foreign corporation, he had no pos ndictment rights whatsoever. To overturn the Constitution and reduce Armstrong to less rights below that of even a terrorist, the relied upon ® previndictment case Brasvell v US, 487 US 99 (1988)(5~4 decison) to argue that aa es seero tere MO) cichtel vhcraosverica hey cavere ot system of justice Sven post~indictment. That decision if constitutionally valid, when applied to the poat~indictment context means that ONLY corporate’ officers have NO rights at all. Again, the SEC and CFIC knew the lew and Sought to eliminate the only system of Justice established by the Constitution, which is adversary, not inquisitional. ‘They also knew that in the case of a foreign corporation, not doing business in the tnited states as vas the case concerning Armstrong, that it was rejected that where an American citizen had books and records of a foreign corporation, thatthe corporate fiction could NOT be used to circumvent personal rights. "[I]t is not inconceivable that the petitioner has cistody of the books for hia own personal purposes"'in the United States having NOTHING to do with a corporate doing business, ‘Application of Daniels, 140 FSupp 322, 327-328 (SDNY 1956), ‘The SEC and CFTC had a duty to know the law and refused to comply. They knew that civil contempt is purely an equitable renedy, Matter of Grand Hury Proceeding Empanelled May 1988, 894 F2d 881, 884 (7th Cir 1989)(It is still an equit procedure) (J.Posner), and CANNOT supersede Legal rights post~indictment §16 Judiciary Act 1780, 29Therefore, it too is confined to the known practices in 1789, Grupo Mexicano, 527 US at 318-319, Therefore, chancery had NO such power Post~indictment. Yes it is true that corporations had no rights under Self-Incrimination in 1789, but that is simply because they COULD NOT be criminally punished! Sir William Blackstone made + that perfectly clear that while corporations could not be criminally punished, their officers and directors could be and they WERE entitled to the protection of the Self- Incrimination Clause, 1 Blackatone, Chp 18, pé64 (Commentaries on the Laws of England 1776). Armstrong was denied Due Process and a fair trial. Therefore, Armstrong was not only denied the only type of trial authorixed by the Constitution, violating SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, by he vas stripped of all counsel of choice in the parallel criminal case and for the indefinite civil contempt. ‘The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is AUTOMATIC REVERSAL for both the contempt since even a civil contemnor is entitled.to counsel and the denial of such counsel requires dismissal of the contempt, Dole Fresh Fruit Co v United Banana Co Pole Fresh Fruit Co v United Banana Co eer eauezde, 110) (2d) (Cir}1987) 4 ond) thetdenta? ce emmeslgoticmne: Ciotre se Sixth Amendment with NO requirement to even show prejudice. “We have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, ‘with consequences that are ne essarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error." ... the erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the ‘framework within which the trial proceeds.!" US v GonzalezLopez, 548 US - , 165 Led at 420 (2006) ‘This issue alone violates everything that makes Anerica a respected free nation and reduced the entire proceeding to something one would expect from a Communist State where the Government alvays wins and laws are nothing but propaganda. Armstrong naintaing that the SEC and CFIC cannot be stupid or ignorant of the law. What they have done is argue for the elimination of the adversarial system of justice relying “pon Pro~government judges vho have viewed government victory more important than Saintaining the Rule of Law. This is AUTONATIC REVERSAL of all judgments. 30PRAYER FOR RELIEF 1, Martin A. Arnstrong, thus pray for bail pending review of habeas corpus. ‘There are substantial grounds for now bail given that all the criminal and civil Judgments are Likely overturned, and the denial of SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS is substantial and Armstrong is likely to srevail. Since Armstrong was attacked and left for dead previously while held in MCC New York and taken to NYU Hospital, even Prosecutors have only immunity in bring charges, That does not apply in thia matter and thus if a prosecutor would not have absolute immunity, netther does ‘any other officer for insisting Armstrorg remain in prison under the facts of this extraordinary case. Armstrong maintains that the corporate defendante Princeton Economics International, Ltd. through its affliates, vere investigating the organized manipulation of markets by AIG, Republic National Bank, Goldman Sachs, and others, A director of ATG even flew to meet with Armstrong to ask that he not talk about the manipulating of markets by investnont bankers. Armstrong contends that they Lied to the government to silence Armstrong and the corporate defendants and now that Morrison has made it clear there was no standing or claim of action that could have been brought in the United States concerning wholly foreign notes individually approved by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, then relief should be granted or in the alternative a change in custody to home confinement forthwith. Respectfully submitted; Martin A. Armstrong #12518-050 FCI Fort Dix Camp PO Box 2000 Fort Dix, NJ 08640 Dated: Fort Dix, New Jersey 31I, Martin A, Armstrong, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of this motion has been served upon the following parties by first class US mail, postage prepaid pursuant to 28 USC §1746. Harley G. Lappin, Director Federal Bureau of Prisons 320 First Street, NW Washington, DC 20534 Respectfully submitted; Martin A. Armstrong | #12518-050 Dated FCI Fort Dix Camp Fort Dix, New Jersey PO Box 2000 Fort Dix, NJ 08640