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Accelerating Bulgaria's Convergence: The Challenge of Raising Productivity - Main Report
Accelerating Bulgaria's Convergence: The Challenge of Raising Productivity - Main Report
Accelerating Bulgaria's Convergence: The Challenge of Raising Productivity - Main Report
A c c elerating Bulgaria’s C o n v e r g e n c e :
t h e Challenge of Raising P r o du c t i v i t y
Volume II
Main Report
Report No. 38570
BULGARIA
July 2007
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
Tables
Figures
Boxes
The report was produced in close collaboration with the Bulgarian authorities. Mr. Lyubomir Datsov,
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance was the immediate counterpart, and his support and comments were
invaluable. However, he is not responsible for the recommendations offered. The cooperation with the
rest of the Bulgarian Government was also excellent, and the team is grateful to officials at all levels, who
took the time to meet with the team, and provided information in a competent and timely manner. Same
applies to the private sector entities, NGOs, universities, schools, research centers, and employers’
associations visited. The report greatly benefited from these exchanges, and the team wants to thank them
for their time and shared insights.
1. THE CHALLENGE OF INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY
1.1 On January 1, 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became the newest members of the European Union
(EU). In the run-up to this momentous event, the Bulgarian economy and institutions had gone through a
major transformation. After an initial collapse in output and employment as the old supply-driven modes
of production were largely destroyed, growth of output and employment has resumed, but now on a
demand-driven basis and in an increasingly competitive environment. This is no minor achievement.
Nevertheless, Bulgaria still has a long way to go to catch up with its fellow EU member countries. The
country’s income per capita, at PPS in 2005, was 32 and 56 percent of the average level of EU25 and
EU81, respectively.
1.2 Closing the income gap and facilitating convergence with other EU countries is, and has been for
some years, an overriding priority for Bulgaria. However, the country is embarking on this road to
convergence with two handicaps: the sheer distance that it hopes to traverse, and its rapidly declining
working age population.2. For a time, the declining working age population can be offset by increasing
the labor force participation rate, but this has a limit. Beyond that, output will inevitably decline, unless
offset by productivity growth.
1.3 Hence, to close the income gap and converge, Bulgaria needs to raise not just its labor force
participation rate, but above all its productivity. To give an idea of the magnitudes involved, Figure 1.1
presents scenarios of Bulgaria’s GDP per capita through 2040 under two sets of assumptions.3 Through
the year 2015, both scenarios assume that: (i) employment will continue to grow at about 3 percent per
year, as it has since 2002, with the employment rate rising to the Lisbon target of 70 percent, and (ii)
labor productivity will continue to grow at its recent pace of two percent per year. During this period,
Bulgaria’s GDP per capita converges from its current level of 34 percent of EU25 GDP per capita to 44
percent by 2015, assuming that EU25 GDP per capita continues growing at 2 percent per year, as it has on
average in recent years (the uppermost trajectory in Figure 1.1). After 2015, the two scenarios diverge.
At that point, there will be no more gains to be had from increased employment since the employable
labor pool will have been more or less exhausted. From there on, productivity will be the sole driver of
GDP growth. In the first scenario (the low trajectory), it is assumed that labor productivity will continue
to grow at 2 percent per year. In the second scenario (the middle trajectory), growth in labor productivity
accelerates to 5 percent per year and stays there for the duration.
1.4 Figure 1.1 shows that if the labor productivity growth remains at 2 percent, Bulgaria will never
converge. Convergence to EU25 stops in 2015, and for the rest of the projection period Bulgaria’s GDP
per capita remains at 44 percent of the EU25 GDP per capita. By contrast, if the rate of growth of labor
productivity increases to 5 percent, Bulgaria’s GDP per capita converges to that of EU25 and achieves
parity around year 2040. However, to achieve that, Bulgaria will have to push on with its reform
program. Ensuring that the rate of growth of labor productivity picks up requires policies and bold
1
EU8 refers throughout the report to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia.
2
Population is projected to decline at 0.7% per year. See discussion on demographic trends later in this chapter.
3
After the analysis for the report was completed, the Bulgarian authorities adjusted GDP figures for 2002-2005.
These revisions are not taken into account in the report since they would not substantially alter the conclusions, but
redoing all the analysis would take significant amount of time.
2
reforms, given the magnitude of the challenge. Marginal measures will not be enough to make the
country converge.
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EU25--average productivity growth (2% p.a.)
Bulgaria--low productivity growth scenario (2% p.a.)
Bulgaria--high productivity growth scenario (2% until 2015, 5% p.a. thereafter)
1.5 This report aims to assist the Bulgarian authorities in analyzing and identifying an appropriate
policy mix in the areas of product and labor markets, human resource development, and research and
development (R&D) that would boost productivity and thereby competitiveness, economic growth, and
achieve income convergence. The implications of these policies for the government’s budget are also
briefly explored, including the utilization of EU grant funds.
1.6 The report largely focuses on the supply-side aspects of Bulgaria’s R&D and innovation system,
its education delivery, and its labor and product markets, and identifies policy options for their
improvement. A companion piece, the Investment Climate Assessment, which is being prepared in
parallel, deals with the demand side and, using firm data, identifies the binding constraints to productivity
growth from the firm perspective. While there is necessarily some overlap, the two reports together are
designed to provide a more comprehensive view of the options to tackle the challenge of boosting
productivity.
1.7 The areas selected for the study respond to the priorities identified by the Bulgarian authorities.
In this context it is worth noting that this report builds on the analysis of two prior Bank reports on
Bulgaria—the Country Economic Memorandum (CEM)4 of 2005 and the Public Finance Policy Review
(PFPR) of 20065. This study is also closely linked with the World Bank study that benchmarked
Bulgaria’s product market regulations using the OECD methodology.6 The benchmarking results have
5
World Bank (2005b), Bulgaria: The Road to Successful EU Integration—The Policy Agenda, Report No. 34233-
BG.
4
World Bank (2006) Bulgaria Public Finance Policy Review: Leveraging EU Funds for Productivity and Growth.
3
been partly utilized in this report, along with some of the prior work carried out by the World Bank on
education. In addition to the areas covered in this report, other factors, such as adequate infrastructure
provision, are important for the quest to raise productivity. However, since they were already covered in
earlier reports, they are not included in the current report.
1.8 Since the onset of the new millennium, transition economies like Bulgaria have faced a significantly
changed global environment. The dimensions of change include globalization, the emergence of knowledge
as the driver of economic growth, and the “flattening” of the world through the high speed information and
communication technology. In economies increasingly based on knowledge, wealth and economic
development depend on citizens’ capacity to creatively use their knowledge and skills to develop products
and services that meet the needs of discriminating globally-connected consumers. Public and private
organizations develop their competitive capacity by providing their employees with life-long opportunities
for learning, and retraining. The organizations and enterprises in knowledge economies become first and
foremost “learning organizations”. Bulgaria will not escape the impact of these trends. To keep up, it must
adapt, and in the process raise the rate of growth of productivity.
1.10 Investment in R&D and Innovation Policies: Firms need incentives to innovate: to adopt
existing or develop new technologies, products, and business processes that raise productivity. The most
basic way to foster innovation is often considered to be investment in R&D. The available empirical
evidence suggests that R&D investments have a positive impact on productivity growth.8 R&D enhances
technology transfer by helping firms to learn about advances at the technology frontier. For example, a
study on OECD countries9 shows that countries that are behind the world technology frontier can grow
more quickly, if they invest in R&D and human capital to facilitate adoption of new technologies.
Further, the closer a country or an industry is to the world technology frontier, the more important the
R&D efforts become—which in this case means not just imitation of existing technologies but their
improvement or replacement by entirely new technologies.
6
De Rosa, Fay, Ilieva (2006), “Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries.” The
World Bank.
7
For a review on current thinking on growth see for example, Rodrik, ed. (2005), In Search of Prosperity; and
Aghion (2006), “A Primer on Innovation and Growth”, Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2006/06, October.
8
See for example Lederman and Maloney (2001), “R&D and Development.” Policy Research Working Paper No
3024, the World Bank.
9
Griffith, Redding, van Reenen (2000), “Mapping Two Faces of R&D: Productivity Growth in a Panel of OECD
Industries.” Discussion Paper Series, No. 2457, Center for Economic Policy Research.
4
1.11 However, while R&D investments may be one of the factors affecting productivity, they alone are
by no means enough to foster productivity growth. Above all, it is necessary to create micro and macro-
economic conditions that enable innovation and technological progress. These include promotion of: (i)
competition and entry into product markets; (ii) flexible labor markets; and (iii) an educated labor force.
1.12 For Bulgaria, these other areas are the most pressing short-term priorities, and warrant most
attention at the moment. As will be shown in Chapter 2, based on past productivity trends, improvements
in these areas can be expected to have most impact on productivity growth in the short and medium run in
Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, it is the adoption of existing technologies—that is, imitation—that primarily
matters at the moment. In general, Bulgarian firms are not yet at the technology frontier, but should strive
to move in that direction through acquisition of best technologies available. To move the country closer
to the world technology frontier, Bulgaria would need to start paying increasing attention also to R&D.
But that is more of a medium to long-term priority for the country. It is vital that the basic micro and
macro-economic conditions are first met and that they are supportive of innovation. This includes above
all promotion of competition.
1.13 Product Market Regulation: Unhindered entry, exit and turnover of firms are crucial for
productivity growth. Firms have little incentive to adopt new technologies, if they are not stimulated by
competition.10 Regulations limiting entry may hinder the adoption of existing and new technologies, as
well as technology spillovers by reducing competitive pressures. Hence, policies that support competition
and encourage outward orientation, flexible product market regulations, and attraction of new FDI
inflows, play a key role in sustaining rapid productivity growth. This is particularly the case for Bulgaria,
as will be discussed later in the report.
1.14 Flexible Labor Markets: Recent research indicates that product and labor market policies are
complementary, and hence improving the functioning of both markets in parallel would be advisable to
promote productivity growth. The evidence from OECD countries suggests that countries with restrictive
product market policies also tend to have restrictive labor market policies, and vice versa.11 Effectively
functioning and flexible labor markets are essential in the quest to raise productivity, since they are the
critical link in ensuring that the skills and knowledge can be put to their most productive use. Rigidities
in the labor market–such as those that discourage the shedding of redundant labor–hinder innovation and
productivity growth, since they make it hard for a firm to move to a new activity and adopt a new
technology. The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that the reallocation of labor across sectors is still rather
slow. Thus, further enhancement of labor market flexibility would need to be considered in Bulgaria to
promote convergence.
1.15 Equipping Labor Force with Relevant Skills: Finally, having a highly skilled and technically
savvy labor force is also essential for new technology adoption, and becomes increasingly important as a
country moves closer to the technology frontier. Existing empirical evidence indicates that skill
composition of the labor force matters for innovation—an increase in the stock of skilled labor is
positively correlated with innovation efforts12, and a more educated labor force is quicker in adopting new
10
Recent economic research suggests that there is an inverted U type relationship between competition and
innovation: while too little competition leads to no innovation, too much competition can discourage innovation
since firms are not able to reap the benefits of their efforts. See Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt
(2002).
11
Nicoleti and Scarpetta (2005), “Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD Countries”, Economics
Department Working Paper No. 472, OECD and the World Bank.
12
See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press.
5
technologies.13 Recent research indicates that tertiary education investment increases a country’s ability
to make leading-edge innovations, while primary and secondary education impact the country’s ability to
implement existing technologies.14 The fact that in the age of globalization, knowledge is becoming an
increasingly important driver of growth further emphasizes the importance of higher education.
1.16 Thus, it is secondary and tertiary education that are critical for productivity growth in Bulgaria.
In addition to tertiary education, this report covers both general secondary and vocational education and
training. However, since none of these education institutions would be effective without strong primary
feeder institutions, the reform of primary education also matters. For that reason it is also covered in this
report.
1.17 Changes in these various areas are likely to affect productivity differently. Increases in labor force
participation and employment can increase aggregate productivity growth by improving resource utilization.
Aggregate productivity growth can also increase if workers move from lower to higher productivity sectors,
and thereby improve resource allocation. However, in addition to raising aggregate productivity, R&D and
innovation, education, and liberalization of product markets have the potential to increase the rate of growth
of productivity. This shift allows any given level of productivity to be achieved more rapidly. It is this that
Bulgaria should be aiming for.
1.18 In analyzing the appropriate policy mix in the above-mentioned areas, it is important to reflect at the
outset on the implications of two trends—Bulgaria’s population decline, and the increasing importance of
knowledge for growth. In addition to influencing the speed of convergence, they also have implications for
sectoral policies, in particular for education.
1.19 Demographic Trends: Of all EU member countries, Bulgaria’s population is declining fastest.
In early 2004, Bulgaria had 7.8 million people.15 However, the population is projected to fall to 6.5
million by 2025, and further to 5.2 million by 2050. Projections carried out by the UN (2007) are similar,
with the low/high scenarios of 6.2-6.9 million people in 2025, dropping to 4.2-6.0 million people by
2050. This represents a 0.7 percent decline in population per year. The demographic patterns are similar,
but more moderate in all EU8 countries.16 By contrast, total population of EU15 is projected to stabilize,
although the share of old people will rise, and that of children and working age population decline.
1.20 Consequently, the working age population (people of ages 15-64) will decrease in Bulgaria.
According to projections, it will decrease about one percent per year after 2010. As a result, the working
age population is set to go down from 5.4 million in 2004 to 4.2 million in 2025, and 3.1 million in 2050.
By 2050, the working age population would represent only 60 percent of the entire population, down
from 69 percent in 2004. This means that even if labor force participation rates increased to 70-75
percent, there would be 35-40,000 fewer workers available each year during 2010-2030, tapering off to an
annual decline of 20-25,000 workers by 2040-2050. While this may quickly eliminate the current
unemployment problem in Bulgaria, it also implies that the labor force will have to go through a major
13
Nelson and Phelps (1966), “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion and Economic Growth,” American
Economic Review, 56(1/2), 69-75.
14
See Aghion (2006), “A Primer on Innovation and Growth”, Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2006/06, October.
15
Eurostat 2005 based on Bulgaria’s NSI data.
16
EU8 refers throughout the report to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia.
6
upgrading of its education and skill levels, accompanied by large capital investments, to raise its
productivity and hence living standards to the average of those in other EU countries.
1.21 At the same time, the share of those aged 65 and above will rise from 17 percent in 2004 to 26
percent in 2050. Figure 1.2 presents these trends. Because the ratio of working age to older people (aged
65+) will be declining steadily, the working age group will need to raise its savings rates sharply over
time to take care not only of the current old people, but eventually themselves. They will not be able to
expect generations younger than themselves to take care of them, since younger generations will be
declining in numbers, while expectations of the living standards once old, will be rising along with the
general rise of living standards expected in the coming decades.
1.22 The number of babies born each year is projected to decline from its current range of 65-70,000
per year towards 50,000 per year. This would imply a birth rate of about 1.5 children per woman. This is
slightly higher than the range of 1.1-1.3 births per woman that has prevailed in the last 15 years. Some
argue that this reflects the unfavorable economic conditions of the transition, which are not expected to
last. However, even if the birth rate were to recover to the population-stabilizing rate of 2.1 births per
woman, which would make it the highest in Europe, it would imply only getting back to the current
number of babies born each year. This “baby bust” will have implications above all for the school
system, which would need to be kept in mind when contemplating reforms.
6000000
5000000
4000000
0 - 14
3000000 15 - 64
65 +
2000000
1000000
0
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
1.23 Implications for the Education Sector: The decline in the number of births in the past fifteen
years is already showing up in the declining student cohorts at primary and lower secondary schools (see
Table 1.1). The decline has been held back at the pre-primary and upper secondary school levels by a rise
in net enrolment rates. However, the rise to net enrolment rates has a limit, and it is only a matter of time
before the population decline will be reflected in the decline in absolute numbers at these levels. Only at
7
the tertiary level is there a likelihood that the absolute cohorts will actually grow in numbers, since net
enrolment rates can still rise a fair amount (see Table 1.2).
1.24 In terms of absolute numbers, average enrolment in schools at all grades from pre-school through
upper secondary will have to adjust downwards to about 60,000 students per grade, which is 20-30
percent below current enrolments, depending on the grade. In tertiary education, where one can expect a
rise in enrolment rates for some years to come, the absolute number of students may well stay in the 200-
250,000 range for a few decades. This suggests that when contemplating the reforms of the Bulgarian
education system, gradual downsizing of the current primary and secondary school system should be
planned for, together with the upgrading of the current tertiary education system. Chapters 5-7 have been
written keeping these developments in mind.
1.25 In addition to making R&D and innovation policies pertinent, the increasing role of knowledge as a
driver of growth has implications for education and how it is delivered. Many of the OECD and EU
countries have already faced this challenge. It is now Bulgaria’s turn.
1.26 Secondary Education: In response to increasing importance of knowledge, most countries have
experienced less difficulty in developing and implementing policies for reform of primary and tertiary
education than for secondary education, including vocational secondary education. This has been
attributed to a number of distinctive dualities of secondary education, which is both terminal and
preparatory, compulsory and post compulsory, uniform and diverse, serving both personal and societal
8
needs, and serving contradictory equity and selectivity purposes.17 These contradictory dualities have led
many countries to experiment with more flexible pathways in upper secondary education and devise
frameworks to allow students in the general secondary stream to acquire recognized labor market
qualifications, and those in the vocational stream to acquire academic credits to allow them to gain access
to tertiary education. A study conducted by OECD18 identified the following four elements in secondary
education reforms: (i) reducing the number of vocational education programs by broadening the
definitions of vocational areas and their qualifications; (ii) creating effective curricular linkages between
general and vocational education; (iii) developing combination of school- and work-based learning, and
(iv) building pathways between vocational secondary education and tertiary education.
1.27 The OECD study also suggested that the teacher-directed, rote learning that dominates secondary
education needs to be replaced by a new student-centered paradigm, which emphasizes the analysis,
application, and synthesis of knowledge in a collaborative learning environment. The continuous
upgrading of teachers in the secondary general, and vocational schools is a real challenge in the
knowledge economy because of the fast pace of change. A number of guiding principles have emerged
and should be taken into consideration for the reform of the system in Bulgaria. These include: (i)
upgrading and reform of teacher education and training has to be an integral part of any reform strategy;
(ii) teacher training has to continue throughout the teacher’s career; (iii) teacher training should
emphasize the importance of student-centered learning; and (iv) group learning complemented by self-
study and self–learning should be incorporated in all teacher training programs.
1.28 Tertiary Education: Four features of the knowledge economy have far-ranging implications for
the reform of tertiary education.19 First, knowledge is being developed and applied in new ways; the
information revolution has expanded knowledge networks and expedited the innovation process. Second,
product development cycles are shorter and the pressures for innovation greater. The product
development cycle in the automotive industry, for example, dropped from six years in 1995 to less than
two years by 2005. Third, the globalization of trade is increasing world wide, putting added pressures on
transition economies to integrate their policies and practices and with potential trading partners. Fourth,
SMEs in the manufacturing and service sectors have become significant players in economic growth and
employment.
1.29 Over the past three decades, many countries have diversified their once publicly-dominated
tertiary education systems in an attempt to respond to the challenge of the knowledge economy. This
diversification includes many, or all of the following types:
17
. World Bank (2002), Expanding Opportunities and Building Competencies for Young People: A New Agenda for
Secondary Education.
18
OECD (2000) Knowledge and Skills for Life: First Results from the OECD Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA).
19
World Bank (2003b),, Life Long Learning in the Global Knowledge Economy.
9
• Private Institutions: Private sector tertiary institutions have grown rapidly in developed and
transition economies. Most EU8 countries have modified their tertiary education regulations to
allow the establishment of private universities and institutions of tertiary education. Poland has
195 private institutions with enrolment of about 380,000 undergraduates. Private business
schools have also mushroomed in the past decade: over 95 in Poland, 30 in the Czech Republic,
18 in Romania, and 4 in Bulgaria.
• Virtual Universities: The ICT revolution and the emergence of web-based services have changed
the tertiary education landscape dramatically. An estimate made in 2000 indicated that there
were over 3000 specialized institutions offering on-line education and training services in the
U.S.20. National as well as regional virtual universities are being established in many countries,
including the African Virtual University, the Virtual University of Monterrey, Mexico, the Arab
Virtual University in Kuwait, and the Tun Abdul Razak University in Malaysia.
• Franchise Universities: Franchise universities have been setup in partnership with private or
public local universities in a number of developing and transition economies by parent
universities in North America, Europe, and Australia. They offer validated courses and programs
from the parent university at the site of the local institution. The cost of these programs is usually
25-30 percent of the full cost of similar programs offered by the parent university.
• Corporate Universities: It is estimated that there are more than 1500 corporate universities
worldwide today. Prominent among them are Motorola, Disney, and Toyota universities, to name
but a few. Corporate universities may have their own network of physical campuses; operate as
virtual universities, or through partnership with formal public or private institutions of tertiary
education.
1.30 Life Long Learning: Another important paradigm that has been recognized by all developed and
transition economies is the importance of life long learning in all stages of education. The speed of
change in the knowledge economy means that skills depreciate much faster than they once did.
Employers no longer rely solely on new graduates, or new labor market entrants as the primary source of
skills and knowledge. They now increasingly seek out people, who have managed to retool, while
already in the labor force. Schools and institutions of tertiary education thus need to prepare workers for
life long learning that goes beyond the existing rigid system to include non-formal education and training
in programs, such as apprenticeship, and internship programs, and structured on-the-job training, as well
as informal education and training, which can take place in the home, community, or work place.
1.31 In chapters that follow, this report examines a number of reforms that could help promote
productivity and convergence in Bulgaria. The next chapter analyzes the productivity trends at
sector/branch level in Bulgaria, after which the report turns to the sectoral reforms. Strong capacity to
innovate and use the innovations effectively could lead to major gains in productivity in the right
businesses environment. Chapter 3 covers some rigidities in the regulation of product markets which, if
reduced, would raise efficiency and lower the costs of production. Reduction of rigidities would lead to a
reallocation of resources to those sectors in which the regulations have been the most binding. The
chapter lays out the main channels through which this might accomplished.
1.32 The labor market connects the demand for a whole range of skills with the supply of these skills.
If labor productivity is to be raised, the labor market must be efficient in reallocating labor from lower to
20
Olsen, J (2000), Is Virtual Education for Real. TechKnowLogia. January-February.
10
higher productivity areas. It must achieve that in a constantly changing environment, so it must be
flexible. Options to improve labor market functioning are covered in Chapter 4.
1.33 Chapters 5-7 deal with the accumulation of human capital in a number of ways. Chapter 5 covers
the ongoing governance and finance reforms in primary and general secondary education. Chapters 6 and
7 examine the quality of vocational education and training as well as of tertiary education, with a
particular focus on how well and efficiently the relevant institutions are preparing the students for the
demands of today’s private businesses and public institutions. Reforms in these sectors could lead to
major improvements in the use of public resources in creating the needed human capital.
1.34 Chapter 8 covers the Bulgarian R&D and innovation sector, both in terms of its size and its
effectiveness. Finally, Chapter 9 links the proposed reforms with the budget. While the report
concentrates on factors that lead to greater productivity from the supply side, their potential cannot be
realized in a business environment that is not geared to facilitating the use of these factors, including
matching them with the requisite capital. Therefore, the report touches on this aspect briefly in several
chapters, based on the already existing research.
11
12
2. PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN BULGARIA
2.1 Since 1997 Bulgaria has implemented important reforms, which have contributed to sustained
output and employment growth. The size and scope of the public sector have been substantially reduced,
the exposure to international trade and competition through trade and foreign direct investment has
increased, and progress has been achieved in improving the regulatory environment for doing business.
Supported by prudent macroeconomic management, output has expanded by close to 5 percent per year
between 2000 and 2005, and is expected to have exceeded 6 percent in 2006. Solid macroeconomic
performance supported by accelerated structural reforms has improved the environment for doing business
in Bulgaria. Private sector’s share in the economy has increased substantially, and is now comparable to
and even higher than in some EU8 countries. Investment surged to close to 30 percent of GDP in 2006,
compared to below 10 percent in 1996-1997, while FDI stock accounted for close to 50 percent of GDP in
2005. Most of the non-infrastructure enterprises and banks have been privatized or liquidated, bank
restructuring has been completed and banking supervision strengthened; trade and prices liberalized;
reforms in the energy sector have been implemented in both district heating and electricity sectors; and
major public sector and institutional reforms have been initiated. These actions can be expected to have
affected productivity growth and/or increased employment.
2.2 This chapter presents a detailed sector-based examination of labor and total factor productivity
trends in Bulgaria since 2000 as well as those in employment by sector, and identifies critical factors
supporting their growth. The most striking message from this analysis is that almost none of the growth in
labor and total factor productivity during the period 2000-2005 was due to the reallocation of labor and
capital from one sector or another. The mobility of production factors, both labor and capital, was low.
Instead, the productivity gains were achieved almost exclusively at the intra-sector level. Yet, for rapid
sustainable growth in productivity and output in the longer run, it is the reallocation of resources across
sectors that is critical. This problem warrants attention in Bulgaria.
2.3 Services and manufacturing were the main sectors driving growth (average annual rate of 4.6
percent) in Bulgaria during the period 2000-2005 (see Figure 2.1, left panel). Both market services
(including trade and transport) and non-market ones, constituting together about 60 percent of output,
were important contributors to the expansion of the service sector. Unsurprisingly, agriculture was the
most volatile sector: it recorded both strong downturns (in 2000 and 2005) and upswings (in 2002 and
2004). On the whole, the decreasing role of agriculture, and the rising role of services are bringing
Bulgaria slowly closer to the economic structures prevailing in the rest of the EU.
2.4 Consumption and investment led growth on the demand side, while the contribution of net exports
was mostly and increasingly negative (see Figure 2.1, right panel). Relatively strong contribution from the
change in inventories, especially in 2005, resembles the experience of several EU8 countries.21 Bulgaria’s
recent EU accession is expected to give a further boost to Bulgaria’s exports owing to improved market
access, but also raise the risk of increased imports. That could further aggravate the external imbalances,
unless a significant portion of the imports are investment goods that would help improve the
competitiveness of firms operating in Bulgaria in the medium term.
21
For example, Poland had intensive accumulation of stocks in 2004, and massive de-stocking a year after EU
accession, which had a large impact on GDP growth volatility.
13
Figure 2.1: Contribution to Output Growth in Bulgaria 2000-2005, percentage points
Sector composition Demand-side composition
15 Consumption
10 Agriculture and forestry Gross Investment
Mining and quarrying Change in Inventories
Manufacturing Net exports
8 Construction 10 Statistical discrapency
Elect., gas and water supply GDP
Services
6 Value Added
5
4
0
2
0 -5
-2
-10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2.5 As in other post-socialist transition countries, also in Bulgaria early gains in growth were driven
solely by total factor productivity (TFP) improvements22, but since 2003 expansion in employment has
significantly contributed to output growth (see Figure 2.2). TFP grew at almost 6 percent annually in the
period 2000-2002, but decelerated sharply to 2.2 percent per annum during 2003-2005 (Figure 2.3).23 The
growth accounting method was used to identify the contribution of different factors of production to
overall growth.24 The results also indicate that capital contributed negatively in 2000-2002, but had a
marginally positive impact on output growth in 2003-2005.25 This is in contrast to other transition
countries, where capital contributed significantly to output growth. The example of Poland is depicted in
Figure 2.2 (right panel).
22
Growth in TFP is usually attributed to factors such as improvements in human capital, research activity, foreign
trade, reallocation of production factors, and “catching up”. See for example, Timmer and Szirmai (2000), and
Miller (2003). Other variables that have been found to be important are demography, macroeconomic volatility, and
structural changes such as deregulation or privatization. See for example, Hyeok and Townsend (2004), Escribano
and Guasch (2005). In Bulgaria, casual observation of the correlations (at a sector level) between TFP growth and
FDI concentration or share of export sales in revenues suggests that they are positive..
23
The TFP decline in 2003 is an anomaly. Since TFP is calculated as a residual, its drop in 2003 resulted from an
increase of employment that was stronger than the increase in output. This sudden expansion in employment was
largely supply-driven, since it was almost certainly due to the launch of the subsidized job-creation program “From
Social Assistance to Employment”, introduced in late 2002 (see Chapter 4). After that, growth in employment was
driven by demand, with the number of people in the employment program actually declining.
24
Output growth (value-added) was decomposed into (i) the growth in the factors of production (capital and labor),
and (ii) a “Solow” residual, termed Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. See Annex 1 for the methodology.
25
This result holds even if one takes into account a possible underestimation of the real growth of the capital stock..
14
Figure 2.2: Decomposition of Value-added Growth by year (%; contribution of L, K and TFP sum
up to 100%)
Bulgaria 2000-2005 Poland 1996-2004
150 200
TFP Labor Capital
120 TFP L K
150
90
100
60
50
30
0
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-30 -50
-60 -100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 2.3: Decomposition of Value-added Growth and Growth of Its Components in Bulgaria by
sub-period
Decomposition of output growth Growth rates (including remuneration of factors)
Capital 35 32.3 2000-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005
120 Labor
TFP 30
2.6 25.7
9.9 25
90 15.7
20 17.9
45.8 15.5
60 121.4 14.5
15
81.7
30 10 6.8 6.6
44.2 4.5
5
0.7 1.4
0
-16.3 0
-0.7
-5.1 -2.2
-30
-5
VA
VA
VA
L
K
TFP
TFP
TFP
2000-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005
2.6 The analysis of output growth across 28 sectors reveals that growth in value added26 was most
rapid in export-oriented manufacturing industries. TFP growth was the main contributor to value added
growth in most sectors. Only a few relied on factor accumulation, and the reallocation of production
factors across sectors played only a minor role.
2.7 This section first examines the trends, by sector, of value added, employment, investment, and
productivity growth using the growth accounting framework. After that changes in productivity—both
labor productivity and TFP—are decomposed into effects arising from reallocation of resources across
sectors, and those due to within-sector productivity growth.
26
Owing to data availability, value added instead of output time series were used in the analysis.
15
A. Value-added and TFP Growth by Sectors
2.8 Value added increased in real terms at an average rate of 5.4 percent during 2000-2005, with
slightly faster average growth in 2003-2005. During the period 2002-2005 value added rose particularly
fast in select manufacturing sectors, financial intermediation (+100 percent cumulatively), trade and repair
(+69 percent), and other services (+69 percent). The cumulative 6-year output growth was most
remarkable in manufacturing (+162 percent), textiles (+134 percent), non-metallic minerals (+134
percent), electrical and optical apparatus (+125 percent), and wood products (+113 percent)—see Figure
2.4 and Annex Table 1 for details. However, these rapidly growing sectors constituted a rather small share
of the overall output (see Figure 2.5), so their overall impact is still small.
Figure 2.4: Cumulative Value-added Growth by Figure 2.5: Structure of Value added by Sector
Sector in 2000-2005, % in 2005, %
180 16
14
150
12
120 10
8
90
6
60 4
2
30 0
0
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2.9 Employment growth (Figure 2.6) and structure (Figure 2.7) largely mirrored growth and structure
of value added, with important exceptions of real estate and public administration. Also, in 2005
agriculture still employed almost a quarter of the entire labor force in Bulgaria, and the number of those
working in the sector had hardly moved since 2000.
tau ery
n
so trat .
lea tic
cia ion
le n
n
l
.
ba s, w n
eta chem ther
mi cals
ci a el ec g n . e r
me r
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co edu tiles
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ure
y, edia u.
k
pla d
t
rv
g o ex . t eq u
mi inin nspo fue
i
sic ate
r al
t
ma
ns l wor
tio
rea uctio
an atio
tra mun atio
nd woo
ag e p a
r an
sta
cti erm l eq
in ap
on
nic als
bli ctu d r ts
ric ater
d p on
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s
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tic
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so uca y
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en als
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te
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ru nter stru her
s, od
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OT r
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A
ur
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ur
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cti
no
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po
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fin
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oth
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Source: NSI, Bank staff calculations. Source: NSI, Bank staff estimations.
2.10 Net investment was positive in over half of the sectors, with strongest increases in manufacturing
of coke, refined petroleum product, nuclear fuel, hotels and restaurants, and trade and repair. The rate of
increase in the overall capital stock was modest (2.3 percent cumulatively). Capital stock shrank
significantly in non-market services (education, health and social work, public administration; compulsory
16
social security) and mining and quarrying of energy producing materials (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). However,
since estimates of capital stock are rather uncertain, trends in net capital growth should be interpreted with
caution.
Figure 2.8: Cumulative Net Capital Real Growth Figure 2.9: Structure of Net Capital by Sector in
by Sector in 2000-2005, % 2005, %
25
40
30
20 20
10
0 15
-10
-20 10
-30
-40 5
-50
-60
-70 0
-80
em ry
m u re p r
ma ner .
gy
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2.11 During 2000-2005, TFP grew most rapidly in several export-oriented manufacturing sectors and,
surprisingly, in education. This is likely due to data problems in the education sector: it is not clear how to
properly measure value-added in education, and there may have been an overestimate in the decline of the
capital stock in education. Overall, TFP growth accounted for the bulk of the real output increase in
Bulgaria (81.7 percent), while labor accounted for 15.7 percent, and capital accumulation for less than 3
percent. If education is treated as an outlier, TFP increased more in manufacturing branches than in
services (see Figure 2.10 and Annex Table 1 for details). Among the five sectors with the fastest TFP
growth were the modern industrial sectors, such as manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
(+146 percent cumulative growth), and manufacturing of transport equipment (+87 percent). TFP growth
was particularly rapid during the early years, reflecting labor shedding and weak investment. Notably,
TFP decreased in sectors that are hardly exposed to foreign competition. These were real estate, renting,
business activities, agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing. These sectors recorded TFP declines of 13-
16 percent over the period (Figure 2.10).
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at.
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ica l
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L
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te
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an foo
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ym
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VA
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17
2.12 Growth in productivity was in part due to exposure to foreign competition through FDI and
growing integration with EU. Evidence of the importance of openness is that FDI and exports were both
positively and significantly correlated with TFP growth at the sector level (Figure 2.12). Owing to data
constraints it was not possible to compute the correlation between TFP growth and innovation.
Figure 2.12: Cumulated TFP Growth and Average FDI-to-Capital Stock Ratios in 2000-2005 and
Share of Exports in Sales by Sector
TFP growth and FDI-to-capital stock ratio, % TFP growth and export-to-total sales ratio, %
160 160
electrical equ. electrical equ.
140 140
other non-metalic other non-metalic
120 minerals minerals
120
manufacturing n.e.c. manufacturing
100
100
TFP growth
n.e.c.
TFP growth
transport financial
textiles equ. wood chemicals
80 intermediation transport equ. textiles
basic metals transport and 80 non- chemicals
mining ofwood
miningcoke
machinery and fuel
rubber and plastic communication energy basic metals
60 leather paper rubber and plastic machinery
other
comm/social/pers.
60 paper leather
40 Serv.
construction
electicity, gas, water
trade and repair
40
20 hotels and food electicity, gas,
restaurants water
20 food
0
agriculture real estate 0
-20
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80
FDI/capital stock, average from 2000-2005, % Share of exports in total sales, Jan-Sep 2006
2.13 Productivity growth can be decomposed into effects arising from reallocation of production
factors across sectors, and those coming from within the sector. The purpose of such decomposition is to
distinguish the impact of “structural changes” in the economy from the impact of “intrinsic” productivity
growth. In the case of aggregate labor productivity, one can distinguish three separate effects: (i) a static
shift effect--the effect of reallocation of labor towards sectors with above-average initial level of labor
productivity; (ii) a dynamic shift effect--the effect of reallocation of labor towards sectors with higher
growth in labor productivity; and (iii) a within-sector growth effect--gains in labor productivity achieved
through means other than reallocation of labor, including increases in the capital-labor ratio within the
same sector. Along the same lines, aggregate TFP growth can be decomposed into two effects: (i) an
intra-sector effect--assuming constant factor-shares; and (ii) a total reallocation effect (TRE)--resulting
from shifts of labor and capital between sectors. TRE is measured as the difference between aggregate
TFP growth and output-weighted TFP growth at the sector level (see Annex 3 for “shift-share”
methodology).
2.14 By 2005, the highest levels of labor productivity were recorded in manufacturing of coke, refined
petroleum products, and nuclear fuel, and financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business
activities. Growth in labor productivity in various sectors during 2002-2005 and the resulting levels of
labor productivity in 2005 are presented in Figures 2.13 and 2.14, respectively (details in Annex Table 2).
In most cases, strong labor productivity growth resulted in above average labor productivity levels.
Unsurprisingly, the lowest productivity levels remained in agriculture, forestry, fishing, leather industry
and textiles. During 2000-2005, labor productivity decreased only in three sectors: (i) real estate, renting
and business activities; (ii) public administration and compulsory social security; and (iii) agriculture,
hunting and forestry and fishing.
18
Figure 2.13: Cumulative Labor Productivity Figure 2.14: Labor Productivity Levels by Sector
Growth by Sector in 2000-2005, % in 2005 (economy-wide average =100%)
965%
175 1000%
150 900%
800%
125
700%
100
600%
75
391%
500%
303%
50 400%
254%
223%
216%
300%
175%
168%
25
132%
128%
124%
120%
119%
116%
105%
100%
200%
94%
88%
87%
74%
0
67%
65%
64%
60%
59%
59%
48%
39%
38%
100%
-25
ed wat L
mi /soc cons ucat er
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te
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s
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d r rk
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m y ls
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is at
er ta e.c
he
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ti
ec g ni al
ity x. tio
co ed at
pa
ac o
in et s ta
ad erg ra
fu
nd e
te fa ed wo
ne
c q
x.
in a at
tu
as
as er
in m
T
el inin u ic
e
si t e
rm st
at
c a re
ic n e
i
bb es n.
an uri a
ke
ul
d
l
ric
y,
p
ag
nd er
fac
a
cit
l in
rt a u b b
ia
el
he s a
an
oc
cti
nu
cia
ho anu
/s
bli
d
th
ci
on
an
r
m
ele
tel
ma
mm
al
an
m
no
an
om
pu
rn
he
rt
fin
ho
po
he
rc
fin
er
co
ns
po
ot
he
tra
oth
ot
ns
er
oth
t ra
Source: NSI, Bank staff calculations. Source: NSI, Bank staff estimations.
2.15 Reallocation of labor towards more productive sectors played only a small role in shaping overall
labor productivity growth, compared to the “intrinsic growth” effects (Figure 2.15). This is similar to the
pattern observed in Poland during 1996-2003 (see Figure 2.16). In Bulgaria, the static effect was positive
in 4 of the 6 years covered by the analysis, which means that employment shares grew in sectors with high
initial productivity levels. Over the 6-year period this effect accounted for 27 percent of the total labor
productivity growth of 24 percent. By contrast, the dynamic effect was negative throughout the period.
This reflects the “structural burden” of the transition economy, in which sectors with rapidly growing
productivity were actually shedding labor. The static and dynamic effects were usually acting in opposite
directions, with the former slightly stronger. The within growth effect was robust, positive, and dominated
the other two, with the exception of the unusual 2003, in which all three of them were negative (see earlier
analysis). This may reflect not only labor productivity gains (for example, improvements in labor
utilization), but also the flow of capital towards more productive sectors.27
Figure 2.15: Shift-Share Analysis of Labor Productivity Growth for Bulgaria 2000-2005, %
10 I. Static shift effect [LP(base)* d(S)] 30 I. Static shift effect [LP(base)* d(S)]
6.4 II. Dynamic shift effect [d(LP) * d(S)]
8.3 II. Dynamic shift effect [d(LP) * d(S)] 24.1 III. Within growth effect [d(LP) * S(base)]
8 III. Within growth effect [d(LP) * S(base)] 24 Labor productivity growth
Labor productivity growth
18.2
6 18 3.8
4.3 4.6
4 3.5 3.5 12 23.6
15.9 5.0
2 6 1.2
5.2
0 0 -1.6 -1.0
-5.6
-2 -6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005
Note: The effects I-III may not sum up to the overall labor productivity growth because of rounding.
LP–labor productivity; base–base year; S–labor share; and d (…) – change between base and final year.
Source: Bank staff calculations.
27
However, lack of change of the alpha-coefficient value (standing for remuneration of labor), which stayed steady
at 0.69 between 1999 and 2005 (see Annex Table 2), and the results from the TFP decomposition exercise, suggest
that the impact from the change of the capital-labor ratio in sectors was limited.
19
Figure 2.16: Shift-Share Analysis of Labor Productivity Growth for Poland 1996-2003, %
9.0 50.0
Within growth effect [d(LP) * S(base)] Within growth effect [d(LP) * S(base)]
8.0
Dynamic shift effect [d(LP) * d(S)] 40.0 Dynamic shift effect [d(LP) * d(S)]
7.0
Static shift effect [LP(base)* d(S)] Static shift effect [LP(base)* d(S)]
6.0
30.0
5.0 37.6
4.0 20.0
3.0
13.9 19.9
10.0
2.0
7.2
1.0 3.4 1.5
0.0 -1.1 -2.0
0.0 -6.2
-1.0 -10.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1996-2003 1996-1999 1999-2003
2.16 During 2000-2005, TFP growth in Bulgaria was predominantly driven by intra-sector productivity
improvements. Reallocation of resources across sectors (TRE) contributed virtually nothing. By contrast,
in Poland the reallocation of resources played an important role, particularly in the second half of the
1990s (Figures 2.17 and 2.18).
Note: Intra-branch effect - TFP increases are weighted with value added-shares in constant prices; Reallocation effect (TRE) – the
difference between total TFP growth and the intra-branch effect (the sum of TRE and intra-branch effects sum up to total TFP
growth--all in logarithms). Both effects may not sum up to the overall TFP growth because of rounding.
Source: Bank staff calculations.
20
Figure 2.18: Shift-Share Analysis of TFP Growth for Poland 1996-2003, %
6.0 35.0
5.3 TRE (total reallocation effect)
4.8 29.4
5.0 30.0 Intra-branch effect
3.9 4.1 TFP growth at aggregate level
4.0
25.0
3.1 11.6
2.9
3.0
20.0
2.0 15.5
1.5
`
15.0
12.1
1.0
0.8 8.2 2.2
10.0
17.8
0.0
TRE (total reallocation effect)
5.0
-1.0 Intra-branch effect 7.3 9.8
2.17 These decomposition results suggest that inter-sectoral mobility of production factors (both capital
and labor) is still low. This contrasts with Poland’s experience, where at least capital proved to be
relatively mobile across sectors. This also raises concerns about the medium to long term growth potential
of the Bulgarian enterprise sector. In the most dynamic economies growth takes place through the
Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction”, in which firms either actively invest in new technologies
and/or organizational change, or achieve labor productivity gains through capital-labor substitution, in the
process challenging their competitors to do the same or face decline.28 The “creative destruction” process
includes the firm entry and exit of firms (“churning”). To gain a better understanding of and confirm these
patterns, firm level analysis is needed. The forthcoming Investment Climate Assessment, a companion
piece to this report, is expected to provide that information.
2.18 Although it is encouraging that employment has been expanding and that intrinsic productivity
growth at the sector level has been robust, there remains much potential for achieving productivity gains
from reallocation of resources towards more productive uses. This is especially true of agriculture and the
largely publicly-funded “non-market” services, such as other community, social and personal service
activities, health, social work, and education.
2.19 Bulgaria has witnessed rather robust output growth during 2000-2005. Services have been the
main driver of output growth, followed by industry. On the demand side, growth came from increases in
consumption and investment. Exports, while growing, were overshadowed by imports, with net exports
exerting an increasingly strong drag on growth in GDP. However, to the extent that imports reflect a rise
in the imports of investment goods due to strong growth in FDI, they are likely to eventually show up in
rising productivity and exports, and thus contribute to a sustained expansion of GDP.
2.20 TFP growth was the driver of output growth in most sectors, especially in export-oriented
manufacturing with high concentration of FDI. TFP, in turn, was driven almost entirely by intra-sector
“intrinsic growth” factors, such as organizational or managerial improvements in the utilization of labor.
Almost none of the TFP improvements came from the reallocation of human and capital resources across
sectors.29 This suggests that there is a lot of untapped potential, which would need to be exploited. In
28
See for example, Aghion and Howitt (2005).
29
While this report will cover some of the reasons for labor immobility—such as overregulated product markets,
inflexible labor markets and skills mismatches owing to weaknesses in the education system—there are likely to be
21
particular, since in the long run it is the reallocation of resources across sectors that will be key to
sustained and rapid growth in TFP, and hence GDP.
2.21 There is a potentially worrisome trend in both TFP and labor productivity (and they are related).
The growth rate of both declined between 2000-2002 and 2003-2005. In the case of the rate of growth in
labor productivity, its decline was a mirror image of the rapid rise in employment (the sum of the two adds
up to the rate of growth of GDP). This can continue for some years, given Bulgaria’s low employment
rate and the still substantial pool of unemployed (see Chapter 4). But at some point these reserves of labor
will run out, and further rapid growth in GDP will depend on the rate of growth of productivity and, as
was shown in Chapter 1, with productivity growth remaining at 2 percent beyond that point, Bulgaria’s
convergence might come to a halt.
2.22 The results suggest that policies that support competition and encourage outward orientation,
including further deregulation and reduction of the role of the state in the economy, and attraction of new
FDI inflows, will play a key role in sustaining rapid productivity growth in Bulgaria. This could have a
particularly large pay-off in various services and agriculture, since these sectors are traditionally less
exposed to competitive pressures than the manufacturing sector. Such policies should go hand in hand
with efforts to further improve the investment climate, and increase labor market flexibility. Flexibility in
labor markets is crucial in aiding the process of creative destruction by shifting labor from firms in decline
to those on the rise. Rather than protecting existing jobs, policies should aim at equipping workers
through education to be better prepared for the changes in the demand for labor and assisting their search
for new employment possibilities through active labor market policies. As Michael Spence the 2001
Nobel laureate in economics, said “institutions and policies that retard the movement of people and
resources will also retard growth, and generally it is better to protect people and incomes rather than jobs
and firms.” (Spence 2007)
2.23 Finally, the demographics of Bulgaria put an extra premium on raising labor productivity. As the
dependence burden of the working age population rises, it will become increasingly difficult for those
employed to improve their standard of living while at the same time supporting proportionate rises in the
standard of living of those living on pensions.
2.24 The remaining chapters in this report address the problem of how to shift the drivers of TFP
growth increasingly from intra-sector productivity improvements to gains that can be had from inter-
sectoral allocations of factors of production, and especially labor. The next two chapters address the
question of how to increase competition in the product markets and how to increase the flexibility of labor
markets. They also discuss the inter-linkage of the two. Subsequent chapters address the questions of
equipping the labor force with more and better education and acquisition of skills. The penultimate
chapter grapples with the problem of R&D and innovation. R&D will not be the main driver of Bulgaria’s
growth in the immediate future, but will become ever more important as Bulgaria approaches the
technological frontiers in various sectors of the economy. As will be argued, R&D and innovation do best
in a system that has a good business environment, flexible labor markets and an excellent education
system that is sensitive to the requirements of business.
other reasons as well not covered by this report (such as weaknesses in transport infrastructure and housing markets).
Further in-depth analysis would be warranted on this issue.
22
Annex 1:
The approach used is the standard growth accounting framework based on an aggregate production
function (expressed in growth rates). This approach focuses on the supply-side of the economy (that is,
the accumulation of labor and capital, as well as technical progress, as the drivers of any increase in output
over time).
In line with common practice, Cobb-Douglas production functions with constant returns to scale were
used and factor markets were assumed to be competitive. The key parameter, the income share of labor
(capital) α (1-α) was calculated from national income accounts. Because of data constrains the analysis
covered the period 1999-2005, while the growth rates were available from 2000 and the 2005 data were
preliminary estimates.
Y = f (L, M, K) P (1)
where Y–output; L–labor; M–intermediate materials; K–capital services; and P–productivity of inputs.
Reflecting data availability, value-added instead of output time series were used. Therefore, intermediate
materials were removed from the right hand side of the equation. Moreover, the assumption of constant
returns to scale implies that α (L) = 1 - α(K) and P=TFP (Total Factor Productivity).
Thus, TFP growth is calculated as a residual (the “Solow” residual) using the equation:
23
Annex 2:
Data:
The growth accounting exercise for Bulgaria in 2000-2005 was based on data available from the Bulgarian
National Statistical Institute (NSI) in January 2007. The analysis was made at a level of desegregation
corresponding to the A-31 breakdown of the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the
European Community30.
Gross fixed capital formation. A breakdown of investment by classification A-31 (29 economic sectors) is
obtained using the structure provided in the NSI annual statistical survey on the expenditure on acquisition
of tangible fixed assets. As for 2005 only data by 17 sectors was available (A-17), additional allocations
and extrapolations were made to arrive at estimates of the fixed capital formation by the 29 sectors.
Capital. The NSI does not provide estimates for gross capital and net capital (K(t)) either in current or
constant prices. However, based on the information from NSI, investments in fixed assets (I(t)) and value
of amortization by sector31 were estimated. The initial capital stock in constant prices was taken from
Ganev, K. (2005), "Measuring Total Factor Productivity: Growth Accounting for Bulgaria", Bulgarian
National Bank discussion paper DP/48/2005 (available only in Bulgarian).
Since the real growth rates of capital were not available, an assumption about the capital deflator was
made, connecting it with the value added deflator. As the baseline scenario, it was assumed that capital
deflators were half of the value added deflators. Alternative scenarios assumed that the capital deflator
increased at the same pace as the VA deflators (bottom scenario), and that capital deflator was equal to
zero (capital prices are constant – cap scenario). Based on these simulations, it was concluded that under
the baseline scenario the average difference between the economy-wide capital deflators and investments
deflators over the period 2000-2005 was minimal.
Wage bill and operating surplus of the self-employed. The share of labor costs in value added determines
the key coefficient α in the Cobb-Douglas production function. The labor input in the calculations was
computed as a sum of the compensation of employees and the operating surplus (OS) of the self-
employed. Doing this it was implicitly assumed that the OS is highly labor-intensive. Data on the
operating surplus was available from the generation-of-income account of the NSI national accounts. It
was calculated as the difference between the gross value added, and the sum of the compensation of
employees and net other taxes on production.
Methodology:
As a check, branch-level depreciation rates (d(t)) were calculated using the following formula:
30
In fact, the analysis was made on 28 sectors. This was because for many economic variables the data on the sector
AA (agriculture, hunting and forestry) and BB (fishing) were available as a single aggregate. Additionally there was
no data available for the sectors PP (activities of households) and QQ (extra-territorial organizations and bodies).
31
Due to the fact that as of January 2007 there were no data available on fixed capital consumption for 2005, the
figures for this year are estimates based on extrapolation of the data for 1999-2004.
24
Knet(t) = Knet(t-1)* (1-d(t)) + I(t) (7)
Where K(t) denotes net capital and I(t) investment in fixed assets (all data in current prices).
There are two methods of estimating α (labor share in total income) at the aggregate level: (1) econometric
regression of the production function; and (2) the Solow method (based on the income-share of labor in
value added). The income share of labor is the total wage bill of employees plus the operating surplus as a
proxy for compensation of self-employed. α was estimated for each individual branch using the second
method (because of short time-series that did not allow for econometric regression).
The value of α at the aggregate level was in the range of 0.69-0.72 during 1999-2005. This is broadly in
line with values normally found in the literature. The estimated value of α varies significantly across the
analyzed 28 branches.
25
Annex 3
ln(va) - ln(l) = ά ln(l) + (1- ά) ln(k) + ln(tfp) - ln(l) Ù ln(va/l) = (1- ά) ln(k/l) + ln(tfp) (8),
where VA - output, L – labor, and K – capital (small letters indicate growth rates of the variables).
Growth in labor productivity contains two effects: changes in the capital/labor intensity [k/l] and increases in
total factor productivity. The aggregate growth of labor productivity is decomposed into three separate effects
(Peneder, 2002):
Equation (9) Static shift-effect Dynamic shift effect Within growth effect
n n n
LP − LP ∑ LPi, by ( S i, fy − S i, by ) + ∑ ( LPi, fy − LPi, by )( S i, fy − S i, by ) + ∑ ( LPi, fy − LPi, by ) S i, by
T , fy T , by i = 1 i =1 i =1
growth ( LP ) = =
T LP LP
T , by T , by
where LP=labor productivity; d(LPT) = growth of LP in time T, by = base year, fy=final year; T=sum over
sectors i; Si = share of sector i in total employment.
In order to measure the impact of changes in both labor and capital shares in the various sectors of the economy
on aggregate total factor productivity growth, the shift-share analysis of TFP was conducted. For a given
sector i:
ln(va) = ∑(VAi/VA) * ln(vai) = ∑(VAi/VA)* άiln(li) + ∑(VAi/VA)* (1- άi)ln(ki) + ∑(VAi/VA)* ln(tfpi)
(11)
Using equations (8) and (11) the difference between aggregate TFP growth, ln(tfp), can be calculated and value
added-weighted TFP growth in branches, ∑(VAi/VA)* ln(tfpi), which is referred to as the Total Reallocation
Effect (TRE).
VA VA l VA k
TRE = ln(tfp ) − ∑ i ln(tfp ) = ∑ i α ln( i ) + ∑ i (1 − α ) ln( i ) (13)
VA i VA i l VA i k
26
VA
Where: tfp = TFP at aggregate level, tfpi=TFP in sector i, i = the share of value added in sector i in
VA
aggregate value added, VA = ∑Y , i l= ∑l i k= ∑k . i
TRE results from shifts of labor and capital from one sector to another: the last term on the right hand side of
equation (12) indicates the effects of changes in capital shares on aggregate TFP, while the previous term
indicates the effects of changes in labor shares.
Both static and dynamic shift effects, as defined above in Equation (8), describe reallocation of labor to sectors
with above-average labor productivity level or growth rates, respectively. They are included in the first term
on the right hand side of Equation (12). These two effects turned out to usually act in opposite directions so
they did not explain TRE. Nevertheless, the third within growth effect in Equation (8) includes labor
productivity gains, which can be attributed to both the contribution of capital as a production factor, and to
gains from capital reallocations from sectors with below-average to sectors with above-average TFP growth.
The stronger the labor productivity growth resulting from more efficient capital utilization in the economy as a
whole (measured as the sum of output-weighted TFP), the higher the last term on the right-hand side of
Equation (12) and the higher the TRE.
27
Annex Table 1: Bulgaria: value-added growth in 2000-2005 and its decomposition by sector, %
Structure of VA Value Added growth and its components Value Added growth and its decomposition (L, K and TFP sum up to 100%)*
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 32.3 4.5 0.7 25.7 14.5 -2.2 -0.7 17.9 15.5 6.8 1.4 6.6 32.3 15.7 2.6 81.7 14.5 -16.3 -5.1 121.4 15.5 45.8 9.9 44.2
1 AA Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 13.9 9.3 -11.5 1.2 0.3 -12.8 -5.0 -2.6 -1.2 -1.3 -6.8 3.9 1.5 -11.7 -11.5 -9.7 -2.3 112.0 -5.0 51.7 23.0 25.3 -6.8 -54.3 -20.7 175.0
2 CA Mining and quarrying (energy) 0.9 0.6 -29.4 -32.5 -11.3 17.9 -21.7 -25.2 -5.9 11.3 -9.8 -9.7 -5.7 5.9 -29.4 113.0 34.5 -47.4 -21.7 118.9 25.1 -44.0 -9.8 98.9 56.5 -55.4
3 CB Mining and quarrying (non-energy) 0.7 0.9 52.2 -11.0 -3.3 76.8 8.8 -9.1 -1.5 21.6 39.8 -2.0 -1.8 45.4 52.2 -27.7 -8.0 135.7 8.8 -113.3 -17.8 231.1 39.8 -6.1 -5.5 111.7
4 DA Food, beverages and tobacco 3.6 3.1 20.7 -1.1 2.6 19.0 2.7 -6.7 -0.3 10.4 17.6 6.0 2.9 7.8 20.7 -6.0 13.6 92.4 2.7 -260.9 -13.1 374.0 17.6 35.8 18.0 46.3
5 DB Textiles 2.2 2.8 134.3 20.2 5.5 84.8 78.3 11.8 4.3 53.0 31.4 7.6 1.1 20.8 134.3 21.6 6.3 72.1 78.3 19.2 7.3 73.5 31.4 26.8 4.1 69.1
6 DC Leather and leather products 0.2 0.3 69.1 5.5 1.0 58.6 48.9 1.2 1.9 44.4 13.6 4.3 -0.8 9.8 69.1 10.2 2.0 87.8 48.9 3.0 4.7 92.4 13.6 32.8 -6.4 73.6
7 DD Wood and wood products 0.2 0.4 112.9 7.1 8.6 83.0 29.6 -3.1 10.6 21.0 64.3 10.6 -1.8 51.3 112.9 9.1 10.9 80.0 29.6 -12.2 38.8 73.5 64.3 20.2 -3.6 83.4
8 DE Pulp and paper; publishing 0.7 0.9 56.9 3.0 -5.6 61.4 26.5 1.7 -3.3 28.7 24.0 1.3 -2.4 25.4 56.9 6.6 -12.9 106.3 26.5 7.0 -14.3 107.3 24.0 6.2 -11.4 105.2
9 DF Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 2.1 1.7 -2.3 -44.2 3.6 69.1 5.0 -17.2 -2.2 29.8 -7.0 -32.6 6.0 30.3 -2.3 2553.7 -156.0 -2297.7 5.0 -384.4 -46.0 530.4 -7.0 547.9 -80.9 -367.1
10 DG Chemicals 1.8 1.4 24.8 -23.2 -11.5 83.6 3.8 -17.4 -4.0 30.9 20.2 -7.0 -7.9 40.3 24.8 -119.3 -55.5 274.7 3.8 -512.0 -107.9 720.0 20.2 -39.4 -44.8 184.2
11 DH Rubber and plastic products 0.4 0.6 91.6 7.4 7.0 66.7 18.3 -4.9 0.2 24.2 62.0 13.0 6.8 34.3 91.6 11.0 10.4 78.6 18.3 -30.1 1.0 129.2 62.0 25.3 13.6 61.1
12 DI Other non-metallic mineral products 0.7 1.1 133.6 -3.5 7.2 125.8 25.1 -12.9 2.8 39.6 86.8 10.8 4.3 61.7 133.6 -4.2 8.2 96.0 25.1 -61.6 12.2 149.3 86.8 16.3 6.8 76.9
13 DJ Basic metals 2.2 2.2 46.7 -15.5 0.4 73.0 18.2 -20.4 4.7 41.8 24.1 6.1 -4.1 22.1 46.7 -44.1 0.9 143.2 18.2 -136.6 27.5 209.1 24.1 27.3 -19.6 92.3
14 DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.8 2.0 48.7 -9.9 -1.7 67.8 13.0 -7.7 -1.8 24.6 31.6 -2.4 0.1 34.7 48.7 -26.2 -4.3 130.5 13.0 -65.8 -14.5 180.3 31.6 -8.7 0.2 108.4
15 DL Electrical and optical equipment 0.9 1.2 124.5 -7.6 -1.1 145.8 93.6 -9.4 -1.1 116.1 16.0 2.0 0.0 13.7 124.5 -9.8 -1.3 111.2 93.6 -15.0 -1.6 116.6 16.0 13.4 -0.2 86.8
16 DM Transport equipment 0.4 0.5 65.1 -16.3 5.5 86.9 15.3 -19.7 -0.1 43.8 43.1 4.2 5.7 30.0 65.1 -35.5 10.8 124.7 15.3 -153.8 -0.8 254.6 43.1 11.6 15.4 73.1
17 DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.4 0.7 162.2 27.4 1.5 102.8 34.5 -1.4 -2.5 39.9 95.0 29.2 4.1 45.0 162.2 25.1 1.5 73.4 34.5 -4.8 -8.6 113.5 95.0 38.4 6.0 55.6
18 EE Electricity, gas and water supply 5.1 4.5 25.2 0.1 -2.0 27.6 37.1 1.1 -3.7 40.8 -8.7 -1.0 1.8 -9.4 25.2 0.3 -8.9 108.6 37.1 3.4 -11.8 108.5 -8.7 11.0 -19.1 108.1
19 FF Construction 4.6 5.6 49.0 7.2 5.0 32.4 8.8 -7.7 1.9 15.7 37.0 16.2 3.1 14.5 49.0 17.4 12.2 70.4 8.8 -95.9 22.1 173.8 37.0 47.6 9.6 42.9
20 GG Trade, repair 8.2 8.2 68.8 22.9 10.1 24.8 24.7 8.6 4.4 10.1 35.4 13.2 5.5 13.4 68.8 39.4 18.4 42.3 24.7 37.2 19.3 43.4 35.4 40.9 17.7 41.4
21 HH Hotels and restaurants 2.1 2.5 55.2 24.4 9.3 14.1 11.7 4.3 3.9 3.1 38.9 19.3 5.2 10.7 55.2 49.7 20.2 30.1 11.7 38.3 34.2 27.5 38.9 53.6 15.5 31.0
22 II Transport, storage and comm. 11.5 13.7 59.2 -5.2 -1.3 70.2 35.4 -2.5 -2.7 42.8 17.6 -2.8 1.5 19.2 59.2 -11.5 -2.8 114.4 35.4 -8.4 -9.2 117.5 17.6 -17.5 9.0 108.4
23 JJ Financial intermediation 3.0 4.7 100.0 9.6 -1.0 84.4 35.7 -2.9 -1.1 41.3 47.4 12.9 0.1 30.5 100.0 13.2 -1.5 88.3 35.7 -9.6 -3.7 113.3 47.4 31.2 0.2 68.6
24 KK Real estate activities 16.9 15.5 16.6 42.2 -2.7 -15.8 8.3 18.8 -4.0 -5.0 7.7 19.8 1.4 -11.3 16.6 228.9 -17.5 -111.4 8.3 216.6 -51.4 -65.2 7.7 242.0 18.7 -160.7
25 LL Public administration; social security 6.9 6.8 18.6 10.3 -23.6 40.7 9.8 1.7 -14.7 26.5 8.0 8.4 -10.4 11.2 18.6 57.4 -157.8 200.4 9.8 17.9 -169.1 251.2 8.0 105.7 -143.9 138.2
26 MM Education 4.2 3.9 9.2 -9.9 -41.9 108.6 4.9 -8.6 -19.7 42.8 4.1 -1.4 -27.7 46.0 9.2 -117.9 -616.8 834.7 4.9 -188.4 -460.2 748.7 4.1 -34.9 -801.2 936.1
27 NN Health and social work 2.5 2.9 1.7 -9.5 -12.6 28.5 7.3 -7.7 -7.9 26.2 -5.2 -1.9 -5.1 1.8 1.7 -597.1 -803.3 1500.3 7.3 -115.0 -117.4 332.4 -5.2 36.1 97.5 -33.6
28 OO Other activities 1.6 2.1 68.9 11.1 4.3 45.7 10.2 -6.0 -0.8 18.2 53.3 18.2 5.2 23.3 68.9 20.1 8.1 71.8 10.2 -64.2 -8.5 172.8 53.3 39.2 11.9 49.0
Note: *) If the change of value added and its components was of the same sign (either positive or both negative) the positive values in the last 12 columns inform about the same direction of change of the
value added and its components (L, K or TFP). The negative values in the last 12 columns inform that the change of the value added and its respective component went in opposite directions.
Sources: Bulgarian NSI, Bank staff calculations.
28
Annex Table 2: Bulgaria: working population, labor productivity and α coefficient estimates
Employment Labor productivity α coefficient
Structure Growth Tho cons. BGN per worker Growth
In percent (unless otherwise indicated)
2000 2005 2000-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005 1999 2005 2000-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005 1999 2005
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 6,6 -3,1 10,0 6,9 8,6 24,1 18,2 5,0 0,69 0,69
1 AA Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 26,2 24,5 1,0 -3,1 4,3 4,4 3,8 -12,4 -2,0 -10,7 0,83 0,91
2 CA Mining and quarrying (energy) 0,8 0,5 -50,3 -37,3 -20,8 7,9 11,2 42,2 25,0 13,8 0,77 0,40
3 CB Mining and quarrying (non-energy) 0,5 0,4 -19,5 -15,1 -5,1 9,0 17,0 88,9 28,2 47,4 0,90 0,65
4 DA Food, beverages and tobacco 3,7 3,6 -1,8 -10,8 10,1 6,7 8,2 22,9 15,1 6,8 0,59 0,61
5 DB Textiles 4,9 5,8 32,2 18,9 11,2 2,7 4,9 77,3 49,9 18,2 0,57 0,65
6 DC Leather and leather products 0,7 0,7 8,6 2,1 6,4 2,7 4,1 55,7 45,8 6,8 0,57 0,72
7 DD Wood and wood products 0,6 0,6 14,0 -5,5 20,6 3,7 6,9 86,7 37,1 36,2 0,57 0,57
8 DE Pulp and paper; publishing 0,8 0,8 6,4 3,8 2,5 5,6 8,2 47,4 21,8 21,0 0,48 0,49
9 DF Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel 0,4 0,2 -50,8 -21,0 -37,6 29,7 58,9 98,5 33,0 49,2 0,68 0,87
10 DG Chemicals 1,1 0,8 -36,9 -28,9 -11,3 7,5 14,9 97,7 46,0 35,4 0,42 0,31
11 DH Rubber and plastic products 0,6 0,7 12,3 -8,9 23,4 4,5 7,7 70,5 29,8 31,4 0,51 0,57
12 DI Other non-metallic mineral products 0,9 0,8 -11,0 -25,2 19,0 5,8 15,2 162,5 67,2 57,0 0,50 0,59
13 DJ Basic metals 2,0 1,9 -22,4 -30,0 10,8 5,2 9,8 88,9 68,7 12,0 0,70 0,49
14 DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2,6 2,1 -16,7 -12,9 -4,3 5,3 9,5 78,5 29,7 37,6 0,60 0,66
15 DL Electrical and optical equipment 1,2 1,1 -12,2 -14,7 2,9 4,4 11,4 155,7 126,9 12,7 0,54 0,73
16 DM Transport equipment 0,5 0,4 -25,8 -30,2 6,3 5,9 13,0 122,4 65,2 34,6 0,56 0,71
17 DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 0,8 1,0 39,7 -2,2 42,8 3,5 6,6 87,7 37,4 36,6 0,64 0,78
18 EE Electricity, gas and water supply 2,0 1,8 -1,0 1,3 -2,2 15,6 19,7 26,4 35,4 -6,6 0,78 0,35
19 FF Construction 4,3 4,5 10,2 -10,5 23,1 7,9 10,7 35,3 21,5 11,3 0,74 0,76
20 GG Trade, repair 11,8 13,9 38,4 13,7 21,7 5,1 6,2 21,9 9,6 11,2 0,65 0,60
21 HH Hotels and restaurants 2,9 3,4 37,5 5,9 29,8 6,1 6,9 12,8 5,4 7,0 0,74 0,71
22 II Transport, storage and comm. 7,4 6,3 -8,1 -3,9 -4,3 9,4 16,2 73,2 40,9 22,9 0,59 0,64
23 JJ Financial intermediation 1,1 1,2 12,3 -4,1 17,1 17,3 30,8 78,1 41,5 25,9 0,69 0,79
24 KK Real estate activities 4,1 5,1 51,7 22,2 24,1 34,3 26,4 -23,1 -11,4 -13,2 0,86 0,82
25 LL Public administration; social security 3,1 4,1 46,0 8,3 34,8 15,7 12,7 -18,8 1,4 -19,9 0,18 0,30
26 MM Education 7,3 6,0 -15,4 -13,5 -2,2 3,6 4,6 29,1 21,2 6,5 0,61 0,62
27 NN Health and social work 5,0 4,5 -14,0 -12,4 -1,8 3,3 3,9 18,2 22,5 -3,5 0,58 0,98
28 OO Other activities 2,9 3,6 23,2 -7,2 32,7 3,3 4,6 37,1 18,7 15,5 0,72 0,60
29
30
3. IMPROVING PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION32
3.1. Competition in product markets provides incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more
productive activities, increase innovation and technological diffusion. In the process it raises
productivity. In addition, less restrictive regulations may affect positively employment by reducing the
rents that some firms extract from overregulation and force firms to expand their activities.33 Unhindered
entry, exit, and turnover of firms are crucial for productivity growth. As was shown in the previous
chapter, in Bulgaria productivity growth has indeed been fastest in sectors most exposed to competition.
3.2. This chapter presents the rationale for improved product market regulation, and explores the links
between regulation, investment, productivity, and innovation. It also looks at the effect of regulation on
labor market performance and functioning, and presents analysis of the current state of product market
regulation in Bulgaria in comparison with OECD countries.
3.3. The analysis shows that Bulgaria has come a long way in improving its product market
regulations. In some areas it performs even better than the OECD average However, distance from the
best performers in OECD and EU8 remains still large in some areas, suggesting that further efforts are
needed, if Bulgaria is to achieve meaningful gains in productivity and investment. The methodology for
benchmarking product market policies used in this analysis does not allow comparison of another
important complement of regulatory quality—the functioning of institutions, including the judiciary.
Nevertheless, a number of international comparative studies suggest that Bulgaria will need to further
improve the functioning of its institutions to ensure that institutions have adequate capacity to enforce
better regulations.
3.4. Policies that encourage competition in product markets have been found to exert positive pressure
on productivity growth, especially in countries like Bulgaria, which are far from the EU and world
productivity leaders. A number of studies34 point to substantial improvements in productivity as a result
of reducing product market regulations. The gains from product market reforms are found, as expected,
to be larger in countries with relatively restrictive product markets, which generally tend to have lower
productivity levels. The more profound the product market reforms are in low productivity countries, the
faster will be the pace of convergence towards the productivity levels of the high productivity countries.
Figure 3.1 plots the increase in productivity in OECD countries between two periods—1996-2003, and
1985-1995—and the restrictiveness of regulation in seven non-manufacturing sectors. As shown in the
Figure 3.1, countries that regulate less tend to have higher productivity growth.
32
This chapter is in part based on the diagnostic and analytical work conducted under the leadership of the ECA
Chief Economist Office. The work involved benchmarking Bulgaria and Romania’s product market policies and
institutions using the OECD methodology and data for OECD countries. The results of this benchmarking exercise
for Bulgaria and a detailed description of all indicators can be found in Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A
Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay, and Ilieva, The World Bank (2006).
33
Conway, Janod, and Nicolletti (2005).
34
Conway, de Rosa, Nicoletti and Steiner (2006), and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005a).
31
Figure 3.1: Product Market Regulation and Labor Productivity Acceleration
3.5. The potential impact of regulatory reforms in OECD countries is estimated by Conway et al.
(2006) to range between 0.2 to 1.8 percentage points increase in labor productivity per year, depending on
the size of the productivity gap and regulation gaps, provided that all countries converged to the most
liberal regulatory policies (Figure 3.2). Potential gains in productivity are smallest in countries such as
Figure 3.2: Increase in Average Annual Business Sector Productivity Growth over 1995 to 2003
(given a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive to competition in 19951)
32
the UK and the US with high productivity levels and among the most liberal product markets. By
contrast, Greece and Portugal would have increased their labor productivity by 1.8 and 1.4 percentage
points per annum, respectively, between 1995 and 2003, if they had aligned their product markets to the
best practice in OECD.
3.6. While data limitations do not allow the inclusion of Bulgaria in this analysis, the state of product
market regulation in Bulgaria, and the level of productivity suggest that gains in labor productivity similar
to those available to but unexploited by Greece or even higher could be expected, if Bulgaria embarked
on profound regulatory reforms. The potential pay-off to these reforms for Bulgaria is therefore very
large.
3.7. Regulation of the economy affects productivity levels and growth through several channels.
Overregulation in the economy could reduce incentives for firms to increase investment and innovative
practices in production of goods and services. A study by Alesina et al. (2005) looks at the effects of
regulation on investment in a number of sectors—transport, communication, and utilities. The study finds
that reducing barriers to entry and the extent of public ownership, has affected positively capital
accumulation in these sectors. Moreover, the impact on investment was much larger where substantial
improvements in regulation were implemented, whereas small steps in removing barriers to entry have
not had any discernable impact in relatively restrictive economies. Empirical estimates suggest that
product market reforms could lead to an increase in the investment rate on the order of 2 percentage
points of GDP in the long run. This analysis provides further arguments for the need to lessen barriers to
investment and entrepreneurship in Bulgaria, where investment picked up only recently and the upgrading
of capital stock is still at an early stage35. While barriers to trade and investment have been reduced
substantially in Bulgaria, and are comparable to the OECD average, their further relaxation together with
solid improvements in domestic regulatory policy could bring substantial benefits in terms of the quantity
and quality of investment, including importantly FDI inflows.
3.8. As will be shown, Bulgaria fares well on barriers to trade and investment, when compared its
immediate peers—Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (hereinafter EU4) and middle-income
countries (MICs) such as Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey—but needs to deepen reforms to ease barriers to
entrepreneurship, if it is to achieve the average levels of OECD and EU15 countries. Barriers to
entrepreneurship could constrain trade integration and divert FDI flows from Bulgaria, which would
further limit the opportunities to catch up with world productivity leaders. Trade integration and FDI
penetration have been found to be powerful sources of transfer of best practices and technologies.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find that easing barriers to trade and investment as well as some other
domestic regulations could improve significantly FDI inward positions of OECD countries. It is
estimated that on average inward FDI stocks could grow by more than 10 percent from their initial level
in OECD countries. In countries with relatively restrictive product market policies--such as Greece, Italy,
and France—this growth could be between 60 and 80 percent. The same would apply to Bulgaria.
3.9. Restrictive product market policies have been found to affect negatively investments in ICT, and
hence the speed of transfer of knowledge and skills to low level productivity countries. Conway et al.
(2006) estimate that 12 percent of cross-country differences in ICT investment in OECD countries could
be attributed to differences in product market regulation. Countries with more liberal product markets
tend to have the highest share of ICT investment in total investment, while more restrictive countries are
at the lower end of innovation. ICT investment in Bulgaria remains one of the lowest among the EU
35
World Bank (2005b) Bulgaria: the Road to Successful EU Integration—The Policy Agenda.
33
countries. Therefore, policies that would encourage the use of ICT could be especially beneficial for
Bulgaria’s growth agenda. Higher ICT adoption, however, would require a well-educated labor force
with adequate skills to produce and use ICT. Discussion on the quality of the human capital in Bulgaria
follows in Chapters 5-7.
3.10. Similar analysis on the impact of product market reforms on innovation has been conducted for
EU countries.36 This impact is expressed in increased incentives for firms to innovate when profits and
rents of firms are squeezed by enhanced competition. Product market reforms, such as lowering domestic
non-tariff barriers to trade and other barriers to the free movement of factors of production across borders,
have been found to exert pressure on average profitability of firms, which has a positive impact on R&D
intensity, and hence total factor productivity growth. Therefore, reforms that improve significantly
product market regulation could support the increase in R&D investment in Bulgaria to levels close to the
target under the Lisbon Agenda (3 percent of GDP, of which two-thirds are expected to come from the
private sector). A discussion of other policies that may have a bearing on R&D in Bulgaria will be
covered in Chapter 8.
3.11. The analysis of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005b) reveals that the impact of product market policies
on employment (in non-manufacturing sectors) is even larger than that of labor market policies per se.
High state control and barriers to entry have had a negative impact on employment rates in OECD
countries. It is estimated that lessening these barriers to those in place in product markets in the best
performing OECD countries, could increase employment rates between 2.5 and 5 percentage points. It
should be noted however, that product and labor market reforms could explain only partially the variation
in employment rates among countries. There are likely to be other factors at play that have not been
included in the above analysis.
3.12. Bulgaria has gone a long way in reforming its product market polices and institutions. However,
comparison with best performers in product market regulation suggests that there is no room for
complacency. Reforms aimed at enhancing competition need to continue to ensure firms operate in an
environment with less state involvement, lower barriers to entrepreneurship, including barriers to entry,
and relying more on incentive-based regulation. Comparing Bulgaria’s performance with high and
middle income countries that are members of OECD provides an idea of where the focus of reforms
should be.
3.13. Product market regulation in Bulgaria has been assessed using the OECD methodology37 that
provides comparative estimates on economy-wide, and industry specific regulatory provisions. The
assessment of product market regulation is based on a survey of existing policies rather than on the actual
enforcement, or outcomes of these policies, and covers a wide range of product market policies—public
ownership, market access and competition issues, regulatory and administrative policies and processes
concerning public administration, and sector specific policies in road freight, railways, passenger air
travel, and retail distribution. In addition, information from World Bank’s Doing Business database was
used to benchmark administrative burdens on start-up of companies.
36
Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2006).
37
Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005). For more information on the results for Bulgaria see Product Market
Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD countries, de Rosa, Fay, and Ilieva, World Bank (2006).
34
A. Overall Product Market Regulation
3.14. The overall indicator of product market regulation, country by country, shows that Bulgaria has
still some way to go to catch up with the best performers in OECD and EU15 in terms of changing
policies that restrict competition (see Figure 3.3).38 Benchmarking Bulgaria to OECD countries provides
useful insights on how Bulgaria compares with the high and middle income countries. The survey for
OECD countries was conducted in 2003, while all data for Bulgaria refer to 2006. This provides an
opportunity to compare Bulgaria with four EU8 countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia (hereafter EU4)—prior to their joining EU. Country group comparison (Figure 3.4) reveals that
Bulgaria’s performance in 2006 was comparable to the EU4 average before their accession, as well as to
other middle income countries (MICs) such as Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey (Figure 3.3).
2.5
2 OECD
1.5
0.5
Italy
Norway
Mexico
Switzerland
Hungary
Ireland
New Zealand
Sweden
Iceland
Germany
Czech Rep.
Australia
U.S.
Canada
Luxembourg
Japan
Finland
Austria
Korea
Spain
France
Bulgaria
Greece
Poland
Turkey
Netherlands
Portugal
UK
Belgium
Slovak Rep.
Denmark
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and Ilieva,
World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The indicator ranges from
0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.15. However, the gap between Bulgaria and other countries may be larger now, if these countries
have further reformed their product markets since 2003, and have kept up the trend observed since 1998.
Between 1998 and 200339, OECD countries implemented a number of reforms, which led to
improvements in the overall product market indicator by close to 30 percent on average (Figure 3.5).
These reforms focused on price liberalization, removing barriers to trade and investment, easing the
licensing and permits systems, and reducing direct control of state over business enterprises. Countries
with more restrictive policies—including the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea,
Mexico, Poland and Turkey—made substantial progress in deregulating their economies. Bulgaria’s most
immediate peers—such as the Czech Republic and Poland40--focused on reducing economic regulation by
limiting state control over businesses, while progress in easing administrative regulation was more
limited. All countries substantially reduced barriers to trade and investment.
38
The indicators were calculated on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative information obtained from survey
answers, which were coded and normalized over a scale of zero to six, with 0 reflecting least restrictive and 6 most
restrictive regulations.
39
Two surveys have been conducted so far with data for 1998 and 2003. Benchmarking product market regulation
has proved to be a useful tool for monitoring performance of policies and institutions in OECD countries, for
identifying gaps, and thus exerting peer pressure on member states.
40
There are no data for Slovakia for 1998.
35
Figure 3.4: Product Market Regulation, Country Groups
3.0 2.8
2.5
2.0 2.0
2.0 OECD 1.8
1.7
1.4 1.4
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Slovak Rep. EU15 Czech Rep. Bulgaria EU4 Hungary Poland
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay
and Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The
indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
Figure 3.5: Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries, 1998 and 2003
4.5
1998
4
2003
3.5
1998 OECD average
3 2003 OECD average
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Germany
Norway
Italy
Hungary
Turkey
Australia
Austria
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
New Zealand
Finland
UK
Iceland
Ireland
Sweden
Japan
Spain
Switzerland
Poland
Canada
U.S.
Denmark
Netherlands
Korea
Portugal
France
Greece
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Mexico
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: The indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6---most restrictive.
3.16. To better understand the divergence of performance among countries the overall indicator of
product market regulation is decomposed into three broad indicators: (i) barriers to trade and investment;
(ii) barriers to entrepreneurship; and (iii) state control. In the next sections, a comparison of Bulgaria’s
performance with other countries is made both using these broad indicators as well as some of their sub-
components.
3.17. Bulgaria has succeeded in reducing most of the barriers to trade and investment faster and further
than its peers— other MICs and EU4 prior to their accession to the EU. The indicator measures barriers
36
to foreign trade and investment in the form of tariffs or other regulatory barriers to trade, legal restrictions
on foreign ownership, and discriminatory procedures against foreign investors. In this area Bulgaria is
close to the average OECD level, and performs even better than the other MICs and EU4 (Figure 3.6).
2.5 2.4
2.0
2.0
1.6 1.6
1.5 1.4
1.3
1.0
1.0 0.9
0.7
0.5
0.0
EU15 Czech Rep. OECD Bulgaria Hungary EU4 Slovak MICs Poland
Republic
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The
indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.18. Easing barriers to trade and investment has translated into improved integration of Bulgaria with
global economy. Bulgaria’s trade of goods and service has grown rapidly over the last five years to reach
the levels of the most integrated EU8 (Table 3.1). In 2005, Bulgaria’s total foreign trade accounted for
close to 140 percent of GDP. Integration in goods has been expanding on the back of rapidly expanding
imports, while the growth of merchandise exports has been more gradual. Trade integration in services
has been advancing more rapidly than in goods, and is the second highest after Estonia among the new
EU member states. Services have also attracted the largest share of foreign direct investments (FDI) in
the country—about 80 percent of the total stock—mainly in ICT - using and producing sectors, such as
financial intermediation and telecommunications. The total stock of FDI in Bulgaria more than tripled in
euro terms between 2000 and 2005 (see Figure 3.7), and in 2005 stood at close to EUR10 billion or 45
percent of GDP. More than 10,000 FDI enterprises operate on the territory of Bulgaria, and employ more
than 255,000 employees, which accounts for close to 12 percent of the total number of employees under
labor contract.
3.19. Looking forward, strong FDI inflows will be instrumental in ensuring continued macroeconomic
stability, and sustained productivity growth. FDI inflows have provided ample coverage of the rapidly
growing external current account deficits in Bulgaria, and so far supported the strong increase in private
investment. To continue the trend in an environment in which few enterprises remain to be privatized
will take further improvements in the business climate. Attracting FDI with further cuts in corporate
income taxation has been exhausted, as Bulgaria levies one of the lowest corporate tax rates in EU since
2007. In addition, Bulgarian legislation is more or less aligned with the acquis. Therefore, competition
for increased FDI inflows would be increasingly based on the regulatory quality, and its effective
enforcement.
37
Table 3.1: Indicators of Integration: Bulgaria and EU8 (percent of GDP)
Trade integration, 2000-2005 Trade integration FDI stock
Goods Services Total goods & services, 2005
2005
Bulgaria 92 29 120 138 45
Czech Republic 116 19 134 144 44
Estonia 125 42 167 174 82
Hungary 116 22 139 137 49
Latvia 75 22 97 110 30
Lithuania 92 17 109 124 29
Poland 56 10 67 74 27
Romania 66 10 76 77 26
Slovakia 130 19 149 150 33
Slovenia 99 18 118 130 10
Average, excluding 97 20 117 124 37
Bulgaria
Source: Eurostat, IMF, BNB, and World Bank staff estimates
3.20. Bulgaria represents best practice in eliminating all discriminatory and other regulatory barriers to
trade and investment, and fares better than OECD and EU15 on average in this area (see Figure3.8, left
panel). This means that Bulgaria does not discriminate between foreign and domestic firms, both of
which have equal rights to appeal and redress through competition agencies, regulatory bodies, trade
policy bodies, or private rights of action. The Law on Encouraging Investment adopted in 2003 provides
explicitly for equal treatment of investors. Easing other regulatory barriers includes the use of
internationally certified standards and certification procedures, and engagement in mutual recognition
agreements with other countries. Bulgaria has signed mutual recognition agreements with a number of
countries outside EU, and was a member of CEFTA prior to EU accession, and signed free trade
agreement with EFTA countries. However, further progress in aligning with international standards and
certification procedures might be warranted.
38
Figure 3.8: Barriers to Trade and Investment by type
1.2 5
EU4 Other MICs EU15 OECD Bulgaria EU4 Other MICs EU15 OECD Bulgaria
4.5
1.0
4
3.5
0.8
3
0.6 2.5
2
0.4
1.5
1
0.2
0.5
0.0 0
discriminatory procedures regulatory barriers ownership barriers tariffs
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD countries, de Rosa, Fay, and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The
indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.21. Tariff levels in Bulgaria were higher than the EU15 average, but lower than in some EU4. Only
the Czech Republic and Slovakia had reduced their tariff levels prior to EU accession, while Hungary and
Poland entered EU with higher tariff levels than Bulgaria had a year before accession. Bulgaria acceded
to EU in 2007 with tariff levels already matching those of EU. However, Bulgaria still ranks low in terms
of some aspects of trading across borders, 104th out of 175 economies according to Doing Business 2007
(World Bank (2006b)). It takes 6 to 8 days more to export in Bulgaria than in EU4 or other middle
income countries, and the cost to export per container is 2/3 higher than in the Czech Republic.
3.22. Also, some foreign ownership barriers still remain in Bulgaria. They are predominantly related to
restrictions on privatization of selected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in some sectors like electricity
generation, gas, and water. These restrictions apply to the sale of these enterprises both to domestic and
foreign investors and take the form of statutory or legal limits to the number or proportion of shares that
can be acquired by foreign investors in SOEs as well as the use of special voting rights that the state has
in firms to restrict the acquisition of equity by foreigners. In Bulgaria, as in other EU countries, there is a
ceiling of 49 percent of foreign ownership in the airline sector.
C. Barriers to entrepreneurship
3.23. Bulgaria had comparatively lower barriers to entrepreneurship41 in 2006 than its peers in 2003.
(Figure 3.9). The “barriers to entrepreneurship” indicator covers policies related to licensing and permits
systems, communication and simplification of rules and procedures, general and sector specific
administrative burdens, as well as legal barriers to competition, and anti-trust exemptions. Relieving
these restrictions has proved to be less pronounced in OECD countries between 1998 and 2003, with
progress achieved mainly in easing the administrative procedures for start-ups. The modest progress can
41
This aggregate indicator should be treated with caution as some of the lower level indicators have been
constructed based on a methodology that is not directly comparable to the one used for OECD countries. Such
indicators include administrative burdens on start-ups and to a lesser extent the sector specific administrative
burdens.
39
be explained by the fact that domestic policies are subject to a large degree of domestic discretion42 in
contrast to policies governing foreign trade and investments, which are subject to international
agreements including the membership of EU and WTO.
2.5 2.3
2.0
1.9
2.0
OECD 1.7
1.3 1.4
1.5
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.5
0.0
Bulgaria Slovak EU15 Hungary EU4 Czech Rep. MICs Poland
Republic
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa,
Fay and Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other
countries. The indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.24. Although ahead of its immediate peers (EU4 and other middle income countries) and of the
OECD average (Figure 3.9), Bulgaria needs to deepen reforms to ease barriers to entrepreneurship, if it is
to enhance further competition on the domestic market and thus maintain high productivity rates required
for accelerated convergence. Bulgaria performs better than OECD and EU4 countries in eliminating anti-
trust exemptions to publicly-controlled firms, legal barriers to entry, and administrative burdens for
corporations43. The only divergence in policies appears to be in sector specific administrative burdens
(Figure 3.11). Removing barriers to competition in Bulgaria has been the result of aligning the
competition legislation with the acquis communautaire. Legal barriers in the form of restrictions imposed
on the number of competitors exist only in electricity generation, gas import, collection and purification
of water, and the air transport infrastructure. The rest of the utility sub-sectors have been fully liberalized,
with a large number of the companies in these sub-sectors already privatized, including by foreign
investors.
3.25. It should be noted, however, that the product market indicators do not take into account the
enforcement of competition legislation and the quality of institutions, which may differ substantially in
the benchmarking countries. Moreover, comparison of Doing Business indicators on administrative
barriers to start-ups suggests that while Bulgaria has achieved progress in this area, the country is still
behind most of the OECD countries (Fig. 3.12) that have succeeded in reducing by half the duration of
registration procedures and the cost to register a company between 2003 and 2006. Progress in Bulgaria
has been more modest.
42
De Rosa, Fay and Ilieva (2006).
43
This indicator is constructed using Doing Business data which are not comparable to the data for OECD countries
and therefore comparisons based on this indicator should be treated with caution.
40
Figure 3.10: Barriers to Entrepreneurship by Type
3.0
EU4
2.5
OECD
2.0
Bulgaria
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Antitrust Legal barriers Communication License & Sector specific Administrative
exemptions & simplif. of permits system administrative burdens for
rules & burdens corporations*
procedures
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de
Rosa, Fay and Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all
other countries. The indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.26. Bulgaria has achieved progress in improving the communication of new rules and regulations but
there is room for further improvements to ensure that these rules are actually being adhered to. The
indicator on communication and simplification of rules and procedures refers to the existence of systemic
procedures for making regulations known to affected parties, procedures in place to allow appeal against
adverse enforcement decisions, programs for simplification of administrative burdens, and programs for
reducing the number of licenses and regulatory regimes imposed by the national government. In
Bulgaria, an amendment to the Law on Normative Acts in 2003 requires that all new regulations be
communicated to affected parties through mass media or representative associations prior to their
approval by Parliament. Affected parties have the right to submit comments to the body drafting the
regulation within at least one month. Consultations on new legislation are organized with business
associations and some of the new regulations are discussed at the sessions of the Council for Economic
Growth44. In addition, the Law on Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control on Economic
Activities was enacted in 2003. The Law regulates the issuance of new regulations, which can be passed
only by Parliamentary approval and requires that new regulations be accompanied by an assessment of
compliance costs. Specific guidelines were issued to central and municipal bodies on the design of
proposed new regulatory regimes, including the identification and measurement of costs and benefits, and
the establishment of a process by which new regimes evolve appropriately from concept to
implementation. However, to ensure that the intended impact of these regulation is achieved, uniform
application and compliance of the above mentioned legislation is warranted both in terms of the
consultation mechanism with affected parties, and in terms of effective parliamentary control over the
issuance of administrative regulations by different levels of government.
3.27. To align its communication and simplification policies with those of the best performers in
OECD, Bulgaria would need to design and implement a program for the optimization of administrative
burden imposed on firms and individuals. This program should be developed in consultation with the
private sector, and aim at eliminating unnecessary or overlapping regulations, and improving the quality
of existing or new regulation. It should be implemented at all levels of government, including in
44
A consultative body established in 2002 under the Council of Ministers and consists of representatives of
businesses, and ministers of economy and energy, finance, transport, regional development, and labor and social
policy.
41
municipalities, and should outline performance indicators with clearly defined lines of accountability.
The regulatory impact assessment would provide important information about the costs and benefits of
regulations and their impact on competition. The OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and
Performance45 could be incorporated in the development of this program.
3.28. Initial steps in developing a Better Regulation program have already been taken. In June 2006
the Council for Economic Growth approved an action plan for introducing best regulatory practices and
assigned responsibilities among affected ministries and institutions. A working group has been
established to study best practices in simplification and modernization of regulatory practices.
3.29. The achievements in the simplification of licenses and permits requirements are visible in the
levels of regulatory and administrative transparency, where Bulgaria compares well with benchmark
groups, ranking as well as or better than EU15 or OECD (Figure 3.10). Bulgaria has implemented a
number of important reforms to bring down the number of licenses and permits at central level, although
progress at local level has been limited. A special program for optimization of the centrally mandated
licenses and permits has been in place since 2002. As a result of this program, 85 percent of the
regulatory regimes slated for optimization have been simplified or eliminated. Moreover, these
achievements have been acknowledged by businesses in Bulgaria, who saw licenses and permits as less of
a problem in 2005 compared to 2002 (Figure3.11).
Figure 3.11: Percent of firms indicating business licenses and permits as a problem for
doing business
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.
Source: EBRD-WB BEEPS, 2005.
3.30. Nevertheless, streamlining of regulatory regimes needs to continue, if Bulgaria is to align with
best performers in the world. Further optimization of licensing and permits may be needed, since about a
quarter of businesses indicate this still as a problem for doing business. Review of the implementation of
the reform program that started in 2002 and evaluation of its outcomes is needed to assess if the program
has actually led to overall reduction of licenses and permits issued by central government, and hence
reduced the burden of compliance. The streamlining needs to be expanded to include also municipalities
and be accompanied by training to ensure that all issuing and enforcement bodies have adequate capacity
to estimate the compliance cost and propose further improvement. The enforcement of licensing and
permits regimes could be further strengthened both at central government, and especially at local level.
The introduction of the “silence is consent” rule for automatic licensing could also help in this regard.
Further improvements in licensing regimes would reduce the compliance costs of businesses, and also
bring savings from lower administrative costs at central and local government levels. Monitoring of
progress in eliminating licensing, and increased reliance on consultation with private sector would be key
for successful streamlining of licensing and permits.
3.31 Reducing administrative barriers to companies needs to continue to allow easier access of new
entrants to the market. As mentioned in the previous section, enhanced competition would force
companies to reallocate resources to more productive activities and provide incentives to firms to
innovate. According to Doing Business 2007 indicators, Bulgaria has made progress in easing the start-
up of corporations, although it still ranks quite low on that compared to many other countries (Figure
3.12). The indicator measuring “administrative burden for corporations” is based on the Doing Business
data on number of procedures and days needed to start a company, and the cost of opening a company.
Bulgaria had improved on this indicator by 6 ranks between 2005 and 2006, as a result of eliminating two
45
OECD (2005).
42
out of eleven procedures needed to start a business, but still ranks quite low, scoring 85th out of 175
countries.
8 40 15
6 30
10
4 20
5
2 10
0 0 0
Bulgaria OECD EU4 Bulgaria OECD EU4 Bulgaria OECD EU4
3.32 To ease the administrative burden on firms, a number of reforms have been initiated. In the
beginning of 2006, the National Revenue Agency (NRA) integrated the collection of taxes and social
contributions, with a view of reducing the taxpayer compliance burden. There is an initiative to simplify
and ease reporting requirements to taxpayers, and especially for start-ups. The new Tax and Social
Insurance Procedural Code provides for reduced reporting requirements for companies and individuals—
most of the information required before from tax payers is now received electronically from other
institutions, which eliminated the need for separate tax and social security registration. With the launch
of the NRA integrated information system in early 2007, benefits to businesses are expected to increase.
In 2006, a Law on Commercial Registry was enacted, which transferred the responsibility for business
registration from courts to a special enlistment agency, thus transforming business registration into an
administrative process. The start-up of the new agency was delayed by more than a year, and is expected
to become operational in early 2008.
3.33 Despite progress in reducing administrative burden to corporations, Bulgaria needs to further the
reforms to catch up with the
Box 3.1: Reforms of Business Start-ups in Europe
best performing countries in
terms of starting a business— Portugal is singled out as a top performer in business entry in 2005/06. The
Canada, Australia, New reform took 5 months. The country managed to reduce the number of days
Zealand, United States, and to register a company from 54 to 8 days within a year. This success was
Ireland, where it takes 2 to 5 achieved by introducing a new fast-track registration service, which provides
days to set up a business, and a choice of pre-approved names at the registry’s website. The registry deals
involves fewer than 5 with tax, social security, and labor registration and publishes the
procedures. The pay-off from incorporation notice website of the Ministry of Justice. Standard articles of
such reforms is likely to be a association make the application fast and error-free—with no need for a
substantial increase in the notary. Within a year, the number of companies using the new service rose
from 12 to 75 per day.
number of new businesses,
improved competition not least Other countries in Europe have also focused on cutting costs or simplifying
through innovation, lower registration—eliminating stamp duties in Switzerland for the first
opportunities for extracting EUR1,000,000 of start-up capital; abolishing the registration fee and piloted
bribes, and reduced online registration in Belgium; reducing minimum capital requirements by
administrative costs to the 90 percent in Georgia; and creating a virtual one stop-shop for new business
government. As mentioned in start-ups in Lithuania.
previous section, the gains of
Source: World Bank (2006b) Doing Business 2007: How to Reform
43
such reforms would be higher if improvements in regulation were substantial. Small steps in removing
barriers to entry have not had any discernable impact in relatively restrictive economies. An example of
how starting a business is being improved in other countries is presented in Box 3.1.
3.34 Entry into sectors such as road freight and retail appears to be highly regulated in Bulgaria and
needs to be reviewed and eased where necessary. These regulations refer to the need to register, notify
and wait for approval or license for establishing and operating national road freight business, or engaging
in selling clothing or food.
D. State Control
3.35 Bulgaria is far advanced in reducing state control of the economy, although benchmarking with
OECD countries suggests that the reform agenda is still unfinished. The state control indicator refers to
the state involvement in business operations of enterprises either through various forms of state
ownership, price controls, or the use of coercive rather than incentive-based regulation both in specific
sectors and in general. In Bulgaria, privatization of the financial sector has been completed, and most
state-owned non-financial enterprises have been privatized, including in telecommunications and some of
the utility sectors. Thus, in 2005 state-owned enterprises in the non-financial sector generated only about
seven percent of GDP and employment46. Prices have been liberalized and most price controls
eliminated, with the exception of controls over some staples, tobacco47, and pharmaceuticals. Despite
these important reforms, Bulgaria lags behind some EU4 countries, and is far behind the EU15 and
OECD averages (Figure 3.13). The largest gaps in performance (Figure 3.14) appear to be due to the
state’s direct control over business, and the use of command and control regulation instead of incentive
based regulation. The size of the public non-financial sector in Bulgaria remains comparatively large.
46
Refers to employment in state-owned enterprises only.
47
Price controls on tobacco and tobacco products have been eliminated since January 2007.
44
Figure 3.13: State Control
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay
and Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The
indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: the values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. The
indicator ranges from 0—least restrictive, to 6—most restrictive.
3.36 When it comes to direct state control over enterprises, Bulgaria is on par with EU4, although the
Czech Republic and Poland have eliminated any constraints to the sale of equity in state-owned
enterprises. Comparison with OECD countries reveals even bigger divergence of Bulgaria from best
practice in this area. The direct control over business enterprises indicator measures the existence of
constraints on the sale of equity in state-owned enterprises; government’s special voting rights in
privately-owned firms, and the extent to which these special voting rights are being exercised to control
strategic choices of firms. The economic rationale for preserving such constraints needs to be reviewed
and appropriate action taken.
3.37 The indicator that measures the extent of the use of coercive regulation rather than incentive-
based regulation shows that Bulgaria is still far from best reformers in this area. The indicator measures
both general and sector specific regulations in a number of sectors. The divergence of Bulgaria from best
practice is due to the fact that alternative forms of regulation have not yet been considered. Alternative
forms of regulations are increasingly being used in OECD countries—out of the 30 member countries,
only in seven countries regulators are not required to assess alternative policy instruments before adopting
a new regulation. Examples of alternative forms of regulation are shown in Box 3.2. On a more
encouraging note, and in contrast to some of the OECD countries, Bulgaria does not regulate shop
opening hours in retail trade, restrict road freight on backhauling, contractual carriage, and inter-modal
operation, or insist on transport only for own account.
Performance-Based Regulations—specify required outcomes or objectives rather than the means by which they
must be achieved. Thus firms and individuals can choose processes that are more efficient and less costly, which
promotes the use of new technology on a broader scale. Such type of regulation is increasingly used in health,
safety, consumer protection, and environmental regulation1. Drawbacks include measurement problems related to
45
desired outcomes, higher administrative and monitoring costs, and greater responsibilities for small companies to
develop appropriate compliance strategies. Most countries have resorted to the use of guidelines or “safe harbors”
in conjunction with performance-based regulation. Guidelines provide information on appropriate compliance
strategies, while safe harbors allow the benefits of certainty of compliance associated with prescriptive regulation to
be attained, while also allowing more innovative firms to take advantage of the benefits of such regulation.
Process Based Regulations—require businesses to develop processes that systematically control and minimize
production risks. These processes are used in businesses with multiple and complex sources of risk, where ex post
testing of the product is either ineffective or expensive. Process based regulation is predominantly used in health,
food safety, and environmental regulation.
Co-regulation—businesses take the lead in regulation through endorsement and adherence to codes of practice.
This type of regulation is highly cost effective for the government. Drawbacks include the possibility for
encouraging anti-competitive activities by business or professional organizations.
Economic Instruments—taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, vouchers and the like. Economic instruments allow
businesses to achieve regulatory goals in the least costly manner and provide market incentives which reward the
use of innovation and technical change.
Information and Education—most widely used approach to regulation in OECD member states; empower
consumers to adopt actions or make informed choices to change their behavior. Examples include campaigns aimed
at reducing speeding when driving, anti-litter behaviors; reducing the use of drinking water; and eco-labeling of
products.
Guidelines—issued by regulatory authorities, setting out processes or providing interpretations to aid understanding
of government objectives by businesses and citizens. Guidelines may accompany existing regulations, but also are
increasingly used as stand-alone documents. Guidelines, for example, are widely used in the area of consumer
protection in Denmark.
Voluntary Approaches—initiated by industries, sometimes formally sanctioned or endorsed by government. They
include voluntary initiatives, voluntary codes, voluntary agreements, and self-regulation. An example of a voluntary
arrangement is the chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program, used in 40 countries, which promotes the
adoption of rules for sound environmental management practice.
Source: OECD (2002a), Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance
1
Product market regulation indicators do not include environmental regulations.
3.38 While the quality of written rules and regulations matters for helping countries move closer to
productivity levels of the best performers, the quality of institutions that enforce these regulations is
equally important. Even if best practice rules and regulations exist in a country, divergence in
implementation may favor one company or individual to another, and thus increase anti-competitive
pressures in the economy. Good regulations may exist only on paper, if there is little effort in monitoring
the enforcement of these regulations. Differences in implementation may exist also between different
levels of government, or between different central government agencies, depending on the degree of their
administrative capacity, or propensity to extract rents from enforcing regulations. The adequate
functioning of the judiciary system can also encourage or discourage such variation in regulation
implementation. Private sector pressure groups could exert pressure on institutions to be more effective,
or tolerate the status quo, if benefiting from low institutional quality.
3.39 As shown in the previous section, Bulgaria is behind the best OECD performers and its EU peers
in terms of product market regulations, which is measured exclusively by looking at the quality of written
rules and regulations. A number of international comparisons point to the conclusion that Bulgaria does
46
not score well in terms of quality of institutions either. The most recent Global Competitiveness Index48
released suggests that Bulgaria is far behind all OECD and EU8 countries. Moreover, at 72nd place in
2006/07, Bulgaria has even worsened its ranking compared to 2006/05 by 11 places, which is the third
largest deterioration in country rankings. On market efficiency, Bulgaria ranks 90th, much behind
countries with similar per capita income levels. The indicator of market efficiency measures the degree
of distortions in the economy (agricultural policies costs; efficiency of legal framework; extent and effect
of taxation; and ease of starting a business), competition policy (extent of barriers to foreign trade and
investment, intensity and effects of competition on the domestic market), and indicators of trade
integration. In terms of quality of institutions, the performance of Bulgaria is even poorer—the country
ranks at 109th out of 125 countries included in the comparison. Indicator of institutions measures the
quality of public institutions (property rights, ethics and corruption, judicial independence, government
efficiency, and security—reliability of police and costs to business of crime) as well as private ones
(corporate ethics and accountability). Table 3.3 summarizes the results.
3.40 Over the last years Bulgaria has improved the regulatory environment for doing business. In
some areas of product market regulation Bulgaria performs even better than the OECD average. Areas in
which Bulgaria outperforms the OECD average (see Figure 3.15) are: antitrust exemptions, procedures
that discriminate against foreign investment; legal barriers to entry; other regulatory barriers to trade and
investment, and licenses and permits systems. Areas, in which Bulgaria is comparable to the OECD
average, or at least not seriously lagging, include: price controls; the scope of the public enterprise sector,
and tariffs. In all other areas Bulgaria significantly lags the OECD average (see Figure 3.16). And if one
looks at Bulgaria’s performance vis-a-vis OECD’s best performers, Bulgaria lags significantly even in
some areas in which it outperforms the OECD average such as licensing and permits and legal barriers.
48
For more information on the coverage of indicators, rankings and score, see World Economic Forum (2006) The
Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007.
47
3.5 Distance from OECD average
Distance from OECD best performer
3
Distance from EU4 best performer
2.5
1.5
0.5
-0.5
-1
Antitrust Discrim. Commun.& Legal Regulatory Licence and Price Scope of Tariffs
exemptions procedures simplif. barriers barriers permits controls public sector
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: The values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. Distances are
calculated as the difference between Bulgaria’s scores and those of the comparator group. Negative values show better
performance of Bulgaria, while positive values show worse performance relative to the comparator groups.
Figure 3.16: Distance from Best Performers in Product Market Regulation: Areas of
Bulgaria’s Relative Weakness
D is t a nc e f ro m O E C D a v e ra ge D is t a nc e f ro m O E C D be s t pe rf o rm e r
4 .0
D is t a nc e f ro m E U8 be s t pe rf o rm e r
3 .5
3 .0
2 .5
2 .0
1.5
1.0
0 .5
0 .0
S ize o f public O wne rs hip ba rrie rs D ire c t c o nt ro l o v e r Us e o f c o m m a nd & S e c t o r s pe c if ic
secto r bus ine s s c o nt ro l re gula t io n a dm in. burde ns
Source: OECD and Product Market Regulation in Bulgaria: A Comparison with OECD Countries, de Rosa, Fay and
Ilieva, World Bank, 2006. Note: The values are for 2006 for Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. Distances are
calculated as the difference between Bulgaria’s scores and those of the comparator group. Positive values show worse
performance relative to the comparator groups.
3.41 To align Bulgaria’s product market policies with the best performers in OECD, a well defined,
government-wide reform program, enjoying high-level political commitment and developed in close
consultation with the private sector, would be needed. Sizeable gaps with best performers exist in all but
4 of the 15 benchmarked policy domains (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16). To address them, both short and
medium-term measures would be warranted.
3.42 In the short term, the program should aim at, in the order of priority:
48
• Minimize administrative burden on business, including barriers to entry of firms: To
promote competition and thereby productivity growth, it would be critical to make the
starting and closing a business administratively easy and inexpensive. While Bulgaria has
made significant progress in reducing the legal barriers to entry, starting and closing a
business is still administratively cumbersome and costly, compared to the OECD average.
For starting a business, nine procedures are required in Bulgaria compared to the OECD
average of six. Opening a business in Bulgaria still takes on average 32 days, while the
OECD average is 16 days, and the minimum capital required in Bulgaria is about 91 percent
of the GNI per capita while it is 36 percent on average in OECD countries. Bulgaria should
aim to reduce these requirements at least to the average OECD levels, but preferably below.
Experience shows that the impact of taking a substantial step in this area is much more
significant than that of a series of small steps. The fast-track business registration service
introduced in Portugal would be worth considering also in Bulgaria.
• Continue privatization and abolish state’s special voting rights in privatized companies: To
further lessen state’s control over enterprises, the government should consider removing the
remaining ownership barriers such as the sale of equity in state-owned firms, and the use of
special voting rights to control strategic choices of firms. In addition, continuing with the
privatization program would help increase the efficiency in the economy, and improve labor
productivity. Such reforms would contribute also to the reduction of the size and scope of the
public enterprise sector, as well as to the creation of a leaner and more efficient public
administration.
• Simplify further the licensing and permit system: Even though Bulgaria’s licensing and
permit system is broadly comparable to the OECD average, it still lags behind the best
performers. Also, despite significant improvements, in a 2005 survey 27% of business still
considered licensing and permit procedures to be cumbersome. The Bulgarian authorities
may want to consider introducing the “silence is consent” rule for automatic licensing to
simplify the system further and thereby facilitate business. This area of action could also
include further progress in the simplification and communication of rules and regulations.
3.43 In the medium-term, the following steps could be taken to improve the investment climate in
Bulgaria:
• Rely more on the use of incentive-based regulation through the use of alternative
instruments. Following the example of OECD countries, the government may consider
requiring the regulators to assess alternative policy instruments before adopting a new
regulation. The authorities could also consider implementing a “regulatory guillotine” to
eliminate unnecessary regulations, which impose administrative burden on business.
• Improve the enforcement of regulations: The quality of written norms and regulations is
important for achieving government goals and objectives, and for encouraging competition
and competitiveness of businesses. Little can be achieved, however, if it is not matched by
adequate quality of the institutions enforcing these regulations, including the functioning of
the judiciary system in the country. Even if some regulations, or reduced forms of
regulations exist on books, their actual implementation depends on the enforcing institutions,
which may further increase the costs of regulation, if processes and procedures are
cumbersome, or if leading to corrupt practice and anti-competitive pressures on selected
firms and individuals.
49
Bulgaria does not fare well in international comparisons in the quality of its governance
framework. It ranks low in terms of the quality of institutions in the Global Competitiveness
Index, Transparency Index, and BEEPS indicators. Therefore, improving regulation of
product markets in Bulgaria and reaping the benefits from this, would hinge upon reforms
aimed at upgrading the quality of institutions. Furthering reforms in public administration
and judiciary would maximize the gains from better regulation of product markets in terms
of higher productivity, innovation and technological upgrade of the economy, which are key
for achieving the goals of the Lisbon Agenda.
3.44 Finally, being behind on the productivity ladder and behind best performers in product market
regulation, implies that Bulgaria could reap high returns from reforms aimed at liberalizing the business
environment both in terms of quality of regulations and quality of regulatory authorities. These returns to
the society could be even higher, if combined with reforms that increase the flexibility of the labor market
that allow firms and individuals to allocate resources to their most productive uses.
50
4. IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF LABOR MARKETS
4.1. Recent cross-country empirical analysis for OECD countries finds that restrictive product market
policies tend to go hand in hand with restrictions in labor market policies.49 Correlation between product
and labor market reforms implies that these policies are complementary, and profound reforms in one
policy domain might facilitate reforms in the other, or amplify the effects of the latter. This means that
Bulgaria should proceed with reforms in product and labor markets in parallel in order to facilitate
productivity growth and convergence. The previous chapter examined some of the constraints in
Bulgaria’s product markets. This chapter covers the issues in the labor market, taking into account the
findings on productivity trends in Chapter 2.
4.2. The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that while labor productivity and employment have been
increasing strongly during 2000-2002 and 2002-2005, respectively, inter-sector mobility of labor is still
low. Lack of labor mobility suggests that sectors with high levels and/or high growth of labor
productivity have not been growing sufficiently rapidly--whether through the expansion of existing firms
or the entry of new ones--to demand new workers. Strong growth in employment in the past fours years
was instead mostly in less productive lower paying sectors. Even there, the relatively high minimum
wage may have dampened the labor demand of the small vulnerable enterprises. At the same time some
of the sectors are reporting shortages of relatively high skilled workers, which would suggest a supply
side problem. Also, on the supply side there may exist an unemployment trap, wherein relatively high
social benefits, when compared to the likely after-tax wage, discourage some workers from seeking
employment. Constraints thus exist on both product and labor market sides, and they need to be tackled
in parallel.
4.3. Labor markets in Bulgaria have gone through a profound and painful transition since the start of
political, economic, and social reforms in the early 1990s. As a result, employment which stood at about
4.1 million on the eve of the reforms in 1990, declined to just under 3 million in 2000.50 This job loss
reflects closure of many enterprises, and “defensive restructuring” by others—a process in which
redundant labor is shed in order to increase productivity. This period of “job loss” growth was followed
by a period of “jobless” growth.
4.4. Bulgaria’s GDP began to grow again in 1998, but it was not until 2002 that the number of
employed persons also began to rise. The employment increase since then has been substantial: about
400,000 new jobs were created during 2002-2006. Excluding the roughly 50,000 participants in the
49
See Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005). In this paper, a summary indicator of labor market policies was estimated for
OECD countries, which includes tax wedges, gross replacement rates, and employment protection legislation. The
indicator of product market regulation includes barriers to entry, public ownership, market structure, vertical
integration, and price controls in seven industries—gas, electricity, post, telecoms, air transport, and railways.
50
Based on the NSI establishment surveys and administrative records/register-based statistics. Comparable labor
force survey data are available only since the beginning of 2003, at which point NSI aligned LFS to Eurostat
methodologies. Data from previous years is not comparable. Subsidized employment refers primarily to the
program “From Social Assistance to Employment.” Other subsidized employment programs include, inter alia,
“Beautiful Bulgaria”, “JOBS”, and “Social Assistant”.
51
subsidized employment program (“From Social Assistance to Employment”), the net gain in jobs was
about 350,000, or 12 percent of the labor force (see Table 4.1).51
4.5. Almost two-thirds of the increase in employment, however, has been concentrated in low wage,
low productivity industries, such as agriculture, forestry, sub-sectors of manufacturing, construction, and
trade. Employment in higher wage sectors, such as mining, electricity supply, transport, communications,
and financial intermediation remained relatively stagnant. In the public sector, employment in public
administration has increased by 36,600 employees, but declined slightly in education, health and social
work during 2002-2006. By sectors, the share of jobs in the service sector rose from 43 percent in 1998
to 48 percent in 2005, while the share of industry fell from 31.6 percent to 27.5 percent, and that of
agriculture stagnated at about 25 percent of total employment.52 These numbers probably overstate the
number of people actually working in agriculture as it probably includes many who own some land and
live in a rural area, but do not actually make a living from working in agriculture (for comparison, see
Table 4.4 that uses the Labor Force Survey (LFS) estimates). Even discounting for that the proportion is
rather high even by EU8 standards. Also, private sector employment has risen significantly from 61
percent of total employment in 1998 to 79 percent in 2005.53
Table 4.1: Labor Force Participation (LFP), Employment and Unemployment Rates
(population age 15 years and over)
Labor Employe Unemploye LFP Empl. Unempl. Employe Incl. Registered
force d (1000) d (1000) Rate Rate Rate (%) d (1000) Subsidized Unemployed
(1000) (%) (%) Empl. (1000) (1000)
2002 Na na na na na Na 2979.0
2003 3283.1 2834.0 449.1 49.2 42.4 13.7 3166.5 79.4 551.6
2004 3322.0 2922.2 399.8 49.7 43.7 12.0 3226.3 93.6 469.2
2005 3314.2 2980.0 334.2 49.7 44.7 10.1 3253.5 59.1 424.4
2006 3415.7 3110.0 305.7 51.3 46.7 9.0 3349.2 47.6 356.1
Source: Labor Force Survey (LFS), except employment data from the National Statistical Institute (NSI yearbook 2003-
2005, NSI 2006c), and data of registered unemployment and subsidized employment data from the National Employment
Agency (MLSP/NEA 2006a). .* administrative data.
4.6. Limited job opportunities during the 1990s led to a massive withdrawal from the labor force,
especially among younger and older cohorts and women. According to the 2006 LFS data, the labor force
participation (LFP) rate of the population aged 15–64 was only 64.5 percent, while the employment rate
was 58.6 percent (51.3 percent and 46.7 percent, respectively, when measured as a proportion of all
people age 15 and above).54 This is still low by any standard, but is a considerable achievement when
compared to the situation in the year 2000. Comparative statistics for Bulgaria, select EU8 countries, and
the EU15 average are presented in Table 4.2.
51
Almost equal employment growth is recorded by the administrative data and the Labor Force Survey (LFS),
which do not distinguish between formal and informal sectors, and thus the growth is not a statistical effect of
shifting employment from the informal to the formal sector.
52
Based on data from establishment surveys and administrative records. According to the LFS data, only 8.9
percent of the employed worked in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing.
53
NSI (2000) and (2006c).
54
The labor force participation rate refers here to the rate among the population aged 15-64, while Table 4.1 refers
to the rate in a broader population group covering 15 and above.
52
B. Informal Employment and Self-employment
4.7. The informal sector is still sizeable in Bulgaria. There are different estimates of the size of the
informal sector. Data from the National Social Security Institute (NSSI) indicate that in 2006 social
contributions were paid for about 2.75 million people. In the same year, there were on average 3.35
million people employed, according to establishment surveys, and 3.11 million according to the LFS data.
This suggests that about one-fifth to one-fourth of employment is informal, that is, working but not
making social contributions. While informal employment provides a cushion for workers who cannot
find a job in the formal sector, it also leads to a loss in budget revenues. These features of the Bulgarian
labor market point to various bureaucratic and regulatory rigidities, which hinder labor market
adjustment, and job creation. Even in the formal sector, according to the 2005 BEEPS survey, about six
percent of the workforce, and 14 percent of the wage bill was not registered with tax authorities.
Table 4.2: GDP growth and labor force participation rates (population age 15-64 years),
percent in 2006
Bulgaria Romania Estonia Czech Hungary Poland Slovak EU15
Republic Republic
GDP, average annual 5.6 5.5 9.1 4.0 4.8 3.6 4.6 1.8
growth in 2000-2006
Per capita GDP 9223 8785 16414 18341 16825 12994 16041 29332 *
(dollars), at PPP, 2005
LFP rate 64.5 63.6 72.4 70.3 62.0 63.4 68.6 71.6
Employment rate: 58.6 58.8 68.1 65.3 57.3 54.5 59.4 66.0
Male 62.8 64.6 71.0 73.7 63.8 60.9 67.0 73.5
Female 54.6 53.0 65.3 56.8 51.1 48.2 51.9 58.4
Youth (15-24) 23.2 24.0 31.6 27.7 21.7 24.0 25.9 40.1
Older workers (55-64) 39.6 41.7 58.5 45.2 33.6 28.1 33.1 45.3
Hours worked per 41.4 41.3 41.5 42.7 41.0 42.9 41.6 41.9
week of full-time
employment**
Average exit age from 60.2 63.0 61.7 60.6 59.8 59.5 59.2 61.1 (e)
the labor force (years),
2005
Harmonized 9.0 7.7 5.9 7.1 7.5 13.8 13.4 7.4
unemployment rate***
Male 8.6 6.5 6.2 5.8 7.2 13.0 12.3 6.5
Female 9.3 9.0 5.6 8.8 7.8 14.9 14.7 8.4
Youth (15-24) 19.5 16.3 12.0 17.5 19.1 29.8 26.6 16.1
Long-term 5.0 4.3 2.8 3.9 3.4 7.8 10.2 3.1
unemployment
rate****
Notes: (e) – estimate;* unweighted average for EU15 countries; ** spring 2006;*** aged 15-74; **** population 15 +
unemployed 12 months and over as a percentage of the total active population
Source: Eurostat online database; IMF online database; OECD 2006.
53
4.8. Among the EU countries,
Table 4.3: Undeclared Work in select EU countries, latest
Bulgaria has the highest ratio of
available data55
undeclared work (see Table 4.3). EU
EU8, Bulgaria, % of GDP Select EU15 % of GDP
uses the concept of “undeclared Romania
work,” referring to “any paid Bulgaria 22-30 Austria 1.5
activities that are lawful as regards Czech 9-10 Belgium 3
their nature, but not declared to the Estonia 8-9 Denmark 5.5
public authorities” (EC 2004). This Hungary 18 Finland 4.2
definition excludes criminal activities, Latvia 18 France 6.5
and work that does not have to be Lithuania 15-19 Germany 6
declared. The main attraction of the Poland 14 Greece 20+
undeclared economy is financial. Romania 21 Italy 17
This type of activity allows Slovak 13-15 Netherlands 2
Slovenia 17 Portugal 5
employers, paid employees, and the
Sweden 3
self-employed to increase their UK 2
earnings or reduce their costs by Source: EC (2004)
evading taxation and social
contributions. This shifts the tax burden to registered workers, which therefore is much higher than
would otherwise be the case in Bulgaria.
4.9. Labor force participation of males is higher than that of females in Bulgaria. According to the
LFS 2006 data, the labor force participation rate of females aged 15-64 is 60.2 percent compared to 68.8
percent for males. Employment rate for females is 54.6 percent, and 62.8 percent for males (see Table
4.4). While the unemployment rate for females is slightly below that for males, women tend to be more
active than men in their search for a job through the National Employment Agency (NEA). In 2006, there
were 204,600 females on the roster of NEA, and “only” 151,500 males.56
Table 4.4: Labor market participation (population of 15-64 years of age), and employment
by gender, professional status, and economic sectors, in percent in 2006 (employed
population 2005)
Total Males Females
Labor force participation rate 64.5 68.8 60.2
Employment rate 58.6 62.8 54.6
Unemployment rate 9.0 8.6 9.3
Employed population*: 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total employees 85.8 83.1 88.8
Employees in private enterprises 56.7 57.8 55.5
Employers 3.8 5.2 2.3
Self-employed 8.6 10.5 6.5
Unpaid family workers 1.5 0.9 2.2
Agriculture and forestry 8.9 10.7 6.8
Industry 34.2 38.9 28.9
Services 56.8 50.3 64.2
Notes: * employed population 15 years of age and over; 0.3 % of the total unknown.
Source: Eurostat online, NSI 2006 c.
55
NSI estimates the proportion of undeclared work at 22 percent of GDP.
56
MLSP/NEA 2006a.
54
4.10. As expected, better- Figure 4.1: Labor Force Participation, Employment, and
educated workers have much Unemployment Rates (population aged 15-64), % in 2006 Q2
more favorable employment
outcomes. In the second quarter Figure 8.1: Labor Force Participation, Employment, and
Unemployment Rates (population aged 15-64), % in 2006 Q2
of 2006, able-bodied population
with higher education had 100 Labor force participation rate
employment rate of 83 percent Employment rate
80
compared with 69 percent for Unemployment rate
those with upper secondary 60
D. Trends in Unemployment
4.11. Bulgaria’s labor market still has a fairly large gap between supply of and demand for labor,
despite the notable improvements in the past four years. According to LFS data, the rate of
unemployment was 8.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2006.
4.12. The bulk of the unemployed are long-term unemployed, less educated, and young (see Table 4.5).
In 2005, 60 percent of all unemployed Table 4.5: Number of Long-term Registered Unemployed
workers had been without work for at (average per month)
least one year, and 34 percent for longer 2002 January-
than three years. Out of total September 2006
unemployed with higher education, 47 Total number (1000) 332.5 209.5
percent were out of work for more than Of which (%):
12 months. Among job seekers with Females 52.8 57.1
secondary vocational education, the Males 47.2 42.9
ratio was 49 percent, while 60 percent Youth up to 24 10.9 9.0
of job seekers with lower secondary or Persons over 50 22.1 33.6
lower education had been jobless for By professional qualification:
more than a year (II quarter of 2006). With worker specialty 19.3 16.4
Forty-four percent of the long-term Specialists 10.7 10.0
unemployed had lower secondary, Without qualification 70.0 73.6
primary or lower education.57 There are By education:
indications that most of these numbers Higher 3.3 3.3
have improved a little in the last few Secondary vocational 22.4 19.5
Secondary general 5.8 5.5
months.
Primary and lower 68.5 71.7
Source: MoLSP/NEA 2006b.
4.13. Unemployment is high among
57
NSI (2006a).
55
certain ethnic groups, particularly the Roma. The Roma have the lowest employment rate at 29 percent,
and the highest unemployment rate at about 70 percent.58 The Roma interviewed in the context of the
JOBS (2003) program, which supports integration of Roma into the labor markets in ten municipalities,
revealed that 45 percent of them had never worked, and 16 percent participated in work activities for the
first time in their life through the program “From Social Assistance to Employment”.59
E. Youth Unemployment
4.14. As in other transition countries, the negative effect of high unemployment rates is especially
serious and damaging for youth. On average, youth unemployment rates in Bulgaria are twice as high as
overall unemployment rates (see Table 4.6), which is similar to other EU countries. Young uneducated
people are in the worst situation in the labor market. This group, with no vocational education and
experience, is so uncompetitive that even a considerable improvement in labor market conditions and
employment growth may not improve their situation.
Table 4.6: Youth Unemployment, Employment and Labor Force Participation Rates, 2005
Youth Youth/adult Youth Youth labor force
unemployment unemployment employment rate, participation rate,
rate, % ratio % %
EU15 16.5 2.0 39.7 47.6
Bulgaria 22.3 2.2 21.6 27.5
Czech R. 19.3 2.4 27.3 33.9
Hungary 19.4 2.7 21.8 27.1
Poland 37.8 2.1 20.9 33.5
Slovakia 29.9 1.8 25.6 36.5
Source: OECD (2006), LFS 2005 for Bulgaria
4.15. In addition to high youth unemployment rates, Bulgaria has low youth labor force participation
rates. At 27.5 percent, Bulgaria’s youth participation rate is fully 20 percentage points lower than the
EU15 average. A significant portion of Bulgarian youth are neither working nor in school. In the age
group 15-24, the rate of joblessness (the proportion of the population neither working nor in school) was
21 percent in 2004, and the rate of idleness (the proportion of the population neither in the labor force nor
in school) was 14 percent. Compared to many EU8 countries, the share of early school leavers of 18
percent is quite high in Bulgaria. There are two main reasons for this. First, about 35 percent of the drop-
outs cited family reasons associated with economic instability, unemployment, and poverty (inability of
the family to provide students with textbooks, clothes, or the need to help earn the living) as the cause for
dropping out. The second most important reason, cited by 29 percent of the drop-outs was unwillingness
to study.60 Bulgarian youth are not alone in their plight. The World Bank’s World Development Report
2007 on Youth noted that an increasing share of young people is facing difficulties in transitioning from
education to the labor market. Primary reasons for this are poverty, poor educational background, barriers
to entry in the labor market, and getting stuck in low productivity jobs.61 As the LFS data reveal (see
Table 4.7), labor force participation, employment and unemployment rates among young people strongly
correlate with the level of education.
58
World Bank (2003).
59
MLSP (2006).
60
MLSP (2006).
61
World Bank (2006b).
56
Table 4.7: Labor Market Participation Rates at Age 15-24 and 25-34 and the Level of Education in
2005, %
Level of education Activity rate Employment rate Unemployment rate
15-24 25-34 15-24 25-34 15-24 25-34
Higher 71.1 88.0 60.5 83.3 14.9 5.4
Upper secondary 48.7 80.8 40.2 73.8 17.4 8.7
Secondary vocational 61.0 84.1 51.4 76.8 15.8 8.6
Secondary general 36.8 74.2 29.0 67.6 20.0 8.9
Lower secondary 9.4 63.9 6.0 51.6 35.7 19.2
Primary or lower 18.2 40.0 9.1 24.9 49.9 37.7
Source: LFS 2005 for Bulgaria.
4.16. In the rapidly changing market economies of the transition countries, an individual’s occupational
future is uncertain, and the risk of a mismatch between the skills of an individual and those required by
the available jobs is high. Therefore, the World Development Report 2007 recommends that these
countries provide young labor market entrants with general academic skills, which will make them mobile
across industries/sector and easier to employ. This is consistent with the proposed reform
recommendations for the education sector in Chapters 6-7. The young are a particularly important group
in Bulgaria, since they have a potentially long working life ahead of them, and the burden of financing the
pensions of the rapidly ageing population will to a great extent fall on their shoulders.
F. Regional Disparities
4.17. There is significant regional variation in participation, employment, and unemployment rates in
Bulgaria. Table 4.8 shows labor market indicators by the urban, rural, and major regional groupings.
Unemployment rates in urban areas are almost five percentage points lower, and participation and
employment rates considerably higher than those in rural areas, suggesting that recent growth has been
concentrated in urban areas as might be expected. The situation in the North-West region is the most
difficult, although the rate of unemployment is almost as bad in the North-East region.
Table 4.8: Labor Market Indicators by Geographical Groupings (population aged 15 years and
over), in 2005
Planning regions
North- North North- South- South South-
Total Urban Rural West Central East East Central West
LFP Rate 49.7 54.2 39.2 40.7 46.3 51.1 48.8 48.5 54.1
Employment 44.7 49.3 33.8 35.2 41.4 44.3 44.1 43.7 50.0
Rate
Unemployment 10.1 9.0 13.7 13.6 10.7 13.3 9.6 10.0 7.6
Rate
Source: MLSP/NEA 2006a
4.18 Finer geographical disaggregation at district level show even more disparity. Variation in
unemployment rates is between 2.2 percent in Blagoevgrad district (South-West), 3.3 percent in Gabrovo
(North Central) and 5.4 percent in Stara Zagora (South Central), as the districts with the lowest
unemployment levels, to 22.5 percent in Vidin (North-West) and 17.7 percent in Pazardzhik (South
Central) as the districts with the highest unemployment levels. Although the capital city Sofia has one of
the highest employment rates of 51.8 percent (second highest following Blagoevgrad district), the
unemployment rate in Sofia is relatively high–7.6 percent (NSI 2006).
57
4.19 Wage levels seem to respond to the demand for labor. The correlation between regional average
wages, as reported to the NSSI, and unemployment rates is negative (-0.3744) and significant at the five
percent level. (2005 data). Regions with low unemployment (higher demand for labor) tend to have
higher wage levels. The finding is also consistent with often heard statement that wages in the private
sector are rising rapidly in Sofia (south-west region) due to shortages of labor. However, there are no
data available to confirm that.
G. Labor Potential of the Currently Inactive Population
4.20 Bulgaria has just over 3.2 million people aged 15 years and above that are not in the labor force.
Labor potential of this currently inactive population should not be ignored. Although a vast majority (85
percent) of this economically inactive population does not want to work, cannot work, or is unable to
work (students, retirees, disabled, household members taking care of children or other dependants)
according to the 2006 LFS, about 15 percent of the inactive population (268,000 individuals) could be
considered to be discouraged workers. They would like to work and would be ready to start working, but
for various reasons are not actively looking for a job. In most cases such respondents report that they
have lost any hope of finding work, or do not know where or how to search.
4.21 Relatively cheap and well qualified workforce continues to be one of Bulgaria’s main competitive
advantages. Labor costs in Bulgaria are the lowest among EU countries, and are about one-tenth of the
average hourly labor costs in EU27 countries (Table 4.9). They have also grown slowly compared to
other EU countries. According to Eurostat data, Bulgaria is the only new EU member state where real
labor costs decreased in 2006 compared to 2000 (see Table 4.9). Combining the low rate of growth in
labor costs with the improvements in labor productivity in the last 5-6 years (see Chapter 2), unit costs of
labor have grown much less in Bulgaria than among its comparators. This has helped preserve Bulgaria’s
competitive edge, improved profitability and future prospects of many of Bulgaria’s enterprises, and
contributed to keeping down the rate of inflation.
4.22 There is a concern, however, that Bulgaria’s competitiveness relies too heavily on low labor
costs, and that Bulgaria may be locking-in into unskilled labor-intensive activities, and low productivity
patterns of specialization. Low unit costs of labor are also a temporary and volatile advantage. As the
labor markets in Bulgaria tighten, pressure to raise wages will mount. This could, in the future, create
inflationary pressures, unless labor productivity rises at least as rapidly as wages.
58
Source: Eurostat online
4.23 Since 1997 real (reported) wages have increased at about the same pace as real GDP. Private
sector wages are reported at 72 percent of the public sector wage level; although this is open to doubt.
There are indications that actual (rather than reported) wages in the private sector are considerably
higher.62 Nevertheless, the public sector seems to have become an attractive option for many, which
perhaps explains the growth in employment in public administration. Whatever the case, getting better
data on wages, productivity gains, and unit labor costs should be a high priority.
4.24 In Bulgaria, as in many other Central and Eastern European countries, minimum wages are set at
a relatively high level, amounting to about 47 percent of the average reported wages in 2005, while for
example in the United States they are at 27 percent (Table 4.10). According to the latest Eurostat data
from early 2007, in relative terms Bulgaria, together with Malta, Luxembourg and Ireland, has the
minimum wage above 49 percent of average gross monthly earnings. In absolute terms, however,
Bulgaria has the lowest level of monthly minimum wage in EU at EUR92, and second lowest when
applying Purchasing Power Parities to households’ final consumption expenditure. Nevertheless, in some
low-wage sectors of the economy, such as in agriculture and forestry, minimum wage is about 65 percent
of the average wage. In trade, the ratio is 60 percent.63 Such high ratios are typically more damaging for
SMEs because these enterprises tend to be more labor intensive, and financially weaker. This likely
contributes to keeping many SMEs smaller than they might otherwise be. It also gives them an incentive
to stay in the informal sector. So, a well-intentioned policy (a high minimum wage) may well have the
perverse effect of reducing the tax base, and possibly the overall level of employment.64 The reason for
high minimum wages in Bulgaria seems to be that, according to the Labor Code, their level is established
administratively by a Decree of the Council of Ministers--it is set centrally and at a uniform rate.65 This
decision is likely to be influenced most by insiders that is those who already have a job. It is also unlikely
to reflect the varying conditions faced by enterprises in different sectors and regions, or be sensitive to the
preferences of certain groups of job-seekers. The process of setting the minimum wage should therefore
be revisited.
62
This differential may reflect as well larger share of underreporting in the private sector than in the public sector.
According to the wage survey conducted in 2006, actual average monthly wages were BGN840 in Sofia, BGN700 in
Burgas, BGN600 in Plovdiv, and BGN590 in Varna (Industry Watch 2006).
63
The draft 2007 budget law envisages a minimum monthly wage of BGN170, but the threshold might be raised to
BGN180 during the discussions in the Parliament.
64
World Bank (2005b).
65
However, according to MLSP, the social partners are consulted within the framework of the Commission on
incomes and living standards under the National Commission for Tripartite Cooperation but an Agreement on
Economic and Social Development in the Republic of Bulgaria until 2009 (a national tripartite agreement) does not
indicate the levels of the minimum wages. Article 10.12 of the Agreement only suggests that the minimum wage
should be determined after negotiations with the social partners taking into consideration the official poverty line
and the average wage for the country.
59
Table 4.10: Dynamics of average wages, minimum wages, and non-taxable monthly incomes, BGN
Minimum Average Average Ratio of minimum Non-taxable
monthly wages* monthly wages monthly wages wages to average monthly incomes***
** ** wages
2002 100 258 267 0.338 100
2003 110 273 263 0.403 110
2004 120 292 295 0.411 120
2005 150 320 313 0.469 130
2006 160 343**** 336**** 0.466**** 180
Notes: * the minimum wage is set by the decree of the Council of Ministers; ** employees under labor contract; ** according to
the Personal Income Tax Act; **** January-September
Source: NSSI
4.25 High minimum wages have been found to have negative effects on employment. These effects
may be small in the aggregate, but significant among workers in jobs that have low productivity, since
even a “minimum” wage may be higher than a particular worker’s productivity, making it unprofitable to
employ him/her.66 This is particularly true of many jobs held by young people. For more experienced
workers the evidence is more mixed.67
4.26 Bulgarian authorities are reportedly thinking of linking the minimum wage to the poverty line.
This is generally not advisable. OECD data indicate that the relatively weak link between low pay and
poverty is a rule rather than an exception.68 The main reason for this is that poverty is predominantly
associated with non-employment (including unemployment), rather than with low wages. Many poor
families have no one working and many minimum wage workers live in households with above average
incomes. Therefore, and given that high minimum wages have negative effects on employment, linking
the minimum wage to the poverty line may only exacerbate poverty and distort the labor markets. Rather
than using minimum wages as an instrument to reduce poverty, it should be the social assistance system
that helps those below the poverty line.
4.27 Mandatory registration of labor contracts with the National Social Security Institute (NSSI) as of
2003 has led to rapid growth in the number of registered new labor contracts, and thus in revenues to the
social security system (see Table 4.11). Initially, most of the increase was due to the registration of
people employed in the informal sector. Later, most of the increase came from the creation of new jobs.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Bulgaria is facing the challenge of a rapidly declining and aging population.
This will eventually lead to an absolute decline in working age population, although for a decade or two
the inevitable fall may be staved off by higher labor force participation and employment rates and, if the
right measures are taken, by a diminished number of people working in the informal sector. Thus, the
ratio of pensioners to insured people, which is now falling, will eventually reverse course and the burden
of dependency will rise.
66
World Bank (2005a).
67
See Kertesi and Köllö (2002) for Hungary, and Gottvald et al (2002) and Eriksson and Pytlikova (2002) for the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
68
OECD (1998).
60
Table 4.11: Employed and insured population, and the number of pensioners in 2000-2006 (million;
average annual)
Population Employed Pensioners Insured* Ratio of pensioners to insured
persons*
2000 8.170 2.980 2.379 2.306 103.3
2001 7.913 2.968 2.371 2.311 102.6
2002 7.869 2.979 2.351 2.170 108.3
2003 7.824 3.166 2.337 2.394 97.6
2004 7.781 3.226 2.328 2.492 93.4
2005 7.740 3.276 2.314 2.597 89.1
2006 7.699 3.349 2.285 2.747 83.2
Source: NSSI; Notes: * Insured in the Mandatory Social Insurance System
A. Unemployment Traps
4.28 High levels of unemployment and other social benefits coupled with high taxes can create
unemployment traps.69 These are situations where unemployed people have financial disincentive to seek
employment since the level of social benefits as unemployed are higher than net earnings as employed
after withdrawal of those benefits. They are “trapped” in unemployment due to perverse effects of the
system of incentives. Low-wage traps may also occur, that is, situations where a relatively large part of
the increase in earned income is taxed Figure 4.2: “Tax” rate on Low Wage Earners:
away through higher income taxes, Unemployment Trap, % in 2005
contributions and reduced benefits,
thus making higher skill work Figure 8.2: "Tax" rate on Low Wage Earners:
unprofitable. Unemployment Trap, % in 2005 (source: Eurostat)
Slovakia 43
4.29 Comparative data from EU Hungary 55
countries suggest that Bulgaria may Estonia 65
suffer from an unemployment trap. Czech R. 66
When unemployed workers in Bulgaria United Kingdom 68
go back to work, they lose
Romania 69
unemployment benefit, all or some of
Ireland 74
the social assistance (Guaranteed
Germany 75
Minimum Income; energy benefit,
income-based child allowance) and EU25 75
69
The unemployment trap measures the percentage of gross earnings, which is "taxed away" through higher tax and
social security contributions and the withdrawal of unemployment and other benefits when an unemployed person
returns to employment. This structural indicator covers single persons without children earning, when in work, 67
percent of the average earnings. See the data and methodology in:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1073,46870091&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&p_produc
t_code=EM042
61
4.30 Bulgaria ranks in the middle of the scale in terms of generosity of unemployment benefit
entitlements, but is well above Slovakia and Hungary which are the leading reformers in this area.
According to the Law on Social Insurance, the duration of benefit payments is from four months for
beneficiaries with at least three years of insurance records, to twelve months for those with over 25 years
of insurance records. Bulgaria is the only transition country that increased the maximum duration of
unemployment insurance payments from 6 to 12 months between the beginning and the end of the
1990s.70 The size of the benefit is 60 percent of the average monthly insurance income of the beneficiary,
and the minimum and maximum benefit levels are determined annually in the budget law.\71 For
comparison, many EU countries are moving in the direction of shortened maximum duration of receiving
a benefit. Others are decreasing the benefit with the length of unemployment spell or, as is the case in
Denmark, even canceling it at some point. However, it should be noted that due to dominance of long-
term unemployment, relatively few registered job seekers--about one fifth–receive the benefit. Because
of the mandated minimum level of the unemployment benefit (over 50 percent of the maximum level); the
current benefit formula creates adverse incentives for job search among the unemployed who were being
paid low wages before losing their jobs.
(Table 4.9). Therefore, once the 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
worker enters the labor market, the
70
World Bank (2005b). This was driven by the accelerating privatization and enterprise restructuring, which is now
largely over.
71
Relatively high unemployment benefit tends to be associated with longer spells in unemployment, inter alia,
because of the decline in the intensity of job search, although it may also potentially improve the quality and
duration of job matches.
72
In particular, the maximum duration of the guaranteed minimum income benefit for able-bodied people who are
not holding disability certificate was limited to 18 months. This will be in effect as of January 1, 2008.
73
The tax wedge on labor cost measures the relative tax burden for an employed person with low earnings.
62
tax burden on labor is below the average in EU25. Thus, from the point of view of taxes, the Bulgarian
labor market has built-in incentives for unemployed people to enter the labor market, although there are
instruments such as tax credits for low-wage workers that could help make the incentives for initial
(re)entry into the labor force stronger, but that could be reduced as wages rose. Also, once the
unemployed have re-entered the labor market, it would be important for the system to encourage them to
develop their skills and thus earning potential.
4.33 Even assuming that strong growth in GDP and employment will continue for some years, the EU
Lisbon targets are beyond reach for Bulgaria by 2010. These targets call for the overall employment rate
to rise to 70 percent, the employment rate for women to reach 60 percent, and the employment rate for
older workers (55-64) to be at 50 percent by 2010 (see Table 4.12). However, the national target of
reaching an employment rate of 61 percent by 2010 is achievable, provided the GDP continues to grow at
about five percent per year. Achieving it would imply adding just over 40,000 new jobs in each year of
the four year period 2007-10; a pace considerably slower than that observed since 2002. If one were to
assume an employment elasticity with respect to GDP of 0.3—roughly the rate observed globally in the
last 15 years74--and project Bulgaria’s GDP growth at 5-6 percent per year, employment would continue
to grow at 1.5-2.0 percent per year. This would translate into about 50,000 additional jobs per year,
leading to the Lisbon target goals being achieved around 2015. Under this projection, Bulgaria’s
employment will have grown by 450,000 people between 2006 and 2015. By 2015, total employment
would be in the range of 3.55-3.7 million (depending on the data source), and the employment rate would
be 69-72 percent. The labor force in such a scenario would by then have absorbed all but the hardest core
of unemployed, most of the quarter million discouraged workers, and would have started tapping into
those underemployed in the rural areas, or those employed in low-wage occupations but looking for better
opportunities. By 2015, the inter-sector reallocation of labor, which is currently almost non-existent (see
Chapter 2) could be well underway, if the various constraints in the product and labor markets were
reduced or removed. Beyond 2015, with the age group of 15-64 year olds declining at almost one percent
per year and open unemployment virtually gone, the labor market would tighten considerably, and most
of the further growth in GDP would have to come from rising total factor productivity. Under that
scenario, provided the rate of growth of labor productivity increased to well above its recent pace of 2
percent per year, Bulgaria would continue to converge towards the average income level of EU25. Of
course, this relatively rosy picture depends a great deal on the policies pursued between now and then and
to some extent on the developments beyond Bulgaria’s borders.
Table 4.12: EU Employment Targets According to Lisbon Criteria, and New Jobs Needed to Reach
them In Bulgaria
EU Lisbon Bulgaria Estimated number of Estimated number of new
targets new jobs needed to jobs needed to reach
reach EU targets in 2010 national targets in 2010*
(1000) (1000)
2005 2010 2005
Overall employment rate 67 70 55.8 635 170
Employment rate for 57 60 51.7 165 -
women
Employment rate for - 50 34.7 178 -
older workers (55-64)
Notes: * employment rate at age group 16-64 at 61 percent level; Pact on social and economic development of Bulgaria until 2009
signed by representative social partners and the Government.
Source: Staff calculations.
74
World Economic Forum (2006)
63
V. CHALLENGES FOR LABOR MARKET POLICIES
A. Institutional Constraints
4.34 Bulgaria has undertaken significant institutional reforms in the field of labor market policies in
the last couple of years. The Labor Code was harmonized with EU Directives. The Law on Economic
and Social Council adopted in March 2003 regulates the establishment of an Economic and Social
Council, a consultative body on economic and social issues involving both social partners and civil
society. A National Institute for Arbitration and Conciliation was established to focus on resolution of
collective labor disputes. The Employment Promotion Act was amended to allow the provision of active
job brokering services by the private sector,75 and an agreement on Economic and Social Development in
the Republic of Bulgaria until 2009 was signed among the employers’ associations, trade unions, and the
government in 2006.
4.35 Surveys of local employers suggest that the demand for labor is constrained primarily by the
business environment, which is perceived as not particularly conducive to investment and job creation,
although the situation has clearly improved since 2002 (Figure 4.4).76 In the 2005 survey, the most
frequently heard complaints by local businessmen were related to factors such as uncertainty about
regulatory policies; anti-competitive practices of their competitors; cost of financing; and tax rates. Issues
such as macroeconomic instability and access to financing that were important in 2002 had receded by
2005.
75
By early 2006, there were 432 private job brokerage agencies licensed in Bulgaria, of which 142 agencies were
recruiting locally for work abroad (MLSP 2006).
76
Based on the results of the EBRD-World Bank environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS) of 2002
and 2005.
64
Figure 4.4: Doing Business, percent of Responding Firms Indicating a Problem in 2002
and 2005
Labour regulations
Business licensing and permits
Skills and education of workers
Tax administration
Contract violations
Access to financing
Functioning of the judiciary
Corruption
M acroeconomic instability
Tax rates
Cost of financing
Anti-competitive practices of others
Uncertainty about regulatory policies
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
4.36 The surveyed businesses perceive skills and education of workers to have worsened between
2002 and 2005, and consider it as an increasingly binding constraint on job creation. It is the only
indicator to have worsened since 2002. In 2005, almost 30 percent of managers indicated skills as an
issue, including one-tenth as a major obstacle to expanding business. This constraint is likely to gain
further prominence in the future, as the labor markets continue to tighten, and the competitive advantage
of firms becomes increasingly based on innovation in products and processes. There are already some
signs of this. Employers report difficulties in hiring certain types of high skilled workers, such as
construction or IT specialists. Moreover, employers’ current unwillingness to spend much on upgrading
of their labor force—through continuing vocational training, distance education, and other formal and
informal methods—may have a negative impact on labor productivity, and the ability of labor to move
from low-productivity to high-productivity jobs. Chapters 5-7 will cover different education sub-sectors
and reforms needed in those areas.
B. Improving Employment Services
4.37 The National Employment Agency (NEA), which is implementing government’s labor market
policies, is well resourced. Its activities are based on the National Employment Action Plan prepared by
MLSP jointly with other ministries and social partners. The Action Plan serves as the operational tool for
concrete actions and measures to attain the objectives laid down in the Bulgaria’s Employment Strategy
2004-2010. For example, the 2006 action plan listed 63 different programs, measures, or projects. Many
of these measures, however, covered only a small number of beneficiaries. NEA is relatively well staffed
65
compared to similar agencies in other transition countries. In 2006, NEA had 2,825 staff, of whom 2,136
were front line counselors, who worked directly with job seekers. Thus, the staff caseload—the ratio of
clients to employment counseling staff–was 130 job seekers per one job counselor (see Figure 8.5).77
Figure 4.5: International Comparison of Public Employment Service Staff (2002 and 2003;
2006 for Bulgaria)
4.38 Public spending on employment programs in Bulgaria also compares favorably with EU8 and
even EU15 countries. In 2005, Bulgaria spent about 0.44 percent of GDP on active labor market
programs (ALMP), compared to the EU15 average of 0.55 percent of GDP (see Table 4.13). However,
what makes Bulgaria an outlier is that more than 70 percent of this amount was spent on direct job
creation (through the program “From Social Assistance to Employment”). Since 2005, the ALMP policy
has been changing. An increasing share of funds has been spent on training and assistance to disabled
individuals.78
77
ILO online database, and NEA.
78
In January-September 2006, expenditures on ALMPs were BGN135.7 million, of which 52 percent was spent on
direct job creation, 18 percent on assistance to disabled people, and 12 percent on training.
66
Table 4.13: Expenditures in active and passive labor market measures, % of GDP in 2005
Bulgaria Czech R. Hungary Romania Slovakia Denmark EU15
Active measures, % of GDP* 0.440 0.122 0.197 0.097 0.170 1.433 0.545
Active measures total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Of which in %:
Training 15.2 10.7 19.8 11.3 14.0 35.5 38.9
Job rotation and sharing - - - - - - 0.6
Employment incentives 9..3 34.4 50.8 51.5 16.4 31.1 23.9
Integration of disabled 2.0 28.7 - - 5.3 33.4 16.6
Direct job creation 71.8 30.0 29.4 36.2 35.7 0.0 13.9
Start-up incentives 1.7 3.2 0.0 0.0 28.6 - 6.1
Passive measures, % of GDP 0.218 0.242 0.391 0.357 0.269 2.514 1.413
Passive measures total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Of which in %:
Out-of-work income support 100 100 98.0 100 64.7 72.9 94.4
Early retirement - - 2.0 - 35.3 26.1 5.6
Notes: * excluding labor market services provided by the staff of PES
Source: Eurostat online
4.39 However, ALMPs cannot substitute for structural labor market reforms, which aim to improve the
functioning and efficiency of the labor market.79 While ALMPs are an important component of labor
market policy, they mainly help disadvantaged groups, and often do not have a significant impact on
unemployment or employment in general. Bulgaria would need to identify the programs that can improve
future employment and earnings prospects in a cost-effective manner. Currently the funds are scattered
across a multitude of programs and projects, the outcomes of which have not been assessed in recent
years. Based on international experience, there is a general consensus that even under best circumstances,
payoffs from ALMPs are modest, and it is difficult to address large scale unemployment through these
programs. They may work for specific groups in specific circumstances, and therefore need to be
carefully targeted. Table 4.14 summarizes the EU country experience with different types of ALMP (see
also Betcherman et al 2004).
4.40 The lessons learned from other countries, as summarized in Table 4.14, suggest that NEA should
focus on helping individuals to find jobs themselves through the provision of job information services and
job search assistance, including job search skills training, job search clubs, or job fairs. Workers often
lack information and confidence about how to look for a job. Also counseling can help job seekers obtain
information about education, training, and alternative job opportunities, make other employment services
increasingly demand-oriented, and thereby improve expenditure targeting. Employment and professional
orientation programs for youth and adults are still limited in Bulgaria. Such services provide assistance to
the unemployed individuals, students, and other groups in determining appropriate work fields and
employment opportunities.80
79
There is an extensive literature on the impact of ALMPs on labor market outcomes. For example, see European
Commission (2006a), Employment in Europe 2006, Brussels.
80
In 2005, through the system of Professional Information Centers, 131,700 individuals received relevant
counseling (MLSP/NEA 2006b).
67
Table 4.14: Impacts of ALMPs based on experience of EU countries
Intervention Summary of overall impact Comments
Job-search assistance Significant positive impact on Improved outcomes when: (i) combined with monitoring and
(job brokerage and the transition from welfare to enforcement of criteria, on which the receipt of unemployment
counseling) work benefits is conditioned; and (ii) job search activities linked with
participation in other programs, such as training.
(Re)training for Effective for some target Following features enhance programs effectiveness: (i) small scale;
unemployed groups (adult women), but not (ii) targeted at disadvantaged groups; (iii) close partnership with
for others (adult men and local employers; (iv) training certified, and certificates recognized
youth) and valued by the market.
Youth measures Disappointing results Interventions such as pre-school facilities, measures to reduce early
school-leaving, and improve basic skills and the relevance of
competencies provided by the education system seem to pay better
dividends.
Employment subsidies Positive effects on the Cost effective to target employment subsidies at specific groups
probability of future (young men with high levels of education), and combined with
unsubsidized employment counseling services.
Direct job creation Positive results rare Should be short duration and targeted at the most disadvantaged
groups, if used.
Source: EC (2006a).
4.41 The Operational Program on Human Resources Development 2007-2013 calls for additional
investments in early professional orientation in schools, and the creation of career development centers in
all universities. Providing information to young people on labor market opportunities, and pay-offs to
different levels and modalities of schooling would allow them to make educated guesses about their
future returns, producing efficiency gains. Other programs for the unemployed youth could include the
provision of employability and training plans, job and career counseling services, aptitude and vocational
assessment tests, and assistance in developing profiling methods to identify profiles that are most
susceptible to long-term unemployment.
4.42 NEA is already downsizing “From Social Assistance to Employment” program. Its primary
objective has been to reintegrate the unemployed people on social assistance into the labor market, restore
their work habits and motivation, and reduce their dependency on the social safety net. The program
covers the most disadvantaged and hardest-to-place groups—that is, those with a low level of education,
the Roma, the long-term unemployed, and the social assistance recipients. The attractiveness of the
program may be partly attributed to the fact it also covers pension and health insurance (including
maternity benefits). It has provided employment for a group of unemployed that would otherwise have
remained unemployed much longer and positively impacted their work discipline, habits, and
qualifications.81 However, the results of the program’s impact analysis (the only impact assessment
carried out of the ALMPs) indicate that only eight percent of program participants have found
employment at the end of the program, while in the control group this proportion was 16 percent. If
getting a job was their only goal, the participants would have done better looking for work themselves.
4.43 As noted earlier, sizeable long-term unemployment is a serious issue in Bulgaria. Most of these
jobless have no qualifications, and/or a low level of education. They may have multiple employment
barriers, including cognitive and health-related barriers, and difficult home lives (for example, lack of
transportation, many children, child care problems, domestic violence), which makes their employability
81
Participants can enroll in a literacy course combined with part-time employment (five hours), and a daily four-
hour study session. However, 67 percent of the employers involved in the program stated that they did not train
their workers either before or during the project (de Koning et al (2005)).
68
a problem.82 Assistance to the long-term unemployed should resort to a combination of temporary
employment, on-the-job training, and job-placement assistance (Egger 2003). Early interventions could
include profiling of job seekers to identify which one of the individuals or groups of unemployed are
susceptible to long-term unemployment. The programs typically include the provision of employability
and training plans, job and career counseling services, various aptitude tests, and vocational assessment
tests. To reduce the probability of long-term unemployment among young workers, they should be
provided with effective job search assistance, or active labor market measures within the first 6 months of
unemployment.
4.44 Given that many of the registered unemployed may not be genuinely unemployed, NEA should
refocus all its efforts on activation policies.83 Good activation policies involve: (i) improving personal,
social, and vocational skills and competencies, and facilitating social integration; (ii) individually tailored
ways to participate in ALMPs, taking into account such factors are the person’s age, experience, needs
and priorities; (iii) taking advantage of the resources and strengths of the beneficiary; (iv) networking
with labor market services, social services, health services, housing sector, and communities; and (v)
cooperation and interaction between the beneficiary and the agency in the planning, design, and
implementation of individual action plans.
4.45 Based on international experience, other measures might include: (a) frequent contacts with the
responsible labor or social office (most OECD countries), and contract-based obligations (UK “New
Deal”); (b) profiling of job searchers based on the amount of help needed to find a job (UK, Denmark);
(c) matching available programs with different categories of job seekers (the Netherlands); and (d)
intensive interviews to adjust/redesign the individual action plan at a certain stage of unemployment.
These measures should be supported by incentives that push people to re-enter the labor force, for
example, by reducing the level of benefits after a (shorter) time period and/or insisting that, after a period,
the unemployed take jobs that they may not have considered “suitable” early in their search.
4.46 Finally, the positive impact of labor market policies cannot be taken for granted. There should be
continuous monitoring and evaluation of their outcomes. NEA should also establish a system for the
evaluation of gross and net effects of programs and measures.
C. Employment Regulations
4.47 On paper (de jure) Bulgarian labor market regulations may not seem particularly rigid, but in
practice (de facto) they are considered to be a problem. Almost one-fifth of Bulgaria’s firms indicate that
rigid labor market regulations are a problem for doing business (see Figure 4.4), and about eight percent
of employers consider them a major obstacle.
4.48 Also, the rigidity of employment index suggests that Bulgaria’s employment regulations are still
rather inflexible (see Table 4.15).84 The main problems seem to lie in the difficulty of hiring, rigidity of
working hours, and the level of hiring costs. Flexibility in such parameters is especially important for
small businesses, which tend to be labor intensive, and are therefore an important means of creating new
82
For example, in 2005 about five out of 100 registered unemployed had disabilities (MLSP (2006a)).
83
Activation policies encourage certain unemployed individuals to step up their job search after an initial spell of
unemployment, with a later obligation to participate in various programs. Eventually, the activation principle makes
the receipt of benefits conditional on participation in programs, in the process shifting the balance between the rights
and obligations of the unemployed. See EC 2006.
84
Rigidity-of-Employment index varies between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. See
http://www.doingbusiness.org for the methodology.
69
jobs. Also, flexible labor markets will become increasingly important to the quest of raising productivity
by allowing movement of labor from low to high productivity areas. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the
immobility of factors of production is an issue in Bulgaria. This suggests that the implementation and
administration of the labor laws and regulations merits attention.
4.49 There are many indications that current labor regulations hinder flexible forms of employment
contracting. Only about two percent of the employed work fewer than 30 hours a week (that is, part-time)
compared to about 18 percent on average in EU15 countries, while six percent of the employed hold
temporary jobs (fixed term rather than open-ended contracts), as shown in Table 4.16. LFS indicates that
the main reason for working part-time is lack of work, or the unavailability of full time jobs. While it
may be true that employees cannot afford to work part-time because of Bulgaria’s low wages, the main
reason for employment on a fixed-term basis is that respondents cannot find a permanent job (or they
have a contract for the probationary period). Inflexible working hours and working time arrangements are
also a problem, with almost all workers working 40-49 hours per week. 85 Overtime is restricted, and only
about six percent of employees work 50 or more hours per week.86 Seniority bonus paid to workers and
employees depending on their job tenure creates disincentives to labor mobility across firms, jobs, and
regions.87
85
Recently the maximum length of the working hours under an employment contract was increased from 40 to 48
hours per week. The employer can increase the working hours per week in excess of 48 hours for a period of six
months in case of a written consent of the employee. The Labor Code provides additional opportunities for the
employers to introduce flexible arrangements for the working hours, for example owing to production
considerations, but the employer is obliged to inform in advance the Labor Inspectorate.
86
Within the EU, some 12 million full-time employees or nine percent, usually work more than 48 hours a week,
which is the statutory maximum number of working hours per week in most EU Member States (EC (2006a)).
87
The seniority bonus is established minimum 0.6 percent of the base wage due for each year of service with any
employer, but could be more, depending on the enterprise level Collective Agreement.
70
Table 4.16: Incidence and Composition of Part-time Employment, 20051
Part-Time employment Women’s share in part-
as share of employment time employment
Total Men Women
Bulgaria 2.0 1.6 2.4 56.7
Czech Republic 3.3 1.6 5.5 72.8
Hungary 3.2 1.8 5.0 70.5
Poland 11.7 7.1 17.4 66.5
Romania 9.7 9.3 10.2 …
Slovakia 2.6 1.4 4.1 69.2
EU15 18.1 7.0 32.3 78.3
Notes: 1 Part-Timers are those individuals, who work less than 30 hours a week in their main job (not only wage earners)
Source: OECD (2006), LFS (2005) for Bulgaria and ILO (KILM 4th edition) for Romania
4.50 The impact of labor Figure 4.6: Under employment due to Labor Regulations, % in
regulations on employment can 2002 and 2005
be measured through an indicator
measuring underemployment due
to labor regulations. The 2005
BEEPS survey of local
Hungary 2005
employers indicates that
Slovenia 2002
employment in the formal sector
could be increased by almost Estonia
4.51 Bulgaria’s employment protection legislation (EPL) does not only discourage hiring and firing,
but may also slow down adjustment to shocks and impede the reallocation of labor. The effects of
employment protection legislation (EPL) on labor market performance remain controversial.89 Typically,
EPL makes it harder for certain groups, including youth, women and displaced older workers, to enter or
re-enter the labor market, at least on an open-ended contract; increases long-term unemployment, and
seems likely to strengthen labor market “insiders”. Regression analysis on pooled data from OECD, and
Central and South Eastern European countries for the second half of the 1990s finds that the strictness of
temporary EPL provisions is positively correlated with higher youth and female unemployment. Stricter
EPL increases the risk of long-term unemployment; and stricter temporary EPL discourages labor
88
For more detailed discussions of labor legislation, see World Bank (2005b).
89
See, for example, OECD (2004c) and (2006); EC (2006a); Young. (2003).
71
supply.90 On the other hand, countries with stringent EPL may have more durable or stable jobs. Recent
studies also indicate that greater flexibility in the host country’s labor market relative to that in the
investor’s home country is associated with larger foreign direct investment flows. This may be of
relevance to Bulgaria, given the importance of sustained high FDI inflows for the economy (see Chapter
3).91
4.52 Drafting and implementing a new set of labor regulations in Bulgaria may thus be called for.
Bulgaria’s current Labor Code dates back to 1985. It had major revisions in 1992, and, as noted earlier,
the Code has been harmonized with EU Directives in the past few years. Nevertheless, there are good
reasons, based on the evidence presented above, for recommending the revision of labor legislation. First,
in the last decade the nature of jobs has changed, and the incidence of temporary and casual informal
sector jobs has increased. Second, there has been a shift from less skilled, blue-collar manufacturing jobs
towards more skilled, white-collar service sector jobs. Third, the share of employment in micro and small
enterprises is rapidly increasing, and especially for this sector, promotion of more diversified employment
relationships would increase incentives to hire workers. Fourth, in general, bargaining on terms and
conditions of employment should become more market driven in order to overcome rigidities of the
current labor market. In terms of enhancing competitiveness of the country’s business and investment
climate it is beneficial to have less rigid labor relations, especially in comparison with other countries in
the region.
4.53 Enhancing flexibility of labor markets—in parallel with reducing barriers in product markets—is
also important from the macroeconomic point of view. Given the Currency Board Arrangement, the
adverse consequences of a macroeconomic shock on growth and employment can only be minimized
through labor and product market flexibility and adaptability. On the labor market side, measures to
promote flexibility would need to be coupled with measures promoting workforce adaptability through
skills upgrading and increasing labor market participation. Similarly, reducing regulatory complexity and
improving the quality of the institutional framework to facilitate competition in the domestic markets
would be needed to improve the adaptability of product markets. Moreover, faster responses in labor and
product markets to the changing external environment would facilitate greater diversification of the
economy and would reduce output volatility.
4.54 Upgrading of the labor force, or vertical mobility, is a precondition for rapid structural and
technological change in all countries, for competitiveness in the world market, and for raising the share of
high-value-added products and services in the markets. The world is moving towards a “lifelong
learning” system, which means not just improving basic skills of adults, but enabling them to continue to
develop a range of skills, and to enhance their employability throughout their lives.
4.55 As the Employment Strategy 2004-2010 of Bulgaria states, there is a deficit in training of workers
in the modern basic and key skills. There are skill gaps in the new types of professions, especially in the
area of advanced and new technologies in production and services, modern technologies in agriculture,
and management and marketing. As will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, opportunities to upgrade skills
through adult education and training and active labor market programs are limited. As stated in the
European Commission’s report “Employment in Europe 2003”, an adaptable skilled workforce, with
access to training, career development, job mobility, flexible work organization, and with a sense of job
90
World Bank (2005a).
91
See Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004).
72
security is the key to increasing productivity within Europe, and encouraging job creation and higher
employment rates.
Table 4.17: Participation of Adult Population in
Lifelong Learning, %*
4.56 Adult education and training is 2000 2005
uncommon in Bulgaria. One of the EU25 7.5 (e) 10.1
Lisbon employment targets deals with EU15 8.0 (e) 11.1
lifelong learning and calls for the EU Czech Republic … 5.6
average level of participation in lifelong Estonia 6.5 6.5
learning to be at least 12.5 percent of the Latvia … 6.9 (e)
adult working age population (25-64 year Lithuania 2.8 4.9 (e)
age group) by 2010. According to the Hungary 2.9 3.8
latest Eurostat labor force survey, Poland … 4.7
Bulgaria has the weakest performance on Slovenia … 15.0
Slovakia … 4.3
this front among EU countries: only 1.3 Bulgaria … 1.3
percent of surveyed workers stated that Romania 0.9 1.3
they had received education or training in Denmark 19.4 29.2
the four weeks preceding the survey (see Sweden 21.6 32.1 (2005)
Table 4.17). United Kingdom 20.5 26.6 (e)
Notes: * Life-long learning refers to persons aged 25 to 64 who stated
4.57 Only a small percentage of that they received education or training in the four weeks preceding the
enterprises provide continuing vocational survey out of the total population of the same age group. The
information collected relates to all education or training whether or not
training (CVT) to their employees (see relevant to the respondent's current or possible future job.
also Chapter 6) The most comprehensive e-estimate
data on continuing vocational training Source: EU Labor Force Survey.
(CVT) in Bulgaria can be obtained from
the latest 2004 survey of about 53,000 enterprises, of which 28 percent were in the public sector and 72
percent in the private sector (NSI 2006d). Stylized facts from the survey are as follows:
• Only a fraction of enterprises, 6.6 percent, had a specific training plan; 4.6 percent of firms
had a specific training budget, and 1.3 percent of enterprises had their own training center.
• In only 30 percent of enterprises providing CVT courses a formal procedure for evaluation
was applied.
• Only 3.6 percent of enterprises provided initial vocational training, of which 69.2 percent was
for pupils from professional schools and students; 17.1 percent for apprentices and newly
employed with training contract; and 24.6 percent for unemployed persons sent by the
employment agency to undergo vocational training and qualification.
73
• Training costs per participant equaled BGN291, which is slightly below the average reported
monthly wage in the country.
4.58 Co-financing schemes, under which employers, employees and governments jointly finance
training, are considered to lie at the heart of a comprehensive strategy to foster CVT. The shift towards
this policy approach is based on three general principles:
• in most societies, because of budget constraints, public authorities alone cannot provide the
necessary financial resources for lifelong learning;
• as lifelong learning generates considerable private returns, employers and employees should
finance most of its costs; and
• greater reliance on market forces could strengthen the incentives both for learners to seek
more efficient learning options and for providers to achieve higher levels of efficiency.
4.59 Recently, the Government has taken some steps to improve the situation. Issues associated with
lifelong learning stand high in the Operational Program on Human Resources Development 2007-2013.
The program emphasizes the following main activities: (i) creation of a system for professional
orientation and career development; (ii) development of vocational education; (iii) giving opportunities
for a “second chance” for education and training; (iv) giving opportunities for making adults literate; and
(v) development of distance education.
E. Improvements in Labor Market Statistics
4.60 Although Bulgaria has been carrying out Labor Force Surveys according to the Eurostat
methodology since 2003, and a census of all establishments is conducted regularly, the lack of
comprehensive labor statistics hampers the assessment of developments in employment and wages,
especially in the private sector. The main shortcomings include: (i) the under-reporting of private sector
wages; (ii) the reporting of only average gross earnings, not wages for time worked nor wages by
occupation; and (iii) the lack of coverage of the self-employed, and employment in small firms. At
present, NSSI administrative data are used to estimate wages by occupation and the number of self-
employed and employment in small firms, which is inadequate for many analytical purposes. Another
shortcoming is the lack of a nation-wide system for assessing the current or likely future demand of
employers for labor and various kinds of skills.
4.61 On the surface, Bulgaria’s labor markets are doing well. Employment has increased significantly
in Bulgaria since 2002. Some 300,000 jobs were added during the period 2002-2005, bringing the
number of employed to the three million range. Although this number includes the workers covered by
the subsidized employment program “From Social Assistance to Employment”, the number of these
workers has been cut in half since 2004. It now stands at about 50,000, and is expected to be reduced
further during 2007. Preliminary data suggest that, the number of employed may have grown another
100,000 during 2006. As a result, employment rates have continued to rise not only for overall labor
force, but also for women, youth, older workers and even long-term unemployed.
4.62 Nevertheless, major challenges lie ahead. Employment and participation rates remain among the
lowest in EU, and are still far from the Lisbon goals. Bulgaria also still has a substantial reserve of
unused labor, both in terms of registered unemployed and those who, for a variety of reasons, choose not
to participate in the labor force. Unemployment remains high, in particular among youth and people with
few skills and a low level of education. Regional disparities in employment situation are significant.
74
4.63 But increasing employment is only one of the objectives of the reforms, although perhaps the
most important one in the short run. The other objective is to increase the mobility of labor across
sectors. Research reported in Chapter 2 points to a problem in this area. If it is not addressed, it will
make it harder to increase the rate of growth of labor productivity which, in the longer term, also means
slower GDP growth. It is for this reason that this chapter has taken a close look at policies and structural
rigidities that contribute to the inflexibility of Bulgaria’s labor market, and laid the basis for the
recommendations that follow. Also in light of Bulgaria’s Currency Board Arrangement promoting labor
market flexibility would be critical.
4.64 The 2006 EU Joint Employment Report highlights that a good balance between flexibility and
security in the labor market, also referred to as “flexicurity”, can be achieved by the interaction of four
key elements: (i) sufficiently flexible contractual arrangements; (ii) effective active labor market policies;
(iii) a credible lifelong learning system; and (iv) modern social security systems. Bulgaria faces
challenges in all of these areas. EU guidelines for the employment policies suggest that member states
should: (i) encourage job creation by supporting entrepreneurship and a favorable business environment
for enterprises; (ii) simplify and reduce the bureaucracy, regulations and administration governing starting
business, hiring staff, and accessing start-up capital; (iii) improve access to training and re-training by
employees; (iv) reform overly restrictive employment legislation that affects labor market dynamics; (v)
promote flexible and diverse forms of labor agreements and working arrangements; and (vi) remove
disincentives to work (for example, simplify regulations, provide incentives), and develop actions to
eliminate undeclared employment.
4.65 Actions (i) and (ii) suggested above by the EU guidelines for employment policy are arguably the
most important in terms of creating a strong demand for labor. They belong more to the overall business
climate, and some aspects of them were discussed in the previous chapter. Actions covered by (iii) will
be discussed in more detail in the chapters on vocational and tertiary education (Chapters 6-7), although
this chapter did look at the current situation with respect to lifelong learning. But the main focus of this
chapter has been on the analysis which underpins potential actions in areas (iv)-(vi). The proposed
reforms that the government may wish to consider in these areas are listed below roughly in the order of
priority and grouped into short and medium term actions.
4.66 In the short term, the authorities may want to consider the following actions:
• Develop and encourage lifelong learning: Employers report that workers with the right
skills are increasingly difficult to find, despite the fact the Bulgarian labor force is relatively
well educated. This problem is likely to only get worse, if the Bulgarian economy keeps
expanding. Therefore, the culture of lifelong learning needs to be further developed, and
education delivery systems modernized. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this includes
expanding the network of adult training centers, VET schools and private providers, and other
alternative training opportunities. Also, their curricula need to be adjusted so that the
certificates obtained by their graduates at the end of their training are recognized and valued
by the employers.
Many countries have established tax incentives to encourage adult education. In Lithuania,
the Law on Income Tax of Individuals envisions the possibility of receiving partial
compensation of the cost of studies. In Hungary, employers pay a vocational training
contribution equivalent to 1.5 percent of the wage. Employers that spend the same amount
on apprenticeships, the training of their own employees, or on the development of a
vocational training school are exempted from this contribution. In-company training,
training related to investments creating new jobs, and training aimed at improving the
75
competitiveness of SMEs, and the development of entrepreneurial skills are supported by
grant schemes.92 Although it may have budgetary implications, Bulgaria may also consider
introduction of tax incentives to stimulate lifelong learning.
Meeting the training needs of employed individuals may require them to stop working for a
period of time, which can be costly to both employers and employees. For this reason,
Bulgaria may consider following the example of many OECD countries, which have
introduced statutory or contractual training leave schemes that guarantee employees the right
to return to their jobs after completing the training course, as well as institutional
arrangements facilitating access to training and education on a part-time basis. Reinstatement
rights help to reduce the risk element of human capital investment borne by the workers and
imply some cost-sharing with employers (who need to either replace the workers undertaking
the training or make do without them on a temporary basis).
• Revise labor legislation and regulations, while complying with EU requirements: Drafting
a new Labor Code and revising labor regulations further is one of the actions that need to be
taken. Although the Labor Code has been amended a number of times, it remains in some
important ways too prescriptive for today’s realities. Social partners—the employers and
representatives of the employees—need to be given a greater role in determining employment
relations. They are best positioned to assess the situation in their enterprises and industries
and, through collective bargaining, develop rules that determine such important matters as
wages, benefits, seniority bonus, and overtime and part-time work arrangements, without
sacrificing an appropriate level of social protection. This would enable workers to benefit
from de facto rather than just de jure employment protection because, by being partners in a
negotiated settlement, their employers would have less incentive for non-compliance, and
enforcement would be easier. At the same time, employers would have a chance to
renegotiate regulations that are particularly costly to them, but of less value to workers.
• Shift the emphasis of active labor market programs (ALMP) to support job search and
strengthen their monitoring and evaluation: NEA should retune the structure and content of
ALMPs, and increasingly shift resources from the job creation program to other ALMPs
deemed to be more cost effective. These include, first of all, activation policies, such as job-
search assistance, counseling, job brokerage, and career guidance. Job seekers should have
stronger incentives to look for new jobs, even in other occupations and in other regions of the
country. This would require a more intensive follow-up of the individual cases by the front-
line social workers than at present. A large-scale direct job creation program is justified at
times of economic downturns, when aggregate demand is depressed and there are few
vacancies. This is no longer the case in Bulgaria. On a limited scale it might be used as
means of helping the most disadvantaged groups of unemployed to regain contact with the
labor market. It should be possible, over the next couple of years, to carry out this reshuffling
of resources from direct job creation programs to other, more cost effective, programs in a
budget neutral way, since the direct job creation program still consumes a good chunk of
ALMP resources. There should be a special focus on young workers so that they do not turn
into long-run unemployed.
However, there is a need to modernize and strengthen the administrative capacity of NEA for
this shift to succeed. Also, ALMPs need to be accompanied by monitoring and impact
evaluation, in order to fine-tune those of most relevance to the labor market situation in
92
See: (http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/04_national_en.htm).
76
Bulgaria. The net impact of most ALMPs has not been assessed since 199993 A net impact
assessment is a rather expensive undertaking, and can be repeated say only once every five
years, but there are less costly alternatives to evaluation of programs developed in other
countries in the region, such as Performance Information and Management Systems (PIMS).
In the meantime, NEA can begin to shift emphasis to programs, which experience has shown
in other countries to be the most effective in reducing unemployment.
• Revisit the mechanism for establishment of the minimum wage and its level: Current levels
of minimum wages are high in Bulgaria compared to other transition economies. This may
be especially harmful in poorly paid industries, and in micro and small enterprises. Hence it
would be important to make sure that the relatively high ratio of the minimum wage to the
average wage is reduced over time. Currently, the minimum wages are set by the Council of
Ministers. It may make better sense for the government to secure close involvement of social
partners (employer and labor representatives) in the process, and have minimum wages
determined sector by sector, in the context of collective bargaining agreements and in line
with the ever-changing situation in each sector.94 Close involvement of social partners in
fixing the level of minimum wages is consistent with the ILO Convention 130 on minimum
wages, which suggests that social partners should be consulted (not just informed), as well as
the Pact on Economic and Social Development until 2009. Also, while evidence is mixed on
the impact of minimum wages on employment, it is fairly clear in the case of young workers.
Creating sub-minimum wages for young workers or in economically depressed regions, as is
done in many EU countries, would promote job creation for less productive workers, who are
also the ones typically hardest hit by unemployment. For example, Poland recently
introduced a youth sub-minimum wage (at 80 percent of the regular minimum wages) in an
attempt to alleviate youth unemployment.
• Revisit the current eligibility and entitlement rules of the unemployment benefit:
Bulgaria’s unemployment benefit eligibility and entitlement rules do not per se currently
create major labor supply disincentives. However, taken together with other schemes, they
may give rise to an “unemployment trap”, especially in lagging regions, where benefits
account for a high proportion of the prevailing market wage of low skilled labor, or for job
seekers who had low wages before losing a job thus giving less incentive to the beneficiaries
to go out and find a job. The current unemployment benefit entitlement rules, and
mechanisms attached to their delivery, should therefore be revisited. The policies may
include setting more efficient activation strategies, which better coordinate the level of
unemployment benefits with ALMPs. In particular, NEA could monitor more closely the job
search efforts of an unemployed person using individual action plans prepared for particular
job seekers and, if their efforts are found wanting, impose sanctions ranging from partial to
total withdrawal of the benefits. Although same performance criteria—such as “availability
for work”, or evidence of “active job search”—are used to decide who will be allowed to the
register as unemployed, unemployment benefits of regressive scale and of limited duration,
relatively strict job search requirements, monitoring of job search intensity efforts, and the
quality job of brokerage services may help speed up transitions out of unemployment.
93
The net impact of most ALMPs in Bulgaria has been evaluated only once. In 1999 the Netherlands Economic
Institute (NEI) implemented the project “Evaluation of the Net Impact of the Active Labor Market Policies”. At
that time all analyzed programs had positive net impact—participation in them improved the chances that the
unemployed have on the primary labor market.
94
Currently the thresholds for minimum social security contributions are negotiated between social partners and the
government by most branches and main professional groups.
77
4.67 In the medium term, the key actions to consider for increasing labor productivity and
employment would be as follows:
• Reduce labor taxes further in a fiscally sustainable manner: According to the 2005 BEEPS
survey, about six percent of the formal enterprise workforce and 13 percent of the wage bill is
not reported. This combined with the still sizeable informal sector, means that the tax base is
not as wide as it could be, and that taxes on those who pay them are higher than they
otherwise might be. The Government is obviously aware of this since it, for example,
lowered the social contribution levy by six percentage points in 2006. It may, however,
following a careful assessment of the impact of recent tax cuts, wish to consider further
reductions of disincentives to work embedded in the tax and benefit systems, including
further reductions of the tax burden on wages. This would need to be done in a budget
neutral manner. While lowering the tax wedge might partly finance itself through higher
employment and output, additional revenue measures or preferably expenditure cuts would
likely be required.
• Strengthen labor market statistics: Bulgaria’s labor market information system, especially
wage statistics, needs further improvement. In addition, the government should consider
developing other statistical instruments. Employer-based surveys of current and projected
labor market conditions, for example, could focus on actual and planned job creation and job
destruction, and on key determinants of hiring and firing. The objective of such surveys
would be to determine the degree of labor market flexibility, and to prepare projections of
likely changes in employment and unemployment.95 A tracer survey of displaced workers
would trace changes in labor market status (earnings, employment compared to
unemployment, career developments), depending on the educational status of workers or
unemployed individuals. It would be useful to keep track of graduates some years after
graduation, as part of labor market monitoring. All these suggestions are in line with the
Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, which urges the
promotion of cooperation between the education system, the vocational education and
training system, the national economy, and EU through the development of systems for
monitoring, analysis, and projections of labor demand and supply.
95
Recently NEA launched an employer survey to determine labor demand by professions and qualification levels.
78
5. GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE REFORMS IN PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION
5.1. An important step in promoting labor productivity will be the development of a skilled, technically
savvy, and adaptable labor force, which has knowledge and skills that match the demands of the labor
market. As mentioned in the previous chapters, rather than protecting existing jobs, policies should aim at
equipping workers through education, on the job training, and lifelong learning for inevitable changes in the
demand for labor, and thereby promote their adaptability and mobility across industries and sectors. While
Bulgaria has a highly educated population for its level of income, that education does often not translate to
marketable skills. To raise labor productivity and mobility, Bulgaria would need to further upgrade its
human capital by modernizing its education system. The next three Chapters of this report (Chapters 5-7)
analyze the performance primary and general secondary education; vocational education and training; and
tertiary education, and identify options for further strengthening of education delivery.
5.2. Bulgaria has recently embarked on an ambitious program to reform its primary and general
secondary school system with the aim of increasing the quality and relevance of skills, raising
participation rates and optimizing resource use.96 While there seems to be broad recognition and
agreement on the challenges facing the Bulgarian school system, there is no consensus on their magnitude
and even less on the policies needed to tackle them.
5.3. This chapter discusses the available evidence and presents reform options for finance and
governance of primary and general secondary education.97 Vocational secondary and higher education
will be covered in the chapters to follow. This chapter argues that decentralizing the school network and
introducing reforms to the finance and governance system can improve the way schools are managed, and
help promote efficiency savings that can be redirected to improving the quality of education, and raising
participation rates. The underlying premise is that the current spending pattern is inefficient, and a lot
more could be done within the existing budgetary framework.
5.4. Increasing the quality of education: Bulgaria does not have a national system of external testing
of student achievement. This makes it difficult to substantiate the widespread claim that quality of
education is unacceptably low, and that it has been declining over the last decade. However, several
indicators suggest that the problem is severe. For instance, in the OECD Program of International
Student Assessment (PISA) 2000 survey, assessing proficiency in foundation skills for the knowledge
society (reading, mathematics and scientific literacy), 40 percent of Bulgarian 15-year olds performed at
or below the lowest level of proficiency in reading literacy. This was twice the EU average and 2.6 times
96
The reform agenda is laid out in the “National Program for the Development of School Education 2006-2015”.
For an in depth analysis of the challenges facing Bulgaria’s primary and general secondary education system see
Ministry of Finance (2005) “Public Expenditure Review–Education–Condition, Problems and Opportunities”, and
World Bank (2005c)“Bulgaria–Education and Skills for the Knowledge Economy”, Policy Note.
97
This chapter is based on prior analysis and work by the World Bank’s Bulgaria education team comprising of
Christian Bodewig, Lars Sondergaard, Steven Bakker, Boryana Gotcheva, Rebekka Grun, Anna Khachatryan,
Rosalind Levačić, Nickolay Mladenov, Juan Manuel Moreno and Reema Nayar. The authors express their gratitude
to Stoyan Baev from the National Statistical Institute for preparing extensive datasets with school-level data.
79
the Lisbon benchmark98. Equally, in the area of mathematics, Bulgarian eight-graders participated in
three rounds of an international assessment Trends in International Mathematics and Sciences Study
(TIMSS) in 1995, 1999, and 2003. Worrisomely, of all the countries participating in the study, Bulgarian
students had the steepest declines in mathematics and science achievement between 1995 and 2003 (see
Figure 5.1). Clearly, international tests such as TIMSS and PISA scores alone are not sufficient evidence
of the poor (and declining) quality of education, but they are the only external assessment of schools
available for now.
Figure 5.1: Mathematics Performance of Bulgarian Eighth Graders Fallen from Above to Below
the EU8 Average
Mathematics performance of eight graders in TIMSS, 1995-2003
Slovenia
Netherlands
Latvia
United
Czech
Slovak
Sweden
Bulgaria
States
Selected EU8 countries .
5.5. Raising participation rates: Participation rates among the school age population have increased
over the last decade (see Table 5.1). Net enrollment rates at pre-primary, basic, and upper secondary
levels are all higher today than they were 10 years ago. Nevertheless, the net enrollment rate in lower
secondary education—at 84 percent—is too low for a country where lower secondary education is
compulsory.99 The sharp fall in net enrollment rates from primary to lower secondary, which is a part of
compulsory basic education, is of concern. Upper secondary shows impressive increases, although to
some extent this reflects the recent increase in the duration of some programs.100 Low participation rates
affect mostly the poor and vulnerable, many of whom fail to complete compulsory education.
98
World Bank (2005c). Bulgarian students are doing better at the lower level: in the 2001 Progress in International
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) test of reading literacy of fourth graders Bulgaria ranked 4th among 35 countries.
However, this advantage appears to disappear at the higher level.
99
Age enrolments, defined as participation of the relevant age group independently of the educational level, are
higher, and close to universal levels, suggesting that a significant fraction of the lower secondary age group may still
be in primary education, while others may have progressed to upper secondary.
100
The duration of several (but not all) upper secondary programs was increased by one year to five years in
2002/03, while the denominator refers to a four year age cohort. Nevertheless, absolute enrolments also increased
by about 14 percent between 2000/01 and 2003/04, despite the fall in the population age cohort.
80
Table 5.1: Net School Enrolment Rates Growing, but Still Low in Secondary
1994/95 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Pre-primary (ICSED-0) 59.7 66.8 73.6 74.2 74.6 73.6 73.7
Primary (grades 1-4, 92.8 96.3 98.5 99.8 100.3 99.7 99.5
ICSED-1)
Lower Secondary (grades 5- 79.0 82.4 83.1 84.0 84.2 84.2 84.9
8, ICSED-2A)
Upper Secondary (grades 9- 61.4 64.7 68.3 74.9 77.1 77.3 78.0
12, ICSED 3A,3C)
Source: National Statistical Institute (2006) Education in the Republic of Bulgaria 2006. Note: Upper secondary includes
students enrolled in general (ISCED 3A) and vocational upper secondary schools (ISCED 3C).
Equity in education remains an issue, evident by low participation and achievement rates among children from poor
and minority backgrounds. Regarding participation, Figure 5.2 shows that a large share of the poor and vulnerable
groups fails to complete compulsory education. It is not possible to document the achievement of children from
poor and vulnerable backgrounds, given the lack of external assessment of student achievement, and the fact that no
administrative data record the ethnic or socio-economic background of students. However, recent external pilot
evaluations of fourth graders conducted by the Open Society Institute Bulgaria (OSIB 2006), which has been
pioneering external assessment of students in the country, provide some concrete evidence of what is widely
assumed in Bulgaria: there are large gaps in student scores between many of the schools predominantly attended by
Roma minority students and majority schools. These evaluations also show that in the schools sampled, the average
student in the “Roma schools” had not mastered half of the curricula taught, and that student performance fell well
short of the performance in “non-Roma” schools. While no hard data exist, anecdotal evidence suggests that
children from ethnic minorities, in particular Roma, are disproportionately represented in schools for children with
special learning needs, perhaps driven by insufficient preparation (as evident in an insufficient command of the
Bulgarian language).. Also, the current segregated and selective system of secondary education is another source of
inequality for the poor, vulnerable, and minority students.
50
(%)
50
40 40
30 Poor 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
5.6. Increasing efficiency of resource use: At first glance, the efficiency of resource use looks
reasonable when looking at readily available aggregate statistics. For example, overall spending on
education as a share of GDP is in line with other countries at similar level of income (4.3 percent of GDP
81
in 2005), and aggregate student-teacher ratios—the most commonly used summary measure in
international comparisons of efficiency—are lower than OECD averages in primary and general
secondary, but not necessarily excessively so (see Table 5.2).
5.7. However, public spending per student has been increasing rapidly since 1997, mostly because
student cohorts have declined faster than the number of teachers (resulting in lower S/T ratios) and
because of rising teacher salaries. But aggregate figures conceal substantial variation in student-teacher
ratios across schools: a large number of schools (31 percent of the municipal schools)—both in rural and
urban areas—have exceptionally low student-teacher ratios (less than or equal to 11). Bulgaria’s problem
of small schools with low student-teacher ratios is partly a result of having a large number of
municipalities located in rural, mountainous areas with scattered settlements. However, there is also a
large number of schools with low student-teacher ratios located in urban areas (see Table 5.3), where
optimization of the school network should be considerably easier, given the short distances between
schools. This problem is particularly visible in Sofia’s 87 “urban” schools teaching only grades 1-8.101
The student-teacher ratio in these schools at 13.2 is lower than the national average of 13.9 for similar
type schools located in urban areas. There are a number of schools with low student teacher ratios and
very few schools which are operating with reasonably high ratios (that is, above 16) (see Figure 5.3). In
addition, schools in Bulgaria have a large non-teaching staff: for every 100 teachers in the system, there is
43 non-teaching staff.102
101
Even large municipalities have schools classified as “rural”. These schools are located in the periphery of the
municipality. In Sofia, some of these schools are located in the surrounding mountains, which make school
consolidation more difficult. Therefore, in the discussion of Sofia above, focus is only on the “urban” schools.
102
Annual Census of Schools, the National Statistical Institute.
82
Figure 5.3: Student-teacher ratios in 87 urban schools in Sofia
(grades 1-8)
25
Number of schools
20
15
10
5
0
5 10 15 20
Student-teacher ratio
5.8. In mid-2006, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved an ambitious 10-year reform agenda for
its general school system in the National Program for the Development of School Education 2006-2015.
The strategy, which covers primary and general secondary education, has six broad objectives:
5.9. While the Government is pursuing reforms across all six priorities, the decentralization, finance,
and governance agenda is essential for promoting access and quality, and freeing up resources to be
reinvested in the pursuit of the overall reform agenda. The objectives of the finance and governance
reforms, as set out in the National Program, are as follows: (i) improved efficiency: better educational
outcomes per BGN spent; (ii) equity: a fair educational system, which gives the right incentives and equal
access to educational opportunities for all children, in particular marginal students; (iii) greater
participation in decision making by local governments, school directors, school staff, parents, and the
local community; and (iv) higher quality of education for all students. The first three objectives will
assist in the achievement of the most important objective: higher quality education for all. Greater
efficiency would allow higher quality to be achieved with a given amount of expenditure on education.
Equity would help to achieve equal access by all students to the available educational opportunities.
83
Greater participation would allow education decisions to be taken by those who have relevant knowledge
of local educational needs and conditions.
A. The Current Primary and General Secondary Education System: Input-oriented and
Centralized
5.10. The National Program describes the education system as excessively centralized, and the legal
framework as complex and inconsistent. Also, the current system of financing municipalities for the costs
of managing schools does not provide incentives for efficient school management. Detailed norms about
teaching hours and class sizes determine the number of teachers, and hence teacher salary costs, for which
municipalities are then compensated. There is, therefore, little incentive or possibilities for municipalities
to reduce costs by closing and consolidating small schools or by organizing larger classes, since both
would result in reduced municipal revenues from the state. Until now, the bulk of education related
resources a municipality receives from the state has gone to pay staff, and these funds have been only
loosely tied to the number of students in the municipality. Specifically, a municipality can only hire a
teacher if—according to official class size standards—there is an appropriate number of students to justify
it. However, this relationship is weak, since there are upper and lower bounds for class sizes. Thus, a
municipality could wait years before having to dismiss a teacher, as class sizes drop below the minimum.
Moreover, the closing of a school can be postponed for years, as municipal councils can simply choose to
overrule the minimum class size requirements, and provide the gap in funding from their own sources or
postpone repair work. In this way, the system has left in place more schools than needed, sometimes in
poor state, all suffering slow decline, with staff compensation consuming a rising share of total
expenditures, and the resources available for teaching materials declining.103
5.11. As a consequence, the decline in student numbers has not been followed by the expected
proportionate decline in the number of teachers. This, along with rising teacher salaries, has helped push
up real costs per students (see Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Student Numbers Falling Faster than Teacher Numbers, and Driving Fast
Growth in Real Expenditure per Student
Student and teacher numbers, index 1992-2005 Real expenditure per student, index 1997-2006
Students (index, 1992=100) 190
105
T eachers (index, 1992=100)
170
100
95 150
(1997=100)
(1992=100)
90 130
85
110
80
90
75
70 70
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Source: National Statistical Institute and Ministry of Finance; Note: includes teachers and students from pre-
primary to non-tertiary post-secondary level, including vocational (ISCED0-4C).
103
Inability to explain the observed variation in student-teacher ratios across municipalities with typical factors is
consistent with this story: a crucial determinant in explaining student-teacher ratios is unobserved, namely, the
mayor’s and municipal council’s willingness to consolidate schools.
84
B. The New Primary and General Secondary Education System: Outcome-oriented with Self-
managing Schools
5.12. The reformed general education system that is envisaged by the National Program is one of self-
managing schools.104 In the new education system, the Ministry of Education and Science (MES) would
focus on the results of the education system rather than on detailed management of the inputs, and
defining the curriculum in terms of content and student hours. This would require setting goals for
student learning outcomes, and monitoring the achievement of those goals at national, municipal, and
school level. Further, school management and resources would be decentralized to the municipal and
school levels. This would require strengthening of regulatory and monitoring capacity of MES, for
example, through information systems to monitor the implementation of school policy. The transition
towards self-managed schools is planned to be done in three related steps: (i) by introducing a unified
standard per student; (ii) by expanding the use of delegated budgets,105 and (iii) by relaxing MES
regulations and establishing school-based management. Box 5.2 defines these terms. Among other EU
countries, Sweden and the UK have been introducing similar reforms to enhance school-based
management to various degrees over the past decade.
5.13. Introducing a unified per capita financing changes the incentive framework to promote efficient
school management, and access to education. First, the unified standard provides incentives for school
consolidation by tying all the funds a municipality receives for education directly to the number of
students. Second, it gives municipalities and schools a clear incentive to attract and keep students. Thus,
the unified standard is likely to help raise enrollment rates, and lower the drop out rates. In parallel, the
Ministry of Education and Science will need to step up oversight efforts through regional inspectorates to
prevent municipalities and schools from reporting ghost students.
104
A well known definition of this system by Caldwell (2002: p. 35) is: “A self-managing school is a school in a
system of education to which there has been delegated a significant amount of authority to make decisions related to
the allocation of resources [resources defined broadly to include knowledge, technology, power, material, people,
time, assessment, information, and finance] within a centrally determined framework of goals, policies, standards
and accountabilities.”
105
The term “delegated budget” has generated some confusion in Bulgaria, because the municipalities that have
experimented with delegated budgets have introduced them in different ways. Similarly, given that there has
already been some element of per student financing in Bulgaria for several years (for non-staff cost), it is often not
understood that the unified standard per student is meant to cover all education expenditures. Bulgaria begun
introducing delegated school budgets and school based management in the late 1990s (with EC support). By 2006,
about 40 municipalities out of 264 had some form of delegated school budgets. Since each municipality developed
its own system, there are substantial differences between them. However, a common feature is that budget
delegation is limited in practice, and the school director has discretion only over all or parts of the non-staff budget.
In the few instances where salaries are said to be delegated, it only means that the school manages the payment of
salaries, not the determination of the number of staff or their salaries as these are determined by MES regulations.
The shift to a delegated non-staff budget has been successful: municipalities and school directors consider their
spending on the non-staff part of the budget more efficient than before. For further details on the evaluation of
delegated school budgets in Bulgaria, see Club Ekonomika (2005), Local Government Initiative (2005), Secondary
Education Information Resource and Financial Management Center (2003), and European Commission (1998).
85
Box 5.2: School Finance and Governance Reforms: Understanding the Terms
Unified standard per student: The unified standard per student is unified because it includes funding for both staff
salaries and non-staff expenditures. Since 2002, the Ministry of Finance has been allocating to municipalities a per
student amount for non-staff expenses. To provide incentives to municipalities increase efficiency, salaries should
be funded on a per student basis as well. For example, if the unified standard applied to Municipality A is BGN800
per student per year and it has 20,000 students, it would receive a grant of BGN16 million per year from which to
meet all the recurrent costs (that is, excluding capital costs) of education for grades 1 to 13. Municipalities could
top up the BGN800 from its own revenues. However, the presumption is that the BGN800 per student would be
sufficient to cover all recurrent costs associated with educating a child, and that a municipality would not receive
any additional funds to cover education costs. That is, all current schemes of funding—such as, heating allowances,
scholarships, traveling costs, clothes allowances—would be abandoned, and the municipalities would have to cover
all costs from the per student unified standard. However, the unified standard is not uniform. That is, it will not be
the same amount for all municipalities, but will vary depending on the type and municipality and structural factors
that influence cost per student. The structural factors are beyond the control of the municipality, such as
mountainous terrain, low population density, or higher than average percentages of socially deprived students, which
cause the cost per student to be high. Municipalities would not be given additional funds owing to small sizes of
schools, since this would provide perverse incentives and defeat the purpose the reform.
Delegated school budgets: Under the unified standard per student, the school receives a single lump sum, with no
indication of allocation between salaries and other expenses. This decision is left to school authorities. The school
budget is determined by a formula, which applies to all schools in the municipality. The main factor in the formula,
which determines the size of the school budget, is the number of students. The amount per student may be different
for different grades, if the cost per student varies by grade due to differences in class sizes, teaching hours, or
teacher pay rates. Examples of other factors included in the formula could be additional supplements for students
with special learning needs, which may be due to their socio-economic background, lack of fluency in the language
of instruction, or to disabilities. Some structural cost factors, such as an isolated location or having staff with higher
salaries, could also be taken into account (for further details, see Ross and Levačić 1999). The main purpose of
delegating budgets to schools (and accompanying it with school based management) is to delegate more decisions
about education to those who have knowledge about local educational needs and conditions. This, in turn, is likely
to lead to more efficient use of resources and higher quality of education.
School based management has different forms, but its main features are: (i) the school director manages the school
budget, including determining the number of teachers and other staff, and selecting and appointing teaching and
non-teaching staff; (ii) the school director is accountable for the honest and efficient management of the school
budget and resources to a school council, which usually consists of representatives of parents, staff, and the local
community (the council may have the power to appoint the school director and the ultimate authority to approve the
budget decisions); and (iii) the school director can also be held accountable by the education authority (that is, the
municipality). The school director and school council have to operate within the MES framework of education
goals and standards—such as salary levels and working conditions for teachers and other staff. School-based
management has been introduced in some OECD countries.
86
5.14. For a coherent and well functioning system of self-managing schools, all three key elements—
unified standard, delegated school budgets, and Figure 5.5: The three aspects of a finance and
school based management—need to be implemented governance reform
(Figure 5.5). In Bulgaria, the reform process started
on January 1, 2007 with the introduction of the
School based
unified per student financing standard, and management Delegated
decentralization to municipalities. While this is an Budgets
essential and important first step, the other two
elements should also be implemented in due course
to achieve the full effects of greater autonomy and
accountability. Problems might arise if only partial
reform was pursued. Rigid central class size and Unified standard
teaching hour norms in turn would prevent schools
to flexibly adjust to per student financing. Without further delegated budgets, municipalities might
reallocate funds to schools on an uneven basis. Also, only further delegation of budgets to school will
unleash the full incentive effect from per student financing for attracting and retaining students.
5.15. Optimization of the primary and general secondary school network, and introduction of a per
capita formula financing system for primary and general secondary education could save substantial
resources for reinvestments in education quality. This is true even if the consolidation were limited to
only large municipalities, where distances between schools are small. For example, there are 667
municipal schools located in urban areas within large municipalities (that is, with a population greater or
equal to 60,000).106 Out of these schools, only 320 operate with student-teacher ratios greater than or
equal to 14, and a consolidation of these schools into schools with student-teacher ratios greater than 14
would yield savings. There are even larger savings to be generated, if policy makers were willing to
tackle the problem of many small village schools. As reflected in Table 5.3, the vast majority of the 794
schools operating with student-teacher ratios less than or equal to 11 are located in villages.107
Consolidating school in these areas would, however, be more challenging and require more planning and
thorough analysis of its impact on access to education.
5.16. There are also large possible savings resulting from the decline in Bulgaria’s student-age
population. As discussed in Chapter 1, the average enrolment in school at all grades from pre-school
through upper secondary will have to adjust downwards to about 60,000 students per cohort over time,
which is 20-30 percent below current enrolments, depending on the grade. With fewer students to
educate, the school network can be further consolidated, freeing up resources for the schools that remain
in the system.
5.17. International evidence suggests that per capita formula financing and school network
optimization can lead to substantial savings without negatively affecting the quality of education. Neither
would it negatively affect access to education, if mitigating measures are in place. It is well-established
that marginal reductions in class size (especially below 30) have at best only a small, if any, impact on
106
There are 29 municipalities (out of 264) which have a population greater than 60,000.
107
The term village can refer to a small settlement in the periphery of a larger municipality.
87
student attainment. However, it has been argued that large reductions can have an impact on children in
the early years of schooling, and on those from socially deprived backgrounds.108
Table 5.3: Large Variation in Student-Teacher Ratios Translating into Varying Per Student
Costs
Location % of student % of municipal Average Average Number
in municipal school student- expenditure of schools
schools expenditure109 teacher ratio per student
Student-teacher ratio≤11
City 3.9 4.8 9.3 1,092 99
Village 7.1 10.6 8.9 1,176 695
Total 11.0 15.4 9.0 1,166 794
Student-teacher ratio>11
City 73.9 68.5 14.4 711 1,014
Village 15.1 16.1 14.3 838 769
Total 89.0 84.6 14.3 766 1,783
All municipal schools
City 77.8 73.3 13.9 745 1,113
Village 22.2 26.7 11.8 999 1,464
Total 100.0 100.0 12.7 889 2,577
Of which: schools with student-teacher ratio≥14
City 41.4 36.1 15.8 665 529
Village 5.9 5.6 17.7 766 278
Total 47.3 41.8 16.4 700 807
Source: School level expenditure data base, NSI/Ministry of Finance/Ministry of Education and Science, and the World
Bank.
5.18. Consistent with international experience, recent evidence from Bulgaria suggests that schools
with lower student-teacher ratios do not automatically achieve better education outcomes (such as
reduced drop out or repetition rates) than schools with higher ones.110 To obtain a measure of education
outcomes, school-level information on drop-out and repetition rates is added to the school-level database.
Figure 5.6 presents scatter plots showing the relationship between drop out, repetition, and student-
teacher ratios.111 The data reveal that schools with few students per teacher do not achieve better quality
outcomes as measured by drop-out and repetition rates. The graphs reveal that there is neither a
discernable relationship between the drop-out rate and the number of teachers per student, nor the
repetition rate and student-teacher ratios. Figure 5.6 also shows that there are a worrisomely large
number of schools with very high drop-out and/or repetition rates. Interestingly, schools with high drop-
out rates do not necessarily also have high repetition rates, ruling out the possibility that poor outcomes
observed on aggregate can be attributed to a core of schools, which fail in all dimensions. It goes beyond
108
For example, Wößmann, (2003); OECD (2005b), and Hanushek (1999).
109
Municipal school expenditures accounted for about a third of total public expenditure on education in 2005.
110
OECD (2004d) analyzed PISA 2003 results in OECD countries, and found no statistically significant relationship
between the student-teacher ratio and student performance.
111
There is data on both drop-out and repetition rates for 2,983 schools in 2005, suggesting that a large share of
about 3,300 schools do not report one or the other. There are 58 schools performing poorly on either or both
accounts–or have data of questionable quality. These schools have repetition rates or drop-out rates above 22.4
percent (the cut-off point for the top one percent drop-out rates), or 26.4 percent repetition rates (the cut-off point for
the top one percent repetition rate). The analysis in this chapter excludes these 58 schools because of their data
quality.
88
the scope of this chapter to analyze the drivers of drop-out and repetition by school, but it is a key area for
future analysis.
Figure 5.6: Student-Teacher Ratios and Drop-Out Rates (left chart) and Repetition Rates
(right chart) by Schools, Bulgaria, 2004
25
20
20
repetition rate in school (%)
drop-out rate in school (%)
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
student-teacher ratio student-teacher ratio
• The new financing system effective from January 1, 2007 sets four different financing
standards for four different types of municipalities. Figure 5.7 presents the groups and per
student standards. The first group consists of the municipalities which have over (or equal
to) 70,000 people in the municipal center. The remaining municipalities (which all have
fewer than 70,000 inhabitants living in their municipal centers) are divided into three groups:
(i) municipalities with the population density greater than (or equal to) 65 per square
kilometer; (ii) municipalities with the population density less than 65 per square kilometer;
and (iii) small mountainous municipalities (a subgroup of (i) and (ii)) with more than three
settlements, and less than 10,000 inhabitants in their municipal center.
• Under the new financing system, there are 88 losing municipalities—that is, municipalities
which will receive less (in nominal terms) under the per capita scheme than in 2006. In
2007, they are entitled to receiving a compensation equivalent to the difference between the
allocation based on the new per student amount and their allocation in 2006.112 However,
these municipalities have to present a school consolidation plan to MES and the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) by March 31, 2007 in order to receive the compensation. Current plans
envisage that the compensation is limited to 2007 only, and that the per student financing
rule will be fully implemented from January 1, 2008 onwards, implying school consolidation
needs to proceed in 2007. Losing municipalities will thus have multiple incentives to initiate
school consolidation. With wages increasing by about 5-10 percent per year nominal terms,
the only way for those municipalities to be financially viable under the per capita scheme is
to consolidate their school network (assuming that non-wage costs are not cut instead, which
is a risk that should be taken into account in the plans).
112
The implementation plans do not specify any ceiling on winning municipalities. Thus, the municipalities which
have well-optimized school systems will experience increases in their education budgets.
89
Figure 5.7: Groupings of municipalities, along with baseline amounts and adjustment coefficients
for 2007
5.19. The Government has created mechanisms to support adjustment by municipalities to the new
funding system and school consolidation. The challenge of introducing the unified standard per student is
that the municipalities which have failed to fully optimize their school network are likely to run into
short-run financial difficulties (or have driven down their maintenance and material spending). While this
should provide municipalities incentives to move ahead decisively, there may be transition problems.
Therefore, MES has introduced support measures for school consolidation. This includes hands-on
advice on managing the process of school consolidation, and a budgetary facility to finance mitigating
measures, such as parent outreach work, transport, and physical adjustments to school buildings to
accommodate students from closed schools.
5.20. The introduction of finance and governance reforms will necessarily span over a number of years,
with municipalities consolidating the network and adjusting to the new financing parameters and
delegated budgets being gradually rolled out.113 It is essential for the Ministry of Education and Science
to monitor this process carefully, in particular through the regional inspectorates and external student
assessments, to detect unduly negative effects on quality and access. Equally, under the new system it is
important to monitor school budgets to prevent municipalities from financing municipal schools on an
unequal basis. Under the intermediate system of decentralized financing to municipalities, and not to
schools through delegated budgets, there is a risk that municipalities provide beneficial financing to some
schools at the expense of others. This may lead to a worsening of short-term outcomes in underfinanced
113
In England, the introduction of school-based management and delegated budgets took seven years from the
announcement of the reform in 1988 to its full roll-out in 1994. Sweden followed a similar multi-year process.
90
schools. To offset this, the introduction of delegated budgets to schools should be accelerated, while
carefully monitoring individual school budgets at the municipal level to ensure equity.
5.21. The introduction of a unified standard, provided it leads to school consolidation, is set to yield
substantial efficiency savings. These can be reinvested into the overall education system. Figure 5.8
provides preliminary estimates of the possible costs and potential savings of shifting to a per capita
financing scheme in municipal schools. The graph on the left hand side of Figure 5.8 illustrates the
additional costs and savings from the reform compared to current situation. The graph on the right-hand
side traces the paths of education expenditures for two different reform scenarios. The underlying
assumptions are explained below. Total savings and costs arising from the reform include (from left to
right in Figure 5.8): (i) an efficiency gain (estimated by MoF when setting the initial funding rates); (ii)
the “demographic dividend” (the saving associated with the fact that the student population is declining);
and (iii) expenditures on mitigating measures.
Figure 5.8: Estimated Fiscal Impact of Introducing Per Student Finance to Primary and
General Secondary Schools
Total spending on municipal schools with and without the funding reform
Education spending in % of GDP
Estimates for 2009 in ‘000 Leva
4.4
850,981
4.3
99,132 60,426 726,423
35,000
4.2
Difference:
(share of GDP)
4.0
3.9
Baseline case MOF proposal
3.8
Source: Ministry of Finance, the World Bank school level expenditure data base for Bulgaria and World Bank
education team simulations
5.22. School consolidation and adjustments to the number of non-teaching staff can achieve substantial
savings. First, school level data shows that 794 schools in Bulgaria (that is about 30 percent) operate at
student-teacher ratios below 11. Measures to consolidate these schools, and to reduce the overall number
to 400 schools operating at ratios just above 11, could yield savings of over BGN80 million per year over
the next three years. Second, a parallel reduction of non-teaching staff by 30 percent (about 7,000 people)
could yield additional savings of about BGN20 million. The total amount of possible and acceptable
savings is a matter of judgment. The figure of about BGN100 million shown in the graph contains the
combined consolidation and non-teaching staff reduction savings. This scenario assumes that
municipalities will respond to the incentives and support measures provided by the central level to
consolidate schools.
5.23. There are also large possible savings resulting from the continued decline in the student-age
population. The “demographic dividend” encompasses the savings that are made to the central
government budget, since the new funding accrues per student and therefore accounts for declining
student numbers. According to the UN population projections, the student age population (that is, age 6-
19) will decline by about 40,000 during 2005-2010, and by another 20,000 by 2050. Assuming that
Bulgaria manages to offset some of this decline by raising participation rates, the decline in students may
be only about 27,000 in 2005-2010. The dividend arises from comparing the funding amount (under the
91
new per capita regime) without student decline with the funding amount with student decline. The
demographic dividend grows each year, in line with the shrinking school-age population, and is estimated
at BGN60 million by 2009.
5.24. Mitigating and support measures in school consolidation are in place to assist municipalities
adjusting the school network. Figure 5.8 also factors in any mitigating and support measures during the
transition period. These would include a program to cover material improvement of school buildings, a
bus transportation scheme, parent-involvement strategies, and municipal capacity support. The annual
expenditure for this is estimated to be BGN35 million.
5.25. The medium-term budget framework for 2007-2009 projects a freeze in total education spending
as a share of GDP at the 2006 current level.114 The fiscal projections on the right hand side of Figure 5.8
integrate all elements of the reform agreed so far by different ministries. The baseline scenario assumes
that spending grows at the rate of growth of GDP in 2007-2009. The line below the baseline scenario
indicates expenditure under per-student financing as percentage of GDP, if there is full transition to the
new per capita funding rates, and losing schools are compensated for two years. The savings generated
(illustrated by the vertical arrow) will be reallocated to the education system. The reduction in allocations
to municipalities based on per student formula would be compensated with increased program spending
(by part of the savings). In 2007, program spending is planned to be allocated to policies aimed at
mitigating the impact of school consolidation, investments in strengthening staff qualification,
modernization of the school base, education quality enhancements, and external student assessment.
5.26. The initiation of the school governance and finance reform in primary and general secondary
education opens an opportunity for the government to promote long-term reforms improving access and
the quality of education. First, the reform agenda, if sustained, would lead to a more efficiently managed
school system with greater focus on quality than before, in particular if coupled with the introduction of
internal and external assessments of learning outcomes to promote achievement of national education
standards. Second, efficiency savings would open the possibility to finance in a sustainable manner
measures aimed at achieving improved education outcomes, and needs in other parts of the education
system.
5.27. While the government has already shifted to per student financing on January 1, 2007 for primary
and general secondary schools, further policy steps on governance and finance sides would still need to be
taken. The remaining short and medium-term policy steps and recommendations can be grouped as
follows.
5.28. The four key short-run policy steps and recommendations would be:
• Establish a clear and credible timeline for reform implementation to facilitate school
consolidation: The efficiency savings will only materialize, if the per student financing
formula leads to a further consolidation of the school network. Therefore, ensuring that
school consolidation happens is critical. The government would need to announce a credible
timeline for the roll-out of the reforms (and their sequencing) across all municipalities,
covering 2007 and subsequent years. At the same time, the government should continue
supporting the consolidation process through targeted advice and financial assistance to
114
Ministry of Finance (2006) Report on the Three-Year Budgetary Forecast for the Period 2007-2009.
92
those municipalities which proceed with the consolidation of their school systems. In
addition, hands-on advice to municipalities on how to manage consolidation would be
helpful. Several municipalities have gained experience on school consolidation over the past
years, and MES could promote peer learning activities among municipal authorities jointly
with the National Association of Municipalities. This support and advice would need to be
available throughout the reform period.
• Monitor the impact of reforms, and introduce external evaluation of learning outcomes: It
is essential that the roll out of the reforms and their impacts are closely monitored and, based
on the results, plans are adjusted as needed. The first stock taking in municipalities and
schools would need to be conducted early on to detect any problems and allow early course
correction. In addition, it would be important to monitor that municipalities treat all schools
equally and fairly in their funding allocations, in particular prior to the roll-out of delegated
budgets to schools. In parallel, the Ministry of Education and Science’s (MES’s) capacity to
monitor education outcomes would need to be strengthened through the introduction of
nationwide external testing to determine learning outcomes, and through its management
information system. MES has already conducted pilot student assessments and is scheduled
to phase in systematic external testing over the coming years.
• Relax central regulations on teaching hours and class sizes: The per student formula
funding, and rigid top-down regulations regarding teacher working hours or class sizes are
mutually inconsistent and could lead to a fiscal crisis in municipalities (or for schools, once
the formula reaches them through delegated budgets). With the shift to per student funding,
schools would need considerable flexibility in determining how they allocate students to
classes and how many classes they establish. Therefore, it is recommended that MES leaves
the class sizes for municipalities to decide, and relaxes regulations on teaching hours.
• Reinvest savings in measures aimed at promoting quality of education and access: The
introduction of per student formula financing, if it leads to the consolidation of the school
network, can yield substantial savings. Since consolidated spending on education as a share
93
of GDP is projected to remain constant in the 2007-2009 medium-term fiscal framework, this
implies that a growing share of the education budget can be reinvested in other education
system needs, including policies to enhance education access and quality. In addition to the
needs on the vocational and tertiary education side, this could include teacher training,
external assessments of schools to promote school and teacher accountability115, and pre-
primary education to promote school readiness and reduce subsequent drop outs116.
115
The Center for Control and Assessment of the Quality of Education (CKOKO) has been tasked with the
institutionalization of the goals for an outcome-oriented education system. Similar agencies exist in every EU
country, and they have emerged as one of the key players in the education sector. The government is planning to
strengthen CKOKO’s technical capacity to implement testing programs, which include: (i) a new placement test at
the end of 7th grade, which has the potential to radically overhaul current patterns of student access to upper
secondary school; (ii) designing and piloting a new Matura, that is, secondary school-leaving examination; (iii) new
tests (sample or census-based) to be used strictly as system-wide evaluation of education quality; and (iv) managing
Bulgaria's participation in international achievement tests. This includes international tests such as TIMSS, PISA,
and PIRLS. Bulgaria has already participated in some international assessment studies but without sustained interest
and funding from MES, which prevents it from taking full advantage of the benefits associated with these
international endeavors. For example, Bulgaria has not participated in PISA since 2002.
116
Household survey data suggest that children from poor and marginalized communities are under-represented in
pre-primary education, and are particularly likely to drop out from primary school. Adopting measures to promote
access to pre-primary education for children from vulnerable groups—for example, through waiving the
kindergarten fees for low income families, and facilitating establishment of community child care providers—might
be a cost-effective way to promote school readiness and reduce drop-out rates. Years later, such measures may have
an important pay-off in terms of lowering youth unemployment (see Chapter 4).
94
6. IMPROVING VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
6.1 The major economic and social changes that have taken place in Bulgaria since 1989 have had an
impact on the role of the vocational education and training (VET) system and its institutions, especially the
public vocational secondary schools. These schools were established to serve the needs of centrally planned
economic sectors of production, such as mining, ore processing, chemical and oil products, and heavy
machinery—that is, sectors that have suffered major downturns in their share of production in the past
fifteen years. The old VET system was also designed to serve the needs of large state-owned enterprises,
with their training centers providing avenue for vocational training for students in the VET systems, as
was also the case in current EU8 countries. These centers are now closed down, and opportunities for
practical training have become limited. Vocational secondary schools still focus on programs designed to
serve the old economic sectors, such as forestry, wood processing, and chemical, metallurgical, and
machine technology. However, the new emerging economy is dominated by private small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) in light industries and service sectors, and the needs of these enterprises are quite
different from those that prevailed in the old one.
6.2 During the transition period, the labor market has experienced disequilibrium, and there is general
consensus among officials and representatives of employers associations117 that the knowledge and skills of
the graduates of vocational secondary schools do not match the skill set required for the emerging job
vacancies, despite the relatively low unemployment rates among its recent graduates (Table 4.7). The
situation is further aggravated by negative population growth rate and emigration.
6.3 With this in mind, the Council of Ministers approved in 2001 the Employment Promotion Act (EPA
2001), which introduced incentives for employers to train their employees and maintain and improve their
qualifications.118 The Vocational Education and Training Act (VETA 1999) in turn defined the regulatory
mechanisms for initial and continuing vocational education and training. Its major goal is to “match the
quality of the vocational education and training provided for the needs of the labor market, and in accord
with the trends in the European Union”.119. Since then a National Agency for Vocational Education and
Training (NAVET) has been established, which is in charge of licensing VET providers and the
classification of occupations. Amendments to the VET Act were introduced in 2003 and 2005 to approve
a new list of professions and framework programs regulating the acquisition of vocational qualifications.
The Bulgarian approach in defining qualification levels and professional competencies is consistent with
the approach developed by the European Qualification Framework and based on knowledge, skills and
personal qualities required for the profession. In 2005, consistent with European directives, progress was
made in the mutual recognition of vocational qualifications. These developments notwithstanding, there
is still significant room for improvement in the system as a whole.
6.4 This chapter provides first an overview of the VET structure and its governance in Bulgaria,
highlighting the enrolment trends. This is followed by a look at continuing VET and how it compares with
the EU8 countries. Finally, the chapter explores the cost-effectiveness of VET, as well as its links to the
labor markets. The chapter ends with a presentation of some options for reform.
117
Such as the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industries, the Bulgarian Industrial Association, and the
Bulgarian Small and Medium Enterprises Agency.
118
EPA regulates the types of continuing VET organized by the National Employment Agency, and the conditions of
its delivery.
119
Council of Ministers (2005) “National Strategy for Continuing Vocational Training, 2005-2010”.
95
I. THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE VET SYSTEM
6.5 The structure of the Bulgarian VET system is complex and includes several different types of
schools. The typology and organization of the Bulgarian education system as a whole and vocational
schools in particular is shown in Figure 6.1. Further, to put into perspective the size of the VET network,
the types and the number of schools providing general education are summarized in Table 6.1. The Figure
and the Table together indicate that in terms of number of schools the VET system is about a sixth of the
size of the secondary education system.
Tertiary
7 (Higher)
6 Doctorate Education
Bachelor 5
4 4
3 3 3 Masters
Specialist 2 2 2
Age 1 1 1
20 XIV Secondary
19 General Secondary Vocational XIII XIII XIII Education
18 Schools XII XII XII Secondary Schools XII XII XII L
17 XI XI XI XI XI XI
16 X X X X X X
15 IX IX IX IX IX IX IX IX IX
14 VIII VIII D VIII VIII VIII VIII H I J VIII Basic
13 VII VII VII VII VII G K Education
12 VI VI VI VI F
11 V V V V
10 IV B IV E1 IV
9 III III III
8 II II II
7 I I I
A C E2
Legend
A: Elementary School, B: Lower Secondary School, C: Primary School, D: Upper Secondary School
E1 & E2: Comprehensive School, F, G&H: Vocational Training School, I,J&H: Vocational Secondary School, L: Vocational College
6.6 Vocational education is provided in three categories and seven types of vocational schools and
colleges. The numbers of schools, teachers, enrollment, and student-teacher ratios by categories and types
of school are summarized in Table 6.2. The categories are as follows:
96
• Vocational Training Schools: These schools provide avenues for students, who wish to pursue
vocational studies as early as Grade VII (Type F), Grade VIII (Type G), or Grade IX (Type H).
That is, students can shift to a vocational school prior to the completion of compulsory
education. Successful completion of VET programs in these schools provides for semi-skilled
occupations (level 1 qualification), with competencies in the targeted trades emphasizing
routine activities, and repetitive tasks.
• Vocational Secondary Schools: These schools provide specialized vocational courses in
selected occupations, and academic courses similar to those offered in general secondary
education. Some of them (type I, J, K) provide for manual skills and occupations (level 2
qualifications), with competencies in the targeted trades involving the execution of complex
activities. Others (type J and K) provide for skilled occupations (level 3 qualification), with
competencies in the targeted trades involving the execution of complex activities, including
responsibilities for the work of other people.
• Vocational Colleges: These colleges established under Article 18 of the Vocational Education
and Training Act (VETA) provide the highest VET award sanctioned (level 4). They prepare
for skilled occupations with middle-management supervisory responsibilities, with
competencies in the targeted trades involving the execution of complex activities, including
responsibilities for the work of other people, and for the allocation of resources as required.
6.7 The Ministry of Education and Science (MES), with support from NAVET, has defined a list of
approximately 275-300 occupations for which VET is provided. The characteristics of the qualifications for
the existing VET scheme in Bulgaria are summarized in Annex 1. The scheme defines the duration and
form of training, the admission requirements, the graduation procedures, and certification secured upon
graduation as well as the continued education opportunities for graduates.
6.8 The quality and labor market relevance varies substantially across the vocational schools. Some of
them are among the elite schools in the country, while others are of much lower caliber academically and in
terms of the quality of their facilities.
6.9 The VET system in Bulgaria streams students before the end of the compulsory education (as
early as grade VII) into vocational schools and designated occupational areas. The experience of other
countries120 indicates that students streamed narrowly early in their education are harder to reorient than
their contemporaries in general secondary education when they become unemployed, because of their
120
World Bank (2006), “Fiscal Efficiency and Vocational Education in the EU8 Countries.”
97
weak educational background. They
also often have difficulty accessing Figure 6.2: Distribution of Enrolment in VET Programs by
tertiary education, and lifelong Type and Level
learning opportunities. In other EU
and OECD countries, the streaming
80
into VET typically takes place only at
the end of compulsory general 60
education, roughly at age 16. Many per
OECD countries have been also cen 40
exploring the development of flexible t
educational pathways in upper 20
secondary education, which allows the
0
integration of relevant generic Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
vocational skills in all secondary
schools to respond to the needs of a Art Business & IT Technology Services
diverse student population, and
changes in the nature of work. This is
what the EU Bologna process is also aiming for (see more of the Bologna process in Chapter 7 on tertiary
education).121 To achieve that typically requires reducing the number of vocational education programs by
broadening the definition of vocational areas; creating linkages between general and vocational secondary
schools; developing a combination of school and work-based learning; and building bridges between
vocational secondary education and tertiary education.122
6.10 Over 60 percent of vocational students are enrolled in technology programs at levels 1, 2 and 3, as
shown in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.3. This still largely reflects an old style VET mandated to prepare workers
for construction and heavy industries.
121
EU launched in 1999 the Bologna process, which supports a series of reforms to make European Higher
Education more compatible, comparable, competitive, and attractive for EU citizens and citizens and scholars from
other continents. The aim of the European Higher Education Area, which EU hopes to establish by 2010, is to
provide citizens with choices from a wide and transparent range of courses, and benefit from smooth recognition
procedures.
122
OECD (1994), Vocational Education and Training for the 21st Century: Opening Pathways and Strengthening
Professionalism.
98
Table 6.3: Distribution of Student Enrolment in Vocational Schools by Vocational
Discipline and Level, percent (2006)
Vocational Area Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Arts and Humanities:
Arts 0 0 3.6 4.7
Humanities 0 0 0.4 1.6
Business & IT:
Business & Administration 0 8.1 18.7 68.5
Computing 0 0 2.7 0
Technology:
Technics 13.4 38.6 36.0 6.2
123
World Bank (2006e), “Fiscal Efficiency and Vocational Education in the EU8 Countries”.
99
Table 6.4: Enrolment Trends in Vocational Secondary Education, 2001-2006
Year Enrolment New Entrants Number Student-
Male Female Total Male Female Total of Teacher
Teachers Ratio
2001 116420 74908 191328 33876 21141 55017 18129 10.6
2002 123710 78802 202512 31591 19693 51284 18809 10.8
2003 130538 80848 211386 31763 18948 50711 19362 10.9
2004 128456 78939 207395 30602 18340 48942 19352 10.7
2005 123791 77154 200945 28041 18078 46119 19064 10.5
2006 120147 74558 194705 26453 17067 43520 18775 10.4
Source: NSI (2006e).
6.12 Several government and private sector bodies are involved in the governance of the VET system.
These are the following:
• The Ministry of Education and Science (MES): MES manages and controls the implementation
of national VET policies. It regulates and controls the provision of VET programs through a
system of public and private VET secondary schools, art schools, and vocational colleges. The
Minister approves national occupational standards, the list of approved VET occupations, and
programs for preparation of VET graduates in the MES affiliated schools.
• The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP): MLSP develops, and coordinates the national
policies for the professional qualifications of the workforce. It is also responsible for the
development of the annual national plan for employment, and the determination of the needs for
vocational training based on labor market analysis. Further, MLSP is responsible for the
maintenance of the National Classification of Occupations and Positions.
• The National Employment Agency (NEA): NEA is an agency of MLSP, which implements the
national policy for employment promotion and labor market protection, and organizes
professional information and counseling, vocational and motivational training for both the
employed and unemployed, and mediatory employment-related services.
• The National Agency for Vocational Education and Training (NAVET): NAVET, established in
1999, is a specialized body under the Council of Ministers mandated to license VET activities
and coordinate the institutions involved in VET. It develops the national VET education
requirements, the list of VET-related occupations, and oversees and regulates the provision of
VET in the licensed VET centers.
• Government Ministries and Municipalities: The Ministry of Culture implements the VET
policies in the Art Schools, and participates in the development and coordination of VET
programs in these schools, and in securing certification in the related occupations. The
Ministry of Health determines the list of chronic disease and physical injury that are
incompatible with VET programs and related occupations
• Employers Associations: Various employers associations participate in the development,
coordination, and maintenance of the national VET educational requirements for the acquisition
of occupational qualifications. They have representatives in the NAVET Board of Management
and expert commissions, and participate in the examination process to certify candidates for
occupations relevant to them.
100
• Labor Unions: Labor unions designate representatives to the NAVET Board of Management
and participate in the development, coordination, and maintenance of the list of occupations.
6.13 Continuing vocational training in Bulgaria is delivered by formal education, training, and VET
institutions, and by a variety of non-formal institutions. The formal institutions are the various types of
vocational secondary schools and colleges discussed earlier, and Vocational Training Centers (VTC). In
2005, there were 490 such institutions, including 440 state, 15 municipal, and 35 private schools.
Continuing education was provided by 182 of these schools. NAVET licenses the VTCs and monitors
their operations. All VTCs
licensed since 2002 offer VET Figure 6.4: Percentage of Enterprises Providing Continuing VET,
programs for the first, second, 2004 (Source: Eurostat, CVTS2)
and third levels of vocational 80 76
71
qualifications. Currently there 70
70
40 32
also provide continuing 30
education certificates and 20 13
diplomas, many of them in 10
vocational subjects in 0
continuing education divisions
ia
ia
a
ia
R.
R.
15
a
ry
8
ia
d
and units. Some enterprises
ni
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EU
ak
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lg
La
ov
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ec
Po
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Es
th
Bu
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Sl
offer informal continuing VET
H
Li
Sl
courses, on-line courses, on-the-
job training, seminars, and workshops.
6.14 The support of Bulgarian enterprises for continuing VET (CVT) lags behind most EU8 countries,
and is significantly below the
EU15 average. Figures 6.4 Figure 6.5: Percentage of Employees Participating in Continuing
and 6.5 show the levels of VET, 2004 (Source: Eurostat, CVTS2)
continuing VET in Bulgarian 50 45
enterprises in comparison 45 41
43
25
17 17 18
20 16 15
14
6.15 According to 15 10
NAVET,124 the key 10
5
challenges for CVT are lack 0
of adequate learning
. ia ia . ia
resources; inadequate training hR ni
a
tv
ia
an ga
ry
lan
d
en kR
8 15 ar nia
ec sto La ov lova EU EU lg ma
z E i thu Hun Po S l B u o
of teachers in adult education C L S R
and training methodology;
and insufficient dialogue with and support from employers, who have so far not shown meaningful
support for CVT activities. The participating schools also consider the centralized financial management
of revenues generated from continuing education activities to be a problem.
124
Council of Ministers (2005), National Strategy for Continuing Vocational Training 2005-2010.
101
IV. EXPENDITURES ON VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
6.16 Early introduction of VET at the secondary school level is costly, as Table 6.5 shows.
Comparison of public spending per student in general and vocational secondary schools indicates that the
average per student expenditures in vocational secondary education were 20 percent higher than the
corresponding expenditures in general secondary during 2001-2005 (see Figure 6.6). This is true also in
all EU8 countries. There are two reasons for this: (i) student-teacher ratios tend to be lower in vocational
schools; and (ii) the cost of Figure 6.6: Per Student Public Spending on General and Vocational
equipping, upgrading, and Education, BGN
maintaining workshops in a
large number of relatively 1800
run-down vocational schools 1500
is costly. These additional
costs might be justified, if the 1200
V. EMPLOYMENT OF GRADUATES
6.17 Graduates of secondary vocational schools have unemployment rates that have been consistently
1-2 percentage points lower than those of their general secondary school counterparts (see Table 6.6). So,
they seem to be more employable. However, one has to weigh that against a number of considerations.
The education of each of the vocational graduates is 23 percent more expensive. They also are about 50
percent more likely to be among the long-term unemployed, which suggests that, in the longer run,
general secondary education might have served them better. Furthermore, studies on returns to
investment in education in OECD countries show substantial wage premia for graduates of alternative
occupational tertiary institutions over secondary school graduates of either type. Those skills are
102
increasingly in demand in advanced economies. But to get there, the students are best served by a broad-
based general education at the secondary level. On balance, the evidence points in favor of general
secondary schools, accompanied by a broadening of curricula in the remaining vocational schools at the
secondary level.
Table 6.6: Unemployment Rates for Secondary (Vocational and Upper General)
Graduates
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of unemployed: upper 112, 800 98, 800 72,500 62,800 52,300 47,100
general secondary
Number of unemployed: vocational 228,000 223,300 157,700 144,900 117,400 103,400
secondary
Unemployment rate of upper general 19.4 17.3 13.5 11.4 10.2 8.2
secondary graduates
Unemployment rate of vocational 17.5 17.1 12.1 11.0 8.6 7.5
secondary graduates
Source: National Statistical Institute, Bulgaria.
6.18 An earlier World Bank study presented evidence that there was a mismatch between the skills of
graduates and the needs of employers.125 To get further information on this issue, a small survey of the
Bulgarian enterprises was carried out for this study by the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
The aim was to gauge employers’ satisfaction with skills of their employees. The survey covered 300
enterprises employing a total of Figure 6.7: Distribution of Employees by Type of Education
34,424 employees. The
enterprises were of four sizes
ranging from micro to large.126 50
38.2 39.6 38.5 41.2 43.9
0
6.19 Employees with tertiary M icro Small M edium Large
education received the highest
Tertiary Vocational Secondary General Secondary Other
combined score for the
satisfaction categories (very
satisfied, or satisfied), and the lowest combined score for dissatisfaction categories (unsatisfied or very
unsatisfied), when the surveyed enterprises were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with their
employees in relation to their educational attainment. Employees with tertiary education were followed
125
. World Bank (2005b).
126
The surveyed enterprises were from the following sectors: agriculture, forestry, and mining—6.4 percent; energy
and process industries—45.7 percent; construction and related business—24.6 percent; services—19.3 percent; and
others—4 percent. Of the surveyed enterprises, 24 percent were micro (up to 10 employees; 35 percent small (11-50
employees); 30 percent of medium size (51-250 employees); and 33 percent large (over 250 employees).. While the
sample size is too small for the results to be statistically valid, the results still provide a snapshot of views of
employers.
103
by graduates of vocational secondary schools, the graduates of general secondary schools, and the others.
The implied preference of employers for tertiary education graduates is consistent with results of similar
surveys in OECD countries. It is also not surprising that the employers prefer people with vocational
skills to those with more general (secondary level) backgrounds. But as discussed earlier, the provision of
such skills at the secondary level is costlier than the provision of general education. It also increases the
risk that if the skills are not needed at some point in time, the lack of a broader general education will
make it harder for such individuals to adjust to the demands of the labor market. A number of countries
have come to the conclusion that the way forward is some sort of a hybrid–a general secondary education
for (nearly) all, followed by a variety of non-university skill-building options at the tertiary level.
6.20 Overall, the link of the VET institutions to labor market is weak. The challenges facing VET in
Bulgaria as identified by NAVET127 include: (i) improving market intelligence and information
availability to potential clients and stakeholders; (ii) developing effective communication and information
dissemination framework; (iii) continuously updating the occupational standards in line with the needs of
employers; (iv) devising effective continuing VET programs to close the competency gap with EU; (v)
creating incentive mechanisms to motivate the employers and workers to appreciate the need for and
effectively participate in continuing VET; and (vi) mobilize and coordinate the efforts of all social
partners, local authorities, NGOs and other to actively participate in the process.
6.21 Bulgaria has a fairly small and ineffective alternative sector of tertiary education, which may partly
explain the low overall tertiary enrolments in Bulgaria compared to other EU countries. The sector
consists of two public and nine private colleges, which enrolled fewer than 7,000 students of the total of
221,400 students—or 3.1 percent—in 2005. In addition, Bulgaria has a large number of post-compulsory,
specialized and costly vocational
colleges. Table 6.7: Alternative Sector in Select Countries (2004)
Country Gross Percentage of Enrolment in:
6.22 This is in stark contrast Enrolment Rate University Sector Alternative Sector
with other EU and OECD Australia 46.4 59.9 40.1
countries, most of which have Canada 49.2 60.5 39.5
Finland 64.6 82.6 16.4
significant and strong France 40.0 72.0 28.0
alternative sectors of tertiary Ireland 42.2 62.7 37.3
education, with enrolments Norway 40.7 78.1 21.9
ranging from a minimum of Spain 31.1 56.9 43.1
16.4 percent of total tertiary Bulgaria 25.7 96.9 3.1
enrolment in Finland to about Source: OECD Statistics 2004. Tables C6.1 and A3.0
40 percent in Australia, Canada,
Ireland, and Norway (see Table 6.8). All EU8 countries and Romania, have alternative tertiary
institutions and colleges with larger relative enrolments than Bulgaria.128
6.23 Academic programs offered by these institutions are typically vocationally and occupationally
oriented, which differentiates them from universities. For this reason they are covered under the VET
127
NAVET has no jurisdiction over the more than 490 vocational secondary schools and colleges that constitute the
VET system. While it is mandated to coordinate the VET system by developing the framework and the occupational
standards governing the four levels of certification, and also mandated to ensure the integrity of the certification
examination system and the participation of employers in it, NAVET does not have any say in the development and
delivery of the VET curricula at the four levels, or in the training required for teachers, especially in emerging
technologies.
128
A summary of the organization of tertiary education and its institutions in the EU8 countries is provided in Annex 2.
104
chapter. The alternative sector institutions can also provide innovative degree-level programs, such as the
Foundation Degrees in the UK, the Engineering Technology Degrees in the United States, and the
Applied Degrees in Canada. Examples of the well established generic areas of studies in such institutions
include business management129, information and communication technology (ICT)130, applied science131,
technology132, agriculture and natural resources133, trades134, applied arts and design135, health studies136,
and social services.137
6.24 As mentioned earlier, high quality vocational education is needed to promote adoption of existing
technologies and promotion of labor productivity. However, this chapter has shown that the skills
provided do not sufficiently match the current and evolving labor market needs. In addition, the system
does not seem to be particularly cost-effective. To move the Bulgarian VET system closer to the best
practice examples in EU and OECD countries, and ensure that vocational education students have an
appropriate basis for lifelong learning to promote their adaptability and mobility across sectors and
industries, the government may want consider five short and medium-run reform options.
6.25 In the short run, the government would be advised to pursue the following financing reform to
promote the efficiency of VET:
129
Including business management, office and organizational management, retail operations, accounting, marketing,
human resources, e-business, supply chain operations, banking and financial services transportation operations, and
hospitality and tourism studies.
130
Computer systems software systems, computer networks, computer games, animation, multimedia design,
Website design, and Internet services.
131
For example, biotechnology, pharmaceutical studies, environmental studies, nutrition studies, veterinary science,
natural resources, industrial chemistry and laboratory studies
132
Such as, mechanical systems, manufacturing technology, automation, transportation and heavy machinery,
electrical distribution, electronics, energy systems, computers and ICT, telecomm, construction and building
technology, architecture, and surveying
133
For example, field crops and processing, agribusiness, agriculture technology, dairy animals, milk production,
and horticulture, forestry, and forest management.
134
For example, construction trades, automotive and transportation trades, heavy machinery, and industrial trades.
135
For example, interior design, graphic design, fashion design, multi media, journalism studies, and theatre design.
136
Nursing, paramedical studies, spa therapy, medical laboratory studies, dental hygiene, optometry, biomedical
technology, assistive devices technology, medical rehabilitation studies, geriatric care studies.
137
New programs are also being developed in fields such as avionics, digital media, financial services, small
business enterprises, marketing, disability studies, early childhood education, leisure studies, animal husbandry, and
optometry.
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6.26 To promote labor adaptability and mobility in response to market needs, it is critical that all
students are equipped with basic general education, and the education system provides options for
continued lifelong learning. To shift the Bulgarian VET system into that direction calls for broader
structural reforms in the medium term. The four key medium-term reform options the authorities may
want to consider are the following:
• Start vocational secondary education only after the completion of compulsory education:
Following the example of other EU countries, Bulgaria would be well advised to delay the
streaming of students into VET until the completion of compulsory education. Students
streamed early in education are hard to reorient when they become unemployed, because of
their weak general education. If this reform is implemented, the vocational schools presently
offering the early programs would need to be closed and the students directed to schools
offering lower general secondary education.
• In parallel, develop curricula for the remaining vocational secondary schools that balance
vocational and general studies. The curricula would need to emphasize occupationally-
oriented skills and competencies as well as strengthening the core of natural and social
science, mathematics, foreign language, and the applied dimensions of this knowledge. This
would imply increased integration of the curricula of the vocational138 and general secondary
schools. The aim would be to ensure strong general education of vocational students, which
would enhance their adaptability and readiness for continued learning.
138
Vocational school types J and K in Figure 5.2.
106
relationship among the various occupations in the construction sector in terms of the type and
duration of studies at the secondary and the tertiary levels, and the corresponding
occupational categories.
107
Table 6.8: Characteristics of the two proposed models
Aspect Model 1 Model 2
International The Colleges for Further Education in the UK, and The Institut Universitaire de Technologie IUT,
Example the Technical Institutes in Ireland France
Bridges to Both models provide bridges to vocational secondary education allowing students in vocational schools
Secondary to continue their studies towards higher occupational awards without obtaining their end of secondary
Education education certificates.
Bridges to Program-specific articulation because the colleges are Systemic articulation. The institutes are
Universities separate from universities. university-based institutions.
Program Level Post compulsory and tertiary programs offered in the Mostly tertiary short-cycle programs. Post-
same institution. At the tertiary level short cycle and compulsory programs can be offered.
three-year innovative degree level programs are
offered.
Admission • Open access for post compulsory programs
Requirements Matura for tertiary programs
Academic Awards • Certificates and advanced certificate of VET • Certificates of VET qualifications
qualifications • 2-year diplomas
• 2-year diplomas
• 3-year new applied degrees
Strengths • The new institutions can be easily, quickly and • The institutions can be linked to existing
cost-effectively established from selected public and private universities, and
existing vocational gymnasia and colleges that benefit from their management and
meet certain criteria for capacity and quality. academic capacity.
• The new institutions can be vehicles for regional • The link to university implies the
economic development. development of systemic articulation
• The new 3-year applied degree can allow between the short cycle programs and
Bulgaria to meet the Bologna objective of a 3- their university counter part, and mobility
year Bachelor degree. for students
Weaknesses • The new “applied” degrees would have to be • The short cycle two- year program has to
formally recognized by MES and the National be fully recognized and transferable to
Qualification Agency, and included in the Higher university programs through a reasonably
Education Act. accessible and short bridging program.
• The innovation would meet resistance from the • The stronger link to university can also
academically conservative established be a disadvantage stifling the spirit of
universities, and thus would require political will innovation in the new institution and
and leadership. creating a “poor cousin” syndrome.
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Annex 1: Typology of VET Qualification in Bulgaria
Aspect of VET Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Duration of 1 or 2 years after 2 or 3 years after 4 years after basic 5 or 6 years after
Studies basic education in basic education in education in basic education in
technical schools technical schools vocational vocational
secondary schools secondary school
or in a vocational
college
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Annex 2: Higher Education System - Tertiary Institutional Types
Bulgaria
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length years
Non-university higher education institutions (kollegi) Non University 5B 2, 3, 5
Universities and specialized higher schools (academies
and institutes) University 5A, 6 3, 4, 5, 6
Czech Republic
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length years
Tertiary Professional School (Vyssi odborna skola) Non University 5B 2, 3, 5
Higher Education Institution (vysoka skola) University 5A, 6 3, 4, 5, 6
Estonia
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Vocational Post Secondary (Kutsekeskharidus
keskhariduse baasil)* Post-Secondary 4 varies
Institutions of professional higher education
(rakenduskorgharidus) Non Universty 5B 3,4,5
Universities University 5A, 5B, 6 3, 4, 5, 6
Hungary
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Colleges (Foiskolak) Non University 5B 2, 3, 4
Universities (egyetemek) University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Latvia
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Non University Type institutions (Koledza) (first and
and second level professional higher education
programs) Non University 4,5B 2, 3, 4
University, Academia (universitate, akademija) University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Lithuania
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Non University Type institutions (Kolegija) Non University 5B 2, 3, 4
Universities Type (Universities and Academies) University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Poland
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Universities, Technical Universities, Agricultural
Academies, Schools of Economics, Teacher Education
Schools, Medical Academies, Maritime Schools,
Academies of Physical Education, Artistic Schools,
Theological Schools, Military Schools and Internal
Affairs Schools; Higher Vocational Schools (just
undergrad) University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Romania
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
University Colleges (colegii universitare) Non University 5B 2, 3, 4
Universities, Institutes or Academies University 5A,6 4, 5, 6
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Slovakia
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Stredna odborna skola (vyssie odborne studium) Non University 5B 2, 3, 4
Univerzita, Vyosoka skola, Akademia University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Slovenia
Institution Institution Type ISCED Level Length
Post Secondary
Higher Technical Colleges (visje strokovne sole) (Subdegree level) 2
Professional colleges Non University 5B 2, 3, 4
Universities Type (Universities and Academies) University 5A,6 3, 4, 5, 6
Source: European Commission, (2006)National Summary Sheets on Education Systems in Europe and Ongoing Reforms,
Eurydice
http://www.eurydice.org/portal/page/portal/Eurydice/ShowPresentationND?pubid=047EN&country=null&countryreg=null
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7. STRENGTHENING TERTIARY (HIGHER) EDUCATION
7.1 Tertiary education institutions are facing the challenge of adapting themselves to the multiple
demands from stakeholders: students for the high quality education, employers for the relevance of
education to their needs, and the government for accountability of the public resources allocated to the
tertiary institutions. Higher education usually refers to the system of universities, or university-type
institutions, which offer undergraduate and graduate studies leading to Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D. degrees.
By contrast, tertiary education is a more comprehensive designation that includes most forms and levels of
post-secondary educational provision in both the conventional university sector, and in non-university
institutions forming an alternative sector.
7.2 Institutions of tertiary education are no longer seen as remote places where students acquire
academic knowledge and professional qualifications, but instead as a major force in the ongoing economic
development, and the advancement of knowledge. Tertiary education is an important determinant of
individuals’ earning capacity and employment prospects, and therefore plays an important role in
determining the level and distribution of income in society. In most developed and transition economies,
the wage premium earned by the graduates of tertiary education compared to the graduates of upper
secondary education are substantial and increasing with work experience. The graduates of tertiary
education also face a lower risk of unemployment than those without tertiary education.
7.3 To put the Bulgarian tertiary education system in context and to highlight the link with the
discussion of VET in the previous chapter, the evolution of tertiary education systems in select other
countries is first briefly summarized. The development of a typology of modern tertiary education faces two
challenges: (i) defining the identity, role, and an appropriate place for the new alternative sector institutions
(that is, the type of occupationally-oriented colleges proposed in the previous Chapter 6) in systems
dominated by the universities; and (ii) branding or labeling of the institutions that do not belong to the
traditional university sector. The early work of the OECD, and the European Association for the Study of
Higher Education called them tertiary short-cycle institutions. However, some of these institutions provide
degrees requiring 3-4 years of study, which could not be considered to be short cycle. The 1991 OECD
report called them alternatives to universities, and some authors referred to them as the non-university sector
of tertiary education.
7.4 A better approach is to define the tertiary education system as a tripartite system composed of
three tiers of institutions.139 Tier I consisting of the elite research and comprehensive universities; Tier II
of lower level universities, and some degree granting tertiary colleges and institutes; and Tier III of
institutions offering mostly short-cycle programs/occupationally-oriented programs. Figure 7.1 outlines
the evolution of tertiary education in OECD countries during 1960-2005. The hierarchy of institutions in
Tiers I and II is established by the nature of the degrees offered, by the selectivity of their admission
criteria, and by the resources allocated per student, which are almost universally greater in Tier I
universities than in Tier II or III institutions. For example, in the UK Tier I cover Oxford, Cambridge,
and the rest of the so-called Russell group of high-status universities; Tier II consists of universities of
lower status, research orientation, and selectivity, including the former polytechnics; and on Tier III are
the Further Education (FE) colleges, which are occupationally-oriented colleges. In the United States,
139
Grubb, W.N (2003). The Roles of Tertiary Colleges and Institutes: Trade-offs in Restructuring Postsecondary
Education, OECD Publications.
112
Tier I is composed of the ivy league and other research universities; Tier II consists of less-selective
universities, which offer a wide array of occupational programs; and Tier III has the community colleges,
and technical institutes. France also has a tri-partite system, in which the Grandes Ecoles form Tier I
with selective admission and high spending per student; the universities form Tier II; and the Institut
Universitaire de Technologie (IUTs), and the Sections de Technicians Superieurs (which award the
Brevet de Technicien Superieur) operated by secondary schools constitute Tier III. See Table 7.1 for
further examples.
7.5 The boundaries between the Figure 7.1: Evolution of Tertiary Education: 1960 to 2005
three tiers are fuzzy, and typically The University Sector of The Alternative Sector of
Tertiary Education
hotly disputed by many of the Tertiary Education
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION IN BULGARIA
7.6 Tertiary education was established in Bulgaria after the country’s liberation at the end of the 19th
century, with the establishment of the University of Sofia. The evolution of tertiary education in the 1920s
and 1930s was influenced by the Humboldtian ideal of the university. The nature and structure of tertiary
education changed drastically after the Second World War. In 1947, the first law on higher education was
adopted, and it emphasized the role of universities and institutions of higher education as agents for the
transformation of the Bulgarian economy into an industrial economy. The mission of the universities was
seen as to primarily prepare graduates with the knowledge and skills to facilitate such transformation. The
structure of the system, which still prevails today, is specialized and characterized by single-discipline
institutions serving a particular sector. Examples include the universities of forestry, chemical technology,
and metallurgy.
7.7 After the collapse of communism, and the transformation of the Bulgarian economy and society
into a market economy, a number of changes have taken place in the tertiary education system, including
renaming of some institutions to reflect the paradigm shift in the philosophy and values of society. An
important development has been the emergence of private universities, and the establishment of colleges of
tertiary education, mostly in the private sector. Tertiary education in Bulgaria today consists of three
categories of institutions: (i) comprehensive and technical universities; (ii) specialized institutions of higher
education; and (iii) colleges. These three categories of institutions are both in the public and private sector
(see Table 7.2). A complete list of tertiary education institutions in Bulgaria is in Annex 1.
7.8 Table 7.2 shows that there is a large number of small specialized institutions, and only a small
number of comprehensive universities (only seven universities have more than 10,000 students). This is a
concern from the quality, fiscal, and effectiveness of R&D points of view. Small narrowly specialized
institutions, such as the University of Transportation (1,000 students), or the University of Mining and
Geology (2,600 students) carry a relatively high overhead cost. As a result, they are likely to have fewer
resources to spend on research, and student support, thus raising quality concerns. Also, proliferation of
small universities reduces the benefits to be gained from scale and scope, and hinders the increase in
student-faculty ratios from the current low levels. Further, as will be discussed later in Chapter 8, it
hinders R&D in universities, since a critical mass of scientists and researchers is usually needed for that.
At the same time, the alternative sector of tertiary education—the colleges—is small compared to EU8 and
EU15 countries, as was discussed in the previous chapter in the context of VET reform.
7.9 Further, the overall student-faculty ratio in the system is below 11, and in the specialized
institutions it is below 9, which is significantly lower than the norm of 16 in OECD countries. If private
universities, which employ many of the faculty of public universities (see paragraphs 7.32-7.34 for
discussion of faculty issues), are excluded, the ratio is even lower. This is a concern, since it highlights that
resources are not efficiently allocated. These characteristics suggest that there are opportunities for reform
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of the system, consolidation of institutions achieving more cost-effective use of resources, and improving
the quality of learning and student services.
7.10 Private provision of tertiary education is uneven in Bulgaria. Of the six private universities and
eight private colleges, three are among the top ten of all institutions by size. All the others, except one,
are small with less than 1,000 students. The demand for private universities in Bulgaria—as in EU8
countries—is high, and still growing, while the demand for public universities is leveling off. The
advantages of private universities include: (i) they act as a catalyst for reform in tertiary education,
increasing private investment, and providing competition and innovation; (ii) they provide an avenue to
respond to some of the unsatisfied demand by the public sector for tertiary education; and (ii) owing to
their flexible management and staffing arrangements, they are able to respond flexibly and efficiently to
market and student demand.
7.12 Compared to most EU8 countries, Bulgaria has (i) a relatively large number of small specialized
universities; (ii) small share of privately run tertiary institutions; and (iii) a small number of alternative
tertiary institutions. These are weaknesses that would merit attention. The comparative analysis of the
types of tertiary education institutions in Bulgaria, Romania, EU8, and EU15 countries is shown in Table
7.3. Of the EU8 countries, the comparison with Czech Republic and Hungary is most relevant, since they
they have comparable population and demographics; both countries have smaller number of universities and
much larger alternative sector of tertiary education.
7.13 A modern knowledge-based economy needs an adequate supply of skilled educated workers, and
the majority of these workers are expected to have tertiary education. Table 7.4 shows that Bulgaria
compares unfavorably with EU8 countries in two important factors influencing participation in tertiary
education: (i) the percentage of 18 years old still in the education system; and (ii) the percentage of 22
years old that have completed upper secondary education. Bulgaria scores lower than all EU8 countries
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in these two important predictors of potential participation in tertiary education. A recent study140 suggests
that this is both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is that participation rates in tertiary
education depend on high-school graduation, and without improvements in performance at the secondary
school level, student numbers in tertiary education are unlikely to increase. The opportunity in turn is that
if school performance improves to the level of the EU8 countries, appropriate supply side policies could
translate this latent demand into actual demand for tertiary education.
7.14 The participation rate in tertiary education in Bulgaria is lagging behind the EU8 countries, and
the EU15 average. As can be seen Table 7.5: Tertiary Education Participation Rates in
from Table 7.5, the participation rate Bulgaria, EU8 and EU15
in tertiary education is not only Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
substantially and consistently lower in Czech Republic 30.2 30.5 34.3 34.8 35.2 35.6
Bulgaria than in EU8 and EU15 Estonia 60.8 60.5 66.2 66.7 67.1 67.4
countries, but the gap has also Hungary 40.1 40.7 49.9 52.2 54.1 54.6
widened during 2000-2005. Table 7.6 Latvia 64.1 63.8 71.9 72.2 73.9 74.1
shows a troubling trend in the Lithuania 59.9 59.9 67.8 68 68.4 68.9
enrolment in tertiary education in Poland 54.1 56.7 59.9 60.7 61.5 61.8
Bulgaria: during 2000-2004, Bulgaria Slovakia 29.8 30.5 32.3 33.1 33.9 34.2
was the only country among EU8 and Slovenia 60.8 61.2 67.9 68.4 69.6 69.9
Average EU 8 50.0 50.5 56.3 57.0 58.0 58.3
EU15 that had a decline of about 13 Average EU 15 52.6 53.6 53.9 57.6 57.8 58.0
percent in tertiary education Bulgaria 24.3 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 26.9
enrolment. During the same period, Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics
all the other countries had robust
growth in tertiary enrolment ranging from 14 percent in the Czech Republic to 51.5 percent in Romania.
Table 7.7 shows that this same troubling trend was for a while happening in the enrolment of new entrants
to the system. However, preliminary data for 2005 and 2006 suggests a reversal of this decline along with
a strong pick-up in net enrolment rates.
140
Bekhradnia, B. (2004). Higher Education in Bulgaria: A Review for the Ministry of Education and Science,
Higher Education Policy Institute.
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Table 7.6: Total Enrolment in Tertiary Education in Bulgaria, Romania, EU 8 and EU15
Country Enrolment in Thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 % Change
Czech Republic 253.7 260.0 284.5 287.0 318.9 26%
Estonia 53.6 57.8 60.6 63.6 65.7 23%
Latvia 91.2 102.8 110.5 118.9 127.7 40%
Lithuania 121.9 135.9 148.8 167.6 182.7 50%
Hungary 307.1 330.5 354.4 390.5 422.2 37%
Poland 1579.6 1775.0 1906.3 1983.4 2044.3 29%
Slovenia 83.8 91.5 99.2 101.5 104.4 25%
Slovakia 135.9 143.9 152.2 158.1 164.7 21%
Bulgaria 261.3 247.0 228.4 230.5 228.5 -13%
Romania 452.6 533.2 582.2 643.9 685.7 52%
Average EU8 2626.8 2897.4 3116.5 3270.6 3430.6 31%
Average EU15 12563.3 12820.3 13191.0 13589.6 13859.7 10%
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics
Table 7.7: Enrolment of New Entrants in Tertiary Education in Bulgaria, Romania, EU8
and EU15
Country Enrolment in Thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 % Change
Czech Republic 51.845 56.81 56.261 61.026 71.957 39%
Estonia 13.055 14.749 14.01 18.162 18.855 44%
Hungary 99.152 88.001 94.343 106.645 110.524 11%
Latvia 34.788 33.295 36.986 40.659 43.037 24%
Lithuania 34.154 37.464 39.94 40.332 42.145 23%
Poland 419.308 435.648 458.339 458.108 465.674 11%
Slovenia 15.363 20.927 23.27 23.353 23.782 55%
Slovakia 36.037 38.72 41.6 38.725 46.054 28%
Total EU8 703.702 725.614 764.749 787.01 822.028 17%
Total EU15 1922.25 2518.08 2587.837 2739.958 2297.933 20%
Total OECD 6052.14 6184.42 7302.342 7336.492 7258.515 20%
Bulgaria 49.767 41.901 42.434 43.564 46.101 -7%
Romania 129.237 170.974 158.094 147.537 195.408 51%
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics
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education, rather than being siphoned off into the VET sector, could lead to increased participation in
tertiary education. The establishment of occupationally-oriented colleges, as proposed in the previous
chapter, could help to address this.
7.16 Inequities in access to education have limited school participation rates in Bulgaria. At present
the highest birth rates are among the poorest and least well educated segments of society—the Roma and
Turkish minorities—whose children are least likely to continue their education. However, with the EU
accession, and growth of the economy, the demand for tertiary education among disadvantaged groups
should grow as it has in the EU8 countries. The limited institutional diversity of tertiary education in
Bulgaria is likely limiting the participation of disadvantaged minorities. Most of the institutions are
traditional institutions belonging to the university sector, and there are few colleges offering
occupationally-oriented programs. The occupationally-oriented colleges discussed and proposed in the
previous chapter would often be better suited to the academic qualifications, needs, and aspirations of
disadvantaged groups as well, and more responsive to the needs of the labor market.
7.17 The present disjointed admission process involving university, or institution-based examination is
seen as an obstacle to improved access to higher education. Currently, each university sets up its own
standards, entrance examinations, and criteria for admission. Experience suggests that for a country the
size of Bulgaria, a nation-wide system of the end-of-secondary school examination would be the best
approach to ensure fairness and transparency, and simplify the entrance examination process.
7.18 The distribution of students across academic subjects in Bulgaria differs significantly from the
rest of EU countries, and may not match the needs of the modern economy. Table 7.9 shows some
discrepancies between the pattern in Bulgaria and the rest of EU: (i) a high proportion of students (47
percent) studying social sciences, compared to 26 percent in the rest of the EU; (ii) a small percentage
(six percent) enrolled in service-related programs compared to 17 percent on average in the EU; and (iii)
only four percent compared to 12 percent in the rest of EU study mathematics, science, and information
and communication technology, subjects essential to achieve competitiveness in the knowledge economy
environment.
7.19 In an attempt to encourage universities to offer programs that are relevant to the needs of the
market, MES has responded with mostly supply-side measures involving the allocation of approved
enrolment numbers, and associated grants to each university on the basis of the perceived needs of the
market. This approach does not take into account the willingness, or the ability of universities to provide
instruction in the targeted areas, nor the readiness of the students to enroll in those programs. An
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alternative, demand-side approach that has been discussed, but not yet implemented is one in which MES
provides incentives in the form of subsidies to institutions, and scholarships to students in the disciplines
it considers a priority. However, this approach, while attractive, has a number of implementation
problems. First, MES would need to identify the subjects which it wished to encourage, and would need
to establish appropriate networks of public and private sector stakeholders to provide input about the
market needs. Second, MES would need to ensure that the universities and other tertiary institutions have
the capacity and resources to offer the approved programs. Third, MES would need to monitor the
outcome of the initiative closely to ensure that the supply of incoming students and the demand for
graduates in those targeted areas indeed meets. Finally, MES would have to establish a strong alternative
sector of tertiary education offering occupationally-oriented programs strongly tied to identified needs of
the labor market.
7.20 Prior to 1991, the degree structure in Bulgarian universities followed the traditional European
two-stage model with the Masters degree over total of five years of study, followed by the Doctorate stage
over three additional years. Bulgaria has since taken the necessary steps to adopt the Bologna three-cycle
(Bachelor/Master/Doctorate) structure. However, the change was more in form than in practice: the
Bachelors degree qualification is not regarded as a valid qualification by the majority of students and their
families. Two thirds of the graduates with the Bachelors degree go on immediately to a Masters program,
and study for five years consecutively before seeking employment. Such a high proportion is contrary to
the goal of the Bologna process, which aims to promote employability of Bachelor degree holders, and
also represents a burden on public finances, even if many of the students in the Masters phase are self-
financed and not subsidized by the state. It may also involve opportunity costs in terms of the students
staying out of the labor force longer than necessary.
7.21 Countries that have joined the Bologna process have restructured their higher education degree
system according to the 3+2 and less frequently to the 4+1 model of the first two cycles.141 Bulgaria, has
adopted the 4+1 model in its universities. The Bologna process intended the Bachelors degree to be a
viable qualification for entry into the workforce. One advantage of a 3-year Bachelors degree is that, if it
is accepted by the labor market and society at large, the financial resources that could be released for use
elsewhere in the tertiary education system would be substantial.
7.22 The current "specialist in" qualification, which is readily awarded in a small number of colleges
and in branches and departments of universities, does not fit the Bologna framework, because it is neither
a college award nor an accepted Bachelors degree. As such, it is somewhat of an anomaly in the
Bulgarian tertiary education. It is intended to provide access to tertiary education for students who do not
have the appropriate academic qualifications from secondary school to enter a Bachelors degree, but
despite the implications of “specialist” in its title, it does not appear to be particularly valued in the job
market. Therefore, the majority of students with the “specialist in” qualification seek advanced-standing
admission to Bachelor degree programs; some in the second and others in the third year of the program,
taking in total 5-6 years to complete the degree. As such, these programs provide the “university
transfer” function that community colleges in the United States and Canada, and the Institut Universitaire
de Technologie in France provide.
7.23 The results of the latest stocktaking on progress show that Bulgaria still faces a number of
challenges with regard to the implementation of the Bologna action lines (see Table 7.10). Every two
years, prior to a ministerial conference, a major stocktaking exercise is undertaken in each country to
141
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are exceptions and follow a model where a three year Bachelor is followed
by a one year Master. Some institutions in the Netherlands also offer this possibility.
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assess the progress of reform along the so called Bologna action lines. The last stocktaking was done in
2005 for the Bergen Ministerial Meeting (the results of 2007 exercise are expected to be available in May
2007). The results suggest that Bulgaria is doing relatively well when it comes to the implementation of
the two cycle structure, although, as stated above, the employability of Bachelor degree holders has not
been fully realized and there remain issues to be resolved with regard to the access to the second cycle.
Bulgarian universities have implemented the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System and the
Diploma Supplement, but some obstacles still hamper mobility. A major challenge remains on the quality
assurance front. Bulgaria is ranked in the lowest category for participation of students in the quality
assurance process, and also scores low on international participation in the quality assessment procedures.
Notes: (1) The maximum score is 5 stars--the scorecard is expressed in ‘traffic light’ colors (from red to dark green) but
stars have been assigned here for clarity. (2) Since the 2005 conference, the Bologna Process has moved to a 3-cycle
system (i.e., BA, MA, and PhD)
Source: Bologna Scorecard 2005.
7.24 Several reviews of higher education have been carried out in Bulgaria since 1989, and these have
led to some reforms of university governance through the introduction of two Higher Education Acts along
with numerous amendments. Until 1989, the university system in Bulgaria was closely controlled and
regulated by the government. The Autonomy Act of 1989 removed most of the controls, and succeeding
legislation changed the balance between autonomy and control close to another extreme.
7.25 The reforms gave university academics too much autonomy, and did not adequately satisfy the
government’s need for accountability. The governance framework is characterized by a number of
contradictions: (i) public universities can own assets, but they do not own the majority of their buildings;
(ii) the universities can appoint their own rectors through elections without interference, but the
government—until the reforms of 2002—required that all academic programs be approved and registered
in the state register; and (iii) universities enjoy freedom in the allocation of the financial resources they
receive from the government, and can carry money forward from one year to the next, while the Ministry
of Education and Science (MES) dictates the number of students that they can recruit. The ultimate
authority of the university resides in the University Council, a body comprised largely of the faculty of
the university, and presided over by a Rector, elected by the same faculty. This system of governance
ensures that universities are run primarily for the benefit of their faculty. The Rector is effectively the
Chief Executive, but instead of being accountable to all stakeholders (the tax payers, their elected
representatives, the students, the faculty, staff, and employers) the Rector is currently accountable to only
the faculty of the university. Furthermore, management experience of the rectors, when first elected, is
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often limited, and is generally not used as a criterion for their appointment. Major reforms to tertiary
education are unlikely to succeed unless the governance framework is changed.
7.26 The accountability of universities has several dimensions. First, universities receive substantial
funds from the government, and should be expected to show that the money has been properly and cost-
effectively used.142 Second, they are also to be accountable for the quality and relevance of their
programs, and at least in theory be subjected to the scrutiny of the National Evaluation and Accreditation
Agency (NEAA). Third, to ensure reliance on the market rather than detailed MES control, the
universities are expected to produce relevant information to ensure that all stakeholders can make
informed choices.
7.27 Public spending on tertiary education in Bulgaria compares favorably with EU8 and EU15. At
first glance it may appear that Bulgaria’s overall tertiary education expenditures compare slightly poorly
with EU8 countries (see Table 7.11). The proportion of GDP devoted to tertiary education declined
through the 1990s, was reversed in the late 1990s, but at 0.9 percent of GDP in 2004 was just slightly
below the EU8 average level of one percent of GDP. However, a closer look at the expenditures on
tertiary education per student and as percentage of the per capita GDP reveals that public spending per
student compares favorably, and in fact exceeds, the levels in EU8 countries and the EU15 average (see
Figure 7.2). The relatively high level of spending per student is explained by the low student-teacher
ratio mentioned earlier, and resulting large spending on faculty salaries.
Figure 7.2: Public Spending per Full-time Tertiary Student in 2005, percent of
GDP per capita (source: Eurostat)
60 54.5
50 39.2 35.7
37.4 33 33 35.8 34.9 34.8 34.9 37.4
40
percent
30
20
10
0
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Slovak R.
Hungary
Poland
EU8
EU15
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Czech R.
7.28 Most European countries have come to accept that the beneficiaries of tertiary education have to
contribute a fair share of the cost of their education through tuition fees, and not expect tertiary education
to be fully subsidized by the state. This is viewed to increase the accountability of universities to students
while also reducing the burden on the state budget. Having beneficiaries pay for a meaningful part of the
education costs tends to increase the vigilance of students and their parents when it comes to the quality
of education delivered. To ensure that the tuition fees will not adversely affect access to university
142
Bulgarian universities are audited by MES, and are expected to account for the use of their funds.
121
education, in parallel student loan schemes have been established,143 or tax benefits.144 Further, to ensure
equal access to tertiary education, grants and scholarships as a form of non-repayable aid are provided to
the talented students from poor families.
7.29 The idea of tuition fees has been accepted in Bulgaria with little opposition. At present, students
pay a fee which can be as high as 30 percent of the cost of provision of education per student, according
to the Higher Education Act. However, in practice the fees charged are significantly less. They range
from BGN200-300 for Bachelor’s programs, to BGN300-400 for a Masters program. The universities
admit students beyond their state quota on the condition that they pay full cost. An estimated 25 percent
of all students in 2005 were admitted on that basis. Universities may charge the full cost for Master’s
degree programs, and about 35 percent of Master’s degree students indeed pay the full cost. This seems
to indicate that the cost of education is not, at least at the present levels, a deterrent in Bulgaria.
7.30 The present funding mechanism provides little incentive for universities to develop relevant
programs, improve the quality of the learning environment or provide better services to students. Until
recently, Bulgarian institutions of higher education have been funded using a framework of “deficit
financing”: budget allocation for the current fiscal year being based on the previous year’s budget, but
taking into account the cost of universities’ additional inputs, and approved enrolment targets. In 2003,
the funding mechanism was amended to include the following reforms: (a) the provision of enrolment-
based subsidy using the enrolment targets approved by MES; and (b) a subject-specific weight to reflect
the actual costs incurred by the universities in teaching costly subjects, such as medicine, engineering, or
defense studies. MES provides funding to the universities using a program-weighted funding formula,
which is summarized in Table 7.12. In sum, what this amounts to is that the government simply divides
the number of student places among universities irrespective of their reputation and quality of their
programs.
143
Salmi and Hauptman (2006) Innovation in Tertiary Education Financing: A Comparative Evaluation of
Allocation Mechanisms, The World Bank. Student loan scheme are provided in over 60 countries around the world.
They vary along a number of dimensions: the source of capital, the type of expenses covered, student eligibility
criteria, and institutions eligibility criteria.
144
Tax benefits have been introduced in Europe and North America. They are intended to help families offset a
portion of the tuition fees paid for a son or daughter attending a university or tertiary institution.
122
Table 7.12: Funding Formula for Tertiary Education in Bulgaria
Discipline Weight Funding/ Student in BGN
Pedagogical Science and Education 1 696
Social Science 1.6 1,136
Natural Science and Engineering 2.3 1,600
Veterinary Medicine 4.3 2,993
Medicine 5.0 3,480
Security and Police Studies 7.8 5,435
Defense Studies 10.6 7,357
Source: Ministry of Education and Science- Datasheet (2006)
7.31 To provide appropriate incentives to universities, the government should consider adjusting the
formula slightly: instead of enrolment targets, linking the enrolment-based subsidy to actual enrolments.
While this would only be a minor change in the formula, its impact in terms of incentives would likely be
significant. Belgium for example is allocating funds based an actual enrolment with positive results.
7.32 In the medium term, to supplement the actual enrolment-based subsidy, a partial shift to
performance-based funding could be considered. Although a number of university vice rectors
interviewed indicated their readiness to consider the introduction of performance-based funding to
improve the quality, relevance, and responsiveness of university programs to the needs of students and
employers, arguments have been made by others that performance-based funding has disadvantages.
First, the attempt to link funding to the desired outcomes, such as the employment rate of graduates, or
greater responsiveness to market signals requires that the universities build the capacity to collect,
analyze, and document data and relevant indicators to validate their claim. This capacity is said not to
exist in Bulgaria. Second, the shift may have unintended consequences, as happened in Ontario, Canada,
where the incentive to prove the occupational relevance of college programs gave rise to an unwelcome
explosion in difficult-to-validate testimonials by employers. Third, many rectors of small specialized
institutions and universities expressed concern that performance-based funding will reward the larger
more powerful institutions at their expense. However, evidence from many OECD countries, including
Denmark, New Zealand, Australia, and many U.S. States and Canadian Provinces, overwhelmingly
indicates that there have been benefits outweighing the disadvantages from the introduction of a
performance-based component in funding mechanisms. Its strengths are the following:145: (i) it is
transparent compared to many other funding mechanisms, if the data for calculating the performance
indicators are publicly available, (ii) it provides a strong link between funding and public policy
objectives; and (iii) it encourages accountability in the use of public funds by linking results to funding
levels.
7.33 The autonomy of Bulgarian universities is reflected in their policies and practices with faculty
employment and work conditions. The university hires and employs faculty, and has complete autonomy
over their progress through the ranks, work load, and retirement. The retirement issue is a serious
problem, because many faculty members remain on staff past the retirement age. This is contributing to
the overstaffing in Bulgarian higher education, and the associated low student to staff ratio with two
negative consequences: (i) a substantial portion of the financial resources are used to employ
disproportionately large numbers of faculty, and as a result faculty salaries remain low and diminished
145
Salmi. J, and Hauptman.A (2006). Innovations in Tertiary Education Financing: A Comparative Evaluation of
Allocation Mechanisms. The World Bank. Washington, D.C.
123
funds are available for equipment, facilities, and learning resources; and (ii) there are little incentives for
faculty to develop new courses, and apply modern learner-centered teaching methods.
7.34 Bulgarian academics are not well-paid and are ageing, a phenomenon witnessed in many
countries, but one that needs to be addressed in an EU member country. This phenomenon is creating a
number of concerns. First, the low income discourages the best graduate students from pursuing an
academic career, given that they can earn substantially more working in the private sector. Second, the
poorly paid faculty members are forced to "moonlight" by accepting teaching assignments in other
institutions, especially the newly formed private universities, as mentioned earlier. The resulting lack of
commitment of these professors to their parent university, and the additional draw on their time when
teaching elsewhere, probably affects the quality of their teaching, and surely the time that they devote to
doing research. Third, the salary distribution in Bulgarian universities is skewed in favor of senior
professors, who are paid more than three times the salary of junior lecturers, adding another impediment
to the ability to attract young faculty. Finally, the ageing of faculty coupled with the lack of resources
leads to stagnation of academic program development and scholarly activities. Given all of this, as the
first step towards the reform, it would be essential to enforce the retirement rules to make room in the
system.
7.35 The high staffing levels have adverse consequences in terms of teaching processes, and program
hours. First, high staffing levels in Bulgarian universities have led to a teacher-centered learning
process—the teachers teaching, and the learners passively taking notes—instead of a learner-centered
process, which encourages a spirit of enquiry, independent thinking, and autonomous study. Second, to
justify the large number of teachers in their departments, academic managers approve structured programs
that often exceed 30 contact hours per week. This preoccupation with student contact hours and the
excessive in-class learning focus is not necessarily conducive to free enquiry that a learner-centered
approach requires. Endemic over teaching is often defended on the grounds that contact with the teachers
is the only way that students can learn in an environment where access to libraries, learning resources,
and the Internet is limited.
X. QUALITY ASSURANCE
7.36 The expansion of tertiary education in Bulgaria since 1989 and its slow, and sometimes painful,
conversion from an elite system of higher education to a more open and diverse system of tertiary
education, which includes both public and new private institutions, has given rise to a concern about
quality. Quality in tertiary education has been traditionally viewed as an institution and/or program-based
attribute. To ensure quality, governments typically make funding of public institutions and authorizing of
private institutions conditional on their securing accreditation from an accrediting body.
7.37 In Bulgaria, the government established the National Evaluation and Accreditation Agency
(NEAA) in 2004, with a mandate that includes both institutional and program accreditation. NEAA
regulates rather than controls the quality of universities. It also ensures that information is provided to
students and to all stakeholders to reassure them about the quality of provision, and to enable them to
make informed choices about programs and institutions. NEAA has eight standing committees covering
the following major disciplines: educational sciences, humanities and arts, social sciences and law,
economic sciences and management, natural sciences, mathematics and computers, technical and military
sciences, agrarian sciences and veterinary medicine, and healthcare and sports. These committees define the
criteria for institutional accreditation in three major dimensions: (i) the educational dimension, which
includes the goals and activities of the institutions, the policies and procedures governing the activities, the
framework for monitoring, evaluation, and quality assurance, and student services; (ii) the research,
development, and scholarly dimension, which includes the scientific research and creative initiatives,
student participation, and outcomes of these activities; and (iii) the institutional management dimension,
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which includes the overall organization of the institution, its human resources and intangible assets, the
educational resources and infrastructure, and domestic, and international cooperation initiatives.
7.38 While based on best practices in the European quality assurance agencies, the NEAA framework
have two major drawbacks. First, it focuses on evaluating inputs, and to a limited extent learning
processes, but rarely outputs and outcomes using tools, such as student and graduate satisfaction surveys,
and indicators. Second, the NEAA evaluation teams are staffed only by full-time university faculty, who
are assigned to evaluate programs in other universities delivered by fellow faculty members. No external
professionals representing the private sector are included in these committees. This is exacerbating the
governance problems in universities. NEAA needs to identify outcome indicators, and develop
mechanisms for collecting and evaluating them. NEAA should also include self-evaluation by
institutions and program faculty, and integrate it in its processes. Further, NEAA should make
information sharing and dissemination an integral part of its mission. The success of the agency depends
on the integrity of its standards, and the confidence that the tertiary institutions have in the integrity of
these standards and procedures. All institutions and their staff, students and their families will rely on the
integrity of the agency’s published information for making informed choices.
7.39 A modern knowledge-economy needs an adequate supply of skilled educated workers, and the
bulk of workers are expected to have tertiary education. There is extensive evidence that effective tertiary
education investment increases a country’s ability to make leading-edge innovations. Highly skilled
people are also usually adaptable in the face of changing labor market needs. Further, tertiary education
and research are among the key elements to promote European integration: through provision of skills and
knowledge that promote labor mobility, and through participation in the European Higher Education Area
(the Bologna process) and the European Research Area. Bulgaria should follow these trends and take
measures to increase the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of its tertiary education to promote
productivity growth.
7.40 Compared to other EU countries, Bulgaria’s tertiary education system is currently characterized
by a relatively large number of small and specialized universities, relatively low participation rates, lack
of program relevance, and weak accountability of universities. The often heard complaint about the lack
of relevance of programs and the knowledge and skills they impart to graduates, reflects the current
divide between universities and their external environment.
7.41 To address these issues and to strengthen the overall performance of the tertiary education sector
and facilitate R&D (as will be discussed in Chapter 8), Bulgarian authorities are in the process of
preparing a new higher education strategy. The aim of the strategy will be to improve the quality of
tertiary education, expand access, and leverage public and private resources. The reforms are expected to
focus on governance and financing systems, quality assurance, student admission policies, and expansion
of university R&D. Initial steps have already been taken in establishing the Matura as the university
entrance examination. In finalization of the strategy, the government may want to consider a set of short
and medium-term reform options. There is no single measure that alone would fix the system.
7.42 In the short term, the following four reform options may be considered, in the order of priority.
Of these recommendations, the first two options would be the most critical ones for improvement of the
performance of universities :
• Base the funding on actual student enrolments: To promote competition among universities
and thereby provide them with incentives to improve quality and efficiency, as the first step
the current funding formula could be adjusted so that instead of enrolment targets, the
subsidy is based on actual enrolments. This change in the formula is critical to promote
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competition and influence incentives. However, over time this kind of a formula could lead
to distortions such as enrolment beyond optimum levels, delays in student completion, and a
bias towards low-cost programs. Therefore, other complementary reforms should be
considered in the medium term, as outlined below.
• Strengthen university governance through the establishment of Boards of Trustees and a
Tertiary Education Council: To enhance accountability of universities in terms of quality,
relevance of programs, and use of resources, the Bulgarian authorities may consider
instituting a contemporary governance structure for tertiary education, embodying many the
reforms adopted in other EU or OECD countries. The governance reform would have two
parts:
First, change the role of government in tertiary education from directing and managing the
system to that of “steering from a distance”. This change would require the establishment of
a Council of Tertiary Education for the whole system, and perhaps two separate lower level
councils for its two sectors—the university sector, and the alternative (or non-university)
sector of tertiary institutions and colleges. These two councils would develop the appropriate
policies relevant to their sectors. See Figure 7.3, which highlights the proposed revised
governance framework. The Council of Tertiary Education would replace the existing
Council of Rectors. It would be an independent body mandated to develop and implement a
national strategy—and related policies—in tertiary education, and ensure that the practices of
tertiary institutions comply with them and serve the public interest.146 The proposed two-tier
framework is essential to ensure that the proposed new alternative tertiary sector (see Chapter
6) has a distinct and significant voice in the development of tertiary education policies in
Bulgaria. Lessons learned from the experience of OECD countries that have introduced
similar reforms over the past decades show the importance of such a two-tier governance
structure147. The linkages between the councils and other tertiary education bodies would
need to be determined during the preparation stage.
146
The Council’s mandate would include: (i) development of a national tertiary education strategy for Bulgaria; (ii)
development of plans to support R&D tertiary education institutions; (iii) forecasting the number of students
necessary for the country, and developing plans to rationalize enrolment in institutions; (iv) developing plans for
continuous upgrading and improvement of the capacity and resources of all publicly funded tertiary institutions; (v)
developing policies on public expenditures and funding of tertiary institutions; (vi) establishing the norms for
employment in tertiary institutions; (vii) overseeing and approving the work of NEAA (viii) overseeing the work of
the two other councils—the university council, and tertiary institutions council; (ix) submitting annual reports to the
Minister of Education and Science, and to the Council of Ministers on the status of tertiary education Bulgaria; and
(x) maintaining contacts with counterparts in Europe and in other countries. In other countries, a typical Council
consists of 15 members; 9 (5 senior public sector and 4 private sector representatives) appointed by the Government,
and 6 members representing the university council and the tertiary education council. In most countries, the Chair
of the Council is a private sector representative appointed by the Government.
147
The introduction of community colleges in Ontario in the mid-1960s, and the reform of higher education
governance in California in the 1980s.
126
Figure 7.3: Proposed Governance Structure for Tertiary Education
National Evaluation &
Accreditation Agency NEAA
University New
Institution
Second, establish a Board of Trustees for each university/tertiary institution and have them
appoint the heads of institutions. The Board of Trustees would govern the affairs of the
university/tertiary institution by: (a) developing broad administrative and management
policies for the institution; (b) providing broad direction and coordination to the development
of academic programs; (c) overseeing the efficient management of funds, property, facilities,
and investments; (d) appointing the rector, as a chief executive of the institution; and (d)
determining the representation of the institution on the Council of Universities/Tertiary
Institutions.148
MES has recently proposed to establish Boards of Trustees, but only with an advisory
function and with membership consisting primarily of faculty members. The implied (and
continued) lack of authority, because of the composition of membership, is a concern. While
these Boards, once in place, might be upgraded and provide proper authority, the concern is
that until then they would simply further entrench the existing interests. This could tarnish
the whole Board concept and make further adjustments unfeasible.
• Strengthen links with labor markets: The relevance of tertiary programs could be enhanced
by strengthening the links to employers. In many countries such links include work
placement of students with private and public sector employers during the studies, and
setting up strong professional orientation programs and services. These measures give the
employers an opportunity to assess the knowledge, skills, and competencies of students, and
the incentive to actively provide input and advice on academic program relevance. MES
could also consider providing incentives to institutions to establish Program Advisory
Committees (PACs) for all programs, and include employer representatives in sectors such
as engineering, engineering technology, business, or medicine. The mandate of the proposed
PACs would include: (i) validating market intelligence about the existing and future demand
for graduates of various disciplines; and (ii) providing advice on the knowledge and skills
148
In other countries, the Board of Trustees is typically composed of 15-20 members, depending on the size of the
institution. Two thirds of the trustees are typically appointed by the government to represent key external
stakeholders, including the government, employers, civil society, and labor unions. One third is elected members
who represent the key internal stakeholders of the institution: faculty, students, academic managers, staff, and
alumni. The chair of the board is usually appointed by the government from the roster of appointed members.
127
needed by employers. PACs and similar committees are used successfully in many EU
countries, United States, provinces in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
• Institute the Matura as access examination: To simplify the university application process
and thereby improve access to tertiary education, the government may want to consider
making the Matura a nation-wide end-of-secondary school examination and the basis for
university admission. As a side benefit, a nation-wide exit (school-leavers) examination
would also provide an objective basis for school evaluation. MES has already taken the
initial steps of this reform, and expanded the mandate of the Center for Control and
Assessment of the Quality of Education (CKOKO) to manage the Matura.
7.43 In the medium-run, the following reform options, which would require preparation and some
structural changes, would be worth considering. The reform options are listed in a descending order of
priority.
• Increase tuition fees, establish a student loan scheme, and review scholarship programs:
As the second step of financing reform, to provide incentives both to universities and students
to perform, it is recommended that the tuition fees are raised to the maximum level of 30
percent of the actual tuition cost per student, i.e. to the maximum permitted by law. In
parallel, to ensure that the access to universities will not be unduly affected by the increased
fees, a means-tested and/or income-contingent student loan system would need to be rolled
out together with a revised policy of existing scholarship programs to target qualified low
income students and to encourage enrolment in public or private tertiary institutions. Taken
together, these reforms would: (i) augment sector financing and potentially expand access and
make it more equal; (ii) provide incentives for students and their parents to demand value for
their money, and press for quality improvements; and (iii) improve graduation rates and
throughput, since students who pay or borrow money are likely to be more vigilant about
their studies.
• Introduce a performance-based component to tertiary institution funding: As the final step
of financing reform, the authorities may want to consider introducing a performance-based
component to tertiary funding, initially equivalent to 10 percent of the total state funding to
an institution, but increasing it to 20-30 percent over five years. The performance-based
component would be transparent, based on well understood set of indicators, and dependent
on the performance of the institution in the previous year, or the moving average of the two
most recent years. Performance could be assessed using key performance indicators (KPIs),
which would measure the success of the institution in achieving the agreed outcomes,
including cost-effectiveness of education delivery.149 This step would provide further
incentives to universities to improve quality, and avoid delaying student completion or focus
on low cost programs, if KPIs are appropriately selected.
• Consolidate universities and tertiary institutions: As discussed in this chapter, the large
number of small, single discipline universities is a concern not just from the fiscal point of
view, but above all for quality and R&D reasons. The large number of small universities
149
Examples of KPIs include: (i) a student satisfaction indicator (based on student surveys) measuring the quality of
the learning process, learning resources, environment, and student services; (ii) a graduate satisfaction indicator
assessing the graduates’ satisfaction with the institution and its programs, including the relevance and utility of the
education received; (iii) employers’ satisfaction indicator (based on surveys of employers of graduates of the
institution) assessing the occupational relevance of the education received; (iv) the employment rate of graduates six
months after graduation, which would measure the relevance of the program content for labor markets (taking into
account graduates who are pursuing further education instead of employment); and (v) a graduation rate indicator
assessing academic programs’ efficiency and throughput.
128
means that a large share of university funding goes to overhead costs finance administration,
which implies that less is available for equipment and materials, with adverse implications for
quality. Further, from the R&D point of view, a critical mass of researchers, usually across
disciplines, would be required, which could not be assembled in such small institutions.
Australia and Hungary provide examples of successful mergers by bold government action,
despite considerable opposition from the universities. The Hungarian reform focused on the
consolidation of 100 specialized institutions into about 30 larger comprehensive institutions.
In Bulgaria, the government may consider merging some universities to create a smaller
number of comprehensive universities with larger average enrolment than at present. The
aim would be to reduce the number of small, specialized universities, and increase the
student-faculty ratio to about 16:1 in all universities. An example of this kind of
consolidation would be the establishment of a second comprehensive multi-campus technical
university in Sofia by clustering the specialized small institutions of architecture, civil
engineering and geodesy; chemical technology and metallurgy; forestry; mining and geology;
transportation; and civil engineering. The consolidation or merger of universities is a classic
example of change management involving strong vested interest. Hence, it would need to be
managed by capable change managers using fair and transparent criteria. The benefits of the
consolidation or mergers would need to be articulated to all affected parties, especially to the
university faculty and rectors.
• Strengthen accreditation and quality assurance of universities and their programs: The
government may want to consider separating the institutional accreditation from the program
accreditation. NEAA should continue its work on institutional accreditation using the
framework developed. However, program accreditation would require the involvement of
international experts and professional organizations, which can add value in assessing the
quality of programs and in ensuring that the employers or employers’ associations are
included in the assessment process. An assessment by an external body would also have a
better chance of ensuring that program accreditation is rigorous, and that university faculty
members are not directly involved in the evaluation of their peers. In addition, it is
recommended that internal quality assurance units and procedures are established in each
tertiary institution to promote a culture of quality and ownership of quality assurance reforms.
• Continued teacher and faculty training: For the above mentioned reforms to produce
maximum results, they would need to be complemented with capacity building. While the
proposed reforms in governance would need to be accompanied with leadership training for
university faculty, in-career teacher development, and initial teacher education for
newcomers would also be warranted. For these purposes, MES may want to consider
establishing a Leadership and Faculty Development Institute (LFDI). The institute could be
established in one of the leading universities, based on a competitive bidding process.
129
Annex 1 : Bulgarian Institutions of Tertiary (Higher) Education
No University Location Students Faculty S/F
Group I: Public Comprehensive and Technical Universities
1University of Sofia (St Kliment Ohrdiski) Sofia 22,000 1,650 13.3
2St. Cyril & St. Methodius University Veliko Tarnovo 10,500 550 19.1
3Rousse University (Angel Kanchev) Rousse 8,000 500 16.0
4University of Plovdiv ( Paisii Hildendarski) Plovdiv 13,000 550 23.6
5Prof. Assen Zlatarov University Bourgas 4,000 320 12.5
6University of Shoumen ( Konstantin Preslavsky) Shoumen 7,200 360 20.0
7South West University (Neofit Rilski) Balgoevgrad 11,000 500 22.0
8Technical University Sofia Sofia 12,000 1,300 9.2
9Technical University Gabrovo Gabrovo 8,000 225 35.6
10Technical University of Varna Varna 6,000 450 13.3
Subtotal Group I 101,700 6,405 15.9
Groip II: Public Specialized Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning
11University of National & World Economy Sofia 20,000 550 36.4
12University of Architecture, Civil Engineering & Geodesy Sofia 3,800 420 9.0
13University of Chemical Technology and Metallurgy Sofia 3,500 380 9.2
14National Academcy of Music "Pancho Vladigerov" Sofia 600 65 9.2
15University of Forestry Sofia 3,500 250 14.0
16University of Mining & Geology ( St. Ivan Rilski) Sofia 2,600 230 11.3
17Higher School of Transport (Todor Kableshkov) Sofia 1,000 157 6.4
18Liuben Karavelov Civil Engineering Higher School Sofia 700 75 9.3
19Medical University of Sofia Sofia 4,000 1,970 2.0
20National Academy of Theatre & Film Arts (Krastio Sarafov) Sofia 540 106 5.1
21National Academy of Fine Arts Sofia 900 130 6.9
22National Sports Academy ( Vasil Levski) Sofia 3,000 260 11.5
23Rakovski Defense & Staff College Sofia 100 138 0.7
24Ministry of the Interior Academy Sofia/ Varna 550 160 3.4
25Higher School of Libarary & Information Science Sofia 200 60 3.3
26Trakia University Stara Zagora 4,000 490 8.2
27Vasil Levski Military University Veliko Tarnovo 550 250 2.2
28Demitar Tsenov Academy of Economics Svishtov 10,000 250 40.0
29Medical University of Pleven Pleven 750 320 2.3
30Medical University of Plovdiv Plovdiv 6,300 240 26.3
31Agricultural University of Plovdiv Plovdiv 2,500 205 12.2
32The University of Food Technologies Plovdiv 4,000 200 20.0
33Academy of Music, Dance & Fine Arts Plovdiv 1,000 108 9.3
34University of Economics Varna 8,700 270 32.2
35Naval Academy (Nikola Vaptsarov) Varna 1,100 121 9.1
36Medical University of Varna Varna 800 360 2.2
Subtotal Group II 84,690 7,765 10.9
Group III: Public Short Cycle Colleges
37College for Islamic Studies Sofia 400 50 8.0
38College of Telecommunication & Posts Sofia 600 52 11.5
Subtotal Group III 1,000 102 9.8
Group IV: Private Comprehensive Universities
39New Bulgarian University Sofia 8,000 240 33.3
130
40American University Balgoevgrad 825 66 12.5
41Bourgas Free University Bourgas 6,500 116 56.0
42Varna Free University (Chernorizets Hrabar) Varna 12,000 600 20.0
Subtotal Group IV 27,325 1,022 26.7
Group V: Private Specialized Institutions of Higher Learning
43European College of Economics and Management Plovdiv 600 30 20.0
44International Business School Botevgrad 650 25 26.0
Subtotal Group V 1,250 55 22.7
Group VI: Private Short Cycle Colleges
45International College of Albena Albena 150 30 5.0
46Higher School of Agriculture Plovdiv 700 20 35.0
47College of Management, Trade & Marketing Sofia 400 45 8.9
48College of Tourism Blagoevgrad 780 60 13.0
49College of Theatre "Lyuben Grois" Sofia 350 40 8.8
50Hristo Danov College of Commerce Plovdiv 750 28 26.8
51European College of Business & Management Plovdiv 1,100 42 26.2
52College of Economy & Administration Plovdiv 800 29 27.6
53College of Telematica Stara Zagora 440 25 17.6
Subtotal Group VI 5,470 319 17.1
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8. TOWARDS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)
STRUCTURES AND POLICIES SUPPORTING INNOVATION
8.1 The final piece of the productivity puzzle covered in this report deals with the R&D policies. As
mentioned at the beginning of this report, the available empirical evidence indicates that R&D
investments have a positive impact on productivity growth, among other things by enhancing technology
transfer. While the other factors already discussed—improving functioning of product and labor markets,
and strengthening the education delivery—are likely to have the largest impacts on productivity growth in
the short and medium term, Bulgaria will need to start paying increasing attention as well to its R&D
policies to sustain high productivity growth over time.
8.2 Scientific research, technological development and the ability to convert research results into
economic and social benefits play an increasingly important role in determining economic development
and international competitiveness of countries. Globalization and rapid distribution and transfer of
knowledge by information and telecommunication technologies have also made investments in
knowledge increasingly pertinent. This includes the generation and adoption of new knowledge created
by scientific research and technological development, investments in education and research, adoption of
best practices, and openness to social, economic, and cultural innovations.
8.3 Bulgarian R&D system faces many challenges and opportunities. The country’s recent entry into
EU has brought along new competitive pressures, but also new windows of opportunity for improving
R&D performance, and its operational and financial structures and instruments. Bulgaria joined EU at a
time when R&D activities are gaining momentum in EU strategies. The Lisbon Agenda formulated in
March 2000 sets the ambitious goal of making EU by 2010 "the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs and greater social cohesion". In Lisbon, and two years later in Barcelona, a number of concrete
objectives in terms of research quantity and quality were formulated. Box 8.1 summarizes these
objectives/targets, which are part of the so called Lisbon goals. Lisbon goals apply primarily at the
national level, since the bulk of R&D investments are made at that level. EU research programs account
only for about five percent of the total R&D investments by the member states.
8.4 Lisbon goals call for all EU member states to increase their R&D investment to three percent of
GDP by 2010, of which two-thirds—two percent of GDP—is expected to be financed by the private
sector. To achieve these goals, member states are to improve the environment for private research
investment, R&D partnerships, and high-technology start-ups. However, as can be expected, the quantity
and quality of R&D investment varies significantly across EU countries. As will be discussed in this
chapter, achieving these goals—in particular, the private sector investment goal—will be a significant
challenge for Bulgaria, and unrealistic to achieve by 2010. But Bulgaria may wish to quicken its pace of
progress in that direction.
8.5 This chapter will review the Bulgarian R&D and innovation system, assess its performance, and
identify options for its strengthening. To put Bulgaria’s performance on the R&D and innovation front in
perspective, Bulgaria will first be benchmarked against other countries in this area. This will help to
identify Bulgaria’s relative strengths and weaknesses in the field of innovation. After benchmarking, the
chapter will review select aspects of the Bulgarian R&D and innovation system, and highlight options to
strengthen it.
132
Box 8.1: Lisbon Strategy Targets/Objectives in R&D
1. Increase R&D spending to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. The share financed by business should
rise to two-thirds of that total (target set at Barcelona).
2. Network national and joint research programs on a voluntary basis around freely chosen
objectives and develop an open method of coordination for national research policies.
3. Improve the environment for private research investment, R&D partnerships, and high-
technology start-ups.
4. Harness new and frontier technologies, notably biotechnology and environmental technologies.
5. Introduce a cost-effective community patent.
6. Remove obstacles to the mobility of researchers, attract and retain high-quality research talent
in Europe.
7. Roll out a world-class research communications infrastructure.
8.6 To assess Bulgaria’s performance in R&D and innovation and to identify the country’s relative
strengths and weaknesses, Bulgaria is benchmarked first against the other European countries using the
European Innovation Scoreboard, and then against a broader set of international comparators using the
Knowledge Assessment Methodology. In addition, to get a sense of potential gaps in the Bulgarian
innovation environment, the structure of the Bulgarian innovation environment is roughly mapped out
and compared with the structure in Finland, which is one of the Europe’s and world’s leaders in
innovation.
8.7 The European Commission publishes annually a European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), which
evaluates and compares innovation performance of EU member states as well as Turkey, Iceland,
Norway, Switzerland, the US and Japan. EIS tracks 26 innovation indicators focusing on innovation
inputs and outputs. Innovation inputs refer to indicators measuring: (i) structural conditions for
innovation (which cover science and engineering graduates, population with tertiary education, life-long
learning, youth education, broadband penetration); (ii) investment in R&D (which covers public and
private investment, share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation, share of university R&D
expenditures financed by businesses); and (iii) innovation efforts at the firm level (which refer to
innovation by SMEs, early-stage venture capital, ICT expenditures). Innovation outputs in turn cover
indicators measuring: (i) application (which cover employment in high-tech services and in medium-high
and high-tech manufacturing, exports of high technology products, sales of new-to-market products); (ii)
the achieved results in terms of patents, trademarks, and designs. Based on these indicators a Summary
Innovation Index (SII) is compiled.
8.8 The 2005 SII results indicate that Bulgaria not only has a sizeable innovation gap to the average
EU25, but is also losing ground relative to the European innovation leaders. SII ranks Bulgaria 26th in a
sample of 33 countries (including a few outside the EU) in terms of innovation performance. Further,
Figure 8.1, which shows SII on the vertical axis and average growth rate of SII on the horizontal axis,
suggests that Bulgaria is falling farther behind the leaders. Countries above the horizontal dotted line had
innovation performance above the average EU25; and countries to the right of the vertical dotted line
experienced a larger than the EU25 average increase in their SII value. Based on this, Switzerland,
133
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany were the innovation leaders in Europe in 2005150, while
Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, and Spain were not just trailing behind, but actually losing ground.
0.80
CH
SE
0.70
FI Leading
JP
DK US
DE
0.60
2005 Summary Innovation Index
0.50 AT
UK BE
NL
FR
LU IS Average
IE
0.40 NO
IT
EE PT SI
0.30 ES HU
CY
PL CZ LT
BG MT
Losing 0.20 LV Catching up
SK
ground RO EL
0.10
TR
0.00
-5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
Dotted lines show EU25 mean performance. Average growth rate of SII
Source : European Innovation Scoreboard 2005 & European Trend Chart on Innovation -
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/tc_innovation_scoreboard.cfm
8.9 The results also suggest that Bulgaria has performed worse on innovation outputs than on inputs,
indicating poor transformation of inputs to outputs. This suggests that Bulgaria would be well advised to
focus its efforts on strengthening the gaps on the output side, instead of further strengthening the areas
where it is already relatively well rated. Table 8.1 below reports Bulgaria’s performance by indicator
relative to the EU25 average. The table indicates that Bulgaria is doing better on structural conditions and
investment indicators than on the others. According to EIS, strengthening the intellectual property regime
and transformation of R&D investments into marketable goods and services would be the areas requiring
urgent attention by the government.
150
However, the SII results show that the US and Japan are still significantly ahead of EU25. While the innovation
gap between EU25 and the US has remained relatively stable, the gap between EU25 and Japan has been increasing.
In the US and Japan the number of different types of patents and the share of population with tertiary education are
higher, and universities better integrated into the innovation process than in EU25.
134
Table 8.1: Bulgaria’s performance relative to EU25 by indicator
Indicator % of EU25 average
INPUT
Structural Conditions for Innovation:
Science and engineering graduates 68
Population with tertiary education 99
Broadband penetration rate --
Participation in life-long learning 13
Youth education attainment level 99
Investment in R&D:
Public R&D expenditures 57
Business R&D expenditures 8
Share of medium-high/high-tech R&D 96
Enterprises receiving public funding 12
Business financed university R&D 506
Innovation efforts at the firm level:
SMEs innovating in-house 36
Innovative SMEs co-operating with others 25
Innovation expenditures 38
Early-stage venture capital --
ICT expenditure 137
SMEs using non-technological change 20
OUTPUT
Application:
Employment in high-tech services 84
Exports of high-technology products 16
Sales new-to-market products 35
Sales new-to-firm not new-to-market products 32
Med-hi/high-tech manufacturing employment 71
Achieve results/Intellectual property:
New EPO patents 3
New USPTO patents 1
New Triad patents --
New community trademarks 0
New community designs 1
Summary Innovation Index, SII (2005) 56
Source: European Innovation Progress Report, Trend Chart 2006.
8.10 The World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) can be used to benchmark
Bulgaria in the area of innovation on a world-wide basis. KAM provides a quick assessment of countries’
readiness for the knowledge economy, and helps to identify areas needing attention. It covers 132
countries, and uses more than 80 structural and qualitative indicators to measure countries’ performance
in four areas: economic incentive and institutional regime; education; innovation; and information and
communications technologies. Investments in all of these areas are considered necessary for sustained
135
creation, adoption, adaptation, and use of knowledge in economic activities and production. Based on
these indicators, a Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) is then constructed.151
8.11 The most recent KEI ranks Bulgaria 41st among the 132 countries that were rated (while Romania
ranks 54th and Hungary 32nd). Denmark, Sweden, and Finland hold the top positions in KEI.
Comparisons over time—comparing Bulgaria relative to other countries in 1995 and today—suggests that
Bulgaria has been falling behind the world’s innovation leaders in the past decade. This reinforces the
EIS results presented in the previous section.
8.12 Comparison of Bulgaria with other European and Central Asian countries on innovation
indicators only (see Figure 8.2) highlights that Bulgaria is performing relatively poorly, in particular in
the areas of royalty and license fee receipts and payments, science enrollment, numbers of researchers
involved in R&D, total expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP (especially private sector investment in
R&D), university-company research collaboration, and firm level technology absorption. According to
the KAM methodology, these are the areas that would require attention to improve Bulgaria’s innovation
performance. On the other hand, the comparison suggests that FDI inflows as a share of GDP, science
and engineering enrollment, and manufacturing trade as a share of GDP are relative strengths of
Bulgaria’s innovation system.
Figure 8.2: Relative strengths and weaknesses of the Bulgarian innovation system152
8.13 Comparing the Bulgarian innovation environment—in terms of relative importance of various
resources, funding, and focus of R&D—with one of the European innovation leaders can be illuminating
and help identify the gaps in the system. Hence, Bulgaria is compared with Finland, and Figure 8.3
151
Variables are normalized on a scale of zero to ten relative to other countries in the comparison group.
152
The indicators are normalized from 0 (the worst) to ten (the best). Hence, the closer to the perimeter the
spiderweb is, the better positioned the country is relative to the comparison group.
136
roughly maps out the situation in these two countries. The horizontal axis describes the innovation chain
starting with basic research at one end and the research moved to the markets at the other. The vertical
axis in turn reflects a continuum from public to private funding. The size of different elements (different
color bubbles) indicates their financial weights in the system.
FINLAND BULGARIA
8.14 Figure 8.3 suggests that R&D in Finland is predominantly applied, business driven, and carried
out and financed by the private sector. In Bulgaria R&D is heavily focused on basic research, financed
largely by public funds, and carried out mainly by public research institutes and universities. R&D
carried out by businesses is quite modest in Bulgaria.154 This is just the opposite of the Lisbon goals, and
thus presenting Bulgaria with a significant challenge.
8.15 R&D done with public funding at universities and research institutes, and R&D with private
funding in companies form the basic elements of an innovation system, but they are not sufficient for high
performance. For innovation performance, these need to be complemented with public-private
partnerships, national and international technology transfer, incubators and science parks for starting and
growing research-based companies, and venture capital for financing start-up companies especially in
high technology areas. In Bulgaria venture funds and business angel155 funding by individuals are largely
lacking, and there is a disconnect between public and private efforts.
153
Note that in the case of Finland, “research councils” refers to funds allocated through the Academy of Finland,
(see paragraph 8.48), while in the case of Bulgaria it refers to the National Science Fund (see paragraph 8.33)
154
Table 8.1 highlights that business financed university R&D is high a share of total university R&D in Bulgaria.
However, this reflects the extremely low volume of total R&D carried out by universities.
155
Centuries ago traders exploring the world called the merchants financially backing their efforts as business
angels. The term was later used in the theatre in the context of financial backers who invested in a theatrical
production. Today, the terms is used to refer to individuals who invest their capital (and sometimes also business
skills) in a range of new and developing commercial ventures.
137
8.16 Funding structures in Finland emphasize the competitive elements in both basic and applied
research, and foster public-private partnership in applied research. For instance, the share of direct budget
funding of universities accounts for less than half of the total (that is, more than half of the funds received
by universities are allocated on a competitive basis). This is a result of about two decades of intensive
restructuring of the system, often accompanied with debates among the stakeholders. In contrast, the
share of competitive R&D funding in Bulgaria is still minor.
8.17 Further, compared to Finland, the different elements in the Bulgarian innovation system are
disjointed: basic and sectoral research is largely detached from R&D carried out by the private sector. It
would be important that the different elements in the innovation system link seamlessly but at the same
time have clear and distinct roles. In terms of Figure 8.3, this would mean the various “bubbles”
remaining distinct in their various remits, but growing much bigger in the case of Bulgaria and
overlapping (indicating collaboration).
8.18 It is important to note that there are large differences in the funding systems of different
countries. In United States, public funding is directed mostly to basic research, but also to defense goals.
In France, funding of the Centre National de Research Scientific, and to a lesser extent in Germany with
Max Planck Institutes, has been institutional, with competitive funding and public-private partnership
funding having emerged only lately. One would thus expect Bulgaria to evolve its own distinct system
that serves the country’s objectives, although the process of reaching them would be conceptually similar.
8.19 While Bulgaria may currently be trailing in rankings, rapid catching up is possible. The cases of
Finland, Chile and Korea are a proof of that, as well as some of the EU8 countries, which have increased
their rankings in the past couple of years. Many of these improvements in rankings were based on the
countries increasing R&D investments and renewing the related structures. Bulgaria has that opportunity
as well.
8.20 Taken together, the results of the above benchmarking and comparisons suggest that the key
challenge facing Bulgaria is to increase private sector investments and involvement in R&D and
innovation. In parallel, there is a need to make R&D efforts increasingly geared towards business and
industry needs so that their results are likely to translate into economic benefits—that is, to be
commercialized—through increased research collaboration between academia and business. Further, to
make that happen, the enforcement of the intellectual property rights regime would need to be
strengthened, number of researchers involved in R&D increased, and science enrolment expanded. What
measures should the Government take to address these issues and to encourage increased private sector
R&D expenditures and move them closer to the Lisbon targets? The next sections will explore select
aspects of the Bulgarian R&D and innovation system, and highlight options to improve their
performance.
8.21 The Bulgarian R&D and innovation system is in a period of transition, and new strategies, laws,
and instruments have been introduced in the past years. There are, however, still several old structures
dating from the earlier era of Bulgarian scientific research, which have not been reformed. To get the
maximum benefit from the new structures that have been introduced, it is essential that the reform of the
R&D and innovation system is continued and old structures renewed. With the recent EU accession, the
EU framework program for research can be expected to further shape the system, and the availability of
EU grants provides a unique opportunity to help finance the needed reforms.
138
8.22 Figure 8.4 depicts the current institutional structure of the Bulgarian R&D and innovation system.
This section will review its main components—the key policymaking bodies, financing instruments,
actors, as well as the overall strategies that are being pursued.
Figure 8.4: Institutional structure of the R&D and innovation system in Bulgaria
National Assembly
Committee on Education and Science
Council of Ministers
Note: Enterprises, BAS, universities and other government research institutions. Have been placed in the diagram to give a more
complete picture of the innovation system in Bulgaria. These entities are not subordinate to the Council of Ministers; no lines
connect them to the rest of the structure.
8.23 Bulgaria has two key strategies156 that lay out government’s policy in the area of R&D and
innovation. These are the National Strategy for Research and Development, and the National Innovation
Strategy.157
8.24 The National Strategy for Research and Development (NSRD), approved by the Council of
Ministers in May 2005 but not yet reviewed by the National Assembly, aims to help the integration into
the European Research Area. The document highlights the low level of R&D funding, in particular by the
156
Other relevant national strategies that partially cover R&D and innovation include the National Strategy for Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises Development and Promotion; the National Strategy for Life-long Learning in
Professional Education for the period 2005-2010; Human Resource Development Strategy 2000-2006; Information
Society Development Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria; Strategy for the Establishment of e-Government;
Strategy and Action Plan for Bulgaria’s Competitiveness on World ICT Markets; and the National Strategy for
Regional Development until 2015. These documents can be accessed at (www.government.bg)
157
In addition, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted a law on scientific research promotion in October 2003, which
stipulates that priorities for research need to be related to solving economic, social and human issues, national
identity and culture, the development of the engineering science, innovations, and new knowledge.
139
private sector; insufficient research infrastructure; low productivity of research; and the shortage of
managerial skills as the main challenges and issues to address. It maps out concrete mechanisms and
measures, which aim at strengthening the administrative capacity for forming a national policy towards
science; R&D funding; raising the profile of the scientific potential; creation of new knowledge in areas
that are traditionally strong and have won national and international recognition; increasing the market
demand for research products; and innovations on the domestic and world markets.
8.25 The National Innovation Strategy (NIS) was adopted in September 2004. Its objective is to
increase the productivity and value added created by the Bulgarian industry through creation of new
knowledge, transfer and implementation of contemporary technologies, provision of financial resources
for innovative products, and development of markets. The strategy envisages a series of financial and
non-financial measures for creation of a framework for a proper innovation policy. Of these, the main
financial measure to encourage innovation—the establishment of a National Innovation Fund—has
already been implemented. The key non-financial measures include the employment of young specialist
in SMEs, cluster development, attracting FDI in R&D activities, and establishment of technology parks.
8.26 The Ministry of Education and Science, and the Ministry of Economy and Energy are the key
ministries responsible for the implementation of the above-mentioned two strategies and R&D and
innovation policy in general. As shown in Figure 8.4, other relevant ministries, which address R&D and
innovation issues are the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry.
8.27 The Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for the national policy in the field of
research, and the National Council for Scientific Research (NCSR) is the key coordinating body for the
research policy. It is chaired by the Minister of Education and Science, has 19 members, including
representatives of other ministries, umbrella organizations of employers, scientists, and universities. The
council approves all major research policy documents, including the NSRD, and funding priorities and
programs of the National Science Fund.
8.28 In parallel, the Ministry of Economy and Energy is responsible for the development and
implementation of the national innovation policy, which contains several elements closely related to
R&D. The National Council for Innovation (NCI) is the central coordinating body for innovation issues.
However, unlike NCSR, NCI has less decision-making power and serves only as an advisory body to the
Minister of Economy and Energy.
8.29 This dual structure—two parallel strategies, two responsible ministries, and two coordinating
councils—raises concerns, since research and innovation are strongly related, and links between them
need to be strong. Although there are some links between the two advisory councils (namely, each
ministry is represented in them), a unified structure would arguably better support horizontal cooperation
among the various bodies. For example, in Finland, like in Bulgaria, two ministries (Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Trade and Industry) have the main responsibility for the implementation of R&D
and innovation policies, but there is only a single council (Science and Technology Policy Council) in
charge of strategic development and the coordination of the overall effort. This council is not under any
particular ministry, but functions as an advisory body to the Government, and is chaired by the Prime
Minister to underpin its importance and cross-cutting nature.158
158
The members of the council are from the government, academia, industry, and labor organizations.
140
8.30 Also, leaving the R&D and innovation policies to individual ministries would merit
reconsideration. While in Bulgaria the Council of Ministers oversees the activities of ministries,
coordination and policy issues are largely left to the ministries. Given their importance, the policy
questions related to R&D and innovation would need to be agreed at the level of the whole government
rather than at the level of individual ministries. Experience from other countries suggests that successful
implementation of R&D and innovation policies calls for consensus and support from the highest political
level, as well as from other public and private actors in the Bulgarian innovation system.
8.31 R&D and innovation are issues that require a long-term vision. The pursuit of this vision needs to
be based on societal consensus, and must hence involve all key actors and especially the politicians. To
educate these actors about the issues on which consensus is needed, a number of countries have
developed a continuous process of education for their politicians, high level policy makers, academia,
industry, labor organizations, and the media (see Box 8.2 on Finland as an example). These courses and
workshops have resulted in a better appreciation of the need of for substantial structural R&D investments
that pay off only in the long run. This is often difficult for politicians, who are elected for short periods of
time and are under pressure to deliver quickly. Nevertheless, the issue is so important that it must be
addressed. Potential availability of EU grant funds should make it easier to tackle it.
Since 1977 programs on economic policy management and national strategies have been organized to policy makers
in Finland. More than 1,500 policy makers so far have attended them. The participants include most members of
the Parliament during their first terms, other decision makers in the public sector, as well as industry, labor market
and media leaders.
The program lasts about two weeks, including visits to relevant organizations. Programs are structured to define
policy objectives and choose the policy instruments, such as taxation structures, allocation of resources in different
sectors, investments and incentives, and interest rate policies. About 20-30 lectures are given by the best domestic
and international experts, and followed by thorough discussions. The lecture series commences with fiscal and
monetary policies, proceeds to structural questions in different sectors, and concludes with long-term development
options. The most important part of the program is the exercise defining the policy objectives and the budgetary and
other instruments to reach them. This exercise takes the form of simulating the work of government, with the
workshop participants playing the role of key decision makers. The exercise is supported by competent economists
and simulation models of the national economy, typically the same models used by the Ministry of Finance and the
Bank of Finland.
Source: Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, eds, “Finland as a Knowledge Economy: Elements of Success and Lessons
Learned.”World Bank Institute, 2006.
C. Financing Instruments
8.32 In addition to private sector financing and direct budget financing, which primarily goes to
finance the established research institutes, there are two potentially important public instruments to
finance R&D investments in Bulgaria. These are the National Science Fund overseen by the Ministry of
Education and Science, and the National Innovation Fund overseen by the Ministry of Economy and
Energy (see Figure 8.4). These two funds are noteworthy because they operate and allocate funds on a
competitive basis, which is still relatively new in Bulgaria.
8.33 The government finances R&D at universities through the National Science Fund (NSF), which
provides funding on a competitive basis through seven instruments/programs: (i) a thematic project call;
(ii) a general project call; (iii) support to the young scientists and researchers, (iv) promotion of research
at universities (and between universities and the Bulgaria Academy of Science); (v) bilateral international
141
cooperation; (vi) fostering cooperation between science and academia; and (vii) scientific publications.
NSF’s flagship program is the annual call for Scientific Research, which accepts research proposals from
any field of science by both public and private institutions.
8.34 The National Innovation Fund (NIF) is the first proactive and purely innovation-related policy
measure in Bulgaria in the past few years. NIF finances on a competitive basis innovative projects in the
pre-market phase of product development, as well as some advisory services for enterprises. It is managed
by the Bulgarian Small and Medium-Size Enterprise Promotion Agency in the Ministry of Economy and
Energy.
8.35 While NIF is an important step forward in policy making and implementation, its initial budget of
EUR2.5 million is still too small to contribute significantly to the Bulgarian innovation performance.
However, its annual budget is projected to increase to about EUR50 million by 2013, which could be
expected to make a difference.
D. Key Actors
8.36 The key entities carrying out the bulk of R&D in Bulgaria are universities, the Bulgarian
Academy of Science, and the National Center for Agrarian Sciences. Both the Bulgarian Academy of
Science and the National Center for Agrarian Sciences are government-funded, and are currently by far
the most dominant actors in the R&D field. There are also other government research institutes, but they
are relatively minor. Also, as mentioned earlier, R&D conducted by private sector enterprises is still
limited.
8.37 Research at the universities: Research and university (including university hospitals)
collaboration with industry have slowly started to gain prominence in the agenda of universities. This is
consistent with NSRD. The 1995 law for higher education stipulates that universities are to carry out
basic and applied research in addition to educational activities. Traditionally, Bulgarian universities have
concentrated on their educational tasks.
8.38 However, universities face several challenges in trying to fulfill their mandate of having to
improve the quality of research and forge strong partnerships with the industry in R&D. According to
international evaluations,159 the quality of higher education has been in decline in the past decade.
Inevitably this has also had an impact on the quality of research. In addition, Bulgaria is facing other,
internationally shared, challenges such as unattractiveness of scientific careers among the younger
population, ageing of scientific professionals, and increasing pressure for the universities to actively
contribute to the overall economic and societal development.
8.39 The 1995 law stipulates that at least 10 percent of the funds allocated to universities should be
devoted to research. While there are no detailed data on investment in research by universities, the
universities are generally considered to spend less than that. According to the National Statistical
Institute, the total higher education sector investment in R&D was about EUR10 million. Research
activities of universities are often assigned to the Rector or Vice-Rector, or to specific research units at
the larger universities. According to the estimates by the Ministry of Education and Science, roughly half
of the university research is conducted on a collaborative basis and includes external funding.
159
OECD (2004b) Bulgaria: Research, Science and Technology and OECD (2003) Trends in Mathematic and
Science Studies (TIMSS).
142
8.40 The large number of small universities in Bulgaria160--that is, the fragmentation of the university
system—in relation to the size of the economy is also an issue, since it is not conducive to research
activities for which a critical mass would be required. Indeed, most university research is currently
conducted by the largest ones (for example, the Sofia University, Technical University, and the
University for the National and World Economy). These are the same universities that also actively
collaborate with industry and participate in EU research projects. It would make sense to have some
consolidation of the university system to improve the quality of research, in addition to the benefits that
this is likely to bring to the quality of education (see Chapter 7).
8.41 Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS): BAS is the leading and dominant research organization
in Bulgaria, and is responsible for the implementation of the large part of Bulgarian R&D policies. Its
central role is highlighted by the fact that it is the recipient of close to 70 percent of total government
R&D funding in Bulgaria. This central role in Bulgarian R&D is further amplified by the fact that the
private sector investment in R&D is so small.
8.42 BAS is a national autonomous association for scientific research, which includes 87 academic
institutes, laboratories, and other independent research units in natural sciences, humanities, social
sciences, and technical sciences. BAS has a Board of Directors, an Executive Board, and a General
Assembly as its governing bodies.
8.43 BAS currently employs about 8,200 people. Of these, 3,600 are trained scientists and 2,600
experts with higher education degrees. At its largest, BAS had a staff of about 16,000 professionals and
held virtual monopoly in Bulgarian science. After the collapse of the central planning system, BAS has
been shrinking in size. The staff has been reduced by 45 percent and the number of units by 27 percent.
8.44 Being the largest research establishment in Bulgaria BAS accounts for more than half of the
scientific output of Bulgaria. It has the largest number of research contracts both from Bulgarian
organizations and from abroad, and has received favorable appraisals in international rankings of
scientific organizations. However, it can not alone respond to the R&D needs of the country. Bulgaria's
modest innovation performance is probably due to four major factors: (i) significant downsizing and
reorientation of BAS as a result of transition to the market system; (ii) Bulgaria’s still underdeveloped
business sector; (iii) weaknesses in the way R&D is funded; and (iv) weaknesses in the performance of
the university sector. Experiences of other countries suggest that additional funding and new funding
instruments can create R&D activities that better match the society's needs and can improve the overall
innovation performance. Increased university research produces graduates with research experience that
will increase competence and interest in R&D activities in corporations. In addition, increased corporate
R&D, driven by the forces of competition, and aided by government funding creates clientele for research
contracts that will also benefit BAS.
8.45 BAS conducts basic and applied research in a large number of disciplines. In both areas they will
face increasing international and global competition. This would require focused basic research efforts on
a more limited number of most promising areas, with strong international partners. This development is
manifested in most advanced countries by the establishment and focus of centers of excellence and the
increased funding for highly competitive frontier research in the EU programs. For educational reasons,
university research tends to cover a greater number of disciplines. Yet, in many countries, universities
too are increasingly focusing on their best units. In applied research and development work the leading
role should be given to the clients and industrial partners, in order to give more emphasis to the demand
side. Both wide strategic programs and product and process development projects are needed. To
enhance market potential and returns to investments in research, increased collaboration with and contract
160
In 2006, there were altogether 42 universities and 10 colleges in Bulgaria.
143
research from the private sector are the way forward. This can be facilitated by strong technology
research funding agencies, as has been the case in many countries Many European research organizations
would serve as good operational models to this end, such as Fraunhofer Gesellschaft in Germany, TNO in
the Netherlands, Sintef in Norway, or the Technical Research Center of Finland (VTT). These
organizations work in close cooperation with industries, service companies, and specialized government
agencies. They carry out joint research projects with domestic and foreign companies, provide advanced
technical services to companies, and exchange with them information and experiences on a regular basis.
Over two-thirds of their financing comes from external sources—from companies, public funding
agencies, and from EU research programs. Apart from strong industrial orientation, these institutes
continue to perform cutting edge basic research in certain fields, in order to maintain their
competitiveness in future technologies.
8.46 Today there are too many small institutions within BAS, and only some of them can be
internationally competitive. There is a wide range of performance outcomes, relevance, and scope across
the 87 research institutes. Some of the equipment in these entities is obsolete, and not conducive to
contemporary research methods. Some units are doing research in areas and sectors which are no longer
viable in Bulgaria. At the same time, some of the best ones have already received international
recognition, such as the status of a Centre of Excellence under EU FP6, but these are few. Overall,
however, resources are not necessarily optimally allocated and there is room for efficiency gains.
8.47 The institutional status of BAS is quite unusual when compared to its counterparts in other
European countries of Bulgaria’s size. Many countries have a network of government research institutes,
which have some similarities with BAS, but these institutes focus on applied research, and report to
various ministries according to the type of work being carried out by the institute. In other words, the
government research institutes are research arms of government sectors (such as, industry, agriculture,
forestry, environment), with the aim of producing data and knowledge of relevance to the strategic and
operational development of the sector.
8.48 Most European countries have a well-established research council system that provides
competitive funding for basic research. For example, Finland has an agency called the Academy of
Finland, but despite its misleading name, it is in fact a research council. It is a planning and funding
agency for basic research carried out mainly by universities, and it does not have research institutes of its
own. Of the Bulgarian organizations, it is NSF that resembles the Academy of Finland, not BAS.
8.49 Further, in other relatively small European countries including Finland, it is the universities that
are mainly responsible for basic research. These countries do not have separate research institutes for
basic research, such as BAS. This structure has been working well in these countries, and locating the
strongest basic research units in universities is a rather universal trend in the world.
8.50 In order to identify the needed structural reforms and a refocusing of BAS activities, a thorough
impact evaluation and functional review of all BAS institutes and functions would need to be carried out
by an independent evaluator. No such evaluation of BAS exists currently. Through a carefully planned
and implemented refocusing process, BAS could become more competitive, the quality of its research
could be raised to an even higher level, and its impact on the Bulgarian economy and society could
increase.
8.51 The Government would be well advised to increasingly shift to competitive R&D funding with
incentives for collaboration, and make BAS also increasingly compete for funds. Directing funding
increases to highly performing institutions on a competitive basis would provide incentives for reform
also from inside, and encourage collaboration and institutional mergers.
144
8.52 The National Center for Agrarian Studies (NCAS): There is also a need to review the role of
the National Center for Agrarian Studies (NCAS), and prepare an appropriate reform program for it.
NCAS is the other major government research institute in Bulgaria. However, unlike BAS, it is not
autonomous, but under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It conducts scientific and applied
research on agricultural issues in its 21 research institutes, and has a staff of over 3,600 people. NCAS
also provides consulting services and training. In addition to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
NCAS receives funding from its consulting and training activities.161 The Strategy for Development of
the Science in the Agrarian Sector envisages that the share of competitive research funding will be
increased. To this end, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has initiated 18 programs for the
development of integrated scientific projects.
8.53 Total investment in R&D amounted to about 0.5 percent of GDP in 2005. This was significantly
below the EU15 average of 1.91 percent of GDP and lower than the EU8 average of 0.82 percent of GDP.
Figure 8.5 below depicts the investment levels in select EU countries in 2005. As can be seen from the
figure, only Cyprus and Romania recorded lower total R&D spending than Bulgaria. Investment in R&D
in Bulgaria as well as in all the EU8 countries is substantially below the Lisbon target of three percent of
GDP. Total R&D investment as a share of GDP has remained largely unchanged since 2001 in Bulgaria.
1.5
% of GDP
0.5
0
EU15 Bulgaria Czech Es to nia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta P o land Romania Slovenia Slovakia
average Republic
8.54 The bulk of R&D investment is financed by the government and only a relatively small share by
the industry (see Table 8.2). This is opposite to what is observed in most EU15 countries and what the
Lisbon targets are striving for. In
2005, about 66 percent of total R&D Table 8.2: Investment in R&D in Bulgaria, percent of GDP
investment (0.33 percent of GDP) was 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
financed by the government, which Total 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50
was significantly above the shares in Government 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33
any EU8 country and the EU15 Industry 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.11
average of 10 percent (or about 30 Higher education 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
percent, if government financed R&D Private non-profit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Source: Eurostat
channeled through universities is
included). This is shown in Figure 8.6. In parallel, only about 22 percent (0.11 percent of GDP) of R&D
161
In 2004, NCAS carried out 255 scientific and research projects financed by the institute, 48 by the Ministry of
Education and Science, 43 by other organizations, and 153 contracts under international and bilateral cooperation.
145
expenditure was financed by industry, which was substantially lower than the EU15 average of 64 percent
and the share in any EU8 country, except Lithuania (see Figure 8.7). R&D investment by higher
education institutions accounted only for about ten percent of the total.
Figure 8.6: Share of R&D Financed by Government in 2005, % of total R&D investment
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Bulgaria P oland Romania Cyprus Slovakia Lithuania Hungary Latvia Czech Slovenia EU15 Es to nia Malta
Republic average
Figure 8.7: Share of R&D Financed by Industry in 2005, % of total R&D investment
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Slo venia Malta Czech EU15 Ro mania Slovakia Es to nia Hungary Latvia P o land Cyprus Bulgaria Lithuania
Republic average
146
8.55 This pattern of R&D financing—two-thirds funded by the government and the rest by industry
and higher education institutions—has remained broadly unchanged during the period 2001-2005 (see
Figure 8.8).162 Further, over 90 percent of R&D investment is used to cover current expenditures, and
less than ten percent goes Figure 8.8: R&D Investment by Sector, % of total investment
towards investment in capital. (Source: National Statistical Institute)
This implies that minimal
100%
scientific infrastructure 12.8 10 9.7 9.2 10
90%
investments have been made at 80% 18.5 20 23.6
21.3 22
universities or research 70%
institutions, which limits the 60%
50%
type of research that can be 40%
71.4
carried out. In other EU 30% 65.9 70.1 67 66
countries, capital investments 20%
10%
represent typically 20-30 percent
0%
of total public R&D investment. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
For example, in Finland, 27
percent of government R&D Government Industry Higher education Private non-profit
expenditures were spent on
research infrastructure and material investment. While Bulgaria’s pattern of investment may be
consistent with its stage in the transition process and level of income, to facilitate the country’s shift to the
next level of development and to raise productivity, increased private sector R&D would be called for.
8.57 About one-third of government R&D funds go to the ministries. The Ministry of Agriculture
receives about 27 percent of total funds, of which a large share goes to finance NCAS. The rest—about
four percent—goes to the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Economy and Energy.
In addition to NSF, the Ministry of Education and Science invests about the same amount of money as on
the NSF budget on what is called evaluation, development, and preservation of the Bulgarian science
162
However, the situation used to be different in early 1990s. The 1996-1997 crisis adversely impacted Bulgarian
businesses, and the share of industry-financed R&D fell from about 50 percent of total R&D expenditure to less than
one fifth.
163
In Figure 3.9, extra budgetary funds refer to international programs and grants not channelled through the budget.
147
potential. In the case of the Ministry of Economy and Energy, the funds finance primarily NIF.
However, the shares going to ministries have declined steadily in the past few years, while the share
going to BAS has increased.
8.58 The allocation of a major part of government R&D financing as institutional funding (that is, as
subsidies to maintain existing staff, facilities and equipment) suggests that the quality of government
R&D investment has not yet adapted to the needs of Bulgaria’s market economy. Only a small fraction of
government financing has been allocated to support what the government itself has defined as its priority
objectives, and of that only a small share is currently distributed on the basis of competitive selection
procedures.
8.59 In the last ten years, the share of R&D funding allocated to basic research has increased steadily
at the expense of applied research and
Table 8.4: Allocation of R&D Funds by Type of
experimental development164 (see Table 8.4).
Research, % of total investment
This trend is disconcerting, and opposite to the
1995 2003
trends in most EU countries. In recent years, Experimental development 20.4 15.5
most EU countries have increasingly shifted Applied research 54.7 46.7
public funding to application-oriented activities Basic research 24.9 37.8
and innovation, instead of basic research. Source: NSI
Bulgaria would be well advised to follow this
trend. Obviously, there will still be need for public investments in basic research as well, but the main
emphasis should be on applied work. The objectives of basic research should thus be carefully
reconsidered.
8.60 To increase industry’s participation in R&D, while also shifting the R&D focus increasingly to
applied research will be a formidable challenge for Bulgaria. In order to reach the Lisbon goal of R&D
investment of one percent of GDP financed by the public sector (one-third of total spending), a three-fold
increase in government R&D investment would be required, even if GDP remained constant. To reach
the goal of private sector R&D investment of two percent of GDP (two-thirds of total R&D spending), a
twenty-fold increase in spending by industry would be needed. It is obvious that the private sector will
not achieve this sort of an increase by 2010. It will take increased competition to provide firms the
incentives to invest in new technologies, and that will take years. Hence the public sector can be expected
to dominate Bulgarian R&D for a while. To shift the course so that the Lisbon goals can eventually be
met, a radical change in policy is probably needed.
164
Experimental development is the most applied form of research.
148
8.61 Governments around the world have experimented with various ways of enhancing private sector
R&D. Some governments have had the public sector undertake industrial R&D activities directly, but the
results have been discouraging in most cases. Government is rarely in a position to judge what type of
research would help firms and have market potential. Nor does it have the right incentives. Public R&D
also tends to crowd out private R&D, unless public efforts are carefully designed to complement private
activities. Some governments provide tax incentives, in-kind grants (for example, land), or cash grants to
encourage private R&D efforts. However, since in the case of subsidies, except cash grants, it is difficult
to estimate the costs involved, the process is effectively hidden from the public view, and becomes
subject to abuse.
8.62 As shown earlier, in OECD and EU15 countries, the private sector finances the bulk of applied
research and product development, even though public-private partnerships for R&D and knowledge
creation remain important. It is worthwhile to note that Finland and Sweden, which were among the
highest ranked in the EIS 2005, have high levels of private R&D and governments of these countries do
not provide substantial direct government or tax support to the private sector for these purposes. How
was this achieved? Much of the answer lies in the creation of an environment that makes it easy to start
and grow a business.
8.63 The challenge posed by the Bulgarian industrial structure: The current industrial structure in
Bulgaria, which is rather low-technology165, adds another dimension to the challenge of increasing
industry financed R&D. According to the Bulgarian Association of Industries, the R&D capacity of
Bulgarian industry is weak due to this industrial structure, in which low-tech SMEs and micro enterprises
dominate and their R&D capacities are limited. Most large companies are foreign-owned. Hence their
connections to Bulgarian universities or research institutions are only occasional, and their R&D is
conducted abroad. The machine-building sector has little domestic product development, and is largely
manufacturing for foreign companies. The same applies for other light industries in Bulgaria. There are
no large domestic chains in the tourism sector that could benefit from R&D. In trade and commerce,
large foreign chains dominate the market, with little development work in Bulgaria. Agriculture is a large
sector, but suffers from fragmentation into many small units. In short, there are few Bulgarian global
export products, and at the moment a limited number of companies have the capacity to carry out R&D
work, though they all could benefit from it.
8.64 The EU Trend Chart on Innovation 2004-2005 report on Bulgaria (EC 2006d) lists many of the
same factors as obstacles to innovation by Bulgarian enterprises: (i) low-technology product
specialization and export structure of the economy; (ii) predominantly low-technology employment; (iii)
short-term planning horizon of enterprises; (iv) poor human resources management system within
enterprises; (v) lack of venture capital schemes; and (vi) lack of policy schemes for high-tech
employment.
8.65 Experiences of advanced EU countries in the field of innovation yields the following lessons:
• competitive markets and the accelerating pace of scientific and technological change force
firms to innovate more rapidly;
• innovation increasingly relies on effective interaction between the science base and the
business sector;
• networking and collaboration among firms are now more important than in the past and
increasingly involve knowledge-intensive services;
165
Less than five percent of the manufacturing sector is high-tech.
149
• SMEs, and especially those based on new technology play an important role in the
development and diffusion of new technologies; and
• globalization is making countries’ innovation systems more interdependent.
8.66 These lessons suggest that the large SME base in Bulgaria is not necessarily a problem. What
may be the problem, rather, are some aspects of the business environment. As was discussed in Chapter 3
there are a number of weaknesses in the quality of the regulatory environment that, by not fostering
competition, reduce the pressure for innovating and raising productivity. Earlier sections of this chapter
discussed the weak links between the science base and the business sector. Other parts of this report
focused on measures needed to raise the quantity and quality of human capital. Much of the economy can
be efficiently run by using people with medium-level skills of the type learned in general secondary
and/or vocational schools. This includes to some extent the adoption of existing technologies. However,
development of new technologies or moving the country closer to the world technology frontier depends
on a large pool of people with higher education. A large proportion (at least 30 percent) of the labor force
of the most innovative and competitive economies have a tertiary-level education. Chapters 5-7 covered
the key reforms needed to raise Bulgaria’s quality of human capital, and Chapter 4 discussed the policies
needed in the labor market to make the continuous reallocation of labor from lower to higher productivity
levels as smooth and rapid as possible. When taken together, these measures would help create a business
environment that would attract private investment, both foreign and domestic, in the process intensifying
competition and thus creating incentives to innovate and raise productivity. Those will be the key
policies that, in the long run, will lift the level of industry-financed R&D towards the Lisbon targets.
However, there are areas in which the government may be able to assist in speeding up the process—one
of them is through the retargeting of existing funding.
8.67 Initiating a shift through government funding instruments: The government has recently
introduced incentives for private financing of R&D through the establishment of NIF and NSF discussed
earlier. These funds provide opportunities for public-private partnership in R&D by providing up to 50
percent of R&D project financing on a competitive basis. In the case of an applied research project, NIF
could finance up to 50 percent of R&D expenses (at most EUR250,000) over a period of three years.
8.68 The sizes of these funds would, however, need to be increased to have an impact on R&D and
innovation and the government would be well-advised to reallocate part of the current institutional
funding to these competitive funds. NSF still has insufficient volume to make a true impact on university
research. A national target with appropriate incentives would need to be set to increase the level of
competitive funding to about 30 percent of total university research expenditure. The purpose of this
would be not so much to raise the volume of research, but rather to raise its quality and hence impact by
increasing competition and thereby directing resources to high-performing units.
8.69 The establishment of NIF has been a significant step forward in boosting innovation in Bulgarian
enterprises but it needs to be developed further. As in the case of NSF, the funding volume of NIF would
need to be increased for it to have an impact. Also, in order to ensure that the funds are properly spent, it
would be important to strengthen the capacities to manage these funds. Professional assessment,
selection, monitoring and follow-up of R&D and innovation projects is of crucial importance. Further,
NIF planning would need to be strengthened. There is a need for broader strategic programming than
exists today to respond to the key industrial needs. The National Technology Programs of Tekes in
Finland166 provide one example of such programming, which might be useful as a successful example
when NIF is developed further. The promotion of public-private partnerships in R&D can be expected to
166
For more information, see www.tekes.fi.
150
enhance the chances of commercialization of research results, which is a problem in Bulgaria. Industry
involvement is likely to steer the R&D process in the direction of serving the business interests.
8.70 Additional innovation funding instruments to complement R&D grants could also be
experimented with. NIF is still young and the available set of funding instruments limited. The funding
instruments that could increase the chances of proper follow-up and commercialization include guarantee
schemes/collaterals, or equity loans. These instruments should be designed in a way that would encourage
collaboration between large and small companies, as well as between universities and industry.
8.71 Research, innovation and competitiveness are high on EU’s agenda. The EU grant funds, both
research and structural, provide a unique opportunity for Bulgaria to reform and develop its R&D and
innovation system. Bulgaria should take advantage of these.
8.72 EU Research Programs: At the EU level, the R&D allocations have been significantly
increased. The seventh Framework Program for R&D (FP7) for the period 2007-2013 has a budget of
over EUR50 billion, which is almost double the earlier program (see Table 8.5). FP7 has also a renewed
structure, including competitive basic research funding, increased international academic-industry
exchange of scientists and researchers, and building of research capacities in member states and at the
level of EU, and an increased collaborative research component. Bulgaria has participated in the prior
programs, and should continue doing so.
8.73 In 2004, about six percent Table 8.5: Budget of the EU seventh Framework Program
(EUR6 million) of the total R&D for Research, 2007-2013
expenditure in Bulgaria was financed FP7 Specific Programs EUR54,587 million
through different EU programs. Though Cooperation–Collaborative Research EUR32,292 million
relatively low, EU funding plays an Ideas–Frontier Research EUR7,460 million
important role in Bulgaria.167 If salaries People–Marie Curie Actions EUR4,727 million
and infrastructure support are excluded Capacities–Research Capacity EUR4,291 million
+ JRC non-nuclear research EUR1,751 million
and only research projects and results
+ Euratom–nuclear fusion and fission EUR4,061 million
are taken into account, EU research In + Euratom–nuclear fusion and fission EUR4,061 million
financing might have exceeded the
government R&D funding, given that the bulk of government funding goes to cover current costs.
8.74 EU grant funds: EU grant funds should be harnessed to advance Bulgaria’s R&D and innovation
agenda. The country’s National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) is operationalized through six
thematic Operational Programs (OP), of which three are linked to R&D and innovation: the OPs for
human resource development; regional development; and for the development of competitiveness.
Through these OPS, about six percent of all structural funds available to Bulgaria are proposed to be
allocated to R&D and innovation. In comparison, during the 2000-2006 program period Objective 1
regions invested up to 15 percent of their grant funds into R&D and innovation, and Objective 2 regions
up to 43 percent.168 Most EU8 countries allocated 2-10 percent. Since the emphasis in the current
program period is on R&D and innovation, these shares can be expected to increase.
167
EC (2006) ERAWATCH Research Inventory Report: Bulgaria.
168
Objective 1 promotes development and structural adjustment of regions, whose development is lagging behind—
that is, average per capita GDP is less than 75 percent of the EU average. Objective 2 supports economic and social
conversion of regions in structural difficulties, but other than those eligible for Objective 1.
151
8.75 The OP for human resource development covers the proposed allocation of available European
Social Funds, and treats R&D and innovation as a horizontal policy, which is supported in each priority
area. These include labor market policy (flexibility, innovative joint actions, start-ups), and education
policy (community initiatives in education and training to promote collaboration between education
institutes and the public, and quality of service delivery, ICT use, business-education system
collaboration, mechanisms to foster international collaboration in research, loan instruments to facilitate
research projects). The OP for regional development, which covers all development topics from the
regional perspective, focuses primarily on infrastructure objectives but also covers R&D and innovation.
About 30 percent of its budget is to be devoted to the Lisbon priority entitled “Establishing European
Area of Research and Innovation”. The OP for competitiveness is the main vehicle for direct support to
R&D and innovation, and several measures are proposed in that area. The program proposes to provide
financial resources to implement the goals of the National Innovation Strategy, and shift Bulgaria towards
a knowledge-based economy. This is to be done through: (i) promotion of R&D activities and
commercialization of innovations in enterprises (for example, through provision of equity capital); (ii)
protection of the intellectual property rights in Bulgarian enterprises and research institutions; and (iii)
development of pro-innovative environment supporting enterprises. In total, about BGN155 million is to
be allocated to these objectives. In addition, under the OP, cluster development activities are proposed to
be launched, which can also be expected to have an impact on R&D and innovation.
8.76 All these proposed measures are highly relevant and much needed. A recently published strategic
evaluation169 of structural funds in Bulgaria suggests the following actions to maximize the impact of
innovation and knowledge interventions: (i) facilitate project preparation capacity for example through
public-private partnerships, and targeted vouchers; and (ii) define clearly the innovation actions, and
establish a proper process of monitoring them. Above all, with the simultaneous introduction of many
new instruments and structures, attention should be paid to (i) competent management of resources, and
whether they adequately respond to needs of industries, and (ii) whether they support structural change
and economic progress of the country in the long run.
169
EC (2006c) Strategic Evaluation of Innovation and the Knowledge-based Economy in relation to the Structural
and Cohesion Funds for the Programming Period 2007-2013, Bulgaria. .
152
IV. HUMAN RESOURCES AND R&D AND INNOVATION
A. Availability of Researchers
8.77 Availability of well-trained researchers, scientists, and engineers is critical for innovation but, as
highlighted by the benchmarking at the beginning of this chapter, this is an area, where Bulgaria is
trailing behind. Having funds for
R&D investments alone is not Figure 8.10: Employment of Researchers by Sector, 2004
sufficient. As in other countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, the
deep social and economic
transformation of Bulgaria during Higher
the 1990s led to a significant education
shrinking and restructuring of the 28%
Bulgarian scientific system. Lifting
restrictions on emigration resulted Government
in a substantial brain drain from 59% Private sector
Bulgaria towards the US, Germany, 13%
the United Kingdom, and
Scandinavian countries. Scientific
activities and employment dropped
significantly. During 1995-2004,
the total number of researchers in
Bulgaria dropped by about 30 Source: Eurosta)
percent, even though the share of basic research funding increased over the same period. Most significant
drop was experienced in the higher education sector, where the number of researchers decreased by more
than 50 percent (from 4,905 to 2,362).
8.78 The share of science and technology graduates in Bulgaria, at 8.5 per 1,000 people (in 2004), is
significantly below the EU25 average of 12.6, Ireland at 23 and the United Kingdom at 18.170 Among the
EU8 countries, only Hungary (5.1), and the Czech Republic (7.4) are below that. Also, the number of
doctoral degree holders in science and engineering is small in Bulgaria, and fewer than half of those
studying for a doctoral degree ever defend a dissertation and complete the degree.
8.79 Further, the bulk of scientists—59 percent in 2004—is employed by government research
institutes, above all BAS (see Figure 8.10). About 28 percent were in universities in 2004. The share of
scientists in Bulgarian enterprises is lowest among the EU countries: only 13 percent of them were
employed by industry in 2004 compared to the EU15 average of 55 percent. As highlighted in the
benchmarking, the low number of researchers involved in R&D, and the declining pipeline of scientists in
light of a decline in the number of science enrolment in universities are concerns in the case of Bulgaria.
8.80 Apprenticeship system could be an effective way to encourage research work in enterprises,
particularly in SMEs. Currently, the industrial training periods tend to be a formality instead of being a
properly planned and implemented learning process. It also appears that the law on scientific titles and
degrees of 1972 should be revised to enhance flexibility and improve career opportunities for young
scientists. For example, the current law defines approval procedures for professorships, which are long,
burdensome, and do not encourage new scientific directions or multi-disciplinary approaches.
170
Eurostat, 2005.
153
8.81 Overall, the issue of availability of researchers and scientists is closely tied to the Bulgarian
university system. The reforms recommended for the university system in the previous chapter (Chapter
7) would help to address some of the R&D needs as well.
8.82 Although the best performing research institutions of BAS and Bulgarian universities have
already developed international connections, the majority of Bulgarian research units are still operating
largely on a domestic basis. Science does not recognize borders. Internationalization is thus an essential
element in improving the quality and relevance of research. There are many areas of research, such as
climate change and other environmental issues, mapping genomic structures and functions, designing
telecom and traffic instrumentation standards, where international collaboration is the only avenue for
successful research.
8.83 Bulgaria could take the advantage of various EU programs to develop and further strengthen links
with the international research community. Key instruments would be the EU Research Framework
programs and other international co-operation mechanisms, such as Eureka. To this end, there would be a
need to raise the general awareness of available EU instruments and their funding possibilities among the
Bulgarian research institutions. To ensure a reasonable success in gaining funding, some investment in
the preparation of competitive proposals would be required, though.
8.84 In addition, there is European collaboration in a number of science fields where research facilities
typically cost billions of euros. The following separate organizations have been created: (i) in particle
physics the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN); (ii) in space research the European
Space Agency (ESA); (iii) in astronomy the European Southern Observatory (ESO); (iv) in molecular
biology the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL); and (v) in synchrotron radiation the
European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF). While Bulgaria has been a member of CERN since
1999, it may want to consider joining some of the other organizations as well in the future.
A. Legislative Framework
8.85 The Bulgarian legislative framework for ensuring the protection of intellectual properties is
reasonably comprehensive, up-to-date, and consistent with the EU directives. In 2000, as the Bulgarian
intellectual property rights regime was renewed, the Government ratified treaties of the World
Organization of Intellectual Property, covering among other things software and the rights of artists. In
2002, Bulgaria joined the European Patent Convention, and obtained an observer status in the
Administrative Council of the European Patent Organization. During the same year further legislative
changes were introduced to address latest developments in ICT, digital technologies, and internet.
Further, new legislation to provide better protection on the development of pharmaceutical products was
adopted in 2003. Bulgaria has also been part of the Innovation Relay Center (IRC) Network since 1997.
154
8.86 Ineffective enforcement
of the intellectual property rights Figure 8.11: To what degree do you agree that the legal system
regime is a concern, however, and will uphold contract and property rights?
considered to be a barrier to
30
foreign investment and
innovation. This was also 25
highlighted as an issue to address 20
percent (%)
by the benchmarking exercise. A
15
large scale EBRD-World Bank
business environment and 10
enterprise performance survey 5
(BEEPS) of 2005 suggests that
0
problems remain with the fully agree agree in tend to tend to disagree in strongly
enforcement of contract and most cases agree disagree most cases disagree
property rights in general, with
only half of the surveyed firms considering the current legal system upholding those rights (see Figure
8.11). In addition to strengthening enforcement, increased emphasis should also be put on raising general
awareness about the importance of the protection of intellectual property rights.
8.87 In general, the Bulgarian culture is positive towards inventors—their social status has always
been high, although commercial benefits to inventors have been rare. According to the Bulgarian Union
of Inventors, there are about 10,000 inventors in Bulgaria. However, the economic impact of Bulgarian
patenting, both domestic and international, is limited compared to the impact of absorbed foreign
technologies through imported investment goods and/or foreign direct investment.171
8.88 In terms of the number of patent applications and the number of patents issued by the two major
international patent offices—the European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trade
Mark Office (USPTO)—Bulgaria lags behind EU8 countries. Following the 1997 crisis, the patenting
activity in Bulgaria began to recover in 2001 and has remained relatively stable for the last five years.
During 2001-2004, 18 patents were granted by USPTO to Bulgarian applicants (twice the number granted
in 1997-2000), and Bulgarian USPTO patent applications returned to the two-digit zone and marked a
historical record of 105 in 2004 (compared to the average of 40 per year in the 1970s and 1980s).
Similarly, the number of Bulgarian EPO patent applications increased from three in 2002 to 16 in 2004.
Yet Bulgaria clearly lags behind the average EU8 level in high-tech patenting. Most of the patenting
activity is generated by the government research institutions and universities.
8.89 The number of scientific publications per million inhabitants is also low in Bulgaria at 182
compared to the EU15 average of 673 (see Figure 8.12). Further, the numbers fell during 1996-2002
Slovakia was the only other European country that experienced a decline during the period.
171
ARC Fund 2006.
155
Figure 8.12: Number of Scientific Publications per million Inhabitants, 2002
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Switzerland 1757
Sweden 1598
Israel 1334
Denmark 1332
Finland 1309
Netherlands 1093
Island 1065
UK 1021
Norway 972
Belgium 929
Austria 871
USA 774
Germany 731
Slovenia 726
France 712
EU15 673
Ireland 647
Spain 567
Japan 550
Italy 545
Greece 458
Czech Rep 415
Estonia 379
Hungary 374
Portugal 339
Slovak Rep 291
Poland 266
Cyprus 209
Luxembourg 196
Bulgaria 182
Lithuania 164
Latvia 142
Turkey 103
Romania 84
Malta 79
8.90 Large foreign direct investments (FDI) in Bulgaria provide an opportunity for importing foreign
knowledge and technologies, and may have a positive effect on domestic R&D intensity. FDI stock in
Bulgaria increased more than three-fold between 2000 and 2005 in absolute terms, and more than doubled
relative to the country’s GDP (see Figure 8.13). The biggest recipients of FDI were the services sectors,
such as financial intermediation, communication, trade, real estate, and business services. These sectors
are usually the largest users of information and communication technology (ICT), and hence contribute to
increased technology diffusion in the country, and increased demand for high-skilled labor. In industry,
FDI was concentrated in non-ICT using sectors. Construction attracted most FDI, while FDI in
manufacturing was concentrated mainly in basic metals and metal products; coke, refined petroleum
products, and nuclear fuel; food, beverages, and tobacco; other non-metal mineral products; and, textiles
and textile products. While investments in ICT have been found to have positive effect on growth and
productivity, it is difficult to estimate their impact on the capacity of firms to innovate and to increase the
level of domestic R&D investment.
8.91 Data limitations do not allow analysis of the size and scope of foreign R&D stock in Bulgaria, but
the experience of some OECD countries suggests that the share of R&D funded and performed by
156
foreign-owned companies is increasing172. This has contributed to increased R&D of domestic firms
especially in countries where domestic policies create environment conducive to innovation—liberal
product market regulation, Figure 8.13: Inward FDI Stock
protection of intellectual property
rights, and education and labor Figure 7.13: Inward FDI Stock
market policies that improve the 10000 50
availability of skilled labor force. in million Euro
9000 %of GDP (RHS) 45
8000 40
VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 7000 35
6000 30
8.92 Despite major changes in 5000 25
the Bulgarian R&D and innovation
system in the last decade, 4000 20
• Increase the share of competitive R&D funding: Bulgarian R&D funding, above all by
industry, remains small and is below the targets set by the Lisbon agenda. Over time it would
need to be increased aiming at a better balance between public and private funding as well as
between institutional and competitive funding. Bulgaria has recently established instruments
for competitive R&D funding (such as NIF and NSF), but their share of budget allocations is
still small and dwarfed by funding that maintains existing institutions (e.g. BAS and NCAS).
Competitive funding has a number of advantages. It allows funds to be allocated directly to
new research areas, rather than having to achieve desired changes through existing research
programs of research institutions. It is likely to identify the best research proposals, and it
rewards active teams, who are likely to use the additional resources effectively. Also,
increasing the share of competitive funding would allow increased industry engagement in
the R&D process. Except for the funding of big science facilities, all international funding is
competitive, so why not establish and follow that practice at the national level.
172
Jaumotte and Pain, Innovation in the Business Sector, Economics Department Working Paper No. 459, OECD,
Dec-02-2005.
157
These programs could then be partly funded through the competitive processes. They could
also be linked with the EU technology platform programs, which aim to provide industries
with the best information about new enabling and generic technologies.
• Re-evaluate the role of the Bulgarian Academy of Science: All Bulgarian research institutes
would benefit from a functional and impact evaluation, but the Bulgarian Academy of
Science, because of its size and potential, needs it most urgently. The size of BAS, with its
87 research centers, is massive—one of the largest in Europe—and does not appear
particularly well justified in the current economic and industrial context of Bulgaria. It also
suggests that there is room for improving efficiency and effectiveness of government
resources. Some of the equipment and facilities in these entities is obsolete and not
conducive to contemporary research methods, and some units are doing research in areas and
sectors, which are no longer viable. Thus, a significant, but careful, reorientation of BAS is
recommended, along with a concerted effort to shift the research conducted by BAS
increasingly towards applied R&D, in order to respond to the needs of clients, including
industrial corporations. By a carefully planned and executed reform process, BAS could
become more competitive, the quality of its research could be raised to an even higher level
and its impact on the Bulgarian economy and society could increase. In addition to the
proposed re-evaluation of the role of BAS, efficiency gains might be achieved also by
reviewing the roles and responsibilities of NCAS and other existing research entities under
line ministries, which spend close to one-third of the government R&D budget. The role of
NCAS could be important given Bulgaria’s agro-industrial potential.
• Rethink the institutional R&D set-up. To keep up with the world and to become world-class
in some niches, Bulgaria would be well-advised to rethink its institutional R&D set-up. The
current dual structure—two parallel strategies, two responsible ministries, and two
coordinating councils—raises concerns, since research and innovation are closely related, and
links between them need to be strong. To promote horizontal coordination, the authorities
may want to consider shifting to a more unified structure and elevating the coordination to a
higher level of Government to give the issues greater prominence. R&D and innovation
issues and activities are connected to the country’s economic performance and will continue
to grow in importance as Bulgaria’s economy catches up with other EU economies, and
approaches the technological frontier in an increasing number of sectors.
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8.94 In the medium term, the following issues would need to be considered:
• Enhance industry-financed R&D: Enhancing industry investments in R&D offers the best
way to improve the performance and economic impact of the Bulgarian R&D. Currently,
R&D funding is unbalanced, with the government financing about two-thirds of all R&D
investments. This is exactly the reverse of the EU15 average, if one group together direct
funding of R&D from the budget with the indirect funding going through the universities.
While Bulgaria’s pattern of investment in R&D may be consistent with its stage in the
transition process and level of income, to facilitate the country’s shift to the next level of
development and to raise productivity, increased private sector R&D would be called for over
time. The challenge is how to get the Bulgarian industry to find it in its interest to raise its
R&D expenditures.
Given Bulgaria’s current industrial structure, a rapid increase in industry financed R&D is
highly unlikely. It will take time. The government can best promote industry-financed R&D
by providing an enabling environment that encourages it to increase over time. As discussed
in previous chapters, this will include above all ensuring that the regulatory environment
promotes competition and does not prevent entry and exit of firms, including those from
abroad, since contested markets force firms to innovate and raise their productivity in order to
stay afloat. There must be effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, and access to
input markets such as capital, materials, and information needs to be unhindered. Finally,
labor markets need to be flexible so that people can easily move from lower to higher
productivity activities.
• Encourage university research: The reform options presented in the previous Chapter for
the tertiary education system would not only improve education delivery, but also facilitate
R&D. In addition, university research could be boosted by linking the educational curricula
with research activities. This would help to introduce students to research methods, and
increase their interest and competence in professional work after graduation. Also, thesis
projects addressing development needs of companies should be actively encouraged. In
addition to promoting a shift to more applied research and practical problem-solving, this
would provide a recruitment channel for students and companies. As was discussed in
Chapters 4-7, strengthening the links between the higher education system and labor markets
is a priority.
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9. BUDGET AND CAPACITY IMPLICATIONS
9.1 All the reform options suggested in this report could be carried out within Bulgaria’s currently
projected budget envelopes for 2007-09. Investment costs could largely be covered by various grant funds
available from EU. This would require some co-financing from Bulgaria’s budget, but the total amount
might be on the order of EUR15-20 million, which is roughly 0.06-0.08 percent of GDP. Even these
amounts can likely be fitted into preliminary budget allocations for current Operational Programs (OP),
since they are all compatible with the OP goals. Additional current running costs of the options taken
together are miniscule compared to the potential savings. This leaves room for a good portion of savings to
be kept by the ministries concerned to give them incentive to carry out the reforms rapidly and efficiently.
The savings could be redeployed for other reform and quality enhancement measures. This implies the need
for leadership to make the case for the proposed reforms and build consensus. Since Bulgarian leaders have
already been thinking about and planning a number of these reforms, this should be feasible. This report has
tried to estimate some of the pay-offs to the reforms, which can be substantial, and thus help with the
process of setting priorities.
9.2 Costs of improvements in product market regulation (Chapter 3) were not calculated. However,
they are all mostly improvements in the way the relevant ministries and agencies think about the problems,
and implement the regulations. These can be handled through shifts in focus and budget allocations, but
within existing budget envelopes. There may even be some savings, for example, through reductions in
permits and licenses, since these require personnel for enforcement, who may no longer be needed. Pay-offs
to the proposed reforms are potentially substantial. By one set of estimates—assuming Bulgaria would
catch up with some of the best performers in the OECD—the ratio of private investment to GDP could
increase by up to two percentage points of GDP, and help raise labor productivity growth by 1.5-2 percent
per year. This would imply higher real earnings, as well as more jobs for the Bulgarian work force.
9.3 Proposed reform actions in the labor markets area (see Chapter 4) that would have any fiscal
implications have largely to do with ALMP activities. However, these can easily be expanded as the
direct employment program is cut back, and accommodated within the existing budget envelope.
9.4 The already on-going reforms in the primary and secondary education are estimated to be self-
financed through efficiency gains. Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.8) presents estimates that suggest that cost
savings from the reforms would be on the order of 0.1 percent of GDP in the first year, rising to the 0.3
percent of GDP range over the next few years. These funds can be re-invested into quality improvements in
that sector, including teacher training, improvements in facilities and teaching aids, reducing drop-out and
repetition rates, and higher teacher salaries.
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D. VET and Tertiary Education
9.5 The thirteen reform options in VET and tertiary education presented in Chapters 6 and 7 form a
comprehensive reform program around four themes: (i) increasing access to vocational and tertiary
education; (ii) improving the internal efficiency of the system; (iii) strengthening the capacity of the system:
and (iv) improving the quality and external efficiency of the system. Figure 9.1 presents the four themes
and the thirteen reform measures. The measures/options are numbered according to their sequence in Table
9.1, which provides a summary of the proposed investments, and anticipated annual savings and/or
projected annual current expenditures. The first four reform options in Table 9.1 refer to the VET system.
The rest refer to the tertiary education system and are listed in rough order of priority, ranging from short to
medium term actions (see Chapters 6 and 7 in this volume and/or Table 9.1 of the Overview volume)
Further details of approximate costs of the reform options are presented in Tables 9.2-9.8. Some of the
thirteen options have no financial implications or their financial implications cannot be determined at this
point. It is important to emphasize that these are rough estimates, and are presented here not as exact
numbers but rather as “orders of magnitude”. They do not include many expenses that may happen, but are
not now known. However, the big picture is not likely to change. The investments are presented in euros
because they could be mostly covered by EU funds under the appropriate OP. They are assumed to be
carried out between mid-2007 and mid-2010. Savings and/or recurrent expenditures are calculated in BGN
and are assumed to start in 2011. Although they would in principle continue indefinitely into the future,
they are likely to be important for only a few years.
9.6 Taken together, net savings (savings minus projected current expenditures) of the proposed
reforms—even under their “minimal” variant—are expected to pay for the investments in well under two
years. Even if the estimates of investments, additional costs and savings are off by a factor of two, the rate
of return of the proposed reform package is still high.
161
Table 9.1: Rough Estimated Costs (in 2007-2010) and Projected Annual Savings and Additional
Operating Costs of the Proposed VET and Tertiary Education Reform Program
Proposed Reforms Proposed Anticipated Annual Savings (BGN) Projected
Investment Min Average Max Annual
(Euros) Expenditures
(BGN)
1. Introduce student -- -- -- -- --
financing to VET
2. Rationalize vocational 6,650,000 12,960,000 25,920,000 38,880,000 0
secondary schools (Table
9.2)
3. Establish occupationally- 42,700.000 3,750,000 7,500,000 11.250,000 0
oriented regional colleges
(Table 9.3)
4. Establish a National 500,000 0 0 0 100,000
Qualifications Framework
and Authority
5. Base tertiary institution -- -- -- -- --
funding on actual student
enrolments
6. Strengthen university 360,000 0 0 0 150,000
governance (Table 9.4)
7. Strengthen links with 0 0 0 0 0
labor markets
8. Institute the Matura as 0 0 0 0 o
access examination
9. Increase university tuition 100,000 50,000,000 100,000,000 150,000,000 0
fees and establish a student
loan scheme (Table 9.5)
10. Introduce a performance- 100,000 30,000,000 30,000,000 30,000,000 0
based component to tertiary
institution funding (Table
9.6)
11. Consolidate universities 0 30,600,000 67,800,000 105,000,000 0
and tertiary institutions
(Table 9.7)
12. Strengthen evaluation 0 0 0 0 0
and accreditation of
universities and their
programs
13. Continued teacher and 500,000 0 0 0 200,000
faculty training (Table 9.8)
162
VET
9.7 Introduce per student financing to VET: To provide incentives for cost control, it was
recommended in Chapter 6 that as the first step of VET reform, the ongoing governance and finance reforms
in primary and general secondary would be extended to VET. Since further analysis on this would be
required, no cost and savings estimates were prepared.
9.8 Start vocational education only after the completion of compulsory education, and develop
curricula for VET that strike a balance between vocational and general studies: The rough estimated
cost of delaying the introduction of VET until the completion of compulsory education, which would
imply closing the vocational schools currently offering the early programs, and developing for the
remaining VET schools curricula that strikes a balance between vocational and general studies would be
about €6.65 million in 2007-2010. Projected annual savings from increasing the student-teacher ratio—
by closing some of the existing vocational schools, keeping students in compulsory education, and
expanding the size of the existing general secondary and remaining vocational schools—from its present
level of 10:1 to 15:1 are estimated to reach on average BGN27 million. They would range from a
minimum of BGN12.96 million to a maximum of BGN38.88 million, depending on the reduction in the
net number of teachers (see Table 9.2). The shift in the allocation of resources would be expected to
result in a more cost-effective operation of vocational secondary schools, with potential cost reduction of
about 10-20 percent per student.
Table 9.2: Rough Estimated Investment Costs (2007-10) and Savings (starting in 2011)
associated with the Rationalization of Vocational Secondary Schools
Item
Investment in the Period 2007-2010 (Euros):
Identify, develop and test 10 key new joint course streams 100,000
Procure equipment for new curricula for 250 schools 6,250,000
Training of Teachers 300,000
Total Investment Cost 6,650,000
Projected Annual Operational Savings (BGN) starting in 2011:
Scenario 1: 30 percent reduction in number of teachers 38,880,000
Scenario 2: 10 percent reduction in number of teachers 12,960,000
9.9 Establish Occupationally-Oriented Regional Colleges: The rough estimated cost of merging
select existing vocational schools and colleges into seven occupationally-oriented regional colleges would
be about €43 million for the period 2007-2010 (see Table 9.3), and is based on the following assumptions:
(i) 15 sq. meter/student for classroom, laboratory and workshop space; (ii) the occupancy rate of these
spaces about 65 percent; and (iii) the average refurbishing cost of €75/sq.meter. It is assumed that these
colleges would occupy already existing, but refurbished educational buildings. The assumed number of
the proposed regional colleges (7) is arbitrary and would be adjusted to reflect the facts on the ground at
the time of implementation, but their size (5000 or more students) is based on international experience.
9.10 The reform of higher education for example in Ireland and Ontario, Canada in the 1970s and
1980s show that, once established, these institutions can absorb 30-40 percent of the tertiary education
students. Most of these students would otherwise have gone to the regular universities. The expenditures
per student in the technical colleges average about 65-75 percent of the corresponding expenditures in the
university sector. In Ireland and Canada, teachers in these institutions are not required to have a Ph.D.—a
Masters degree with relevant work experience is usually sufficient—and as a result the cost of teaching is
163
lower than in the university sector. Further savings in public expenditures can also be achieved once the
quality and relevance of the new programs are ascertained and accepted by employers, because the
graduates can have access to employment after 2-3 years of education, instead of the 4-5 years (at least)
taken by a typical university student to graduate. To be conservative, the initial savings from this reform
option were assumed to be in the range of 5-15 percent of current average student unit costs, and it was
assumed that about 25,000 students currently heading for universities would, instead, choose to attend a
technical college. It is also assumed that the teachers needed for the new colleges would come from the
existing pool of teachers, and/or fresh recruits where necessary, but at no additional cost.
164
Table 9.3: Rough Estimates of Investment Costs and Annual Operational Savings
Item
Investment in the Period 2007 to 2010 ( Euros):
Refurbishing Facilities for 7 Regional Institutions of 28,000,000
5000 students each
Equipment and ICT Infrastructure 14,000,000
Other 700,000
Total Investment Cost 42,700,000
Projected Annual Operational Savings starting in 2011 (BGN) :
10% reduction in expenditures per student in new 7,500,000
tertiary institutions (25,000 students)
Net Projected Annual Operational Savings 7,500,000
Tertiary Education
9.12 Base tertiary institution funding on actual student enrolments: Basing the funding on actual
student enrolments would be expected to generate savings, and have negligible costs. However, further
analysis would be needed to determine the fiscal impact.
Table 9.4: Rough Estimated Cost of Reform of the University Governance Structure
Item
Investment in the Period 2007-2010 (Euros):
Governance Coordinator and support staff 60,000
ICT Infrastructure 100,000
Board induction training, plus cost of Boards of 220,000
Trustees and Boards of Governors
Total Investment Cost 380,000
Projected Annual Operating Costs 2011 (BGN) :
Governance Coordinator and support staff 30,000
Boards of Trustees and Boards of Governors 120,000
Annual Operating Budget (BGN) 150,000
9.14 Strengthen links with labor markets: The proposal would be to strengthen links with
employers by establishing Program Advisory Committees (PACs) for all university programs. PACs
would include employer representatives in sectors such as engineering, technology, business, or medicine,
165
following the practice in other EU countries. The mandate of PACs would be to validate market
intelligence about the existing and future level of demand for graduates of various disciplines, and to
provide advice on the knowledge and skills likely to be needed by future employers. It should be possible
to accommodate the cost of this process within the existing university budgets.
9.15 Institute the Matura as access examination: The proposed reform of instituting the Matura
exam as a basis for entrance into the university would be consistent with the goal of facilitating access to
tertiary education, and increasing participation rates. No cost calculations were carried out, since the
authorities already have plans to pilot the examination, and based on that annual costs of the nation-wide
examination and its management could be estimated.
9.16 Increase university tuition fees, establish a student loan scheme, and review the scholarship
programs: To increase the accountability of universities to students and to reduce the burden on the state
budget, it was proposed in Chapter 7 that tuition fees be increased in practice, and a student loan scheme
be established in parallel to ensure access will not be adversely affected. A rough estimate of additional
revenues from this measure would be about BGN100 million. The assumptions made in calculating this
amount are: (i) that the student portion of tuition costs would be 30 percent of the average per student
cost, or BGN900 per student; (ii) that at present, students pay only half of that amount—that is, about
BGN450; and (iii) that there are roughly 220,000 students attending the university. The student loan
scheme would, therefore, fund the extra BGN450 per student, which comes to roughly BGN100 million
(see Table 9.5).
9.17 The loans could be distributed according to a variety of criteria that would need to be decided.
But if access to higher education is to be maximized the criteria would need to include some sort of
means-testing, with the poorest students obtaining larger amounts than the students whose parents’
income is higher. It may also be decided that the level of tuition to be paid should be lower than 30
percent of the average cost. Further, the management of the student loan scheme would have a cost
(presumably it would be put out to bid to commercial banks that already have the infrastructure to
administer loans), as would the interest rate subsidy, if any, and the risk of non-repayment. However,
until the broad parameters of the scheme have been settled, they cannot be estimated. For all these
reasons, the ultimate savings from a student loan scheme are uncertain, and a range of BGN50 million to
BGN150 million was assumed, representing low and high variants, respectively. Nevertheless, regardless
of the criteria and the size of the scheme, there could be substantial savings from shifting the burden of
tertiary education financing partly onto students and away from the public purse, in addition to improved
accountability of universities to its clients.
Table 9.5: Rough Estimated Costs and Revenues (Savings) from Increased Tuition
Fees and the Student Loan Scheme
Item
Investment in the Period 2007-2010 (Euros):
Student Loan Expert and Committee to decide on recommended 100,000
approach
Total Investment 100,000
Projected Annual Savings from Student Loan Scheme starting in 2011 (BGN) :
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The rough estimated cost of setting up the performance-based funding framework would be € 100,000.
The projected annual savings would be accrued as a result of anticipated: (i) faster progression of students
through the system; (ii) reduced program and teacher contact hours; (iii) improved operational efficiency,
and increased student-teacher ratios. Assuming these led to savings of 2-5 percent of the annual budget,
the annual savings would be BGN30 million (see Table 9.6). The fiscal impact of adjusting the current
funding formula so that it is based on actual rather than enrolment targets is not calculated, owing to lack
of data on enrolment targets used.
Table 9.6: Rough Estimated Costs and Savings from Introduction of Performance-
based Funding
Item Cost/Saving
Investment in the Period 2007-2010 (Euros):
Funding Expert and Committee to decide on the recommended approach 100,000
Total Investment in Euros 100,000
Projected Annual Savings starting in 2011 (BGN):
Projected improvement in throughput or rate of graduation 6,000,000
(2% of graduating class)
Reduction in teaching hours by one contact hour per week/student 24,000,000
Total Projected Annual Savings 30,000,000
9.19 Consolidate universities and tertiary institutions: The consolidation of universities through
mergers or clustering of existing institutions could produce substantial savings in the operational costs.
For example, merging universities into 20-25 large comprehensive universities operating at a cost-
effective student faculty ratio of about 16:1 could reduce the size of the faculty by about 8,000 through
retirement and other incentives. This would bring the total size of the university faculty down from
24,000 to a more sustainable level of about 16,000. Estimated reductions in the annual operating costs
would vary from a conservative BGN31 million to an optimistic BGN105 million annually (see Table
9.7).
9.20 Strengthen evaluation and accreditation and quality assurance of universities and their
programs: To improve the existing processes and standards of university accreditation it was proposed
in Chapter 7 that the National Evaluation and Accreditation Agency (NEAA) would be strengthened. The
proposed reforms could be accommodated within the existing budgets of NEAA or MES, since the reform
concerns largely guiding principles and the process of program assessment and accreditation.
9.21 Continued teacher and faculty training: To ensure the quality of teaching, continued teacher
and faculty training was proposed to be established. Training would be carried out by the newly
167
established Leadership and Faculty Development Institute (LFDI). The estimated cost of setting up the
LFDI during 2007-2010 would be about €500,000. Subsequent annual operating budget is estimated at
BGN200 00 (see Table 9.8).
Table 9.8: Rough Estimated Cost of Continued Teacher and Faculty Training
Item
Investment in the Period 2007-2010 (Euros):
LFDI Director, managers, staff and consultants 150,000
ICT Infrastructure 200,000
Development of LFDI Programs/Courses 50,000
Delivery and Evaluation of LFDI Training Sessions 100,000
Total Investment 500,000
Projected Annual Operating Costs starting in 2011 (BGN):
LFDI Director , managers, staff and consultants 100,000
LFDI Program Delivery 100,000
Annual Budget (BGN) 200,00
E. R&D
9.22 Bulgaria has a long way to go to reach the Lisbon target of having the public and private sector
spend jointly three percent of GDP on R&D and innovation. The shortfall is particularly acute in the case
of the private sector. The problem is that private sector expenditures in this area come out of a process of
competition. They cannot be willed by the public sector. Chapter 8 considered what could reasonably be
done to provide incentives for enterprises to increasingly invest in R&D.
9.23 Most of the actions proposed can be undertaken within the currently proposed budgets for R&D
(these would grow slightly faster than projected GDP) with reallocations across activities. The only
action that could cost more is funds that would match efforts by the private sector to innovate, but these
must be proposed and driven by the private sector. This will take time, so there are no or minimal fiscal
implications for the next few years. However, should the private sector come up with a pleasant surprise,
the issue can easily be revisited.
9.24 The proposed reforms in this report are directly linked to two of the OPs under the National
Strategic Framework for 2007-2013. These programs are: (i) Development of the Competitiveness of the
Bulgarian Economy, and (ii) Human Resources Development. While some of the proposed reforms are
already included in the two OPs, others may be included subsequently or just reinforce the reforms
envisaged in the OPs.
9.25 The Competitiveness OP is consistent with the reforms outlined in Chapter 8 aimed at creating
incentives to firms to innovate and invest in R&D. The objective of the Competitiveness OP is to create
business environment conducive to higher productivity and efficiency of production. Specifically, it aims
at: (i) development of a knowledge-based economy and innovation activities; (ii) increasing efficiency of
enterprises and promoting supportive business environment; (iii) providing financial resources for
developing enterprises; (iv) strengthening the international market position of the Bulgarian economy;
and (v) providing technical assistance. EUR1.2 million has been allocated to cover the activities in this
OP over the period 2007-13, of which EUR988 million is from the European Regional Development
Fund, and EUR247 million of the state budget.
168
9.26 Out of the total amount, EUR156 million is allocated to activities aimed at developing a
knowledge-based economy and innovation activities. These include support for establishment and
commercialization of innovations in enterprises, protection of intellectual property rights, and investments
in innovation infrastructure—technology transfer centers, technology incubators, technology platforms,
and technology parks—or investment in equipment in research organizations. These activities are in line
with the reforms proposed in Chapter 8 for enhancing industry-financed R&D through subsidies, grant
schemes, and the encouragement of public-private partnerships.
9.27 The largest portion of the Competitiveness OP funding, EUR775 million, is allocated to efforts to
modernize technologies and management of firms, reduce energy intensity, information and consultancy
services to business, and business networking and clustering. These efforts are to focus on firms
purchasing or introducing innovative technologies, and introducing international market standards.
Special financial instruments for SMEs have also been envisaged under this OP, totaling EUR180
million. These instruments include guarantee funds, micro-loan funds, venture capital funds, and
establishment and/or upgrade of existing business angels’ networks.
9.28 The Human Resources Development OP is mostly consistent with the policies proposed in
Chapters 4-7 labor markets and education. The objective of the Human Resources Development OP is to
improve the quality of life through enhancing human capital, achieving higher levels of employment,
increasing productivity, and enhancing social inclusion. Specific objectives of this OP are: (i) promotion
of sustainable employment and development of inclusive labor market; (ii) increasing productivity and
adaptability of the employed persons; (iii) improving the quality of education and training and its
alignment with labor market needs; (iv) better access and integration to education and training; (v) social
inclusion; (vi) improving the efficiency of labor market institutions and social and healthcare services;
(vii) transnational cooperation; and (viii) support for human resources OP management. EUR1.2 million
has been allocated to finance the activities under this program over the period 2007-13, with EUR1.0
financed out of the European Social Fund, and EUR182 financed out of the state budget.
9.29 However, the impact of these activities would be further strengthened, if the proposed activities
were extended to cover policies and reforms suggested in Chapter 4. Close to 60 percent of the financing
is currently slated to direct at activities promoting labor market development, institutions, and outcomes.
It would be a pity if the effectiveness of those funds was compromised by the omission of some key
reforms. The rest of the financing of the Human Resources Development OP is allocated to activities
aimed at improving the quality and access to education and training.
9.30 Also, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system and to align it with the
requirements of a knowledge-based economy, the activities envisaged under this OP could be
complemented with education reforms suggested in this report. These include the extension of per
student financing to all levels of education, consolidation of secondary, vocational, and tertiary education
institutions; reforms in the governance of these institutions; and establishment of occupationally-oriented
regional colleges. These reforms would help further improve the access to education, improve the
quality, relevance, and external and internal efficiency of the education system in Bulgaria.
9.31 Much of the success of the reforms proposed in this report will depend on the capacity of
Bulgaria’s institutions. Many of the reforms are complicated, and have to deal with vested interests. No
matter how high the eventual pay-off to the proposed reforms might be, the short-term losers from the
reforms are likely to resist them. Hence one needs leadership to explain the value of reforms and reduce
resistance, and determined follow-through on implementation. That will involve many institutions and
many individuals at all levels of government.
169
9.32 Available evidence suggests that in a number of ways the capacity of Bulgaria’s institutions
relative to that of other countries is lagging. It is thus implementation capacity rather than the cost of
reforms that is a cause for concern. However, even that is a relative matter. Various indexes of
governance and implementation capacity are typically highly correlated with per capita GDP, so it is
likely just a matter of time before the capacity of Bulgaria’s institutions catches up with its per capital
GDP. The problem for Bulgaria is that, because of its convergence and demographic challenges, it has to
overachieve on the productivity growth front, and thus also in terms of its institutional framework that
would make the rapid catching up possible.
9.33 Perhaps the most complete source of evidence on Bulgaria’s institutional capacity is the Global
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum 2006). The 2006 GCR ranks the competitiveness of
125 countries around the world along dozens of dimensions, grouped into nine pillars (see also Chapter
3). Those in turn are divided into three broad groups: (i) basic requirements (that is, institutions,
infrastructure, macro economy, health, and primary education); (ii) efficiency enhancers (that is, higher
education and training, market efficiency, and technological readiness); and (iii) innovation factors (that
is, business sophistication, and innovation). Countries are also divided into five groups, covering the
various “stages of development” from “factor driven” through “efficiency driven” to finally “innovation
driven”.
9.34 Bulgaria is considered now to be in the “efficiency driven” stage (stage 3). Its world ranking in
2006 was 72, down from 61 in 2005. In the same sample of 125 countries, it was ranked as 56th in its
GDP per capita using the purchasing power parity method. The main factors dragging down its global
competitiveness ranking fall under four pillars: (i) institutions (pillar 1); (ii) market efficiency (pillar 6);
(iii) business sophistication (pillar 8); and (iv) innovation (pillar 9). This report has covered a number of
the issues concerning market efficiency and innovation in other chapters.
9.35 Bulgaria’s institutions received the weakest ranking of all nine pillars (109th out of 125 countries).
Of the 29 indicators on which the relative ranking of Bulgaria’s institutions is based, the ten that GCR
ranks as the most serious “disadvantages” (institutions being one of only two pillars that list no
“advantages” in the case of Bulgaria) are: (i) organized crime (ranking 118); (ii) reliability of police
services (ranking 117); (iii) favoritism in decisions of government officials (ranking 112); (iv) diversion
of public funds (ranking 108); (v) public trust in politicians (ranking 105); (vi) wastefulness of
government spending (ranking 101); (v) judicial independence (ranking 100); (vi) business costs of crime
and violence (ranking 97); (vii) burden of government compliance (ranking 92); and (viii) property rights
(ranking 91). The factors concerning organized crime, reliability of police services, and judicial
independence have been so prominent that they are already being attended to as urgent matters at the
highest levels.
9.37 Afonso et al (2006) analyzed public sector efficiency in new EU member states, using GCR 2003
data. The analysis covered 24 countries—EU8, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and 10 emerging market countries (Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, Singapore, South
Africa, Thailand and Turkey). Of these countries, all except Korea and Singapore are not far from
Bulgaria’s current stage of development. The analysis covered a set of indicators expected to reflect how
well the public sector has performed in different areas in which the countries spent public funds. The
170
broad areas covered were administration, human capital, health, income distribution, economic stability,
and economic performance.
9.38 Bulgaria ranked the lowest on the aggregate public sector efficiency among the countries
included. However, the sample period covered the ten year period preceding 2003. If data for only the
years since 2000 were used, Bulgaria’s performance in the economic, human capital, health, and income
distribution areas would have been at least average compared to other countries. This would leave only
the administration area ranked below the sample average. In that area, measured by aspects such as
corruption, red tape, quality of the judiciary, and the size of the shadow economy, Bulgaria ranked behind
all the other countries, except Turkey and Romania. On the corruption index, Bulgaria ranked above
average. The picture is much the same with the performance indicators related to the public resources
spent in each of the areas: Bulgaria again ranks at or above average in most areas. The only exception is
again the administration area, in which Bulgaria ranks lowest, on par with Romania and Brazil.
9.39 In terms of cost-effectiveness of resource use, Bulgaria could do much better. According to the
analysis, it could either achieve the same performance with only 50-60 percent of the resources, or it
could produce 30-25 percent more output with the same resources. This is consistent with the results of
PFPR of 2006 (WB 2006a), which argued that major efficiency gains should be possible in the use of
public resources. A number of countries in the Afonso et al study have been able to grow at rates as rapid
as Bulgaria’s in the past 7-8 years with public expenditures as proportion of GDP well below Bulgaria’s
levels. Much of this shortfall, of course, cannot be just due to deficiencies in administrative capacity, but
it does suggest that it is a problem.
9.40 The Government is aware of the administrative capacity problem, and is taking it seriously.
There is a law that covers administrative reform, as well as a strategy and an action plan. Also, binding
standards have been adopted for the quality of administrative services—these include, for example, what
the clients can expect, ranging from specifying the working hours for the delivery of services, how fast
the mail has to be answered, and obligation for civil servants to identify themselves in phone calls. Every
administrative unit has to adopt a Client Charter that specifies what is expected, and every six months the
various units are to report their progress in the delivery of services in an internet-based System for Self-
Assessment of Administrative Services. Further, plans for laying a basis for an e-Government are well
underway, which should raise the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of the process. Monitoring
and evaluation (M&E), and the indicators needed to do that (from inputs to outcomes) are now mentioned
in just about every document, with M&E to be done mostly internally, but from time to time to be carried
out by independent external evaluators. One can hope that the results will soon be visible in future GCR
rankings and other evaluative studies—but most of all, in the speed of Bulgaria’s convergence with the
rest of EU countries.
171
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