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Natural Resources and Environmental Law 25

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code).
Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of
patrimonial property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced (no
allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is
based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area
expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth.

11. Republic vs. Rosila Roche, G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010
Full text: ​GR No. 175846

12. People vs.Tensuan, G.R. No., 171136, October 23, 2013


Full text: ​GR No. 171136

FACTS:​In 1998, Aruelo representing Tensuan filed an application for registration of Lots. 1109-A and
1109-Band stated that these lands were inherited by her father Felix Capco and alleged as well that they
had been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the said lands
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 and many years earlier. In 1998, Tensuan filed
a motion to withdraw Lot 1109-B from the application and to amend such because a portion of the said
lot was a legal easement and MeTC granted Tensuan’s motion. The Republic, through the OSG filed an
opposition to Tensuan’s application arguing that neither Tensuan nor her predecessor-in-interest had
been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the said lands under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 and the subject property form part of the public domain
not subject of private appropriation. The Laguna Lake Development Authority also filed its opposition
which according to them the land sought to be registered remains inalienable and indisposable in the
absence of declaration by the Director of Lands as required by law. In 2004 MeTC granted Tensuan’s
Application for Registration and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tensuan has complied the requirement of an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the said lands under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
HELD: ​No, Tensuan has not complied with the requirement for possession and occupation of said lands. It
is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 26

land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The
CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring
public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the
DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Given the lack of evidence that
the subject property is alienable and disposable, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other
issue in this case, i.e., whether Tensuan has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Regardless of the character and length of her possession of the subject property, Tensuan cannot
acquire registrable title to inalienable public land.

B. National Environmental Council PD 1121


Full text: ​PD No. 1121

C. Philippine Environmental Policy PD 1151


Full text: ​PD 1151 Philippine Environmental Policy

D. Philippine Environmental Code PD 1152


Full text: ​Presidential Decree No. 1152, s. 1977

E. Reorganization Act of DENR EO 192 1987


Full text: ​Executive Order No. 192, s. 1987

1. National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission RA 3931 (PD 984)
Full text: ​Presidential Decree No. 984

2. Shell Philippines vs. Jalos, G.R. 179918, September 8 2010


Full text: ​GR No. 179918

FACTS: ​Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the Philippines entered into
Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years
later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the
well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed the construction and installation of a
pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea, from Shell’s production
platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals, claiming
that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 27

complaint for damages against Shell on the ground that their livelihood was adversely affected by the
construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint
alleging that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), not the trial court, has primary jurisdiction over
pollution cases and actions for related damages and that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of
state immunity without the State’s consent on the basis that it merely serves as an agent of the Philippine
government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves through Service Contract 38.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the PAB. CA reversed RTC’s
order upon respondent’s petition for certiorari. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but
the same was denied. Hence, Shell filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:​ Can Shell invoke state immunity, as agent of the Republic of the Philippines?
RULING: ​No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines. It is just a service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s
natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and supervision, it does not
follow that Shell has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law.
An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or
on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s
ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third persons.
Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government
for the purpose of transacting business with third persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of the
Philippine government but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural
Gas Project; it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for claims even without the State’s consent.
And as evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38, the Phil.
Government recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.

3. Maynilad vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019


Full text: ​G.R. No. 202897
Digest: ​Maynilad-Water-Services-v-Secretary-of-Denr.pdf

4. Summit One vs. PAB, GR No. 215029, July 5, 2017


Full text: ​GR No. 215029
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 28

Wala ako mahanap eh. Break ka muna! Drink your water hooman!
F. Local Government and Environmental Laws
1. Lina vs. Pano, GR No. 129093, August 30, 2001
Full text: ​GR No. 129093

FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on
September 18, 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the
following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon.
Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3)
an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining
the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE:​ WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto in the said locality.
HELD: NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna,
merely states the “objection” of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy statement on
the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit this in their petition.
As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
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premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent
mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna
as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the
local legislative unit concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source
of power, the national legislature.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise
to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a
game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would
seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as
lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of
government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will
necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.

2. DENR vs. PICOP, GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006


Full text: ​GR No. 162243

FACTS: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR
Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP
even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No.
43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by
then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA)
with PICOP.
ISSUE: ​Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which
the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
HELD: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
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3. Cordillera Global Network vs. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019
Full text: ​G.R. No. 215988
Digest: ​Cordillera-Global-Network-v-SM.pdf

4. Republic vs. Provincial government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018
Full text: ​G.R. No. 170867
Digest: ​Republic-of-the-Philippines-v-Palawan.pdf
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 31

ASSESSMENT Q&A:
1. What is the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental law?
➔ The Public Trust Doctrine, holds that certain natural resources, like water, cannot be owned
privately due to its inherent importance to the society as a whole. As such, the state is merely a
trustee which manages these natural resources for the benefit of the trust principal, which is the
current and future generations. Those who acquire rights in these natural resources hold these
rights subject to the trust and could not assert vested rights to use these rights in a manner
harmful to the trust. (Maynilad vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019)

2. Corporation ABC was charged by the DENR with violation of the Clean Water Act. The Pollution
Adjudication Board recommended a fine of 1M pesos against ABC Corporation which was approved and
issued by the DENR Secretary. ABC Corporation appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via rule 43.
Decide with legal basis in not more than 5 sentences.
➔ The appeal must be dismissed for prematurity for ABC Corporation’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies at the level of the DENR. The DENR Secretary’s Orders are appealable to
the Office of the President and not to the Court of Appeals. In the instant case, what is being
appealed by ABC Corporation is the order of the Secretary and not of the PAB. Hence. the appeal
must be dismissed. (Maynilad vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019)

★ NOTES
➔ The Pollution Adjudication Board chaired by the DENR Secretary is a separate office under the
DENR. In general, the PAB has exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of pollution cases,
including the imposition of administrative sanctions. However, the Orders of the SENR are
different from the issuances of the PAB. While under its 1997 rules, the PAB had jurisdiction to
impose the fine or administrative sanction on all cases of pollution, Section 28 of the 2009 Clean
Water Act bestows upon the Secretary, upon recommendation of the PAB, in cases of commission
of prohibited acts under and violations of the Clean Water Act, the power to impose fines, order
the closure, suspension of development or construction, or cessation of operations, or, where
appropriate disconnection of water supply.
➔ The role of the PAB in the imposition of fines for violation of Section 28 of the Clean Water Act is
restricted to a recommendation of penalty. The execution of punitive power thereunder remains
with the SENR. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the recommendatory role of the
PAB is dispensable. Its technical expertise in pollution cases such as the one at hand remains
crucial, and this expertise, the SENR definitely did not disregard.

3. The Malampaya Natural gas project is located 80 kms from the main island of the province of Palawan,
the closest LGU unit. Palawan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the National Government
asserting its share in the proceeds of the utilization of natural resources in the Malampaya project
alleging that pipelines passed through the province. Decide with legal basis in not more than 5 sentences.
Natural Resources and Environmental Law 32

➔ The Petition must be dismissed. The Local Government Code and the Constitution provides that
LGU shall be entitled to equitable share of the proceeds of utilization of national wealth within
their respective areas. In the instant case, the Malampaya gas project was not shown to be within
the territorial jurisdiction of Palawan. Neither can Palawan assert share in the products passing
through the pipelines since the natural resource was not extracted within its territorial
jurisdiction. Hence, the Petition must be dismissed. (Republic vs. Provincial government of
Palawan, G.R. No. 170867)

★ NOTES
➔ Constitution, Art. X Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas,
in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
➔ LGC, Section 289. Share in the Proceeds from the Development and Utilization of the National
Wealth. - Local government units shall have an equitable share in the proceeds derived from the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, including sharing
the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits

----------END OF PART 1----------

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