ALLUVIUM

FMM
Republic v. CA
132 SCRA 514

DOCTRINE: Article 457 of the New Civil Code states that, “To the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.”

Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken
place: (1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the rivers.

FACTS:
Tancinco (the “Tancincos”) are registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers.

On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed the application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond property (Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan Psu-131892).

However, on 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, representing the
Bureau of Lands (the “Republic”) filed a written opposition to the said application for registration.

On 6 March 1975, in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court,
the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration of Lot 3.

On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only
with respect to Lots 1 and 2.

On 26 June 1976, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lots (1 and 2) are accretions to the Tancincos’ fishpond
property.

On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals (the “CA”)

However, the CA, on 19 August 1982, rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
lower court.

Hence, the Republic filed this petition with the Supreme Court (the “SC”). The Republic
contended that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further down the riverbed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial
and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.

ISSUE:
Whether there was accretion to the fishpond property of the Tancincos. -- NO

HELD:
The SC agreed with the Republic’s contention that there is no accretion to speak of under
Article 457 of the New Civil Code.
The SC held that Article 457 of the New Civil Code which provides that “To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters”, requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion is
said to have taken place, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The SC emphasized that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. It held that this excludes from Article 457 of the New Civil
Code all deposits caused by human intervention.

It further held that alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. On the contrary, in the instant
case, there is no evidence to prove that the addition to the fishpond property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as
a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it by reclamation.

Thus, the SC granted the Republic’s petition, reversed and set aside the decisions of the lower
courts and ordered the Tancincos to move back the dikes of their fishpond to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.

NKVS
Grande v. CA
5 SCRA 524

FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at the
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia. Said property is
identified as Lot No. 1. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a
gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105
meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters, more or less, had
been added to the registered area.

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the CFI of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that
they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the
land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer, respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of
said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the land formed through accretion becomes automatically registered land of the
riparian owner. -- NO
2. W/N defendants acquired the property through prescription. -- YES

HELD:
1st Issue: NO, land formed through accretion does not become automatically registered.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the
old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners
of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically
registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby
making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not,
just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not,
by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility
of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration
and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain,
however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed
sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

2nd Issue: YES, the defendants acquired the property through prescription.

This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or
duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that
respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.
This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions
of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the
old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence,
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

CHANGE OF COURSE OF RIVER

Baes v. CA
224 SCRA 562

DOCTRINE: If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the
change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means.

FACTS:
The government dug a canal on a private parcel of land to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Baes and registered it under his name. Said lot was subdivided
into 3 parts: A, B, and C. However, Lot B was totally occupied by the canal. To resolve this, the
government gave Baes a lot exactly the same area in exchange for Lot B. It was near but not
contiguous to Lot C. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old bed of the creek.
Thereafter, the lots were resurveyed and subdivided wherein Lot A was designated as Lot 1-A
and B.

After years, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B on which Baes erected an
apartment building, was a filled-up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes claimed that they
own said lot as they became the owners of the old bed by virtue of Article 461. The government
rejects this claim and avers that sps. Baes had already been fully compensated for it when they
agreed to exchange their Lot B to another lot belonging to the government.

ISSUE:
Is Baes entitled for compensation for his lot which was totally occupied by the man-made canal
by virtue of Article 461? -- YES

HELD:
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to
natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course
of the river is effected through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by
the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the
Baeses for their loss. We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated.
Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of
Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because the two lots
were of the same area and value and the agreement was freely entered into by the parties. The
petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation because, as correctly observed by the
Solicitor General,. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the
creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of
the state. The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of
voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B
under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land was
needed for a public purpose.

Binalay v. Manalo
195 SCRA 374

DOCTRINE: For accretion to take place as a mode of acquiring ownership over the land, the
land formed should be directly adjacent to the land owned.

FACTS:
Guillermo Manalo bought parcels of land in Isabela; 8.65 hectares from was acquired from
Faustino Taccad and 1.80 hectares was bought from Gregorio Taguba. The parcels of land
were described as having the Cagayan River on their west.

During a cadastral survey conducted, the two parcels of land was consolidated into one lot and
was designated as Lot No. 307. But since the survey was conducted on a rainy day, a portion of
the land bought from Taccad was covered with water and was not included in Lot No. 37.

The Sketch Plan shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain
point to form 2 branches (eastern and western branches) and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrow strip of land. It appears that eastern branch of the river cuts
through the land of Manalo and is inundated with water during rainy season. The bed of the
eastern branch is the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to Manalo, and is, for most part
of the year (about 8 months), dry and susceptible to cultivation.

Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from it during the rainy season.
Being a portion of the land bought from Taccad, Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him
by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent. Petitioners
(Binalay et al) however claims ownership over the land as they have possessed it, occupied it
and have cultivated it.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative saying that 1.) it is part of public dominion and 2.) it fails to meet
all the requisites needed for accretion to take place.

First, it must be noted that Art. 70 of the Law of Waters defines the natural bed or channel of a
creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The periodic
swelling of the water was taken into consideration and it was concluded that the submerged
portion of the land during rainy days forms part of the natural bed of the river. In connection with
this conclusion, Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides that rivers form part of public dominion.

Second, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of 3 requisites: 1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). In this
case, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite Lot 307 across the river.

Lastly, SC held that it is difficult to suppose that a land with an area of 22.72 hectares resulted
from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. If Manalo’s contention is accepted, then
his land would have doubled in a span of 10 years.

All these considered, the Court held that the land in question is part of public dominion and
neither Manalo nor the petitioners were held owners of the land.

COMMIXTION AND CONFUSION

Siari Valley Estate v. Lucasan

97 Phil. 987

DOCTRINE: One who has stolen a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum
lost by the offended party. If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share.

FACTS:
Siara Valley Estate filed an action to recover 200 head of cattle that were driven to the adjoining
ranch of Lucasan, which the latter denied having appropriated or retained any cattle belonging
to the former. Lucasan alleging that there’s no actual evidence on the number of missing bulls
and that plaintiff’s cattle comingle with his. Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Siara Valley.

ISSUE:
WON Lucasan can recover his share of the cattle. -- NO

HELD:
Defendant’s cowboys and even his sons Rafael and Vicente- rounded up and drove plaintiff's
cattle into his pasture; he knew he had plaintiff's cattle, but refused toreturn them despite
demands by plaintiff; he even threatened plaintiff's men when the latter tried to retrieve its
animals; he harassed them with false prosecutions for their attempts to get back the company's
animals; he wouldn't allow plaintiff' s cowboys to get into his pasture to identify its flock; he
rebranded several Siari Valley cattle with his own brand; he sold cattle without registering the
sales; after some cattle impounded were entrusted to his custody as trustee, he disposed of not
less than 5 head of cattle among those he received as such trustee; lastly, he disposed of much
more cattle than he had a right to.

One who has stolen a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum lost by the
offended party. If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it
will lose his share.

Santos v. Bernabe
54 Phil 19

DOCTRINE: Article 381 of the Civil Code states: “If, by the will of their owners, two things of
identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case
the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.”

FACTS:
Plaintiff Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and appellant Pablo
Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain in defendant Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse. It does not appear that the sacks of palay deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse bore any marks or signs nor were they separated one from the other.

Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose C.
Bernabe, to recover the cavans and kilos palay he deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted, and the
attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found by
the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof
delivered to said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.

Plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's
filing the proper bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present
complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff acquired right over the mixture of cavans and kilos of palay. -- YES
HELD:
The sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in said warehouse at the
time of the attachment thereof and there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans
and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the
following rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:

Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if
the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or commingled.

The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of
the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who
deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans,
525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at at the rate of
P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION

HEIRS OF OLVIGA V COURT OF APPEALS

Gr no. 104813 Oct. 21 1993

FACTS
Eutequio Pureza and his father cultivated a forest land in 1950. The same land was surveyed in
1954 by the Bureau of Lands in the name of Eutequio Pureza and has since been known as Lot
13,Pls-84. However, Godofredo Olviga protested and claimed that 1/2 hectare of the surveyed
land belonged to him and not to Pureza. In 1960, Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot
13. Since his application had not been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said land to Cor-
nelio Glor. Unfortunately, the said transfer was also not acted upon by the Director of Lands for
undisclosed reasons.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for Lot 13 in a cadastral proceeding in fraud of
Pureza and Cornelio Glor. He also failed to disclose that the land in dispute was currently in
possession of the Glors. Angelita Glor, wife of Cornelia Glor, testified that she did not receive
any notice about the said proceedings. Glor then filed an action for reconveyance over Lot 13.

ISSUE
Whether or not the action for reconveyance has already prescribed

HELD
No, the cause of action should be considered to have accrued not from the date of registration
of the title of Olviga over Lot 13 in 1967, but on 1988 when the Glors gained knowledge of the
said proceedings. The rule that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years cannot be applied in this case because it only ap-
plies when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if a person claiming to be
owner of the property is in actual possession of the property,in this case the Glors, then their
right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. In Faja vs CA, it was held that the owner who is
in actual possession of the property may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is at-
tacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.

Pingol v. CA
226 SCRA 118

DOCTRINE: A vendee (buyer) in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring
suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not
necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
● 1969 - Pingol, the owner of a lot in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF
LAND (274.5 sqm) in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years. And
Donasco agreed to pay in monthly basis (for 72 months).
○ Both agreed that in case of default in the payment due the same should earn a legal
interest.
○ Donasco took possession immediately and constructed a house thereon.
● 1984 - Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000
downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161.
○ The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the
balance with Pingol.
○ However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount.
■ Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with
Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon
Donasco’s lot).
■ Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full
payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale).
■ With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale
was deemed cancelled, and the continuous occupancy of the heirs was only
being tolerated by Pingol.

RTC: ordering heirs of Donasco to pay monthly rental to Pingol

CA: ordering Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161 plus legal interest from heirs of Donasco as
payment to the land in question

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco. -- NO
2. Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title.

HELD:
1. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell.
The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that
the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to
the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donasco’s possession and construction of the house)
and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested
Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or
 rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the
expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made
upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has
equitable title over the property.

2. Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was
actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that
the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos
and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title
to property in ONE’s POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

SC: appealed decision affirmed

Titong v. CA
287 SCRA 102

DOCTRINE: The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be
"an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.

FACTS:
Mario Titong filed an action for quieting of title against Victorico and Angeles Laurio. Petitioner
alleged that he was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land. He claimed that private
respondents (Laurios), with heir hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing
an area of approximately 2 hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
The Laurios denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the
5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo
Espinosa, an adjoining owner of Titong’s land. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents,
declaring Laurio as the true and absolute owner of the property. Petitioner appealed to the CA,
the RTC decision was affirmed and the MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the action for quieting of title should have prospered. -- NO

HELD:
The SC held that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should
have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may
be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:

“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.”

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
the owner's title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for
quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding."
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that
other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same
action.

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other
course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an
"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the
property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the respondents, together with their hired
laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the
plaintiff and plowed the same. He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees.

Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property.
Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely
not one for quieting of title. In addition, when the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to
the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute.

CO-OWNERSHIP

PARDELL VS BARTOLOME
Facts:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the
existing heirs of the lateMiguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de
Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves withoutan judicial authorization or even extra judicial
agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. Theseproperties included
a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in
MagallanesStreet, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land
in Candon, Ilocos Sur.Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring
and returning to them one half of the total value ofthe fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from
the aforementioned properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that shenever refused to give
the plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar
areobliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta
Street.
Issue:
Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said property
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property
was a mere exercise oftheir right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-
owner’s right of use is that he must use it in such a way so
as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to provide
proof that by the occupation ofthe spouses Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same

GATCHALIAN VS COLLECTOR

Facts:Plaintiffs purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly authorized agents of
the National CharitySweepstakes Office one ticket for the sum of two pesos (P2), said ticket was
registered in the name of Jose Gatchalian andCompany.The ticket won one of the third-prizes in the
amount of P50,000.Jose Gatchalian was required to file the corresponding income tax return covering
the prize won. Defendant-Collector madeanassessment against Jose Gatchalian and Co. requesting the
payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the deputy provincial treasurer ofPulilan, Bulacan. Plaintiffs,
however through counsel made a request for exemption. It was denied.Plaintiffs failed to pay the
amount due, hence a warrant of distraint and levy was issued. Plaintiffs paid under protest a part of the
taxand penalties to avoid the effects of the warrant. A request that the balance be paid by plaintiffs in
installments was made. This wasgranted on the condition that a bond be filed.Plaintiffs failed in their
installment payments. Hence a request for execution of the warrant of distraint and levy wasmade.
Plaintiffspaid under protest to avoid the execution. A claim for refund was made by the plaintiffs, which
was dismissed, hence the appeal.

Issue:

 Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership hence liable for Income tax.

Held:

 Yes. According to the stipulation facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because
each of them put upmoney to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize
which they may win, as they did in fact in theamount of P50,000. The partnership was not only formed,
but upon the organization thereof and the winning of the prize, JoseGatchalian personally appeared in
the office of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collectionthe
prize, the office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said
partner, in the samecapacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the
plaintiffs organized and formed a community ofproperty only.

Siari Valley Estate v. Lucasan

97 Phil. 987

DOCTRINE: One who has stolen a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum
lost by the offended party. If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share.

FACTS:
Siara Valley Estate filed an action to recover 200 head of cattle that were driven to the adjoining
ranch of Lucasan, which the latter denied having appropriated or retained any cattle belonging
to the former. Lucasan alleging that there’s no actual evidence on the number of missing bulls
and that plaintiff’s cattle comingle with his. Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Siara Valley.

ISSUE:
WON Lucasan can recover his share of the cattle. -- NO

HELD:
Defendant’s cowboys and even his sons Rafael and Vicente- rounded up and drove plaintiff's
cattle into his pasture; he knew he had plaintiff's cattle, but refused toreturn them despite
demands by plaintiff; he even threatened plaintiff's men when the latter tried to retrieve its
animals; he harassed them with false prosecutions for their attempts to get back the company's
animals; he wouldn't allow plaintiff' s cowboys to get into his pasture to identify its flock; he
rebranded several Siari Valley cattle with his own brand; he sold cattle without registering the
sales; after some cattle impounded were entrusted to his custody as trustee, he disposed of not
less than 5 head of cattle among those he received as such trustee; lastly, he disposed of much
more cattle than he had a right to.

One who has stolen a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum lost by the
offended party. If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it
will lose his share.