CIV PRO CASES-jurisdiction

CIVIL PROCEDURE – CASES RE: JURISDICTION
1. NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION v. ATTY. NARCISO MORALES, GR No. 222821, 2017-08-09

Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction[1]
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner North Greenhills Association, Inc. (NGA) seeks the review of the
March 13, 2015 Decision[2] and February 3, 2016 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131707,
which affirmed the February 17, 2010 Decision[4] and August 8, 2013 Resolution[5] of the Office of the President (OP) in
O.P. Case No. 08-1-004. The CA ruled in favor of respondent Atty. Narciso Morales (Atty. Morales), a resident of North
Greenhills Subdivision, who filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), docketed as
HLURB Case No. HOA-A-050425-0014, against the NGA for allegedly blocking his side access to the community park.
Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision in San Juan City. His house is located alongside Club Filipino
Avenue and adjacent to McKinley Park, an open space/playground area owned and operated by NGA. He also has a
personal access door, which he built through a wall separating his house from the park. This access door, when unlocked,
opens directly into the park. On the other hand, NGA, an association composed of members of the subdivision, organized
to promote and advance the best interests, general welfare, prosperity, and safeguard the well-being of the owners,
lessees and occupants of North Greenhills, is the undisputed owner of the park. It has acquired ownership thereof through
a donation made by the original owner, Ortigas &. Co. Ltd.
In June 2003, NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park adjacent to the residence of
Atty. Morales. Part of the design was a public restroom intended to serve the needs of park guests and members of NGA.
Objecting to the construction of the restroom, Atty. Morales filed on July 23, 2003 a complaint before the HLURB... he
amended his complaint and additionally sought the demolition of the pavilion which was then being built.
Atty. Morales alleged that for a period spanning 33 years, he had an open, continuous, immediate, and unhampered
access to the subdivision park through his side door, which also served as an exit door in case of any eventuality; that
having such access to the park was one of the considerations why he purchased the lot; that the construction of the
pavilion was illegal because it violated his right to immediate access to the park, Presidential Decree No. 957 and the
Deed of Donation of Ortigas & Co. Ltd., which required the park to be maintained as an open area; and that the restroom
constructed by NGA was a nuisance per se.
NGA, in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, rejected the assertions of Atty. Morales. It contended that as the
absolute owner of the park, it had the absolute right to fence the property and impose reasonable conditions for the use
thereof by both its members and third parties; that the construction of the restroom was for the use and benefit of all NGA
members, including Atty. Morales; and that Atty. Morales' use of a side entrance to the park for 33 years could not have
ripened into any right because easement of right of way could not be acquired by prescription.
the HLURB Arbiter conducted an ocular inspection of the park and noted that the construction started by NGA blocked
Atty. Morales' side access to the park.
HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision... ordering respondents of the removal of the pavilion and the relocation of the
common toilet in a place where it will not be a nuisance to any resident. Respondents are further directed to remove the
obstruction to the side door of the complainant. All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed
NGA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners
HLURB Board modified the ruling of the HLURB Arbiter... respondent NGA is ordered to relocate the restroom
constructed or being constructed in the McKinley Park away from the walls of any resident and where it will not block
complainant's side door access to the park.
NGA appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
OP rendered its decision, affirming in toto the ruling of the HLURB Board.
NGA moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the OP
Aggrieved, NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA
Ruling of the CA In its March 13, 2015 Decision,[10] the CA affirmed the ruling of the OP. It found no error on the part of
the OP in affirming the characterization of the restrooms built as nuisance per accidens considering that the structure
posed sanitary issues which could adversely affect not only Atty. Morales, but also his entire household; that even if there
existed a perimeter wall between the park and Atty. Morales' home, the odor emanating from the restroom could easily
find its way to the dining area, and the foul and noxious smell would make it very difficult and annoying for the residents of
the house to eat; and that the proximity of the restroom to Atty. Morales' house placed the people residing therein at a
greater risk of contracting diseases both from improperly disposed waste and human excrements, as well as from flies,
mosquitoes and other insects, should NGA fail to maintain the cleanliness of the structures.
NGA moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN IN RULING THAT THE TOILET
BUILT BY NGA AT THE MCKINLEY PARK IS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS, ON THE BASIS OF MERE
SPECULATION, SUPPOSITION AND PURE CONJECTURE, CONSIDERING THE TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE ON
RECORD TO PROVE SO.
RESPONDENT ATTY. MORALES DID NOT SET OUT TO PROVE THAT THE TOILET ADJACENT HIS HOUSE
INJURED HIM OR THAT FOUL ODOR EMANATED FROM IT BECAUSE HE MISTAKENLY ALLEGED THAT THE
TOIILET WAS A NUISANCE PER SE.
BY FAILING TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE THAT THE TOILET, IN ANY WAY, ANNOYED RESPONDENT'S SENSES, OR
THAT FOUL ODOR EMANATED FROM IT, OR THAT IT POSED SANITARY ISSUES DETRIMENTAL TO HIS FAMILY'S
HEALTH - THE SUBJECT TOILET CANNOT BE LEGALLY CONSIDERED NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS.
1.WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE HLURB HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FILED
BY ATTY. MORALES;
2. WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RESTROOM BUILT BY NGA INSIDE THE MCKINLEY PARK
IS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS;
3. WHETHER NGA HAS THE RIGHT TO BLOCK ATTY. MORALES' ACCESS TO THE PARK; AND
4. WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM OF NGA AGAINST ATTY. MORALES FOR
UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES WAS A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM.
Ruling:
The Court partly grants the petition.
On the finding that the restroom was a nuisance per accidens The CA in disposing the case, ruled that the restroom
posed sanitary issues to Atty. Morales and is, therefore, a nuisance per accidens. Such is a finding of fact, which is
generally conclusive upon the Court, because it is not its function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.
By the use of the words "would, should, could," it can be discerned that the CA was not even sure that the restroom has
caused such annoyance to Atty. Morales or his family. Its declaration that the restroom is a nuisance per accidens had no
basis in evidence.
It was improper on the part of the CA to assume those negative effects because modern day restrooms, even those for
the use of the public, are clean, safe and emitting no odor as these are regularly maintained. For said reason, it was an
error on the part of the CA to rule that the restroom was a nuisance per accidens and to sustain the order that it should be
relocated.
NGA claims that the CA erred in upholding Atty. Morales' unbridled access to the park, which effectively constituted an
easement of right of way without any basis as against the clear statutory right of NGA, as the owner of the park, to fence
and protect its property on the basis of Articles 429 and 430 of the Civil Code. The Court agrees with NGA.
CA essentially violated the right of NGA. Atty. Morales never introduced any evidence that he had acquired any right by
prescription or by agreement or legal easement to access the park through his side door. Moreover, he never claimed that
his side door was his only access to the park. He has other means and, being adjacent to the park, going through other
means is not cumbersome.
The conditions[25] set forth under the Deed of Donation by Ortigas & Co. Ltd. to NGA could not be used by Atty. Morales
in his favor. Assuming that he has a right as a member to use the park, it does not mean that he can assert that his
access to the park could only be done through his side door. Atty. Morales knows very well that he can access the park
through some other parts of the park.
Principles:
On Jurisdiction Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations
contained in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains vested irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
There are, however, well-recognized exceptions. These are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance.
Obviously, it requires a determination of such circumstances as to warrant the abatement of the nuisance. That can only
be done with reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing
before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance per accidens.
it requires a proper appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal rules that the property being maintained is a
nuisance per accidens.
Under the Civil Code, NGA, as owner of the park, has the right to enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. It also has
a right to exclude others from access to, and enjoyment of its property. NGA's legal right to block the access door is
beyond doubt. Courts have no business in securing the access of a person to another property absent any clear right on
the part of the latter.
2. G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017
GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner, v. ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
In law, nothing is as elementary as the concept of jurisdiction, for the same is the foundation upon which the courts
exercise their power of adjudication, and without which, no rights or obligation could emanate from any decision or
resolution.
The Case
Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 promulgated on March 12, 2015, which affirmed in
toto the Decision2 dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 of Mandaue City. Likewise
challenged is the subsequent Resolution3 promulgated on October 19, 2015 which upheld the earlier decision.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Magay, Municipality
of Compostela, Province of Cebu. The latter derived his title over the property from a successful grant of a Free Patent
(Free Patent No. VII-519533), which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-37324, more particularly
described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (lot 1280, Case 3, Pls .962) situated in the Barrio of Magay, Municipality of Compostela, Province of
Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by Lot 707 (As 07-01-000033-amended); along line 2-3 by Lot
1275; on the SW., along line 3-4 by Lot 1281; on the NW., along line 4-5 by Lot 1315; along line 5-6 by Lot 1314; on the
NE., along line 6-7 by Lot 1392, along line 7-1 by Lot 1279, all of Compostela, Cadastre x x x. 4
On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against Glynna
Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the
subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a certain Eleno T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum of
P200,000.00. According to her, since her acquisition, she has been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued under her name. 5
According to the respondent, the issuance of the Free Patent in favor of the petitioner's father was "due to gross error or
any other cause."6 In support thereof, the respondent alleged that "there is no tax declaration in the name of patentee
Eddie Foronda" and that this "goes to show that Eddie Foronda is not the owner of lot 1280 and neither has payment of
real estate taxes been made by him when he was still alive or by his heirs." 7
On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) venue is
improperly laid, (3) action has prescribed, and, (4) lack of cause of action. A week thereafter, the RTC issued an Order
dated April 20, 1999,8 which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC asserted that the "market value of the
subject property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B, Complaint) is P2,830.00" and thus, jurisdiction over the case
lies with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu.
However, in yet another Order9 dated July 23, 1999, issued by the RTC following herein respondent's motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on the following ratiocination: (1) Paragraph
III of the Complaint stated that the property was worth P200,000.00; (2) the Court has "judicial knowledge that under the
BIR zonal valuation, the property located at Magay, Compostela, Cebu carries the value that may summed (sic) up to
more than P20,000.00 for the property with an area of 1,570 square meters"; 10 and (3) the "tax declaration, sometimes
being undervalued, is not controlling."11 Hence, trial ensued.
On November 24, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent. The Register of Deeds of Cebu was
ordered to cancel OCT No. OP-37324, and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new one under the name of the respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
1) Declaring the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free Patent No. VII-519533) in the name of Eddie
Foronda a grave error since he is not the owner of Lot 1280, and therefore null and void;
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free Patent No. VII-
519533) and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new one in the name of Aniana Lawas Son of Compostela, Cebu. No
pronouncement as to damages and costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner herein elevated the case to the CA. The material allegations that she presented included the
following: (1) the RTC rendered its decision with undue haste considering that the same was promulgated even before the
expiration of the period within which the parties' respective memoranda were to be filed; (2) the respondent was not able
to prove that the lot she acquired from Arias was Lot No. 1280; (3) the respondent failed to prove that she was in actual
physical possession of the subject property whereas the petitioner was able to do so since 1972; (4) the RTC erred in its
order to cancel OCT No. OP-37324 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new title in herein respondent's name; and (5) the
action filed by the respondent was already barred by prescription and laches.
On March 12, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, which affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Mandaue City dated November 24, 2006 in Civil Case No. MAN-3498, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
On October 19, 2015, the Resolution14 issued by the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors her plea for the reversal of the assailed decision on the following grounds: 15
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC OF MANDAUE CITY OVER THIS CASE AS THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS P1,030.00 AND THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN COMPOSTELA,
CEBU.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE PROCEEDINGS AS WELL AS THE JUDGMENT
RENDERED BY THE RTC AS VOID
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 434 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE CASE AT
BAR
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT LOT NO. 1280 WAS A PUBLIC GRANT TO
WHICH EDDIE FORONDA WAS ISSUED A FREE PATENT
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION VI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
(SIC) VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE VALIDITY AND INTEGRITY OF
THE DECISION OF THE RTC IS QUESTIONABLE BECAUSE IT WAS RENDERED WITH UNDUE HASTE.
The foregoing assignment of errors could be summarized in three main issues: (1) whether or not the RTC validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case, and whether or not the RTC decision was void ab initio; (2) whether or not the Original
Certificate of Title issued under the name of petitioner's father should be canceled and set aside on the strength of the
respondent's allegations of ownership over the same; and (3) whether or not the action is already barred by prescription.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. 16 In order for the court or an
adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
the subject matter.17 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or
all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. 18
What is relevant in this case, therefore, is the delineation provided for by law which separates the jurisdictions of the
second level courts—the Regional Trial Courts—and the first level courts—the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC), and Municipal Trial Courts in the Cities (MTCC).
This can be easily ascertained through a reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691.19
According to this law, in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the
RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. 20 For those below the foregoing threshold amounts,
exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC, MCTC, or MTCC.21
For a full discourse on the resolution of the present petition, emphasis must be given on the assessed values 22—not the
fair market values—of the real properties concerned.
According to the case of Heirs of Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,23 the law is emphatic that in determining which court
has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed. Heirs of Concha, Sr. averred
this definitive ruling by tracing the history of the The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It said:
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, as amended, gave the
RTCs x x x exclusive original jurisdiction. x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction
whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129
or one involving title to property under Section 19(2).
The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts. x x x. Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section
19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property
involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which
would result in the speedier administration of justice." 24 (Emphasis, underscoring and formatting supplied, citations
omitted)
Time and again, this Court has continuously upheld Heirs of Concha, Sr.'s ruling on this provision of law.25 In fact,
in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.26 the Court said that "the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the
word 'shall' and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00." 27
To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate jurisdiction, an examination of
the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged
in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. 28 According to the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses
Cruz, et al.,29 only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one
cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of
the action thereby initiated.30
It is not a surprise, therefore, that a failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the complaint would result to
a dismissal of the case. This is because absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
Indeed, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land. 31 This is the same ratio put forth
by the Court in the case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al.,32 where the case was dismissed partly on the basis of
the following:
The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed value of the property. There is no showing on the face
of the complaint that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of petitioners. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint
of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action.33 (Citations omitted)
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court had no qualms in dismissing the case for failing to allege the assessed
value of the subject property. Similar to Spouses Cruz,35Quinagoran36 held that: "Considering that the respondents failed
to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC."
This is not to say, however, that there is no room for a liberal interpretation of this rule. In Tumpag v. Tumpag,37 the Court,
through Justice Brion, provided for an instance when an exception to the strict application could be allowed. It said:
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this rule may result in defeating substantial
justice or in prejudice to a party's substantial right. 38
In that case, there was also no allegation of the assessed value of the property. However, the Court pointed out that the
facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property, which was attached to the complaint, could have facially resolved the
question on jurisdiction and would have rendered the lengthy litigation on that very point unnecessary. 39 In essence, the
Court said that the failure to allege the real property's assessed value in the complaint would not be fatal if, in the
documents annexed to the complaint, an allegation of the assessed value could be found.
A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would invariably guide both the bench and the bar in similar
situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the
identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:
First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property as alleged in the
complaint; and
Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the complaint, could
still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the complaint.
Indeed, it is by adopting this two-tiered rule that the Court could dispense with a catena of cases specifically dealing with
issues concerning jurisdiction over real properties.
In upholding these afore-quoted rule, however, the Court is not unmindful of the cases of Barangay Piapi v.
Talip40 and Trayvilla v. Sejas41 where the market value of the property, instead of the assessed value thereof, was used by
the Court as basis for determining jurisdiction.
In Barangay Piapi,42 the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the subject property. What it alleged was the
market value thereof. The Court held that, in the absence of an allegation of assessed value in the complaint, the Court
shall consider the alleged market value to determine jurisdiction.
Notably, this case referred to Section 7(b), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which deals with Legal Fees, to justify its
reliance on the market value. It said:
The Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall
be alleged by the claimant." It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and
the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action involves
the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified
the market value or estimated value, which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the
case.43 (Italics in the original, and emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the rule alluded to above, while originally containing the sentence: "In a real action, the assessed value of the
property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees," has already been deleted through an amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. As it currently stands,
Section 7 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7 Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—
a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an
estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the
total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET
value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL
VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN
LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is: x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Two things must be said of this: first, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed filing and
docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be filed; 44 and
second, the latest iteration of the same provision already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such that the
determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the fair market value
of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.
A reading of the discourse on this would indicate that the jurisdiction referred to above does not deal with the delineation
of the jurisdictions of the first and second level courts, but with the acquisition of jurisdiction by the courts through the
payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
This is the same tenor of the Court's decision in Trayvilla. In that case, where no assessed value was likewise alleged in
the complaint, the Court determined jurisdiction by considering the actual amount by which the property was purchased
and as written in the Amended Complaint. The Court stated that:
However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in the Amended
Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate
that the property was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case
against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax
declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.45 (Emphasis supplied)
But then again, like the discussion on Barangay Piapi above, Trayvilla was one which dealt with the payment of the
required filing and docket fees. The crux of the case was the acquisition of jurisdiction by payment of docket fees, and not
the delineation of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts. In fact, Trayvilla interchangeably used the terms
"assessed value" and "market value" in a manner that does not even recognize a difference.
Like Barangay Piapi, therefore, Spouses Trayvilla must not be read in the context of jurisdiction of first and second level
courts as contemplated in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, 46 where the assessed values of the
properties are required. These cases must perforce be read in the context of the determination of the actual amount of
prescribed filing and docket fees provided for in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Having laid out the essential rules in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts for civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the Court now shifts focus to the specific
circumstances that surround the current case.
In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject property. Rather, what she
included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to P200,000.00. 47 In the course of the trial, the petitioner
asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the
RTC lacked jurisdiction.
The question thus posed before this Court was whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, and in the affirmative, whether or not the RTC decision should be rendered void for being issued without
jurisdiction.
As discussed above, settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, required the
allegation of the real property's assessed value in the complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver the
assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because the court which would
exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.
However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag,48 would necessitate an examination of the
documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached
therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal
that the property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC should have
upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the same. Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null
and void.
In the case of Maslag v. Monzon,49 the Court had occasion to rule that an order issued by a court declaring that it has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be
given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended, already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property,
neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same.
In yet another case, Diona v. Balangue,50 the Court ruled that void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is
null and void. As said by the Court in Cañero v. University of the Philippines:51
A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no
protection to those who seek to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the
same as it would be if there was no judgment.52
Thus, considering the foregoing, it would be proper for the Court to immediately dismiss this case without prejudice to the
parties' filing of a new one before the MTC that has jurisdiction over the subject property. Consequently, the other issues
raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 dated March 12, 2015, and the
Resolution dated October 19, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the Decision dated November 24, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Mandaue City, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for being issued without
jurisdiction. This is without prejudice to the filing of the parties of the proper action before the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
3. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eugenio Dalauta [G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017]
“The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.”
FACTS:
Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City. The land was placed
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Thus, Dalauta received on February 7, 1994 a Notice of Coverage notifying him that his land was
subject of expropriation. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but
Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to
determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject property. In its Resolution, the PARAD affirmed the valuation
made by LBP in the amount of ₱192,782.59.
Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992,
which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income (CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as he
had a net income of ₱350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of the trees that were grown on the said land to Norberto C.
Fonacier.
On May 30, 2006, the SAC rendered its decision pegging the just compensation in the amount of ₱2,639,557.00, higher
than the value made by LBP.
Unsatisfied, LBP filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC.
Hence, LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA, arguing, among others that the
SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained
finality and that the SAC violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing the just
compensation.
The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It ruled that the SAC had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
ISSUES
A. Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD
Resolution.
RULING:
A. In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB as provided
for in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 which reads:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, the SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657
provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
Recognizing the separate jurisdictions of the two bodies, the DARAB came out with its own rules to avert any confusion.
Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure reads:
Land Valuation Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation
and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be
brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. “The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the ‘justness’ of the decreed compensation. “
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.” This “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of
the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of
directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by Dalauta is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently,
the SAC properly took cognizance of Dalauta’s petition for determination of just compensation.
Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, the Court must abandon its ruling in Veterans Bank,
Martinez and Soriano that a petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC shall be proscribed and
adjudged dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period prescribed under the DARAB Rules.
NOTA BENE:
Please note the following observation of the Supreme Court:
“There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for determination of
just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse is not strictly a case of
forum shopping, the administrative determination being not resjudicata binding on the SAC. This was allowed by
the Court in LBP v. Celada and other several cases. Some of these cases were enumerated in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Umandap as follows:
1. In the 1999 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that the SAC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the petition to determine just compensation filed by the landowner without waiting for the
completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land.
2. In the 2004 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, we allowed a direct resort to the SAC even where
no summary administrative proceedings have been held before the DARAB.
3. In the 2006 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the SAC despite
the pendency of administrative proceedings before the DARAB. x x x. xxxx
4. In the 2009 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista, this Court permitted a direct recourse to the SAC
without an intermediate appeal to the DARAB as mandated under the new provision in the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure. We ruled:
Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by
the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No.
6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes
direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation. In accordance with the
said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies while rules of procedure cannot.
Nevertheless, the practice should be discouraged. Everyone can only agree that simultaneous hearings are a waste
of time, energy and resources. To prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should withdraw his case with the
DAR before filing his petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of withdrawal by alleging it in the petition
itself. Failure to do so, should be a ground for a motion to suspend judicial proceedings until the administrative
proceedings would be terminated. It is simply ludicruous to allow two procedures to continue at the same time.
4. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest
filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never
raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during
the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May
20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
5. September 20, 2017
G.R. No. 201271
ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES, and JUSTO TORRES,

.JR., Petitioners
vs.
ANTONIA F. ARUEGO, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rules 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the September
12, 2011 Resolution2 and March 26, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 which
dismissed petitioners' Roberto A. Torres, Immaculada Torres-Alanon, Agustin Torres and Justo Torres, Jr. (petitioners)
Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and denied their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents

On March 7, 1983, Antonia F. Aruego (Antonia) and Evelyn F. Aruego (Evelyn), represented by their mother and guardian
ad litem Luz M. Fabian, filed a Complaint4 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for '"Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights" against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of Gloria A. Torres,
represented by their father and guardian ad litem Justo M. Torres, Jr. (collectively dependants). The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 83-16093.
In their Complaint, Antonia and Evelyn alleged that they are the illegitimate children of the deceasedJose M. Aruego
(Aruego) who had and maintained an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, their mother, up to the demise of Aruego on
March 30, 1982.
Alleging further that they are in continuous possession of the status of children of the deceased Aruego and not being
aware of any intestate proceeding having been filed in court for the settlement of the estate of Aruego, they have thus filed
this complex action for compulsory acknowledgment and participation in said inheritance. In paragraph 10 of their
Complaint, they enumerated the following properties left by the deceased Aruego, so far as known to them:
10. The deceased Jose M. Aruego left, among other things, so far as known to the plaintiffs, the following properties:
(a) Undivided one-third (%) share to a parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 30770 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, Metro Manila, with an area of797 square meters, more or less.
(b) Undivided one-half(~;) share to the parcels of land covered by:
T.C.T. No. 48618 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 68,365 square meters, more or
less.
T.C. T. No. 18683 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of23,13 l square meters, more or
less.
less.
T.C.T. No. 21317 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 7, 776 square meters, more or
less.
less.
less.
T.C.T. No. 127154 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 757 square meters, more or
less.
T.C.T. No. 9598 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 1, 167 square meters, more or
less.T.C.T. No. 1060 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 44,602 square meters, more
or less.(c) Undivided one-half share of whatever rights, interests and participation the deceased Jose M. Amego has on
the University Stock Supply, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.5
In their Answer,6 defendants denied the allegations of the Complaint and set forth affirmative defenses
to dispute the claim of Antonia and Evelyn that they are the illegitimate children of the deceased Aruego.
After trial on the merits, the court rendered a Decision 7 on June 15, 1992, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
1. Real [Estate] Properties covered by
TCT No. 48680, exh "K";
2. TCTNo. 18683, exh "K-1";
3. TCTNo. 12150, exh "K-2";
4. TCTNo. 21316, exh "K-3";
5. TCT No. 21317, exh "K-4";
6. TCTNo. 21318, exh "K-5'';
7. TCT No. 127154, exh "K-6";
8. TCT No. 9598, exh "K-7";
9. TCT No. 1060, exh "K-8";
10. TCT No. 30730, exh ''K-9";
11. share in the University Book S
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to Yi portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego's share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to pay plaintiff (Antonia Aruego) counsel the Sum of ₱10,000.00 as Atty's. fee.
8. Cost against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.8
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 9 but it was denied by the lower court in its Order10 dated January 14,
1983. They filed a Notice of Appeal11 on February 12, 1993 but it was denied due course by the lower court in its
Order12 dated February 26, 1993 on the ground that it was filed out of time.
Subsequently, defendants (now petitioners) filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.13 On August 31, 1993, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, 14 denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration in a Minute Resolution dated October 13, 1993. 15
On December 3, 1993, petitioners appealed the CA's Decision dated August 31, 1993 to this Court through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.16 In a Decision17 dated March 13, 1996, this Court denied the Petition and affirmed the CA's
Decision dated August 31, 1993 and Resolution dated October 13, 1993.
On December 4, 1996, the court a quo issued a Writ of Execution18 to execute its Decision dated June 15, 1992.1âwphi1
On August 15, 1997, plaintiff Antonia (now respondent) filed a Motion for Partition 19 with the court a quo alleging that its
June 15, 1992 Decision became final and executory in view of the denial of the notice of appeal filed by petitioners and
the dismissal of their Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari by the CA and the subsequent denial of their appeal to the
Supreme Court on March 13, 1996.
On November 6, 1997, respondent filed a Motion to Implement Decision 20 dated June 15, 1992 which was granted by the
court a quo in its Order21 dated December 5, 1997.
On December 12, 1998, petitioners filed a Verified Complaint 22 with the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-98-36300, seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale 23 dated May 14, 1998 and the corresponding titles (TCT No.
18820024 and TCT. No. 19125725 ) issued in relation thereto, which was executed by respondent in favor of Sharon
Cuneta, Inc. covering the Yi portion of the lot covered by TCT No. 30730, one of the enumerated properties comprising
the estate of the deceased Aruego as declared in the June 15, 1992 Decision of the lower court.
On July 1, 1999, respondent filed anew a Motion for Partition 26 dated June 28, 1999 praying for the implementation of the
June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo.
In view of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-36300, the court a quo in its Order27 dated November 8, 1999 resolved to
defer the resolution of respondent's Motion for Partition dated June 28, 1999 on the ground that the controversy involved
in the Quezon City RTC case would constitute a prejudicial question to the issue involved in the Motion for Partition.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the court a quo in its Order28 dated March 21, 2000, she
filed a Petition for Certiorar29 in the CA. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58587.
Finding that no prejudicial question existed between the two cases involved, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari on
March 23, 2004.30 The CAs' Decision became final and executory for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom. Thereupon,
respondent moved that her Motion for Partition be given due course.
Petitioners opposed the motion arguing in the main that the partition of the estate of Aruego could not take place by virtue
of respondent's mere motion considering that there was no conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the properties
declared as constituting the estate of Jose M. Aruego and that all the identities of his heirs had yet to be determined. 31
Unconvinced, the lower court rejected the arguments of petitioner and granted respondent's motion in its Order 32 dated
July 23, 2009 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The court orders:
1. The Defendants to submit, within 30 days from notice of this order, an accounting of all the fruits, rents, profits, and
income from the properties belonging to the estate of Jose M. Aruego from the time of his death until the actual division
thereof among his heirs;
2. Each [party] to nominate three (3) competent and disinterested persons and submit, within 15 days from notice of this
Order, the names of said persons from which this court shall choose three (3) commissioners who will be tasked to
perform the following:
a) To make an updated project of partition specifying the metes and bounds of the particular portion of the
property assigned to plaintiff; and,
b) Upon approval by the court of the project of partition, to effect the same and deliver to plaintiff her
share thereon.
SO ORDERED.33
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but it was denied by the court a quo.35
Unsatisfied, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari36 with the CA. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113405. In a
Resolution37 promulgated on September 12, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit 38 and later denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution 39 dated March 26, 2012. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 4540 filed by petitioners anchored on the following grounds:
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERSAPPELLANTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL

JUDGMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO.
B. IN LIGHT OF HEIRS OF JUAN D. FRANCISCO v. MUNOZ-PALMA, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN

FAILING TO FIND NO COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WARRANTS A REVIEW AND/OR MODIFICATION OF
THE [15] JUNE 1992 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THAT:
a. THE [15] JUNE [1992] DECISION (OF THE COURT A QUO) IS NOT CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE ESTATE OF MR. JOSE M. ARGUEGO, SR. AS THE SAME IS NOT AN ISSUE IN
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS.
b. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUD/CATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF SOME
OF ITS ELEMENTS.
c. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ISSUE REGARDING THE PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE ESTATE
OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR. HAS ATTAINED FINALITY, THE SAME MAY STILL BE MODIFIED AS THE TERMS
THEREOF ARE PATENTLY UNCLEAR AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARE OF MS. SIMEONA SAN JUAN
ARGUEGO, AS WELL AS THE SHARES OF THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS AND/OR THIRD PARTIES THAT
EXIST PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR. 41
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners assail the September 12, 2011 and March 26, 2012 Resolutions of the CA on the principal ground that the
Court erred in applying the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the exceptions thereto. Citing the case of Heirs
of Francisco v. Hon. Munoz-Palma,42 petitioners contend "that the doctrine of immutability of judgments admits of
exceptions, x x x [as] when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough that there remains room for interpretation
thereof, [in which case,] the judgment may still be appealed even when the same has already attained
finality."43 Petitioners cited and quoted the following portion from the Decision in the aforementioned case of Heirs of
Francisco v. Hon. Muñoz-Palma44 to prove their point:
It may be well to remember, that the fact that the decision in the case has long become final and executory, and that the
order in dispute was issued merely in execution thereof, does not necessarily imply the non-existence of an appeal
therefrom. For while it is true that, as a general rule, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable, it also
recognized that the rule is subject to two exceptions, viz., (1) when the order of execution varies or tends to vary the tenor
of the judgment, and (2) when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough that there remains room for interpretation
thereof by the trial court.45
Petitioners assert that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo "are obviously unclear as it admits of
different interpretations"46 which, in fact, account for the remaining conflict between the parties herein. Respondent
believes that the "1/2 portion" should be taken from the "whole estate," contrary to their interpretation that the "1/2 portion"
refers to "1/2 of the share of each legitimate descendant of Aruego." 47 Acting on her erroneous belief, she had, in fact,
caused the subdivision of the property covered by TCT No. 30730, now the subject of the pending annulment case before
the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36300.
Likewise relying on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Muñoz-Palma,48 petitioners fault the CA in failing to find no
compelling circumstance that warrants a review and/or modification of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo.
According to them, the June 15, 1992 Decision is not conclusive with respect to the properties comprising the estate of
Aruego as the same is not an issue in respondent's complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights.
Petitioners also dispute the ruling of the court a quo in its February 26, 2010 Order49 (one of the assailed Orders in their
petition for certiorari before the CA) that it was forced to grant respondent's motion because the June 15, 1992 Decision
had already attained finality and the necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. According to
petitioners, the court a quo in effect is saying that they are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. They do not agree,
as the elements of res judicata are absent in this case. They insist, first, that the June 15, 1992 Decision is not a judgment
on the merits regarding the extent of the estate of Aruego. It "was rendered without any presentation of evidence during
trial, much less argued by the respective parties;" 50 second, that it is not a final judgment, but a mere interlocutory order,
as it leaves something more to be done which is the partition of Aruego's estate; and third, there is no identity of subject
matters, parties and causes of action between the case adjudicated in the June 15, 1992 Decision and the present
controversy.
Even assuming that the June 15, 1992 Decision has attained finality, petitioners still maintain that it may still be modified
because its terms are patently unclear. There is ambiguity in the manner the estate of Aruego should be divided as it
admits of various interpretations.
All said, petitioners pray that the instant Petition be given due course -
a) by declaring that the June 15, 1992 Decision is erroneous at least with respect to the properties comprising the estate
of Aruego;
b) by declaring that the terms thereof, with respect to the estate of x x x Aruego, are unclear and ambiguous;
c) by allowing the parties to present evidence to determine the properties and/or property interests of Aruego which are to
be properly included in his estate; and
d) to issue an Order annulling and setting aside the assailed Resolutions of the CA. 51
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent's arguments are anchored principally on the finality of the June 12, 1992 Decision of the court a quo. She
points out that the said Decision has attained finality more than 20 years ago for failure of petitioners to timely appeal
therefrom. Their subsequent actions before the CA and the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the said Decision all
proved futile as the appellate courts sustained its validity and denied their petitions.
Respondent contends that there is no ambiguity in the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision. Its dispositive portion clearly
identified the properties of the estate and the share of respondent therein. Moreover, petitioners could have raised their
objections on these matters in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration or on appeal, or certiorari in said case, but did not.
According to respondent, the Order52 dated July 23, 2009 of the court a quo giving due course to the Motion for
Partition53 dated July 28, 1999 merely implements the final and executory Decision dated June 15, 1992 giving respondent
"1/2 share of the share of legitimate child in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr. enumerated therein." 54 The CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 113405 did not err in dismissing the petition to set aside the said Order. 55
The Principal Issue
The principal issue to be resolved in this Petition is whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo, which
attained finality more than 20 years ago, may still be subject to review and modification by the Court.
Our Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
The first assailed Resolution dated September 12. 2011 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 dismissed petitioners'
Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit. The CA ruled that it cam10t issue a writ of certiorari to allow parties to present
evidence in a case that has long attained finality. It held:
Asking this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to enable a party, in this instance the Petitioners, to present evidence after a
decision has longattained finality is no different from praying that an already executory decision be reviewed. More
certainly, such strat[e]gem cannot be allowed as it will contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments. Instructive on this
point is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Milan, viz[.]:
A judgment becomes 'final and executory' by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to
appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has became final.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. x
xx
x x x Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time. x x x
True, the doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of exceptions such as the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.
These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench. Hence, there is no ground to justify the modification of the
Respondent RTC's June 15, 1992 Decision.
To stress, the Court finds, after a thorough review of the records, no compelling circumstance extant in this case that
would warrant a departure from the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Most certainly, We cannot issue a writ so as to
allow the Petitioners to present evidence as the same should have been raised by them during trial. x x x 56 (Emphasis in
the original)
Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the CA ruled in its second assailed Resolution dated March 26, 2012,
viz.:
At the risk of being repetitious, it bears reiterating, therefore, that this Court cannot and will not issue a writ of certiorari to
enable the Petitioners to present evidence in a case where a decision has been rendered as far back as June 15, 1992,
for doing so will contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments. 57
We affirm the assailed Resolutions of the CA.
Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 58 The only recognized exceptions
to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the socalled nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.59
In arguing that the assailed Resolutions erroneously applied the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the
exceptions thereto, petitioners relied heavily on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Munoz-Palma.60 Petitioners insist
that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo are not clear enough, as there remains room for
interpretation thereot: hence, the judgment may still be appealed even when the same has already attained finality.
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Munoz-Palma61 is misplaced. It should be stressed that in
the Heirs of Francisco case, on appeal was an order of execution, which although generally not appealable, was allowed
because the Court found that the Project of Partition submitted to implement the decision was not in accordance with the
final decision in the case. The Order approving the Project of Partition becomes subject to review and whatever error may
have been committed in arriving thereat is correctible by appeal. In the earlier case of Castro v. Surtida,62 it was held that
an appeal from an order of execution would be allowed as an exception to the general rule so that the appellate tribunal
might pass upon the legality and the correctness of the said order. 63 In contrast, what petitioners in the present case seek
is an order from the court to allow them to present evidence with regard to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego
and the heirs who are to share in the inheritance. This is, in effect an appeal from the June 15, 1992 Decision which has
long become final and executory, and not from an order of execution which is yet to be carried out, thru a Project of
Partition still to be submitted to and approved by the court.
As correctly held by the court a quo in its Order dated July 23, 2009, "[t]he question as to what properties have been
deemed included in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr. has already been settled when the court finally resolved the main
controversy on June 15, 1992 and declared, inter alia, that plaintiff, Antonia Aruego, is entitled to one-half of the share of
the legitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr. x x x." 64 The court directed the parties to submit the names of their nominees
from among whom the court shall choose three commissioners to submit an updated Project of Partition for the approval
of the court.
Worthy to note also is the ruling of the CA in its assailed Resolution dated September 12, 2011 that said court "cannot
issue a writ so as to allow the [p]etitioners to present evidence as the same should have been raised by them during
trial."65
We have perused the records and found that respondent offered in evidence the certificates of title to the properties
allegedly comprising the estate of Aruego.66 There is nothing in the records to show that petitioners opposed the said offer
of evidence. They also lost the chance to dispute the evidence presented by respondent when they failed to raise the
issue in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the June 15, 1992 Decision and more so when they failed to appeal
therefrom.
The records also disclose that petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case. They presented and formally offered
their own evidence67 but nothing was presented to rebut respondent's evidence on the properties comprising the estate of
Aruego. In short, petitioners had ample opportunity to present their countervailing evidence during trial and it is now much
too late in the day to present the evidence that they should have presented way back then. It is settled that the active
participation of a party before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the
court's resolution of the case. 68
Petitioners pass the blame to their counsels of record in the court below for their lost appeal. This is unacceptable.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. 69 We explained
in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People70 that "[t]he rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to
do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that
any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission
of the client himself."
Petitioners next contend that the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo is not conclusive with respect to the properties
comprising the estate of Aruego, as the same is not an issue in respondent's Complaint 71 for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights.
This contention is specious.Although the Complaint of respondent is captioned "For: Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights", a close reading of the averments therein would indubitably show that the
determination of the estate of Aruego and the participation of respondent in the inheritance are among the issues raised in
her Complaint. Paragraph 9 of her complaint stated:9. To the best knowledge of the plaintiffs, no intestate proceeding has
been filed in court for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, thus this complex action for
compulsory acknowledgement and participation in said inheritance. 72On the other hand, in paragraph 10 of the Complaint,
respondent enumerated the properties left by Aruego, so far as known to her. 73 Consistent with her averments in
paragraphs 9 and 10, respondent prayed that:4. The share and participation of the plaintiffs in the estate of their deceased
father be determined, and the defendants ordered to deliver such share unto the plaintiffs. 74It has been consistently held
that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. 75 In Leonardo v. Court of
Appeals,76 the Court said: "it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action.
The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for."Petitioners
assail the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 Decision insofar as it declares the properties enumerated therein as
comprising the estate of Aruego. . They point out that such declaration in the dispositive portion is bereft pf any discussion
in the body of the decision.They are mistaken. "To understand the dispositive portion of a decision, one has only to
ascertain the issues of the action."77 As shown above, the determination of the estate of Aruego is one of the issues raised
in the Complaint of respondent. In support thereof, respondent submitted in evidence the certificates of title covering the
properties claimed to be part of the state of Aruego, as well as the By-Laws of the University Bookstore. 78 No
countervailing evidence having been presented by petitioners, the court a quo declared these properties as comprising
the estate of Aruego in the dispositive portion of this Decision.Jurisprudence holds that it is the dispositive portion of the
decision that controls for purposes of execution.79 If petitioners believed that the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992
Decision is questionable, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the said Decision became
final and executory. But as pointed out earlier, while petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, they did not
raise therein the supposed error of the court in declaring the properties enumerated in the dispositive portion of the
Decision as comprising the estate of An1ego. They also failed to appeal the Decision and thereby lost the chance to
question the Decision and seek a modification or amendment thereof. The inevitable result of their failure to timely
question the Decision is for them to be botmd by the pronouncements therein. To reiterate, once a decision has attained
finality, '"not even this Court could have changed the trial court's disposition absent any showing that the case fell under
one of the recognized exceptions."80 As amp1y discussed above, this case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions.WHEREFORE, the Petition for review on Certiorari is DENIED and the assailed September 12, 2011 and
March 26, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CIV PRO CASES-jurisdiction

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CIV PRO CASES-jurisdiction

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CIVIL PROCEDURE – CASES RE: JURISDICTION

1. NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION v. ATTY. NARCISO MORALES, GR No. 222821, 2017-08-09

NGA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners

NGA appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

Hence, this petition.

The Court partly grants the petition.

2. G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017

GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL, Petitioner, v. ANIANA LAWAS SON, Respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

On the Issue of Jurisdiction

Section 7 Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—

Please note the following observation of the Supreme Court:

5. September 20, 2017

G.R. No. 201271

ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES, and JUSTO TORRES,

The Factual Antecedents

(b) Undivided one-half(~;) share to the parcels of land covered by:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The court orders:

THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERSAPPELLANTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

A. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL

B. IN LIGHT OF HEIRS OF JUAN D. FRANCISCO v. MUNOZ-PALMA, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN

The Principal Issue

The Petition is not meritorious.

We affirm the assailed Resolutions of the CA.

You might also like