Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6

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Annals of Nuclear Energy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/anucene

Risk assessment on abnormal accidents from human errors during

decommissioning of nuclear facilities
KwanSeong Jeong ⇑, ByungSeon Choi, JeiKwon Moon, DongJun Hyun, JongHwan Lee, IkJune Kim,
GeunHo Kim, ShinYoung Kang
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daedeok-daero 989-111, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-353, Republic of Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper is intended to suggest an approach to the methodology of evaluation on abnormal accidents
Received 30 July 2015 from human errors during decommissioning of nuclear facilities. A structure of model was established
Accepted 13 August 2015 and a mathematical method was also designed to evaluate both normal and abnormal environments.
Available online 27 August 2015
The proposed methodology was verified by applying a practical test case of decommissioning scenarios
using the assessment system in virtual decommissioning environment.
Keywords: Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Abnormal accident
Decommissioning
Human errors
Nuclear facilities
Risk assessment

1. Introduction
Human error has been associated with significant losses in
many industries (Candice and Sanskaran, 2015). Despite years of
research, difficulties still exist in quantifying the contribution of
human error to accidents that result in disaster and/or losses.
Incorporating human errors into safety analyses is a rather difficult
and complex exercise. Indeed, engineers still find it difficult both to
incorporate human and organization sources and to realistically
quantify them (Colombo and Demichela, 2008). Maintenance-
related human errors have imposed heavy costs on industry
(Asadzadeh and Azadeh, 2014). Research studies have reported
on the significant role of maintenance-related human errors in avi-
ation accidents (Wells, 2001; Hackworth et al., 2007), hazardous
events in nuclear power plants (Heo and Park, 2010), and software
faults (Hollnagel, 1998). The impact of human errors in mainte-
nance was found n the literature and come to the end with the
finding that human error in maintenance is a pressing problem
(Dhillon and Liu, 2006).
There are a lot of radiological and non-radiological hazards dur-
ing decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Workers need to be pro-
tected by eliminating or reducing the radiological hazards and
non-radiological hazards that may arise during routine decommis-
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +82 42 868 8652, +82 42 868 2975.
E-mail address: ksjeong1@kaeri.re.kr (K. Jeong).
sioning activities and as well as during accidents. The hazards asso-
ciated with decommissioning of structures and buildings or with
construction of temporary facilities are important because not only
they may be a direct cause of harm to workers but also their occur-
rence may indirectly result in increased radiological hazard (IAEA,
2013). Therefore, workers always are situated on a work place
within the occupational radiation exposure in the middle of
decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
This paper was intended to suggest an approach to the method-
ology of radiological assessment on abnormal accidents from
human errors during decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
2. Hazards during decommissioning of nuclear facilities
There are radiological hazards and non-radiological hazards
throughout decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Radiological
hazards, in general, fall into four categories: external exposure,
ingestion and inhalation of radionuclides, criticality, and breach
of containment. Overall radiological risks can be lower during
decommissioning of nuclear facilities than during that. However,
the nature of decommissioning activities can mean that there is
an enhanced risk of exposure for some workers during decommis-
sioning. ‘External exposure’ is the most potential hazard to workers
during decommissioning of nuclear facilities than other hazards. In
other words, ‘external exposure’ is an occupational exposure to
workers during decommissioning of nuclear facilities (IAEA, 2013).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2015.08.009
0306-4549/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 K. Jeong et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6

3. Method to the dose distribution of radiation according to a scenario under

3.1. Concept of the safety assessment during decommissioning of
nuclear facilities
During decommissioning activities of nuclear facilities, the pro-
cedure of radiological safety assessment consists of mainly four
steps. The steps as presented in Fig. 1 are ‘development of a decom-
missioning scenario’, ‘evaluation of the occupational radiation
exposure, ‘assessment of its acceptability’, and ‘taking actions of
countermeasures to reduce the occupational radiation exposure’.
3.2. Considerations of the occupational exposure
During decommissioning activities of nuclear facilities, there
are a lot of worker’s intrusion into working in places. Decommis-
sioning activities consist of decontamination and dismantling by
hand-on equipments and remote equipments.
According to experiences of decommissioning activities in
Korea, the occupational radiation exposure to workers belongs to
the exposure of normal environments and the exposure of abnor-
mal environments from human errors. The exposure of normal
environments is the working condition that a worker is exposed
radiological environments. The exposure of abnormal environ-
ments from human errors is composed of physical errors, procedu-
ral errors, and operational errors of equipments under radiological
environments. The physical error means that a worker makes
errors such as falling from elevation, turnover during decommis-
sioning activities. The procedural error means that a worker com-
mits out of order in the middle of according to precedence. The
operational error means that a worker makes control error during
in-tact and remote operations of equipments.
3.3. Evaluation model of the occupational exposure
The structure of model to evaluate the occupational radiation
exposure is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2, the structure of
evaluation model consists of two categories. One is to evaluate
the exposure under normal environments. Another is to evaluate
the exposure under abnormal environments. Evaluation of normal
environments is to estimate the exposure from the dose distribu-
tion in a work place. Evaluation of abnormal environments is to
estimate the exposure from physical errors, procedural errors,
and operational errors.
3.4. Mathematical model for evaluation of the occupational exposure

Evaluation of the occupational radiation exposure during

START decommissioning of nuclear facilities can be defined as the combi-
nation of the evaluation of normal environments and the evalua-
tion of abnormal environments in a decommissioning scenario.
In the context of evaluation of the exposure, a simplified defini-
Development of tion of evaluation of the exposure is as follows in Eq. (1)
a decommissioning scenario
Ri ¼ Ni þ Ai ð1Þ

where Ri is the evaluation of the exposure to workers in the ith

Taking actions of Evaluation of decommissioning scenario, Ni is the evaluation of the exposure to
countermeasures the occupational radiation exposure workers under normal environments in the ith decommissioning
scenario, and Ai is the evaluation of the exposure to workers under
abnormal environments in the ith decommissioning scenario.
No According to the simplified definition of evaluation of the expo-
Acceptable ? sure, Ni can be expressed as shown in Eq. (2)

Yes N i ¼ Di  t i  n i ð2Þ

where Ni is the evaluation of the exposure to workers under normal

STOP
environments in the ith decommissioning scenario, Di is the dose
distribution rate of the exposure to a worker per time under normal
Fig. 1. Concept of the safety assessment for decommissioning of nuclear facilities. environments in the ith decommissioning scenario, and ti is the

Evaluation of the Evaluation of Evaluation of

occupational
exposure
= Normal
Environments + Abnormal
Environments

Evaluation of Evaluation of
Normal Environments Abnormal Environments

Estimation of Estimation of the Estimation of the Estimation of the

the occupational exposure occupational exposure occupational exposure occupational exposure
from the dose distribution from physical errors from procedural errors from operational errors

Fig. 2. The evaluation model of the exposure to workers.

 K. Jeong et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6
working duration time of a worker under normal environments in
the ith decommissioning scenario, and ni is the number of workers
under normal environments in the ith decommissioning scenario.
According to the simplified definition of evaluation of the expo-
sure, Ai can be expressed as shown in Eq. (3)
Ai ¼ ðDi  tei  ni Þ þ ðDi  tci  ni Þ
where Ai is the evaluation of the exposure to workers under abnor-
mal environments in the ith decommissioning scenario, Di is the
dose distribution rate of the exposure to a worker per time under
normal environments in the ith decommissioning scenario, and tei
is the working duration time of a worker under abnormal environ-
ments from human errors in the ith decommissioning scenario, ni is
the number of workers under normal environments in the ith
decommissioning scenario, and tci is the consuming time of taking
actions under abnormal environments from human errors in the
ith decommissioning scenario.
4. Development of the situational evaluation system in virtual
decommissioning environments
4.1. Requirements of the assessment system
Based on evaluation methodology of the exposure to workers,
the requirements of assessment system were established as show
Table 1
Requirements of the assessment system in virtual decommissioning environments.
Items Requirements
Real-time detection of Real-time detection of data according to
worker moving route working routes of decommissioning scenarios
Operation of multi-subjects Simultaneous operation of the system
including several subjects in a
decommissioning scenario
Real-time monitoring of Real-time visualization of structures and
worker moving route equipments according to changes of
decommissioning scenarios in view of third-
person mode
Data management
Real-time simultaneously
under networking module
Graphic Server
Monitoring
Fig. 3. Configuration of the assessment system.
3
in Table 1. Items to be required are real-time detection of worker
moving route, operations of multi-subjects, and real-time monitor-
ing of worker moving route. Real-time detection of worker moving
route is that the system can detect exposure of worker, duration
time of worker, error of worker because working situations also
change as decommissioning scenarios change. Operation of
ð3Þ
multi-subjects is that several subjects can simultaneously carry
out in a work place. Real-time monitoring of worker moving route
shows that the system can monitor worker because the location of
worker also changes as decommissioning scenarios change.
4.2. Configurations of the assessment system
The hardwares of the assessment system are a head mounted
display (whereafter ‘HMD’), a monitoring device, and a graphic ser-
ver (Jeong et al., 2014). The HMD is a device that taken on the head
of worker and enable worker experience decommissioning sce-
nario under virtual environment. It visualizes real-timely the same
structure and equipment as working place. The monitoring device
is to check the changes of structures and equipment and track the
worker’s location in view of third person according to changes of
decommissioning scenarios. The graphic server is hardware that
structures and equipment of nuclear facilities are databased on
and serve to provide HMD and monitoring device with the changed
data as routes of worker change.
The assessment system of the occupational radiation exposure
was improved with networking module for operation of multi-
subjects as shown in Fig. 3. When worker puts the HMD on his
head, the graphic server of virtual training system is being oper-
ated. The graphic server receives data of worker’s direction chang-
ing. The graphic server exchanges data management unit with the
detected numerical data. The graphic server provides the HMD
with pictures of direction response and the monitoring device with
pictures of worker’s location and behavior. In this situation, worker
is in first person mode and recognizes decommissioning scenarios
with HMD as ones of working in place. On the other hand, Manager
is in third person mode and could keep up with location of worker
and situation of working.
Subject A
Visualization
Subject B
Subject C
Workers
(Multi-subjects mode)
4 K. Jeong et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6

Gantry
Band Manipulator
Saw

Waste
Container

Circular
Saw

Turntable

Fig. 4. Installation of the equipments to dismantle a reactor pressure vessel.

Occurrence of
an accident

Server Deployment Crane Installation of Stop of Work

turntable, Waiting
Connection of subject A Operation crane operation completion
circular saw

Movement ? Feedback Feedback Feedback Feedback

Server Deployment Movement Check of Movement out of

Waiting A work shift
Connection of subject A to water-way location water-way

Start of Occurrence of
exposure an accident
dose Display of
measurements

Deployment of
subject C

Fig. 5. The accidental scenario in installation of the equipments.

5. Performance test of the evaluation methodology

5.1. The input scenario of validating the evaluation methodology

The scenario of equipment installations for dismantling a reac-

tor pressure vessel was selected to test the feasibility of the evalu-
ation methodology and system. The necessary equipments to
dismantle a reactor pressure vessel are band saw, circular saw,
gantry manipulator, turntable, and waste container as presented
in Fig. 4.

5.2. Assumption of an abnormal accident

There are three persons including a subject A, a subject B, and a

subject C in experiment of equipment installations. The subject A is
a crane operator. The subject B is a worker who checks installation
of equipments on the reactor upper floor. And the subject C is a
recuing worker who takes care of the injured worker in the middle Fig. 6. Operation of the assessment system in abnormal mode.
 K. Jeong et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6 5

Table 2
The performance test of ‘pool seal installation’ scenario in normal environment.

Subject Measurement of normal Note

environment (mSv)
Subject A 0.01 Deployed
Subject B 0.6 Deployed
Subject C 1.0 Not deployed

Table 3
The performance test of ‘pool seal installation’ scenario in abnormal environment.

Subject Measurement Measurement of Deployment

of normal abnormal
environment (mSv) environment (mSv)
Subject A 0.01 0.02 Deployed
Subject B 0.6 0.8 Deployed
Subject C 1.0 1.5 Deployed

Fig. 7. In situation of a subject struck by equipment.

According to the procedure of installing equipments, a subject B

went down the floor and another subject A put several equipments
of checking equipments of the reactor upper floor. As shown in
down. In the middle of installing equipments, an accident was
Fig. 5, an accident was supposed to be occurred after installation
occurred. The accident is a worker struck by equipment. At this
of turntable and circular saw.
time, a subject C went down the floor and came back with the
injured worker.
5.3. A feasibility study of the evaluation methodology

Fig. 6 depicts that the assessment system is executing in emer-
gency mode because of an abnormal accident from operational
errors. Fig. 7 illustrates that in view of monitoring, a subject B is
struck by equipment operated by a subject A. In case of emergency
mode, the subject A is waiting without operation of the crane, the
subject B is in the middle of situation struck by equipment, and a
subject C is supposed to go down accident spot floor to rescue
the injured the subject B.
On the basis of the input scenario, the performance test of the
evaluation methodology was carried out as shown in Fig. 8.
5.4. Results of the performance test
Throughout simulation of three subjects, the performance test
of normal environment was shown in Table 2 and that of abnormal
environment was shown in Table 3. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the
difference between measurement of normal environment and
measurement of abnormal environment. It is concluded that the
condition of abnormal environment takes more three times of
the occupational radiation exposure than that of normal
environment.

Fig. 8. The performance test of an abnormal accident.

6 K. Jeong et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 87 (2016) 1–6
6. Conclusion
This paper suggested that the abnormal environment from
human errors should be included to evaluate the occupational
exposure dose during decommissioning of nuclear facilities. And
the structure of model and mathematical method were also
designed to evaluate both normal and abnormal environments.
The proposed methodology was verified by applying a practical
test case of decommissioning scenarios in virtual decommissioning
environment.
It can be concluded that this methodology enables workers to
take actions on several accidents from human errors during
decommissioning of nuclear facilities and helps workers improve
their skills by making experiments on human behaviors under var-
ious conditions. Further study is to compare theoretical situations
with practical situations.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Nuclear Research and Develop-
ment Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea
funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning.
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