G.R. No.

74695 September 14, 1993

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate
Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.

Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.

Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 19861 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament3 with codicil4 of the
late Brigido Alvarado.

On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin"
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.

As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were
present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent,
as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them.

Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th
day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa
Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some
dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from
glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will,
the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it
aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial
will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979
by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan,
Laguna.5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated
was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally
incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed
under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly,
that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate
Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of
the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and
the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was
admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.

On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that
Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness,
the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to
the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not
followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the
contents of the drafted will was served.

The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time
his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article
complied with?

Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the
time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three
(3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his
first consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.

The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under
Art. 808 which reads:

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he
can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner
presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute
of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute),6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms
by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent.7 Dr. Roasa explained that
although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or
handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation.8

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still
read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor
eyesight."9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808
need not be complied with.

We agree with petitioner in this respect.

Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will
and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so
because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred"12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the
actual reading for him.

The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term
"blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason
or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final
drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the
scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions.
Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether
Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of
the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The
purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give
him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness,
it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the
same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices
for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to
the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of
the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.

We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of
the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are
intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and
inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator,
his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the
will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with
respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth
and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado
already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5
November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his
conformity to the draft. 15

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the
will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O.
Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the
contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons
following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his
instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we
consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his
physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.

The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections
should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator's will. 17

As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the
Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
 not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).

Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the
codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement
intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by
the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of
his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has
been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11
April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is
immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent.

Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.

Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in
Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez,
Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration
and the motion for appointment of a special administrator.

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages.
The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by
the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the
three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial
court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner
submitted his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who
testified on its genuineness and due execution.

The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate
of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also
required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be
properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex
parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the
disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of
intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the
motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable
Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were
still pending resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of
the respondent court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion
filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise
denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the
intestate heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the
three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of
one another?
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid,
it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign
at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting
witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient
compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition
precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He
contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the
signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.

We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the
statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other
hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification
of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to
the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the
attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should
be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444,
449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on
the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions
to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103).

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the
place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of
the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned
order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two
pages including this page".

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to
the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which
the win is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada,
42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30;
Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect
of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been
adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:

... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and
two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of
the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
 witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control
where the purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its component
pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de
Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may
sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the
probate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a
special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to
conduct further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D.
Seangio and Virginia Seangio."

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still
very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is
the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate
of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by
petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No.
98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na
pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga
kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si
Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa
aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na
pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na
si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3

(signed)
Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)

Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)

ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated. 4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited
only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is
preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New
Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not
being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme
Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for …
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO
PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING
THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the
court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-
Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo,
to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there
was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid,
respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the
document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son,
Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the
legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
 (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or
to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. 10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be given
effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention
of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999
and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until
the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.
 [G.R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909. ]

PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-Appellant.

C. Oben, for Appellant.

L. Joaquin, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ESTATES: ACTION AGAINST EXECUTION OR ADMINISTRATIONS. — While an estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be
maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against the executor or administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil.
Rep., 436.)

2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS OF ACTION BY LEGITIMATE AND BY NATURAL CHILDREN TO COMPEL RECOGNITION. — As a general rule, the right of action of
a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status continues only during
the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when the latter dies during minority or while insane,
or in case the action has already been instituted. Action by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the parents during
the minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes
to this natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. (Arts. 18 and 137, Civil Code.)

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court of
First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of
Casiano Abaya it appears:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on
the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom
she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said
intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November,
1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano
Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of
the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of
November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir
of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled
to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November
22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property
of the estate.

II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed a
petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the
evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the
property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding
products thereof.

III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court below entered
the following judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being
natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of
her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is
hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
administrator, Roman Abaya."cralaw virtua1aw library

IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented the following
statement of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children under
articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate proceedings.

2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of
such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.

3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the deceased children of Paula Conde
of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and

4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula Conde, as
improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that said property should be
reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded
securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall within the
reservation.

As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the administration
and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural
child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one might appear as heir on
the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not having been so recognized by the
deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same
time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased
who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.

According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —

"If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the deceased
person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to
such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and signed by witness. Any party in interest
whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the
manner provided in the last preceding section."cralaw virtua1aw library

This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental v. Engracio
Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)

The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a natural child
now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may
bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural father.

In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only
foundation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In resolving a similar question Manresa says: ’An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the natural child
and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person
as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority.’ On
this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A
private action is in question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: ’It may so
happen that the child dies before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that the document
supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring after
his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such right of action
shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest.’ (See Commentaries to
arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code. Vol. I.) ’

The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks legal and
doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants can
not be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.

It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting in form, when
establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is
shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time no argument has been
presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could be based.

Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children, granting them
rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the
same plane as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as
proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with succession in relation to the members
thereof. It may be laid down as a legal maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children,
or in connection with their rights, must still less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in
connection with their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.

If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child, the
acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the
father or the mother who recognizes him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the family, relatively
advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of the family
of his purely natural father or mother.

Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish a comparison
between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.

"Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall be
transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be
allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.

"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed before
then.

"Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may institute the action
before the expiration of the first four years of its majority.

"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which
the child is expressly acknowledged.

"In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such
instrument."cralaw virtua1aw library

On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in that the right of
action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought against the
presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the
presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.

With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of the
obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical
difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may
demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily from the
heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the
presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is
always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for
acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases
prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.

So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to acknowledge the
natural filiation.

As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter’s action to claim his legitimacy, or to obtain the
acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first case, but not the second. It
contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose of claiming his legitimacy
inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation.

Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of action which
devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain
cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to
which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any
case, not even as an exception.

It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to secure
acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his
heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a
general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception.
Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of
his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to
sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no
basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs
of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the
position of a natural child is no better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.

From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right
to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.

Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may
exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the
presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.

Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains
exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three
cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane,
or after action had been already instituted.

An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the
presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and
second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the
father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.

But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It can not be
transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.

In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action should be
considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it
up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows;

"There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed admissible as a solution, that
the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the
same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy,
under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child
on a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained
and questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the
heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said,
there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits
it." (Vol. V.)

Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the supreme court of Spain,"
commenting upon article 137, say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants them the right to claim
said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five
years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based
on the consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it
does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents,
excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to
pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on
general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of
both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor can it be, an omission, but a
deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a
natural one."cralaw virtua1aw library

(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)

Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a natural child claim the
acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge" ? And
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right of investigation
forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is
altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the
legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy is not
transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances.
Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation
would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived
that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child, which is only granted
under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same
rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation, and that in this conception the heirs of
the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by article 118. The majority, however, are
inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive
to the heirs. Really there are not legal grounds to warrant the transmission." (Vol. 2, 229.)

In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the purpose of
considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the
heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other
is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be understood that the
provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.

The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in the Roman
Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was
incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was
not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things which the heir held and
could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights,
both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia.
According to article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a
person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the latter,
among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his
father, during the life of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137, such right,
which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was so understood by
the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the child
which is extinguished by his death, but as any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right
of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.

The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child
who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is
not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the
component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish its
transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order
that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms
contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime,
being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission,
would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of
article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without
exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the
deceased child.

On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the child’s inheritance, it would be necessary to
establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and
from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of
the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable to compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place
the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only
be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of
the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.

For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts, without any
special ruling as to the costs of this instance.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980

CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,

vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA,
PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.

E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.

Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari  by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled
"Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan.

The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:

Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495,
4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."

The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz,
Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.

Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina,
Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.

Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza.

La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and
Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.

Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto.

Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other
plaintiffs herein.

On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.

On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of
the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could
be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1")
covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781
square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica
Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled
and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh.
"A").

After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte
constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which
he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia
Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto
and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of
their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although
the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.

From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and they even constructed a
piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises
where they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by
the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as
regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of
said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of
the purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual and
moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958
until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the same.

The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of
Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.

After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual error
between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the
lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496
which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30,
1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as
regards the 390.5 square meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.

The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 square meters of Lot 1496
measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.

After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496,
the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
9843 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to
the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495
and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision
ordered cancelled. The defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna
the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall
have become final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.

Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of Laguna for his information and
guidance.

With costs against the defendants. 2

The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment, hence they now come to this Court.

The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and circumstances duly established by the
evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.

There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of
P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New
Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled
and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act
3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the
property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega
in the concept of a co-ownership.
 The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses,
ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law,
between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower
or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his
part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs.
Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)

In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no reason in law why the heirs of the deceased
wife may not form a partnership with the surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband
might be formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough,
when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has authority to sell the property with ut
the concurrence of the children of the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of
bringing about a conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such property; and any one
purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the property will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the
family who join in the act of conveyance.

It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees constructed their house on the
eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of
the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at
the back of their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees
believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No.
14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as
Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case below,
the area sold was within Lot 1496.

Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son
Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private
respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the
land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the
same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)

We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved six years before and
therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased
wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a follows:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto
pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their
house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.

Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot
1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters.
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is
bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496.
Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear that the three
lots constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not
disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these three lots
adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq.
meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses.
Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the other half for the very simple
reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which
he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-
owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the
vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.

Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of
P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and
Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which
is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole property sold, which is
transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of
and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.

Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is
the object of the sale.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or
predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And
under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original
obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the
filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a
segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance
of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the
sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid
in its entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied
by said petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq. meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843
and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211972               July 22, 2015

WILSON GO and PETER GO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, represented by RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS; and
RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 212045

ELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER ALVIN A. GUERRERO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, herein represented by RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and
RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated1 petitions for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated December 19, 2013 and the
Resolution4 dated April 1, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697, which modified the
Decision5 dated June 8, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-97-
32515, and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson Go
(Wilson) and Peter Go (Peter), petitioners in G.R. No. 211972; (b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate
of Felisa Tamio; and (c) the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1704 75, as well as the issuance of a
new title in the name of the Estate of Felisa Tamio by the Register of Deeds.

The Facts

On March 17, 1959, the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of
land with an area of 533 square meters, more or less, situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City (subject property) and, thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 was issued in her name. Thereafter, she constructed a
three-storey building thereon, called D'Lourds Building, where she resided until her death on February 19, 1994. 6 On
February 10, 1960, Felisa supposedly sold the subject property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella), the latter's
husband, Delfin Guerrero, Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law
husband.7 Bella, co-petitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid ₱15,000.00 as consideration therefor. 8 Thus, TCT
No. 45951/T-233 in the name of Felisa was cancelled and TCT No. 49869 9 was issued in the names of Felimon, Sr. and
Bella, married to Delfin, Sr..

Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis10 (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella, and respondent in
both G.R. Nos. 211972 a nd 212045, began to occupy the second floor of the D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until
her death in 2007.11

As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., was irretrievably
destroyed in the interim, Bella caused its reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), 12 again registered in
their names.

When Felisa died on February 19, 1994, she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and testament, half of the
subject property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis (Rhea) and Regina A. Bihis (Regina), corespondents in
both G.R. Nos. 211972 and 212045 (collectively, the Bihis Family). Thus, on April 19, 1994, the Bihis Family caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Felisa's purported will likewise declared Bella as the
administrator of the subject property.13

On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, on May 24, 1994, a petition for the probate of Felisa's will. She was
eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and, in an inventory of Felisa's properties, Bella included
the subject property as part of said estate.14

On January 22, 1997, the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled. The following day, January 23, 1997, Felimon
Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina Buenaventura Mariano 15 (Teresita), apparently the
heirs of Felimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon, Sr.), executed a purported Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon
Buenaventura, Sr., and caused its annotation on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910
(49869) was cancelled and TCT No. N-170416 was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella, and her co-
petitioners in G.R. No. 212045, Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A. Guerrero (Lester) (collectively,
Bella, et al.).16

On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property was sold to Wilson
and Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of ₱4,500,000.00, a transaction completely unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the
Bihis Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of
Wilson and Peter. Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the subject
property.17

In July 1997, the probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and eventually,
granted letters of administration to Resurrecion.18 Hence, on October 17, 1997, herein respondents, the Estate of Felisa,
as represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis Family, in their personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against Bella, et al.,
Wilson, Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her lifetime, merely entrusted the
subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan
and mortgage from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have
the title over the subject property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested herself of her
ownership over the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence thereon, as well as her act of leasing
several units to various tenants. In fact, in a letter 19 dated September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970 letter) addressed to
Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for
Bella and Delfin, Sr. to procure a loan from the GSIS. 20 At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s signatures
appear beside their names.21

Likewise, respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they were aware of the facts and
circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry into the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella, et al. They averred
that Wilson and Peter knew that the building was occupied by individuals other than the sellers, as in fact, the Bihis Family
was residing therein.22

In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was owned by Bella and (the late) Felimon, Sr.,
as evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), which title was issued to them as early as February 10, 1960. Such title has
therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years without having been voided or nullified by a court decree. Moreover,
they have exercised acts of ownership over the subject property, such as m01igaging the same and leasing the building to
third parties. Finally, they asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the inventory of properties of the
Estate of Felisa was merely because of inadvertence.23

For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the subject property from Bella, et al. on
January 23, 1997, he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the Estate of Felisa. He testified that before they acquired
the subject property, he verified the validity of the title covering the same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of
two (2) months had lapsed before the sale was consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella to cancel
the encumbrance annotated on the title over the subject property. However, he asserted that .his lawyer merely advised
him to ask for the cancellation of the annotation but he was not aware of the details surrounding the same. Eventually, the
annotation was cancelled and that he only knew that the subject property was included in the Estate of Felisa when herein
respondents' complaint before the RTC was filed. As such, he maintained that he and Peter were purchasers in good
faith.24

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision25 dated June 8, 2009, the RTC found that there was an implied trust between Felisa, on the one hand, and
Bella and Felimon, Sr., on the other, created by operation of law. The RTC concluded that it was the intention of the late
Felisa to merely entrust to Bella and Felimon, Sr. the subject property for the sole purpose of using the same as collateral
to secure a loan with the GSIS. As such, while it is true that a title was issued in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and
Felimon, Sr. by virtue of the sale of the subject property to them, it was clear that Felisa never intended to relinquish her
ownership over the subject property. In concluding so, the RTC gave probative weight to the September 21, 1970 letter
executed and signed by Felisa which not only reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was
merely entrusted to them for purposes of securing a loan from the GSIS, but also expressed Felisa's desire to have the
subject property divided equally among her heirs.26

However, the R TC held that reconveyance can no longer be effected since the subject property had already been
transferred to Wilson and Peter, whom it found to be purchasers in good faith. The RTC found that through Wilson's
testimony, they were able to disprove respondents' allegation that they were aware of an infirmity in the title of the sellers
when they acquired the subject property.27

Consequently, as Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. were unjustly enriched at the expense of the respondents who, as
compulsory heirs, were also entitled to their share in the subject property, the RTC directed Bella, et al. to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the amounts of: (a) ₱2,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, representing half of the purchase
price of the subject property considering that reconveyance can no longer be granted; (b) ₱200,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱200,000.00 as attorney's fees. 28

Dissatisfied, the following parties filed their separate appeals before the CA: the Estate of Felisa; the Bihis Family; the
Estate of Rosalinda B. Mariano;29 and Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester.30 The CA simplified the issues raised in the separate
appeals, as follows: (a) whether or not there was a trust established by Felisa in favor of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr.; (b) whether or not the action for reconveyance had already prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are
purchasers in good faith.31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated December 19, 2013, the CA modified the RTC Decision, and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of
the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson and Peter; ( b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to
the Estate of Felisa; and (c) the cancellation of TCT No. N-170475 in the name of Wilson and Peter, as well as the
issuance of a new title in the name of the Estate of Felisa by the Register of Deeds. 33

In its ruling, the CA upheld the RTC's finding that an implied trust was constituted between Felisa, during her lifetime, and
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. when the former sold the subject property to the latter. Like the RTC, it gave substantial
weight and credence to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa which expressed her intention to convey the
subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. only for the purpose of obtaining a loan from the GSIS. The CA
similarly found that Felisa had not intended to relinquish her ownership over the subject property in their favor, as
evidenced not only by the said letter but also by her contemporaneous and subsequent acts of ownership, i.e., leasing the
building to tenants, instituting ejectment suits, having business permits issued in her name, and including the subject
property in her last will and testament.34

Moreover, the CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. did not
operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon them, as a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. Hence, the
presentation of TCT No. 49869 does not conclusively prove their claim of ownership over the subject property. 35

With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already prescribed,
the CA found that prescription has not set in. Citing jurisprudence, it held that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten ( 10) years, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
However, the rule applies only when the claimant or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.
When the claimant is in actual possession of the property, the action for reconveyance, which is effectively an action for
quieting of title, is imprescriptible. In this case, it has been indubitably established that the Bihis Family have been in
actual possession of the subject property; hence, their action for reconveyance is imprescriptible. 36

Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith, the CA ruled in the
negative. It took into consideration the admission made by Wilson that he has knowledge of the adverse claim of the Bihis
Family annotated on the title of the subject property but denied knowledge of its contents. Likewise, he admitted that he
directed his lawyer to have the said annotation cancelled before purchasing the subject property. Records also show that
he knew that the Bihis Family have been occupying the second floor of the D'Lourds Building. However, despite
knowledge of the foregoing facts, he and his brother failed to make the necessary inquiries as to the validity of the title of
the sellers, Bella, et al. Consequently, he and Peter cannot be considered as buyers in good faith. 37

Wilson and Peter, Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester, Felimon, Jr., and the Estate of Rosalinda Buenaventura Mariano filed
separate motions for reconsideration,38 which were all denied in the Resolution39 dated April 1, 2014; hence, these
petitions.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues advanced for the Court's consideration are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was an implied
trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other; (b) whether or not the
action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.
 The Court's Ruling

The petitions are bereft of merit.

The following facts are undisputed: in 1960, Felisa, as owner of the subject property, transferred the same to her daughter
Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. to assist them in procuring a loan from the GSIS. In view thereof, her title
over the property, TCT No. 45951/T-233, was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 49869, was issued in the names of
Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. After it was lost, TCT No. 49869 was reconstituted and TCT No. RT-74910
(49869) was issued in their names.

Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been occupying the subject property,
caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the same on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Subsequently, however, or on
January 22, 1997, the said annotation was cancelled, and the next day, the Heirs of Felimon, Sr. executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of his estate and caused its annotation on said title. TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was then cancelled and TCT
No. N-170416 was issued in the names of Bella, et al. Finally, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997, the
subject property was sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names TCT No. 170475 currently exists. Months later, or on
October 17, 1997,40 the complaint for reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, was
instituted.

From the foregoing factual milieu, the Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa, on the one hand, and
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as concluded by the RTC and the CA but an
express one; two, the present action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not
purchasers in good faith.

I.

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary
relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.1âwphi1 Trust relations
between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the
parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law. 41

Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a
trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily
indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create
the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship
which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship
which is called a trust.42

Further, in the case of Tamayo v. Callejo,43 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in
the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale
of the property to another party effectively converted the same into an express trust. 44

In the present case, both the R TC and the CA found that an implied trust was established, heavily giving credence,
among others, to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa during her lifetime, which partly reads:

Dear Delfin,

Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging damdamin. Hinihiling ko sa iyo at
ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa late at building ng D 'lourds.

Hindi naman kaila sa ivo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina Filemon C. Buenaventura Sr., Bella
Alvarez Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.

Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at walang sinumang nagbigay o
tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Fe ling mo ay walang naibigay na pera dito.
Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-kapareho ang paghahati ng bawat isa sa
anumang aking kabuhayan.

Kaya hinihiling ko sa iyo Delfin na kung maaari lamang ay ang lahat ng nakatala dito ay pirmahan ninyo.

x x x x45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Beneath the letter appear the signatures of Bella and Delfin, and the signature of Felisa signing as "MOMMY" as well. 46

Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration – the validity and due execution of which were never put in
issue, hence, indubitably established - the Court therefore differs from the finding of the courts a quo that an implied trust
was established; instead, the Court rules that an express trust was duly proved in this case.

The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of transferring the title
over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely accommodate them in securing a loan
from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated
her wish to have her heirs share equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created
between Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution of the
September 21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between them as an express one,
their true intention irrefutably extant thereon.

Bella's attempt to thwart the express trust established in this case by claiming that she affixed her signature on the
September 21, 1970 letter only "to appease" her mother, Felisa, and that she could afford to sign the letter since the title
covering the subject property was in their name as owners anyway, 47 does not hold water. As correctly ruled by the CA,
citing Lee Tek Sheng v. CA,48 the "[m]ere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the ce1iificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title,"49 as in this case.50 Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. 51 Moreover, the
Court notes that even during the proceedings before the RTC, Bella never denied the purpose for which the sale to them
of the subject property was effected. Instead, they relied heavily and anchored their defense on the existence of their
certificate of title covering the subject property, which, to reiterate, was insufficient to prove their ownership over the same
independent of the express trust.

In light of the foregoing, while the Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. only hold the subject property in trust for Felisa, the Court however finds that an express trust, not an implied one, was
established in this case.

II.

Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet
prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is
repudiated.52

In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property to
Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on
October 17, 1997,54 or only a few months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that
the same has prescribed.

III.

Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject property in good
faith, the Court concurs with the CA' s finding that they are not.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or
an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of some other person's claim or interest in the property. 55 Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual
possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy
or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his
rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in
making purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the
land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. 56

In his testimony57 before the R TC, Wilson claimed to have verified the validity of the title covering the subject property
before the Registry of Deeds. However, he also admitted that two (2) months had lapsed before the sale could be
consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella, one of the sellers, to cancel the encumbrance annotated
on the title of the subject property. He also claimed that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation, and
that he was aware that individuals other than the sellers were in possession of the subject property.

As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation on the title covering the subject property
and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any presumption of good faith on the part of
Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value, 58 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 19, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 1, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33365             December 20, 1930

Estate of the deceased Paulino Diancin. TEOPISTA DOLAR, proponent-appellant,

vs.
FIDEL DIANCIN, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Montinola, Montinola and Hilado for appellant.

Lopez Vito and Lopez Vito for appellees.

MALCOLM, J.:

The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on the sole
ground that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the thumbmarks of the testator. Disregarding the
other errors assigned by the proponent of the will, we would direct attention to the third error which challenges
squarely the correctness of this finding.

The will in question is alleged to have been executed by Paulino Diancin at Dumangas, Iloilo, on November 13,
1927. A thumbmark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages in the
following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same
Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will is detailed in nature, and disposes of an
estate amounting approximately to P50,000.

For comparative purposes, Exhibit 8, a document of sale containing an admittedly genuine thumbmark of
Paulino Diancin, was presented. Photographs of the thumbmarks on the will and of the thumbmark on Exhibit 8
were also offered in evidence. One, Carlos J. Jaena, attempted to qualify as an "expert," and thereafter gave
as his opinion that the thumbmarks had not been made by the same person .One, Jose G. Villanueva, likewise
attempted to qualify as were authentic. The petition of the proponent of the will to permit the will to be sent to
Manila to be examined by an expert was denied. On one fact only were the opposing witnesses agreed, and
this was that the ink used to make the thumbmarks on the will was of the ordinary type which blurred the
characteristics of the marks, whereas the thumbmark on Exhibit 8 was formed clearly by the use of the special
ink required for this purpose. The trial judge expressed his personal view as being that great differences
existed between the questioned marks and the genuine mar.lawphi1>net

The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the customary written
signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark .Expert testimony as to the identity of thumbmarks
or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close
study .Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus
rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the
impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its
own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine thumbmark and the
questioned thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here. (Emperor vs. Abdul Hamid [1905], 32 Indian L. Rep.,
759, cited in 3 Chamberlayne on the Modern Law of Evidence, sec. 2561, notes 3.)

There is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three instrumental witnesses
united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It was stated that in
addition to the testator and themselves, on other person, Diosdado Dominado, was present. This latter
individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the will to identify Exhibit 8. He was later placed on the
witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and thereupon declared positively that he was the one who
prepared the will for the signature of Paulino Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were those of
Paulino Diancin, and that he saw Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The testimony of a witness called
by both parties is worthy of credit.

We reach the very definite conclusion that the document presented for probate as the last will of the deceased
Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were the thumbmarks of the
testator .Accordingly, error is found, which means that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby,
reversed, and the will ordered admitted to probate, without special finding as to costs in this instance.
G.R. No. 6845           September 1, 1914

YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.

Chicote and Miranda for appellants.

O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 23d day of August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap
Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the
said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition
and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as
Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.

Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing on the 18th day of September, 1909. Timoteo Paez
declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the
11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the
time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that Anselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had
also signed said will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the deceased.

Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
during her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had
executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there were also
present Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora and a person called Anselmo; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed
the will in the presence of the witnesses; that he had seen her sign the will with his own eyes; that the witnesses had
signed the will in the presence of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and in the presence of each other; that the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will voluntarily, and in his judgment, she was in the possession of her faculties;
that there were no threats or intimidation used to induce her to sign the will; that she signed it voluntarily.

No further witnesses were called and there was no further opposition presented to the legalization of the said will.

After hearing the foregoing witnesses, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, on the 29th day of September, 1909,
ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. The will was
attached to the record and marked Exhibit A. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the
will, upon the giving of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later.

From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and
desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause.

On the 1st day of March, 1910, the court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O
accepted said appointment, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad litem  of
said parties. On the 2d day of March, 1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in court and presented a motion in which he
alleged, in substance:

First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of
September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons:

(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes.

(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally
capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness.

(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part of
persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no
intention of executing the same.
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had
executed another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909.

Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in
presenting their opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age.

Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order of the 29th day of September, 1909,
and to grant to said minors an opportunity to present new proof relating to the due execution of said will. Said petition was
based upon the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.

While it is not clear from the record, apparently the said minors in their petition for a new trial, attached to said petition the
alleged will of August 6, 1909, of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, and the affidavits of Severo Tabora, Clotilde and
Cornelia Serrano.

Upon the 10th day of March, 1910, upon the hearing of said motion for a rehearing, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge,
granted said motion and ordered that the rehearing should take place upon the 18th day of March, 1910, and directed that
notice should be given to the petitioners of said rehearing and to all other persons interested in the will. At the rehearing a
number of witnesses were examined.

It will be remembered that one of the grounds upon which the new trial was requested was that the deceased, Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong, had not signed the will (Exhibit A) of the 11th of August, 1909; that in support of that allegation, the
protestants, during the rehearing, presented a witness called Tomas Puzon. Puzon testified that he was a professor and
an expert in handwriting, and upon being shown the will (of August 11, 1909) Exhibit A, testified that the name and
surname on Exhibit A, in his judgment were written by two different hands, though the given name is the same as that
upon Exhibit 1 (the will of August 6, 1909), because he found in the name "Tomasa" on Exhibit A a similarity in the tracing
to the "Tomasa" in Exhibit 1; that comparing the surname on Exhibit A with the surname on Exhibit 1 he found that the
character of the writing was thoroughly distinguished and different by the tracing and by the direction of the letters in the
said two exhibits; that from his experience and observation he believed that the name "Tomasa" and "Yap Caong,"
appearing in the signature on Exhibit A were written by different person.

Puzon, being cross-examined with reference to his capacity as an expert in handwriting, testified that while he was a
student in the Ateneo de Manila, he had studied penmanship; that he could not tell exactly when that was, except that he
had concluded his course in the year 1882; that since that time he had been a telegraph operator for seventeen years and
that he had acted as an expert in hand- writing in the courts in the provinces.

Gabriel La O was called as a witness during the rehearing and testified that he had drawn the will of the 6th of August,
1909, at the request of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that it was drawn in accordance with her request and under her
directions; that she had signed it; that the same had been signed by three witnesses in her presence and in the presence
of each other; that the will was written in her house; that she was sick and was lying in her bed, but that she sat up to sign
the will; that she signed the will with great difficulty; that she was signed in her right mind.

The said Severo Tabora was also called as a witness again during the rehearing. He testified that he knew Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that she was dead; that his signature as a witness to Exhibit A (the will of August
11, 1909) was placed there by him; that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, became familiar with the contents of
the will because she signed it before he (the witness) did; that he did not know whether anybody there told her to sign the
will or not; that he signed two bills; that he did not know La O; that he did not believe that Tomasa had signed the will
(Exhibit A) before he arrived at the house; that he was not sure that he had seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong sign Exhibit
A because there were many people and there was a screen at the door and he could not see; that he was called a a
witness to sign the second will and was told by the people there that it was the same as the first; that the will (Exhibit A)
was on a table, far from the patient, in the house but outside the room where the patient was; that the will was signed by
Paez and himself; that Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he was not sure whether Anselmo Zacarias signed the will or
not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong could see the table on which the will was written at the time
it was signed or not; that there were many people in the house; that he remembered the names of Pedro and Lorenzo;
that he could not remember the names of any others; that the will remained on the table after he signed it; that after he
signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was lying; that the will was left on the table outside; that Tomasa was
very ill; that he heard the people asking Tomasa to sign the will after he was (the witness) had signed it; that he saw Paez
sign the will, that he could not remember whether Anselmo Zacarias had signed the will, because immediately after he
and Paez signed it, he left because he was hungry; that the place where the table was located was in the same house, on
the floor, about two steps down from the floor on which Tomasa was.
Rufino R. Papa, was called as a witness for the purpose of supporting the allegation that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was
mentally incapacitated to make the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Papa declared that he was a physician; that he
knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that he had treated her in the month of August; that he visited her first on the 8th day
of August; that he visited her again on the 9th and 10th days of August; that on the first visit he found the sick woman
completely weak — very weak from her sickness, in the third stage of tuberculosis; that she was lying in bed; that on the
first visit he found her with but little sense, the second day also, and on the third day she had lost all her intelligence; that
she died on the 11th of August; tat he was requested to issue the death certificate; that when he asked her (Tomasa)
whether she was feeling any pain or anything of that kind, she did not answer at all; that she was in a condition of stupor,
induced, as he believed, by the stage of uraemia from which she was suffering.

Anselmo Zacarias, who had signed the will of August 11, 1909, was also called as a witnesses during the rehearing. He
testified that he had known Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong since he was a child; that Tomasa was dead; that he had written
the will exhibit A; that it was all in his writing except the last part, which was written by Carlos Sobaco; that he had written
the will Exhibit A at the request of the uncle of Tomasa; that Lorenzo, the brother of the deceased, was the one who had
instructed him as to the terms of the will ; that the deceased had not spoken to him concerning the terms of the will; that
the will was written in the dining room of the residence of the deceased; that Tomasa was in another room different from
that in which the will was written; that the will was not written in the presence of Tomasa; that he signed the will as a
witness in the room where Tomasa was lying; that the other witnesses signed the will in the same room that when he went
into the room where the sick woman was (Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong) Lorenzo had the will in his hands; that when
Lorenzo came to the bed he showed the will to his sister (Tomasa) and requested her to sign it; that she was lying
stretched out on the bed and two women, who were taking care of her, helped her to sit up, supporting her by lacing their
hands at her back; that when she started to write her name, he withdrew from the bed on account of the best inside the
room; when he came back again to the sick bed the will was signed and was again in the hands of Lorenzo; that he did
not see Tomasa sign the will because he withdrew from the room; that he did not know whether Tomasa had been
informed of the contents of the will or not; he supposed she must have read it because Lorenzo turned the will over to her;
that when Lorenzo asked her to sign the will, he did not know what she said — he could not hear her voice; that he did not
know whether the sick woman was him sign the will or not; that he believed that Tomasa died the next day after the will
had been signed; that the other two witnesses, Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora, had signed the will in the room with the
sick woman; that he saw them sign the will and that they saw him sign it; that he was not sure whether the testatrix could
have seen them at the time they signed the will or not; that there was a screen before the bed; that he did not think that
Lorenzo had been giving instructions as to the contents of the will; that about ten or fifteen minutes elapsed from the time
Lorenzo handed the will to Tomasa before she started to sign it; that the pen with which she signed the will as given to her
and she held it.

Clotilde Mariano testified that he was a cigarette maker; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and that she was dead;
that she had made two wills; that the first one was written by La O and the second by Zacarias; that he was present at the
time Zacarias wrote the second one; that he was present when the second will was taken to Tomasa for signature; that
Lorenzo had told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first; that Tomasa said she could not sign it.

On cross examination he testified that there was a lot of visitors there; that Zacarias was not there; that Paez and Tabora
were there; that he had told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first.

During the rehearing Cornelia Serrano and Pedro Francisco were also examined as witnesses. There is nothing in their
testimony, however, which in our opinion is important.

In rebuttal Julia e la Cruz was called as a witness. She testified that she was 19 years of age; that she knew Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that she lived in the house of Tomasa during the last week of her illness; that
Tomasa had made two wills; that she was present when the second one was executed; that a lawyer had drawn the will in
the dining room and after it had been drawn and everything finished , it was taken to where Doña Tomasa was, for her
signature; that it was taken to her by Anselmo Zacarias; that she was present at the time Tomasa signed the will that
there were many other people present also; that she did not see Timoteo Paez there; that she saw Severo Tabora; that
Anselmo Zacarias was present; that she did not hear Clotilde Mariano ask Tomasa to sign the will; that she did not hear
Lorenzo say to Tomasa that the second will was the same sa the first; that Tomasa asked her to help her to sit up and to
put a pillow to her back when Zacarias gave her some paper or document and asked her to sign it; that she saw Tomasa
take hold of the pen and try to sign it but she did not see the place she signed the document, for the reason that she left
the room; that she saw Tomasa sign the document but did not see on what place on the document she signed; and that a
notary public came the next morning; that Tomasa was able to move about in the bed; that she had seen Tomasa in the
act of starting to write her signature when she told her to get her some water.

Yap Cao Quiang was also called as a witness in rebuttal. He testified that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and knew
that she had made a will; that he saw the will at the time it was written; that he saw Tomasa sign it on her head; that he
did not hear Lorenzo ask Tomasa to sign the will; that Lorenzo had handed the will to Tomasa to sign; that he saw the
witnesses sign the will on a table near the bed; that the table was outside the curtain or screen and near the entrance to
the room where Tomasa was lying.

Lorenzo Yap Caong testified as a witness on rebuttal. He said that he knew Anselmo Zacarias and that Zacarias wrote the
will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that Tomasa had given him instructions; that Tomasa had said that she sign the will;
that the will was on a table near the bed of Tomasa; that Tomasa, from where she was lying in the bed, could seethe table
where the witnesses had signed the will.

During the rehearing certain other witnesses were also examined; in our opinion, however, it is necessary to quote from
them for the reason that their testimony in no way affects the preponderance of proof above quoted.

At the close of the rehearing the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, in an extended opinion, reached the conclusion that
the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, which was attached to the record and marked Exhibit A was
the last will and testament of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and admitted it to probate and ordered that the
administrator therefore appointed should continue as such administrator. From that order the protestants appealed to this
court, and made the following assignments of error:

I. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed by the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong, without
the intervention of any external influence on the part of other persons.

II. The court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of
signing the will.

III. The court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong in the first will, Exhibit 1, is
identical with that which appears in the second will, Exhibit A.

IV. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed in accordance with the law.

With reference to the first assignment of error, to wit, that undue influence was brought to bear upon Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong in the execution of her will of August 11th, 1909 (Exhibit A), the lower court found that no undue influence had
been exercised over the mind of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified
that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the
other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of the
will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the
witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue
influence had been used. we find no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon that question.

With reference to the second assignment of error to wit, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not of sound mind and
memory at the time of the execution of the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we
found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition
of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the
execution of the will in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for
her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten
or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the
conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the
time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do
not feel justified in reversing his conclusions upon that question.

With reference to the third assignment of error, to wit, that the lower court committed an error in declaring that the
signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is identical with that which appears in
the second will (August 11, 1909, Exhibit A), it may be said:

First. That whether or not Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the
question presented to the court. The question presented was whether or not she had duly executed the will of August 11,
1909 (Exhibit A).

Second. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute the will of August 6, 1909.
Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up
to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills
and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain
the charge that she did not make the new will.

Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong, in her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A)" the inference that
she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants relating to said third assignment of error is
based upon the alleged fact that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified that they
saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion,
and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name tot he
will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one
who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply
upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a
portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. (Re  Goods of
Savory, 15 Jur., 1042; Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr., 504; Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El., 94 Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400;
Vernon vs. Kirk, 30 Penn., 218; Cozzen's Will, 61 Penn., 196; Re  Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443; Main vs. Ryder, 84
Penn., 217.)

We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A., 353), and cited by the appellees,
which was known as "Knox's Appeal." In this case one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888,
at the residence of her father. After her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in her handwriting, written with a lead
pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature simply of "Harriett." In this
paper the deceased attempted to make certain disposition of her property. The will was presented for probate. The
probation was opposed upon the ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the only
question presented to the court, whether the signature, in the form above indicated, was a sufficient signature to constitute
said paper the last will and testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper was in the handwriting of
the deceased. In deciding that question, Justice Mitchell said:

The precise case of a signature by the first name only, does not appear to have arisen either in England or the
United States; but the principle on which the decisions already referred to were based, especially those in regard
to signing by initials only, are equally applicable to the present case, and additional force is given to them by the
decisions as to what constitutes a binding signature to a contract. (Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Denio, 478; Sanborne
vs. Flager, 9 Alle, 474; Weston vs. Myers, 33 Ill., 424; Salmon Falls, etc. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.), 446.)

The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to "sign" as
effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a
signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In the
present case we think the proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her
full name, did at least sign her given name "Tomasa," and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the argument which was preceded is sufficient to
answer it also.

During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her
name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of
each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed
by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was
presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below
the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It
was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the
witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making
the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are
made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the
will.

In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions
that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses,
to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity.
Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909
(Exhibit A). Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. 15566           September 14, 1921

EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants.

Dionisio Villanueva for appellants.

Marcelino Lontok for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia,
contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors
Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced
one of the three attesting witnesses who testified — with details not necessary to be here specified — that the
will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession
of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at
the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence
accounted for by the proponent of the will.

When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended
to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as
to be unable to comprehend what he was about.

After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge found that
the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had
been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.

From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will, and the only errors here
assigned have reference to the two following points, namely, first, whether a will can be admitted to probate,
where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the
absence of the other two; and, secondly, whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact
that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each
page of the will instead of the left margin.

Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the testimony of only
one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared
after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of
the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.

In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had
been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal
contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent,
believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go
to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting
witnesses.

Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply
any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be
mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the
will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.

It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon the
submission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a
new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the first time in
this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must be declared not be well
taken. This exact question has been decided by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of
the appellant, and we see no reason why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us. (Estate of
McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)

There are at least two reason why the appellate tribunals are disinclined to permit certain questions to be
raised for the first time in the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion of the Court of
First Instance upon the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a court of first instance
with reference to that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the second place, it permits, if it
does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and
from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is placed, while they are engaged in other discussions
more simulated than real. These considerations are, we think, decisive.

In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be understood as laying down any hard and fast
rule that would prove an embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in the future. In one way or
another we are constantly here considering aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have escaped the
attention of all persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is necessary if this court is to contribute the
part due from it in the correct decision of the cases brought before it. What we mean to declare is that when we
believe that substantial justice has been done in the Court of First Instance, and the point relied on for reversal
in this court appears to be one which ought properly to have been presented in that court, we will in the
exercise of a sound discretion ignore such question relates a defect which might have been cured in the Court
of First Instance if attention had been called to it there. In the present case, if the appellant had raised this
question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a motion for a new trial, that court would have had the
power, and it would have been is duty, considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new
trial in order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of thus calling the error to
the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this court. We hold that
this is too late.

Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains nothing inconsistent with the ruling we
now make, for it appears from the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had obtained an order for a
republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of presenting the two additional attesting witnesses who
had not been previously examined, but nevertheless subsequently failed without any apparent reason to take
their testimony. Both parties in that case were therefore fully apprised that the question of the number of
witnesses necessary to prove the will was in issue in the lower court.

The second point involved in this case is whether, under section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of the testator
and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the left margin of each page, as required in said Act, and
not upon the right margin, as in the will now before us; and upon this we are of the opinion that the will in
question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their
names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect
that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is
also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.

Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial it would be absurd to suppose
that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the effect that the
signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page — rather than on the
right margin — seems to be this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part
thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin,
provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No. 12558, decided March 23, 1918, not
reported), this court declared a will void which was totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its
several pages; and in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil., 875), a will was likewise declared void
which contained the necessary signatures on the margin of each leaf ( folio), but not in the margin of each
page containing written matter.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of deviation
from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the
mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from possible
alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in the left margin; and
the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the
consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.

The same could not be said of a case like that of Estate of Saguinsin, supra, where only the leaves, or
alternate pages, were signed and not each written page; for as observed in that case by our late lamented
Chief Justice, it was possible that in the will as there originally executed by the testratrix only the alternative
pages had been used, leaving blanks on the reverse sides, which conceivably might have been filled in
subsequently.

The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476,
479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at
the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant
upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate
the instrument.

It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. It
is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-21755        December 29, 1924

In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA NAYVE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants.

Manuel M. Calleja for appellants.

Felix U. Calleja for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena
Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased.

The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to the will, and ordered the probate
thereof, holding that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in
accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will
to probate and overruling their opposition.

The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four pages
written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses
on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also
on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the
page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not
appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.

The defects attributed to the will are:

(a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b)
the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed
all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above stated, that the third page actually used was signed by the testator,
not on the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that the
fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the testator, but about the middle of the page
and at the end of the attestation clause.

In this respect the holding of this court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez  (42 Phil., 145), is applicable,
wherein the will in question was signed by the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right, margin. The rule laid
down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will
was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and
consequently it was allowed to probate.

Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of
the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not
detract from the validity of the will.lawphi1.net

Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters,
suffice it to cite the case of Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and
not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will, which is the third
defect assigned, it must be noted that the last paragraph of the will here in question and the attestation clause, coming
next to it, are of the following tenor:
 In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay,
Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed
of four sheets, including the next:
ANTONIO MOJAL

(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and testament in
the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator Don Antonio Mojal, we
signed this will in the presence of each other and of the testator.)
PEDRO CARO
SILVERIO MORCO
ZOILO MASINAS

As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case of Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was held that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages
composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at
the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be
no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by
the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.

With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator does not appear to have signed on all the sheets of the
will in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed on all the sheets in the presence of
the testator and of each other, it must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator
signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the
testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement
was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses
signed all the sheets of the will.

The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be proven by the
mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause
now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the
mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the
instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.

Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is
proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does not
invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.

The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-3362             March 1, 1951

TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee,

vs.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant.

Eligio C. Lagman for appellant.

Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee.

JUGO, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos
Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only question of law. Her counsel
assigns the two following alleged errors:

Primer Error. — El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos Gil
no ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley.

Segundo Error. — Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento.

The alleged will read as follows:

Primera Pagina (1)

EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN

Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 años de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano y en pleno
goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o
influencia ilegal de persona extraña, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en
castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:

1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos hijos;

2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga;

3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herretos todos mis bienes ya que muebles e inmuebles
situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes
remanentes heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a Don Carlos
Worrel.

4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien
tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza;

En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus
dos paginas, utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez
firmaron cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de
ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil novecientos treinta
y nueve.

CARLOS GIL

Testificacion:

Segunda Pagina (2)

 Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que precede
este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la
clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la
casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos
atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la
de cada uno de nosotros.

(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA

(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA

(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAÑA

Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court below said:

. . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G.R. No. L-254,
entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto
Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee." Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the
will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal).

The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be disputed. The
conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the
evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not
have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of the
attestation clause.

It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor signed the will. It
declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the
attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the
clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is
too much of a clerical error for it effects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or
correct only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement.

It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences,
when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the
line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implication, and even
by internal circumtantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear, uniquivocal, language of the
statute as to how the attestation clause should be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will
read the clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be
against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the
following provision:

. . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the contents
of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of
the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we, in
view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences, implications,
and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain requisities for the
conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence.

It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of the
alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made
an attestation clause, which is the function of the witness. But the important point is that he attests or certifies
his own signature, or, to be accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own
signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own
bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the
attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.

It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but said
rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause,
which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.

The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which are said to be
rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645.

In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say:

1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. — The right to dispose of the property by will is governed entirely by
statute. The law is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. The law not
alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative,
to enforce legislative intention.

2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. — The Philippine authorities relating to the attestation clause to wills
reviewed. The cases of Saño vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar
([1924], 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra, adopted and
reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides that "The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other" applied and enforced.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and
each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a
defect annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)

In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following pronouncement:

. . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se hace constar que los testadores
firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres testigos instrumentales y que estos firmaron el
testamento los unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos firmaron el
testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las
paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de los segundos y vice-versa.

En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento Exhibit A
de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado.

The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:

1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. — The attestation clause
must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect
constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban
 vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on
the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect
intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.).

2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. — Section 618 of
Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly
construed. Courts cannot supply the defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas
L. Sioca, supra.)

It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine of the Gumban vs.
Gorcho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an attestation clause similar to that involved herein.

In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation clause which was complete,
and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court said:

In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in the
above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the
said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament
constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides
that: . . . (p. 381, supra.)

The attestation clause involved herein is very different.

In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:

An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: "We, the undersigned attesting
witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the
testatrix, whose name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will consisting of two
pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our presence, and in witness
whereof we have each signed the same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in
the presence of each other," held not to be fatally defective and to conform to the law.

This very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.

In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will was objected
to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated that "each of the pages of which the said will is
composed" was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the
signature was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency was cured by
the phrase "as well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as" indicate that the
testatrix signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to
"also." The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any
correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the presence of each and all of the three
witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it was unnecessary.

In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939; 68 Phil.,
745), the attestation clause reads as follows:

Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada
uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testsador, Valerio Leynez. El
testamento consta de dos (2) paginas solamente.
The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the witnesses signed each and
every page of the will. This fact , however, appears in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in case of the will
complied with all the requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted.

In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa  1 (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939), the
attestation clause reads as follows:

Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionadios otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima
voluntad o testamentao compuesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clasula de atestiguamiento. Que
estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el testamento arriba mencionado es su
ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente
estabamos presentes cuando el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de
cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno de nosotros en cada pagina y en el
margen izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en prsencia del
testador y de cada uno de nosotros.

The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it says "testador" instead of
"testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador." The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the
verb "firmamos."

In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil  2 (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation clause did not
state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held that this deficiency was cured by the will itself,
which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages.

In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by the Court of
Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads as follows:

Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemos firmado es el testamento y ultima voluntad,
que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y de leer y de
leerle el mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firmo y marco con su dedo
pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros, que asimismo cada uno
de nosotros, los testigos, firmamos enpresencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de
nosotros.

It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the testatrix and the witnesses
of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured by the fact that their signatures appear on every
page. This attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case.

There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the
law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural
but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.

The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory creation, and is
available only upon the compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the
Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot be
disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the right, and the heir can be
deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining
whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to no
consideration. For that purpose only intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the language of the
statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with
the statute. Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30 L. R. A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re
Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700, 701.)

In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to weaken
the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are
 observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made a will, but
the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or . . .
failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . . wills . . . truly expressing the intertions of the testator are
made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is
frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . . has taught of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of
frustrating (that intention, . . . in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of
spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . . . The evil probably to arise by giving to wills made without
any form, . . ." or, in derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his effect on
his estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.

It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot
break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be
presented apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419, 420.)

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and
declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 147145            January 31, 2005

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner,

vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to probate the last will and
testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").

The Antecedent Facts

Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in September 1943. Both
died without legitimate children.

On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the last
will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.

Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in
1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following
reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the
testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries.
Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro,
Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors
are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.

On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071
(312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi
Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).

On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 069
(309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and
Toray.

In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the
oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray’s will became
final and executory.8

In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-
Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.9 Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of
the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20
August 1991.10

Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an Order
dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for decision.
Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial compliance with the
formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of Felix
Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further, there being no
evidence of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada
dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.

As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who shall
discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking
his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos.

Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue discharging her
duties as such until further orders from this Court.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition
for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-
Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.

Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.

In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-
Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the will of
Abada.

Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;

2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;13

3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator;

4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;

5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is written
in a language known to Abada;

6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada.

The Applicable Law

Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old
Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure14 which governed the execution of wills before the
enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,15 governs the form of the attestation clause of Abada’s
will.16 Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 618. Requisites of will. – No will, except as provided in the preceding section,17 shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by
the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in
the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure

Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:

(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;

(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction;

(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other;

(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;

(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet;

(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed
and signed the will and all pages of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She cites
in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the testator.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. xxx18

Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the Old Civil Code
is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old
Civil Code defines a legitime.

Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the
Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the testator,
or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are
known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure
themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.

Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700 and 701,
are also required to know the testator.

However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.23 Therefore, Abada’s will
does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.1awphi1.nét

Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language.
She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the Court of
Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the
issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate
proceedings.24 In addition, the language used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.

Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will
itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.25 This is a matter that a party may establish
by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to
show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will.
However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language.27 This sufficiently proves that
Abada speaks the Spanish language.

The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will

A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abada’s will reads:

Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de
nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada
una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de
nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos
hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y
"DOS’ en la parte superior de la carrilla.28

Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that
the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.

The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que
esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting
of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters
"ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las
letras "UNO" y "DOS."

Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the
will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to
the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code.29

The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su
ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra
presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is:
"Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the
testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the
same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of
the witnesses.

However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of
witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.

This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the
law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court
noted that Abangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later
decisions of the Court.

In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable laws,
enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending that the rule on
strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court, after
examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:

x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to
all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the
application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the
instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to
probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect.
x x x.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending
the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other
casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x x 331a\^/phi1.net

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will
itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of
the rule on liberal construction, thus:

[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only permit a probe into the will,
an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of
the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any
fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on the will
itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed before the
three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each
page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.

Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances that
the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other.
This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a
parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.35

The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one of us also signed in our
presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will
of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
47644.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS
CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact,
ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO
CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.

Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners.

Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the
attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of
Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.

The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight
years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses,
namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer,
Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. 1 It was declared
therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties
to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara,
all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. 2

Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-
R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The
probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were
postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard
by the probate court.3 On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees named in the will, sough his appointment
as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed
by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981. 4

Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R, before Branch IX
of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate
proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and
opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. 5

Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an
order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceeding for the
probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled and eventually assigned
to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of the probate proceedings. 6

In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to
the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to
the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein. 7

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified
that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that,
contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any
way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing
as the had died by then.8
On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the
late Mateo Caballero, on the ratiocination that:

. . . The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo
Caballero executed the Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978.
Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo Caballero who initiated the probate of his Will during his lifetime
when he caused the filing of the original petition now marked Exhibit "D" clearly underscores the fact that
this was indeed his Last Will. At the start, counsel for the oppositors manifested that he would want the
signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a handwriting expert of the NBI but it would
seem that despite their avowal and intention for the examination of this signature of Mateo Caballero in
Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it because they abandoned the idea and instead presented Aurea
Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses for the oppositors.

All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero
and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law. 9

Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will
in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision 10 affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus:

The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in question may be considered as having
substantialy complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What appears in the attestation
clause which the oppositors claim to be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by him and
the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES,
including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each
page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in
the presence of each and all of us (emphasis supplied).

To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need be presented to indicate the meaning
that the said will was signed by the testator and by them (the witnesses) in the presence of all of them
and of one another. Or as the language of the law would have it that the testator signed the will "in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another." If not completely or ideally perfect in
accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the phrase as formulated is in substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law." 11

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court, but the same was denied in the latter's
resolution of January 14, 1992, 12 hence this appeal now before us. Petitioners assert that respondent court has ruled
upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled jurisprudence on the matter and are now questioning
once more, on the same ground as that raised before respondent court, the validity of the attestation clause in the last will
of Mateo Caballero.

We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter, after some prefatory observations which we
feel should be made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controversy.

1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death. 13 Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds
of wills which a testator may execute.14 the first kind is the ordinary or attested will, the execution of which is governed by
Articles 804 to 809 of the Code. Article 805 requires that:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
 direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness, it shall be interpreted to them.

In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting witness. 15 hence
it is likewise known as notarial will. Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must personally
read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons who would read the will and communicate its
contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him twice;
once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the notary public before whom it is acknowledged. 16

The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A common
requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator. 17

However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect
known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the
attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. 18 The last paragraph of Article 805 merely
requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has
been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. 20 It is made for the purpose of preserving in
a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved. 21

Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the
will, 22 should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or
expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that
the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also
signed the will  and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages;23 whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and
attested to by the witnesses.24

Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.25 The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will
and to insure the authenticity thereof.26 As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed
only by them.27 Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to
add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses. 28

In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for requiring the formalities to be followed in the
execution of wills, in the following manner:

The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this Project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
 more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.

This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of
wills. . . .29

2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which
have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the
testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other
hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses
hereto.30 Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference:

We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the
Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the
testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES,
including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each
page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the
presence of each and all of us.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was
published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper
published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. 31

In Taboada vs. Rizal,32 we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see
and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the
signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the
same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it involves a
mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the
witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed in the
attestation.

It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the
third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree.

What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that
the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the
words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the
presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however,
be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately
follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the
left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as
contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to wit:
 Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the
will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of article 805" (Emphasis supplied.)

While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page
by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their
respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting
witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to
be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations,
the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. 33

We believe that the further comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes 34 regarding Article 809, wherein he urged caution in
the application of the substantial compliance rule therein, is correct and should be applied in the case under
consideration, as well as to future cases with similar questions:

. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All theses are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in
the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis ours.)

3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner
of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself without
resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. 35 In such a situation, the defect is
not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article
805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present
case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an
implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it
presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually
complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied
by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from
with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses
alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he
is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law
he cannot do directly.

4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a divergence of views as to which manner of
interpretation should be followed in resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in the
execution of wills. The formal requirements were at that time embodied primarily in Section 618 of Act No. 190, the Code
of Civil Procedure. Said section was later amended by Act No. 2645, but the provisions respecting said formalities found
in Act. No. 190 and the amendment thereto were practically reproduced and adopted in the Civil Code.
One view advance the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first laid down in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan,36 where it was held that the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. Nonetheless, it
was also emphasized that one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will, hence when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded. The subsequent cases of Avera vs. Garcia,37 Aldaba vs. Roque,38 Unson vs.
Abella,39 Pecson vs. Coronel,40 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, et al.,41 and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al.42 all adhered to this
position.

The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the formalities that should be observed in the
execution of wills are mandatory in nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent cases of In the
Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin,43 In re Will of Andrada,44 Uy Coque vs. Sioca,45 In re Estate of Neumark, 46 and Sano vs.
Quintana.47

Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al.,48 provided the Court with the occasion to clarify the seemingly conflicting decisions in the
aforementioned cases. In said case of Gumban, the attestation clause had failed to state that the witnesses signed the will
and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator. The will in question was disallowed,
with these reasons therefor:

In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-mentioned, appellants rely on a series of
cases of this court beginning with (I)n the Matter of the (E)state of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil., 875),
continuing with In re Will of Andrada [1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca [1922], 43 Phil.,
405), and In re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil., 841), and ending with Sano vs. Quintana ([1925], 48
Phil., 506). Appellee counters with the citation of a series of cases beginning with Abangan vs.
Abangan  ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), continuing through Aldaba vs. Roque  ([1922], 43 Phil., 378),
and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios  ([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if possible, conciliate the last
two decisions cited by opposing counsel, namely, those of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and Nayve vs.
Mojal and Aguilar, supra.

In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite
that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of
the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was
cited, but the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision
in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held that the attestation clause must estate the fact
that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be
proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere
examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident
facts does not invalidate the will.

It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; seldom do they admit inconsistency in
doctrine. Yet here, unless aided impossible to reconcile the Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are
fundamentally at variance. If we rely on one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse.

In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three outstanding points may be mentioned. In the first
place, the Mojal, decision was concurred in by only four members of the court, less than a majority, with
two strong dissenting opinions; the Quintana decision was concurred in by seven members of the court, a
clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in
December, 1924, while the Quintana decision was promulgated in December, 1925; the Quintana
decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the third place, the Quintana decision is believed
more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the law.

The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in
section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same
Code, as unamended. It is in part provided in section 61, as amended that "No will . . .  shall be
valid . . . unless . . .." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number
of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
 presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that "The will shall be disallowed
in either of the following case: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone
carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to
enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose
so emphatically and clearly expressed.

We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary,
modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. (Emphases in the original text).

But after the Gumban clarificatory pronouncement, there were decisions of the Court that once more appeared to revive
the seeming diversity of views that was earlier threshed out therein. The cases of Quinto vs. Morata,49 Rodriguez vs.
Alcala,50 Enchevarria vs. Sarmiento,51 and Testate Estate of Toray52 went the way of the ruling as restated in Gumban.
But De Gala vs. Gonzales, et al.,53 Rey vs. Cartagena,54 De Ticson vs. De Gorostiza,55 Sebastian vs.
Panganiban,56 Rodriguez vs. Yap,57 Grey vs. Fabia,58 Leynez vs. Leynez,59 Martir vs. Martir,60 Alcala vs. De
Villa,61 Sabado vs.
Fernandez,62 Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 63 and Lopez vs. Liboro,64 veered away from the strict interpretation rule and established
a trend toward an application of the liberal view.

The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the undeniable inclination towards a liberal
construction, recommended the codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be in accord with
the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the interpretation of wills. Said rule thus became what is now Article
809 of the Civil Code, with this explanation of the Code Commission:

The present law provides for only one form of executing a will, and that is, in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines had previously upheld the strict compliance with the legal formalities
and had even said that the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
regarding the contents of the attestation clause were mandatory, and non-compliance therewith
invalidated the will (Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405). These decisions necessarily restrained the
freedom of the testator in disposing of his property.

However, in recent years the Supreme Court changed its attitude and has become more liberal in the
interpretation of the formalities in the execution of wills. This liberal view is enunciated in the cases
of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R. No. 46097, October 18,
1939; Martir vs. Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June 21, 1940; and Alcala vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April 18,
1941.

In the above mentioned decisions of our Supreme Court, it has practically gone back to the original
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment by Act No. 2645 in the
year 1916. To turn this attitude into a legislative declaration and to attain the main objective of the
proposed Code in the liberalization of the manner of executing wills, article 829 of the Project is
recommended, which reads:

"Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article
829."65

The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano,66 "does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the
door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that
should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results."

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. 67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition
for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the
matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the
estate of the said decedent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 83843-44               April 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR,
ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.

Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.

Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is dated, as
provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil Code.

The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality
of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No.
1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal,
Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.

On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and
Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I
of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for
the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling,
transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of
fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador
sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)

Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already
acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968,
the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint decision
dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of
Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to
reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption price for the property paid by
the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to
vendee a retro.

Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint
decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing
the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by
the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE
REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.

The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is quoted as follows:

ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE

LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ

I — First Page

This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the partition in
favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.

And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or less one hectare,
and the boundary at the South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their
sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on the
NORTH is assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That
because it is now the time for me being now ninety three (93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me
to partition the fishponds which were and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two
mothers, hence there shall be no differences among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for
it is I myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of
them the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or differences
among the brothers and sisters.

II — Second Page

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and
this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing
is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.

Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should be followed and
complied with in order that any differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen along
these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good relations among themselves, brothers
and sisters;

And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut trees and all others
like the other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that there
shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the other, and against anyone of the
brothers and sisters.

III — THIRD PAGE

And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located, the same being
the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share
among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property, which property we have been able to
acquire.
 That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL) which I am here hereof
manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature
below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children
of their two mothers — JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your
father who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)

The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in its
usual place, is impressed with merit.

The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.1âwphi1 It is
worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and
this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing
is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements
are present in the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered
into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the
said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like
the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain
from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an
agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will.
The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be
followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of
and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption price as
erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the property (fishpond)
with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and which
they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from
Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the
will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED.
The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are
directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.

Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:

This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court.

As found by the Court of Appeals:

... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla,
Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by
law.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275).
Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.

On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:

(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and

(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February
23, 1979.

The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and
settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition
for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
 ... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic
wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity
of said wills.

MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic
Will.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that
the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve
question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE
PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS
DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It
is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated
August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla,
is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123486           August 12, 1999

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,

vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration,
ruling:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity
of testators holographic will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers,
enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question
be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion
for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief,
if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence
in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant
case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the probate of the holographic will
of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.2

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when
she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the
testator, and will was written voluntarily.

The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of
her death.4

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to the petition for probate, alleging that
the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an
interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.

Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the
deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after
the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of
the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud
and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence,
filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having being well taken, same is
granted, and the petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits. 7

On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again
reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal
Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.

To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their testimonies.

Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special proceedings for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear
the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the
handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.

Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the
decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of
Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven
(11) years of close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her (deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial
buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in
posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will
dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the
dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and
handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a
result of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will
was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.

The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region 10. She testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the
signature of the deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.

Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact
adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that
the signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:

Instruction

August 30, 1978

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:

 1. Eufemia Patigas

2. Josefina Salcedo

3. Evangeline Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with
the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

Gene and Manuel:

Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

Mama

Matilde Vda de Ramonal

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the
case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of
Appeals held:

. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present
civil code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of
the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and
signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator's
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of
paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of
article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same
thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
 It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only
one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45
PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered
mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if
absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the court deem it necessary", which
reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the
prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of
those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the
court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil
code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of
the testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems
essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for
the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because
the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a
party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
witnesses.10

According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no
uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.

Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of
Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to
probate.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of
Appeals, was applicable to the case.

(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been able to present credible
evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.

(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal.

In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The
article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. 11

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the
goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An
exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified
the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.

Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the signature of the deceased in
the voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q.   And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Would you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?

A.   Collecting rentals.

Q.   From where?

A.   From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Who sometime accompany her?

A.   I sometimes accompany her.

Q.   In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?

A.   Yes, sir.13

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts which she
issued to them?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs. Binanay?

A.   Matilde vda. De Ramonal.

Q.   Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?

A.   I am familiar with her signature.

Q.   Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her
tenants?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Why do you say so?

A.   Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.

Q.   How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

A.   In handwritten.14

xxx     xxx     xxx
 Q.   In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did
you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?

A.   Posting records.

Q.   Aside from that?

A.   Carrying letters.

Q.   Letters of whom?

A.   Matilde.

Q.   To whom?

A.   To her creditors.15

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its title "tugon" is this the
document you are referring to?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?

A.   My Aunt.

Q.   Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?

A.   Because I am familiar with her signature.16

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants.
She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal
belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:

Q.   Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you
said, yes?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Who was in possession of that will?

A.   I.

Q.   Since when did you have the possession of the will?

A.   It was in my mother's possession.

Q.   So, it was not in your possession?

A.   Sorry, yes.

Q.   And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the possession of your mother?

A.   1985.17
 xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and therefore you have that in
your possession?

A.   It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.

Q.   After taking that document you kept it with you?

A.   I presented it to the fiscal.

Q.   For what purpose?

A.   Just to seek advice.

Q.   Advice of what?

A.   About the will.18

In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of
the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death
of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:

Q.   Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals,
is that correct?

A.   Yes, sir.19

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word Vda.?

A.   Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.

Q.   And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued towards letter D.

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?

A.   Yes, sir.20

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a document marked as
Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the
signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?

A.   Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
 Q.   You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you
said she was exhausted?

A.   In writing.

Q.   How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain yourself out because
of the apparent inconsistencies?

A.   That was I think. (sic).

Q.   Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will
notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the
name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature appearing in the alleged holographic will
marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?

A.   Yes, sir.21

Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She
testified that:

Q.   You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could
you tell the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?

A.   During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her transactions.

Q.   What else? What services that you rendered?

A.   After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.

Q.   What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?

A.   I used to be her personal driver.

Q.   In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   How come that you acquired familiarity?

A.   Because I lived with her since birth.22

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item
No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is this?

A.   Yes, sir, that is her signature.

Q.   Why do you say that is her signature?

A.   I am familiar with her signature.23

So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she
lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:

Q.   Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by
consanguinity.

Q.   Can you tell the name of the husband?

A.   The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have legitimate children?

A.   As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?

A.   Here in Cagayan de Oro City.

Q.   Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A.   I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.

Q.   When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?

A.   It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court before.26

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo
Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A.   That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?

A.   This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other assistance wherein you
were rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to show that I have assisted then I
can recall.28

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court
whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?

A.   I am not familiar with the handwriting.

Q.   This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A.   I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
 A.   Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.

Q.   Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is that?

A.   As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Why do you say that?

A.   Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.

Q.   How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?

A.   The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.29

xxx     xxx     xxx

Q.   Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to
be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

Q.   So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be
her signature because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?

A.   That is true.30

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three
witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs.  Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely
directory and not mandatory.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on
the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or
five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents
signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms.
Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents
written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In
the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with
instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the
instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr.,
and their children.

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They
alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose
Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed
that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will,
its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all
for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written
in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the
question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the
will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for
probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually
executed by the testatrix.

xxx xxx xxx

 While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question
was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who
have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence,
the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting
of the testatrix has been complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was
executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the
will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object  of her bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature
of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will.
The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a
nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than
sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.

In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic
will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance
where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand
has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the
time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent
person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of
superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced
or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper
pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary
provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances,
this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.

Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt,
testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds
were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the
aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of
Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated,
and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found
that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
 (a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time
of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should
be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to
probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of
the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with,
hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919),  that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
 A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242  (1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an
identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or
on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear
in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites
required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his
signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil
Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will
that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to
question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840,
dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire
house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is
hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14003             August 5, 1960

FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.

F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant.

Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the quantity of evidence
required for the probate of a holographic will.

The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from (Rec. App. pp. 22-24):

"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that on September 9, 1957,
Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last residence of said
testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said
holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the
nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the
holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was
handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that he recognized all the signatures
appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said
statement, witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of the attorney (Exh. F), and the
general power of attorney (Exh. F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an affidavit
(Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to
show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said witness, Azaola, testified that
the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix
as well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the
testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said
witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to him by
the testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page 16 on the
same transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by counsel if he was
familiar with the penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he answered
positively in the affirmative and when he was asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the
previous answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers (testatrix'), he answered, "I
would definitely say it is hers"; that it was also established in the proceedings that the assessed value
of the property of the deceased in Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of P7,000.00.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or
6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present
three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the
body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the
will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should
be denied by the adverse party.

Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.

In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate
denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of
paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second
paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems
it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the
same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and
only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs.
Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement
can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at
least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805).
Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three
witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it
necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their
testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it
should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry,
for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the noted
Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:
 La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho precepto induce la
conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al
criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten
insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La prudencia con que el Juez debe
de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del
testamento olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes comprometidos en
aquel.

En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion facultativa del dicho profano de los
testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la
autenticidad que trata de averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo
apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no testigos y dudaran o no estos
respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.

El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los sucesos y de su significacion,
para responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de dictar.

And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no unfavourable inference can be
drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with
the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is
not mandatory.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to construe the
import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample
opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded to the
Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on
record shall not be retaken. No costs.
G.R. No. 138842               October 18, 2000

NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39441 dated
May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
an action for annulment of sale and damages.

The facts are as follows:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while
Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico,
and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino,
Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.

During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City and in
the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case.

It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the
courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed
administrator of his father’s estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of
sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in
Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January
29, 1970 for the total amount of ₱47,800.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale reads as follows:

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, Filipino, married to Aurea Poblete-Nazareno, of legal age and a resident of the
Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines,

-WITNESSETH-

That I am the absolute registered owner of six (6) parcels of land with the improvements thereon situated in
Quezon City, Philippines, which parcels of land are herewith described and bounded as follows, to wit:

"TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946"

"A parcel of land (Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-47404, being a portion of Lot 3, Block D-3 described on
plan Bsd-10642, G.L.R.O. Record No.) situated in the Quirino District, Quezon City. Bounded on the N., along
line 1-2 by Lot 15, Block D-3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D-3 of plan Bsd-10642; along
line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3-D of the subdivision plan.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S.29 deg. 26’E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M. 9, Quezon City,

thence N. 79 deg. 53’E., 12.50 m. to point 2;

thence S. 10 deg. 07’E., 40.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 79 deg. 53’W., 12.50 m. to point 4;

thence N. 10 deg. 07’W., 40.00 m. to the point

of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points "1" and "4" by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.
bearings true; date of the original survey, April 8-July 15, 1920 and that of the subdivision survey, March 25,
1956."

"TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 132019"

"A parcel of land (Lot 3, Block 93 of the subdivision plan Psd-57970 being a portion of Lot 6, Pcs-4786,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917) situated in Quirino District Quezon City. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by Lot 1,
Block 93; on the NE., along line 2-3, by Road Lot 101; on the SE., along line 3-4, by Road Lot 100; on the SW.,
along line 4-1, by Lot 4, Block 93; all of the subdivision plan. Beginning at point marked "1" on plan, being S.
65 deg. 40’ 3339.92 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Marikina, Rizal;

thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point "2";

thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point "3";

thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point "4";

thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point

of beginning; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED TEN SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY SQUARE
DECIMETERS (210.60). All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by B.L.
Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; date of the original survey, Nov. 10, 1920 and Jan. 31-March 31,
1924 and that of the subdivision survey, February 1 to September 30, 1954. Date approved - March 9, 1962."

"TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118885"

"A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of
the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 11 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on
the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 9 of the
consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the plan, being S. 7 deg. 26’W.,
4269.90 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;

thence S. 25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point "2";

thence S. 64 deg. 59’W., 29.99 m. to point "3";

thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m to point "4";

thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to the point of

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.;
bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the
consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941."

"TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118886"

"A parcel of land (Lot No. 11, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of
the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 12 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on
the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the NW., by Lot No. 10 of the consolidation
and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 79 deg. 07’W., 4264.00 m. more or
less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;

thence S. 64 deg. 59’W., 29.99 m. to point "2";

thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point "3";

thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to point "4";

thence S. 26 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to the point of

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground, are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.;
bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E.; date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the
consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941."

"A parcel of land (Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of
the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 14, of the consolidation; and subdivision plan; on
the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 12, of the
consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked "1" on plan, being S.78 deg. 48’W., 4258.20
m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;

thence S. 64 deg. 58’W., 30.00 m. to point "2";

thence N. 25 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point "3";

thence N. 64 deg. 59’E., 29.99 m. to point "4";

thence S.25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point of

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360, more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.;
bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the
consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941."

"A parcel of land (Lot No. 14, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of
the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 15, of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on
the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 13 of the
consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked "1" on plan, being S.78 deg. 48’W., 4258.20
m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;

thence S. 25 deg. 00’E., 12.00 m. to point "2";

thence S. 65 deg. 00’W., 30.00 m. to point "3";

thence S. 65 deg. 00’W., 12.00 m. to point "4";

thence N.64 deg. 58’E., 30.00 m. to the point of

beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.;
bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50’E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the
consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941."

That for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P43,000.00) PHILIPPINE
CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and a resident of
the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction, I
do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs,
administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and participations to the abovedescribed parcels of
land with the improvements thereon, with the exception of LOT NO. 11 COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 118886, free
of any and all liens and encumbrances; and

That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P4,800.00)
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal age and
a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire
satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P.
Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and participations in and to Lot
No. 11 covered by T.C.T. No. 118886 above-described, free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with the
understanding that the title to be issued in relation hereto shall be separate and distinct from the title to be
issued in connection with Lots Nos. 13 and 14, although covered by the same title.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this deed of absolute sale in the City of Manila, Philippines,
this 29th day of January, 1970.2

By virtue of this deed, transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad, to wit: TCT No. 162738 (Lot 3-
B),3 TCT No. 162739 (Lot 3),4 TCT No. 162735 (Lot 10),5 TCT No. 162736 (Lot 11),6 and TCT No. 162737 (Lots
13 and 14),7 all of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered under TCT No. 140946. This
lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo,
Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr.,8 for which reason the latter was issued TCT No.
293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.9

When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino, Jr., he and his wife Eliza locked Maximino, Jr. out of the
house. On August 4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. brought an action for recovery of possession and damages with
prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No. 12932, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.10

On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the present case for
annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. The case was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-58.11 Romeo sought the declaration of nullity
of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the
ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.

On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and
Eliza.12 They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to
Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No.
277968) in his name.13 They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third
persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the
eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of damages.

The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino
and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the
said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962
executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then
abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea. By virtue of this deed, the nine lots subject of this Deed of
Partition were assigned by raffle as follows:

1. Romeo - Lot 25-L (642 m2)

2. Natividad - Lots 23 (312 m2) and 24 (379 m2)

3. Maximino, Jr. - Lots 6 (338 m2) and 7 (338 m2)

4. Pacifico - Lots 13 (360 m2) and 14 (360 m2)

5. Jose - Lots 10 (360 m2) and 11 (360 m2)

Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name,14 while Maximino, Jr. received Lots 6 and 7 through a
Deed of Sale dated August 16, 1966 for the amount of ₱9,500.00.15 Pacifico and Jose’s shares were allegedly
given to Natividad, who agreed to give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose, in the event the latter came back from abroad.
Natividad’s share, on the other hand, was sold to third persons16 because she allegedly did not like the location
of the two lots. But, Romeo said, the money realized from the sale was given to Natividad.

Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 was sold to him for ₱7,000.00 by
his parents on July 4, 1969.17 However, he admitted that a document was executed by his parents transferring
six properties in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13, and 14, to Natividad.

Romeo further testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the
sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer was made
in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.18 Romeo denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister
but instead claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after their father died.

Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed in 1962 was not really
carried out. Instead, in December of 1969, their parents offered to sell to them the six lots in Quezon City, i.e.,
Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and 14. However, it was only Natividad who bought the six properties because she was
the only one financially able to do so. Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing
Corp.19 and Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. for ₱175,000.00.20 Natividad admitted that Romeo and the latter’s wife
were occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that she did not tell the latter about the sale she had made to
Maximino, Jr.

Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. She could not get an original copy of the
said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds had been destroyed by fire. She claimed she was
surprised to learn that Romeo was able to obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.
Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970. She
alleged that their parents had sold these properties to their children instead of merely giving the same to them
in order to impose on them the value of hardwork.

Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in the action for recovery of
possession (Civil Case No. Q-39018) which had been brought against him by Maximino, Jr. It appears that
before the case filed by Romeo could be decided, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-GR CV No.
12932 affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of Maximino, Jr.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970.
Except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold
the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 162735 and 162736 as a lien in
the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.

The defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed. Likewise, the third-party complaint is dismissed.

The defendants are hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of ₱30,000 as and for
attorney’s fees. Likewise, the third-party plaintiff is directed to pay the third-party defendant’s attorney’s fees of
₱20,000.

All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.21

Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, on October 14, 1992 the trial court
modified its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted. The judgment dated August
10, 1992 is hereby amended, such that the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is correspondingly modified
to read as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deeds of Sale dated January 29,
1970 and July 31, 1982.

"Except as to Lots 3, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third person, the defendant Natividad shall hold the
rest OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (LOTS 10 and
11) in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.

"The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificates of Title
No. 162735 and 162736 as a lien on the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.

"LIKEWISE, THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS IS DIRECTED TO CANCEL TCT NO. 293701 (formerly
162705) OVER LOT 3-B AND RESTORE TCT NO. 140946 IN THE NAME OF MAXIMINO NAZARENO SR.
AND AUREA POBLETE."22

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3
(in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10
and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. The dispositive portion of
the decision dated May 29, 1998 reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision and the order in question are modified as follows:
 1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July
1982 are hereby declared null and void;

2. Except as to Lots 13 and 14 ownership of which has passed on to third persons, it is hereby declared
that Lots 3, 3-B, 10 and 11 shall form part of the estate of the deceased Maximino Nazareno, Sr.;

3. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to restore TCT No. 140946 (covering Lot 3-
B), TCT No. 132019 (covering Lot 3), TCT No. 118885 (covering Lot 10), and TCT No. 118886
(covering Lot 11).23

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated May 27, 1999. Hence this
petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT

ROMEO P. NAZARENO CAN DESTROY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACCORDED TO
NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS LIKE THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970
(EXH. 1) EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA
POBLETE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS OF

THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED
JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING:

A) THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, ALL OF WHICH ARE NOTARIZED, EXECUTED BY

THE DECEASED SPOUSES DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING SOME OF THEIR
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES.

B) THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION WITH WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND

CONFIRMATION OF SALE DATED MAY 24, 1975 (EXH. 14A) OF THE ESTATE OF AUREA
POBLETE BY THE DECEASED MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND THEIR CHILDREN
INVOLVING THE ONLY REMAINING ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE THUS IMPLIEDLY
ADMITTING THE VALIDITY OF PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS MADE BY SAID DECEASED
SPOUSES ON THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, HALF OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BECOME
A PART OF AUREA POBLETE’S ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE.

C) THE ADMISSION MADE BY MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN OPEN

COURT ON AUGUST 13, 1980 DURING HIS LIFETIME IN CIVIL CASE NO. NC-712 (EXH. 81,
81B) THAT HE HAD SOLD CERTAIN PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P.
NAZARENO THUS BELYING THE CLAIM OF ROMEO P. NAZARENO THAT THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IS ONE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES TO BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.

D) THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY ROMEO P. NAZARENO HIMSELF CONTAINED IN A FINAL

DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-GR CV NO. 12932 DATED AUGUST 31,
1992 AND AN ANNEX APPEARING IN HIS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-39018 (EXH. 11-B) INVOLVING LOT 3B, ONE OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
THAT THE SAID PROPERTY IS OWNED BY PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.

E) THE PARTIAL PROJECT OF PARTITION DATED MAY 24, 1995 WHICH WAS APPROVED
BY THE INTESTATE COURT IN SP. PROC. NO. NC-28 AND EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LATTER COURT’S FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 9, 1991 DETERMINING WHICH
WERE THE REMAINING PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE.
 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 EXECUTED
BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA POBLETE DURING
THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES IS AN INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT?
AND IF SO WHETHER OR NOT UPON THEIR DEATH, THE ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO,
SR. ALONE CAN SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF SAID SALE?

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF LOT 3 UNDER THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED
JANUARY 29, 1970 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT AS PER THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DATED NOVEMBER 21,
1990. ROMEO NAZARENO ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT PAY THE CONSIDERATION STATED IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JULY 4, 1969 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES
IN HIS FAVOR (EXH. M-2).

5. WHETHER OR NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF ROMEO P.

NAZARENO, TCT NO. 277968 (EXH. M) SHOULD BE CANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AND A NEW ONE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO PURSUANT TO THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THE LATTER’S FAVOR ON JANUARY 29, 1970 BY THE
DECEASED SPOUSES.24

We find the petition to be without merit.

First. Petitioners argue that the lone testimony of Romeo is insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity
accorded to a notarized document.

To begin with, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all
over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.25 The lone testimony of a witness, if credible,
is sufficient. In this case, the testimony of Romeo that no consideration was ever paid for the sale of the six lots
to Natividad was found to be credible both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals and it has not been
successfully rebutted by petitioners. We, therefore, have no reason to overturn the findings by the two courts
giving credence to his testimony.

The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As held in Suntay
v. Court of Appeals:26

Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not
the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first
place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and
always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.

Second. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final by this
Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot
3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held:

As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by purchase in
1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When
her parents died, her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in
1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the property in question. There was no way
therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and
Aurea Poblete. The mere fact that Romeo P. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the
properties of the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty.
Appellant Romeo P. Nazareno’s suspicion that his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in
the name of Natividad P. Nazareno, their eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their
demise to all the compulsory heirs, has not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced allegation on
the point not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. The deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit "B"), being a public document (Rule 132, Secs. 19 and 23, Revised Rules on Evidence),
is entitled to great weight; to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant (Yturralde vs. Aganon, 28 SCRA 407; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308).
Defendants-appellants’ own conduct disproves their claim of co-ownership over the property in question. Being
themselves the owner of a ten-unit apartment building along Stanford St., Cubao Quezon City, defendants-
appellants, in a letter of demand to vacate addressed to their tenants (Exhibits "P", "P-1" and "P-2") in said
apartment, admitted that the house and lot located at No. 979 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City where they were
residing did not belong to them. Also, when they applied for a permit to repair the subject property in 1977,
they stated that the property belonged to and was registered in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno. Among the
documents submitted to support their application for a building permit was a copy of TCT No. 162738 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Natividad Nazareno (Exhibit "O" and submarkings; tsn March
15, 1985, pp. 4-5).27

To be sure, that case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case
were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the
parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and
Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party
complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint
concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.

The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.28 Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the
former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B
binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties
which were wrongfully disposed.

Furthermore, Natividad’s title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to the other five
lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was
the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.

Third. Petitioners allege that, as shown by several deeds of sale executed by Maximino, Sr. and Aurea during
their lifetime, the intention to dispose of their real properties is clear. Consequently, they argue that the Deed of
Sale of January 29, 1970 should also be deemed valid.

This is a non-sequitur. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino, Sr. and
Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 is valid.

Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale. The question, however, is whether
these sales were made for a consideration. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno
spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes.

Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that Natividad had no means to pay for
the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.

All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to pay for all the lots she purportedly purchased from
her parents. What is more, Romeo’s admission that he did not pay for the transfer to him of lots 3 and 25-L
despite the considerations stated in the deed of sale is a declaration against interest and must ring with
resounding truth. The question is, why should Natividad be treated any differently, i.e., with consideration for
the sale to her, when she is admittedly the closest to her parents and the one staying with them and managing
their affairs? It just seems without reason. Anyway, the Court is convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale
dated January 29, 1970 (Exh. "A" or "1") is simulated for lack of consideration, and therefore ineffective and
void.29
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals said:

Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29
January 1970 void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs. Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]), the
Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties thereto enter
into a transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.

It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of ownership of real
properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Per the testimony of Romeo, he
acquired Lot 25-L from his parents through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no consideration was paid by
him. He even truthfully admitted that the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969 (Deed of Absolute Sale, Records,
Vol. II, p. 453) likewise had no consideration. This document was signed by the spouses Max, Sr. and Aurea
as vendors while defendant-appellant Natividad signed as witness.30

Fourth. Petitioners argue further:

The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970 is an indivisible contract founded on an indivisible
obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by only one of them. And since this suit was filed
only by the estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the present suit
must fail. The estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while its validity is sustained
by the estate of Aurea Poblete.31

An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of the
thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the object thereof.32 In the
present case, the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The
obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise the
value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a
contract on the number of obligors.

In any case, if petitioners’ only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone cannot contest the validity of the
Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been settled, the argument would nonetheless be
without merit. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it.33 A void contract is
inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of the sale,
the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.

Fifth. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3, we find that this has been passed upon by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of
Sale. Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired ownership over the
property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and title to Lot 3
cannot be issued in her name.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As
Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only
"female and the only unmarried member of the family."34 She was thus entrusted with the real properties in
behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the
latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.1âwphi1 Art. 1449 of the
Civil Code states:

There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate
is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061
which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.

As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. on April 20, 197935 will have
to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad.
The rule is settled that "every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property."36

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990

JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.

Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.

Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28,
1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was
opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills. 1

On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a petition for
the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn opposed by Jose
Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed special
administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent
but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in
question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had
no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to
probate. 3

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its decision is
now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.

In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show that the said
person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose Exhibit A, the
marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the couple was indicated
as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that Jose was indeed the son of
the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido
considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted that
Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6

Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he could not present his
parents' marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were destroyed when the
town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his own birth certificate and
those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were each described therein as the legimitate children of
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he knew
the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the Japanese
occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two
persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate
showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the marriage
certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of
Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12

We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.

It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it, the
marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could still
rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived
together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in all during that time.

According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:

In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, ... .

The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.

By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described therein as the
son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his
baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is not
conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be considered to
determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one and the same person, arguing that it
is not uncommon for a person to be called by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no
evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more
persons may live at the same time and bear the same name, even in the same community. That is what the
courts below found in the cases at bar.

What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of Venancio
Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported
himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline attendant and driver for many years. All
the time, his father was residing in the same town — and obviously prospering — and available for support. His
alleged father was openly living with another woman and raising another family, but this was apparently
accepted by Jose without protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and
Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and instead left
Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable
life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered — assuming the claims
to be true — that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate wife — if
indeed she was — she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and founded another family by
another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria Jocson were being raised well
while her own son Jose was practically ignored and neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at
least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if
she is deserted in favor of another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his
wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant
husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson,
the alleged partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.

Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to support her
son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done because she was
already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of her deposition in her own house.
No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses
such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's
marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the burden of proving that serious allegation.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio Rivera
who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate
mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of
Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of
names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two families or showing that the deceased
Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been
written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held
there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of
the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In
his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he
denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings,
Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious.
Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest
the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony
of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their
father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169193             November 30, 2006

SPOUSES ILUMINADA CAPITLE and CIRILO CAPITLE, Petitioners,

vs.
FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA and ROSALINDA C. OLAR, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The parcel of agricultural land subject of the present controversy contains 1.8144 hectares, identified as Lot 1849 (the lot),
and situated in Barangay Valle, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar) covering the lot on account of which
he was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-0-3514.

Respondents Fortunata Elbambuena (Fortunata) and Rosalinda Olar (Rosalinda), spouse and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of Olar, now deceased, claim that Olar relinquished one-half or 0.9072 hectare of the lot to Rosalinda by a
"Kasunduan"1 dated July 17, 1992 the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner Cirilo Capitle; and that the
remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to Fortunata by an undated document. 2

Respondents, alleged that on petitioners’ request, petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of
livelihood. Since 1990, however, petitioners did not pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the
demand to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of Possession and
Payment of Back Rentals3 against petitioners before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Regional Office in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, docketed as DARAB Case No. 5987’NNE’96.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in possession of the lot since 1960, presented a "Waiver of
Rights"4 executed by Olar wherein he renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"5 wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a
Pinagsamang Patunay6 from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and barangay chairman of
Valle certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.

Petitioners further claim that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even remarried,
thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar.

While respondents’ petition in DARAB Case No. 5987'NNE'96 was pending before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners filed before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija a
petition for cancellation of the CLOA issued to Olar, docketed as DARAB Case No. 6261'NNE'97, claiming that they are
the new farmer-beneficiaries as shown by, among other things, the "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar.

By Decision7 dated August 20, 1997 which jointly resolved DARAB Case Nos. 5987'NNE'96 and 6261’NNE’97, the
PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: ORDERING AND DECLARING

 1. DARAB Case No. 5987’NNE’96 DISMISSED for lack of merit;

2. The recall/cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-0-3514 previously issued to the late Cristobal Olar;

3. The PARO, DAR-North, Talavera, Nueva Ecija thru the Chief, Landed Estate Section to cause the issuance of
a new CLOA in the name of Iluminada Capitle married to Cirilo Capitle;

4. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-0-3514 adverted to if the same is already
registered and cause the registration of a new CLOA in the name of Iluminada Capitle married to C[i]rilo Capitle;
and

5. Other claims and counterclaims likewise DISMISSED for lack of legal basis. 8

Respondents appealed the decision to the DARAB, arguing that the PARAD erred in holding that:

I.

. . . PETITIONERS FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA AND ROSALINDA OLAR CAN NO LONGER RECOVER

POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT FARM LOT, MUCH LESS DEMAND PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS
FROM THE RESPONDENTS.

II.

. . . THE PETITION FOR RECALL/CANCELLATION OF TCT NO. CLOA-0-3514 PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO THE
LATE CRISTOBAL OLAR WOULD PROSPER.9

By Decision10 of December 29, 2003, the DARAB set aside the PARAD’s decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering Spouses Capitle and any or all persons acting in their behalf to immediately vacate the subject
landholding and deliver the same to Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda C. Olar;

2. Ordering the issuance of CLOA in favor of Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda C. Olar as legal heirs of
Cristobal Olar.

3. Setting aside the decision of the Adjudicator a quo in DARAB Regional Case No. 6261’NNE’97 for lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the Heirs of Cristobal Olar;

4. The demand for back lease rentals by [respondents] is denied for lack of merit. 11

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review, arguing that the DARAB erred:

1. IN CONCLUDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF LOT NO. 1849 since 1960 DESERVES NO MERIT THERE
BEING NO BASIS BOTH IN FACT AND IN LAW;

2. THAT THE PRESUMPTION, THE CLOA WAS ISSUED TO CRISTOBAL OLAR IN THE REGULAR COURSE
[OF] OFFICIAL FUNCTION WAS NEVER OVERCOME BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE;

3. THAT THE WAIVER EXECUTED BY CRISTOBAL OLAR IN FAVOR OF SPS. CAPITLE IS VOID FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY;

4. IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRANSFER ACTION CONDUCTED BY THE SAMAHANG NAYON OF VALLE,
TALAVERA, NUEVA ECIJA CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL DEFECTS; [and]

5. IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CANCELLATION OF TCT No. CLOA-0-3514 DOES NOT BIND FORTUNATA
ELBAMBUENA AND ROSALINDA OLAR BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MADE PARTY TO DARAB CASE NO.
6261’NNE’97.12
By the challenged Decision of November 23, 2004,13 the appellate court affirmed in toto the DARAB decision, ratiocinating
as follows:

The DARAB correctly found that petitioners-appellants’ possession of the questioned property since 1960 is of dubious
legality. No amount of possession under whatever claim (actual tilling and actual possession) can clothe petitioner-
appellants with any lawful right over the questioned property. Reason: It can be gleaned from the factual antecedents that
petitioners-appellants’ stay in Cristobal Olar’s property was, or had been , by mere tolerance of respondents-appellees.
Indeed, so much is clear from the averments on page 5 of their petition: "xxx; that Cristobal Olar beginning 1959 up to the
time of his death in 1995  lived all alone by himself  and his companions in his house  are the Spouses Iluminada and
Cirilo Capitle xxx." These averments, being in the nature of judicial admissions, are conclusive and binding on petitioners-
appellants and can no longer be controverted. This simply meant that no title of ownership as farmer beneficiary was
passed unto the Capitles, thereby rendering ineffective the certification issued by the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
Even the Board Resolution of the Samahang Nayon of Valle, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, naming the Capitles as new
allocatees of the landholding, had no binding effect, as the said samahang nayon is not the proper authority under the law
with power to pass upon the legal issue as to who rightfully deserves to own Cristobal Olar’s landholding after him.
Besides which, there was nothing amiss with the DARAB’s ruling relative to the issuance of the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award to Cristobal Olar, as this was done in the regular course of an official function. It simply established the
fact that petitioners-appellants’ claim could in no way legally stand against Cristobal Olar, whose title under the CLOA
cannot be overthrown or supplanted by some organizational resolution and/or barangay attestations/certifications. On the
other hand, Cristobal Olar’s death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the subject property to his
legal heirs by operation of law. In the case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata Elbambuena, being
his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his son’s surviving spouse, acting for and in behalf of her children with Nemesio
Olar. This is as it should, considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. And since Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda Olar’s relationship with Cristobal Olar was in this case never
put in issue, their being legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all proceedings affecting
the subject property.

What is more, as shown in the records, the respondent in DARAB Case No. 6261’NN[’]97 was the MARO OF TALAVERA,
N.E. Private respondents-appellees were not impleaded therein. But as heirs of Cristobal Olar, private respondents-
appellees ought to have been so impleaded. The Rules mandate that the full names of all the real parties in interest
whether natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or petition.
Who is a "real party in interest"? He is that party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Tested by this criterion, Fortunata Elbambuena’s legitime and Rosalinda Olar stood
to be "injured" by the glaringly erroneous decision of the PARAD, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Hence, that decision must be
vacated, it having transgressed substantive rights protected by law. 14 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Hence, the present petition which reiterates the above-enumerated errors petitioners proffered before the appellate court.

Petitioners maintain that their possession since 1960 was satisfactorily established by evidence including Olar’s "Waiver
of Rights," Board Resolution of the Samahang Nayon of Valle naming petitioners as new allocatee, Joint Certification of
the BARC Chairman and barangay chairman, and MARO Certification that they have been in actual possession of the lot.

Although the CLOA was issued to Olar, petitioners contend that their preferential right over the lot should be recognized,
they being the transferees pursuant to the "Waiver of Rights" and the actual tillers thereof.

Petitioners concede that although Olar’s death passed all his rights and interest over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of
not bequeathing them to his estranged wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him,
should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on hereditary succession.

Finally, petitioners claim that respondents are not qualified to become farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP as they did
not till or cultivate the property nor help Olar in his farming activities.

The petition fails.

Petitioners’ argument that "[i]t would be absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative
who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and [took] good care of his needs,"15 is a virtual admission that their
possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely "helped" in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that
Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed
their duties, including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which
provides:

SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. – The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given
preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholding
shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.

Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are
disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make the land as
productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance of each beneficiary, so
that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to
continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.

x x x x,

thus stands.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the
CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.

Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. 16 Rosalinda, on the other
hand, is the surviving spouse of Olar’s son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited
by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olar’s name. 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145545             June 30, 2008

PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated
October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated March 2, 1993 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S.
Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary in favor of respondent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent
was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents
and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego
Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament 3 on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of
her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares
or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at San
Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M.
Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to
respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of
Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.

On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case
was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.

On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) declaring the will as probated;

 2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as such without a bond as stated in paragraph
VI of the probated will;

3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia Abena.

So ordered.4

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13,
2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no merit in fact and in law, is
hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed Decision of the trial court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to
oppositors-appellants.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL
BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PETITIONER, HER
SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION TO HER.6

Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply
with the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured
through undue influence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal
heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article
8058 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in
the presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not
the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was procured
through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless
and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected
her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margarita’s total dependence on
respondent and her nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should
have declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in
accordance with Articles 10099 and 101010 of the Civil Code.

Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum11 that the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and
as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the
Supreme Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no compelling
reason to review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was
validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities required by law were duly complied with. The
Court of Appeals also concurred with the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when
she executed the will.

After careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.

We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the
same day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all
questions of fact.

This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 112 of Rule 45 limits this Court’s review to questions of law only.

Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the
case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.13

We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.

Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioner’s arguments
lack basis. The RTC correctly held:

With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita
Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit.
The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption
that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr.
Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that
Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does
not warrant hospitalization…. Not one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned any instance that they
observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity.
The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound
mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.

Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states
that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered
 opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate
the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which
is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been
brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of
the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."

The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different
occasions based on their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and
appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the
court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator
was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to
show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.

Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject
will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while
executing the subject will (See Exhibit "H").

In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the
notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements
(See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject
notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 88715 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her
properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for
review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. 5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
(Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were
then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. 6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, 7 to the prejudice of petitioners who
are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. 8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth;
(b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have
been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean that they
could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established
the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted
which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth;
(c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the
counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, 15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the
ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 16 It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled
to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. 19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs
of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared
null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding 20 precludes the RTC,
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a
court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. 25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that
the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204029               June 4, 2014

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and
September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.

The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:

On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for
annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 6, 2002 before the court a quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos
(Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate
children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-
Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham
Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-
nine(2,869) square meters, more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda)
and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to
facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null
and void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.

In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended
to facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:

Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to
[respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the
Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective
buyers, it was agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be transferred to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez
and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is
sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares on the property; That pursuant to said purpose
Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given
an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by
[respondents].3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole
heir of her parents and was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina
did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling of such property. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria
Villareal, dated December 4, 2001 as well as the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002,
covering the property described in par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;

2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name
of private [respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No.
0141 in the name of Eulalio Abarientos;

3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to return or refund to
[respondents] spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the ₱50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the
former.4

Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be
annulled being a public document that has for its object the creation and transmission of real rights over the immovable subject
property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted
deed remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by
petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for those compulsory heirs unlawfully
deprived of their inheritance.

Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living
heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.

In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the
RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the
existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not
in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a
notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner
Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of the appellate court.

We find merit in the instant petition.

It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil
action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is
sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. 6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. 7 In Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February
15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses
of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for
the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner
Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents
have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:

IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)

A. x x x

B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:

1. Identity of the parties;

2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;

3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria
Abarientos;

4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject property;

5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;

6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;

7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;

8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
[petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject property.9 (emphasis supplied)

In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an
unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the
affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that
self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is
one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in
the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA
VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid. The
RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has
committed.

In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the
RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As
she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition.
Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have
transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents
and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to
respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be
bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement. (emphasis supplied)

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person
and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their
real agreement.

In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal
effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and
the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false
cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their
real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or
terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest.
(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from
respondents’ very own Answer to petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication
that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive
possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of
ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 12

Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and
notarized does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a
contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad.
Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)

The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in
issue in the present case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the
Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the
exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail
over the letter of the document. That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being
absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January
20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014

HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, ANSELMA B. ENDRINAL, GERTRUDES BASBAS, RUFINA BASBAS, CEFERINA B. CARTECIANO, ANACLETO
BASBAS, ARSENIA BASBAS, ANASTACIO BASBAS, BEDACIO BASBAS, TEODOCIA B. OCAMPO, SEGUNDO C. BASBAS, MARIA B. RAMOS
AND EUGENIO BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF PEDRO BASBAS; HERINO T. BASBAS AND NESTOR T. BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF
LUCAS BASBAS; ADELAIDA B. FLORENTINO, RODRIGO BASBAS, FELIX BASBAS, JR., TEODULO BASBAS, ANDRESITO BASBAS, LARRY
BASBAS AND JOEY BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF FELIX BASBAS, SR., VICTOR BEATO, ALIPIO BEATO, EUTIQUIO BEATO, JULIANA B.
DIAZ, PABLO BEATO AND ALEJANDRO BEATO IN REPRESENTATION OF REMIGIA B. BEATO, AS REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO
BASBAS, Petitioners, v. RICARDO BASBAS AS REPRESENTED BY EUGENIO BASBAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially supported by evidence as required under
our law. The resolution of a case, in this instance, an action for annulment of title and reconveyance of real
property, cannot be further stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a party of an ostensible conflicting claims
of heirship of the common decedent. Not all rights to property and incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be
preceded by a declaration of heirship, albeit supposedly traced to a single decedent and original titleholder.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 998531 which reversed and set aside the rulings, after trial and then on
appeal, of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sta. Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No.
19132 and Civil Case No. B-6334,3 respectively. The trial courts annulled TCT No. 294295 issued in the name of
Crispiniano Talampas Basbas (Crispiniano) and herein respondent Ricardo Talampas Basbas (Ricardo), covering
Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, the subject property, and originally titled to the decedent,
Severo Basbas (Severo) under Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.). Crispiniano and Ricardo and all their
successors-in-interest were ordered to reconvey the subject property to petitioners.

Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and respondent Ricardo trace their claim of
ownership over herein subject property to Severo.

Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano and
respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1) annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 issued in the names of
Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the contested lot, and (2) recover possession of the subject property before
the Municipal Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 1913.

Countering petitioners’ allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo denied petitioners’ ownership over Lot No. 39 and
contended that upon Severo’s death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather of petitioners) and
Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who evenly divided Severo’s estate,
comprising of two lots, herein subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40,
adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited by Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.

The pertinent documents presented in evidence by both parties include:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the name of Severo;

(2) Order of the Land Registration Court, Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna dated 1 June 1989, granting the Petition for Reconstitution
of Title covering Lot No. 39 filed by Crispiniano and Ricardo;
(3) TCT No. T-294295 covering Lot No. 39 issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo; and
(4) Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of decedent Severo.

The undisputed facts uniformly found by all three lower courts, at the first instance, the MTC, the RTC, Branch
24, Biñan, Laguna, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals
are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo x x x died on July 14, 1911. They had a child named
Valentin (Basbas). During Severo’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise
known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin Basbas. Sometime in 1995, [herein
petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that [respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to
secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate. Sometime in 1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title
before the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot No. 39 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC
granting the aforesaid petition. On the basis of said Order, the title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered
reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was
issued. On November 13, 1993, [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and [respondent] Ricardo
Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased Severo Basbas x x x stating
among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha. On the basis of
said Extra-Judicial Settlement x x x, the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 was issued in the names of
[therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas x x x. [Petitioners] then brought the
matter to the Barangay but no settlement was reached. Hence, this instant action.4

Significantly, the Pre-Trial Order of the MTC, dated 2 September 1998, contained the following Stipulation of
Facts:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

STIPULATION OF FACTS

1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.

2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.5

After trial, where both parties presented evidence, the MTC ruled, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners] and against defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1) declaring TCT No. T-294295 in the name of the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] as NULL and VOID;
2) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] to reconvey to [petitioners] Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate, and to surrender possession thereof in favor of the [petitioners];
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a new certificate of title covering said Lot No. 39 in favor of the heirs of
Severo Basbas; and
4) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] and their successors-in-interest to pay [petitioners] the sum of Php
50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.6

On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and Ricardo docketed as Civil Case No. B-6334, judgment of the MTC was
affirmed in toto.

Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano and Ricardo appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In a subsequent turn of events, the appellate court reversed, applying our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon.
del Rosario,7 and set aside the uniform rulings of the trial courts:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The court  a quo  erred in affirming the decision of the MTC, as the MTC had ruled on filiation and heirship,
matters which fall within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which the MTC or RTC of Sta. Rosa, Laguna were
not designated to be. It is also proper that these particular matters be threshed out in a special proceeding.
In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, it was ruled that it is decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the establishment of a status or
right.

The case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages, a civil action, whereas matters
which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased person as well as filiation and heirship
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court. With both parties claiming to be the heirs of Severo Basbas, it is but proper to thresh out
this issue in a special proceeding, since [Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo] seeks to establish his status as
one of the heirs entitled to the property in dispute. Before the action for annulment of title, reconveyance with
damages can be resolved, this Court opines that the matter of heirship should be adjudicated upon first. The
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding.

xxxx

The MTC and the RTC, both acting in their general jurisdiction, are devoid of authority to render an adjudication
and resolve the issue of annulment of title and reconveyance of the real property in favor of the respondents.
We reiterate that the question of who are the heirs of Severo Basbas should be adjudged first in a probate court
prior to the resolution of the action for annulment of title and reconveyance.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.8

Hence, this appeal by certiorari  of petitioners — Heirs of Valentin, raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 24 OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA AFFIRMING THAT OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA’S DECISION FINDING FOR THE PETITIONERS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING IN HEIRS OF GUIDO
AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY VERSUS HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, THAT PRIOR TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND RECONVEYANCE, THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THE HEIRS ARE
SHOULD FIRST BE ADJUDGED IN A PROBATE COURT.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES RAISED AND RULED UPON BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA.9

In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts found that petitioners fully established their
filiation with the decedent Severo, the original titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from whom all parties trace their
claim of ownership over the subject property. Oppositely, the trial courts found wanting, lacking documentary
evidence, the different claims of heirship of Crispiniano and herein respondent Ricardo, through Severo’s
purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The MTC, affirmed in toto by the RTC, declared,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[Petitioners] have fully established their true filiation with the late Severo Basbas from whom the subject
property came from. Through their own evidence, testimonial and documentary, it was established that Severo
Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. They had one (1) child named Valentin Basbas x x x. Valentin Basbas had
no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin) was married to Irene Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children, namely:
(1) Pedro Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3) Feliz Basbas, Sr.; and (4) Remigia Basbas. x x x.

xxxx

As shown, [petitioners] are now the great grandchildren of the late Severo Basbas who died in Santa Rosa,
Laguna on July 5, 1911.
The defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] on the other hand claim that they are also the legal heirs
of the late Severo Basbas. Such a claim, however, was not supported by any document. x x x.

xxxx

As correctly pointed out by [petitioners] that assuming, for the sake of argument, that Nicolas Basbas,
predecessor of these defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo], was the son of Severo Basbas, then
Nicolas Basbas must have been an illegitimate child of Severo Basbas, in which case his filiation should be first
established before he can claim to be an heir. But this cannot be done anymore, simply because an action for
recognition should have been made or brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents x x x. It could not
even be applied under the exception of said law x x x, as no evidence was ever adduced to that effect. The only
conclusion, therefore, is that Nicolas Basbas was neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate son of Severo Basbas,
so that defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas.

x x x [T]he defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas.
They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived their title and ownership
over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged son of the late Severo Basbas; that Severo
Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to Valentin
Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at all. The [petitioners’] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands Certificate x x x
and the Certification from the DENR x x x show that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate by purchase from the government way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the
defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas
as the latter’s share in the inheritance.10

In marked contrast, the Court of Appeals zeroed in on the claim of Crispiniano and Ricardo that they are
descendants, likewise great grandchildren, of Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from their father Felomino
Basbas, Severo’s grandson from the latter’s son, Nicolas, who received the subject property as his share in
Severo’s estate. On the whole, the appellate court ruled that the MTC and the RTC, acting in their general
jurisdiction, did not have authority to rule on issues of filiation and heirship of the parties to the decedent
Severo, such matters to be sorted and established in a special proceeding and falling within the jurisdiction of a
probate court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on the applicability of our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling unqualifiedly applying Heirs of Yaptinchay. Mistakenly, the
Court of Appeals glosses over facts, not controverted by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:
(1) Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana Rivera; and

(2) Petitioners are themselves legitimate descendants of Valentin.

Not only is the petitioners’ heirship to Severo uncontroverted. The status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of
Severo and of petitioners’ statuses as heirs of Valentin and Severo are stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano
and respondent Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.

2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.11

On the other hand, Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably fail to establish the status of their ascendant
and purported predecessor-in-interest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the
status of Valentin, not about Nicolas’ status, as a compulsory heir of Severo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q Now, do you know also [petitioners] in this case the heirs of Valentin Basbas, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know them Mr. Witness?
A They are my relatives, sir.
Q Will you tell us specifically what is your relationship with [petitioners] in this case, Mr. Witness?
A They are my cousins, I used to call them “Kuya.”
Q How come you became the relatives of [petitioners,] (sic) Mr. Witness?
A My father and the father of [petitioners] are relatives.
Q Specifically, what is the name of the father of [petitioners], Mr. Witness?
A Valentin Basbas.
Q What is the name of your father?
A Felomino Basbas.
Q How is Felomino and Valentin related?
A They are cousins.
Court
How come they became [your] cousins?
A Their family names are both Basbas.
Q And that is your only basis in saying that they are relatives?
A No.
Q So, what other basis?
A Severo Basbas is the eldest and he bore a child name[d] Nicolas Basbas and Nicolas Basbas bore a child name[d] Felomino
Basbas who [had] two sons named Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas.
xxxx
Q Who was the father of Valentin Basbas then?
A Severo Basbas.
Q You said a while ago that Nicolas Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas and now you are saying that Valentin Basbas is the son
of Severo Basbas, you mean to say that Valentin Basbas and Nicolas Basbas are brothers?
A Yes, Nicolas is the eldest[older] th[a]n Valentin Basbas.
Q So, it is clear now that Nicolas and Valentin Basbas are brothers?
A That is what I know. That is what my brother told me.12

Mauro Basbas (Mauro), one of the defendants before the trial court, while testifying, also failed to shed light on
the status of Nicolas as an heir of Severo, insisting only that Nicolas is Severo’s son as told to him by his
grandfather, Felomino Basbas. Mauro even categorically answered that the wife of Severo is Ana Rivera, further
establishing the legitimacy of Valentin as the son of Severo and Ana Rivera:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q Who is the father of Felomino Basbas?

A Nicolas Basbas.
Q You mean to tell us that Nicolas is the son of Severo Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Do you happen to know the mother of Felomino Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Would you tell us?
A Catalina Mane.
Q Since you seem to be so well informed about the family of Severo Basbas, can you tell us who was the wife of Severo Basbas?
A Ana Rivera.
Q How can you say now unless you are implying that Severo Basbas had an illegitimate son, how can you explain now why the
surname… the middle name of your grandfather is [not] Rivera?
Court
xxxx
What is the middlename (sic) of Severo Basbas?
A I don’t know.
Court
Who is the son of Severo Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas.
Q What is the maiden name (sic) of Nicolas Basbas?
A I don’t know.13

In all, Valentin’s long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be the
subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals. There is no
need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.

And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin’s status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas’
status as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas’ right thereto expiring upon his death.

Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent’s end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only that he
is Severo’s son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is
a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code
state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Code.

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.

CHAPTER 4
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

SECTION 1. - Recognition of Natural Children

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

Our ruling in  Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez14 is instructive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in  Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents
must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is,
undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in  Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs —
has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a
trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children,
and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a
litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's,
and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez  required herein respondents to
present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is
clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein
respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate
children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to
Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the
latter's status as legitimate children:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents,
questioned the RTC, Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled
against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of
Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of
Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the
judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata. We subsequently
reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata  in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and
affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically
held therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is
different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not
because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]." Clearly,
herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly
or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.

Articles 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the
foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.

If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and
two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of
the fraud.

Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by
an authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed
for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared
the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal
a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents
as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo
Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her
children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.,
and prolong this case interminably.15

Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to resolve
petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject property.

Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents presented in evidence by Crispiniano and
Ricardo before the trial court, betray the fraudulence of their claim.

1. Order of the RTC, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna in LRC B-758, a Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner alleges that a certain parcel of residential land, situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of
Laguna is registered in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (N.A.) of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Exhibit “E”); that the aforementioned duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) was lost during the latter part of the Japanese Occupation when the
petitioner and his family evacuated from their residence to evade the atrocities being committed by the
Japanese soldiers; that after peace and order was restored, diligent efforts were exerted in trying to find the
said certificate of title, but the same proved futile; and that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, petitioner
desires that the original copy of said title be reconstituted and thereafter have the full technical description of
Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate be inscribed therein.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26 copies of the petition, notice of hearing, plan and technical
description of Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate were forwarded to the Office of the Land
Registration Commission for appropriate action. On January 18, 1989, this Court received the Report (Exhibit
“C”) of the Acting Administrator of the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA).

xxxx

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.

During the hearing of the petition, Atty. Agapito G. Carait, counsel for the petitioner, presented Crispiniano
Basbas. Together with his testimony, the following documentary evidence were presented, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Exhibits “A” - the publication in the Official Gazette;

“B” - Certificate of Posting;
“C” - Report;
“D” - Certification form from the Register of Deeds; and
“E” - Friar Lands Sale Certificate.

CRISPINIANO BASBAS, 70 years old, widower and a resident of Santa Rosa, Laguna, stated that he is the
petitioner in this case; that the parcel of land involved in this case is situated at Aplaya, Santa Rosa, Laguna
and is identified as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate with an area of 330 sq. m.; that he was born
in that property; that this parcel of land was covered by a title in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas; that
the title was lost during the Japanese Occupation when his father Felomino Basbas who was then in possession
of the duplicate title, evacuated to the Province of Rizal particularly in Tanay; that later on his father moved to
Sta. Maria, Laguna; that he was with his father when they evacuated to a place called Laranga; that while
there, he saw the title in the possession of his father in the “maleta” where he kept it; that when they returned
to Santa Rosa, Laguna, he asked his father regarding the Transfer Certificate of Title and his father told him
that the title was lost in the mountains of Rizal; the petitioner verified from the Office of the Register of Deeds if
said title is still intact with their office; that the Register of Deeds issued a certification (Exhibit “D”) to the
effect that Lot 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate has no record on file with the office; that petitioner went to
the Bureau of Lands to verify the title and found out that the said patent was issued in the name of the legal
heirs of Severo Basbas (Exhibit “E”); that the children of the petitioner are now in possession of Lot 39; that the
petitioner’s father had paid the realty taxes and after his death, he (petitioner) continued paying the taxes; that
his father exerted all efforts to recover or find the said title but the same proved futile; and that to his own
knowledge, Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 has never been encumbered, sold or
given as security for the performance of any obligation.

xxxx

Thus, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, in his REPORT dated January 18, 1989
recommends:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the foregoing information relative to Lot No. 39, Santa Rosa Detached Estate, is respectfully
submitted for consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and
hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, the owner’s duplicate
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) may be used as a source of the desired reconstitution pursuant to
Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 26, Provided, however, that in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted
title should be made subject to such encumbrances as may be subsisting, and provided, further that no
certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the Office of the Register of Deeds concerned.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be in order and meritorious and there being no objection on the part of the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) as to the technical description of Lot No. 39, the same is hereby
GRANTED. The Court hereby orders the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to reconstitute the
original copy of TCT No. (N.A.) in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas who appear in the aforesaid Transfer
Certificate of Title at the time the original was lost and/or destroyed as the registered owners, using as basis
the technical description of Lot 39, certified by the Bureau of Lands, and thereafter to annotate on the
corresponding title the full technical description of Lot No. 39 of the Sta. Rosa Detached Estate.

For this purpose, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch,
a certified copy of the Report of the Acting Administrator, Land Registration Authority dated January 18, 1989,
the copy of the technical description, which documents shall be used by the Register of Deeds as bases for
reconstitution and inscription.16

2. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by Crispiniano and respondent

Ricardo:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF

DECEASED SEVERO BASBAS

xxxx

That FELOMINO BASBAS is our father and likewise died intestate last October 30, 1976 leaving no will or debts
and the share of MELENCIO CASUBHA was sold and bought by us last 5 December 1977, xerox copy of such
Deed is hereto attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part of this Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased SEVERO BASBAS;

That there is no pending testate or intestate proceedings against said estate;

That in view thereof the aforenamed CRISPINIANO and RICARDO both surnamed BASBAS do hereby adjudicate
unto themselves the aforedescribed parcel of land subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CRISPINIANO BASBAS – undivided share and

RICARDO BASBAS – undivided share;17

Ultimately, we agree with the disquisition of the trial courts in annulling TCT No. 294295 and ordering the
reconveyance of Lot No. 39 to petitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x [We proceed to] the next issue as to “whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Severo Basbas executed by Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas is valid.” The Court believes otherwise. Simply
because the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas.
They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived their title and ownership
over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged [grand]son of the late Severo Basbas; that
Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to
Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at all. The [petitioners’] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands
Certificate x x x and the Certification from the DENR x x x show that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate by purchase from the government way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the
allegations of the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given by Severo Basbas
to Valentin Basba as the latter’s share in the inheritance.

Claiming to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father), and that Felomino Basbas and Melencio
Casubha are the only heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas on November 12, 1993, whereby they
adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x x x. On the basis of the said Extra-
Judicial Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The Reconstitution of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x x x before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, and after
hearing, an Order was issued granting the aforesaid petition. Subsequently thereafter, TCT No. RT-1684 (N.A.)
in the names of the Heirs of Severo Basbas was cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295) was issued in the
names of Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas, defendants [therein.]

Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the property in
question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of [petitioners] under Article 1456
of the New Civil Code, which provides, thus:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
What right or rights, therefore, do they have under these circumstances? Since a constructive trust was
created, [petitioners] have the right to recover the property subject of this action. The fact that the decision of
the RTC, Biñan, Laguna approving/granting the petition for the reconstitution of the title covering Lot No. 39
and said decision has obtained its finality, is of no moment. It has been held: “the rule that registration of real
property under the Torrens System has the effect of constructive notice to the whole world cannot be availed of
when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the
benefit of the cestui que trust. In other words, the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to
enforce a trust x x x.

The fact that the subject lot was already registered in the defendants’ [including herein respondent Ricardo]
name and indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favor for taxation purposes, and they have paid the
taxes due thereon, are not conclusive evidence of ownership. Hence, it has been held:
When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the
rights of a true owner, he is considered guilty of fraud, and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value x x x.
Also it has been held “that an original owner of registered land may seek annulment of the transfer thereof on
the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance x x x.18

We add that Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent Severo.19 In
turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo, rights to the succession
vested from the moment of Valentin’s death. As such, they own Lot No. 39, undisputedly titled in Severo’s
name and forming part of Severo’s estate, and are entitled to the titling thereof in their names.

In this regard, we note that the Court of Appeals did not reverse the trials courts’ factual finding on Cripiniano’s
and Ricardo’s fraudulent titling of Lot No. 39 in their names. The evidence presented by Crispiniano and Ricardo
highlight the fraudulence of their claim:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. Title to Lot No. 39 is not in their names, neither is it titled in the name of their predecessors-in-interest,
Nicolas and Felomino Basbas;

2. Crispiniano and Ricardo are not the only heirs of Severo, if they are even heirs to begin with.

One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is well-nigh that title to the subject
property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs of
Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to finally settle title thereto and
prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof. Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-
interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99853
is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Trial Court
are AFFIRMED. Petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas and their successors-in-interest, are
likewise DIRECTED to take the appropriate action for titling of Lot No. 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate with
dispatch, and NOTIFY this Court within ten (10) days of such action.

SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library