CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW

MAGNO vs. CA (Theories)

FACTS: Petitioner was putting up a car repair shop, but he did not have complete equipment, and lacked funds with
which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner approached Corazon
Teng, of Mancor Industries for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. Teng referred
Magno to LS Finance, advising its VP Gomez that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed
if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement with LS Finance went
through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit of P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up
with such amount, unknown to petitioner, Corazon Teng advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same
would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. Petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby
LS Finance would lease the garage equipment to the former. Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the
monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipment. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that
Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner went to see Corazon Teng and promised to
pay the latter but the payment never came and the four (4) checks which were issued earlier were returned for the
reason "account closed." Magno was convicted for violation of BP 22 (bouncing check).

ISSUE: WON, Magno violated B.P. 22

HELD: No. By the nature of the "warranty deposit”, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by
petitioner as the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned
equipment. To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since
petitioner did not receive the amount in question. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the
warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by Petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty
deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No. 22) violated. The law was
devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not
intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and
circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is
the protection of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered
as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged.

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral
disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disapprobation is inevitable to the extent that morality
is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all . . . That which we call punishment
is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation: the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment. In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore
petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question.

2. ROMUALDEZ vs. COMELEC (Enactment of Penal Statutes)

FACTS: Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s
Registration Act for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the
evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for the prosecution of the same. Later on, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the
COMELEC Law Department the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners. Thus, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director
IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos
S. Romualdez 19 for violation of RA 8189. Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by
private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC,
claiming they were not accorded due process of law. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45 (j) of the Voter's
Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an
election offense. SEC. 45. Election Offense. — The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

ISSUE: (a) WON, there is a deprivation of due process; (b) WON, Sec. 45(j) can be constitutionally challenged for its
vagueness

HELD: (a) No. Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of
before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges
as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC. Evidently, the Informations directed
to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set
of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit.

(b) No. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Vagueness challenges, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation." An "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of
parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having
no factual concreteness. For judicial review to be exercised, “there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory”. Like overbreadth, it is said that “a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications”. Thus, the challenge of the litigants
seeking to declare vagueness of Sec. 45(j) is a facial challenge. The case could have been an as-applied challenge had
they challenge the vagueness of Sec. 45(j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 — the provisions
upon which they are charged.

3. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, assailing for
being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human
Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

ISSUE: WON, RA 9372 can be facially challenged through void-for-vagueness doctrine and overbreadth doctrine

HELD: No. A litigant cannot successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech, thus, statute concerning speeches are not in terrorem. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Facial challenge is available to protect the rights of citizens to speech against chilling effect. It should not be applied to
penal statutes as they generally have in terrorem effect because acts which penal statutes seek to punish are not
constitutionally protected.
4. ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

5. PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY

FACTS: Private respondents Matondo, Caval, and Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The
respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that: a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case
due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the
offense b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may
run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty
of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court. On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to
Branch IV where the respondent Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its
violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

ISSUE: (a) WON, the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case; (b) WON, Sec. 32 of RA no. 4670 is
unconstitutional

HELD: (a) Yes. The penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more
than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover.
When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No.
296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P3,000.00 fall
under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein
private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

(b) Yes. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a
minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified (not less than P100.00 and not more than
P1,000.00), there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration
thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this
cannot be allowed as it warrants judicial legislation.