FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998.]

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE , petitioner, vs . V.M. REALTY

CORPORATION , respondent.

Leo Luis P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Robiso & Reyes for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the

Municipality of Parañaque led with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, on
September 20, 1993 a complaint for expropriation against private respondent over two
parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters located at Wakas,
San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila and covered by Torrens Certi cate of Title No.
48700. Allegedly, the complaint was led for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project.
In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
Private respondent led its answer alleging in the main that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action because it was led pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by the Local Government Code. The trial court then nulli ed its
February 4, 1994 order and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The power of
eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government which may delegate
the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utilities.
A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. AIDTHC

A local government unit, like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an

expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The
Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a law for the
purpose. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but
a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a speci c matter. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of
the complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of
an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. On the other
hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the
expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise
are complied with.

SYLLABUS
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 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN BY AN LGU; A MUNICIPALITY MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT ONLY TO AN ORDINANCE AND NOT A MERE
RESOLUTION. — Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: "Section
19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
or purpose, or welfare for the bene t of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . . In
the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the rst requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; PETITIONER'S
COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; REASON. — It is hornbook
doctrine that ". . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for determination is
the su ciency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.
The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" The fact that there is no cause of action
is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of
cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
3. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA . — The Court holds
that the principle of res judicata, which nds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates
that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." All
separate interests of individuals in property are held by the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in
the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus,
the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

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 A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an
ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not su ce. On the other hand, the
principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of
the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied
with. LLphil

Statement of the Case

These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on
certiorari of the July 22, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No.
48048, which a rmed in toto 3 the Regional Trial Court's August 9, 1994 Resolution. 4
The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:
"The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not
disputed. However, such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance
(Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such ordinance passed by
the Municipal Council of Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief
Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore,
states no cause of action.

Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior
judgment. On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff led a complaint for expropriation
involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939
of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May
18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the
same became nal. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action
without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No.
17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still
applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of
the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of
Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the 'Deed of Assignment Exchange'
executed on June 13, 1990.

WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted.

The order dated February 4, 1994 is vacated and set aside.

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED." 5

Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the
Municipality of Parañaque led on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-
2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000
square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered
by Torrens Certi cate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was led "for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
for the homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for
this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the
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 property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. 1 0
Finding the Complaint su cient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 1 1 giving it due course.
Acting on petitioner's motion said court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, 1 2
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its
clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on
its current tax declaration.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent led its Answer containing a rmative
defenses and a counterclaim, 1 3 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action because it was led pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's
motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 1 4 On March 24, 1994, 1 5
petitioner led its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4,
1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata
was not applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 1 6 nullifying its
February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioner's motions for
reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a Resolution
dated December 2, 1994. 1 7 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95,
Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of
Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by the plaintiff-appellant.

2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.

3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of
procedure resulted in technicality standing in the way of substantial
justice.
4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case." 1 8

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals a rmed in toto the trial court's
Decision. Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997,
1 9 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this appeal. 2 0

The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:
"1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid
cause of action.

2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved." 2 1

The Court's Ruling

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 The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" 2 2 because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are
synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain." 2 3 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention
by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for
public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings." 2 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. 2 5 An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control
and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations."
2 6 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the bene t of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and de nite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the ling of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with
the proper court of at least fteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, nally , That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated .property shall
be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of
the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.LexLib

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or

welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and de nite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 2 7
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 In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the rst requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 2 8 to show that a resolution may
su ce to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 2 9 This case, however, is
not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, 3 0 the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, 3 1 the present Local Government Code
which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was led, explicitly
required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a speci c matter. 3 2 An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 3 3
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice." 3 4 In the instant case, there is no reason to depart
from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or
unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people. 3 5 Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language — from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160
— demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the
right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 3 6
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires
only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly
misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule
which merely seeks to implement it. 3 7 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in
the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires
that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act
pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy." It merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160. We stress
that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has
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 therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations
imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an
LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform to the limits
imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. 3 8
Indeed, "the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." 3 9

Complaint Does Not

State a Cause of Action
In its Brief led before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sanggunian
Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-
35, Series of 1993, and rati ed all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject
expropriation. 4 0
This argument is bereft of merit. In the rst place, petitioner merely alleged the
existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certi ed true copy thereof. In
the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was
mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. 4 1 In any event, this allegation
does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation led on
September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that
". . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, the question submitted before the court for determination is the
su ciency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations
are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the
motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" 4 2

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint
for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance
authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in a rming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 4 3 and the trial court, 4 4 all the
requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous
nal judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests,
subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which nds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, 4 5 cannot bar the right of the State or
its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain
is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use." 4 6 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held
of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding
the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
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 property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires it." 4 7 Thus, the State or its authorized agent
cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to
exercise eminent domain, it does apply to speci c issues decided in a previous case.
For example, a nal judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there
was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar
the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by
law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.
48 By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true
of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs De Knecht, 4 9 the Court ruled that the
power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior nal judgment over the property to be expropriated has become
the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's
proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. cdrep

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 21-25.

2. Special Sixth Division, composed of J. Antonio M. Martinez (now an associate justice of the
Supreme Court), ponente and chairman; and JJ. Ricardo P. Galvez and Hilarion L.
Aquino, concurring.
3. See Rollo, p. 25.

4. Penned by acting Presiding Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

5. Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; Rollo, p. 70.
6. Rollo, pp. 41-43.
7. Ibid., pp. 27-32.
8. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 184.

9. Rollo, pp. 37-38.

10. Complaint, p. 3; Rollo, p. 29.
11. Rollo, p. 45.
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 12. Ibid., p. 47.
13. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
14. Private respondent's Memorandum, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 197-198.

15. Rollo, pp. 66-68.

16. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
17. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
18. Ibid., pp. 78-79.
19. Ibid., p. 26.

20. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 13, 1998, when the Court received
private respondent's Memorandum.

21. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 187.

22. Ibid., p. 4; Rollo, p. 188.
23. Ibid.
24. Paragraph A.
25. Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586, 592, February 20, 1997

26. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, 179-180, May 17, 1993, per
Quiason, J.

27. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key To National
Development, 1993 ed., p. 110.
28. Supra.
29. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 189.
30. Approved on February 10, 1983 and published in 79 O.G No. 7. See Moday vs. Court of
Appeals, supra, p. 593. Sec. 9 of BP 337 reads:
"SEC. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

31. Effective January 1, 1992.

32. Mascuñana vs. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental, 79 SCRA 399, 405, October 18, 1977;
cited in private respondent's Memorandum, p. 5.
33. Article 107, pars. a and c, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160; cited in
Pimentel, Jr., supra, pp. 163-164.

34. Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 762, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.;
citing Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.

35. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349, 366 (1919), and Arriete vs.
Director of Public Works, 58 Phil 507, 511 (1933). See also Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 348.

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 36. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 59.
37. See Villa vs. Llanes, Jr., 120 SCRA 81, 84, January 21, 1983, and Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78
Phil 655, 676 (1947). See also Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.
38. Bernas, supra, pp. 348-349.
39. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 272-273, July 20, 1994, per Cruz, J.
40. Rollo, pp. 81-82.

41. See private respondent's Memorandum, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 201-202.
42. Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205, 210, July 15,
1991, per Cruz, J.; citing The Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217, 222,
October 28, 1977.
43. Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 25.

44. Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; Rollo, p. 70.

45. Republic vs. Director of Lands, 99 SCRA 651, 657, September 11, 1980.
46. Bernas, supra, p. 349.
47. Ibid.

48. See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577, March 11, 1996.
49. 182 SCRA 142, 147-148, February 12, 1990.

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