Edilberto Noel (Pinito Mercado) as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of declaration in the name of Virgilio was cancelled and
led and a new tax declaration was
Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin, vs. Court of Appeals and Jose Deleste.
240 SCRA 78
Grn59950 Jan.11, 1995
FACTS: (Quiason, J.)
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin (Nanaman spouses) were a childless,
legally-married couple. Gregorio, however, had a child named Virgilio
Nanaman (IC) by another woman. Since he was two years old, Virgilio was
reared by Gregorio and Hilaria. He was sent to school by the couple until he
reached third year of the law course.
During their marriage, Gregorio and Hilaria acquired certain property
including a 34.7-hectare land in Tambo, Iligan City on which they planted
sugarcane, corn and bananas. They also lived there with Virgilio and 15 tenants.
On October 2, 1945, Gregorio died. Hilaria then administered the property with
the help of Virgilio. Through their tenants, Hilaria and Virgilio enjoyed the
produce of the land to the exclusion of Juan Nanaman, the brother of Gregorio,
and Esperanza and Caridad Nanaman, Gregorio's daughters by still another
woman. In 1953, Virgilio (IC) declared the property in his name for taxation
purposes. On November 1, 1952, Hilaria and Virgilio, mortgaged the 34.7-
hectare land in favor of private respondent, in consideration of the amount of
P4,800.00.
On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio executed a deed of sale over the same
tract of land also in favor of private respondent in consideration of the sum of
P16,000.00. Witnesses to the sale were the wife of Virgilio, Rosita S. Nanaman,
Rufo C. Salas, the driver of private respondent, and Remedios Pilotan. The tax
issued in the name of private respondent, Jose Deleste. Having discovered that
the property was in arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952, private
respondent paid the taxes for 1952, 1953 and 1954. From then on, private
respondent has paid the taxes on the property.
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. On October 27, 1954, Esperanza and Caridad
Nanaman filed intestate estate proceedings concerning the estate of their father,
Gregorio. Included in the list of property of the estate was the 34.7-hectare land.
Inasmuch as only Esperanza, Caridad and Virgilio Nanaman were named as
heirs of Gregorio in the petition, Juan Nanaman, Gregorio's brother, opposed it.
On November 26, 1954, the petition was amended to include the estate of Hilaria
with Alejo Tabuclin, Hilaria's brother, and Julio Tabuclin, (nephew)a son of
Hilaria's deceased brother, Jose, as additional petitioners. Having been
appointed special administrator of the estate of the Nanaman couple, Juan
Nanaman included the 34.7-hectare land in the list of the assets of the estate.
Juan also reported that Virgilio took the amount of P350.00 from the produce of
the estate without prior permission and that five tenants delivered sugar and
palay to private respondent. Hence Juan prayed that the court cite private
respondent and the tenants in contempt of court. Accordingly, in its Order of
January 30, 1956, the probate court required private respondent and said tenants
to appear before it and "show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
for illegally interfering in the land" under special administration.
On June 16, 1956, when Edilberto Noel took over as regular administrator of the
estate, he was not able to take possession of the land in question because it was
in the possession of private respondent and some heirs of Hilaria. Later, Private
respondent and the heirs of the Nanaman spouses executed an amicable
settlement of the Nanaman estate. In the document, private respondent agreed
"to relinquish his rights to one-half (1/2) of the entire parcel of land in Tambo,
Iligan City, indicated in item 1 under the Estate, sold to him by Hilaria Tabuclin,
in favor of all the heirs of the abovementioned intestate [estate] for the reason
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that not all of the heirs of Gregorio Nanaman have signed and agreed.” The
court approved the amicable settlement but when it was questioned by some
heirs, the court set aside its approval and declared it null and void.
Noel, as regular administrator, and as ordered by the court filed an action
against private respondent for the reversion of title over the 34.7-hectare land to
the Nanaman estate and to order private respondent to pay the rentals and
attorney's fees to the estate.
RTC: action for annulment of the deed of sale had prescribed in 1958 inasmuch
as the sale was registered in 1954 and that Gregorio's heirs had slept on their
rights by allowing Hilaria to exercise rights of ownership over Gregorio's share
of the conjugal property after his death in 1945. On the issue that Hilaria had no
authority to dispose of one-half of the property pertaining to her husband, the
trial court ruled: (1) that Hilaria in effect acted as administratrix over the estate
of Gregorio; (2) that she sold the 34.7- hectare land in order to pay the debts of
the conjugal partnership; and (3) that out of the purchase price of P16,000.00,
P4,000.00 was in payment to private respondent (who was a doctor of medicine)
for medical services rendered and medicine administered during Gregorio's
ailment and P800.00 was used to pay taxes in arrears. Noel appealed.
CA: the transaction between Hilaria and Virgilio on one hand and private
respondent on the other, was indeed a sale. It found that no fraud, mistake or
misrepresentation attended in the execution of the deed of sale and that no proof
was shown that the contract was merely a mortgage.
The appellate court, however, agreed with Noel that Hilaria could not validly
sell the 37.7-hectare land because it was conjugal property, and Hilaria could
sell only her one-half share thereof.
On the issue of prescription, the appellate court ruled that since no fraud,
mistake or misrepresentation attended the execution of the deed of sale, the
prescriptive period of ten years had not yet elapsed when the action to recover
the property was filed in 1963. Moreover, the appellate court held that in the
absence of proof of adverse possession by Hilaria, she should be considered as
holding the property pursuant to her usufructuary rights over the same under
the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the law in force at the time of
the death of Gregorio.
Finding that Noel's claim for rentals of P5,000.00 per annum from 1957 was
uncontroverted, the appellate court ruled that one-half thereof belonged to the
estate of Gregorio.
CA AMENDED DECISION: affirmed its previous decision regarding the due
execution of the Deed of Sale adding that since no fraud attended its execution,
there was no basis for the action to annul the sale, and therefore there was no
starting point in reckoning the prescriptive period of four years. It reconsidered
the Decision of Feb. 18, 1980 insofar as it declared Deleste and the estate of
Gregorio as co-owners of the said land.
The appellate court tacked "the physical possession of Hilaria and Virgilio to the
possession of the defendant for another nine (9) years up to the time the
complaint was filed." It considered the "change of conditions or relations" which
had transpired in the case such as private respondent's registration of his
muniment of title over the property; the cancellation of Virgilio's tax declaration
and the issuance of another tax declaration in the name of private respondent;
private respondent's payment of taxes from 1952 "up to the present;" the
execution of a new tenancy agreement between private respondent and the
tenants; and private respondent's purchase of plows, a carabao and insecticides
for use in the ricefield.
Stating that it was "proscribed from taking away property from the alert and the
industrious and dumping it into the hands and possession of one has previously
slept on his rights," the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court
in all its parts, including the award of damages and the costs of suit.
ISSUE: W/N Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the entire property sold to
private respondent and assuming that they did not have full ownership thereof,
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whether the right of action to recover the share of the collateral heirs of Gregorio
had prescribed or been lost through laches.
HELD: NO. Gregorio died in 1945 long before the effectivity of the Civil Code
of the Philippines on August 30, 1950. Under Article 2263 of the said Code,
"rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before
the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws, and by the rules of Court."
Thus, succession to the estate of Gregorio was governed primarily by the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse
like Hilaria, who is survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent, as is obtaining in this case, was entitled to receive in
usufruct the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs. Hilaria, however,
had full ownership, not merely usufruct, over the undivided half of the estate
(Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 493). It is only this undivided half-interest that
she could validly alienate.
On the other hand, Virgilio was not an heir of Gregorio under the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889. Although he was treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses,
illegitimate children who were not natural were disqualified to inherit under
the said Code (Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]). Article 998 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary
rights, could not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral
heirs of Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 2253; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530 [1953]). Therefore,
Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over which he did not own.
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he
is selling. The principal obligation of a seller is "to transfer the ownership of" the
property sold (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1458). This law stems from the
principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him (Azcona
v. Reyes, 59 Phil. 446 [1934]; Coronel v. Ona, 33 Phil. 456 [1916). NEMO DAT
QUAD NON HABET .
While it cannot be said that fraud attended the sale to private respondent, clearly
there was a mistake on the part of Hilaria and Virgilio in selling an undivided
interest in the property which belonged to the collateral heirs of Gregorio.
The sale, having been made in 1954, was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Under Article 1456 of said Code, an implied trust was created on
the one-half undivided interest over the 34.7-hectare land in favor of the real
owners
Under the law in force in 1945, the surviving spouse was given the management
of the conjugal property until the affairs of the conjugal partnership were
terminated. The surviving spouse became the owner of one-half interest of the
conjugal estate in his own right. He also became a trustee with respect to the
other half for the benefit of whoever may be legally entitled to inherit the said
portion. "He could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those
for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian his
ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of an estate. . . . The surviving
husband as the administrator and liquidator of the conjugal estate occupies the
position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold
that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law
imposes upon him duty of administration and liquidation" (Pamittan v. Lasam,
60 Phil. 908 [1934]).
The possession of Virgilio, his registration of the land in his name for tax
purposes, his hiring of tenants to till the land, and his enjoyment of the produce
of the tenants, appear more as acts done to help Hilaria in managing the conjugal
property. There is no evidence to prove indubitably that Virgilio asserted a
claim of ownership over the property in his own right and adverse to all
including Hilaria.
Amended judgment reversed and set aside, original judgment reinstated in toto.
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CONCHITA NOOL and GAUDENCIO ALMOJERA vs.CA
GR No. 116635
July 24, 1997
Facts:
One lot formerly owned by Victorio Nool has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot
previously owned by Francisco Nool has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Spouses
(plaintiffs) Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera alleged that they are the
owners of the subject lands. They are in dire need of money, they obtained a
loan DBP , secured by a real estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which were
still registered in the names of Victorino and Francisco Nool, at the time, Since
the plaintiffs failed to pay the said loan, the mortgage was foreclosed; that
within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted Anacleto Nool for the
latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and
as a result, the titles of the 2 parcels of land in question were transferred to
Anacleto; that as part of their arrangement or understanding, Anacleto agreed
to buy from Conchita the 2 parcels of land , for a total price of P100,000.00,
P30,000.00 of which price was paid to Conchita, and upon payment of the
balance of P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were to regain possession of the 2 hectares
of land, which amounts spouses Anacleto Nool and Emilia Nebre failed to
pay. Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject lands
when plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having
been made to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem
the said properties.
Issue: Is the purchase of the subject lands to Anacleto valid?
Held:
Nono dat quod non habet, No one can give what he does not have; Contract of
repurchase inoperative thus void.
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that “where goods are sold by a person
who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or
with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than
the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller’s authority to sell.” Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches
us that “a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer
can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.”
No one can give what he does not have — nono dat quod non habet. In the
present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP
to sell the property to the private respondents. Further, the contract of
repurchase that the parties entered into presupposes that petitioners could
repurchase the property that they “sold” to private respondents. As petitioners
“sold” nothing, it follows that they can also “repurchase” nothing. In this light,
the contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.
LUIS PICHEL vs. PRUDENCIO ALONZO
G.R. No. L-36902
January 30, 1982
Facts:
Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land
designated as Lot 21 of Subdivision Plan Psd-32465 of Balactasan, Lamitan,
Basilan City in accordance with RA 477. The award was cancelled by the Board
of Liquidators on 27January 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, Alonzo
was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972,
Alonzo’s rights to the land were reinstated. On 14 August 1968, Alonzo and his
wife sold to Pichel through a “deed of sale” all the fruits of the coconut trees
which may be harvested in the land for the period, from 15 September 1968 to 1
January 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Itwas further stipulated that the
vendor’s right, title, interest and participation herein conveyed is of his own
exclusive and absolute property, free from any liens and encumbrances and he
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warrants to the Vendee good title thereto and to defend the same against any
and all claims of all persons whomsoever. Even as of the date of sale, however,
the land was still under lease to one Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that
part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid
by Pichel directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the
latter. Pending said payment Alonzo refused to allow the Pichel to make any
harvest. In July1972, Pichel for the first time since the execution of the deed of
sale in his favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.
Alonzo filed an action for the annulment of a “Deed of Sale” before the CFI
Basilan City. On 5 January 1973, the lower court rendered its decision holding
that although the agreement in question is denominated by the parties as a deed
of sale of fruits of the coconut trees found in the vendor’s land, it actually is, for
all legal intents and purposes, a contract of lease of the land itself; an
encumbrance prohibited under RA 477. The court thus held that the deed of sale
is null and void, and ordered Alonzo to pay back Pichel the consideration of the
sale in the sum of P4,200 with interests from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid, and Pichel to pay the sum of P500.00 as attorney’s fees;
with costs against Pichel. Hence, the petition to review on certiorari was
raised before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of
the lower court and entered another dismissing the complaint; without costs.
Issue: Is the contract of sale valid?
Held: Contract of sale valid, essential elements valid
The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale as it has the
essential elements of a contract of sale as defined under Article 1458 of the New
Civil Code. Article1458 provides that “by the contract of sale one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver
a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or
its equivalent,” and that “a contract of sale maybe absolute or conditional.” The
subject matter of the contract of sale are the fruits of the coconut trees on the
land during the years from 15 September 1968 up to 1 January1976, which
subject matter is a determinate thing.
Things having potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale
Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence
may be the object of the contract of sale. A valid sale may be made of a thing,
which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into
existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in
existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and the title will vest in the buyer
the moment the thing comes into existence. A man may sell property of which
he is potentially and not actually possessed.
YU BUN GUAN vs ONG
GR No. 144735, Oct 18, 2001
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Paraphernal property refers to a property over which the wife has complete
control.
Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and
her children were abandoned by him in 1992 because of his incurable
promiscuity, volcanic temper and other vicious vices.
In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal
property) from Aurora Seneris. Also during their marriage, they purchased a
house and lot out of their conjugal funds.
Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale
on the Rizal property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a
commercial building for the benefit of their children. He suggested that the
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property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved for any
liability. The consideration for the sale was the execution of an Absolute Deed
of Sale in favor of their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from
the Allied Bank.
However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan, he did
not pay the consideration of 200k, supposedly the “ostensible” valuable
consideration.
Because of this, the new title issued in his name was not delivered by Ong. Yu
Bun Guan then filed a petition for Replacement of the TCT , with an affidavit of
Loss attached. Ong, on the other hand executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
and asked that the Sale be declared null and void.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since
she purchased it with her personal funds. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot in question is a paraphernal property and not a part of
the absolute community property?
HELD:
Yes. The property was a paraphernal property because:
1) the title has been issued under her name
2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the title was under her name
3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale which states that Ong was the “absolute and registered
owner”
4) that Ong was the one who paid the real taxes and proved that she has means
to do so.
5) a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid is
considered null and void.
RONGAVILLA V. CA – G.R. NO. 83974
Facts:
The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed
P2,000 from the Rongavillas to have their rooftop repaired. Later, petitioners
went back to their aunts to have them sign a contract. Taking advantage of their
lack of education, the sisters were made to believe that such document,
typewritten in English, was just for the acknowledgment of their debt. After
four years, petitioners asked their aunts to vacate the land subject to litigation
claiming that she and her husband were the new owners. After verifying with
the Registry of Deeds, the aunts were surprised that what they have signed was
actually a deed of sale. Their land title was cancelled and the ownership was
transferred to their nephews. The land was mortgaged with the Cavite
Development Bank.
Issue:
Was the deed of sale void?
Held:
Yes. While petitioners claimed they were regularly paying taxes on the land in
question, they had no second thoughts stating at the trial and on appeal that
they had resorted to doctoring the price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale,
allegedly to save on taxes. While it is true that public documents are presumed
genuine and regular under the Rules of Court, this presumption is a rebuttable
presumption which may be overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.
Ong v. Ong
Facts:
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On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other
valuable considerations, executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in
favor of Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor. On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked
the quitclaim and donated the property to her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra,
through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to recover the land
and to declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading,
petitioners claimed that the quitclaim is equivalent to a donation which requires
acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid
acceptance. The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation
Held:
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself
prima facie evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party
alleging lack of consideration has the burden of proving such allegation. Even
granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the
Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in
favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges
or burdens. Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance
by the lawful representative if said donation does not contain any condition. In
simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor
requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do
anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not
impose any condition.
Bagnas v. CA
Facts:
Hilario Mateum died on March 11, 1964, single, without ascendants or
descendants, and survived only by petitioners who are his collateral relatives.
He left no will, no debts, and an estate consisting of 29 parcels of land in Kawit
and Imus, 10 of which are involved in this controversy. On April 3, 1964,
respondents who are also collateral relatives of the deceased, but more remote,
registered 2 deeds of sale purportedly executed by Mateum in their favor. The
considerations were P1.00 and “services rendered, being rendered, and to be
rendered for my benefit”. On the strength of the deeds, respondents were able
to secure title over the 10 parcels of land. On May 22, 1964, petitioners
commenced a suit against respondents, seeking annulment of the deeds of sale
a fictitious, fraudulent or falsified or, alternatively, as donations void for want
of acceptance in public instrument. Respondents contend that the sales were
made for valuable considerations, and attacked the legal standing of the
petitioners as being mere collateral heirs.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioners have the legal standing to sue
(2) Whether the sale is void for want of consideration
Held:
(1) The law as it is now no longer deems contracts with a false cause, or which
are absolutely simulated or fictitious, merely voidable, but declares them void,
i.e., inexistent ("nulo") unless it is shown that they are supported by another true
and lawful cause or consideration. A logical consequence of that change is the
juridical status of contracts without, or with a false, cause is that conveyances of
property affected with such a vice cannot operate to divest and transfer
ownership, even if unimpugned. If afterwards the transferor dies the property
descends to his heirs, and without regard to the manner in which they are called
to the succession, said heirs may bring an action to recover the property from
the purported transferee. As pointed out, such an action is not founded on fraud,
but on the premise that the property never leaves the estate of the transferor and
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is transmitted upon his death to heirs, who would labor under no incapacity to
maintain the action from the mere fact that they may be only collateral relatives
and bound neither principally or subsidiarily under the deed or contract of
conveyance.

(2) Upon the consideration alone that the apparent gross, not to say enormous,
disproportion between the stipulated price (in each deed) of P l.00 plus
unspecified and unquantified services and the undisputably valuable real estate
allegedly sold worth at least P10,500.00 going only by assessments for tax
purposes which, it is well-known, are notoriously low indicators of actual value
plainly and unquestionably demonstrates that they state a false and fictitious
consideration, and no other true and lawful cause having been shown, the Court
finds both said deeds, insofar as they purport to be sales, not merely voidable,
but void ab initio. Neither can the validity of said conveyances be defended on
the theory that their true causa is the liberality of the transferor and they may
be considered in reality donations because the law also prescribes that
donations of immovable property, to be valid, must be made and accepted in a
public instrument, and it is not denied by the respondents that there has been
no such acceptance which they claim is not required. The transfers in question
being void, it follows as a necessary consequence and conformably to the
concurring opinion in Armentia, with which the Court fully agrees, that the
properties purportedly conveyed remained part of the estate of Hilario Mateum,
said transfers notwithstanding, recoverable by his intestate heirs, the petitioners
herein, whose status as such is not challenged.

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