CRIMINAL LAW 1
JAMES IENT and MAHARLIKA
SCHULZE, Petitioners, vs. TULLETT
PREBON (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
Respondent. GR No. 189158 January
11, 2017
DOCTRINE:
The rule of lenity applies when the court
is faced with two (2) possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one
that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The
rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient
to the accused.
FACTS:
Tradition Group, where
petitioners herein are employed, and
Tullett are competitors in the inter-dealer
broking business. On the Tradition
Group's motive of expansion and
diversification in Asia, petitioners lent
and Schulze were tasked with the
establishment Tradition Financial
Services Philippines, Inc.
However, Tullett, filed a Corporation Code applies to Sections 31
Complaint-Affidavit with the City
Prosecution Office of Makati City
against the officers/employees of the
Tradition Group for violation of Sections
31 and 34 of the Corporation Code
which made them criminally liable under
Section 144. Impleaded as respondents
in the Complaint-Affidavit were
petitioners lent and Schulze, Jaime
Villalon, who was formerly President
and Managing Director of Tullett,
Mercedes Chuidian who was formerly a
member of Tullett's Board of Directors.
Villalon and Chuidian were charged with
using their former positions in Tullett to
sabotage said company by orchestrating
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the mass resignation of its entire
brokering staff in order for them to join
Tradition Philippines which was evident
on their conduct of several meetings
with the employees. According to Tullett,
petitioners lent and Schulze have
conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in
the latter's acts of disloyalty against the
company. Petitioners argued that there
could be no violation of Sections 31 and
34 of the Corporation as these sections
refer to corporate acts or corporate
opportunity, that Section 144 of the
same Code cannot be applied to
Sections 31and 34 which already
contains the penalties or remedies for
their violation; and conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code cannot be applied
to the Sections 31 and 34 of the
Corporation Code. The city prosecutor
dismissed the criminal complaint
however, on respondent’s appeal to the
Department of Justice, the dismissal
was reversed finding the arguments of
the respondent proper. CA affirmed the
decision of the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE/S:
WoN Section 144 of the
and 34 of the same code, thus, making
it a penal offense so that conspiracy can
be appreciated and the petitioners can
be impleaded
RULING:
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court
applied rule of lenity as a principle
related to liberal interpretation in favor of
the accused in criminal cases. The rule
applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
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interpretation which is more lenient to A corporate officer guilty of fraud or

the accused. mismanagement may be held liable for
lost profits. A disloyal agent may also
According to SC, a close reading suffer forfeiture of his compensation.
Section 144 shows that it is not purely a There is nothing in the deliberations to
penal provision because it provides that indicate that drafters of the Corporation
when the violator is a corporation, an Code intended to deviate from common
administrative penalty is imposed in law practice and enforce the fiduciary
form of dissolution, which is not a obligations of directors and corporate
criminal sanction. The Court also added officers through penal sanction aside
that there is no provision in the from civil liability. GRANTED. Court of
Corporation Code using an emphatic Appeals Resolutions are REVERSED
language to compel the SC to construe and SETASIDE.
the provision as a penal offense. SC
held that through a thorough scrutinizing
of the different provisions in the
Corporation Code including Sections 31
and 34, they only impose civil liability
aside from Section 74. SC concludes
that had it been the intention of the
drafters of the la to define Sections 31
and 34 as offenses, they could have
easily included similar language as that
found in Section 74.

The intention can also be gleaned from

the floor deliberations of its proponents.
Quite apart that no legislative intent to
criminalize Sections 31 and 34 was
manifested in the deliberations on the
Corporation Code, it is noteworthy from
the same deliberations that legislators
intended to codify the common law
concepts of corporate opportunity and
fiduciary obligations of corporate officers
as found in American jurisprudence into
said provisions. In common law, the
remedies available in the event of a
breach of director's fiduciary duties to
the corporation are civil remedies. If a
director or officer is found to have
breached his duty of loyalty, an
injunction may be issued or damages
may be awarded.

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Whether or not Magno should be

punished for the issuance of the checks
Magno vs. CA
in question.
GR 96132
June 26, 1992 Ruling:
No. To charge Magno for the refund of a
warranty deposit which he did not
Facts:
withdraw as it was not his
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring
own account, it having remained with LS
complete set of equipment to make his
Finance, is to even make him pay an
car repair shop operational, approached
unjust debt since he did
Corazon Teng, Vice President of
Mancor Industries. not receive the amount in question. All
the while, said amount was in the
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance
safekeeping of the financing
and Management Corporation, advising
its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that company which is managed by the
Mancor was willing to supply the pieces officials and employees of LS Finance.
of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate Magno and and
provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring
Magno to pay 30% of the total amount
of the equipment as warranty deposit
but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he
requested VP Gomez to look for third
party who could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon
was the one who provided that amount.
As payment to the equipment, Magno
issued six checks, two of them were
cleared and the rest had no sufficient
fund. Because of the unsuccessful
venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance
which then pulled out the equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP
Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and
found guilty.
Issue:

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ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 148560
November 19, 2001
As it is written, the Plunder Law
contains ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation; As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide
or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained.
FACTS
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the
highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as
amended by RA 7659..
Estrada wishes to impress the Court
that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from
the constitutionality infirm. That there
was a clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Plunder Law
requires less evidence for providing the
predicate crimes of plunder and
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therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process.
RULING:
No. The legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum
of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to constitute a
crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the
information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.
ISSUE: Whether Plunder as defined
in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
RULING:
No. It is malum in se. The legislative
declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se
and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially
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 CRIMINAL LAW 1
since in the case of plunder that
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-
political and economic context in which
the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, green and
syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace.
[With the government] terribly lacking
the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very
survival of people it governs over.
Note:
A statute establishing a criminal offense
must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It
can only be invoked against the specie
of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by
construction.
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The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has
acquired such exalted statute in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which
protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged.
A statute or act may be said to be vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance,
the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects it
violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. The
first may be “saved” by proper
construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such
activities.
The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It
must be stressed, however, that the
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
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A facial challenge is allowed to be made

to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling
effect” upon protected speech. The
theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate
or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in
a single prosecution, the transcendent
value of all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to
justify along attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the
persons making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute draw with narrow
specificity. The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.

This do not apply to penal statutes.

Criminal statutes have general in
terorrem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In
the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free
speech.

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a. The Municipal Court of Hindang

has no jurisdiction over the case due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A.
No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is
unconstitutional because, (1) the term of
imprisonment is unfixed and may run to
reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an
People vs Dacuycuy undue delegation of legislative power, the
173 SCRA 90 (1989) duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court
Petitioner: People of the Philippines as if the latter were the legislative
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. department of the Government.
Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. On March 30, 1976, the petition was
Zanoria transferred to Branch IV where the
respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled
DOCTRINE: that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional
but cases for its violation fall outside of the
Legislative power cannot be delegated to jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
the court. The court only interprets what’s in
the law. It is not for the courts to fix the term Issue:
of imprisonment where no points of A. Whether or not Republic Act No.
reference have been provided by the 4670 is unconstitutional.
legislature. What valid delegation B. Whether or not the municipal and
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise city courts have jurisdiction over the
of discretion to fix the length of service of a case.
term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated Held:
limits provided by law, the absence of which Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is
designated limits will constitute such unconstitutional.
exercise as an undue delegation, if not an Section 32 violates the constitutional
outright intrusion into or assumption, of prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power. legislative power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the
Facts: punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts
were the legislative department of the
On April 4, 1975, private government.
respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, Yes, the municipal and city courts
public school officials from Leyte were have jurisdiction over the case.
charged before the Municipal Court of Republic Act. No. 296, as amended
Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes
No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School punishable by fine of not more than Php
Teachers). The respondents pleaded not 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and municipal courts.
prohibition with preliminary injuction before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch Decision:
VII alleging that:

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 CRIMINAL LAW 1
The decision and resolution of
respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private
respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
Benedicto v. CA
GR No. 125359
4 September 2001
SUBJECT MATTER: Rights of the
suspect accused and convicted; Right to
criminal due process, etc.
CASE SUMMARY:
Petitioners were charged with several
violations of Circular 960. Said circular
prohibited maintaining foreign accounts
without authorization from Central Bank
and required all PH residents to report
foreign currencies habitually earned or
received. Subsequently, another circular
was issued deleting such prohibition.
Subsequently, petitioners were allowed
to come home to Philippines on the
condition that they face the charges
against them. They immediately posted
bail, were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty and filed motions to quash all
information filed against them. However,
the trial court denied their motions to
quash the information which was
affirmed by the CA. The SC also did
NOT rule in their favor.
DOCTRINES:
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Preliminary investigation is not part of
the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution. The right to a preliminary
investigation is personal. It is afforded to
the accused by statute, and can be
waived, either expressly or by
implication. The waiver extends to any
irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was
conducted.
Posting bail immediately, entering pleas
to the charges, and filing of various
motions and pleadings without
simultaneously demanding a proper
preliminary investigation amount to
waiver of any and all irregularities in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation.
FACTS:
On Dec. 27, 1991, Imelda Marcos,
Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Sec. 10 of Circular no. 960 in
relation to Sec. 34 of the Central Bank
Act (RA 265 as amended) in five
information filed with RTC. It was
alleged that they failed to submit reports
of their foreign exchange earnings from
abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the
Central Bank within the period
mandated by the Circular no 960.
Said Circular prohibited natural and
juridical persons from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad
without prior authorization from the
Central Bank. It also required all
residents of the Philippines who
habitually earned or received foreign
currencies from invisibles, either locally
or abroad, to report such earnings or
receipts to the Central Bank.
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On the same day, nine additional
information charging Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto with the same offense
involving different accounts were filed
with RTC.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more
Information accusing Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto of the same offense, in
relation to different accounts, were filed.
On the same day these were filed, the
Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318
which revised the rules governing non-
trade foreign exchange transactions. It
took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank
issued Circular No. 1358 which
amended Circular 1318 deleting the
requirement of prior Central Bank
approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking
system. However, the aforementioned
circulars contained a saving clause,
excepting from their coverage pending
criminal actions involving violations of
Circular No. 960 and, in the case of
Circular No. 1353, violations of both
Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the
government allowed petitioners
Benedicto and Rivera to return to the
Philippines, on condition that they face
the various criminal charges instituted
against them, including the dollar-salting
cases. Petitioners posted bail in the
latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners
Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned.
Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a
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similar plea during her arraignment for
the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved
to quash all the Informations filed
against them grounded of lack of
jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction
of criminal liability with the repeal of
Circular No. 960, prescription,
exemption from the Central Bank’s
reporting requirement, and the grant of
absolute
immunity as a result of a compromise
agreement entered into with the
government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court
denied petitioners’ motion. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repeal of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act
No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and
Republic Act No. 7653 respectively,
extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners. (NO)
RULING:
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law
has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with
violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule.
One is the inclusion of a saving clause in
the repealing statute that provides that the
repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions. act reenacts the former statute and
punishes the act previously penalized under
the old law. In such instance, the act
committed before the reenactment
continues to be an offense in the statute
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books and pending cases are not affected,
regardless of whether the new penalty to be
imposed is more favorable to the accused.
In the instant case, it must be noted that
despite the repeal of Circular No. 960,
Circular No. 1353 retained the same
reportorial requirement both contain a
saving clause, expressly providing that the
repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no
effect on pending actions for violation of the
latter Circular.
A saving clause operates to except from the
effect of the repealing law what would
otherwise be lost under the new law.
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents
GR No. 142396
February 11, 2003
Topic: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
It is a well-established principle of
international law that diplomatic
representatives, such as ambassadors
or public ministers and their official
retinue, possess immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the country of
their sojourn and cannot be sued,
arrested or punished by the law of that
country.
FACTS
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national
appointed as Labor Attaché for the
Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and
Manila, came to the Philippines to study
in the University of the Philippines in
1974. He became a refugee of the
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United Nations and continued to stay in
the Philippines and headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines.
Minucher, and one Abbas Torabian was
charged with an information for violation
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as “Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972”. They were accompanied by the
private respondent, Arthur Scalzo who
became one of the principal witnesses
for the prosecution.
On 8 January 1988, Presiding Judge
Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.
On 3 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil
case before the RTC Branch 19 of
Manila for damages on account of what
he claimed to have been trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note
of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and
a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a
true and faithful copy of its original. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not Scalzo is
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
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Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic In conducting surveillance activities on

immunity. Minucher, later acting as the poseur-
buyer during the buy-bust operation,
A foreign agent, operating within a
and then becoming a principal witness
territory, can be cloaked with immunity
in the criminal case against Minucher,
from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
directives of the sending state. beyond the scope of his official function
or duties.
The consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the activities of
the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from
the undisputed facts in the case.
 The official exchanges of
communication between
agencies of the government of
the two countries
 Certifications from officials of
both the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy
 Participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in
the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the
“diplomatic status” of Scalzo but they
give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked
him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest.

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ruled that the MeTC erred in dismissing

the complaints.
DOCTRINES
The immunity provided in the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the act was done in
official capacity. Slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with
the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
LIANG vs. PEOPLE Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
G.R. No. 125865 (2000) defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
Ynares-Santiago, J. before the Metropolitan Trial Court
Criminal Law is General in (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two
Application counts of grave oral defamation.
After he was released on bail, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from
SUMMARY: the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that petitioner is covered by
Two counts of grave oral defamation
immunity from legal process under
were filed against petitioner who is an
Section 45 of the Agreement between
ADB employee before the MeTC-
the ADB and the Philippine Government
Mandaluyong. The MeTC judge
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
received an Office of Protocol from the
(hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
The MeTC judge without notice to the
immunity from legal process under the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal
ADB Headquarters Agreement. Based
cases.
on the said protocol, the judge
dismissed the complaints. The RTC set The prosecution filed a motion for
aside aside the MeTC rulings and reconsideration which was opposed by
ordered the MeTC to enforce the the DFA.
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. Thus,
petitioner appealed to the SC. The SC When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the Regional Trial

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Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court via a petition for review.
ISSUE:
1. WON MeTC has no jurisdiction
because petitioner is covered by the
Agreement. (NO, MeTC has jurisdiction)
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s
case is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Gov’t.
RATIO:
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take
on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA’s determination that
a certain person is covered by immunity
is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts.
The immunity provided in the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the act was done in
official capacity. Section 45 of the
Agreement provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including
for the purpose of this Article experts
and consultants performing missions for
the Bank shall enjoy the following
privileges and immunities:
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(a) immunity from legal process with
respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity.
Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
The imputation of theft is ultra vires and
cannot be part of official functions.
It appears that even the government’s
chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand
taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
agent, assuming petitioner is such,
enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official
functions. Again, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
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LACSON v. CA, PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-46485, 21 November 1979
FENANDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos
Tan and Enrique Masacote were
neighbors. In the birthday party of Tan’s
son in their house, while they were
eating and drinking in the yard, Tan told
Pitalio that the laborers of Lacson were
leaving their work and asked him to find
out whether the Pitalio could get the
balance of his unpaid wages from
Lacson. Pitalio went to Lacson’s
residence, kicked open the gate of
appellant’s residence, and forced his
way inside the yard. Lacson and his wife
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had just arrived and were alighting from
their car when Pitalio, under the
influence of liquor, confronted Mrs.
Lacson and asked her to produce their
truck driver named Serafica, saying,
“Pag hindi mo siya hinarap sa akin ay
may mangyayari. ”Lacson remonstrated
with Pitalio to abide by the law. This
enraged Pitalio who replied, “Ano ang
batas, ito ang batas!” attacked Lacson
with a knife. Taking the Magnum .22
caliber pistol of his wife from her
handbag, the appellant then fired it once
at Pitalio’s chest.
Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio
to the hospital. Pitalio’s confinement in
the lasted for 10 days but the medical
certificate issued unto him stated that
his injury would incapacitate him for
more than 30 days.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Lacson is entitled
to acquittal on the ground of complete
self-defense.
RULING:
Yes. Lacson should be acquitted under
the theory of self-defense.
Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances. —
The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his
person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
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Second. Reasonable necessity of the petitioner the only reasonable means to

means employed to prevent or repel it; ward off the attack.
Third. Lack of suffcient provocation on Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to
the part of the person defending himself. acquittal on the ground of complete self-
defense.
This Court explained the meaning of
reasonable means employed thus: “That
there is reasonable necessity of the
means employed by herein appellant to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
cannot seriously be disputed.
Reasonable necessity of the means
employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not
depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such
injury. The Court stated in the case of
People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this
kind, human nature does not act upon
processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation; and when it is apparent
that a person has reasonably acted
upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
courts to sanction the act and hold the
act irresponsible in law for the
consequences.”
In the instant case, there was an
imminent danger to the lives of the
petitioner and of his wife from unlawful
attack of an enraged, drunken, and
armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his
wife, who was beside him, afforded the

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were dishonored due to the reason

“account closed”. Dimagiba was
prosecuted for the violation of BP 22
under separate complaints filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Baguio City. After a joint trial, the MTCC
(Branch 4) rendered a decision
convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
Dimagiba filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He
prayed for the recall of the order of
Arrest and Modification of the Final
Decision arguing that the penalty of fine
only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.
MTCC denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On October 2001, he filed with the RTC
of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
The RTC issued an order directing the
GO v. DIMAGIBA immediate release of Dimagiba from
confinement and requiring him to pay a
GR No. 151876 fine of 100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
June 21, 2005
The RTC justified its decision invoking
Topic: PRINCIPLE OF the Supreme Court Administrative
RETROACTIVITY Circular No. 12-2000, which allegedly
required the imposition of a fine only
The rule on retroactivity states that
instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
criminal laws may be applied
violation if the accused was not a
retroactively if favorable to the accused.
recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The
This principle, embodied in the Revised
RTC held that this rule should be
Penal Code, has been expanded in
retroactively applied in favor of
certain instances to cover special laws.
Dimagiba.

FACTS
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle
of retroactivity be applied in this
Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Susan
case.
Go 13 checks. Go presented the checks
to the drawee bank for encashment but

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RULING: favor of the accused, much less those

convicted by final judgment.
No, principle of retroactivity shall not
Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily
be applied in this case.
requires a review of all factual
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not circumstances of each case. Such a
a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the review can no longer be done if the
Revised Penal Code is not judgment has become final and
applicable. executory.
Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the
jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment
The circular applies only to those cases
in the guise of granting a writ of habeas
pending as of the date of its effectivity
corpus.
and not to cases already terminated by
final judgment. WHEREFORE, the Petition is
GRANTED and the assailed Orders
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely
NULLIFIED.
lays down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties for violation Respondent's Petition for habeas
of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. corpus is hereby DENIED.
Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent
behind the law.
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely
urges the courts to take into account not
only the purpose of the law but also the
circumstances of the accused whether
he acted in good faith or on a clear
mistake of fact without taint of
negligence and such other circumstance
which the trial court or the appellate
court believes relevant to the penalty to
be imposed.
Because the Circular merely lays down
a rule of preference, it serves only as a
guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is
addressed to the judges, who are
directed to consider the factual
circumstances of each case prior to
imposing the appropriate penalty.
In other words, the Administrative
Circular does not confer any new right in

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G.R. No. 119619 December 13,
1996HIZON, et. al. Vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The accused crew members and
fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by
First Fishermen FishingIndustries, Inc.,
represented by Richard Hizon were
apprehended by SPO3 Romulo
Enriquez,and the members of the Task
Force BantayDagat for allegedly fishing
in the shoreline of coastalwaters of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, with the use
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of obnoxious or poisonous substance
(sodiumcyanide), of more or less one (1)
ton of assorted live fishes. Such acts
constitute an offense ofIllegal Fishing
with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance penalized under PD No.
704,the Fisheries Decree of 1975. A day
following the arrest, random samples of
fish from the fishcage of F/B Robinson
were gathered for laboratory
examination. The specimens were
broughtto the NBI sub-office to
determine the method of catching the
same for record or evidentiarypurposes.
The NBI Forensic Chemist conducted
two tests on the fish samples and found
thatthey contained sodium cyanide.The
trial court convicted the petitioners of the
offense charged and CA affirmed the
decision,hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the fish specimen, which
yielded a positive result to the test of the
presence of sodium cyanide, are
admissible being illegally seized on the
occasion of warrantless search and
arrest.
Whether the statutory
presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of
PD 704 prevails over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court
sustained the warrantless arrest and
therefore the evidence obtained was
admissible.
Our Constitution proscribes
search and seizure and the arrest of
persons without a judicial warrant. As a
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general rule, any evidence obtained
without a judicial warrant is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The
rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a
search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle; and
(4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been
the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search
warrant. It is rooted on the recognition
that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor
vehicles, can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the
search warrant must be sought and
secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial
authorities have not required a search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts before
their search and seizure can be
constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to
seizures of fishing vessels and boats
breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-
speed motors that enable them to elude
arresting ships of the Philippine Navy,
the Coast Guard and other government
authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless
search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing
boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing. The fish and other
evidence seized in the course of the
search were properly admitted by the
trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to
raise the issue during trial and hence,
waived
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their right to question any irregularity
that may have attended the said search
and seizure.
On the second issue. Petitioners
contend that this presumption of guilt
under the Fisheries Decree violates the
presumption of innocence guaranteed
by the Constitution. The validity of laws
establishing presumptions in criminal
cases is a settled matter. It is generally
conceded that the legislature has the
power to provide that proof of certain
facts can constitute prima facie
evidence of the guilt of the accused and
then shift the burden of proof to the
accused provided there is a rational
connection between the facts proved
and the ultimate fact presumed. To
avoid any constitutional infirmity, the
inference of one from proof of the other
must not be arbitrary and unreasonable.
In fine, the presumption must be based
on facts and these facts must be part of
the crime when committed.
The third paragraph of section 33 of
P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt
based on facts proved and hence is not
constitutionally impermissible. It makes
the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, explosives, or devices for
electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed
with the use of obnoxious and
poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman evidence that
the owner and operator of the fishing
boat or the fisherman had used such
substances in catching fish. The
ultimate fact presumed is that the owner
and operator of the boat or the
fisherman were engaged in illegal
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fishing and this presumption was made The petitioners were acquitted of the
to arise from the discovery of the crime charged.
substances and the contaminated fish in
the possession of the fisherman in the
fishing boat. The fact presumed is a
natural inference from the fact proved.
The statutory presumption is merely
prima facie.It cannot, under the guise of
regulating the presentation of evidence,
operate to preclude the accused from
presenting his defense to rebut the main
fact presumed. At no instance can the
accused be denied the right to rebut the
presumption. thus:
The inference of guilt is one of fact and
rests upon the common experience of
men. But the experience of men has
taught them that an apparently guilty
possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused
person may therefore put witnesses on
the stand or go on the witness stand
himself to explain his possession, and
any reasonable explanation of his
possession, inconsistent with his guilty
connection with the commission of the
crime, will rebut the inference as to his
guilt which the prosecution seeks to
have drawn from his guilty possession
of the stolen goods.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was
able to overcome the presumption when
they requested another sampling of the
fishes captured for laboratory
examination where the result yielded
negative presence of sodium cyanide .
The prosecution was not able to explain
the contradictory findings of the
laboratory examinations.

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unconstitutional for being vague and

overboard.
The municipal trial court denied the
motions, directed respondents to file
their respective counter-affidavits, and
declared that the law on vagrancy was
enacted pursuant to the State’s police
power (or the power of promoting public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property) and justified
by the Latin maxim “salus populiest
suprema lex” (which calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the
interest of the greater number).
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the RTC challenging
theconstitutionality of the anti-vagrancy
law and claiming that Art 202 (2)
violated the equal protectionclause. The
RTC granted the petition of the herein
respondents and declared Art. 202 (2)
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy
violate the equal protection clause?
People vs. Siton, et al.,GR 169364, 18
Sept. 2009
Ruling:
Facts:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not
Respondents Evangeline Siton and
violate the equal protection clause;
Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged
neither does it discriminate against the
with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of
poor and the unemployed. Offenders of
the RPC in two separate Informations.
public order laws are punished not for
Accused were found wandering and
their status, as for being poor or
loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi
unemployed, but for conducting
Streets of Davao City, without any
themselves under such circumstances
visible means to support herself nor
as to endanger the public peace or
lawful and justifiable purpose.
cause alarm and apprehension in the
Respondents filed separate Motions to
community. Being poor or unemployed
Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is
is not a license or a justification to act

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 CRIMINAL LAW 1
indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct.
.Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as
to be considered constitutionally offensive.
—Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal
protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws
are punished not for their status, as for
being poor or unemployed, but for
conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public
peace or cause alarm and apprehension in
the community. Being poor or unemployed
is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as
to be considered constitutionally offensive. It
is a public order crime which punishes
persons for conducting themselves, at a
certain place and time which orderly society
finds unusual, under such conditions that
are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society, as would engender a justifiable
concern for the safety and wellbeing of
members of the community.
LADIONGA v. PEOPLE
GR No. 141066
February 17, 2005
Doctrine:
RPC, ART. 10. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
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FACTS
June 1990 – Evangeline Ladonga with
her husband Adronico borrowed money
from pawnshop owner Alfredo Oculam.
Because they were his regular
customers, he extended them loan in 3
consecutive times (P 9,075.55, P
12,730, P 8,496.55). Adronio then draw
3 checks and indorsed it to Oculam. The
checks are considered as guarantee
and were postdated to be encashed
only if the couple defaults in payment.
However, upon presentation of the
checks to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same were dishonored
because the account of the couple with
the UCPB Tagbilaran Branch, had
already been closed.
RTC-TAGBILARAN
March 1991. Three Informations for
violation of BP 22 were filed with the
RTC. The cases were consolidated and
jointly tried.
Spouses Ladonga’s defense: While the
checks bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was
closed, the checks were issued only to
guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not
encash the checks when they mature.
The RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Adronico
applied for probation which was granted.
COURT OF APPEALS
On the other hand, Evangelina brought
the case to the Court of Appeals. She
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argued that the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to BP 22 as it is a special
law and she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner:
The provisions of the penal code were
made applicable to special penal laws in
the decisions of this Court in People vs.
Parel, US vs. Ponte, and US vs. Bruhez.
Article 10 of the RPC itself provides that
its provisions shall be supplementary to
special laws unless the latter provide the
contrary.
Since BP 22 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the RPC, the principle
of conspiracy may be applied to cases
involving violations of BP 22.
The fact that petitioner did not make and
issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it
is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator takes a direct part in every
act and knows the part which everyone
performed. In conspiracy the act of one
conspirator could be held to be the act
of the other.
Petitioner filed for petition of certiorari
before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy is
applicable in violations of BP 22.
RULING:
Yes.
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Some provisions of the RPC,
especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws. BP 22 does
not provide any prohibition regarding the
applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the RPC to it.
ART. 10. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the
contrary.
1st clause: the special penal laws are
controlling with regard to offenses
therein specifically punished. Lex
specialis derogant generali. Such
statement is a superfluity, and could
have been eliminated altogether.
2nd clause: contains the soul of the
article. The main idea and purpose of
the article is embodied in the provision
that the code shall be supplementary to
special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner
who was not the drawer or issuer of
the 3 checks that bounced could be
held liable for violations of BP 22 as
conspirator. NO.
RULING:
No.
ART 8: A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement
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concerning the commission of a felony

and decide to commit it.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must
be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. The prosecution failed to
prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Her mere presence during
the signing of the check cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence.
Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy.
The prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of the petitioner with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction.

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