CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
a. Discuss Article 36 of the Family Code.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
b. What are the essential marital
obligations referred to in Article 36 of
the Family Code?
 Essential marital obligations are
which arise by reason of
marriage. So, they are not
required of non-married
persons. The non-performance
of said obligations by the
problem spouse endows the
other spouse certain causes of
action such as declaration od
nullity of the marriage (Art. 36),
separation of property,
receivership and sole
administration of community
property (Art. 101, FC).
 Under the Family Code, the
following are essential marital
obligations—
1) To procreate children
based on the universal
principle that procreation
of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic
end of marriage;
2) To live together under one
roof (Art. 68, FC) for
togetherness spells the
unity in marriage;
3) To observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art.
68, FC) for love, sexual
comfort, and loyalty to
one another are basic
postulates of marriage;
4) To render mutual help
and support (Art. 68) for
assistance in necessities,
both temporal and
spiritual, is essential to
sustain the marriage;
5) To jointly support the
family (Art. 70) for
spouses are joint
administrator in the
partnership;
6) Not to commit acts which
will bring danger,
dishonor or injury to each
other or to the family (Art.
72) for the safety and
security of the family at all
times is a primordial duty
of the spouses.
- It must be observed that the constant
non-fulfillment of any of the above
obligations will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
They go to the core or essence of the
marriage. Without them, marriage is a
meaningless relationship. Hence, they
are essential marital obligations.
c. What are the three characteristics of
psychological incapacity?
 In Santos v. CA, the Court
declared that psychological
incapacity must be
characterized by
(a) Gravity,
(b) Juridical antecedence, and
(c) Incurability.
 It should refer “no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity
marital that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.”
 The intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter
1

insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage (Republic vs. Cuison-
Melgar, 486 SCRA 177).
c.1. Discuss Santos v. Court of
Appeals, GR. No. 112019, 04 January
1995.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,
respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most
likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O.
No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on
certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching
its application in his attempt to have his
marriage with herein private respondent,
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then
held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel
and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18
July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days
with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United
Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to
visit the United States, where he underwent a
training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come
home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court
of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
2
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)

Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). less, is psychologically

Summons was served by publication in a incapacitated.
newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental. The family Code did not define the term
"psychological incapacity." The deliberations
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
answer (through counsel), opposed the Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, however, provide an insight on the import of the
in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in provision.
fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
Art. 35. The following
A possible collusion between the parties to marriages shall be void from the
obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was beginning:
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court). xxx xxx xxx

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences Art. 36. . . .

had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a (7) Those marriages contracted
manifestation, stating that she would neither by any party who, at the time of
appear nor submit evidence. the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally judgment to understand the
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3 essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The incapacitated to discharge the
latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4 essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity
The petition should be denied not only because is made manifest after the
of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, celebration.
which requires a certification of non-shopping,
but also for its lack of merit. On subparagraph (7), which as
lifted from the Canon Law,
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
home, or at the very least to communicate with suggested that they say
him, for more than five years are circumstances "wanting in sufficient use," but
that clearly show her being psychologically Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his preferred to say "wanting in the
own words, Leouel asserts: sufficient use." On the other
hand, Justice Reyes proposed
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is that they say "wanting in
no affection for (him) because sufficient reason." Justice
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia- Caguioa, however, pointed out
Santos failed all these years to that the idea is that one is not
communicate with the lacking in judgment but that he
petitioner. A wife who does not is lacking in the exercise of
care to inform her husband judgment. He added that lack of
about her whereabouts for a judgment would make the
period of five years, more or marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked

3
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
that lack of judgment is more
serious than insufficient use of
judgment and yet the latter
would make the marriage null
and void and the former only
voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7)
be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity
is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that
the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage"
refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question:
Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity"
only a ground for annulment
and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance
of consent, which is the reason
why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but
to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera
suggested that, in subparagraph
(7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the
word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence.
Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with
one but not with another. Justice
(Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that
it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated
that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code,
the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the
Civil Code. Justice Caguioa
added that in Canon Law, there
are voidable marriages under
the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit
said that this is precisely the
reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in
Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that
the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno
suggested that the phrase "even
if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to
read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
4
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Justice Reyes remarked that in
insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there
are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in
the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not
know all the consequences of
the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he
might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in
favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really
understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not
and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by
acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that
it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that
his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects
in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore,
it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance
of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity,
Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider
it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent.
In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected
but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there
is a valid consent. He objected
to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each
other, because they require a
different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno,
however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice
of consent and that it should not
be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be
no prescription. In other words,
as long as the defect has not
been cured, there is always a
right to annul the marriage and
if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that
when the action for annulment
is instituted, the issue can be
raised that actually, although
one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at
the time the action is brought, it
5
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of
marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised
the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a
sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that
psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is
the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated
that psychological incapacity is
not a defect in the mind but in
the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not
be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the
same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there
are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding
of the consequences of
marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the
time when there is
understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they
include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some
instances the impotence that in
some instances the impotence is
only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person.
Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that
the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is
incurable.
Justice Puno observed that
under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one
was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the
essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the
psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the
time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed
that the idea in the provision is
that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one
is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential
marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy,
however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he
is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry.6
6
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the
next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated,
to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the
beginning even if such
incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that
"even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization" be
deleted since it may encourage
one to create the manifestation
of psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that,
as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of
abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they
also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological
incapacity is not a species of
vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop
Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop
Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of
some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained
that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding
of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the
members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not
to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno,
remarked that, since there
having been annulments of
marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil
Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the
question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family
Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil
Law? The other members
replied negatively.
7

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was
for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of
church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid
under the Civil Law. On the
other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they
put the issue to a vote, which
the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno
and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy,
Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that
they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which
the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be
filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code
Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon.
Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus:8
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
The Committee did not give any
examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and
researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable
of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of
reason;
2. who suffer from a grave
defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to
be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of
psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even
perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid,
at least, to the interpretation or construction of
the codal provision.
8

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10 giving an account on how the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of
this canon does not leave any
doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the
rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the
essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-
sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem)
are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a
new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave
psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) .
. . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was
retained in the text submitted to
the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was
promulgated:
because of causes of a
psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from
psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly
was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not
be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
assume the ordinary obligations
of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries
on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,
Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is
here described in legal terms.
This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due
by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap;
(b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must
be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true
psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from
giving what is due (cf. John Paul
II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
1987). However, if the marriage
9

is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person
is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of
the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility
of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the
work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or
even desirable.
10
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime itself can always provide all the specific answers
commitment. We should continue to be to every individual problem.
reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
— SO ORDERED.

Art. 1. Marriage is a special

contract of permanent union d. Discuss the guidelines to determine
between a man a woman entered psychological incapacity stated in
into in accordance with law for Republic v. Molina, GR. No. 108763,
the establishment of conjugal 13 February 1997.
and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution Republic of the Philippines
whose nature, consequences, SUPREME COURT
and incidents are governed by Manila
law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage EN BANC
settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage
 
within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
Filipino family as the
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is The Family Code of the Philippines provides
the foundation of the family and an entirely new ground (in addition to those
shall be protected by the State. enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution). validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
The above provisions express so well and so effectivity, our courts have been swamped
distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on with various petitions to declare marriages
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the void based on this ground. Although this
tenets we still hold on to. Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said
measure at all, can come close to the standards
novel provision in specific cases. In the
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
present case and in the context of the herein
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his

11

frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the
May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990
with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O.
Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since
he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged;
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989,
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the
following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were
legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a
child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-
in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking
support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not
asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the
parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of
her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
12

the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked
as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during
the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that
"the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the
respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of
marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part
of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal
relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave
the spouses to their individual
fates.
In the case at bar, We find that
the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these
discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity
. . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
13

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is
no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other
parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for
their professions?
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that
his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the
part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes
of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case
vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view
of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and
the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10
a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
14

on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
15

Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the
evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,
we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use
of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
e. Discuss the following cases involving
the determination of psychological
incapacity:
e.1. Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, GR. No.
119190, 16 January 1997.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by
which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate.
Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a
distraught wife against her uncaring husband in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of
the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the
Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February
14, 1995.
16

The statement of the case and of the facts made
by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the
following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff
married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
(Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded
to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same
bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that
contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in
a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio
City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at
the living room. They slept together in
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was
no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did
not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of
her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant
is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that
she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married
her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile
with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the
defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his
marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her
very much; (2) that he has no defect on
17

his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and
that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect,
it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was
no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants
to have sexual intercourse with his wife,
she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and
she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to
the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1)
that she is afraid that she will be forced
to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their
marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a
physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for
the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is
no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-
C")
The doctor said, that he asked the
defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of
two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by
one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only
a soft erection which is why his penis is
not in its full length. But, still is capable
of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a
woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor
manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred:
I
18

in affirming the conclusions of the lower
court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of
both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the
marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent
has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis
for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings.
— Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment
on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial.
The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner
to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because
petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which
was affirmed by this Court is not based
19

on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is
not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the
mind of this Court clearly demonstrates
an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, —
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts, — why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span
of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court
nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted
to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not
be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so,
petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He
never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover
what the problem with his wife could be. What
he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since
it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
20

As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence
convinces Us that the husband's plea
that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire
belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife,
purely out of symphaty for her feelings,
he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111
Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at
p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is
the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity
weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that
she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put
to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's
claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can
be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of
cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly,
and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of
the Family Code.7
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is
an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy
between petitioner and private respondent. That
is — a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view
the relationship with love amor gignit amorem,
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment
to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment
of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES ,
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
21

e.2. Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No.
136490, 19 October 2000.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v.
WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for
such declaration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which
disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set
aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid." 2 Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3,
1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between
petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code.
The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic]
in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the
same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent" .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy
each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City where the marriage was solemnized, the
National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It was established during the trial that the
parties were married twice: (1) on September 6,
1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto
H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig
(Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila
(Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5)
children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed
was transferred to the Presidential Security
Command in Malacañang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women’s Auxiliary Corps
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
22

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of
them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982,
they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she
acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left
the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look
for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in
any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex
with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a
slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living
separately.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"All the while, she was engrossed in the
business of selling "magic uling" and chicken.
While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before
going to Malacañang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on
her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was
able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took
place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymore. On that day, when she saw him
in their house, she was so angry that she
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. The following day,
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sister’s house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to]
medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were
diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records,
153).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with
her two sisters and driver, went to him at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and
their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker
Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure
to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards appellee and their
children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that
psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
23

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the
allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s
psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and
Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly
be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the
decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"In the case before us, the appellant was not
subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the
appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or
any one of them was mentally or psychically ill
to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations
he or she was assuming, or as would make him
or her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The
root cause of his supposed incapacity was not
alleged in the petition, nor medically or
clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there
is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental — not
physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for
this Court’s consideration the following
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
issues:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity
of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the
merits of the Petition." 7
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal
medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not
show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the
results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent’s psychological incapacity
to perform the obligations of marriage should
not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not
taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself
to such tests.cralaw : red
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines
governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article
36 of the Family Code 9 were laid down by this
Court as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
24

should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation
of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally
‘inviolable,’ thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the
state.
x       x       x
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their ‘I
do’s.’ The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
x       x       x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
25

decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095." 10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality
of the evidence presented in the present case —
including the testimonies of petitioner, the
common children, petitioner’s sister and the
social worker — was enough to sustain a finding
that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the
family home.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition
is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Because Article 36 has been abused as a
convenient divorce law this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in
Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution
of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines in outlined in Molina.
26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination
as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
e.3. Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No.
162368, 17 July 2006.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368             July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS,
petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of
the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision 1
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on
record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where
the trial court reiterated that there was no
evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that
his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's
psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that
the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there
was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
As already stated, the petition for review was
denied for failure of petitioner to show that the
appellate tribunal committed any reversible
error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent
Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to
comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court
directed the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2,
2006.
27

After considering the arguments of both the
petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to
deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the
province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive
of such factual determination.10 It is a well-
established principle that factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the
most compelling and cogent reasons, like when
the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions
of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing
in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.13 As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of
the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to
convincingly demonstrate.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic
consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish
respondent's psychological condition.
Here, appellant contends that there is
such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed,
the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent
was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage,
or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-
serving, petitioner's evidence showed
that respondent's alleged failure to
perform his so-called marital obligations
was not at all a manifestation of some
deep-seated, grave, permanent and
incurable psychological malady. To be
sure, the couple's relationship before the
marriage and even during their brief
union (for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company
of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's
own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x.
Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting
about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his
shell and corner, and failed to perform
his so-called marital obligations.
Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her
suspicions irrational. Respondent could
not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
28

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain
how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality
disorder called "schizoid," and why he is
the "dependent and avoidant type." In
fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one
suffering from such mixed personality
disorder is dependent on others for
decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems
to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's
information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the
petitioner herself. Notably, when asked
as to the root cause of respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such
disorder "can be part of his family
upbringing" x x x. She stated that there
was a history of respondent's parents
having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's
parents also came from petitioner. Nor
did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that
there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse integral
element" in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from
accepting, and, thereby complying with,
the essential marital obligations. Of
course, petitioner likewise failed to
prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed
even before the marriage. All these
omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her
devolved the onus of establishing nullity
of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein
respondent preferred to spend more time with
his friends than his family on whom he
squandered his money, depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his
wife regarding his finances, the Court held that
the psychological defects spoken of were more
of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent
failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage.19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity
of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37,22 38,23
and 4124 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 4525 that would make the marriage
29

merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify
a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are
not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36
should not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for
review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner
to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error, is DENIED
WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
e.4. Antonio v. Reyes, GR. No. 155800,
10 March 2006.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped
a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of
deception between spouses, no matter the
gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following
pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir
tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty
spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24
October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of
Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void.
After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989
when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their
first meeting, they got married before a minister
of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the
Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who
sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to
have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income,
30

educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously
gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted
child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their
marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-
law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist
to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and
told some of her friends that she graduated with
a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance
voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member
of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect 14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos
and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from
Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth
P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and
sent the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez
were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected
with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She
bought a sala set from a public market but told
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over
him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no
longer take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented
Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who
stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of
person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It
undermined the basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further
asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was
also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that
she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from
petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to
rape and kill her because she surmised such
31

intent from David’s act of touching her back and
ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance
graduate and had been teaching psychology at
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de
las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders
Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not
under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was
indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner
were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the
Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate
of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the
one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and
not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent
lavishly as she supported almost ten people from
her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her
non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage,
the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is
not sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio
Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute
the allegations anent her psychological
condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of
tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
the screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he
himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there
were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr.
Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent’s
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use
of only one instrument called CPRS which was
not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to
petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and
her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court,
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to
live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to
her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its
decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During
the pendency of the appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held
instead that only respondent was impaired by a
lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
32

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of
these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment.
While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the
totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had
not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s
pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the
Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations
of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by
the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute
the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded
that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual
version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the
state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing
the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47
In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led
to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar
as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what
Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was
a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration
of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under
Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity
of marriage is novel in our body of laws,
although mental incapacity has long been
recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from
contracting marriage persons "who are not in the
full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and
persons already married, among others. A
party’s mental capacity was not a ground for
divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a
marriage where "either party was of unsound
mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as
an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage
Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under
33

the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil
Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party
of "unsound mind" was classified under Article
85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56
The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable
under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is
recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one
of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The
initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee
that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given
free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights
and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated
in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original
understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would
not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of
consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of
the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been
a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of
consent to the marriage."63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v.
Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity
pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has
recognized that psychological incapacity "is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of
psychological incapacity deviates from the
literal wording of Article 36, with its central
phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to
comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the preference of the revision committee was for
"the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding
on
34

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon
Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition
of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable
specifics. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience. It is under the auspices of the
deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the
Court has developed the Molina rules, which
have been consistently applied since 1997.
Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts
in adjudicating petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the
Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself
arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina
at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is
need though to emphasize other perspectives as
well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Of particular notice has been the citation of the
Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the
interpretation of psychological incapacity. This
is but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that
the concept of psychological incapacity was
derived from canon law,73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic
Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the
influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of
Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. 75
Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in
the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law,
its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in
wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is
merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on
another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of
the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and
that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
35

But the Constitution itself does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course
to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also
falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage
and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given
the avowed State interest in promoting marriage
as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family
life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
These are the legal premises that inform us as
we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the
guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article
36. The Court has consistently applied Molina
since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules.
They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected"’ by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming,
36

or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to
our law on evidence—what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional
requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his
37

agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This
requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue
in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s
participation in the hearings before the trial
court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC
are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to
the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the
Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and
personality. The question remains whether her
pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently
satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his
burden in proving the psychological incapacity
of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the
Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which
disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological
incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioner’s evidence as credible
enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must
be able to establish the cause of action with a
preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed
with State interest, the Family Code likewise
requires the participation of the State, through
the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,
even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such
proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying
about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in
generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the
field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2)
such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of
psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the
affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are
a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with
38

the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent,
constant and repeated lying of the "respondent";
which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that
because of these actuations of the respondent she
is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that
one owes towards another. The lack of concern,
the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship.
You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what
we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly
lie, what do you think is going to happen as far
as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it
undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to
the behavior of the respondent in constantly
lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of
the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr.
Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been
calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask
him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And
this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you
say about this, Mr. witness?
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point
that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband
is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way
as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is
abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in
reality to the fact that the husband is having an
affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having
an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy,
would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of
the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to
establish not only the psychological incapacity
of respondent, but also the psychological
capacity of petitioner. He concluded that
respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate
about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of
psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s
testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had
already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is
not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses
as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common
conclusion of respondent’s psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set
of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the
39

conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented
as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this
wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are
indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown
clearly from her actuations that respondent has
that propensity for telling lies about almost
anything, be it her occupation, her state of
health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She
has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities. She practically lived in
a world of make believe making her therefore
not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such
repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity
was established to have clearly existed at the
time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner
in the dark about her natural child’s real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter
had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove
her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that
the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner
left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent’s
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record,
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
was so grave in extent that any prolonged
marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to
respondent were not adopted as false pretenses
in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part
of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction,
or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies
and the pathologic nature of her mistruths,
which according to them, were revelatory of
respondent’s inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to
reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to
any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that
since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect
a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her
ability to perform her marital obligations. We
are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to
remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. Respondent’s
ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the
truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article
45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article
46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of
40

marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article
45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is
lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of
the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity
under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult
to see how an inveterate pathological liar would
be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when
it failed to take into consideration the fact that
the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity
of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89
dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93
was appended to the sentence of nullity
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains
that matrimonial consent is considered
ontologically defective and wherefore judicially
ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or
serious impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with
the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised
on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse
personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and
that seriously undermined the integrality of
her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was
impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
evidence in the Case however to prove as well
the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the
part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological
incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They
hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent’s version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
41

conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church
on this matter would have diminished persuasive
value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the
requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It was on this score that
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondent’s
condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did
not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and
his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However,
respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be
definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a
cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it
would have been easier had petitioner’s expert
witnesses characterized respondent’s condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on
whether the psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good
reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in
1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated
in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly
stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the
Family Code.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which
was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the
Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of
canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of
psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to
Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is
incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100
However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos
omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was
decided months before the trial court came out
with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondent’s psychological incapacity
was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the
psychological incapacity be established in an
action for declaration of nullity. At least, there
was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the
trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court’s decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such
requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or
after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court
countered an argument that Molina and Santos
should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or
construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the
statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this
present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is
one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses
42

that respondent’s psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was
no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration
and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply
Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before
Molina or Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even
if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone,
and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be
insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no
impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more
than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has
established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present
petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond
as having been inexistent in the first place. It is
possible that respondent, despite her
psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in
the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases
on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than
the legitimatization of a desire of people in love
to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
e.5. Paras v. Paras, G. R. No. 147824,
02 August 2007.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147824             August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate
this Court’s ruling that the Guidelines set forth
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel
Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a
physician should examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition."2
43

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision 3
dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4
dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-
Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married
respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely:
Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27,
1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint
for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil
Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by
the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and
forged her signature in one mortgage
transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a
child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to
his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both
as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered
documentary and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in
Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos
University, Cebu City.5 He courted her,
frequently spending time at her "Botica." 6
Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding
was considered one of the "most celebrated"
marriages in Bindoy.7
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1)
week in Davao for their honeymoon.8 Upon
returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents’
house. It was their residence for three (3) years
until they were able to build a house of their
own.9 For the first five (5) years of their
marriage, Justo did not support her and their
children because he shouldered his sister’s
schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who
spent for all their family needs, using the income
from her "Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor. 12 His usual
routine was to spend time with his "barkadas"
until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes,
he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their
children’s well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with
leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house
with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier
advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the
latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire
family went to the United States. Her sisters
supported them throughout their two-year stay
there. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines.
Upon her return to the Philippines, she was
shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo
was a profligate. At one time, he disposed
without her consent a conjugal piece of land. 16
At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas
station free of charge.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his
act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found
that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988,
Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl,
Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa)
and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose
Paras.17
44

As expected, Justo has a different version of the
story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after
taking the bar examinations in Manila. 18 He
frequently spent time in her store.19 Believing he
loved her, he courted her and later on, they
became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get
married. However, it was postponed because her
family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took
place in 1964 upon his mother’s signing a deed
of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut
land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their
assets from the slump of the price of sugar and
not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due to his
business ventures, he and Rosa were able to
acquire a 10-room family house, expand their
store, establish their gasoline station, and
purchase several properties. He also denied
forging her signature in one mortgage
transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and
Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank’s authorized
employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the
change in Rosa’s attitude after her return from
the United States. She became detached, cold,
uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was
steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before
other people, he merely pretended that their
relationship was blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United
States. It happened that they only had tourist
visas. When they were there, their children’s
tourist visas were converted into study visas,
permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he
was granted only three (3) months leave as
municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
immediately returned to the Philippines.25
He spent for his children’s education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just
starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
provide for their needs. He admitted though that
there were times he failed to give them financial
support because of his lack of income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was
Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his
birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare
food for the guests. When confronted, she
retorted that she has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of
concern.27 This was further aggravated when she
denied his request for engine oil when his
vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-
infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that
Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her
secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle
Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is
not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC
rendered a Decision upholding the validity of
the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not
abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to
leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of
their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were
sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there
was no need for Justo to shell out his limited
salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the
relationship between the parties started well,
negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it
ruled that there appeared to be a collusion
between them as both sought the declaration of
nullity of their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a
petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed
as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges
alleged in her complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this
Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty
of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank
45

documents, immorality, and abandonment of
his family. He was suspended from the practice
of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS
on the charge of falsifying his wife’s
signature in bank documents and other
related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on
the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously.
Let notice of this Decision be spread in
respondent’s record as an attorney, and
notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on
the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months
after this Court promulgated the Decision in
A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC Decision in the present case, holding
that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls
short of the standards required by law to decree
a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s
alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is
extant on the record – first, the income
which supported their children came
from the earnings of their conjugal
properties and not singularly from
Rosa’s industry; second, Justo gave his
share of the support to his children in
the form of allowances, albeit smaller
than that derived from the conjugal
property; third, he was booted out from
their conjugal dwelling after he lost his
bid for re-election and as such did not
voluntarily abandon his home; and
fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes
of the law and morality, Justo’s alleged
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
infidelity came after he was driven out
of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s
inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist
is fatal to her case, being in violation of the
tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus,
she failed to substantiate her allegation that
Justo is psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings
in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive
on the present case. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual
findings. Also, she argues that she filed the
instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well
before this Court’s pronouncement in Molina
relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states
that she could have presented an expert to prove
the root cause of Justo’s psychological
incapacity had she been required to do so. For
relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be
annulled on the bases of the Court’s conclusive
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the
alternative, remand this case to the court a quo
for reception of expert testimony in the interest
of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that
the present case is a "new matter completely
foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333;
hence, the factual findings of this Court therein
are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no
hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it
was decided merely on the bases of pleadings
and documents.
The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the
following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this
Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive
on the present case;
46

second, whether a remand of this case to
the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justo’s
alleged psychological incapacity is
necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in
the case shows psychological incapacity
on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I incapacity as contemplated under
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about
nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals’
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel
aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even
assumed that her charges "are true," but
concluded that they are insufficient to declare
the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion
of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted
evidence, we find that even if we assume
Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to support
his family and alleged abandonment of their
family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal
husband and father. However, by themselves,
these grounds are insufficient to declare the
marriage void due to an incurable psychological
incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize,
do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that he must assume
and discharge as a married person. While they
may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged
psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily
show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts
violated the covenants of marriage, they do not
necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological
incapacity which prevents him from undertaking
the basic obligations of marriage in the future. 36
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its
Resolution denying Rosa’s motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the
findings of the Supreme Court in the
disbarment case appellant filed against
her husband, namely, appellee’s
falsification of documents to obtain
loans and his infidelity, these facts, by
themselves, do not conclusively
establish appellee’s psychological
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
we already went as far as to presume
the existence of such seeming
depravities in appellee’s character in
our earlier judgment. However, as we
emphasized in our Decision, the
existence of such eventualities is not
necessarily conclusive of an inherent
incapacity on the part of appellee to
discern and perform the rudiments of
marital obligations as required under
Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual
findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered
"conclusive" on the present case is
unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already
"went as far as to presume the existence" of
Justo’s depravities, however, even doing so
could not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result.
As Rosa’s prayer for relief suggests, what she
wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on
the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333. 38
Obviously, she is of the impression that since
her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be
true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the
practice of law, the same charges are also
sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. The
basic premise is that criminal and civil cases
47

are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa.39 The Court’s exposition in In re
Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does
not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a
husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks for such
roles are simply different. This is why the
disposition in a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage. While Rosa’s charges sufficiently
proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however,
they may not establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband.
In the disbarment case, "the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the
court." On the other hand, in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the
ground of psychological incapacity, the question
for determination is whether the guilty party
suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing
mental incapacity that renders him truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its
purpose is to free the innocent party from a
meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be
seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are
not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts
really fall short of what is expected from a
lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is
necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove
psychological incapacity has its origin in
Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth therein
states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts, and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
48

its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the
Court clarified that the above Guideline does not
require that the respondent should be examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage. What is important is "the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that
Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit
when it held in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the
root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts" and this
requirement was not deemed complied with
where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
on the alleged psychological incapacity of one
party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,45
promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003,
geared towards the relaxation of the requirement
of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d)
states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court
categorically explained that under the New
Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity
or on its root cause. What must be alleged are
the physical manifestations indicative of said
incapacity. The Court further held that the New
Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos
doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,
further clarified that there is no
requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should
be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
allege expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to
Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 filed by a battered wife
sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its
Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the
marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s Decision, applying the Guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and
Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this
Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina
should not have retroactive application, the
Guidelines being merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature. She submitted that the
proper application of Santos and Molina
warranted only a remand of her case to the trial
49

court for further proceedings, not a dismissal.
The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the
premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines
"constitute a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted," thus:
The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained
in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim –
‘legis interpretado legis vim obtinet’
that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would
thus constitute a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court
finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of ‘lex
prospicit, non replicit.’
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It
affirmed that the wife failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence,
to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of her husband. The Court then
concluded that "emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos,
Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case,
there is no reason to remand it to the trial court.
The records clearly show that there is sufficient
evidence to establish the psychological
condition of Justo.
III
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of
marriage.
The last issue left for this Court’s consideration
is whether the totality of the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the
dissolution of the marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties
be reminded of the State’s policy on marriage.
Article XV of the Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the
State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage
has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family
Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract
of permanent union, between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law, and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional
and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the
position that any doubt as to the validity of a
marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
50

Of course, the law recognizes that not all
marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is
psychological in nature and renders a person
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, the State provides refuge to
the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the
Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a
party who, at the time of celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines
for the interpretation and application of Article
36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
51

adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements mandated by the Court in Santos, 54
to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the
testimonial and documentary evidence, shows
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
that Rosa’s main grounds in seeking the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo
are his infidelity, profligacy which includes
the falsification of her signature in one of the
loan documents, failure to support the
children, and abandonment of the family.
Both the courts below found the charges
unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court,
in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the
evidence sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of
sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature,
and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION
OF COMPLAINANT’S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the
National Bureau of Investigation on the
signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the
questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing
in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related
instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the
standard sample signatures
JUSTO J. PARAS were written
by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the
standard sample signatures
ROSA YAP PARAS were not
written by one and the same
person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p.
26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical
statement that respondent forged the
signatures of complainant. However, an
analysis of the above findings lead to no
other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of
complainant Rosa Y. Paras were
authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample
signatures of respondent.
52

To explain this anomaly, respondent
presented a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais
Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of
the SPA places him in hot water. For if
he was so authorized to obtain loans
from the banks, then why did he have to
falsify his wife’s signatures in the bank
loan documents? The purpose of an SPA
is to especially authorize the attorney-in-
fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF
IMMORALITY AND
CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is
overwhelming. The affidavit-statements
of his children and three other persons
who used to work with him and have
witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court
that respondent has strayed from the
marital path. The baptismal certificate of
Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent
was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming
the child after his deceased first-born
daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in
their house in Dumaguete City bolster
the allegation that respondent is carrying
on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the
mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges
hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual
infidelity, falsification of her signature,
abandonment and inadequate support of
children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing
in the records showing that they were caused by
a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not
sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
The records indicate that the marriage between
the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth
of their four (4) children. The early days of their
cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo
was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading
his mother to give her a dowry. They were able
to build a 10-room family home and acquire
several properties, thus, proving themselves to
be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that
Justo took care of their children when they were
young. Unfortunately, the passage of time
appeared to have taken its toll on their
relationship. The acts committed by Justo
appeared to have been the result of
irreconcilable differences between them caused
by the death of their two (2) children and
financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law
practice. Furthermore, the superior business
acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude
of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and
lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects"
were present at the inception of the marriage.
His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years
when these events took place; their two children
died; he lost in the election; he failed in his
business ventures and law practice; and felt the
disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the
present case only after almost 30 years of their
marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate
that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an
adequate basis why the marriage between Justo
and Rosa should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a
promiscuous wife who left her family to live
with one of her many paramours, this Court
ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity absent a showing of the presence
of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:
53

x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a
valid assumption thereof. It appears
that respondent’s promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed
by the records is a blissful marital
union at its celebration, later affirmed
in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s
inability to conceive led her husband to other
women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to
have a child of his own flesh and blood. This
Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of
the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court
declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does
not constitute psychological incapacity. And,
again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband,
married an American and had a family by him,
which she flaunted to her former husband. This
Court ruled that these acts, while
embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did
not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave
psychological or mental defect of an incurable
nature present at the time of marriage; and
that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity, and
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment per se do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has
gone astray from the path of marriage because of
a conflicting relationship with his wife and her
family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these
do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to
establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly
declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes thereof
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the
like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
While this Court commiserates with Rosa’s
plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex.
54

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
e.6. Ting v. Velez-Ting, GR. No.
166562, 31 March 2009.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166562 : March 31, 2009]
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, v.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution 2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in
its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were
wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first
child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home
in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to
Carmen's family home in Cebu City. 7 In
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical
board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
take a residency program to become a surgeon
but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By
1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship
program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he
began working for Velez Hospital, owned by
Carmen's family, as member of its active staff, 10
while Carmen worked as the hospital's
Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely
Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James
Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene,
born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born
on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July
19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for
more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to
their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally
with his friends.14 But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and
would go home at about midnight or sometimes
in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her
to have sex with him. There were also instances
when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate
of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit,
Benjamin's job as anesthesiologist was affected
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer
the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task
to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even
stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable.
Respondent tried to talk to her husband about
the latter's drinking problem, but Benjamin
refused to acknowledge the same.16
55

Carmen also complained that petitioner
deliberately refused to give financial support to
their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin
would spend his money on drinking and
gambling and would even buy expensive
equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his
children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in
compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two
or three times a week and would borrow from
his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes,
Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to
finance his gambling.21 There was also an
instance when the spouses had to sell their
family car and even a portion of the lot
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be
able to pay off his gambling debts. 22 Benjamin
only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after
he was banned therefrom for having caused
trouble, an act which he said he purposely
committed so that he would be banned from the
gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's
psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely
affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by
his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of
which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited
from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the
same; andcralawlibrary
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as
shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.24
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
In his answer, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person, as his peers
would confirm. He said that he is an active
member of social and athletic clubs and would
drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
leisure. He also denied being a violent person,
except when provoked by circumstances. 25 As
for his alleged failure to support his family
financially, Benjamin claimed that it was
Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he
was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin
also insisted that he gave his family financial
support within his means whenever he could and
would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary
things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who
often comforted and took care of their children,
while Carmen played mahjong with her friends
twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding
Benjamin's drinking and gambling habits and
violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses'
children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated
that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of
their children.30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza
Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the
usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate's
evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during
Benjamin's deposition because the latter had
already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
hospital in South Africa. After reading the
transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate
concluded that Benjamin's compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner
suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner
presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as
56

his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated
Benjamin's psychological behavior based on the
transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the
psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr.
A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University
of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's)
interview with Benjamin's brothers.34 Contrary
to Dr. Oñate's findings, Dr. Obra observed that
there is nothing wrong with petitioner's
personality, considering the latter's good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good
track record as anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision36 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The
RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and
the admissions made by Benjamin in the course
of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage.
Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler,
someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his
marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between plaintiff and defendant null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. x x x
xxx
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On
October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38
reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the
trial court's finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin
was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion
was based only on theories and not on
established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep.
of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case
since the Molina decision was promulgated only
on February 13, 1997, or more than five years
after she had filed her petition with the RTC. 42
She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be
made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially,
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for
having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation
explaining compliance with the prescriptive
period but the same was likewise denied for lack
of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari 43 with this Court. In a Resolution 44
dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen's
motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus,
on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial court's decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time
by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the
CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines
set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the
requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been liberalized; andcralawlibrary
III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void [is] in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
57

We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence
by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. 49
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issues,50 necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare
decisis was applied by the English courts and
was later adopted by the United States.
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S.
Puno's discussion on the historical development
of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in
Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is
enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta
movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation."
As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be
followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2)
where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force
of the decision was the "actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the
words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It
was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict
rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison
agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Madison "disagree about the countervailing
policy considerations that would allow a judge
to abandon a precedent." He added that their
ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between
the concreteness required by the rule of law and
the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is
this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has
attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will
confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although
stare decisis developed its own life in the United
States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts
to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that
high courts must follow its own precedents.
Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation,
while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed
as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts
set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds
of horizontal stare decisis - constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional
stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The
distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view
on the binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway today.
In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis
is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided." In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it." In contrast, the application of stare
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is
more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains:
"after a statute has been construed, either by this
58

Court or by a consistent course of decision by
other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial
gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."
This stance reflects both respect for Congress'
role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule
for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while judges
that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court
has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races
be segregated on public transportation. In
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously
held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare
decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the
stare decisis rule in order to promote public
welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling
and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in
major countries will show that courts are agreed
on the factors that should be considered before
overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law
and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of
the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court
should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood
v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The
court should (1) determine whether the rule has
proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to
have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether
facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the
doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
no longer new. The same argument was also
raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, 54
and again in Antonio v. Reyes. 55 In these cases,
we explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part
of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It
is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith,
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36.
59

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have
abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
by it, which is not only contrary to the intention
of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can
be considered as on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the
application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. 58 At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. 59 The
trial court, as in any other given case presented
before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the
parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary
to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated
distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply
suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition
the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified
written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for
the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it
necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full
opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of a party's alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert
opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the
totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly,
we reverse the trial court's and the appellate
60

court's rulings declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine
the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.61 The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume. 62
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In this case, respondent failed to prove that
petitioner's "defects" were present at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. She merely
cited that prior to their marriage, she already
knew that petitioner would occasionally drink
and gamble with his friends; but such statement,
by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
"defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should
have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these
experts strengthened respondent's allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting
psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified
that petitioner's behavior is a positive indication
of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra
maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears
to be greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion
because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate
did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his
(Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's
brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts
in favor of Dr. Obra's findings.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning
petitioner's drinking and gambling problems, or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is
no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love,
respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the
latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this
court finds respondent's testimony, as well as the
totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this
case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari is
GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
e.7. Te v. Yu-Te, GR. No. 161793, 13
February 2009.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161793               February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
61

Far from novel is the issue involved in this
petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado,
it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity
should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the
way the concept was formulated—free in form
and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged
decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a
glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the
two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other.
In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he
was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could
not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home.
As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the
two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued
to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to
go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able
to call home and talk to his brother who
suggested that they should stay at their parents’
home and live with them. Edward relayed this to
Rowena who, however, suggested that he should
get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this,
but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward
must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her
family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for
the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-
39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial
court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
investigate whether there was collusion between
the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
62

entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to
appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined
petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings
and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL
HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-
old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born
Again Christian at Manila. He finished two
years in college at AMA Computer College last
1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ
YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his
petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are
now in business and one deceased sister. Both
his parents are also in the business world by
whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable,
and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He
generally considers himself to be quiet and
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be
afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his
luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner,
he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His
interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God
by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to
isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the
Bible and hear its message.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Respondent is said to come from a fine family
despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her
kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually
wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time
on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are
both young and inexperienced, but she insisted
that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March
1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed
to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The
parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by
respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his
whole family was all out of the country so
respondent decided to go back to her home for
the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at
their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said
she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house,
respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted
irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home
again. Respondent would call by phone every
now and then and became angry as petitioner
does not know what to do. Respondent went to
the extent of threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would
be able to make amends and at this point in
63

time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to
her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondent’s uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at
their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission
their military friends to harm his family.
Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the
authorities should look for him at his parents[‫]ۥ‬
and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of
1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went
home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by
giving him military escort. Petitioner, however,
did not inform them that he signed a marriage
contract with respondent. When they knew about
it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling.
Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to
contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents
while they are still studying. Respondent refused
the idea and claimed that she would only live
with him if they will have a separate home of
their own and be away from his parents. She
also intimated to petitioner that he should
already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where
he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to
tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused
by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment
and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she
was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this
case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so
as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
founded to be on the search of what he wants in
life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting
to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of
the reserved and timid type of person, as he
prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
64

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the
respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-
rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of
wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with
petitioner will bring her good fortune because he
is part of a rich family. In order to have her
dreams realized, she used force and threats
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-
willed. Upon the realization that there is really
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way
out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get
to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not
be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,]
is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to
be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent
that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both
parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take. 15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. 17 The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed
its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed
August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s
ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina21 needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted
the lower court for rendering the decision
without the required certification of the OSG
briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may
be, the petition.23 The CA later denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court
the instant petition for review on certiorari. On
June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the
CA erred in substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC
declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties’ psychological
incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is
no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent. Further, he
avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the
OCP because the latter represented it during the
trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its
memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the
essential marital obligations that the parties
failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not
alleged in the petition; neither was it medically
or clinically identified. The purported incapacity
of both parties was not shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
65

the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that
the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of
whether, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, the marriage between the parties is null
and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its
origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil
Code Revision Committee that drafted the
Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law
Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to
add some observations. The letter dated April
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family
Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the
Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal
for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of
legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but called
by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the
family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not
pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead,
opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was thought that
such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
66

law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by
Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working
as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the
inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
as well as the following implementing
provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void,
without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken
marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary.
In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of
the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Committee was informed that since Vatican II,
the Catholic Church has been declaring
marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice
of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal
work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she
expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the
draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing
discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was
over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding
formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
67

judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It
was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation
of one's marital obligation." There being a defect
in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee
then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the
term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon
Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the
majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T.
Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
"and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista
commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability
and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the
remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases
for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art.
36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on
Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to
being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances
existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy
or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in
keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the
following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
68

psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law,
Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid
and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
"annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really
existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage
between two living Roman Catholics can only
be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent
with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo—freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless
of civil law sanctions, some persons contract
new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory
solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to
engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code—and classified
the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law
(1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to be ‘capable according to
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of
the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of
due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’
Lack of due discretion means that the person did
not have the ability to give valid consent at the
time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during
the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman
Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological
problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to
give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. 36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that by so doing, it might limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37
The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.38
69

Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.41 This
interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume.
A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example.
Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on
the assumption that they are capable according
to positive law to enter such contract, there
remains the object of the contract, viz, the house.
The house is located in a different locality, and
prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house
was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of
them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the
third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological
process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and
its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the
object of the consent/contract which does not
exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its
formal object. The consent as a psychological
act is both valid and sufficient. The
psychological act, however, is directed towards
an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third
paragraph deals not with the positing of consent
but with positing the object of consent. The
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the
consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of
the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of
nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from
sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied
under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus:
do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition
which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of
the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable
of free human acts. The evidence from the
empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which
are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although
he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather
than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
70

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if
not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at
the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom.
This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect,
at the moment of consent, is under the influence
of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made
as it was under these circumstances, lacks the
necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible
that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But
this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of
fact, true that the intellect is always and
continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible,
and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and
what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to
say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.
The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.
Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as
he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on
the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs
usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a
free and intelligent consent. However, such
persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object
of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between the act of
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
consenting and the act of positing the object of
consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him,
such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating
intact. What it affects is the object of consent:
the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the
Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a
certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal
object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation
and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
with regard to the moment of consent but also,
and especially, with regard to the matrimonium
in facto esse. The decision concludes that a
person in such a condition is incapable of
assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage
are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those
same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon
Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a
specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies
and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or
psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt
with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies
render the subject incapable of binding himself
in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
anomaly renders that person incapable of
fulfilling the essential obligations. According to
the principle affirmed by the long tradition of
moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
71

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is
incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately
thinks of those cases where one of the parties is
so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality]
that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity
could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity
could arise when a spouse is unable to
concretize the good of himself or of the other
party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum
partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse
who is capable only of realizing or contributing
to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of
a person who may be quite capable of procuring
the economic good and the financial security of
the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes
and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition
where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering
from serious sociopathy. He concluded that
while the respondent may have understood, on
the level of the intellect, the essential obligations
of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment
of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially
during the moment of execution of decision.
And when this is applied to constitution of the
marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of
marriage is a pertinent consideration that must
be factored into the question of whether a person
was in a position to assume the obligations of
marriage in the first place. When one speaks of
the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium
in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the
respondent to assume the essential obligations of
marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his
irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy
as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this
personality disorder. A lack of empathy
(inability to recognize and experience how
others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement,
unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common
is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others
are taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s
ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations
considered as essential matrimonial obligations.
One of them is the right to the communio vitae.
This and their corresponding obligations are
basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to
assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was
not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage –
that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978,
Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is
said to be unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
72

understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus
but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly
seems to be the more adequate juridical structure
to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable
to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract.
In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much
in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the
object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that
needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a
psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the
opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words,
there must be a reference to the psychic part of
the person. It is only when there is something in
the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the
person which impedes his capacity that one can
then affirm that the person is incapable
according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found
to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of
these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained
in one’s consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems
to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as
given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem
then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of
some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the
courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43
ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,45 explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended
by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and
73

marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
74

Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to
our law on evidence—what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of
the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church—
while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other—shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority
of the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three—
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took
pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law’s
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world."50 The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended
75

by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but
it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical
violence, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in
the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the
freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more
or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows
in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of
the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
76

became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but
rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment
are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept
of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of
personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out
the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right
to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists
six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
77

situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into
the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised
(lack of due competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always
is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.62
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert
for an independent assessment and evaluation of
the psychological state of the parties. This will
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field
of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious determination of the case. The rule,
however, does not dispense with the parties’
prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the
psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disorders—to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note
that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health
discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or
traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent
and long-term functioning. Patterns of
perceiving and thinking are not usually limited
to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained,
inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to
cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or
to interfere with interpersonal relationships and
normal functioning. Personality disorders are
often recognizable by adolescence or earlier,
continue through adulthood and become less
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may
have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who
have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder
leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble
getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems.
Other individuals with personality disorders are
not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend
to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits
can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
78

Causes of Personality Disorders Different
mental health viewpoints propose a variety of
causes of personality disorders. These include
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories
and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation
at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought
to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate
relationships.lawphil.net However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality
patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that
there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have
borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively
correlated with measures of aggression and a
past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal
personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and
impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported
abnormality. A study of borderline patients
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in
a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear to have odd or
eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals
who have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-
compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category,
"personality disorder not otherwise specified,"
that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized
in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern
of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others’
comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this
79

disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects
or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65
and antisocial personality disorder described, as
follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of
behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a façade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder
describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or
politics whose habits of self-centeredness and
disregard for the rights of others may be hidden
prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that
was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity
of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
evaluation made by the expert witness; and,
thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null
and void on ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity. We further consider
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view
of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with
dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live),
tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears
of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this
case, petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as
a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may
also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on
April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
80

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January
19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30,
2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
e.8. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G. R.
No. 185286, 18 August 2010.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185286               August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES,
Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-
familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts
should be extra careful before making a finding
of psychological incapacity or vicariously
diagnosing personality disorders in spouses
where there are none. On the other hand, blind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is
an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null
and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very
reason why a marriage that is doomed from its
inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon
its hapless partners for life.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA -G.R. CV No. 897612 which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when
they were both nineteen (19) years old. They
were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the
UP Los Baños campus. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was
initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not
follow conventions and traditions.4 Since both
resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each
other every day and drove home together from
the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed
respondent’s style of courtship which included
dining out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university student’s budget.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s
good impression of the respondent was not
diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished
university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent
had dropped out of school on his third year, and
just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following
petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that
time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.
81

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All
living expenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective
salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a
monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22,
1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their
marriage, the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00
from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the
respondent about this, the latter told her that he
had resigned due to slow advancement within
the family business. Respondent’s game plan
was to venture into trading seafood in the
province, supplying hotels and restaurants,
including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However,
this new business took respondent away from
his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the
set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make
ends meet as the single-income earner of the
household, respondent’s business floundered.
Thereafter, another attempt at business, a
fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly
unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the
family’s financial woes and further straining the
parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude
of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not
seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any
effort to remain in touch with them while he was
away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses
transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did
not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as
well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered
a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At
that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did
not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later,
respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with
nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills
were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s
fishpond business stopped operations. Although
without any means to support his family,
respondent refused to go back to work for the
family business. Respondent came up with
another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of
respondent’s business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now
hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as
well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the
parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that
respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
She overheard respondent talking to his
girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone
inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to
her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was
not only unable to provide financially for their
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in
his obligation to remain faithful to her and their
family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of
the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his
wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb
when petitioner requested that he accompany her
as she was wheeled into the operating room.
After the operation, petitioner felt that she had
had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and
asked her mother to order respondent to leave
the recovery room.
82

Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts
to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and
asked them to intervene, confessing that she was
near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent’s
siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and
his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the
parties to join the group. The elder couple
scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner
and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." As with all other
attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did
not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the
knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship
still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the
RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied
petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent
maintained that he was not remiss in performing
his obligations to his family—both as a spouse
to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical
psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
were presented in evidence), the RTC granted
the petition and declared the marriage between
the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled,
thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological
incapacity of both parties, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA
CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel
Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void
under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried
status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO
REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the
full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for
themselves having finished their studies, are free
to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration
of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion
for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor
or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall
forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the
parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the
Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive
portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10
SC) shall be issued by the Court only after
compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rules on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC)
in a situation where the parties have properties.
83
 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be II

registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City III
and the Civil Registrar General at their
respective office addresses. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN
IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF
SO ORDERED.6 THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY
PETITIONER.
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior
ruling, the trial court, on motion for IV
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to V
petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting. RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
Significantly, a special division of five (two EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY
members dissenting from the majority decision ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
ruled, thus: COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, VI
2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7 OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE
ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE
appeals to this Court positing the following OF EVIDENCE.
issues:
VII
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE,
RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. INITIATIVES OF THE STATE

84

CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE
MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION
WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM
TO EVIDENCE.8
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of
whether the marriage between the parties is void
ab initio on the ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity, as provided in Article
36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC
relied heavily on the oral and documentary
evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e.,
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC
ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence
presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the
mutual obligations of a marital partner towards
each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the
Family Code express the duties of parents
toward their children.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Article 36 does not define what psychological
incapacity means. It left the determination of the
same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines
in the determination of psychological incapacity
in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive
pattern of behaviors of the respondent and
outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
Villegas on the psychological condition of the
respondent, the Court finds that the marriage
between the parties from its inception has a
congenital infirmity termed "psychological
incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the
parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in
relation to their essential duties to mutually
observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to
mutually render help and support, (Art. 68
Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed
niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the
personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They
were unanimous in their findings that respondent
is suffering from personality disorder which
psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his
basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals
and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession,
the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product
of an honest evaluation on the psychological
status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform
words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage
and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the
respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself
from his consistent behaviors simply because he
did not consider the same as wrongful. This is
clearly manifested from his assertion that
85

nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf
ears to counseling and efforts extended to them
by his original family members to save his
marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital
atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings
of petitioner who appeared to have been
saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly
submitted to counseling to save their marriage.
However, the hard position of the respondent
finally constrained her to ask respondent to
leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of
the respondent were unanimous that separation
is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of
the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of
his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a
give and take relationship and not a one sided
one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment
of the essential duties to the marriage which
must naturally be observed by the parties as a
consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately,
the more than 21 years of marriage between the
parties did not create a monument of marital
integrity, simply because the personality
disorder of the respondent which renders him
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic
duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his
structural system and cure is not possible due to
his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely
attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is
to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she,
too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as
her personality cannot be harmonized with the
personality of the respondent. They are poles
apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a
perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited
or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the
respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner
and vice-versa.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of
both parties constitute the thunder bolt or
principal culprit on their inability to nurture and
reward their marital life with meaning and
significance. So much so that it is a pity that
though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still
it is an empty kingdom due to their
psychological incapacity which is grave,
incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in
their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the
law. As human beings, they are entitled to live
in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive
to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family
Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by
their marital reality. The case of the parties is
already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra.
Magno, their marriage, at the very inception,
was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their
marriage for it never existed at all. The Court
finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in
agony by continuously sustaining a marriage
that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no
longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due
to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to
sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the
case through a divided decision, the appellate
court diverged from the findings of the RTC in
this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the
totality of evidence presented by herein
[petitioner], we find that the latter failed to
sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself.
There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to
show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan
86

diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering
from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno
found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic
and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from
Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as
conclusive, but as purely advisory in character.
A court may place whatever weight it chooses
upon such testimonies. It may even reject them,
if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts
of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the
instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno
nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a
psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion
made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay.
They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they
have no personal knowledge of the
psychological condition of the [respondent] as
they never personally examined the [respondent]
himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of
Dayan that the purported psychological
incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the
[petitioner] would like this Court to think. It
bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to
Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." The undeniable fact is that based
on Dayan’s personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used,
behavioral observations made, background
information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is
that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling
sessions.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by
the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his
failure to give regular support, substance abuse,
infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true,
the totality of the evidence presented still falls
short of establishing that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s
findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged
mixed personality disorder, his "come and go"
attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his
family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to
consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in
connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s]
"defects" were not present at the inception of
marriage. They were even able to live in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them two children xxx. In fact,
[petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition
that initially they lived comfortably and
[respondent] would give his salary in keeping
with the tradition in most Filipino households,
but the situation changed when [respondent]
resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat
Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in
his business ventures. It appears, however, that
[respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which
fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological
incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’
Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner]
"manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the
87

emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition
shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its
celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed
for in the said Amended Petition is that
judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really
encountered a lot of difficulties in their
marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled
that psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations, it
is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent]
failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null
and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity
of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41
that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45
that would make the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter. Article 36 should not be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake
in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.10
After a thorough review of the records of the
case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
court’s ruling that the psychological incapacity
of respondent was not sufficiently established.
We disagree with its decision declaring the
marriage between the parties as valid and
subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the
jurisprudential foundation of the principle that
the factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical
antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were
one in diagnosing respondent with a personality
disorder, to wit:
88

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of
educated parents. Belonging to an average social
status, intellectual achievement is quite
important to the family values (sic). All children
were equipped with high intellectual potentials
(sic) which made their parents proud of them.
Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he
was able to assume his financial and emotional
responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he
has been described as the unseen strength in the
family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in
activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and
community services, she was not the
demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional
mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the
form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing,
sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional
reaction (sic). Psychological home environment
did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or
depression, but one has to stand up and to help
himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic)
emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she
has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She
is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable,
systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a
strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she
is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and
strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a
superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the
dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how
she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect
for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has
deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low
self esteem and self-worth despite his
intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner]
remained in her marriage for more than 20 years,
trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic). She was
hoping for the time when others, like her
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
husband would make decision for her (sic),
instead of being depended upon. But the more
[petitioner] tried to compensate for
[respondent’s] shortcomings, the bigger was the
discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At
the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated,
uncared for and she characterized their marriage
as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11
siblings and belonged to the second set of brood
(sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and
limitations during his growing up stage.
Additionally, he was acknowledged as the
favorite of his mother, and was described to
have a close relationship with her. At an early
age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct
disorder and was on marijuana regularly.
Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials
(sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him
going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do
what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing
ideas from other people. He presented no guilt
feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever
wrongdoings he has committed. His studies
proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit
at the middle of his course, despite his apparent
high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger
pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit
work from his family employment and ventured
on his own. With no much planning and project
study, his businesses failed. This became the
sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack
of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with
each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and
sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at
her face which impliedly meant "you are nothing
as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses
for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and
has bright ides. However, this seemed not
coupled with emotional attributes such as
perseverance, patience, maturity, direction,
focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to
make it work. He complained that he did not feel
89

the support of his wife regarding his decision to
go into his own business. But when he failed,
the more he became negativistic and closed to
suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was
too careful not to let go or make known his
strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence,
doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even
feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or
loss of pride. When things did not work out
according to his plans, he suppressed his
hostilities in negative ways, such as
stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor
impulse control, lack of insight and primitive
drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in
being untraditional and different from others.
Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an
unconscious wish for the continuance of the
gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in
his mother-son relationship. From this stems his
difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his
wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and
expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital
relationship. Strong masculine strivings is
projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he
may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and
father, but because of a severe psychological
deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the
opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested
strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the
antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His
being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse,
no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of
this clinical condition. His prolonged drug
intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs
lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is
due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or
the unconscious mental processes, that the ego
uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and
closed attachments to his mother encouraged
cross identification and developed a severe sense
of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his
weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness,
unilateral and forceful decision making,
aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to
antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered
by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest
only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as
permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in
degree, because it hampered, interrupted and
interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)13
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers,
referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to
them, respondent has not really taken care of his
wife and children. He does not seem to have any
direction in life. He seems to be full of bright
ideas and good at starting things but he never
gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are
suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is
still taking drugs. There are times when they see
that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum
around and just spends the day at home doing
nothing. They wish that he’d be more
responsible and try to give priority to his family.
[Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the
family because she has a stable job.
90

[Respondent]’s brothers learned from friends
that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him.
She has discussed things with him but he always
refused to listen. She does not know what to do
with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug
problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it
in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling
the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop
taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for
the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also
asked what his problems are at the moment, he
mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He
does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he
and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be
close to somebody and discuss things with this
person but he is not given the chance. He also
mentioned that one of his weak points is that he
is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is
taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to
avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and
compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or]
to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other
people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is
apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached
attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal
patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy.
Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel
inferior and to exclude himself from association
with others. He feels that he is "different" and as
a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he
is apt to avoid personal and social involvement,
which increases his preoccupation with himself
and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from
interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to
be the less dominant partner. He feels better
when he has to follow than when he has to take
the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not
really need to interact with others in order to
enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a
small need of companionship and is most
comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he
maybe very angry within but he may choose to
repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need
for social approval, which could have stemmed
from some deep seated insecurities makes him
submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to
make extra effort to please people. Although at
times[, he] already feels victimized and taken
advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior
for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to
minimize dangers of indifference and
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are
suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and
frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at
the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension
and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension
and nervousness. Likewise, he is also
entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is
preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that
he is up in the air but with no sound foundation.
He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will
never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and
focusing on things which he needs to prioritize.
He has many plans but he can’t accomplish
anything because he is unable to see which path
to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from
significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
91

Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental
Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and
starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of
his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning –
Fair (Emphasis supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner’s]
case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of
the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on
the information available about the respondent,
he suffers from [an] antisocial personality
disorder with narcissistic and dependent features
that renders him too immature and irresponsible
to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.
As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and
conscientious person and she has tried her best
to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is
emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of
her academic and professional competence. And
this explains why she married RRR even when
she knew he was a pothead, then despite the
abuse, took so long to do something about her
situation.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style
with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive
Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug
abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with
marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive
Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondent’s] early
childhood in order to understand the root cause
of his antisocial personality disorder.
[Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood
of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by
his grandmother. [Respondent’s] father was
kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was
[reared] by his mother. Unfortunately,
[respondent’s] mother grew up believing that
she was not her mother’s favorite child, so she
felt "api, treated like poor relations."
[Respondent’s] mother’s reaction to her
perceived rejection was to act out—with poor
impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent
money like water, had terrible temper tantrums,
etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became
[respondent’s] role model.
92

However, because [respondent] had to get on
with the business of living, he learned to use his
good looks and his charms, and learned to size
up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly
and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his
deprived mother who liked admiration and
attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed
money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love
and to empathize with others was impaired so
that he cannot sustain a relationship with one
person for a long time, which is devastating in a
marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features
were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g.
moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years,
leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose
sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just
"come and go," without telling his wife his
whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g.
felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner]
deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);
interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife
spend for all the maintenance needs of the
family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when
asked to choose between his mistress and his
wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The
aggressive sadistic personality features were
manifested whom he has physically, emotionally
and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on
drugs; and his dependent personality features
were manifested by his need for others to
assume responsibility for most major areas of
his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on
his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial
personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent
features, is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse
and children. A personality disorder is not
curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there
is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very
beginning. (emphasis supplied)15
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the
CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay
since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview
of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed
with personality disorder, does not per se
invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither
do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, 16
necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this
case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties’
marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner,
during their marriage, had occasion to interact
with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of
behavior which she could then validly relay to
the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and
psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely
on the narration or personal interview of the
petitioner. Other informants such as
respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on
their own observations of respondent’s behavior
and interactions with them, spanning the period
of time they knew him.17 These were also used
as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 18 citing
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), 19 instructs
us on the general diagnostic criteria for
personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This
93

pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving
and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity,
liability, and appropriateness of
emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and
pervasive across a broad range of personal and
social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically
significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of
functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration,
and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted
for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug
of abuse, a medication) or a general medical
condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic
criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for
and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or
more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms
with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts
that are grounds for arrest
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by
repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as
indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self
or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as
indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being
indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with
onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not
exclusively during the course of schizophrenia
or a manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise,
doctors can diagnose the psychological make up
of a person based on a number of factors culled
from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have
personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-
diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in
his bare denial of the doctors’ separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence
and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s
findings and recommendation, the psychological
incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
94

A recommendation for therapy does not
automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by
clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s
textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, 21
treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of
personality disorders are recommended. In short,
Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily
negate the finding that respondent’s
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony,
categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated by
Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the
ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party’s mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.
… [Because] of advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence &
consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan
and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize
and work towards providing the needs of his
family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money
obligations.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or
psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically
believed by the courts in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a
personality disorder does not exclude a finding
that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not
beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’
psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an
expert’s opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party. 24 In Lim v.
Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in
Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina, 26 the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court
of Appeals27 must be independently met by the
party alleging the nullity of the marriage
grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the
findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with
nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics
of the case" and the factors characterizing the
psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse
testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. Even on questioning from
the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality
disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of
both parties' personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly
administered by clinical psychologists
specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality
disorders of the parties, considering that such
diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological
tests which are designed to measure specific
aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or
personality.
95

xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at
after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the
trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case.
The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that he can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and
the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the
experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons
with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the
following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can
often seem to be normal and even charming and
ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal
many areas of disordered life functioning.
Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts,
fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are
typical experiences that patients report as
beginning in childhood. x x x Their own
explanations of their antisocial behavior make it
seem mindless, but their mental content reveals
the complete absence of delusions and other
signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they
frequently have a heightened sense of reality
testing and often impress observers as having
good verbal intelligence.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the
truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task
or adhere to any conventional standard of
morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of
remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to
lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of
behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5)
unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a
job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner’s purported
psychological incapacity, we agree with the
CA’s ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it
failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
became manifest only after its celebration x x x.
In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered
"declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent solemnized on 04 December
1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of the
marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that
[petitioner’s] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner]
is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area
does not amount to psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such
alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that
incapacitates her from complying with the
essential marital obligations of
96

marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological
Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist
Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing
evaluation as she was found to be a "good,
sincere, and conscientious person and she has
tried her best to provide for the needs of her
children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric
report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to
remain in their marriage for more than 20 years
"trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the
foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it
hard to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated within the contemplation of Article
36 of the Family Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat
articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his
separate statement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina:30
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present
case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
SO ORDERED.
e.9. Kalaw v. Fernandez, GR. No.
166357, 14 January 2015.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357               January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19,
2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no
reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that
his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but
the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
97

and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity
in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the
bases or underlying premises of the conclusions
of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact,
respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly
played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that
she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week
and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so
frequent that respondent neglected her family.
While he intimated that two of his sons repeated
the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing
during the years when these two children were
in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about
respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive
need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons orher frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-
out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs
with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men.
Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able
to prove that respondent had an extramarital
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated
with obsessive need for attention from other
men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that
respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the
totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would
show that respondent was not totally remiss and
incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties. Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she
took care of them, was around when they were
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts tosee and take
care of her children despite her estrangement
from their father. There was no testimony
whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect
of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact
that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors,
there is nothing to link their academic short
comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the
Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the
CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s
Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective
parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity
of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The
trial court did not make factual findings which
can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof
psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony
and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but
98

certainly not psychological incapacity that voids
a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May
27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the
petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough
second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial
court as supported by the testimonies of three
expert witnesses; and consequently to find that
the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their
respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we
resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
I conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as
to deprive the party of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was about to assume. Although
the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually
looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not
unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they
decided to adopt the provision "with less
specificity than expected" in order to have the
law "allow some resiliency in its application."4
Illustrative of the "less specificity than
expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples
of psychological incapacity that would have
limited the applicability of the provision
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
conformably with the principle of ejusdem
generis, because the Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals
that had persuasive effect by virtue of the
provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee and the
relevant materials on psychological incapacity as
a ground for the nullity of marriage have
rendered it obvious that the term psychological
incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family
Code"has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances," and could not be taken and
construed independently of "but must stand in
marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."7
99

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the
Court set some guidelines for the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical,
althoughits manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe
existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
100

accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including
suchprovision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to
our law on evidence — whatis decreed
as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of
the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be
rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less
specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency
in its application." Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts"
in recognition of the verity that no case would
be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
101

concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and
other evidence are not shown to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where
the findings of the trial court are sufficiently
supported by the facts and evidence presented
during trial, the appellate court should restrain
itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It is
not enough reason to ignore the findings and
evaluation by the trial court and substitute our
own as an appellate tribunal only because the
Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We
have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution14
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection
can be accordedto a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio,
therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend
and promote the sanctity of marriage as an
inviolable social institution. The foundation of
our society is thereby made all the more strong
and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as
the trial court deserved credence because it was
in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial
judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the
Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by
Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard
Healy on the ground that their conclusions were
solely based on the petitioner’s version of the
events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider
it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to
dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards
of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore
be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the
veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the
transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well
as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister
Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her
findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the
findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert
opinion took into consideration other factors
extant in the records, including the own opinions
of another expert who had analyzed the issue
from the side of the respondent herself.
Moreover, it is already settled that the courts
must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullityof
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of
the Family Code the courts, "despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties."18
102

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately
necessary herein to enable the trial court to
properly determine the issue of psychological
incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the
respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings
of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos
v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one
to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to
be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence
that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence
showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the
court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be considered
as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s
findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering
that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as
weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was
clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties’ upbringing and
psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’
expertopinion should be considered not in
isolation but along with the other evidence
presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of
psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and
opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr.
Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr.
Dayan impressed that the respondent had
"compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the
extent of being "relationship dependent." Based
from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely
to be reserved and seemingly detached in her
ways. Although she likes to be around people,
she may keep her emotional distance. She, too,
values her relationship but she may not be that
demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may
be quite difficult for her since she tries to
maintain a certain distance to minimize
opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne
may appear, critical and demanding in her ways.
She can be assertive when opinions contrary to
those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is
apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious
level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her.
Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others
would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a
different person— clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important
person in his life. She became relationship-
dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the
results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent,
observing that the respondent obtained high
scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory?
103

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to
be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained
very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam
Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means
that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it
will be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high
score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under
narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is
84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not
contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr.
Gates to the effect that the respondent had been
afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder
as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself
is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms.
So, more or less, could you please tell me in
more layman’s terms how you arrived at your
findings that the respondent is self-centered or
narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion.
Basically, if you ask about her childhood
background, her fatherdied in a vehicular
accident when she was in her teens and
thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to
partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her
family. I gathered that paternal grandmother
partly took care of her and her siblings against
the fact that her own mother was unable to carry
out her respective duties and responsibilities
towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings
considering that the husband died prematurely.
And there was an indication that Elena
Fernandez on several occasions ever told
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
petitioner that he cannot blame her for being
negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own
mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her
background, in her childhood, and indeed this
seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in
psychology a script, the tendency to repeat
somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s
say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency
to sustain it even on to your own life when you
have your own family. I did interview the son
because I was not satisfied with what I gathered
from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though
as a young son at the age of fourteen already
expressed the he could not see, according to the
child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part
of Elena and that he preferred to live with the
father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the
conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which
tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she
is still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends,
it seems that she would jump from one
boyfriend to another. There is this need for
attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-
centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a
wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that she can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and
the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should
weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the
other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy,
a canon law expert, an advocate before the
Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal,
104

and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert
testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could
be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, by current
trends in psychological and even by canonical
thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for
us to do so because the concept of psychological
incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the
Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or
not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children
and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
claims that she is not psychologically
incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based
on the records of this case before this Honorable
Court, what can you say to that claim of
respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of
psychological incapacity because of her
immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with
regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of
respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her
whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a
doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then
her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual
position of prominence and then begun to inflate
her own ego and she begun to concentrate her
own beauty and that became an obsession and
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
that led to her few responsibility of
subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that
she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with
the children, the impact. How about the impact
on the relationship of the respondent with her
husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to
her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her
husband and toher children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her
mahjong and associating with friends. They
were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family
was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological
incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or
fulfill the obligations of marriage which
everybody takes for granted. The concentration
on the husband and the children before
everything else would be subordinated to the
marriage withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and
her mahjong, they were their priorities in her
life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what
specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in
love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in
Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what
narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to
make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the
case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that
became known in clinical terminology as
narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed]
105

with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in
her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove
this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave,
slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases
of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not
properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed]
with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not
this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even
thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop
narcissism or psychological incapacity. You
bring with you into the marriage and then it
becomes manifested because in marriage you
accept these responsibilities. And now you show
that you don’t accept them and you are not
capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care
about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by
accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you
become a model and still the family was
depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at
Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her
ego so much that this became the top priority in
her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism
of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became
very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is
this medically or clinically curable, this
narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many
years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure
would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring
to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she
was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and
influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the
family was exalted in a very very unusual
manner and therefore she had that pressure on
her and in her accepting the pressure, in going
along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in
Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and
findings commanded respect. The contribution
that his opinions and findings could add to the
judicial determination of the parties’
psychological incapacity was substantive and
instructive. He could thereby inform the trial
court on the degrees of the malady that would
warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as
well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to
the courts as psychological incapacity has been.
We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those
of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more
the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo
Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
follows:
106

Furthermore, and equally significant, the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked togive professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but
rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept
of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole
of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning
the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have
the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists
six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
107

The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into
the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promisedat the time the
marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the
unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should
consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended
by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority
of the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took
pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
108

in the world." The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical
violence, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psycho
sexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak
of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
xxxx
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court
declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it
was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner’s allegations that she played four to
five times a week. She maintained it was only
two to three times a week and always withthe
permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that theywere with
their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home.Petitioner did not present any
proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing
during the years when these two children were
in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
109

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong
playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital
vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages
to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the
respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children. We do find to be revealing
the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro
Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim
of his father that his mother had been hooked on
playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your
parent’s separation, do you remember any habit
or activity or practice which your mother
engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy
smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and
I can’t remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother
played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do
you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not
actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay
playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my
aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we
would get there by lunch then leave, we fall
asleep. I think it was like one in the morning.
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She
brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah
and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but
sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children
with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her
own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that
regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained
that the current psychological state of the
respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard
for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as
a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as
expressly defined under Article 209 and Article
220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and
duty of parents over the person and property of
their unemancipated children, parental authority
and responsibility shall includethe caring for and
rearing of such children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising
parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following
rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to
support, educate and instruct them by
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right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping
with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and
spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire
in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and
maintain their physical and mental
health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and
wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not
properly take into consideration the findings of
the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and
the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The RTC
would not have found so without the allegation
to that effect by the respondent in her answer,39
whereby she averred that it was not she but the
petitioner who had suffered from psychological
incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological
incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as
follows:
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were
behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that
respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the
marriage Malyn had noticed already some of
those short temper of the petitioner but she was
very much in love and so she lived-in with him
and even the time that they were together, that
they were living in, she also had noticed some of
his psychological deficits if we may say so. But
as I said, because she is also dependent and she
was one who determined to make the
relationship work, she was denying even those
kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m
talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What
led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was
behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of
marriage was not duly stable then. He was not
really thinking of marriage except that his wife
got pregnant and so he thought that he had to
marry her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that
ultimately the decision to marry lied on the
petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you
mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to
you that in his younger years he was often out
seeking other women. I’m referring specifically
to page 18. He also admitted to you that the
thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by
petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible
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for such a person to enter into marriage despite
this fear of commitment and given his admission
that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this
person to stop his womanizing ways during the
marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving
up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving
up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent
womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof
commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar
as his psychological capacity to perform his
duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual
integrity and also to be fully committed to the
role of husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly
answered my question on whether the petitioner
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
duty as a husband. You only said that the
petitioner was behaviorally immature and that
the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked
[sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried
the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage,
the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as
the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.
Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in
one party alone or in both of them, and if
psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null
and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since
the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the
awful truth that their marriage, assuming it
existed in the eyes of the law, was already
beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so
much damage not only to themselves, but also to
the lives and psyche of their own children. It
would be a greater injustice should we insist on
still recognizing their void marriage, and then
force them and their children to endure some
more damage. This was the very same injustice
that Justice Romero decried in her erudite
dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to
petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties
has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations
involved in the ruling the Court makes
today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced
to maintain illicit relations with another woman
or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the
Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce
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but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s
psychological incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation. In this case, the marriage
never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological
incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate
to declare the nullity of the marriage between
the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the
inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation
of our society does not preclude striking down a
marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote
family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on
another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably
cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he
State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State."
These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course
to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also
CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)
falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage
and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the
Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the foundation of
the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion
for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring
the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
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 CHAVEZ | Family Notes (Week 4)

SO ORDERED.

114