FREIE

UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN
OTTO-SUHR-INSTITUT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

THE SCHIZOPHRENIC STATE: A PATHOPSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON STATE PERSONHOOD



Hausarbeit
Seminar: Theories of International Cooperation
Dozentin: Prof. Dr. Ingo Peters
Autor: Oscar Santiago Vargas Guevara
Studiengang: M.A. Internationale Beziehungen
Matrikel-Nr.: 595078





WS 2017/18

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION - 2 -

THE STATE-AS-PERSON DEBATE IN IR - 3 -

ON WENDT’S “STATES ARE PEOPLE TOO” - 4 -
ON COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS - 6 -
AWAY FROM WENDT’S QUANTUM PERSONHOOD - 7 -

ON THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC METAPHORS - 9 -

ON THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS - 10 -

THE MINIMAL & EXTENDED SELF - 11 -
DISTURBANCES OF EMBODIMENT AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SCHIZOPHRENIA - 12 -
SPLIT-BRAIN SYNDROME & THE DISUNIFIED CONSCIOUSNESS - 14 -

THE STATE AS DISUNIFIED CONSCIOUSNESS - 15 -

MAPPING THE METAPHOR - 15 -
EMBODIMENT - 17 -
INTERSUBJECTIVITY - 18 -

IMPLICATIONS FOR IR THEORY - 19 -

CONCLUSION - 21 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY - 22 -

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 THE SCHIZOPHRENIC STATE: A PATHOPSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON STATE PERSONHOOD

INTRODUCTION
Alexander Wendt’s systemic constructivism, rests on the basic assumption of literal State personhood, i.e.
that States are real persons and not simply a metaphorical instrument of the discipline. He recognizes
three criteria for personhood in humans, which he seeks to apply onto the state: intentionality, being an
organism and consciousness. His claim has sparked a good amount of scepticism in the field of IR. The
downsides of Wendt’s scientific realism notwithstanding, I locate this paper as a contribution to his
concept, in particular in regards to his third criterion of state personhood: collective consciousness. I do
this by seeking inspiration from the field of phenomenological Pathopsychology, which “provides a rich
framework for the analysis of subjectivity and its disturbances in mental disorders” (Fuchs 2010, 547). I
then attempt to develop a metaphor of the State-As-Person with a consciousness, albeit a disunified one,
which can satisfy the theoretical needs of Wendt’s systemic constructivism. My research question is: Can
a systemic constructivist approach with a strong input from Phenomenology and Pathopsychology, which
treats the state-as-person as a metaphor, provide a valuable alternative understanding of the assumption
that the State is like a Person?

This attempt requires, however, moving away from Wendt on two key respects. First, his rejection of
employing metaphors – what he calls the commonplace ‘as-if’ view in IR, and which describes the concept
of state personhood as “a useful instrument for organising experience and building theory, but does not
refer to anything with ontological standing in its own right” (2004, 290). Wendt dismisses metaphors for
being optional and contestable, and seeks instead a stronger naturalistic foundation (2005, 26). I will seek
to counteract this argument and make the case for the use of scientific metaphors as theory-generating
devices within the field of IR. Second, I reject his quantum-based explanation of state personhood in
“Social Theory as Cartesian Science”, which is not only metaphorical in itself, but also weaker through its
own claim for scientific realism. I will follow Höne (2014) on her defence of scientific metaphors in IR,
while also delivering criticism of Wendt’s quantum explanation of the state-as-person.

After clarifying these preliminaries, I delve into the debate on the Unity of Consciousness within
phenomenological pathopsychology. The thesis of the Unity of Consciousness departs from the notion

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that our consciousness does not perceive A, B and C separately, but A-and-B-and-C together, as the
contents of a single conscious state. Mental disorders are often described by patients precisely as a
disruption of this experienced unity of the self, which may be intuitive for others. Phenomenological
research in the last years has attempted to analyse the experiences of mentally ill patients in order to map
the different dimensions of consciousness, in which discontinuity is experienced. I argue that this
understanding of discontinuity and disunity may be key to reframing the debate around state personhood.

In what follows, I begin by contextualizing the State-As-Person debate within IR in Chapter 2, zeroing in
on Wendt’s claim that states have a collective consciousness. Then, after distancing myself from his
quantum-based explanation of state personhood, I explore the necessity to uphold the state-as-person
thesis for Wendt’s systemic constructivism. In Chapter 3, I define scientific metaphors and the defend
their use within IR research. In Chapter 4, I map the debate within phenomenological psychopathology
around the Unity of Consciousness, concretely looking into how Schizophrenia affects the pre-reflective
embodiment and intersubjective levels of the self. In Chapter 5 I then seek to translate these findings into
the field of IR, in order to argue in favour of a metaphorical collective consciousness of the state.

This however needs to give up the idea of a unitary collective consciousness in favour of a disunified one,
which takes into account the parallel and intersecting input and throughput processes within state
institutions, political parties, civil society and the private sector. Even though the input and throughput
are disunified, the output – both domestic and foreign policy – can still be observed unitarily, crucial for
the upholding of systemic constructivism. Rather than an in-depth discussion on these subjects, however,
this paper limits itself to giving grounding to research that still upholds the idea of the state-as-person. I
conclude with a discussion on the implications of such an understanding on IR theory.

THE STATE-AS-PERSON DEBATE IN IR

The field of International Relations relies on the implicit assumption that states are human collectives,
which can interact with one another in a more or less intelligible fashion; and yet surprisingly little
attention has been given to the ontological basis of the state until fairly recently. “Realists, neorealists,
neoliberal institutionalists, theorists of international society, and even many Marxists were content to
treat states as, in effect, big people, endowed with perceptions, desires, emotions, and the other
attributes of personhood” (Jackson 2004a, 255). Alexander Wendt’s call to theorize the primitive units of
analysis in IR, which culminated in his claim that “states are persons too” (2004), changed the panorama.
In this Chapter, I first summarise Wendt’s contribution to the debate in “The state as person in

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international theory”, to then delve into his third criterion for personhood: collective consciousness. I
proceed to distance myself from Wendt’s quantum explanation of collective consciousness in “Social
Science as Cartesian Science”.

ON WENDT’S “STATES ARE PEOPLE TOO”

Reus-Smit distinguishes between three kinds of constructivism: systemic, unit-level, and holistic
constructivism. Wendt is presented as not only the dominant exponent of systemic constructivism, but as
‘the only true example of this rarefied form of constructivism’. According to Reus-Smith, systemic
constructivism adopts ‘third-image’ theorizing, thereby following neorealists. Systemic constructivism
focuses on the interactions between states understood as unitary actors; staying true to the name
systemic constructivism, everything that belongs to the domestic realm is bracketed (Reus-Smit 2005). In
order to ground his constructivist theory, Wendt first has to justify an understanding of the state as a
unitary actor – he goes even further, claiming that the state not only acts as a unit, but that it is also
literally a person, and thus comparable to human beings.

In “The state as person in international theory”, Wendt departs from the assumption that the attribution
of personhood – or person-like qualities – to states is commonplace in social science, the media and
policymaking. Yet very few IR scholars, if pressed on the issue, would agree that state persons are ‘real’;
they are much rather ‘as if’ constructs, which help heuristically subsume the intentions and actions of its
members. “State personhood is a useful fiction, analogy, metaphor, or shorthand for something else. That
something else, what state persons really are, is the behaviour and discourse of the individual human
beings who make them up” (Wendt 2004, 289). He takes issue with this metaphorical understanding of
the State-As-Person based on his shaky ‘miracle argument’: If state personhood is not real, it would have
to be a miracle for it to explain international relations as well as it has – thus, the metaphor, must refer
to something real. Wendt’s rejection of ‘as-if’ metaphors stems from his commitment to scientific realism,
which grounds on the idea that “both the material and ideational should be conceived in the context of
real entities that exist independently of our conceptualization and have real powers, liabilities and causal
effects” (Joseph 2007, 354). Thus, “the state, though not directly observable, can be said to be real; it
exists independent of our particular conception of it” (Höne 2014, 62). In this context, Wendt sets off to
define state personhood.

Wendt begins by distinguishing first between two forms of personal constitution: internal and external.
While internal constitution refers to the conditions and process, which occur within a person, external
constitution refers to the role of social recognition (293). He also distinguishes between psychological,

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legal and moral kinds of personhood. While “legal persons refer to the rights and duties of a person within
a community of law, moral persons are accountable for actions under a moral code” (294). Psychological
persons, on the other hand, possess specific mental, cognitive and emotional attributes. Wendt focuses
on inside constitution and on psychological personhood for being, what he terms the “hard case for a
realist view” (295).

He further distinguishes three criteria for internal constitution of psychological persons: intentionality,
being an organism, and consciousness. In regard to the first, he contends against physicalist reductionism
– the ‘as-if’ view –, which reduces the properties and intentions of states to the interactions of its
members without loss of meaning. He attempts to refute this approach first, by remarking that
reductionism is circular, i.e. that group-oriented individual intentions already presuppose the existence of
a collective; and second, through counter-examples in which individuals may act on group intentions
without actually intending the same result – for example out of fear or to keep harmony. Against
reductionism, he favorably contrasts the Supervenience and the Emergence models, which recognize the
state as real and as going above and beyond its individual members, albeit to different degrees. Wendt
veers particularly towards the Emergence model, which describes collective cognition as distributed
cognition or computation between its members. In this context, the network itself is able to store
information and perform complex task, that the individual members on their own could not have achieved
or even conceived on their own.

In respect to his second criterion for psychological personhood, being an organism, Wendt reaches into
evolutionary biology for five convergences on the features of organisms: individuality, organization,
homeostasis, autonomy, and genetic reproduction. While he attributes the first four characteristics to
states as well, he reckons that states do not engage in genetic reproduction. Instead of abandoning his
argument however, he adopts Wilson and Sober’s concept of superorganism as “a collection of single
creatures that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of organism”
(1989, 341). If individual natural selection can be limited within the collective and turned into group
selection, so that members strive not for their survival as individuals but as a group, as in the case of bee
colonies, one can speak of a superorganism. Wendt employs the case of war as an example of this dynamic
at work in human societies, and thus as a key argument in favor of understanding states as superorganisms
(2004, 311).

The above summaries of Wendt’s first and second criteria for personhood are regrettably brief and non-
exhaustive – his work has however sparked widespread discussion throughout the discipline. Jackson, for

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example, agrees with Wendt’s claim that states are persons, but relocates the focus from static ontology
towards the constitutive process of said persons, i.e. on the process of how states come to be recognized
as persons and how that recognition is sustained over time (2004b). Neumann on the other hand, sheds
Wendt’s realist organicism in favor of a narrative account of the state-as-person. He argues that thinking
depends on language, which operates through metaphors, thus making any attempts to escape the ‘as-if’
view a futile endeavor (2004). Having sketched the context of Wendt’s argument, I now move on to his
third criterion of psychological personhood: collective consciousness.

ON COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
Wendt does not elaborate much on collective consciousness in “The state as person in international
theory”. He refers to Ringmar (1996), claiming that “subjectivity is a function of narratives, of stories that
constitute our diverse experiences as those of a coherent Self. […] this view of subjectivity is quite
applicable to states. States are constituted by narratives of ‘We’ as opposed to ‘Them’, which define
individuals as members of collective identities that are not reducible to individuals.” (Wendt 2004, 314).
Wendt however recognizes a physicalist limit to this claim: subjectivity is more than a narrative – it is also
the experience of a narrative, or in Thomas Nagel’s much cited phrase “an organism has conscious mental
states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the
organism” (1974, 436). Wendt concludes that this limit cannot be surmounted within the physicalist
paradigm. He starts to develop an alternative approach borrowing from quantum physics in “Social
Science as Cartesian Science”.

Wendt’s main claims are that if quantum physics is correct, then human consciousness is a “macroscopic
quantum mechanical phenomenon” (7); and states share this structure, albeit on a larger scale. His aim is
then to offer a solution to the mind-body problem, concretely the “two features of the human condition
that differentiate us from ordinary physical objects, namely consciousness and meaning” (9).

Wendt departs from the entanglement phenomenon, in which two sub-atomic particles are so related,
that changes in one cause changes in the other, even when the particles are far apart and in the absence
of any apparent causality. “Entangled particles do not behave as if they were distinct objects but rather
as parts of a ‘superposition’ of particles that absorbs their individual identities into a larger whole” (Wendt
2005, 21). The entanglement phenomenon does not hold beyond the sub-atomic level – it ‘breaks apart’
or decoheres when we amplify the scope of reference, which explains why this phenomenon is not
observable in classical physics. The premise of quantum computers is to maintain coherence between

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several particles on a macro scale at the same time, thus being able to process information in a radically
different way than classic binary coded computers.

Borrowing from Quantum Brain Theory, Wendt suggests that the brain is a superior quantum computer1,
able to “insulate particles from measuring (and thus collapsing) each other, while simultaneously enabling
them to be entangled (and thus having coherence)” (2005, 22). This nonetheless still fails to explain
consciousness on its own, since nothing suggests yet that entangled particles (even coherent macro-
arrangements of them) have subjective experience. In order to bridge this gap, Wendt draws from
panpsychist ontology, which recognizes some degree of at least latent subjectivity in objects all the way
down to sub-atomic particles. For this reason, there is no question about the emergence of consciousness
because it is present from the very beginning, and one can see it developing at the later stages of the
evolutionary chain – one would hardly question that dogs have consciousness, even if less complex than
ours. In Wendt’s view, consciousness thus ‘rises’ from subatomic particles all the way up to the person
level through the brain’s ability to maintain coherence between its constitutive sub-atomic particles.

As fascinating as this thesis might be at the individual organic level though, it is still a long way from
justifying a quantum approach in social science. The second leap he attempts lies between individual and
collective consciousness: “if we really are quantum beings, then our interactions will necessarily have
quantum aspects that cannot be reduced to classical considerations” (31). In a nutshell, Wendt argues
that shared knowledge within a society implicitly ties its members together, generating relations of
identity not only between individuals, but between the individual brain and the society – just like brains
are subjectivity all the way down to the sub-atomic, collectives are subjectivity all the way to the
individual. When interacting with one another however, individuals within a society partially ‘decohere’,
thus exposing difference between themselves and the other. This is a challenge for the quantum
hypothesis of the social: “Instead of producing a unity of consciousness, it must produce difference”
(Wendt 2005, 34).

AWAY FROM WENDT’S QUANTUM PERSONHOOD

As mentioned, Wendt’s intention is to ground social science on a naturalist realism, pretending to do away
with metaphors at all levels of theorization. He for example refers to Akrivoulis (2002), who also employs

1
Even this might be an understatement of sorts. To date, the most sophisticated quantum computer, produced
by IBM, has the capacity to process 50 qubits (a unit of quantum information which exhibits entanglement) for
a maximum time of 90 seconds (Knight 2017). In comparison, the human brain would have to maintain
coherence between zillions of subatomic particles for an entire lifetime.

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quantum physics to develop a post-modern understanding of world politics, albeit in a strictly
metaphorical fashion. Wendt criticizes this, arguing that the claim would be more compelling with a
naturalistic foundation (2005, 26). And yet, Wendt’s own work can only be understood as a metaphor if it
is to have any weight whatsoever. His claim is based on a triple theoretical bet that 1. quantum physics in
his interpretation is correct, 2. that consciousness rises up from sub-atomic particles to the brain, and 3.
that this phenomenon applies all the way up to states. De Canio reminds us of the fragility of theories in
the natural sciences – the principle of falsifiability –, and of the very shaky terrain, on which
interpretations of quantum physics are built: “Although the mathematics of quantum theory works
exceedingly well in predicting (probabilistically) experimental outcomes, the underlying reality behind the
equation is obscure, perhaps unknowable (or perhaps is such that even asking about it is meaningless)”
(2017, 126). At best, Wendt’s argument is risky, at worst, it is speculation.

Another issue with Wendt’s explanation is that, were one to grant all his already demanding conditions,
it could still only explain consciousness at a vague societal level, but not a state level – his point of
departure. In the context of globalization, the limits of a society are porous and up for contestation – one
needs only to look at the current debate on the integration of immigrants and refugees in receiving
countries. What a state is – in terms of an actor within international politics – remains unclear. Concretely,
two interrelated questions come to mind: 1. How should we determine exactly which individuals make up
one state? and 2. How should we differentiate a state from another? If ultimately states are made up of
interacting subjects who also interact with others from outside their immediate circles, communities and
countries, then it leaves the question open of what the key factor is that binds a specific individual
consciousness to the state’s. Ultimately, every criterion that Wendt could come up with, from national
institutions, to language, to civic engagement, to a sense of identity, does not hold 1:1 in today’s
globalized world, leading to conflicting understandings of who makes up the state, and who helps shape
its national and foreign policies. Wendt would reply, leaning onto Waltz that systemic theories do not aim
to explain individual action, and thus “theories of international politics should not be confused with
theories of foreign policy” (Wendt 2005, 42). This is however incompatible with his wish to depart from
an ontological definition of the state-as-person – Wendt cannot have his cake and eat it too. He has two
options: (1) he drops either systemic constructivism or the quantum state-as-person, or (2) he drops his a
priori rejection of metaphors within IR.

All of this is not to deny the immense value of Wendt’s work. I believe Wendt’s integration of quantum
physics into social science is a revolutionary contribution to the field of IR, in particular his integration of

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physics and philosophy into social science debates, which will undoubtedly generate debate for years to
come. My argument in this section limits to a critique of his scientific realism, which in my opinion, opens
his theory to falsification from all sides.

ON THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC METAPHORS

In spite of Wendt’s opposition, the discipline of IR has relied by far and large on metaphors. In The Prison
as Metaphor, Marks (2004) develops a metaphor for inter-state relations based on the context of a prison,
where he carried sociological research. Conversely, in The Balance of Power in International Relations,
Richard Little analyses four key IR scholars: Morgenthau, Bull, Waltz and Mearsheimer, in order to
conceptualises the balance of power as “a simple but extremely effective and universally applicable
metaphor” (2007, 13). The argument put forth here is that “the intelligibility of the state is mediated by
metaphors regardless of whether or not we subscribe to the idea that the state really exists or locate it
‘only’ in intersubjective beliefs and shared practices” (Höne 2014, 39). What however is a metaphor?

Intuitively, a metaphor could be defined as a figure of speech – an embellishment of the way we speak.
Höne, however, recognises two additional kinds of metaphors: metaphors as heuristic tools that offer
orientation in a complex world, and metaphors as elements in the construction of knowledge (2014, 223).
Boyd names the latter theory-constitutive metaphors, “metaphorical expressions that at least for a time,
[constitute] an irreplaceable part of the linguistic machinery of a scientific theory” (1993, 486).The
metaphor I develop below ascribes to this kind: it encourages new angles and perspectives to theorise
about the state. I adopt Höne’s understanding of scientific metaphors:
A scientific metaphor is a process whereby one concept is thought of in terms of another. This process
is to be understood as an interanimation of thoughts and is potentially open-ended. Based on this
interanimation of thoughts, a scientific metaphor invites further research and exploration of
connections between concepts. The connections established between the two elements of a
metaphor highlight or create similarities while hiding differences. A scientific metaphor constitutes
the assumptions made within a theoretical framework in important ways. The nature of this process
allows for exchanges between two different discourses or disciplines. In that sense, a scientific
metaphor can serve as an interdisciplinary bridge-builder and a tool for incorporating concepts form
other disciplines by making them useful for the realm under investigation (Höne 2014, 105)

In other words, a metaphor brings concepts in a target domain – the discipline which we are trying to
explain – into contact with concepts from a source domain – the more familiar element that is drawn upon
to explain the former. In this case, the source domain is constituted by ideas about persons which are
applied to the more abstract target domain: the state. Metaphorical reasoning does not assume the

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existence of a general rule that applies for both the source and the target domain – it is not deductive.
Similitudes between both domains are highlighted, while differences are toned down, with the purpose
of raising questions and pinpointing alternatives in the target domain. Most importantly, the metaphorical
process rests on the assumption “that identical operations and relationships hold among non-identical
objects” (Gentner 1982, 108). This process of interaction thus does not seek to compare the elements of
both domains in and as of themselves – the underlying difference between them is not denied. Rather, it
seeks to compare the relations that the elements within the system have with one another. As a brief
example of what follows, the point is not that the physical body of a person is comparable with the
territory of a state; but the relationship that the individual has with his or her own body is comparable
with that of a state – and the people within the state – with its own territorial borders.

This understanding of metaphors allows me to select the aspects and interpretations from within the
source field, pathopsychology, that can best be applied to the state, without the need for an exhaustive
analysis of the source literature. By remaining in the metaphorical level, I avoid Wendt’s ontological
question: Clearly, I do not claim that states literally are persons with a mental illness. I do not even claim
that states literally have a disunified consciousness. If, however, one is to speak of the state as if it were
a person – and one were to reject Wendt’s quantum explanation of subjectivity all the way down to the
subatomic level –, then the only alternative is imagining it as a disunified one. In the next chapter, I map
out my source domain and select the more relevant aspects for my argument.

ON THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The idea of the Unity of Consciousness centres around phenomenal consciousness, which questions how
and why individual experiences “do not occur as phenomenal atoms but have a conjoint phenomenology
– there is something it is like to have them together, and they are so had” (Bayne 2008, 280). In other
words, we do not experience the sweetness of sugar, the bitterness of – unsweetened – ground coffee,
and the scolding heat of boiling water separately when drinking a cup of coffee. We experience them as
a whole, i.e. in the experience of drinking a cup of coffee. Beyond the immediate moment, experience
also seems to be unified. Growing up in urban Colombia, receiving admission at a German university, and
being close to graduating from my MA degree all have concrete and differentiable characteristics for me;
and yet, I experience them as unified in my narrative. Not only are my experiences of black coffee at this
very moment unified, but I also feel to be the identical person now that I was ten years ago – even if I am

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not the same. Mental disorders are often described by patients precisely as a disruption of this
experienced unity of the self, which may come across as intuitive for others, such as in my example above.

Phenomenological research in the last years has attempted to analyse the experiences of mentally ill
patients in order to map the different dimensions of consciousness, in which discontinuity is experienced.
The phenomenologist employs first-person accounts to relate psychopathology to the basic structures of
consciousness; this are: self-awareness, embodiment, spatiality, temporality, intentionality and
intersubjectivity (Fuchs 2010, 547) – drawing from feminist research, I provisionally also count in
performativity or the sense of having agency. In what follows, I will mostly discuss embodiment and
intersubjectivity, but the other dimensions should be overlooked.

Phenomenology does not concern itself with the biological causes of the illness, but with how it is
experienced. It furthermore “aims at grasping not the content or object, but rather the form and structure
of conscious experience. […] phenomenology does not consider symptoms of mental illness in isolation,
i.e. as disconnected manifestations of localized brain dysfunctions, but in relation to the subject and the
whole of consciousness in which these symptoms emerge” (Fuchs 2010, 548). In this chapter, I map out
the source domain of my metaphor, individual conscience as explored by phenomenological
psychopathology, sketching first the main concepts before delving into some experiences of
Schizophrenia. I conclude with an open question about whether consciousness is unified at all.

THE MINIMAL & EXTENDED SELF

The literature recognizes a main distinction when arguing about consciousness between the minimal and
the extended self. The minimal self is pure, implicit and pre-reflective self-awareness, present in every
experience without the need for introspection. It’s based on the assumption that every sensation, thought
or action implies a tacit self-awareness (Fuchs 2010, 550) – in other words, the automatic
acknowledgement that the currently lived experience is mine. The minimal self includes basic dimensions
of embodiment, temporality and self-affection, and it “constitutes our primary presence in the world”
(Barry 2016, 185). Sass and Parnas call it Ipseity, “the experiential sense of being a vital and self-coinciding
subject of experience or first person perspective on the world” (2003, 428).

In contrast, the extended self is based on a set of emerging reflective capacities, for example:
- The capacity for a higher-order awareness of one’s conscious states, i.e. introspective or
reflective self-consciousness.
- The capacity to understand others as intentional agents and to take their perspective, i.e. self-
transcendence.

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 - The capacity to understand and issue verbal reports about one’s own or other’s feelings,
thoughts and intentions, i.e. narrativity
- The capacity to form a conceptual and autobiographical knowledge of oneself, i.e. a self-
concept (Fuchs 2010, 550)
The extended self is constituted through the relation with others, which “includes seeing oneself ‘in
others’ eyes, internalizing their attitudes toward oneself and gradually adopting the roles offered by the
community” (Fuchs 2010, 550). It is thus at a higher developmental level than the minimal self. Whereas
pre-reflective self-awareness is already present in one-year-olds, the extended self only starts developing
between the second and fourth years of age. Also, only a being with a constant sense of self is in the
position to create concepts about himself, consider his goals, ideals and aspirations, and create stories
about himself. Conversely, illnesses that disturb the minimal self, also distort perceptions on the extended
level (Fuchs 2010, 551). On the contrary, disorders that affect the reflective level, such as those affecting
the autobiographical self, do not necessarily affect the minimal self. Summa and Fuchs also propose an
intermediate dimension: the episodic self, which blends in some reflective aspects of the extended self,
while not requiring an overall narrative nor a specific social and cultural context (2015).

For the sake of brevity, I limit myself to the minimal sense of self in the following sections. However, I
argue in the last chapter that both the minimal and the extended self in their different expressions can
provide insights on our state-as-person metaphor.

DISTURBANCES OF EMBODIMENT AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SCHIZOPHRENIA

Embodiment refers to the causal role that an agent’s body – beyond the brain – and its characteristics
plays on the agent’s cognitive and performative processes (Wilson & Foglia 2015). It goes beyond the
embedding of cognition in the brain, to include the organisms’s sensory motor experience in relation to
its environment – this includes both my perception of the world as well as my action in it, both of them
mediated by the body. In line with our previous discussion, Fuchs and Schlimme distinguish between a
minimal and extended sense of embodiment, or “between the body that I prereflectively live, that is, the
lived or subject body (Leib), and the physical body that I can perceive or that is perceived by others, in
other words, the object body (Körper)” (2009, 571). The subject –minimal– body is the backdrop of our
experience, it mediates every interaction with others; and yet it isn’t consciously perceived. The object –
extended– body does however often come to our attention, when for example, it is inadequate for a task
(571), when we feel exposed to the world. We oscillate between these two states on an everyday basis.

In a 2003 article, Sass & Parnas argue that schizophrenia disrupts the subject body through two
interrelated phenomena: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms

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of “exaggerated self consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin to external objects.
Diminished self affection is a loss of the sense of inhabiting one’s own actions, thoughts, feelings,
impulses, or perceptions, often to the point of feeling that these are actually in the posession or under
the control of some alien being or force” (431). Some chronic cases have gone as far as to develop Cotard’s
syndrome, in which the detachment from the own body generates the delusion that one is already dead,
and that the own body is decomposing (Fuchs 2010, 432). In the experience of an alien body, patients also
describe discomfort when interacting with others, due to the fear that their own thoughts and feelings –
which are experienced as external – are being read and appropriated by the other. Schizophrenia thus
also affects intersubjectivity.

Intersubjectivity refers to the freedom of behaving and interacting with others, while being constrained
by shared norms of appropriateness. Before these shared norms emerge, however, intersubjectivity is
based on a pre-reflective relation between self and other. As infants grow, they “begin to perceive others
as intentional agents whose actions and mutual interactions are meaningful in pragmatic contexts. In the
course of cooperative actions, they also experience themselves as being perceived as intentional agents
by others, in a common social space that gradually assumes a symbolic structure” (Fuchs 2010, 562). The
zenith of intersubjective development is reached when the infants are in a position to switch back and
forth between an embodied perspective, from which we perceive the other as an outside, and a
decentered perspective, i.e. when we observe ourselves through the eyes of the Other. Fuchs terms this
step, reaching an “excentric position” (2010, 563).

The disturbances in the subject-body discussed above also affect the patient’s intersubjective dimension.
On the initial stages of the illness, schizophrenic patients may have difficulties to relate to others – their
disconnection with their own physical and mental states makes the other’s intentions also inaccessible on
an intuitive basis. Schizophrenic patients, however, can learn how to rationally and consciously interpret
social cues and body language, so that they can live a fairly regular life – albeit in a hyperreflexive state of
consciousness, both towards their own body and towards others. When there is a more advanced
disturbance of embodiment, the interaction with others can go as far as to threaten the schizophrenic
patient with a loss of his self. These patients describe encounters with others as profoundly disturbing
experiences – they feel their own consciousness merging with that of the other, thus risking their own
individuality. In situations of social exposure and emotional disclosure, the schizophrenic patient does not
feel able to affirm his own self against the perspective of the others (Fuchs 2000).

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SPLIT-BRAIN SYNDROME & THE DISUNIFIED CONSCIOUSNESS
Research on mentally illness has heavily questioned the claim that consciousness is unified at all. In 1971,
Thomas Nagel’s analysis of Split-brain syndrome voiced scepticism about the unity of consciousness. Split-
brain syndrome is a condition characterised by a set of abnormalities arising after the severing or lesioning
of the corpus callosum, the bundle of nerves that connects the right and left hemispheres of the brain.
The intentional severing was performed in the mid-XX century as a treatment against extreme epilepsy.
After the surgery, patients displayed no visible side-effects and reported no discomfort in their everyday
lives. In experimental conditions, however, in which objects or words were presented solely to the right
or left eye or hand – understanding that the right hemisphere receives information from the left field of
vision and the left hand and vice versa, and that the left hemisphere processes language – abnormalities
started to emerge.

What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right hand, can be reported
verbally. What is flashed to the left half field or felt by the left hand cannot be reported, though if the
word ‘hat’ is flashed on the left, the left hand will retrieve a hat from a group of concealed objects if
the person is told to pick out what he has seen. At the same time, he will insist verbally that he saw
nothing. Or, if two different words are flashed to the two half fields (e.g. ‘pencil’ and ‘toothbrush’) and
the individual is told to retrieve the corresponding object from beneath a screen, with both hands,
then the hands will search the collection of objects independently, the right hand picking up the pencil
and discarding it while the left hand searches for it, and the left hand similarly rejecting the toothbrush
which the right hand lights upon with satisfaction (Nagel 1971, 400)

Interpretations of this phenomenon ranged from the existence of two separate minds, residing each in
one brain hemisphere; to the existence of only one mind residing in the language-producing left
hemisphere – while the right hemisphere was portrayed as an automat –; all the way to one single mind,
which can however dissociate under said experimental conditions. For Nagel, however, this points at the
possibility that our mind isn’t unified at all. Just as in split-brain patients’ regular lives, when both
hemispheres manage to cooperate and integrate, our brains do this as well on an everyday basis. The
unity of consciousness would be “quite genuinely an illusion” (Nagel 1971, 410). This has been by no
means the last word on the matter, and many still argue for the unity thesis. Rather than settling the
debate on the issue, I leave this as an open question: If it is conceivable that the individual mind is
disunified, couldn’t we grant this claim as well in the case of the state-as-person?

In the following chapter, I work with the introduced categories of embodiment and intersubjectivity, as
well as with the alterations observable in schizophrenia, discussing how they could be relevant to
conceptualise the state-as-person. Although I find these categories very productive to build this

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metaphor, I do not mean that states are like patients with mental disorders. My claim is that states can
indeed be conceptualised as persons; not as unitary ones, as Wendt pretends, but as disunified ones.

THE STATE AS DISUNIFIED CONSCIOUSNESS

Having laid down the groundwork in our source domain, I now proceed to develop the metaphor. I’ve
explained how I understand metaphors not as directly comparing the elements in both domains – rather,
they compare the relations between the elements of both systems and propose patterns. To do this, I first
map the key elements within the target domain, before entering a discussion on the dimensions of
embodiment and intersubjectivity from a state perspective.

MAPPING THE METAPHOR

Höne develops her metaphor departing from the basic criteria for personhood that a person is a location
in time and space that is clearly identifiable and shows continuity over time. In her argument, the modern
state fulfils these criteria based on the principle of external sovereignty linked with an emphasis on
territorial integrity (225). I accept this argument, but only in regards to the external constitution of the
State. My main claim here is that the interior constitution of the state, in contrast to the external one, is
a discontinuous and conflicting process of identity renegotiation, which can limit intelligibility when acting
towards the outside in a community of states. I do not claim to have discovered these process, for each
one has been thematised widely in academic literature, journalism and political discourse; again, my
attempt here is at representation through a scientific metaphor.

For this purpose, I will identify the human body with the territory, the natural resources and capital, as
well as the national bureaucracies that administer the functioning of the state on an everyday basis.
Territory, i.e. the land, maritime and airspace borders of a state, relate to the physical limits of our own
skin, which separates us from our environment and the Other. Incursions into sovereign territory would
thus amount to physical violence as a violation of the limits of our ‘skin’. Natural resources are understood
broadly: it refers to every material or immaterial object that contributes to the livelihoods of states’
members: this includes raw materials, consumable goods, energy sources (petroleum, coal, wind, water,
etc.), tourism, technology, and human capital or know-how. Finally, ‘bureaucracies’ includes every
national institution which has built-in mechanisms and protocols, which carries out important functions
for life in society, and which can work on an everyday basis without requiring continued input from
lawmakers or the executive. In the metaphor, bureaucracies reflect the everyday biological processes

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carried out by the body without the need for a conscious decision, such as digestion, circulation, and
respiration.

The executive, legislative and judicial branches, which represent the instances of decision-making in
states, could be intuitively compared to the mind’s higher conscious states. I, however, picture the
collective mind as spanning every individual who could potentially disturb the status quo from within, in
order to generate the need for and influence a process of decision-making. This means that every citizen’s
individual consciousness counts towards providing the cognitive and affective basis for higher-order
thoughts; they all count to create a collective subconscious. Nonetheless, it is clear that not every citizen
will receive an equal chance to influence state-level decisions. In the case of democracies, citizens can
play a role through their right to vote for representatives who can, in turn, defend their interests and
values in local and national institutions. There are, however, other ways in which citizens can translate
their potentiality into collective action: journalism, activism, entrepreneurship, etc. The tipping point
comes when they are able to somehow influence public discourse – what are higher-order thoughts other
than inner discourse.

In this regard, it is important to go back to the previous discussion on split-brain syndrome. In

experimental conditions, it seemed as if both hemispheres of the brain were thinking and acting
independently and simultaneously. A similar process can be said to occur on a state-level, but at a much
larger level. Instead of two parallel and interacting minds, one could speak of thousands – represented in
different interest groups, social movements, the press, academia and any other collectives with some
mobilizing strength within the state. Intentionality and discourse emerge from the interaction – which
includes power struggles, alliance, negotiations, mergers etc. – of these state minds. What I term here
state minds could also be related to Sabatier’s advocacy coalition, which comprises “people from a variety
of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief
system – i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions – and who show a non-
trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (1988, 139). The discourse that emerges from this
interaction, and then leads to policymaking, is then what I relate to a reflective or extended sense of
intentionality.

These processes within the mind and the public arena respectively are what constitutes action. In the case
of the individual, this is reflected in a willed change of ourselves and the environment around us. At the
social level, this translates into changes in the internal structure of society and the state, as well as the
state’s interactions with others on the international level. I believe this understanding underscores

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Wendt’s performative model of subjectivity, which treats subjectivity as “a process all the way down.
There simply is no agent before agency; we only become agents in and through performances” (2005, 29).
Mental processes within the subject – both the individual and the state – are only made intelligible
through action.

Performativity at the state level is both domestic and foreign policy. Individuals make decisions related to
themselves all the time, for example deciding to enlist in a gym or to fast over lent. Similarly, domestic
policies regulate interior structures, such as tax collection or public health policy. In both cases, these
decisions enter a social dimension, for example when our decision to exercise inspires those around us to
follow suit; or in cases of policy diffusion, when domestic policies in one country are adopted by others
through no pressure from the former. The intention – or the objective – of both personal decisions and
domestic policy is the self. In contrast, foreign policy refers to the actions of the state towards other states
– its behaviour in a community of states. This is the reason why the state can and should be understood
as a person: the state’s actions at the international level can be attributed to the itself; it is, in other words,
accountable for its own foreign policy, even if the process in which decisions are made is complex and
obscure. Performativity – i.e. the actions that can be observed and reacted to – is the precondition for the
view of the state as a black box, dominant in systemic constructivism. These actions at the international
level are comparable to a reflective sense of intersubjectivity. At a pre-reflective level, intersubjectivity
would refer to the basic distinction between a Self and the Other. In the case of the state, this would point
at a basic sense of who belongs to the state and who doesn’t.

EMBODIMENT
If the state had a unified experience of embodiment at the pre-reflective level, then all of its state minds’
actions would be oriented toward the Status Quo, determined by the institutions and bureaucracies in
place at a given time. This would rest on the implicit assumption of being moving parts of a perfect
collective – reminding us to some extent of the medieval concept of the body politic. In this context, the
‘body’ of the state, i.e. its territory, resources and bureaucracies, would be unquestionable from within,
and simply taken for granted in state interactions at the international level. This simplistic notion of the
state could be tracked back to the Westphalian System of state sovereignty. Arguably, this perspective is
also largely responsible for Europe’s careless creation of states through the stroke of a pen from Berlin
(1885) to Sykes-Picot (1916) and Sèvres (1920). Even if some ‘state minds’ within conservative circles may
still represent this view, the struggle of other groups is based almost entirely on the idea that what
constitutes the ‘body’ of the state needs to be fundamentally questioned.

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We saw how hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection are the main characteristics of schizophrenia
– in short, patients feel foreign to their own body, feelings and thoughts, experiencing them as ‘through
a TV screen’. Unable to rely on instinct or intuition for everyday tasks, they must constantly be present
and aware of their own physicality. In today’s world of increased mobility across borders, the state’s ‘body’
is constantly under external pressure. This, in turn, generates anxiety and possibly a feeling of alienation
towards the ‘body’, the underlying structures of the state. One concrete discussion catches my eye: the
debate on extractivism in developing countries, particularly in Latin America.

Extractivism refers to a way of running the economy based on raw material exports, which has developed
throughout the XX and XXI centuries. Contemporary discussion focuses on “the efforts of left leaning
governments using revenues from resource extraction to finance social programs for the poor and middle
classes in their respective countries. Negative effects such as environmental degradation and social costs
are also highlighted in critical approaches” (Matthes & Crncic 2012). On a very basic level the debate goes
to the core question of how should the natural resources of the state be used, and who should have the
right to exploit them – let’s not forget that extractivism is carried out almost entirely by multinational
companies (MNCs) with state approval. Seeing the integrity of the ‘state body’ at risk, and not being in a
position to change this directly, can create feelings of alienation not only towards ruling elites, but also
towards the ‘state body’ itself. Other examples of this questioning of the ‘state body’ could be identified
in secession struggles, which radically reject belonging to a specific state; or in the anxiety and feelings of
insecurity caused by immigration and refugees. I elaborate on this last example in the following section.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY
The debate on migration has two sides: an embodied and an intersubjective one. On a basic level,
immigration makes territorial borders highly porous, opening up the country to potential foreign agents,
who could then plot a terrorist attack, or so the rhetoric goes. Importantly, in this case fear does not stem
from the opening of the borders per se – the EU-wide free movement policy has already shown how this
is in and as of itself unproblematic. In the context of embodiment, the problem lies in the perceived sense
of insecurity that the prospect of incoming foreign agents and terrorists cause on the population. On these
grounds, some ‘state minds’ advocate closing the borders with an aim at guaranteeing the security of the
‘state body’. The following is an excerpt of President Donald Trump’s speech at the Conservative Political
Action Conference in February 2018, which broadly captures these feelings.

These are animals. They cut people. They cut them. They cut them up in little pieces, and they
want them to suffer. And we take them into our country. Because our immigration laws are so

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 bad, and when we catch them, we have to release them […] To secure our country, we are calling
on Congress to build a great border wall to stop dangerous drugs and criminals from pouring into
our country. (Trump qtd. in Wolfe 2018)

A second and interrelated concern stems from the fear and anxiety of losing a collective identity as a
perceived consequence of accepting immigrants. In the following excerpts, the first two are accounts from
patients with schizophrenia describing encounters with other people, while the third is a fragment of a
speech held by Nigel Farage at the UKIP Spring Conference 2014.

When I look at somebody my own personality is in danger. I am undergoing a transformation and

myself is beginning to disappear

The others’ gazes get penetrating, and it is if there was a consciousness of my person emerging
around me […] they can read in me like a book. Then I don’t know who I am anymore (Fuchs 2000,
172)
Do I think parts of Britain are a foreign land? I got the train the other night, it was rush hour, from
Charing Cross. It was a stopper going out and we stopped at London Bridge, New Cross, Hither
Green, it was not til we got past Grove Park that I could hear English being audibly spoken in the
carriage. Does that make me feel slightly awkward? Yes it does (Farage qtd. in Sparrow 2014)

Both the patients and Farage describe the anxiety produced by the encounter with the Other. As we
discussed, patients with advanced cases of schizophrenia may start feeling as if their thoughts merged
with those of the Other, threatening to eliminate their own individuality. On the other hand, Farage
describes the “awkward” experience of hearing foreign languages in the heart of London. The city, which
once stood as the very symbol for everything British, is now seen as ‘invaded by foreigners’; it becomes
unrecognizable to an extent. Similar to the self-talk that schizophrenic patients must conduct to remind
themselves of their condition, social dialogue around immigration goes to the roots of collective identity,
in order to ask: what is this state? What are the values and practices that separate it from the outside?
Who has a right to be a part of this state?

IMPLICATIONS FOR IR THEORY

Why then should we understand the state as having a disunified consciousness? Does this concept
uncover previously unseen mechanisms of the state and the international system? The answer to the
latter question is no. The characteristics I mentioned above have all been thematised separately by
theorists in the past. Advocacy coalitions, contentious politics, extractivism, protectionism, immigration
and asylum policies have all been explored in depth before. How then is this metaphorical approach
defensible in its own right?

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As discredited as the concept of the state-as-person might be in the discipline, I offer a way out: to
acknowledge both the immediate and the long-term discontinuities in the state, while still presenting it
as a unitary actor towards the outside. I cannot stress this enough: the argument here presented is not
that the states are people with mental illness. My claim is broader: Wendt’s third criterion of state
personhood, collective consciousness, is plausible, but only if it recognises it as a disunified consciousness.
Analysing the state from the perspective of specific cases of mental illness can shed light on concrete
political phenomena, and it can inspire new ways of conceptualizing them. This approach can also more
clearly bring to light the interactions between the first, second and third image levels of IR theorising,
while also being in a position to integrate and represent existing theories of International Relations.

In this paper, I’ve only sketched a very basic structure for the state-as-person metaphor from
phenomenological pathopsychology, and provided two examples of how it can work in theory based on
an analysis of Schizophrenia. As such, the metaphor is open for expansion and renegotiation. In terms of
expansion, further research could depart from the phenomenology of other mental disorders to identify
voids in IR research. For example, Multiple Personality Disorder and its effects on the extended
autobiographical self (Gillet 1997) could be used to explore discontinuities in foreign policy, caused by
electoral turnover. Looking into the experience of Autism in children could also possibly shed light on
defective inter-state communication channels, or on why state action is not always intelligible in a
community of states. Furthermore, the metaphor allows far more complexity than here established.
Future research could for example analyse whether MNC’s or other transnational organizations are
persons as well or not; or if international organizations function as collective decision-making groups of
individuals. Even if the metaphor were to be rejected as a whole, I believe this to be a fruitful contribution
at the very least to the principle of taking metaphors within IR research seriously.

To conclude, Wendt recognises one of the reservations that the social sciences have when granting the
state-as-person argument, grounded on the fear of fascism and the elimination of the Other. “If state
persons in fact cannot be reduced to their members, then we cannot rely on physicalism as a metaphysical
firewall against non-liberal politics, and in particular against normative claims on behalf of state persons
themselves, or raison d’état. The potential costs of such claims – fascism, genocide, and war – are high
and well known, which is one reason that organismic thinking about the state has long been rejected by
social scientists” (Wendt 2004, 292). I believe that understanding the state as a disunified person avoids
this criticism – rather than focusing on a predetermined naturalistic identity, it celebrates difference

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within the state, as well as the ongoing social processes of conflict, identity renegotiation and
reconciliation.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, I’ve sketched a basic structure for the state-as-person metaphor from phenomenological
pathopsychology, and provided one example of how it can work in theory based on an analysis of
Schizophrenia. I took Alexander Wendt’s claim that “states are people too” as a starting point, but
attempted to propose an alternative to his recourse to quantum physics to explain collective
consciousness. I first defended the use of metaphors against Wendt’s own scientific realism, explaining
how metaphors provide the space for interdisciplinary dialogue, bringing blind spots in the literature to
light and possibly inspiring new ways of conceptualising known phenomena. I later delved into the
phenomenological research around the Unity of Consciousness in general, differentiating between the
minimal pre-reflective and the extended reflective levels of the self; and then concretely around
Schizophrenia and how it affects embodiment and intersubjectivity at the pre-reflective level. I concluded
this chapter with an open question about individual consciousness being disunified all along – but able to
better integrate in cases of good mental health.

I then mapped the metaphor of the state-as-person, limiting myself to the criteria of embodiment,
intentionality, performativity and intersubjectivity. I compared the body with the state’s territory, natural
resources and bureaucracy; individual intentionality with the prevailing discourse that gets translated into
policy, both domestic and foreign, which I then compared with the state’s actions or performativity. At a
reflective level, intersubjectivity for the state refers to interactions with other states at the international
level. At a pre-reflective level, it relates to the basic differentiation between the Self and the Other. With
these criteria in mind, I discussed how the disturbances to the pre-reflective senses of embodiment and
intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia could be applied to the State, discussing the debates around
extractivism and immigration.

Throughout this paper, I attempted to show that his third criterion of state personhood, collective
consciousness, is plausible, but only if it recognises it as a disunified consciousness. I believe this approach
gives some much needed oxygen to the concept of the state-as-person. It also opens a door for future
interdisciplinary research between IR, phenomenology and pathopsychology; while making a defence of
taking our metaphors seriously within IR research.

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