Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions;
No. 209569 July 1, 2014
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Courts;
The Constitution vests judicial power in the
Supreme Court (SC) and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.—The
Constitution vests judicial power in the
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. In creating a lower
court, Congress concomitantly determines
the jurisdiction of that court, and that court,
upon its creation, becomes by operation of
the Constitution one of the repositories of
judicial power. However, only the Court is a
constitutionally created court, the rest being
created by Congress in its exercise of the
legislative power.
Same; Same; The Constitution states that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable” but
also “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—The Constitution states that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable” but
also “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” It has thereby expanded the
concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of
settling actual controversies involving rights
that were legally demandable and
enforceable.
Certiorari; Prohibition; The present Rules of
Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.—What are the remedies by
which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution? The present Rules
of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition, and
both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64,
but the remedy is expressly applicable only
to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is to
be distinguished from prohibition by the fact
that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the
court itself, while prohibition is a
preventative remedy issuing to restrain
future action, and is directed to the court
itself.—Although similar to prohibition in that
it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari is to be distinguished from
prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the reexamination of some
action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed
to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while
prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing
to restrain future action, and is directed to
the court itself.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.—With
respect to the Court, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the
second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials. Necessarily, in
discharging its duty under Section 1, supra,
to set right and undo any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, the Court is not at all
precluded from making the inquiry provided
the challenge was properly brought by
interested or affected parties. The Court has
been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and
the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative
or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of
checks and balances.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review;
Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial
Review.—The requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review are the
following, namely: (1) there must be an
actual case or justiciable controversy before
the Court; (2) the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the act must be a proper party;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity and must
be the very litis mota of the case.
Disbursement Acceleration Program; The
implementation of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have
been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason or on account of such challenged
executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an
actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication by the Court.—An actual and
justiciable controversy exists in these
consolidated cases. The incompatibility of
the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant
issuances satisfy the requirement for a
conflict between legal rights. The issues
being raised herein meet the requisite
ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being
implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such
implementation was repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the
implementation of the DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have
been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason or on account of such challenged
executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an
actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication by the Court.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and
Academic; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot
agree that the termination of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)
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as a program was a supervening event that
effectively mooted these consolidated
cases. Verily, the Court had in the past
exercised its power of judicial review
despite the cases being rendered moot and
academic by supervening events.—A moot
and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or
value. The Court cannot agree that the
termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that effectively mooted
these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court
had in the past exercised its power of
judicial review despite the cases being
rendered moot and academic by
supervening events, like: (1) when there
was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
when the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) when the
constitutional issue raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4)
when the case was capable of repetition yet
evading review. Assuming that the
petitioners’ several submissions against the
DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court
here, these cases would definitely come
under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court
should not abstain from exercising its power
of judicial review.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Locus
Standi; Legal standing, as a requisite for the
exercise of judicial review, refers to “a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.”— Legal standing, as a
requisite for the exercise of judicial review,
refers to “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” The concept of
legal standing, or locus standi, was
particularly discussed in De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666
(2010),  where the Court said: In public or
constitutional litigations, the Court is often
burdened with the determination of the
locus standi of the petitioners due to the
ever-present need to regulate the invocation
of the intervention of the Court to correct
any official action or policy in order to avoid
obstructing the efficient functioning of public
officials and offices involved in public
service. It is required, therefore, that the
petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as
indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402
SCRA 612 (2003): The question on legal
standing is whether such parties have
“alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” Accordingly, it has been
held that the interest of a person
assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
Same; Same; Same; The Court has
cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402
SCRA 612 (2003), that “standing is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been
3
personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest.”—The
Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., 402 SCRA 612 (2003), that “[s]tanding
is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest.” Except
for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No.
209164, the petitioners have invoked their
capacities as taxpayers who, by averring
that the issuance and implementation of the
DAP and its relevant issuances involved the
illegal disbursements of public funds, have
an interest in preventing the further
dissipation of public funds. The petitioners
in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No.
209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as
citizens to sue for the enforcement and
observance of the constitutional limitations
on the political branches of the Government.
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds
that the Court has long recognized its legal
standing to bring cases upon constitutional
issues. Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No.
209136, cites his additional capacity as a
lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No.
209260, stands by “its avowed duty to work
for the rule of law and of paramount
importance of the question in this action, not
to mention its civic duty as the official
association of all lawyers in this country.”
Under their respective circumstances, each
of the petitioners has established sufficient
interest in the outcome of the controversy
as to confer locus standi on each of them. In
addition, considering that the issues center
on the extent of the power of the Chief
Executive to disburse and allocate public
funds, whether appropriated by Congress or
not, these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire
Nation, the petitioners included. As such,
the determination of such important issues
call for the Court’s exercise of its broad and
wise discretion “to waive the requirement
and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.”
Same; The President, in keeping with his
duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of
the budget to adapt the budget to changes
in the country’s economic situation.—The
President, in keeping with his duty to
faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in
the country’s economic situation. He could
adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose.
He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and
the identification of the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP did not involve appropriation
in the strict sense because the money had
been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In
such actions, the Executive did not usurp
the power vested in Congress under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Constitutional Law; Section 25(5),
Article VI, not being a self-executing
provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative.—
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, not being a self-executing
provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative. That
law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal
year. To comply with the first requisite, the
GAAs should expressly authorize the
transfer of funds.
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Constitutional Law; Operative Fact Doctrine;
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes
the existence of the law or executive act
prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always
be erased, ignored or disregarded; It
provides an exception to the general rule
that a void or unconstitutional law produces
no effect.—The doctrine of operative fact
recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always
be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short,
it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception
to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But
its use must be subjected to great scrutiny
and circumspection, and it cannot be
invoked to validate an unconstitutional law
or executive act, but is resorted to only as a
matter of equity and fair play. It applies only
to cases where extraordinary circumstances
exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent
conditions that will permit its application. We
find the doctrine of operative fact applicable
to the adoption and implementation of the
DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds
from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and
its related issuances could not be ignored or
could no longer be undone. To be clear, the
doctrine of operative fact extends to a void
or unconstitutional executive act. The term
executive act is broad enough to include
any and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial in nature.
Same; Same; Disbursement Acceleration
Program; To declare the implementation of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) unconstitutional without recognizing
that its prior implementation constituted an
operative fact that produced consequences
in the real as well as juristic worlds of the
Government and the Nation is to be
impractical and unfair.—The implementation
of the DAP resulted into the use of savings
pooled by the Executive to finance the
PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or
that did not have proper appropriation
covers, as well as to augment items
pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the
Constitution. To declare the implementation
of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic
worlds of the Government and the Nation is
to be impractical and unfair. Unless the
doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as
the disburser and the offices under it and
elsewhere as the recipients could be
required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP.
That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity
alleviates such burden.
FACTS:
Araullo vs Aquino (July 1, 2014, penned by
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin) declared
unconstitutional four “acts and practices
under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related issuances.” It did not declare
the DAP unconstitutional, only the “acts and
practices under” it, unlike Belgica vs Ochoa
(Nov. 13, 2013) which plainly declared the
Priority Development Assistance Fund
unconstitutional. The four are worded in
deep legalese and need to be explained for
lay readers.
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Backgrounder. Annually, Congress
approves the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) or budget. In general, it contains an
estimate of revenues and funding sources,
which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital
revenues (like proceeds from the sales of
assets), (3) grants, (4) extraordinary income
(like dividends of government corporations)
and (5) borrowings.
The budget also contains itemized public
expenditures allotted to the three main
branches of government (executive,
legislative and judicial) and the independent
agencies (Commission on Audit or COA,
Commission on Elections or Comelec,
Office of the Ombudsman, etc.). The current
budget totals about P2 trillion.
Often, the estimated revenues are
exceeded by actual receipts. These excess
funds are referred to as “unprogrammed
funds.” Examples are unexpected large
dividends from government institutions like
the Social Security System and Government
Service Insurance System. Often, too, the
estimated expenditures are not spent;
hence “savings” occur.
The DAP aims to pool these unspent funds,
and uses them to fund projects that
stimulate the economy. Citing the World
Bank, the Supreme Court’s decision (p.36)
acknowledged the program’s success,
saying that “the continued implementation of
the DAP strengthened growth by 11.8%
year on year while infrastructure spending
rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 34%
growth as of September 2013.”
Unconstitutional acts. The Constitution
states, “No public money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.” Also,
“No law shall be passed authorizing the
transfer of appropriations…” Under
these provisions, money allotted for one
program, activity or project (PAP) cannot
be spent for another PAP even if both
are in the GAA. Congress cannot even
authorize “the transfer of
appropriations” from one budget item to
another.
However, the Constitution allows one
limited exception to that rule: “… [T]he
President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the [GAA] (or budget)
for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective
appropriations” (bold types mine). This
exception is called the power of
augmentation.
The bulk of DAP funds may have been
pooled in strict adherence to this exception.
However, the Court found that these four
“acts and practices” violated it:
(1) Only “actual savings” may be transferred
from one budget item to another item in the
GAA. Savings are “actual” only when “(a)
the PAPs (projects, activities or programs)
for which the appropriation had been
authorized was completed, finally
discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there
were vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; or (c) the required or
planned targets, programs and services
were realized at a lesser cost because of
the implementation of measures resulting in
improved systems and efficiencies.” (p.59)
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 the nullification of such acts would result in
an injustice. In short, unconstitutionality has
Thus, the “act or practice” of transferring
prospective effects only.
funds “prior to the end of the fiscal year,”
which did not meet any of those three
instances, were deemed unconstitutional.
Example: A bridge is constructed from
illegally augmented funds. The government
officials who supervised in good faith the
(2) Augmentation can be made only for
construction cannot be forced to reimburse
items allocated “for their respective offices,”
the government. Neither may injustice be
that is, within the same branch or office.
heaped on suppliers of construction
Thus, the “act or practice” of transferring
materials by refusing to pay them.
savings from the executive to the Congress,
or to the Comelec, or to the COA, being
“cross-border” transfers, were declared
May the President, the “author” of the
unconstitutional.
augmentation, be impeached? The Court
did not take that up. Neither will I.
Impeachment is more political than legal.
(3) The funding of PAPs that are not
So, I will leave it to the politicians.
covered by any appropriation in the GAA is
also unconstitutional because augmentation
can be made only from one existing item to
another existing item in the budget. The
President cannot use budgeted funds for
PAPs not found in the GAA.

(4) Unconstitutional also is the use of

unprogrammed funds in the absence of a
legally required certification by the national
treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the “total of the revenue targets.”

Accountability. As a rule, an unconstitutional

“act or practice” is void and cannot give rise
to any right or obligation. However, the
Court held that the exception to this rule, the
old “doctrine of operative fact,” should be
applied “in the implementation of the DAP.”
(p.87)

Under this doctrine, acts done in good faith

pursuant to a law or executive act that is
later declared unconstitutional would remain
valid and enforceable. It also applies when

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Ifurung vs. Carpio-Morales , 862 SCRA
684, G.R. No. 232131 April 24, 2018
Judicial Power; Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice not only “to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”—Under
the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not
only “to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Its
expanded power of review provides: Sec. 1.
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions;
Certiorari; Prohibition; Petitions for certiorari
and prohibition filed before the Supreme
Court (SC) “are the remedies by which the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government
may be determined under the Constitution,”
and explained that “[w]ith respect to the
Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.”—Fundamental is the
rule that grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law, or existing
jurisprudence. We have already ruled that
petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed
before the Court “are the remedies by which
the grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the
Constitution,” and explained that “[w]ith
respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.”
Judicial Power; The legal teaching is that
the power of judicial review is limited by four
(4) exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis
8
mota of the case.—“Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political.
x x x. The duty to adjudicate remains to
assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld.” The Court however,
does not have unrestrained authority to rule
on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Hence, the legal teaching is that
the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.
Same; Actual Case or Controversy; Words
and Phrases; An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.—An actual case or
controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. Closely linked to this
requirement is that the question must be
ripe for adjudication, i.e., when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual or entity challenging it. It is
a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action. The
Court holds that the present petition
involves an actual case or controversy and
that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. It will be noted that, granting
there was merit to the position raised by the
petitioner that Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is
unconstitutional, the incumbent
Ombudsman and deputies are de facto
officers who have overstayed in office since
2 February 2015. Of prime consideration,
too, if petitioner’s position is correct, is the
alleged pervasive noncompliance and
nonobservance of the constitution relative to
the seven-year term of office of the
Ombudsman and the deputies, the
principles of which, albeit relevant to the
constitutional commissions, have been
settled in Gaminde. It should likewise be
taken into account, granting that petitioner’s
challenge to Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 was
valid and legal, that there are continuing
illegal disbursements of public funds to pay
the salaries of the de facto Ombudsman
and deputies. From these considerations, it
cannot be gainsaid that there is indeed a
justiciable controversy involving an alleged
serious infringement of the fundamental law,
and which the Court is duty-bound to
resolve.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Jurisprudence
dictates that a party challenging the
constitutionality of a law, act or statute must
show “not only that the law is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.”—
Jurisprudence dictates that a party
challenging the constitutionality of a law, act
or statute must show “not only that the law
is invalid, but also that he has sustained or
is in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way.”
There is likewise the teaching that locus
standi is merely a matter of procedure and
9
that, in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other
government act, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the
public interest.
Statutory Construction; It is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that the
words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature, or in this case the framers of the
fundamental law, intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.—It is
a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that the words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature, or in this case
the framers of the fundamental law,
intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. It is presumed
that the framers and the people meant what
they said when they said it, and that this
understanding was reflected in the
Constitution and understood by the people
in the way it was meant to be understood
when the fundamental law was ordained
and promulgated. Index animi sermo or
“speech is the index of intention” and verba
legis non est recedendum or “from the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.”
Judicial Review; Where the acts of the other
branches of government run afoul of the
Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.—It is a legal
teaching that the courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by
the fundamental law. And where the acts of
the other branches of government run afoul
of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s
solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.
The Court has punctiliously reviewed the
1987 Constitution and its jurisprudential
declarations but found nothing that would at
the very least tenuously support the
argument of the petitioner that Sec. 8(3) of
R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional.
IFURUNG v. CARPIO MORALES, G.R. No.
232131, April 14, 2018
FACTS
On July 25, 2011, Conchita Carpio Morales
was appointed to a seven-year term
following the resignation of then-
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez who
resigned on May 6, 2011 to avoid
impeachment trial in the Senate over
allegations of incompetence and inaction on
various cases. Merceditas Gutierrez left an
unexpired term until November 30, 2012.
In his Petition, Ifurung argued that
Respondent Morales and her deputies must
vacate their post for supposedly overstaying
as they must serve only the unexpired term
of their predecessor. He alleges that Sec.
8(3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770
also known as the Ombudsman Act, which
provides that in case of a vacancy at the
Office of the Ombudsman due to death,
resignation, removal or permanent disability
of the incumbent Ombudsman and his
deputies, the newly appointed Ombudsman
and his deputies shall be appointed to a full
10
term of seven (7) years, is constitutionally
infirm as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation
to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution. He avers that like all
constitutionally created positions, i.e.,
President, Vice-President, Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives
and Members of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission
on Audit (COA), the successor to the
positions of the Ombudsman and deputies
should serve only the unexpired term of the
predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that
the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies
have been overstaying in their present
positions for more than two years
considering that their terms have expired on
1 February 2015. "To allow them to stay in
the said positions one day longer
constitutes a continuing affront to the 1987
Constitution, unduly clips presidential
prerogatives, and deprives the nation of the
services of legitimate Ombudsman and
Deputies Ombudsman."
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec.
7 of RA 6770 also known as Ombudsman
Act of 1989 is unconstitutional for being
outright transgression of Sec. 11 in relation
to Sec. 8 and 10 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution; and
2. Whether all individual respondents
should be declared as de facto Ombudsman
and Deputies Ombudsman as all these
positions are vacant.
HELD:
1. NO. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is
not unconstitutional. Petitioner anchors his
challenge on the constitutionality of Sec.
8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the belief that
because the Ombudsman and the deputies
have the same rank and salary as the
chairman and the members of the
constitutional commissions, their term of
office, following the Court's disquisition in
Gaminde case, shall always be seven years
counted from 2 February 1987 and seven
years thereafter, and not the full term of
seven years. However, the Office of the
Ombudsman is not a constitutional
commission. A commission is defined as "a
board or committee officially appointed and
empowered to perform certain acts or
exercise certain jurisdiction of a public
nature or relation." Noteworthy, the CSC is
composed of a chairman and two
commissioners; the COMELEC, a chairman
and six commissioners;81 and the COA, a
chairman and two commissioners. These
three constitutional commissions shall
decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it; thus,
the commissions are collegial bodies whose
manner of working is characterized by a
sharing of responsibility among the
chairman and the commissioners of the
commission. In contrast, Office of the
Ombudsman, albeit composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon,
the Deputy for the Visayas, the Deputy for
Mindanao, the Deputy for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Office (MOLEO),
and the Special Prosecutor, is not a
collegial body. The Ombudsman and the
deputies do not resolve cases by a majority
of all its members but rather are confined
within the sphere of their respective
jurisdiction.
Additionally, the constitutional commissions
observe the appointment in regular
rotational plan which is seven, five and
three years which cannot apply to the Office
of the Ombudsman because the
Ombudsman and the deputies do not make
a collegial body thus, making it implausible
to apply the regular rotation or cycle in its
membership. The Ombudsman and the
deputies, in contrast to the constitutional
11
commissions, do not decide by a majority
vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before the Office of the
Ombudsman. To stress, the Ombudsman
and the deputies have their respective
jurisdiction; hence, they could not have
common responsibility relative to the
discharge of their separate and distinct
functions.
ISSUE ON TRANSGRESSION. Sec 8(3) of
R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with Sec. 11,
Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman
and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, and they shall
receive the same salary, which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
In Sec. 10, Art. XI, the undeniable intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to
provide that the rank and salary of the
Ombudsman and his deputies shall be the
same as that of the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional
commissions and does not include the “term
of office”.
While, Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Ombudsman
and his Deputies shall serve for a term of
seven years without reappointment. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in
the election immediately succeeding their
cessation from office. The quoted provision
of the Constitution is clear and explicit: (a)
the Ombudsman and the deputies shall
serve the term of seven years; (b) that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be
reappointed; and (c) the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall not run for any office in
the election immediately succeeding their
cessation from office. Sec. 11, Art. XI by
itself is clear and can stand on its own.
Notably, the framers plainly provided for a
seven-year term of the Ombudsman and the
deputies. For sure, nowhere in the
Constitution can it be gathered that the
appointment to any vacancy for the position
of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be
only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. This can only mean that it was
the intent of the framers that the
appointment to the positions of the
Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it
be for the expired or unexpired term of the
predecessor, shall always be for a full term
of seven years. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770,
we note that in case of death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability of the
Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman shall be
appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec.
8(3), R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with Sec.
11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far
as it provides that the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall serve for a term of seven
years.
2. NO. To summarize, pertinent to Sec.
10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only
as to the rank and salary that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the
same with the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional
commissions. Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI
of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of
R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the
positions of Ombudsman and the deputies,
whether as a result of the expiration of the
term or death, resignation, removal, or
permanent disability of the predecessor, the
successor shall always be appointed for a
full term of seven years.
Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art.
IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year
term of office of the first appointees for
Ombudsman and the deputies is not
reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall
be reckoned from their date of appointment.
Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and
deputies shall serve a full term of seven
12
years from their date of appointment unless
their term is cut short by death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability.

RULING:
Petition is dismissed.

NOTE:
Carpio Morales stepped down as
Ombudsman on July 26, 2018, after a
completion of a seven-year term and was
succeeded by Duterte-appointed Samuel
Martires

Carpio, (Acting Chief Justice), Velasco, Jr.,

Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, Reyes, and
Gesmundo, JJ., CONCUR. Sereno, C.J., on
leave.

13
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,
represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES
P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam,
En Banc]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an
ineligible public official may be availed of
when the subject act or omission was
committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid.
Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the
act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a
member of the faculty of the University of
the Philippines-College of Law. While being
employed at the UP Law, or from October
2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic
in two international arbitrations known as
the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office
of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was
no record on Sereno’s file of any permission
to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a
tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”.
The Ombudsman likewise had no record of
any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has
certified to the existence of one SALN. In
sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as
Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of
Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the
JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those
in the government and “SALN as of
December 31, 2011” for those from the
private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became
a private practitioner, she was treated as
coming from the private sector and only
submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs
from the time she became an Associate
Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government
records in the academe are more than 15
years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and
CSC should be taken in her favor. There
was no record that the letter was
14
deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report
to the JBC, Sereno was said to have
“complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon
against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed
to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.
The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable
cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of
Sereno. Other findings were made: such as
pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000,
that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and
subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the
1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote
to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo
warranto proceeding against Sereno. The
OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution in relation to the special
civil action under Rule 66, the Republic,
through the OSG filed the petition for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust
and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
[yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes,
et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a
Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De
Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of
Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an
available remedy because what is being
sought is to question the validity of her
appointment, while the impeachment
complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing
Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto
and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG
maintains that the phrase “may be removed
from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution means that Members of the SC
may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed
within the one-year reglementary period
under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s
transgressions only came to light during the
impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG
claims that it has an imprescriptible right to
bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time
runs against the king”) or prescription does
not operate against the government. The
State has a continuous interest in ensuring
that those who partake of its sovereign
powers are qualified. Even assuming that
the one-year period is applicable to the
OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other
means by which to know the
disqualification.
15
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has
jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC
which created a permanent Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to
investigate complaints involving graft and
corruption and ethical violations against
members of the SC and contending that this
is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the
interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons
of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position
as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to
show that she is a person of proven integrity
which is an indispensable qualification for
membership in the Judiciary under Section
7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.
According to the OSG, because OSG failed
to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the
complete SALNs, her integrity remains
unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
which is a legal obligation, should have
disqualified Sereno from being a candidate;
therefore, she has no right to hold the office.
Good faith cannot be considered as a
defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are
special laws and are thus governed by the
concept of malum prohibitum, wherein
malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable
officer may only be ousted through
impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI
of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In
Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales,
and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno
contends that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to create an
exclusive category of public officers who
can be removed only by impeachment and
not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as
the method of removing certain high-ranking
government officers to shield them from
harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to
the continued operations of government.
Sereno further argues that the word “may”
on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the
penalty imposable after the impeachment
trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno
contends that the since the mode is wrong,
the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited
by OSG is not in all fours with the present
case because the President and the Vice
President may, in fact, be removed by
means other than impeachment on the
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Court the power
to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating
to the qualifications of the President and the
Vice-President. There is no such provision
for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on
the rest of the cases cited by the OSG,
there is no mention that quo warranto may
be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for
quo warranto may be filed before the RTC,
such would result to a conundrum because
a judge of lower court would have effectively
exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of
the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution which vests upon the SC
disciplinary and administrative power over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
16

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of
the SC can be ousted through quo warranto
initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check”
on the SC through impeachment would be
rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is
already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66
provides that a petition for quo warranto
must be filed within one (1) year from the
“cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court
cannot presume that she failed to file her
SALNs because as a public officer, she
enjoys the presumption that her
appointment to office was regular. OSG
failed to overcome the presumption created
by the certifications from UP HRDO that she
had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is
a political question which can only be
decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno
contends that the fact that SALNs are
missing cannot give rise to the inference
that they are not filed. The fact that 11
SALNs were filed should give an inference
to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not
incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC
that she possessed the integrity required by
the Constitution; rather, the onus of
determining whether or not she qualified for
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover,
submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the
imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors
likewise contend that “qualifications” such
as citizenship, age, and experience are
enforceable while “characteristics” such as
competence, integrity, probity, and
independence are mere subjective
considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
Whether the Court should entertain the
motion for intervention
Whether the Court should grant the motion
for the inhibition of Sereno against five
Justices
Main Issues:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction
and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in
a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that an impeachment complaint has
already been filed with the House of
Representatives.
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable
officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only
way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.
Whether to take cognizance of the quo
warranto proceeding is violative of the
principle of separation of powers
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible
on the ground of prescription
17
Whether the determination of a candidate’s
eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether
such determination. partakes of the
character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
Whether the filing of SALN is a
constitutional and statutory requirement for
the position of Chief Justice.
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required
by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative,
whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed
properly and promptly.
Whether Sereno failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the
affirmative, whether the failure to submit
SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible
to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether
the subsequent nomination by the JBC and
the appointment by the President cured
such ineligibility.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto
officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion:
Q&A Format]
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is
improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third
party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for
a certain purpose: to enable the third party
to protect or preserve a right or interest that
may be affected by those proceedings. The
remedy of intervention is not a matter of
right but rests on the sound discretion of the
court upon compliance with the first
requirement on legal interest and the
second requirement that no delay and
prejudice should result. The justification of
one’s “sense of patriotism and their
common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”, and that of the
Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation
in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges
if the articles of impeachment will be filed
before the Senate as the impeachment
court will be taken away is not sufficient.
The interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the
Republic. It is vested in the people, and not
in any private individual or group, because
disputes over title to public office are viewed
as a public question of governmental
legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel
among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis
for the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. However, the right of a party to
seek the inhibition or disqualification of a
judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and
18
independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression.
Bias must be proven with clear and
convincing evidence. Those justices who
were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite
imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that
the Members are to testify only on matters
within their personal knowledge. The mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis. There must be acts
or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness
or prejudice before it can brand them with
the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call
for inhibition has been based on
speculations, or on distortions of the
language, context and meaning of the
answers the Justices may have given as
sworn witnesses in the proceedings before
the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of
the SC are towing the line of President
Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto
petition must be struck for being unfounded
and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the
public. The Members of the Court are
beholden to no one, except to the sovereign
Filipino people who ordained and
promulgated the Constitution. It is thus
inappropriate to misrepresent that the
SolGen who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the SG shall
likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action.
As a collegial body, the Supreme Court
adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting
in a case rests with the magistrate sought to
be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto
petition is allowed against impeachable
officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the
CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and
in this case, direct resort to SC is justified
considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To
exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear
renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright
dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be
tried on impeachment is a clear abdication
of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it.
Quo warranto proceedings are essentially
judicial in character – it calls for the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual
controversies. This constitutional duty
cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor
of, or in deference to, any other branch of
the government including the Congress,
even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo
warranto involves a judicial determination of
the eligibility or validity of the election or
appointment of a public official based on
predetermined rules while impeachment is a
political process to vindicate the violation of
the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the
19
legality of the appointment. The title to a
public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a
public office is treated as a public wrong
and carries with it public interest, and as
such, it shall be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines through the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen
is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest
and the government policy on the matter at
hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo
warranto proceeding and impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping and is
allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may
proceed independently of each other as
these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the
act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought. The crux of the
controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether
or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice
position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the
other hand, impeachment is for
respondent’s prosecution for certain
impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the
issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that
Sereno legally holds the public office and
thus, is an impeachable officer, the only
issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her
removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different.
respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
shall be adjudged to cease from holding a
public office, which he/she is ineligible to
hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction
for the charges of impeachable offenses
shall result to the removal of the respondent
from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that
he/she, in the first place, does not and
cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping
because the impeachment proceedings
before the House is not the impeachment
case proper, since it is only a determination
of probable cause. The impeachment case
is yet to be initiated by the filing of the
Articles of Impeachment before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The
process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably
charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an
exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
20
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable
official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable
officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.” The provision uses the
permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect, indicative of a
mere possibility, an opportunity, or an
option. In American jurisprudence, it has
been held that “the express provision for
removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by
other methods when there are other
adequate reasons to account for this
express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their
incumbency, impeachable officers cannot
be criminally prosecuted for an offense that
carries with it the penalty of removal, and if
they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions,
they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer’s title or right to
the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of
either an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto to question the eligibility of the
President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of
“impeachable offenses” is made absolute,
that is, only those enumerated offenses are
treated as grounds for impeachment, is not
equivalent to saying that the enumeration
likewise purport to be a complete statement
of the causes of removal from office. If other
causes of removal are available, then other
modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside
judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible
defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-
prescribed qualifications which cannot
otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an
absurd situation where the appointment of
an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned even when, for instance, he or
she has been determined to be of foreign
nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or
she fraudulently represented to be a
member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over
an action for quo warranto involving a
person who would otherwise be an
impeachable official had it not been for a
disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment
cases shall be exclusively tried and decided
by the Senate. Again, the difference
between quo warranto and impeachment
must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability
of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce
such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
21
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings
does not preclude Congress from enforcing
its own prerogative of determining probable
cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor
will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason,
practicality and even principles of plain
arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed
from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were
not met or breached. To abdicate from
resolving a legal controversy simply
because of perceived availability of another
remedy, in this case impeachment, would
be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous
and compel the entire membership of the
Legislative branch to momentarily abandon
their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible
removal of a public official, who at the
outset, may clearly be unqualified under
existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an
act or omission committed prior to or at the
time of appointment or election relating to
an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid
is properly the subject of a quo warranto
petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being
a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else,
which may either be impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and
the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does
not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that
“nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a
public officer or employee for his ouster
from office unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose”. Previously,
the one-year prescriptive period has been
applied in cases where private individuals
asserting their right of office, unlike the
instant case where no private individual
claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which
commenced the present petition for quo
warranto and puts in issue the qualification
of the person holding the highest position in
the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must
commence such action.” It may be stated
that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or
penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right.
There is no limitation or prescription of
action in an action for quo warranto, neither
could there be, for the reason that it was an
action by the Government and prescription
22
could not be plead as a defense to an action
by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case
can also be deduced from the very purpose
of an action for quo warranto. Because quo
warranto serves to end a continuous
usurpation, no statute of limitations applies
to the action. Needless to say, no prudent
and just court would allow an unqualified
person to hold public office, much more the
highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover,
the Republic cannot be faulted for
questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office
only upon discovery of the cause of ouster
because even up to the present, Sereno
has not been candid on whether she filed
the required SALNs or not. The defect on
Sereno’s appointment was therefore not
discernible, but was, on the contrary,
deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has
supervisory authority over the JBC includes
ensuring that the JBC complies with its own
rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court.” The power of supervision
means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate
officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to
place its non-action or improper· actions
beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not
what the Constitution contemplates. What is
more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise
of discretion, is neither absolute nor
unlimited, and is not automatically
equivalent to an exercise of policy decision
as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory
and corrective powers. While a certain
leeway must be given to the JBC in
screening aspiring magistrates, the same
does not give it an unbridled discretion to
ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Thus, the nomination by the
JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy
or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in
the same category as political questions
that the Court is barred from resolving.
[yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion:
Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that
qualifications under the Constitution cannot
be waived or bargained by the JBC, and
one of which is that “a Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and
independence. “Integrity” is closely related
to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and
fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a
goal of preserving the confidence of the
litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC
was created in order to ensure that a
member of the Supreme Court must be a
person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is
a constitutional and statutory requirement.
23
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution
states that “A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has
likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a
violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the
dismissal from service of the public officer.”
It is a clear breach of the ethical standards
set for public officials and employees. The
filing of the SALN is so important for
purposes of transparency and accountability
that failure to comply with such requirement
may result not only in dismissal from the
public service but also in criminal liability.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides
that non-compliance with this requirement
is not only punishable by imprisonment
and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer,
she is constitutionally and statutorily
mandated to perform a positive duty to
disclose all of his assets and liabilities.
According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who
accept a public office do so cum onere, or
with a burden, and are considered as
accepting its burdens and obligations,
together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and
undertake to perform all the duties of their
office. The public has the right to demand
the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It
is not merely a trivial or a formal
requirement. The contention that the mere
non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity
does not persuade considering that RA
6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum
and not malum in se. Thus, it is the
omission or commission of that act as
defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. Malice
or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically
failed to file her SALNs and thus violated
the Constitution, the law, and the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service
in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed.
Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts
as to the filing or nonfiling of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them
before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to
withhold such information or such evidence,
if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada
case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be
applied, because in the Doblada case, there
was a letter of the head of the personnel of
the branch of the court that the missing
SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as the repository
agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing
SALNs are neither proven to be in the
records of nor was proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The
existence of these SALNs and the fact of
filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover,
the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there
is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar
24
years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending
December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her
SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to
discharge its burden of proof with the
certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes
incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her
burden of evidence. Further, the burden of
proof in a quo warranto proceeding is
different when it is filed by the State in that
the burden rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno
contends, being on leave does not exempt
her from filing her SALN because it is not
tantamount to separation from government
service. The fact that Sereno did not receive
any pay for the periods she was on leave
does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be
exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713.
[yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification
of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno.
During the period when Sereno was a
professor in UP, concerned authorized
official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established
compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of
State Colleges and Universities, like U.P.
The ministerial duty of the head of office to
issue compliance order came about only on
2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P.
HRDO could not have been expected to
perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such
rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes
for SALNs. The import of said clearance is
limited only to clearing Sereno of her
academic and administrative
responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix
of candidates with complete requirements
and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC
confirm or ratify her compliance with the
SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of candidates for the position of
Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She
should have been disqualified at the outset.
Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be
deemed to have considered Sereno eligible
because it does not appear that Sereno’s
failure to submit her SALNs was squarely
addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of nominees and subsequent
appointment to the position do not estop the
Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises
where the representation or conduct of the
party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to
properly and promptly file her SALNs, again
in violation of the Constitutional and
statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and
accurate SALN would likewise amount to
dishonesty if the same is attended by
malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only
filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in
1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed
which were the years when she received
25
the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases,
2006 SALN was later on intended to be for
2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases
were not reflected, suspicious increase of
P2,700,000 in personal properties were
seen in her first five months as Associate
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that
Sereno failed not only in complying with the
physical act of filing, but also committed
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not
hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal against public officials whose
SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to
submit the required SALNs as to qualify for
nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least
ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent
which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for
nomination. From the minutes of the
meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno
was singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a
single piece of SALN for her years of
service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did
not do away with the SALN requirement, but
still required substantial compliance.
Subsequently, it appeared that it was only
Sereno who was not able to substantially
comply with the SALN requirement, and
instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no
longer be required to file the SALNs: that
she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then
resumed government service only in 2009,
thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records
are more than 15 years old and thus
infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared
her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not
obliterate the simple fact that Sereno
submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her
20-year service in U.P., and that there was
nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to
mention that she did not file several SALNs
during the course of her employment in U.P.
Such failure to disclose a material fact and
the concealment thereof from the JBC
betrays any claim of integrity especially from
a Member of the Supreme Court.
[yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to
substantially comply with the submission of
the SALNs but there was no compliance at
all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave
offense the penalty of which is dismissal
from the service at the first infraction. A
person aspiring to public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is
expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act
that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to
perform his duties with the integrity and
uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee. For these reasons, the JBC
should no longer have considered Sereno
for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no
permit to engage in private practice while in
UP, her false representations that she was
in private practice after resigning from UP
when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the
clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her
compliance with SALNs requirement, her
commission of tax fraud for failure to
26
truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for
the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new
Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Macasaet without requisite public bidding,
misused P3,000,000 of government funds
for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La
Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to
the Supreme Court’s internal rules,
manipulated the disposition of the DOJ
request to transfer the venue of the Maute
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings
of the Supreme Court with respect to the
grant of survivorship benefits which caused
undue delay to the release of survivorship
benefits to spouses of deceased judges and
Justices, manipulated the processes of the
JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ
Francis Jardeleza, by using highly
confidential document involving national
security against the latter among others, all
belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure
to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several
years means that her integrity was not
established at the time of her application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made
more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing
the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4,
2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator
Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next
Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had
gone through. Further, the failure to submit
the required SALNs means that the JBC
and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s
fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example,
the waiver of the confidentiality of bank
deposits would be practically useless for the
years that she failed to submit her SALN
since the JBC cannot verify whether the
same matches the entries indicated in the
SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s
ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot
be cured by her nomination and subsequent
appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for
public office must be possessed at the time
of appointment and assumption of office
and also during the officer’s entire tenure as
a continuing requirement. The voidance of
the JBC nomination as a necessary
consequence of the Court’s finding that
Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice
and to be nominated for said position
follows as a matter of course. The Court has
ample jurisdiction to do so without the
necessity of impleading the JBC as the
Court can take judicial notice of the
explanations from the JBC members and
the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, maintains the power to issue
such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of
appointment cause to qualify Sereno.
Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of
the President in the selection and
nomination process is evident from the
composition of the JBC itself.
27
An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the
President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements
that the appointee is qualified and all other
legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is
susceptible to attack.
HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to
commence the application and nomination
process.

This Decision is immediately executory

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de without need of further action from the
facto officer removable through quo Court.
warranto

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within

The effect of a finding that a person ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she
appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is should not be sanctioned for violating the
that his presumably valid appointment will Code of Professional Responsibility and the
give him color of title that confers on him the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing
status of a de facto officer. For lack of a the sub judice rule and for casting
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is aspersions and ill motives to the Members
ineligible to hold the position of Chief of the Supreme Court.
Justice and is merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has
never attained the status of an impeachable
official and her removal from the office,
other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust
Sereno from the appointive position of Chief
Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo

Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is

hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY

28
 branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
Political Law; Judicial Power; Political quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Questions; The political question doctrine is
“no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Requisites
impenetrable shield that protects executive
Before the Supreme Court (SC) May
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry
Exercise its Power of Judicial Review.—The
or review” under the expanded definition of
Court’s power is not unbridled authority to
judicial power of the 1987 Philippine
review just any claim of constitutional
Constitution.—The political question
violation or grave abuse of discretion. The
doctrine is “no longer the insurmountable
following requisites must first be complied
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
with before the Court may exercise its
the impenetrable shield that protects
power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is
executive and legislative actions from
an actual case or controversy calling for the
judicial inquiry or review” under the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner
expanded definition of judicial power of the
has standing to question the validity of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 1,
subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of
personal and substantial interest in the case
justice not only “to settle actual case
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
controversies involving rights which are
injury as a result of the enforcement of the
legally demandable and enforceable” but
act or issuance; (3) the question of
also “to determine whether there has been
constitutionality is raised at the earliest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
question is the very lis mota of the case. Of
branch or instrumentality of the
these four, the most important are the first
Government.”
two requisites, and thus will be the focus of
the following discussion.

Same; Same; Certiorari; It has long been

judicially settled that under the Supreme
Same; Same; Same; Actual Case or
Court’s (SC’s) expanded jurisdiction, the
Controversy; For a case to be considered
writs of certiorari and prohibition are
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
appropriate remedies to raise constitu tional
an act had been accomplished or performed
issues and to review and/or prohibit or
by either branch of government before a
nullify, on the ground of grave abuse of
court may interfere, and the petitioner must
discretion, any act of any branch or
allege the existence of an immediate or
instrumentality of the government, even if
threatened injury to himself as a result of
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
the challenged action.—An actual case or
judicial or ministerial functions.—Contrary to
controversy is one which involves a conflict
the Solicitor General’s assertion, it has long
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
been judicially settled that under the Court’s
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
difference or dispute since the courts will
raise constitutional issues and to review
decline to pass upon constitutional issues
and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of
through advisory opinions, bereft as they
grave abuse of discretion, any act of any
are of authority to resolve hypothetical or

29
moot questions. Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of “ripeness,” and a question is
ripe when the act being challenged has a
direct effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act
had been accomplished or performed by
either branch of government before a court
may interfere, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Legal
standing refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.—Legal standing refers to
a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. In
constitutional cases, which are often
brought through public actions and the relief
prayed for is likely to affect other persons,
nontraditional plaintiffs have been given
standing by this Court provided specific
requirements have been met. When suing
as a concerned citizen, the person
complaining must allege that he has been or
is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. In the case of taxpayers,
they are allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. On the other hand, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which infringe upon their
legislative prerogatives. An organization,
asserting the rights of its members, may
also be granted standing by the Court.
Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Under the
“enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill
by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed is conclusive not only as
to its provisions but also as to its due
enactment.—The enrolled bill doctrine
applies in this case. Under the “enrolled bill
doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed is conclusive not only as
to its provisions but also as to its due
enactment. The rationale behind the
enrolled bill doctrine rests on the
consideration that “[t]he respect due to
coequal and independent departments
requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly
arises, [as in the instant consolidated
cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution.”
Jurisprudence will show that the Court has
consistently adhered to the enrolled bill
doctrine. Claims that the required three-
fourths vote for constitutional amendment
has not been obtained, that irregularities
attended the passage of the law, that the
tenor of the bill approved in Congress was
different from that signed by the President,
that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill, and even claims that the
enrolled copy of the bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had
30
been “surreptitiously” inserted by the
conference committee, had all failed to
convince the Court to look beyond the four
corners of the enrolled copy of the bill.
Same; Delegation of Legislative Power; In
determining whether or not a statute
constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the Supreme Court (SC)
has adopted two (2) tests: the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test.—In
determining whether or not a statute
constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted
two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
The policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate must be set
forth therein. The sufficient standard test, on
the other hand, mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy
and identify the conditions under which it is
to be implemented.
Same; Same; K to 12 Law (RA No. 10533);
Under the two (2) tests (completeness test
and sufficient standard test), the K to 12
Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is
complete in all essential terms and
conditions and contains sufficient
parameters on the power delegated to the
Department of Education (DepEd),
Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
and Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA).—Clearly,
under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read
and appreciated in its entirety, is complete
in all essential terms and conditions and
contains sufficient parameters on the power
delegated to the DepEd, CHED and
TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did
not have any provision on labor does not
make said law incomplete. The purpose of
permissible delegation to administrative
agencies is for the latter to “implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by
‘filling in’ the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide.” With the
proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the
legislature has found it necessary to entrust
to administrative agencies, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular
fields assigned to them, the authority to
provide direct and efficacious solutions to
these problems. This is effected by the
promulgation of supplementary regulations,
such as the K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the
DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint
Guidelines issued in coordination with
DOLE, to address in detail labor and
management rights relevant to
implementation of the K to 12 Law.
Political Law; Police Power; Words and
Phrases; Police power is defined broadly as
the State’s authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general
welfare.—Police power is defined broadly
as the State’s authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general
welfare. This all-comprehensive definition
provides ample room for the State to meet
the exigencies of the times depending on
the conditions and circumstances. As the
Court eruditely explained in Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp.,
197 SCRA 52 (1991), (Basco): The concept
of police power is well-established in this
31
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the “state
authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.” (Edu
v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition or restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, 163 SCRA 386). Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuming the
greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra). It
finds no specific Constitutional grant for the
plain reason that it does not owe its origin to
the charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact
of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that
has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom
the expression has been credited, refers to
it succinctly as the plenary power of the
state “to govern its citizens.” (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978).
The police power of the State is a power
coextensive with self-protection and is most
aptly termed the “law of overwhelming
necessity.” (Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is “the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers.” (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40
Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables
the state to meet the exigencies of the
winds of change.
Same; Same; The State has an interest in
prescribing regulations to promote the
education and the general welfare of the
people.—From the legislative history of the
Philippine education system as detailed
above, one can easily discern that the
enactment of education laws, including the
K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education
Act, their respective implementing rules and
regulations and the issuances of the
government agencies, are an exercise of
the State’s police power. The State has an
interest in prescribing regulations to
promote the education and the general
welfare of the people. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972), the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that “[t]here is no
doubt as to the power of a State, having a
high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations
for the control and duration of basic
education.”
Constitution; Statutes; Presumption of
Constitutionality; Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution.—Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution. The grounds for nullity
must be clear beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed
laws, petitioners must clearly establish that
the constitutional provisions they cite
bestow upon them demandable and
enforceable rights and that such rights clash
against the State’s exercise of its police
power under the K to 12 Law. To be sure,
the Court’s role is to balance the State’s
exercise of its police power as against the
rights of petitioners. The Court’s
pronouncement in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 (2000), (Lantion)
instructs: x x x The clash of rights demands
a delicate balancing of interests approach
which is a “fundamental postulate of
constitutional law.” The approach requires
32
that we “take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of
situation.” These interests usually consist in
the exercise by an individual of his basic
freedoms on the one hand, and the
government’s promotion of fundamental
public interest or policy objectives on the
other.
Same; Self-Executing Provisions; Only self-
executing provisions of the Constitution
embody judicially enforceable rights and
therefore give rise to causes of action in
court.—This balancing of interest approach
has been applied in this jurisdiction in
Lantion in determining whether there was a
violation of the private respondent’s right to
due process when he was not furnished a
copy of the request for his extradition. This
right was balanced against the country’s
commitment under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty to extradite to the United States of
America persons who were charged with
the violation of some of its laws. The Court
held in Lantion that at the stage of the
extradition, it was only at an evaluation
stage; thus there was yet no requirement
that he be given notice of the proceedings.
At that stage, the balance was tilted in favor
of the interest of the State in helping
suppress crime by facilitating the extradition
of persons covered by treaties entered into
by the government. It is with these
standards and framework that the Court
examines whether the enactments of the
Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12
Law and their implementing rules and
regulations, were valid exercises of the
State’s police power to regulate education.
In this regard, and to digress, only self-
executing provisions of the Constitution
embody judicially enforceable rights and
therefore give rise to causes of action in
court. Accordingly, it is necessary to
determine first whether the constitutional
provisions invoked by petitioners are self-
executing; and if they are, is there a conflict
between these rights and the State’s police
power to regulate education? If a conflict
does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield
to the police power of the State?
Same; Same; As defined, “a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for
action.”—As defined, “a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for
action.”
Same; Same; Absent any showing of a
violation of any Constitutional self-executing
right or any international law, the Supreme
Court (SC) cannot question the desirability,
wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as this
is best addressed by the wisdom of
Congress.—There is absolutely nothing in
Article 26 that would show that the State is
prohibited from making kindergarten and
high school compulsory. The UDHR
provided a minimum standard for States to
follow. Congress complied with this
minimum standard; as, in fact, it went
beyond the minimum by making
kindergarten and high school compulsory.
This action of Congress is, in turn,
consistent with Article 41 of the CRC which
provides that “[n]othing in the present
Convention shall affect any provisions which
are more conducive to the realization of the
33
rights of the child and which may be
contained in: (a) [t]he law of a State party;
or (b) [i]nternational law in force for that
State.’’ The enactment of the K to 12 Law
was the manner by which the Congress
sought to realize the right to education of its
citizens. It is indeed laudable that Congress
went beyond the minimum standards and
provided mechanisms so that its citizens are
able to obtain not just elementary education
but also kindergarten and high school.
Absent any showing of a violation of any
Constitutional self-executing right or any
international law, the Court cannot question
the desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to
12 Law as this is best addressed by the
wisdom of Congress.
Same; Same; Prospectivity of Laws; The K
to 12 Basic Education Program is not being
retroactively applied because only those
currently enrolled at the time the K to 12
Law took effect and future students will be
subject to the K to 12 Basic Education
Curriculum and the additional two (2) years
of senior high school. Students who already
graduated from high school under the old
curriculum are not required by the K to 12
Law to complete the additional two (2) years
of senior high school.—The K to 12 Basic
Education Program is not being retroactively
applied because only those currently
enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took
effect and future students will be subject to
the K to 12 BEC and the additional two (2)
years of senior high school. Students who
already graduated from high school under
the old curriculum are not required by the K
to 12 Law to complete the additional two (2)
years of senior high school. More
importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer
any vested right to four (4) years of high
school education. Rights are vested when
the right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a
present interest. The right must be absolute,
complete, and unconditional, independent of
a contingency, and a mere expectancy of
future benefit, or a contingent interest in
property founded on anticipated
continuance of existing laws, does not
constitute a vested right. Contrary to
petitioners’ assertion, the rights of students
under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not
absolute. These are subject to limitations
prescribed by law and regulations. In fact,
while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that
students have the right to continue their
course up to graduation, Section 20 of the
same law does not restrict elementary and
high school education to only six (6) and
four (4) years. Even R.A. No. 9155 or the
Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001,
which was enacted under the 1987
Philippine Constitution, does not specify the
number of years in elementary and high
school. In other words, BP Blg. 232 or R.A.
No. 9155 does not preclude any
amendment or repeal on the duration of
elementary and high school education. In
adding two (2) years of secondary
education to students who have not yet
graduated from high school, Congress was
merely exercising its police power and
legislative wisdom in imposing reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of
basic education, in compliance with its
constitutional duty to promote quality
education for all.
Same; Same; Same; Mother Tongue; When
the government, through the K to 12 Law
and the Department of Education (DepEd)
issuances, determined that the use of
mother tongue as primary medium of
instruction until Grade 3 constitutes a better
curriculum, it was working towards
discharging its constitutional duty to provide
its citizens with quality education.—Clearly,
when the government, through the K to 12
Law and the DepEd issuances, determined
34
that the use of MT as primary medium of
instruction until Grade 3 constitutes a better
curriculum, it was working towards
discharging its constitutional duty to provide
its citizens with quality education. The
Court, even in the exercise of its jurisdiction
to check if another branch of the
government committed grave abuse of
discretion, will not supplant such
determination as it pertains to the wisdom of
the policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Despite the
provision on the use of mother tongue as
primary medium of instruction for
kindergarten and Grades 1 to 3, Filipino and
English remain as subjects in the curriculum
during the earlier stages of schooling and
will later on be used as primary medium of
instruction from Grade 4 onwards.—While
Section 12, Article II grants parents the
primary right to rear and educate their
children, the State, as parens patriae, has
the inherent right and duty to support
parents in the exercise of this constitutional
right. In other words, parents’ authority and
the State’s duty are not mutually exclusive
but complement each other. In the matter of
education, a parent is always the first
teacher. The language first learned by the
child or his “mother tongue,” which the child
understands best and hence, an effective
tool for further learning, is first and foremost
taught by the parent. The inclusion in the K
to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of
instruction and a subject in the early years
of learning is, therefore, not intended to
curtail the parents’ right but to complement
and enhance the same. Moreover, despite
the provision on the use of MT as primary
medium of instruction for kindergarten and
Grades 1 to 3, Filipino and English remain
as subjects in the curriculum during the
earlier stages of schooling and will later on
be used as primary medium of instruction
from Grade 4 onwards. In other words, in
addition to the MT, the basics of Filipino and
English will still be taught at the early stages
of formal schooling; and should the parents,
in the exercise of their primary right and
duty to rear their children, so desire to give
additional Filipino and English lessons to
their children, they have the absolute right
to do so. Nothing in the K to 12 Law
prohibits the parents from doing so.
Same; Constitutional Law; Academic
Freedom; Words and Phrases; The
Supreme Court (SC), in its previous
decisions, has defined academic freedom
for the individual member of the academe
as “the right of a faculty member to pursue
his studies in his particular specialty and
thereafter to make known or publish the
result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers
that be, whether in the political, economic,
or academic establishments.”—Without
question, petitioners, who are faculty
members in HEIs, indeed possess the
academic freedom granted by Constitution.
This Court, in its previous decisions, has
defined academic freedom for the individual
member of the academe as “the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make
known or publish the result of his endeavors
without fear that retribution would be visited
on him in the event that his conclusions are
found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments.”
Same; Same; Same; K to 12 Law (RA No.
10533); The Supreme Court (SC) does not
agree with petitioners that their transfer to
the secondary level, as provided by the K to
12 Law and the assailed issuances,
constitutes a violation of their academic
35
freedom; Civil servants, like petitioners, may
be removed from service for a valid cause,
such as when there is a bona fide
reorganization, or a position has been
abolished or rendered redundant, or there is
a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of
the service.—The Court does not agree with
petitioners that their transfer to the
secondary level, as provided by the K to 12
Law and the assailed issuances, constitutes
a violation of their academic freedom. While
the Court agrees, in principle, that security
of tenure is an important aspect of
academic freedom — that the freedom is
only meaningful if the faculty members are
assured that they are free to pursue their
academic endeavors without fear of
reprisals — it is likewise equally true that
convergence of security of tenure and
academic freedom does not preclude the
termination of a faculty member for a valid
cause. Civil servants, like petitioners, may
be removed from service for a valid cause,
such as when there is a bona fide
reorganization, or a position has been
abolished or rendered redundant, or there is
a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of
the service. Hence, petitioners’ contention
that the law is unconstitutional based on this
ground is specious.
Constitution; Non-Self-Executing Provisions;
The Supreme Court (SC) was of the view
that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to
arts and culture are all non-self-executing,
which includes Section 14 on Filipino
national culture and Section 18 on access to
cultural opportunities.—In Knights of Rizal v.
DMCI Homes, Inc., 824 SCRA 327 (2017),
the Court held that Section 15 on arts and
culture of Article XIV is not self-executory
because Congress passed laws dealing
with the preservation and conservation of
our cultural heritage. The Court was of the
view that all sections in Article XIV
pertaining to arts and culture are all non-
self-executing, which includes Section 14 on
Filipino national culture and Section 18 on
access to cultural opportunities. The Court
in Basco also ruled that Section 17, Article II
on giving priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports, and
Section 2, Article XIV on educational values,
are non-self-executing. Thus, the Court
reiterates that these constitutional
provisions are only policies that may be
“used by the judiciary as aids or as guides
in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.” The Court reiterates
that they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.
Education; Schools; Constitution; The
Supreme Court (SC) agrees that there is
indeed a constitutional mandate that the
study of the Constitution should be part of
the curriculum of educational institutions.—
As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV on the
requirement that all educational institutions
shall include the study of the Constitution as
part of the curricula, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm that the
intention was for it to be constitutionally
mandated. The Court agrees that there is
indeed a constitutional mandate that the
study of the Constitution should be part of
the curriculum of educational institutions.
However, the mandate was general and did
not specify the educational level in which it
must be taught. Hence, the inclusion of the
study of the Constitution in the basic
education curriculum satisfies the
constitutional requirement. In this regard, it
must be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only
provides for the minimum standards for the
GE component of all degree programs.
Under Section 13 of R.A. No. 7722 or the
Higher Education Act of 1994, the CHED is
authorized to determine the (a) minimum
36
unit requirements for specific academic
programs; (b) general education distribution
requirements as may be determined by the
Commission; and (c) specific professional
subjects as may be stipulated by the various
licensing entities. The provision further
provides that this authority shall not be
construed as limiting the academic freedom
of universities and colleges. Therefore, HEIs
are given the freedom to require additional
Filipino or Panitikan courses to these
minimum requirements if they wish to.
Same; K to 12 Law (RA No. 10533); Due
Process; There is no conflict between the K
to 12 Law and right of due process of the
students.—There is no conflict between the
K to 12 Law and right of due process of the
students. It is established that due process
is comprised of two components, namely,
substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which
consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal. Substantive due process, the
aspect of due process invoked in this case,
requires an inquiry on the intrinsic validity of
the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his property.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the
Laws; Those adversely affected may invoke
the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far
from being inspired by the attainment of the
common goal, was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination
that finds no support in reason.—To assure
that the general welfare is promoted, which
is the end of the law, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely
affected may invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common
goal, was prompted by the spirit of hostility,
or at the very least, discrimination that finds
no support in reason. This, petitioners’ failed
to sufficiently show. For this reason, the
Court holds that the K to 12 Law did not
violate petitioners’ right to due process nor
did it violate the equal protection clause. In
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319 (1996),
the Court explained the object and purpose
of the equal protection clause in this wise:
The equal protection clause is directed
principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited to the object to which it is directed or
by the territory in which it is to operate. It
does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike
under like conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. We have
held, time and again, that the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does
not forbid classification for so long as such
classification is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, concerns all members of
the class, and applies equally to present
and future conditions, the classification does
not violate the equal protection guarantee.
Constitution; Non-Self-Executing Provisions;
As the Supreme Court (SC) already held in
Basco, “Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 [Philippine]
Constitution x x x are merely statements of
principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly
37
define and effectuate such principles.”—
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is a non-self-executing
provision of the Constitution. Again, as the
Court already held in Basco, “Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 [Philippine] Constitution x x x are
merely statements of principles and policies.
As such, they are basically not self-
executing, meaning a law should be passed
by Congress to clearly define and effectuate
such principles.”
The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by
the Legislature to bring the said guiding
principle to life. The question of what is
‘relevant to the needs of the people and
society’ is, in turn, within the sole purview of
legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot
intervene.
Political Law; Judicial Review; When the
validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of
the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.—Policy matters
are not the concern of the Court. To
reiterate, government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches
of the government. It is not for the Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Stated otherwise,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. Indeed, whether an enactment is
wise or unwise, whether it is based on
sound economic theory, whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired results,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner — all these
are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them
within the range of judicial cognizance.
When the validity of a statute is challenged
on constitutional grounds, the sole function
of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC),
despite its vast powers, will not review the
wisdom, merits, or propriety of
governmental policies, but will strike them
down only on either of two (2) grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2)
grave abuse of discretion.—The courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality
to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution, but also because the judiciary,
in the determination of actual cases and
controversies, must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
The Court, despite its vast powers, will not
review the wisdom, merits, or propriety of
governmental policies, but will strike them
down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2)
grave abuse of discretion. For having failed
to show any of the above in the passage of
the assailed law and the department issu
ances, the petitioners’ remedy thus lies not
with the Court, but with the executive and
legislative branches of the government.
38
FACTS
Before the Court are consolidated petitions
under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality
of Republic Act (RA) No. 105332 (K to 12
Law), RA No. 101573 (Kindergarten
Education Act), and related issuances of the
Department of Education (DepEd),
Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA)
implementing the K to 12 Basic Education
Program
Power of Judicial Review
Actual case or controversy
These consolidated cases present an actual
case or controversy that is ripe for
adjudication. The assailed laws and
executive issuances have already taken
effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty
members, students and parents, are
individuals directly and considerably
affected by their implementation.
Legal Standing
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and 218465
include organizations/federations duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines,
representing the interest of the faculty and
staff of their respective colleges and
universities, who allegedly are threatened to
be demoted or removed from employment
with the implementation of the K to 12 Law.
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 217752 and 218045
are suing as citizens, taxpayers and in their
personal capacities as parents whose
children would be directly affected by the
law in question. Petitioners in G .R. Nos.
218123 and 217 451 are suing in their
capacities as teachers who allegedly are or
will be negatively affected by the
implementation of the K to 12 Law and
CMO No. 20, respectively, through job
displacement and diminution of benefits;
and as taxpayers who have the right to
challenge the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20
as public funds are spent and will be spent
for its implementation.
Under the circumstances alleged in their
respective petitions, the Court finds that
petitioners have sufficient legal interest in
the outcome of the controversy. And,
considering that the instant cases involve
issues on education, which under the
Constitution the State is mandated to
promote and protect, the stringent
requirement of direct and substantial
interest may be dispensed with, and the
mere fact that petitioners are concerned
citizens asserting a public right, sufficiently
clothes them with legal standing to initiate
the instant petition.
the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case
The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate
and House of Representatives on January
20, 2013, approved by the President on
May 15, 2013, and, after publication, took
effect on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no
doubt as to the formal validity of the K to 12
Law.
There is no undue delegation of legislative
power in the enactment of the K to 12 Law.
39
The K to 12 Law adequately provides the
legislative policy that it seeks to implement.
Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12
Law are the standards to guide the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA in carrying out the
provisions of the law, from the development
of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training
of teaching personnel and to the formulation
of appropriate strategies in order to address
the changes during the transition period.
under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read
and appreciated in its entirety, is complete
in all essential terms and conditions and
contains sufficient parameters on the power
delegated to the DepEd, CHED and
TESDA.
Police power of the State
the enactment of education laws, including
the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten
Education Act, their respective
implementing rules and regulations and the
issuances of the government agencies, are
an exercise of the State’s police power. The
State has an interest in prescribing
regulations to promote the education and
the general welfare of the people.
There is nothing in the UDHR, ICESCR and
CRC which proscribes the expansion of
compulsory education beyond elementary
education.
There is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that
would show that the State is prohibited from
making kindergarten and high school
compulsory. The UDHR provided a
minimum standard for States to follow.
Congress complied with this minimum
standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the
minimum by making kindergarten and high
school compulsory. This action of Congress
is, in tum, consistent with Article 41 of the
CRC which provides that “[n]othing in the
present Convention shall affect any
provisions which are more conducive to the
realization of the rights of the child and
which may be contained in: (a) [t]he law ofa
State party; or (b) [i]nternational law in force
for that State.”
Academic freedom
However, the Court does not agree with
petitioners that their transfer to the
secondary level, as provided by the K to 12
Law and the assailed issuances, constitutes
a violation of their academic freedom. While
the Court agrees, in principle, that security
of tenure is an important aspect of
academic freedom -that the freedom is only
meaningful if the faculty members are
assured that they are free to pursue their
academic endeavors without fear of
reprisals -it is likewise equally true that
convergence of security of tenure and
academic freedom does not preclude See
Montemayor v. Araneta University
Foundation, 167 Phil. 667, 668 (1977). the
termination of a faculty member for a valid
cause.
Civil servants, like petitioners, may be
removed from service for a valid cause,
such as when there is a bona fide
reorganization, or a position has been
abolished or rendered redundant, or there is
a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of
the service.Sec. 2, RA No. 6656, AN ACT
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF
40
TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION, June I 0, 1988.
Hence, petitioners’ contention that the law is
unconstitutional based on this ground is
specious.
The K to 12 Law does not violate
substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.
There is no conflict between the K to 12
Law and right of due process of the
students.
Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the
substantive due process of petitioners. The
assailed law’s declaration of policy itself
reveals that, contrary to the claims of
petitioners, the objectives of the law serve
the interest of the public and not only of a
class:RA No. I 0533, Sec. 2
All students are intended to benefit from the
law.
contrary to the claims of petitioners, the
assailed law caters to the interest of the
public in general, as opposed to only a
group of people.
Furthermore, the means employed by the
assailed law are commensurate with its
objectives. Again, the restructuring of the
curriculum with the corresponding additional
years in senior high school were meant to
improve the quality of basic education and
to make the country’s graduates more
competitive in the international arena.
The students of Manila Science High School
(MSHS), petitioners in G.R. No. 218465,
aver, in particular, that the decongestion of
the originally existing basic education
curriculum and the lengthening of the basic
education cycle do not, and should not, be
made to apply to them as their curriculum is
supposedly congested on purpose.
What these petitioners are saying is that the
K to 12 Law did not make a substantial
distinction between MSHS students and the
rest of the high school students in the
country when it, in fact, should have done
so.
Those adversely affected may invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far
from being inspired by the attainment of the
common goal, was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination
that finds no support in reason. Bautista v.
Juinio, 212 Phil. 307, 317 (1984).
This, petitioners failed to sufficiently show.
For this reason, the Court holds that the K
to 12 Law did not violate petitioners’ right to
due process nor did it violate the equal
protection clause.
To emphasize, valid classifications require
real and substantial differences to justify the
variance of treatment between the classes.
The MSHS students did not offer any
substantial basis for the Court to create a
valid classification between them and the
rest of the high school students in the
41
Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal
protection clause would, in fact, be violated
if the assailed law treated the MSHS
students differently from the rest of the high
school students in the country.

To be clear, the Court is not saying that

petitioners are not gifted, contrary to their
claims. The Court is merely saying that the
K to 12 Law was not infirm in treating all
high school students equally. The MSHS
students are, after all, high school students
just like all the other students who are, and
will be, subjected to the revised curriculum.

Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution is a non-self-executing
provision of the Constitution.

The restrictions expressed in Section 4(2),

Article XIV only refer to ownership, control,
and administration of individual schools, and
these do not apply to the State’s exercise of
reasonable supervision and regulation of
educational institutions under Section 4(1 ),
Article XIV.

Accordingly, the Court declares Republic

Act No. 10533, Republic Act No. 10157,
CHED Memorandum Order No. 20, Series
of 2013, Department of Education Order No.
31, Series of 2012, and Joint Guidelines on
the Implementation of the Labor and
Management Component of Republic Act
No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL

42
Province of North Cotabato vs.
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain
Remedial Law; Actions; Judicial Review;
The power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases or controversies; An actual
case or controversy involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.—The power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical
or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions. The limitation of the power of
judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to
the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power, to assure that the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. An actual case or
controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence. The Court
can decide the constitutionality of an act or
treaty only when a proper case between
opposing parties is submitted for judicial
determination.
Same; Same; Same; Related to the
requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness;
For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action.—Related to
the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.
Same; Judicial Review; Concrete acts under
the Memorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) are not
necessary to render the present controversy
ripe.—Concrete acts under the MOA-
AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,
336 SCRA 201 (2000), this Court held: x x x
[B]y the mere enactment of the questioned
law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation
of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty. x x x x By the same
token, when an act of the President, who in
our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
43
Same; Same; That the law or act in
question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.—That the law or act in question is
not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
For example, in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), decided in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court held that the
action by the State of New York challenging
the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication
even if the questioned provision was not to
take effect until January 1, 1996, because
the parties agreed that New York had to
take immediate action to avoid the
provision’s consequences.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Mandamus and
Prohibition; Mandamus and Prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials.—The present petitions
pray for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are
remedies granted by law when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted, in the case of
certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of
prohibition, without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mandamus is a remedy granted by law
when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is
entitled. Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When an act of
a branch of government is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.—
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on
the part of respondent that exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under
E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the
Constitution and statutes, the petitions
make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual
case or controversy ripe for adjudication
exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; Parties; For a
party to have locus standi, one must allege
“such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions”; When the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest
in the execution of the laws.—For a party to
have locus standi, one must allege “such a
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” Because
constitutional cases are often public actions
in which the relief sought is likely to affect
other persons, a preliminary question
frequently arises as to this interest in the
constitutional question raised. When suing
as a citizen, the person complaining must
allege that he has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.
44
When the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and
has an interest in the execution of the laws.
Same; Same; Moot and Academic;
Circumstances where the court will decide
cases otherwise moot and academic.—In
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160
(2006), this Court held that the “moot and
academic” principle not being a magical
formula that automatically dissuades courts
in resolving a case, it will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that
(a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved; (c) the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Same; Same; Same; The petitions have not
been rendered moot and academic simply
by the public disclosure of the Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD), the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Panel not withstanding;
Present petitions are not confined to the
terms and provisions of the Memorandum of
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD), but to other on-going and future
negotiations and agreements necessary for
its realization.—Contrary then to the
asseverations of respondents, the non-
signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not
moot the present petitions. It bears
emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD
did not push through due to the Court’s
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents’ position, the
MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere “list
of consensus points,” especially given its
nomenclature, the need to have it signed or
initialed by all the parties concerned on
August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching
Constitutional implications of these
“consensus points,” foremost of which is the
creation of the BJE. In fact, as what will, in
the main, be discussed, there is a
commitment on the part of respondents to
amend and effect necessary changes to the
existing legal framework for cer tain
provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect.
Consequently, the present petitions are not
confined to the terms and provisions of the
MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future
negotiations and agreements necessary for
its realization. The petitions have not,
therefore, been rendered moot and
academic simply by the public disclosure of
the MOA-AD, the manifestation that it will
not be signed as well as the disbanding of
the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Same; Same; Same; The petitions are
imbued with paramount public interest,
involving a significant part of the country’s
territory and the wide-ranging political
modifications of affected Local Government
Units (LGUs).—There is no gainsaying that
the petitions are imbued with paramount
public interest, involving a significant part of
the country’s territory and the wide-ranging
political modifications of affected LGUs. The
assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever
provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to
Information on Matters of Public Concern;
45
Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right
which was eventually accorded
constitutional status.—As early as 1948, in
Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 (1948), the
Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right
which was eventually accorded
constitutional status.
Same; Same; Same; The Memorandum of
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.—That the subject of the
information sought in the present cases is a
matter of public concern faces no serious
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that
the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In
previous cases, the Court found that the
regularity of real estate transactions entered
in the Register of Deeds, the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various
laws, the civil service eligibility of a public
employee, the proper management of GSIS
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials, the recovery of the Marcoses’
alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of
party-list nominees, among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the
MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of
public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.
Same; Same; Same; The right to
information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information while Section
28, Article II of the Constitution recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands.—Intended as a
“splendid symmetry” to the right to
information under the Bill of Rights is the
policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec.
28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public
interest. The policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28
complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern
found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands.
Same; Executive Power; That the authority
of the President to conduct peace
negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does
not mean that she has no such authority.—
That the authority of the President to
conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution does not mean that she has no
such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, 421 SCRA 656 (2004), in issue
was the authority of the President to declare
a state of rebellion—an authority which is
not expressly provided for in the
Constitution. The Court held thus: “In her
ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668 (1989), Justice Cortes put her
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court,
by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President’s
power to forbid the return of her exiled
predecessor. The rationale for the majority’s
ruling rested on the President’s . . . unstated
residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered
46
provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 to limit the powers of the President
as a reaction to the abuses under the
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific powers of the
President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive
power. Thus, the President’s authority to
declare a state of rebellion springs in the
main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time, draws strength from
her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x
Same; Same; The President has authority,
as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution; Such
presidential power does not extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision.—It will be
observed that the President has authority,
as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long
as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments
and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
Same; Same; The Constitution does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.—No province,
city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
Same; Same; That the Memorandum of
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
would have been signed by representatives
of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement would not have
sufficed to vest in it a binding character
under international law.—That the MOA-AD
would have been signed by representatives
of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement would not have
sufficed to vest in it a binding character
under international law.
Same; Same; The mere fact that in addition
to the parties to the conflict, the peace
settlement is signed by representatives of
states and international organizations does
not mean that the agreement is
internationalized so as to create obligations
in international law.—Assessing the MOA-
AD in light of the above criteria, it would not
have amounted to a unilateral declaration
on the part of the Philippine State to the
international community. The Philippine
panel did not draft the same with the clear
intention of being bound thereby to the
international community as a whole or to
any State, but only to the MILF. While there
were States and international organizations
involved, one way or another, in the
negotiation and projected sign ing of the
MOA-AD, they participated merely as
47
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as
facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case,
the mere fact that in addition to the parties
to the conflict, the peace settlement is
signed by representatives of states and
international organizations does not mean
that the agreement is internationalized so as
to create obligations in international law.
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect
of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and
the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the
people's right to information on matters of
public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA,
the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for
adjudication. The failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to
the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues
which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants
the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention
and intervening respondents the requisite
locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy
48
even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution
and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right
to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of
paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring
that the right to information contemplates
steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of
the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics
for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to
seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed
to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even
the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an “associative” relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local
or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than
the autonomous region recognized in the
49
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of
the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD
would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it –
which has betrayed itself by its use of the
concept of association – runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the
relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not
surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is
more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the
term “autonomous region” in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions
of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to
the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework,” implying
an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has
authority, as stated in her oath of office, only
to preserve and defend the Constitution.
Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long
as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments
and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD
viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s
authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are
vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
50
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it
is “the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro
people” as the natives or original inhabitants
of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago
at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as
defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only “Moros” as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of
choice consists in has not been specifically
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership
of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the
MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public
domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement
or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the
environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in such
locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number
of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process
by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence.
51
Magallona vs. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476,
G.R. No. 187167 August 16, 2011
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III); UNCLOS III has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of
territory.—UNCLOS III has nothing to do
with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is
a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles
from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations
among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in
the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of
waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines
(Republic Act No. 9522); Baselines laws
such as RA 9522 are enacted by United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from
which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.—
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III
on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf.—The breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from
archi pelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves.—Baselines laws
are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves. In turn, this gives
notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction
to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
Same; RA 9522 increased the Philippines’
total maritime space by 145,216 square
nautical miles.—Petitioners’ assertion of
loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles
of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On
the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the
location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering
its internal waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles.
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress’ decision
52
to classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of
Islands’ manifests the Philippine State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.—
Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of
Islands’ under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121” of
UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
“naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,”
such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of “regime of islands,” whose
islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
Same; The recognition of archipelagic
States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed
by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III.—The
recognition of archipelagic States’
archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III.
Separate islands generate their own
maritime zones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than 24 nautical
miles beyond the States’ territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the
rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
Same; United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) creates a sui
generis maritime space—the exclusive
economic zone—in waters previously part of
the high seas.—UNCLOS III favors States
with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space—the exclusive economic zone—in
waters previously part of the high seas.
UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal
States to exclusively exploit the resources
found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other
States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Same; Absent an United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured.—Absent an
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured. This is recipe
for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an
open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the
country’s case in any international dispute
over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
Same; Archipelagic Baselines of the
Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); The
enactment of United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf.—The
enactment of UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
53
9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the
part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046
demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State
pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying
the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some
errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A.
9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III
of 1984. The requirements complied with
are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify
KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of
the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory
under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent
and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime
of islands’ would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with
acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of
States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the
legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages.
but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their
waters are subject to both passages does
not place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP
is a customary international law, no modern
state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely
followed the basepoints mapped by RA
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total
maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
54
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of
the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not
exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we
draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules:
that it should follow the natural configuration
of the archipelago.
FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No.
3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. This law followed the
framing of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their
territorial sea, the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined. Attempts
to fill this void during the second round of
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS
II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five
decades, save for legislation passed in
1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
correcting typographical errors and
reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA
3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted
by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified
on 27 February 1984. Among others,
UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and
sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf.
Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified
adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students
and a legislator, in their respective
capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators, as the case may be, assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically,
the reach of the Philippine states sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Parisand ancillary treaties,and (2)
RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country's
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.
55
In addition, petitioners contend that RA
9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of
islands not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.To
buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA
9522 for what it excluded and included its
failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris
or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs
framework of regime of islands to determine
the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi
to bring this suit;
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are the proper remedies to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522; and
3. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
HELD: On the threshold issues, we hold
that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to
bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of RA
9522. On the merits, we find no basis to
declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
REMEDIAL LAW: Petitioners Possess
Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their
assertion of locus standi as legislators and
taxpayers because the petition alleges
neither infringement of legislative
prerogative or misuse of public
funds,occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless,
we recognize petitioners locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the
case which undoubtedly raises issues of
national significance necessitating urgent
resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar
nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing a
more direct and specific interest to bring the
suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements
for granting citizenship standing.
REMEDIAL LAW: The Writs of Certiorari
and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to
Testthe Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on
preliminary grounds, respondents seek a
strict observance of the offices of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the
writs cannot issue absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers
on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners.
Respondent's submission holds true in
ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court
exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition
as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of
acts of other branches of
government.Issues of constitutional import
are sometimes crafted out of statutes which,
while having no bearing on the personal
interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the
Court inevitably finds itself constrained to
56
take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the
letter of procedural rules notwithstanding.
The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
POLITICAL LAW: RA 9522 is Not
Unconstitutional - RA 9522 is a Statutory
Tool To Demarcate the Country's Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522
dismembers a large portion of the national
territory because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and
related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign
control over waters, beyond the territorial
sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of
Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the
United States. Petitioners argue that from
the Treaty of Paris technical description,
Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters
extends hundreds of nautical miles around
the Philippine archipelago, embracing the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris.
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations
among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in
the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of
waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as
RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve
as geographic starting points to measure
the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III
on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:
Article 48.Measurement of the breadth of
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. The breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelfshall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice
to the rest of the international community of
the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
57
exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article
77).
Even under petitioners theory that the
Philippine territory embraces the islands
and all the waterswithin the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have
to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522
because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.
The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws
play no role in the acquisition, enlargement
or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law
typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treatys terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are
outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general
international law.
POLITICAL LAW: RA 9522s Use of the
Framework of Regime of Islands to
Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal, not
Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of
Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use
of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable
maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our
territorial claim over that area.Petitioners
add that the KIGs (and Scarborough
Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine
archipelagic baselines results in the loss of
about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood
of subsistence fishermen.A comparison of
the configuration of the baselines drawn
under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent
of maritime space encompassed by each
law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA
9522 and its congressional
deliberations,vis-visthe Philippines
obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this
view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn
under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA
9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to
optimize the location of basepoints and
adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the
baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic
fact takes the wind out of petitioners
argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory
renunciation of the Philippines claim over
the KIG, assuming that baselines are
relevant for this purpose.
58
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both
in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522,
by optimizing the location of base
points,increased the Philippines total
maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone)
by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown
in the table below:
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as
amended, taking into account the Treaty of
Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles)
Extent of maritime area using RA 9522,
taking into account UNCLOS III (in square
nautical miles)
Internal or archipelagic waters
166,858
171,435
Territorial Sea
274,136
32,106
Exclusive Economic Zone
382,669
TOTAL
440,994
586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of
the exclusive economic zone drawn under
RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular
demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping
exclusive economic zones of opposite or
adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in
accordance with UNCLOS III.
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG
now lies outside Philippine territory because
the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text
the Philippines continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas
over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall
be determined as Regime of Islands under
the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as
constituted under Presidential Decree No.
1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as
Scarborough Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects
would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions
of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of
UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of
such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago. Second,
Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that
the length of the baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles, save for three per cent
(3%) of the total number of baselines which
can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
59
Although the Philippines has consistently
claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,such
that any straight baseline loped around
them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably depart to an appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines
claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress decision to classify the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121of
UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States
responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,
such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of regime of islands, whose
islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
POLITICAL LAW: Statutory Claim Over
Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA
9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines claim over Sabah in North
Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA
5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of
Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of
the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
POLITICAL LAW: UNCLOS III and RA 9522
not Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of
RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally converts internal waters
into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting
these waters to the right of innocent and
sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably
expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation
of the Constitution.
Whether referred to as Philippine internal
waters under Article I of the Constitutionor
as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49.Legal status of archipelagic
waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1.The sovereignty of an archipelagic State
extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast.
60

2.This sovereignty extends to the air space
over the archipelagic waters, as well as to
their bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage established in this Part shall not in
other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters,including the sea
lanes,or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters
and their air space, bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law
principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed,
bills drawing nautical highways for sea
lanes passage are now pending in
Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation,
international law norms, now codified in
UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent
passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys
limitations and conditions for their
exercise.Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.No modern State
can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their
archipelagic waters are subject to both the
right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passagedoes not place them in lesser
footingvis-viscontinental coastal States
which are subject, in their territorial sea, to
the right of innocent passage and the right
of transit passage through international
straits. The imposition of these passage
rights through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by
archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines,regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic
waters subject to theirterritorial sovereignty.
More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one
cohesive entity prevents the treatment of
their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.Separate islands generate their
own maritime zones, placing the waters
between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the
rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
Petitioners invocation of non-executory
constitutional provisions in Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in
Article II as mere legislative guides, which,
absent enabling legislation, do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
61
Article II provisions serve as guides in
formulating and interpreting implementing
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the
legislation, as well as in interpreting
permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress
executory provisions of the Constitution.
was not bound to pass RA 9522.We have
AlthoughOposa v. Factorantreated the right
looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS
to a healthful and balanced ecology under
III and we find petitioner's reading plausible.
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing
present petition lacks factual basis to
this option belongs to Congress, not to this
substantiate the claimed constitutional
Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this
violation. The other provisions petitioners
option comes at a very steep price. Absent
cite, relating to the protection of marine
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2)
archipelagic State like the Philippines will
and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII,
find itself devoid of internationally
Section 7), are not violated by RA 9522.
acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured. This is recipe
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines
for a two-fronted disaster:first, it sends an
enables the Philippines to delimit its
open invitation to the seafaring powers to
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely
freely enter and exploit the resources in the
to the Philippines the exploitation of all living
waters and submarine areas around our
and non-living resources within such zone.
archipelago; and second, it weakens the
Such a maritime delineation binds the
country's case in any international dispute
international community since the
over Philippine maritime space. These are
delineation is in strict observance of
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant
refuse to be bound by it.
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized
UNCLOS III favors States with a long
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
creates asui generis maritime space the
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the
exclusive economic zone in waters
part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS
maritime zones, consistent with the
III grants new rights to coastal States to
Constitution and our national interest.
exclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
DISMISS
traditional freedom of navigation of other
States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

POLITICAL LAW: RA 9522 and the

Philippines Maritime Zones

62
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION
(THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V .
THE PEOPLE’ S REPUBLIC OF CHINA )
The Hague, 12 July 2016
The Tribunal Renders Its Award
A unanimous Award has been issued today
by the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII
to the UnitedNations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (the “Convention”) in the
arbitration instituted by the Republic of the
Philippines against the People’s Republic of
China.
This arbitration concerned the role of
historic rights and the source of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea, the
status of certain maritime features and the
maritime entitlements they are capable of
generating, and the lawfulness of certain
actions by China that were alleged by the
Philippines to violate the Convention. In light
of limitations on compulsory dispute
settlement under the Convention, the
Tribunal has emphasized that it does not
rule on any question of sovereignty over
land territory and does not delimit any
boundary between the Parties.
China has repeatedly stated that “it will
neither accept nor participate in the
arbitration unilaterally initiated by the
Philippines.” Annex VII, however, provides
that the “[a]bsence of a party or failure of a
party to defend its case shall not constitute
a bar to the proceedings.” Annex VII also
provides that, in the event that a party does
not participate in the proceedings, a tribunal
“must satisfy itself not only that it has
jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the
claim is well founded in fact and law.”
Accordingly, throughout these proceedings,
the Tribunal has taken steps to test the
accuracy of the Philippines’ claims,
including by requesting further written
submissions from the Philippines, by
questioning the Philippines both prior to and
during two hearings, by appointing
independent experts to report to the
Tribunal on technical matters, and by
obtaining historical evidence concerning
features in the South China Sea and
providing it to the Parties for comment.
China has also made clear—through the
publication of a Position Paper in December
2014 and in other official statements—that,
in its view, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in
this matter. Article 288 of the Convention
provides that: “In the event of a dispute as
to whether a court or tribunal has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by
decision of that court or tribunal.”
Accordingly, the Tribunal convened a
hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility in
July 2015 and rendered an Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October
2015, deciding some issues of jurisdiction
and deferring others for further
consideration. The Tribunal then convened
a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30
November 2015.
The Award of today’s date addresses the
issues of jurisdiction not decided in the
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility and
the merits of the Philippines’ claims over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The
Award is final and binding, as set out in
Article 296 of the Convention and Article 11
of Annex VII.
63
Historic Rights and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’:
The Tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to
consider the Parties’ dispute concerning
historic rights and the source of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea. On the
merits, the Tribunal concluded that the
Convention comprehensively allocates
rights to maritime areas and that protections
for pre-existing rights to resources were
considered, but not adopted in the
Convention. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that, to the extent China had
historic rights to resources in the waters of
the South China Sea, such rights were
extinguished to the extent they were
incompatible with the exclusive economic
zones provided for in the Convention. The
Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese
navigators and fishermen, as well as those
of other States, had historically made use of
the islands in the South China Sea, there
was no evidence that China had historically
exercised exclusive control over the waters
or their resources. The Tribunal concluded
that there was no legal basis for China to
claim historic rights to resources within the
sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.
Status of Features: The Tribunal next
considered entitlements to maritime areas
and the status of features. The Tribunal first
undertook an evaluation of whether certain
reefs claimed by China are above water at
high tide. Features that are above water at
high tide generate an entitlement to at least
a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas
features that are submerged at high tide do
not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have
been heavily modified by land reclamation
and construction, recalled that the
Convention classifies features on their
natural condition, and relied on historical
materials in evaluating the features. The
Tribunal then considered whether any of the
features claimed by China could generate
maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles.
Under the Convention, islands generate an
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical
miles and a continental shelf, but “[r]ocks
which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.” The Tribunal concluded that this
provision depends upon the objective
capacity of a feature, in its natural condition,
to sustain either a stable community of
people or economic activity that is not
dependent on outside resources or purely
extractive in nature. The Tribunal noted that
the current presence of official personnel on
many of the features is dependent on
outside support and not reflective of the
capacity of the features. The Tribunal found
historical evidence to be more relevant and
noted that the Spratly Islands were
historically used by small groups of
fishermen and that several Japanese fishing
and guano mining enterprises were
attempted. The Tribunal concluded that
such transient use does not constitute
inhabitation by a stable community and that
all of the historical economic activity had
been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is
capable of generating extended maritime
zones. The Tribunal also held that the
Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime
zones collectively as a unit. Having found
that none of the features claimed by China
was capable of generating an exclusive
economic zone, the Tribunal found that it
could—without delimiting a boundary—
declare that certain sea areas are within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines,
because those areas are not overlapped by
any possible entitlement of China.
Lawfulness of Chinese Actions: The
Tribunal next considered the lawfulness of
Chinese actions in the
64
South China Sea. Having found that certain
areas are within the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found
that China had violated the Philippines’
sovereign rights in its exclusive economic
zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing
and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing
artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent
Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone.
The Tribunal also held that fishermen from
the Philippines (like those from China) had
traditional fishing rights at Scarborough
Shoal and that China had interfered with
these rights in restricting access. The
Tribunal further held that Chinese law
enforcement vessels had unlawfully created
a serious risk of collision when they
physically obstructed Philippine vessels.
Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal
considered the effect on the marine
environment of China’s recent large-scale
land reclamation and construction of
artificial islands at seven features in the
Spratly Islands and found that China had
caused severe harm to the coral reef
environment and violated its obligation to
preserve and protect fragile ecosystems
and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or
endangered species. The Tribunal also
found that Chinese authorities were aware
that Chinese fishermen have harvested
endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant
clams on a substantial scale in the South
China Sea (using methods that inflict severe
damage on the coral reef environment) and
had not fulfilled their obligations to stop
such activities.
Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal
considered whether China’s actions since
the commencement of the arbitration had
aggravated the dispute between the Parties.
The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider the implications of a stand-off
between Philippine marines and Chinese
naval and law enforcement vessels at
Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this
dispute involved military activities and was
therefore excluded from compulsory
settlement. The Tribunal found, however,
that China’s recent large-scale land
reclamation and construction of artificial
islands was incompatible with the
obligations on a State during dispute
resolution proceedings, insofar as China
has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine
environment, built a large artificial island in
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,
and destroyed evidence of the natural
condition of features in the South China Sea
that formed part of the Parties’ dispute.
An expanded summary of the Tribunal’s
decisions is set out below.
The Tribunal was constituted on 21 June
2013 pursuant to the procedure set out in
Annex VII of the Convention to decide the
dispute presented by the Philippines. The
Tribunal is composed of Judge Thomas A.
Mensah of Ghana, Judge Jean-Pierre Cot of
France, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak of Poland,
Professor Alfred H.A. Soons of the
Netherlands, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of
Germany. Judge Thomas A. Mensah serves
as President of the Tribunal. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as the
Registry in the proceedings.
Further information about the case may be
found at www.pcacases.com/web/view/7,
including the Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, the Rules of Procedure, earlier
Press Releases, hearing transcripts, and
photographs. Procedural Orders,
submissions by the Philippines, and reports
by the Tribunal’s experts will be made
available in due course, as will unofficial
65
Chinese translations of the Tribunal’s etc. The Registry also serves as the
Awards. channel of communications amongst the
Parties and the Tribunal and observer
States.
Background to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration
SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL’S
DECISIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is
AND ON THE MERITS OF THE
an intergovernmental organization
PHILIPPINES ’ CLAIMS
established by the 1899 Hague Convention
on the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes. The PCA has 121 Member
1. Background to the Arbitration
States. Headquartered at the Peace Palace
in The Hague, the Netherlands, the PCA
facilitates arbitration, conciliation, fact-
finding, and other dispute resolution The South China Sea Arbitration between
proceedings among various combinations of the Philippines and China concerned an
States, State entities, intergovernmental application by the Philippines for rulings in
organizations, and private parties. The respect of four matters concerning the
PCA’s International Bureau is currently relationship between the Philippines and
administering 8 interstate disputes, 73 China in the South China Sea. First, the
investor-State arbitrations, and 34 cases Philippines sought a ruling on the source of
arising under contracts involving a State or the Parties’ rights and obligations in the
other public entity. The PCA has South China Sea and the effect of the
administered 12 cases initiated by States United Nations Convention on the Law of
under Annex VII to the United Nations the Sea (“Convention”) on China’s claims to
Convention on the Law of the Sea. historic rights within its so-called ‘nine-dash
line’. Second, the Philippines sought a ruling
on whether certain maritime features
claimed by both China and the Philippines
In July 2013, the Tribunal in the South
are properly characterized as islands, rocks,
China Sea Arbitration appointed the PCA to
low-tide elevations or submerged banks
serve as Registry for the proceedings. The
under the Convention. The status of these
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provide that
features under the Convention determines
the PCA shall “maintain an archive of the
the maritime zones they are capable of
arbitral proceedings and provide appropriate
generating. Third, the Philippines sought
registry services as directed by the Arbitral
rulings on whether certain Chinese actions
Tribunal.” Such services include assisting
in the South China Sea have violated the
with the identification and appointment of
Convention, by interfering with the exercise
experts; publishing information about the
of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and
arbitration and issuing press releases;
freedoms under the Convention or through
organizing the hearings at the Peace Palace
construction and fishing activities that have
in The Hague; and the financial
harmed the marine environment. Finally, the
management of the case, which involves
Philippines sought a ruling that certain
holding a deposit for expenses in the
actions taken by China, in particular its
arbitration, such as to pay arbitrator fees,
large-scale land reclamation and
experts, technical support, court reporters

66
construction of artificial islands in the
Spratly Islands since this arbitration was
commenced, have unlawfully aggravated
and extended the Parties’ dispute.
The Chinese Government has adhered to
the position of neither accepting nor
participating in these arbitral proceedings. It
has reiterated this position in diplomatic
notes, in the “Position Paper of the
Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines” dated 7
December 2014 (“China’s Position Paper”),
in letters to members of the Tribunal from
the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, and in many public
statements. The Chinese Government has
also made clear that these statements and
documents “shall by no means be
interpreted as China’s participation in the
arbitral proceeding in any form.”
Two provisions of the Convention address
the situation of a party that objects to the
jurisdiction of a tribunal and declines to
participate in the proceedings:
(a) Article 288 of the Convention provides
that: “In the event of a dispute as to whether
a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by decision of that
court or tribunal.”
(b) Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention
provides that:
If one of the parties to the dispute does not
appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to
defend its case, the other party may request
the tribunal to continue the proceedings and
to make its award. Absence of a party or
failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before
making its award, the arbitral tribunal must
satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction
over the dispute but also that the claim is
well founded in fact and law.
Throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal
has taken a number of steps to fulfil its duty
to satisfy itself as to whether it has
jurisdiction and whether the Philippines’
claims are “well founded in fact and law”.
With respect to jurisdiction, the Tribunal
decided to treat China’s informal
communications as equivalent to an
objection to jurisdiction, convened a Hearing
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 7 to 13
July 2015, questioned the Philippines both
before and during the hearing on matters of
jurisdiction, including potential issues not
raised in China’s informal communications,
and issued an Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility on 29 October 2015 (the
“Award on Jurisdiction”), deciding some
issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for
further consideration in conjunction with the
merits of the Philippines’ claims. With
respect to the merits, the Tribunal sought to
test the accuracy of the Philippines’ claims
by requesting further written submissions
from the Philippines, by convening a
hearing on the merits from 24 to 30
November 2015, by questioning the
Philippines both before and during the
hearing with respect to its claims, by
appointing independent experts to report to
the Tribunal on technical matters, and by
obtaining historical records and
hydrographic survey data for the South
China Sea from the archives of the United
Kingdom Hydrographic Office, the National
Library of France, and the French National
Overseas Archives and providing it to the
67
Parties for comment, along with other
relevant materials in the public domain.
2. The Parties’ Positions
The Philippines made 15 Submissions in
these proceedings, requesting the Tribunal
to find that:
(1) China’s maritime entitlements in the
South China Sea, like those of the
Philippines, may not extend beyond those
expressly permitted by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea;
(2) China’s claims to sovereign rights
jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with
respect to the maritime areas of the South
China Sea encompassed by the so-called
“nine-dash line” are contrary to the
Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime
entitlements expressly permitted by
UNCLOS;
(3) Scarborough Shoal generates no
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf;
(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal,
and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that
do not generate entitlement to a territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf, and are not features that are capable
of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
(5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas
Shoal are part of the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf of the
Philippines;
(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef
(including Hughes Reef) are low-tide
elevations that do not generate entitlement
to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf, but their low-water line
may be used to determine the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of
Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is
measured;
(7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery
Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf;
(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the
enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign
rights of the Philippines with respect to the
living and non-living resources of its
exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf;
(9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its
nationals and vessels from exploiting the
living resources in the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines;
(10) China has unlawfully prevented
Philippine fishermen from pursuing their
livelihoods by interfering with traditional
fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
(11) China has violated its obligations under
the Convention to protect and preserve the
marine environment at Scarborough Shoal,
Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef,
68
Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson
Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;
(12) China’s occupation of and construction
activities on Mischief Reef
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention
concerning artificial islands, installations
and structures;
(b) violate China’s duties to protect and
preserve the marine environment under the
Convention; and
(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted
appropriation in violation of the Convention;
(13) China has breached its obligations
under the Convention by operating its law
enforcement vessels in a dangerous
manner, causing serious risk of collision to
Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity
of Scarborough Shoal;
(14) Since the commencement of this
arbitration in January 2013, China has
unlawfully aggravated and extended the
dispute by, among other things:
(a) interfering with the Philippines’ rights of
navigation in the waters at, and adjacent to,
Second Thomas Shoal;
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of
Philippine personnel stationed at Second
Thomas Shoal;
(c) endangering the health and well-being of
Philippine personnel stationed at Second
Thomas Shoal; and
(d) conducting dredging, artificial island-
building and construction activities at
Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross
Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes
Reef and Subi Reef; and
(15) China shall respect the rights and
freedoms of the Philippines under the
Convention, shall comply with its duties
under the Convention, including those
relevant to the protection and preservation
of the marine environment in the South
China Sea, and shall exercise its rights and
freedoms in the South China Sea with due
regard to those of the Philippines under the
Convention.
With respect to jurisdiction, the Philippines
has asked the Tribunal to declare that the
Philippines’ claims “are entirely within its
jurisdiction and are fully admissible.”
China does not accept and is not
participating in this arbitration but stated its
position that the Tribunal “does not have
jurisdiction over this case.” In its Position
Paper, China advanced the following
arguments:
The essence of the subject-matter of the
arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over
several maritime features in the South
China Sea, which is beyond the scope of
the Convention and does not concern the
interpretation or application of the
Convention;
69
China and the Philippines have agreed,
through bilateral instruments and the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, to settle their relevant
disputes through negotiations. By
unilaterally initiating the present arbitration,
the Philippines has breached its obligation
under international law;
Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-
matter of the arbitration were concerned
with the interpretation or application of the
Convention, that subject-matter would
constitute an integral part of maritime
delimitation between the two countries, thus
falling within the scope of the declaration
filed by China in 2006 in accordance with
the Convention, which excludes, inter alia,
disputes concerning maritime delimitation
from compulsory arbitration and other
compulsory dispute settlement procedures;
Although China has not made equivalent
public statements with respect to the merits
of the majority of the Philippines’ claims, the
Tribunal has sought throughout the
proceedings to ascertain China’s position on
the basis of its contemporaneous public
statements and diplomatic correspondence.
3. The Tribunal’s Decisions on the Scope of
its Jurisdiction
The Tribunal has addressed the scope of its
jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’
claims both in its Award on Jurisdiction, to
the extent that issues of jurisdiction could be
decided as a preliminary matter, and in its
Award of 12 July 2016, to the extent that
issues of jurisdiction were intertwined with
the merits of the Philippines’ claims. The
Tribunal’s Award of 12 July 2016 also
incorporates and reaffirms the decisions on
jurisdiction taken in the Award on
Jurisdiction.
For completeness, the Tribunal’s decisions
on jurisdiction in both awards are
summarized here together.
a. Preliminary Matters
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal
considered a number of preliminary matters
with respect to its jurisdiction. The Tribunal
noted that both the Philippines and China
are parties to the Convention and that the
Convention does not permit a State to
except itself generally from the mechanism
for the resolution of disputes set out in the
Convention. The Tribunal held that China’s
non-participation does not deprive the
Tribunal of jurisdiction and that the Tribunal
had been properly constituted pursuant to
the provisions of Annex VII to the
Convention, which include a procedure to
form a tribunal even in the absence of one
party. Finally, the Tribunal rejected an
argument set out in China’s Position Paper
and held that the mere act of unilaterally
initiating an arbitration cannot constitute an
abuse of the Convention.
b. Existence of a Dispute Concerning
Interpretation and Application of the
Convention
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal
considered whether the Parties’ disputes
concerned the interpretation or application
of the Convention, which is a requirement
for resort to the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the Convention.
The Tribunal rejected the argument set out
in China’s Position Paper that the Parties’
70
dispute is actually about territorial
sovereignty and therefore not a matter
concerning the Convention. The Tribunal
accepted that there is a dispute between the
Parties concerning sovereignty over islands
in the South China Sea, but held that the
matters submitted to arbitration by the
Philippines do not concern sovereignty. The
Tribunal considered that it would not need
to implicitly decide sovereignty to address
the Philippines’ Submissions and that doing
so would not advance the sovereignty
claims of either Party to islands in the South
China Sea.
The Tribunal also rejected the argument set
out in China’s Position Paper that the
Parties’ dispute is actually about maritime
boundary delimitation and therefore
excluded from dispute settlement by Article
298 of the Convention and a declaration
that China made on 25 August 2006
pursuant to that Article. The Tribunal noted
that a dispute concerning whether a State
has an entitlement to a maritime zone is a
distinct matter from the delimitation of
maritime zones in an area in which they
overlap. The Tribunal noted that
entitlements, together with a wide variety of
other issues, are commonly considered in a
boundary delimitation, but can also arise in
other contexts. The Tribunal held that it
does not follow that a dispute over each of
these issues is necessarily a dispute over
boundary delimitation.
Finally, the Tribunal held that each of the
Philippines’ Submissions reflected a dispute
concerning the Convention. In doing so, the
Tribunal emphasized (a) that a dispute
concerning the interaction between the
Convention and other rights (including any
Chinese “historic rights”) is a dispute
concerning the Convention and (b) that
where China has not clearly stated its
position, the existence of a dispute may be
inferred from the conduct of a State or from
silence and is a matter to be determined
objectively.
c. Involvement of Indispensable Third-
Parties
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal
considered whether the absence from this
arbitration of other States that have made
claims to the islands of the South China Sea
would be a bar to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The Tribunal noted that the rights of other
States would not form “the very subject-
matter of the decision,” the standard for a
third-party to be indispensable. The Tribunal
further noted that in December 2014, Viet
Nam had submitted a statement to the
Tribunal, in which Viet Nam asserted that it
has “no doubt that the Tribunal has
jurisdiction in these proceedings.” The
Tribunal also noted that Viet Nam, Malaysia,
and Indonesia had attended the hearing on
jurisdiction as observers, without any State
raising the argument that its participation
was indispensable.
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
noted that it had received a communication
from Malaysia on 23 June 2016, recalling
Malaysia’s claims in the South China Sea.
The Tribunal compared its decisions on the
merits of the Philippines’ Submissions with
the rights claimed by Malaysia and
reaffirmed its decision that Malaysia is not
an indispensable party and that Malaysia’s
interests in the South China Sea do not
prevent the Tribunal from addressing the
Philippines’ Submissions.
d. Preconditions to Jurisdiction
71
 China insisted that only bilateral talks could
be considered.
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal
considered the applicability of Articles 281
and 282 of the Convention, which may
e. Exceptions and Limitations to Jurisdiction
prevent a State from making use of the
mechanisms under the Convention if they
have already agreed to another means of
dispute resolution. In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
considered whether the Philippines’
Submissions concerning Chinese historic
rights and the ‘nine-dash line’ were affected
The Tribunal rejected the argument set out
by the exception from jurisdiction for
in China’s Position Paper that the 2002
disputes concerning “historic title” in Article
China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct
298 of the Convention. The Tribunal
of Parties in the South China Sea prevented
reviewed the meaning of “historic title” in the
the Philippines from initiating arbitration.
law of the sea and held that this refers to
The Tribunal held that the Declaration is a
claims of historic sovereignty over bays and
political agreement and not legally binding,
other near-shore waters. Reviewing China’s
does not provide a mechanism for binding
claims and conduct in the South China Sea,
settlement, does not exclude other means
the Tribunal concluded that China claims
of dispute settlement, and therefore does
historic rights to resources within the ‘nine-
not restrict the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under
dash line’, but does not claim historic title
Articles 281 or 282. The Tribunal also
over the waters of the South China Sea.
considered the Treaty of Amity and
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that it
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the
had jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’
Convention on Biological Diversity, and a
claims concerning historic rights and, as
series of joint statements issued by the
between the Philippines and China, the
Philippines and China referring to the
‘nine-dash line’.
resolution of disputes through negotiations
and concluded that none of these
instruments constitute an agreement that
would prevent the Philippines from bringing In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
its claims to arbitration. also considered whether the Philippines’
Submissions were affected by the exception
from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes
concerning sea boundary delimitation. The
The Tribunal further held that the Parties
Tribunal had already found in its Award on
had exchanged views regarding the
Jurisdiction that the Philippines’
settlement of their disputes, as required by
Submissions do not concern boundary
Article 283 of the Convention, before the
delimitation as such, but noted that several
Philippines initiated the arbitration. The
of the Philippines’ Submissions were
Tribunal concluded that this requirement
dependent on certain areas forming part of
was met in the record of diplomatic
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
communications between the Philippines
The Tribunal held that it could only address
and China, in which the Philippines
such submissions if there was no possibility
expressed a clear preference for multilateral
that China could have an entitlement to an
negotiations involving the other States
exclusive economic zone overlapping that of
surrounding the South China Sea, while
the Philippines and deferred a final decision

72
on its jurisdiction. In its Award of 12 July
2016, the Tribunal reviewed evidence about
the reefs and islands claimed by China in
the South China Sea and concluded that
none is capable of generating an
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone.
Because China has no possible entitlement
to an exclusive economic zone overlapping
that of the Philippines in the Spratly Islands,
the Tribunal held that the Philippines’
submissions were not dependent on a prior
delimitation of a boundary.
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
also considered whether the Philippines’
Submissions were affected by the exception
from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes
concerning law enforcement activities in the
exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal
recalled that the exception in Article 298
would apply only if the Philippines’
Submissions related to law enforcement
activities in China’s exclusive economic
zone. Because, however, the Philippines’
Submissions related to events in the
Philippines’ own exclusive economic zone
or in the territorial sea, the Tribunal
concluded that Article 298 did not pose an
obstacle to its jurisdiction.
Lastly, in its Award of 12 July 2016, the
Tribunal considered whether the Philippines’
submissions were affected by the exception
from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes
concerning military activities. The Tribunal
considered that the stand-off between
Philippine marines on Second Thomas
Shoal and Chinese naval and law
enforcement vessels constituted military
activities and concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the Philippines’ Submission
No. 14(a)-(c). The Tribunal also considered
whether China’s land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands at seven
features in the Spratly Islands constituted
military activities, but noted that China had
repeatedly emphasized the non-military
nature of its actions and had stated at the
highest level that it would not militarize its
presence in the Spratlys. The Tribunal
decided that it would not deem activities to
be military in nature when China itself had
repeatedly affirmed the opposite.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that
Article 298 did not pose an obstacle to its
jurisdiction.
4. The Tribunal’s Decisions on the Merits of
the Philippines’ Claims
a. The ‘Nine-Dash Line’ and China’s Claim
to Historic Rights in the Maritime Areas of
the South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
considered the implications of China’s ‘nine-
dash line’ and whether China has historic
rights to resources in the South China Sea
beyond the limits of the maritime zones that
it is entitled to pursuant to the Convention.
The Tribunal examined the history of the
Convention and its provisions concerning
maritime zones and concluded that the
Convention was intended to
comprehensively allocate the rights of
States to maritime areas. The Tribunal
noted that the question of pre-existing rights
to resources (in particular fishing resources)
was carefully considered during the
negotiations on the creation of the exclusive
economic zone and that a number of States
wished to preserve historic fishing rights in
the new zone. This position was rejected,
however, and the final text of the
Convention gives other States only a limited
right of access to fisheries in the exclusive
73
economic zone (in the event the coastal
State cannot harvest the full allowable
catch) and no rights to petroleum or mineral
resources. The Tribunal found that China’s
claim to historic rights to resources was
incompatible with the detailed allocation of
rights and maritime zones in the Convention
and concluded that, to the extent China had
historic rights to resources in the waters of
the South China Sea, such rights were
extinguished by the entry into force of the
Convention to the extent they were
incompatible with the Convention’s system
of maritime zones.
The Tribunal also examined the historical
record to determine whether China actually
had historic rights to resources in the South
China Sea prior to the entry into force of the
Convention. The Tribunal noted that there is
evidence that Chinese navigators and
fishermen, as well as those of other States,
had historically made use of the islands in
the South China Sea, although the Tribunal
emphasized that it was not empowered to
decide the question of sovereignty over the
islands. However, the Tribunal considered
that prior to the Convention, the waters of
the South China Sea beyond the territorial
sea were legally part of the high seas, in
which vessels from any State could freely
navigate and fish. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that historical navigation and
fishing by China in the waters of the South
China Sea represented the exercise of high
seas freedoms, rather than a historic right,
and that there was no evidence that China
had historically exercised exclusive control
over the waters of the South China Sea or
prevented other States from exploiting their
resources.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, as
between the Philippines and China, there
was no legal basis for China to claim
historic rights to resources, in excess of the
rights provided for by the Convention, within
the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash
line’.
b. The Status of Features in the South
China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
considered the status of features in the
South China Sea and the entitlements to
maritime areas that China could potentially
claim pursuant to the Convention.
The Tribunal first undertook a technical
evaluation as to whether certain coral reefs
claimed by China are or are not above
water at high tide. Under Articles 13 and
121 of the Convention, features that are
above water at high tide generate an
entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile
territorial sea, whereas features that are
submerged at high tide generate no
entitlement to maritime zones. The Tribunal
noted that many of the reefs in the South
China Sea have been heavily modified by
recent land reclamation and construction
and recalled that the Convention classifies
features on the basis of their natural
condition. The Tribunal appointed an expert
hydrographer to assist it in evaluating the
Philippines’ technical evidence and relied
heavily on archival materials and historical
hydrographic surveys in evaluating the
features. The Tribunal agreed with the
Philippines that Scarborough Shoal,
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery
Cross Reef are high-tide features and that
Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and
Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at
high tide in their natural condition. However,
the Tribunal disagreed with the Philippines
regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North)
74
and McKennan Reef and concluded that
both are high tide features.
The Tribunal then considered whether any
of the features claimed by China could
generate an entitlement to maritime zones
beyond 12 nautical miles. Under Article 121
of the Convention, islands generate an
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone
of 200 nautical miles and to a continental
shelf, but “[r]ocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf.” The Tribunal noted that
this provision was closely linked to the
expansion of coastal State jurisdiction with
the creation of the exclusive economic zone
and was intended to prevent insignificant
features from generating large entitlements
to maritime zones that would infringe on the
entitlements of inhabited territory or on the
high seas and the area of the seabed
reserved for the common heritage of
mankind. The Tribunal interpreted Article
121 and concluded that the entitlements of
a feature depend on (a) the objective
capacity of a feature, (b) in its natural
condition, to sustain either (c) a stable
community of people or (d) economic
activity that is neither dependent on outside
resources nor purely extractive in nature.
The Tribunal noted that many of the
features in the Spratly Islands are currently
controlled by one or another of the littoral
States, which have constructed installations
and maintain personnel there. The Tribunal
considered these modern presences to be
dependent on outside resources and
support and noted that many of the features
have been modified to improve their
habitability, including through land
reclamation and the construction of
infrastructure such as desalination plants.
The Tribunal concluded that the current
presence of official personnel on many of
the features does not establish their
capacity, in their natural condition, to
sustain a stable community of people and
considered that historical evidence of
habitation or economic life was more
relevant to the objective capacity of the
features. Examining the historical record,
the Tribunal noted that the Spratly Islands
were historically used by small groups of
fishermen from China, as well as other
States, and that several Japanese fishing
and guano mining enterprises were
attempted in the 1920s and 1930s. The
Tribunal concluded that temporary use of
the features by fishermen did not amount to
inhabitation by a stable community and that
all of the historical economic activity had
been extractive in nature. Accordingly, the
Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide
features in the Spratly Islands (including, for
example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island,
Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West
Cay) are legally “rocks” that do not generate
an exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.
The Tribunal also held that the Convention
does not provide for a group of islands such
as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime
zones collectively as a unit.
c. Chinese Activities in the South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal
considered the lawfulness under the
Convention of various Chinese actions in
the South China Sea.
Having found that Mischief Reef, Second
Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are
submerged at high tide, form part of the
75
exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the Philippines, and are not
overlapped by any possible entitlement of
China, the Tribunal concluded that the
Convention is clear in allocating sovereign
rights to the Philippines with respect to sea
areas in its exclusive economic zone. The
Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China
had (a) interfered with Philippine petroleum
exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to
prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,
(c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese
fishermen from fishing within the
Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal,
and (d) constructed installations and
artificial islands at Mischief Reef without the
authorization of the Philippines. The
Tribunal therefore concluded that China had
violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights
with respect to its exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf.
The Tribunal next examined traditional
fishing at Scarborough Shoal and concluded
that fishermen from the Philippines, as well
as fishermen from China and other
countries, had long fished at the Shoal and
had traditional fishing rights in the area.
Because Scarborough Shoal is above water
at high tide, it generates an entitlement to a
territorial sea, its surrounding waters do not
form part of the exclusive economic zone,
and traditional fishing rights were not
extinguished by the Convention. Although
the Tribunal emphasized that it was not
deciding sovereignty over Scarborough
Shoal, it found that China had violated its
duty to respect to the traditional fishing
rights of Philippine fishermen by halting
access to the Shoal after May 2012. The
Tribunal noted, however, that it would reach
the same conclusion with respect to the
traditional fishing rights of Chinese
fishermen if the Philippines were to prevent
fishing by Chinese nationals at Scarborough
Shoal.
The Tribunal also considered the effect of
China’s actions on the marine environment.
In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by
three independent experts on coral reef
biology who were appointed to assist it in
evaluating the available scientific evidence
and the Philippines’ expert reports. The
Tribunal found that China’s recent large
scale land reclamation and construction of
artificial islands at seven features in the
Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to
the coral reef environment and that China
has violated its obligation under Articles 192
and 194 of the Convention to preserve and
protect the marine environment with respect
to fragile ecosystems and the habitat of
depleted, threatened, or endangered
species. The Tribunal also found that
Chinese fishermen have engaged in the
harvesting of endangered sea turtles, coral,
and giant clams on a substantial scale in the
South China Sea, using methods that inflict
severe damage on the coral reef
environment. The Tribunal found that
Chinese authorities were aware of these
activities and failed to fulfill their due
diligence obligations under the Convention
to stop them.
Finally, the Tribunal considered the
lawfulness of the conduct of Chinese law
enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal
on two occasions in April and May 2012
when Chinese vessels had sought to
physically obstruct Philippine vessels from
approaching or gaining entrance to the
Shoal. In doing so, the Tribunal was
assisted by an independent expert on
navigational safety who was appointed to
assist it in reviewing the written reports
provided by the officers of the Philippine
vessels and the expert evidence on
76
navigational safety provided by the e. Future Conduct of the Parties
Philippines. The Tribunal found that
Chinese law enforcement vessels had
repeatedly approached the Philippine Finally, the Tribunal considered the
vessels at high speed and sought to cross Philippines’ request for a declaration that,
ahead of them at close distances, creating going forward, China shall respect the rights
serious risk of collision and danger to and freedoms of the Philippines and comply
Philippine ships and personnel. The with its duties under the Convention. In this
Tribunal concluded that China had respect, the Tribunal noted that both the
breached its obligations under the Philippines and China have repeatedly
Convention on the International Regulations accepted that the Convention and general
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and obligations of good faith define and regulate
Article 94 the Convention concerning their conduct. The Tribunal considered that
maritime safety. the root of the disputes at issue in this
arbitration lies not in any intention on the
part of China or the Philippines to infringe
d. Aggravation of the Dispute between the on the legal rights of the other, but rather in
Parties fundamentally different understandings of
their respective rights under the Convention
in the waters of the South China Sea. The
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal Tribunal recalled that it is a fundamental
considered whether China’s recent large- principle of international law that bad faith is
scale land reclamation and construction of not presumed and noted that Article 11 of
artificial islands at seven features in the Annex VII provides that the “award . . . shall
Spratly Islands since the commencement of be complied with by the parties to the
the arbitration had aggravated the dispute dispute.” The Tribunal therefore considered
between the Parties. The Tribunal recalled that no further declaration was necessary.
that there exists a duty on parties engaged
in a dispute settlement procedure to refrain
from aggravating or extending the dispute or
disputes at issue during the pendency of the
settlement process. The Tribunal noted that
China has (a) built a large artificial island on
Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation located
in the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines; (b) caused permanent,
irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem
and (c) permanently destroyed evidence of
the natural condition of the features in
question. The Tribunal concluded that China
had violated its obligations to refrain from
aggravating or extending the Parties’
disputes during the pendency of the
settlement process.

77
Republic vs. Provincial Government of
Palawan
The province of Palawan has lost its claim
to 40% of the total government earnings
from the Camago-Malampaya gas project
after the Supreme Court unanimously ruled
against the local government.
Under the contract, the national government
is entitled to 60% of the net proceeds from
sale. The province of Palawan claimed that
under the Local Government Code and the
1987 Constitution, it is entitled to 40% of the
national government’s 60%.

This ends more than a decade of legal

battle for the province, which had argued it
Here are the relevant legal provisions they
was entitled to shares, which it estimated at
attached to their claim:
P35 billion as of 2009.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE: Section

The en banc voted 12-0 to grant the petition
290. Amount of Share of Local Government
of the national government. The decision
Units. – Local government units shall, in
was penned by now-retired associate justice
addition to the internal revenue allotment,
Noel Tijam, with concurrences from Chief
have a share of forty percent (40%) of the
Justice Lucas Bersamin and associate
gross collection derived by the national
justices Antonio Carpio, Diosdado Peralta,
government from the preceding fiscal year
Mariano del Castillo, Estela Perlas Bernabe,
from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and
Marbic Leonen, Benjamin Caguioa, Andres
fishery charges, and such other taxes, fees,
Reyes Jr, Alexander Gesmundo, Jose
or charges, including related surcharges,
Reyes Jr, and Ramon Paul Hernando.
interests, or fines, and from its share in any
co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreement in the utilization and
Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza did not
development of the national wealth within
take part in the voting, while Associate
their territorial jurisdiction.
Justice Rosmari Carandang was on leave.

CONSTITUTION: SECTION 7. Local

What was the petition about? In 1990, the
governments shall be entitled to an
Department of Energy entered into Service
equitable share in the proceeds of the
Contract No. 39 with Shell, which eventually
utilization and development of the national
became a consortium made up of Shell
wealth within their respective areas, in the
Philippines Exploration, Chevron
manner provided by law, including sharing
Malampaya LLC, and Philippine National Oil
the same with the inhabitants by way of
Company-Exploration Corporation (PNOC-
direct benefits.
EC).

In 2007, former president Gloria Macapagal

The government and the consortium was to
Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 683 that
explore the Camago-Malampaya reservoir
allowed Palawan "to securitize their
for gas.
respective shares in the 50% of the

78
disputed 40% of the Net Government Share
in the proceeds" while cases were ongoing.
Palawan never received any amount
despite Arroyo's EO, said Harry Roque, who
represented a group from Palawan that
petitioned the Supreme Court for the 40%
share.
What did the Supreme Court say? The en
banc ruled that Palawan is not entitled to
profit sharing, not based on the provisions
cited above, but because the Court said
jurisdiction refers only to land area.
The national government wanted the Court
to rule based on the provisions cited above,
but the Court said that to do so would
“render Section 7 of Article X nugatory for in
such case, it will not be possible for any
LGU to benefit from the utilization of
national wealth.”
Instead, the Court focused on the meaning
of jurisdiction as it applies to this case.
“Unless clearly expanded by Congress, the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its
land area,” said the Supreme Court in a 94-
page decision signed on December 4, 2018,
but only released to media on Wednesday,
January 23.
The SC relied on an earlier decision in Tan
vs Comelec, where the High Court
“interpreted territory to refer only to the
mass of land above sea water and excludes
the waters over which the political unit
exercises control.”
“Tan, in fact, establishes that a Local
Government Unit (LGU) may have control
over the waters but may not necessarily
claim them as part of their territory. This
supports the Court's finding that the
exercise of authority does not determine the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction,” the SC said.
Palawan argued that its prosecutors and
courts had handled complaints of illegal
fishing in the area, and therefore means that
they have jurisdiction in that part of the
ocean.
The SC did not agree, saying: “The LGU's
authority to adopt and implement measures
to protect the environment does not
determine the extent of its territorial
jurisdiction.”
Palawan also invoked Presidential Decree
No. 1596, which constituted the Kalayaan
Island Group. PD 1596 included the sea-
bed, sub-soil, continental marching and air
space in the jurisdiction of the Kalayaan
islands. The decree also declared Kalayaan
as a “distinct and separate municipality of
the Province of Palawan.”
The SC said Palawan could not use the
decree for this purpose because it referred
to Kalayaan only.
“To hold otherwise is to expand the
province's territory, as presently defined by
law, without the requisite legislation and
plebiscite,” said the justices.
79
Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA
792
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The
subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines;
All the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present.—Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class
suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that
the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said
civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’
personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.—This case, however, has a
special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time
the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generation
to come.—Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses
on one specific fundamental legal right; The
right to a balanced and healthful ecology.—
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right—the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation’s constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.—The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
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Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance
the said right.—Thus, the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987—to protect and advance the
said right.
Same; Political Question; The political
question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield
that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review.—The
foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
cannot be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.
Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause;
A timber license is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.—
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights.—A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37
C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber
licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked.—
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the
non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.—In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.
Syllabus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
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Facts:
The petitioners are minors represented and
joined by their parents, and the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation. They
instituted a class suit as taxpayers who are
all entitled to the enjoyment of the natural
resources of the Philippines, specifically, the
virgin tropical forests. They pray for the
cancellation of all existing timber license
agreements (TLAs) and the cessation of the
issuance of new TLAs. The petitioners claim
that “they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn.”
The complaint alleges that to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, “the
country’s land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of 54 percent for forest cover
and 46 percent for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses.”
Moreover, it alleges that due to the
degradation and deforestation of the forests,
there are a number of environmental
tragedies in the country. The petitioners
base their cause of action on scientific
evidence of the adverse effects of
deforestation as a result of the issuance of
the TLAs of the public respondents.
Public respondents assert that there is no
cause of action, and that the question raised
by the petitioners is a political question that
should be directed towards the legislative or
executive branches of the government. The
lower court granted the motion to dismiss,
thus the petitioners were constrained to file
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have a cause of
action to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment” of Philippine rainforests and
“arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country’s vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.”
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action.
The complaint of the petitioners is based on
the Right to a Balanced and Healthful
Ecology as provided in Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution. Although this right
falls under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies, the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is not less important than
the civil and political rights under the Bill of
Rights. “Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation – aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners – the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions.” The reason
why this right is placed under Article II of the
Constitution is to emphasize the importance
of the State’s obligation to preserve the
Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology,
and to protect and advance the Right to
Health.
The Supreme Court also held that “the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.” Section 3 of EO
No. 192 declares as a policy of the State “to
ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use
of the country’s natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for future
generations as well.” This declaration is
affirmed in Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and included
as part of the DENR’s responsibility to carry
out “the State’s constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration,
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development, utilization, and conservation
of the country’s natural resources.”
Therefore, it is definite that the petitioners
have the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) has the
duty to protect and advance such right. The
violation of the petitioners’ right gives rise to
a cause of action. The Supreme Court thus
held that the full protection of the
environment requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

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