Republic of the Philippines

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN PHILIPPINES

College of Law
Vigan City

Special Proceedings
Prosecutor Elizabeth Garcia Bringas, JD
Every Mondays, 5:30 – 7:30 pm

I. Rule 72

REPUBLIC VS CA, MADRONA

G.R. NO. 163604 6 MAY 2005

SHEKER VS SHEKER

G.R. NO. 157912 13 DECEMBER 2007

REYES VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 12956 10 APRIL 2008

CHING ET.AL VS RODRIGUEZ

GR 192828 28 NOVEMBER 2011

II. Rule 73, Section 1

MENDOZA VS TEH et.al

G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

REPUBLIC VS VILLARAMA
G.R. No. 117733. September 5, 1997
 MALOLES II VS PHILIPPS

G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000

MALOLES II VS COURT OF APPEALS, Gorospe

GR No. 129505. 31 January 2000

NITTSCHER VS DR NITTSCHER

G.R. No. 160530 20 November 2007

III. Rule 73, Section 2

CORTES VS CA & RESELVA

G.R. No. 117417 21 September 21 2000

IV. Rule 74, Section 1 NERI, ET AL. VS HEIRS OF UY

GR NO. 194366 10 OCTOBER 2012

HEIRS OF TEVES VS CA, HEIRS OF IT – IT

G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999

TAN VS. BENOLIRAO

GR NO. 153820 16 OCTOBER 2009

REILLO et. al vs SAN JOSE

GR 166393 18 JUNE 2009

V. Rule 75, Section 1

ANTONIO BALTAZAR et al. VS. LORENZO LAXA
GR NO. 174489, 11 APRIL 2012

VI. Rule 75, Sections 2 – 5

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R.No. 176831 15 January 2010

VII. Rule 76, Sections 1 -2 PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS

 G.R. No. 169144 26 JANUARY 2011

VIII. Rule 76, Sections 3 -5

DY YIENG SEANGIO, et al. vs. REYES, et al.
G.R. NO. 140371-72 / 27 NOVEMBER 2006

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MADRONA

G.R. No. 163604
May 6, 2005

FACTS: In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse

Clemente P. Jomoc, the Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the basis of the
Commissioners Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his
petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41,
par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding

HELD: Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant
petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The
petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of
absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right
or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000
denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in
the nature of a special proceeding,OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice
of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court .

SHEKER VS SHEKER

G.R. NO. 157912 13 DECEMBER 2007

FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria
Medina.
Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the
estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in
the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for
selling some properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses
he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the
money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification
of non-forum shopping thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum
shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at
bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather
upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. Under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to
file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of
the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental
matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.
REYES VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 12956 10 APRIL 2008

FACTS: The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with
an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu. The petitioners
contended that they are the legal heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject
parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes involving a portion of the subject
parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of over the same
property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was
cancelled and new TCTs were issued. Respondents alleges that their predecessor-in-
interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera owned pro-indiviso
share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m They further allege that Spouses
Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who died single and without issue,
and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann. who
succeeded their parents rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject
parcel of land.During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus,
making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land.
Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah
Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners
Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to
Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez , also their co-respondents. After the sale,
Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they
discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so, which are the following:
(1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No.
1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes
dated
July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m.
belongs to
Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes,
Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the
Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the
herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto
Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned
documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision
of the subject property. Upon the motion of the petitioners, The RTC dismissed the case
on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to
be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they cannot demand the partition of the
real property without first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an
ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically
instituted for the purpose. The case was elevated to the CA who reversed the decision
of the RTC. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil
action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title
issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents.

HELD: The Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an
ordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive competence of the court in a
special proceeding. In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an
action for the Declaration of NonExistency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being
asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim
co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely onefourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance. In the same manner, the respondents
herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there
anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have
themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial
court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is
instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship
was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right
the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered
co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title
that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in
the proper forum. In the present case, nothing in the records of this case shows that the
only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had
respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as
heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned
documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a
determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
CHING ET.AL VS RODRIGUEZ GR 192828 28 NOVEMBER 2011

FACTS: The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del
Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and
Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining
Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction." In the complaint, the respondents alleged
that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented himself as
Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificated merely simulated;
(2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior to the conclusion of
the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the formers estate and illegally
transferred to his name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked
respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of
P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered
under Ramons name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged
document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate
to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in
Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land,
which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del
Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his
representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of
Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching;
and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard
to the issues which could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an
ordinary civil action
HELD: No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both
ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA
that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition
of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have
the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that
there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue
influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then
claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by
Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void
as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a
declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of
the civil case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case
was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon.
In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the
respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the
dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was not instituted to conclusively resolve
the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate,
hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be
strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if
their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters
which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
MENDOZA VS TEH et.al
 G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

FACTS: On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate
estate of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Batangas a complaint for reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in
Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction, complaint states: that
Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late
Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B.
Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993; that Adelia C. Mendoza should be
appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her coplaintiff for
purposes of this case. Private respondents filed their answer with motion to dismiss
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioner’s demand had
already been paid. On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading
entitled motion to dismiss invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action,
estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of
administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for
reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that
the allegation seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter which is
not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents
argued that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death,
the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in
accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their
argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking
appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
the whole case?
HELD: No. Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) (4) In all matters of probate, both testate
and intestate
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that: Metropolitan Trial Court shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate.
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property
worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC.
Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such
as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate
proceedings impliedly recognize the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of
letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of
estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the
estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted
the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with
venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions
involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in
this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased husband resides in
Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court.
 REPUBLIC VS VILLARAMA

G.R. No. 117733. September 5, 1997

FACTS: Republic of the Philippines is the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 10279.
The petition, filed on 16 October 1992, alleged that during his exile the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos executed his last will and testament in Hawaii, United States of
America, with his wife Imelda Trinidad R. Marcos and son Ferdinand R. Marcos II as
executors. Petitioner justified its action in filing the petition by claiming neglect on the
part of the testators heirs to initiate testate proceedings and the need to protect the
interest of the Philippine government in assessing and collecting the taxes due the
estate. It moved that Mrs. Marcos and Ferdinand II be declared incompetent as
executors and prayed that letters of administration be issued in favor of petitioners
nominee.
Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II opposed the motion claiming that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not a suitable person to act as administrator of
the estate.
After establishing the jurisdictional facts and concluding its presentation of evidence in
the probate court, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Appointment of Special
Administrator/s
In its Order of 9 September 1994, the probate court, per public respondent Judge
Villarama, granted the motion and appointed Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
as Special Administrator of the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Citing Section 1 of Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the order also declared that upon the filing of the petition for
probate of the will, the probate court acquired jurisdiction over the estate to the
exclusion of all other courts; and that the U.S. District Court of Hawaii cannot assert its
jurisdiction over the assets of the estate and exclude the jurisdiction already vested in
[the probate court].
In his Opposition Atty. Domingo also contended that the motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction was grossly insufficient both in form and substance, since it was
not verified and was deficient and baseless.; and that petitioners reliance on Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The words exclusive jurisdiction found
therein should be limited to proceedings concerning the probate of the will and
settlement of the estate of the decedent and should not include other litigation for or
against the estate. He argued that MDL No. 840 is an action for recovery of damages
arising out of the late President's tortuous violation of international law. The action is
totally unrelated to the probate proceedings. He reasoned that the probate court is of
limited jurisdiction and that it can only exercise jurisdiction over the property of the
estate in the Philippines.
Mrs. Marcos subsequently filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit its petition
in intervention, citing that petitioner failed to defend the interest of the estate of her late
husband. She claims that the proceeding undertaken by the special masters by virtue of
the reference order was a continuation of the trial of MDL No. 840, considering that (1) a
reference is the trial and determination of questions arising in litigation by a person
appointed for that purpose by the court wherein the case is pending; (2) a special
master is an officer of the appointing court; and (3) the applicable law pertaining to a
reference and a master is Section 53 of the U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts. Public respondent Judge then erred in considering the proceeding as one for
deposition as a mode of discovery. Accordingly, in denying the petition for injunction he
abdicated the jurisdiction of the probate court in favor of the U.S. District Court of
Hawaii; he even made a turn-about since earlier, in his 9 September 1994 Order, he
ruled that the Hawaii Court could not assert jurisdiction over the Marcos assets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction.
HELD: We dismiss the petition not only on the ground of mootness which, generally,
would justify dismissal. We dismiss it also for lack of merit.
It is settled that where the ground invoked in a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is abuse of discretion --as in this case -- the abuse must
be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility; or, it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. This remedy then is extraordinary, and its use is restricted to
truly extraordinary cases.
For another, Section 1 of Rule 73 refers to courts in the Philippines and simply means
that once a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is filed in
one of such courts, that court has exclusive jurisdiction over said estate and no other
special proceedings involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other
court. Since foreign courts are not contemplated in Section 1, in no way then can it be
validly maintained that the District Court of Hawaii has encroached upon, or impinged
on, the jurisdiction of the probate court by the issuance of the Reference Order. The
Reference Order cannot be construed as concerning or affecting the Marcos estate
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The duties of the special masters
as defined in the Reference Order were to prepare written findings for submission to the
jury regarding
(a) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture, summary execution
or disappearance, and (b) the extent of the damages sustained. No extravagant
imagination can lead us to a conclusion that such duties do not involve any issue
cognizable by the probate court.
Neither is there merit to the claim that the issuance and implementation of the
Reference Order violated the sovereignty of the Philippines. The decision of the lower
court is affirmed.
 MALOLES II VS PHILIPPS

G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000

FACTS: On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He
claimed he had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of
said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips.
On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting
the petition and allowing the will, the court found that the testator was of sound mind
and freely executed said will.
Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died
Petitioner (testator’s nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceased’s sister Alicia
de santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of
the deceased.
Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61,
but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC
Branch 65.
Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a
full blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was pending
in Branch 61.
Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61.
Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioner’s motion to intervene, and
denied taking cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in
Branch 65 involved the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61
was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and had already been decided
back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed it’s decision and again took
cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
probate proceedingsupon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de
Santos.

2. Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of letterstestamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos,
has a right tointervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed
by the respondent.

HELD: Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioner’s contention that that the proceedings
must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and
legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, sec. 1 of the Rules of Court is without
merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited
to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. This
was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos’ will during his lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73,
§1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts…

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in
Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising
each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and
incompatible with each other.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, sec. 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition
for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of
the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death.
Lastly, regarding petitioner’s claim as heir and creditor the Court said that

“The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all
his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being
a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his
reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not
supported by evidence.”

Thus, the Petition was denied.

MALOLES II VS COURT OF APPEALS, Gorospe

GR No. 129505. 31 January 2000

NATURE OF THE CASE: These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of
the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that
petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de
Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties
and some of the issues raised are the same.
FACTS: Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory
heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.

The Trial Court then granted the petition allowing the will. Arturo de Santos died shortly
thereafter.

Petitioner filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de
Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor
of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the
will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.

The Trial Court however appointed Private Respondent as executor of the estate in
which petitioner sought to intervene reiterating his allegations. The Trial Court granted
the Motion for intervention by the Petitioner.

Aggrieved, Private Respondent sought recourse with the Court of Appeals through
Petition for Certiorari which was granted accordingly.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to intervene.

RULING: Rule 79 states that any person interested in a will may state in writing the
grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as
executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent. Thus, even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he
cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire
estate by will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural
that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted
to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond
may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these
circumstances is present in this case.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED.
 NITTSCHER VS DR NITTSCHER

G.R. No. 160530 20 November 2007

FACTS: 31 January 1990, Dr. Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for
the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with
due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said
holographic will.
26 September 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters
testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers
surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the
said petition. However, the court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioners
motion to dismiss, and granted respondents petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but motion was denied for lack of merit. On May 9,
1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process. The
appellate court dismissed the appeal
Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident
of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims
that the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will actually belong to her. She
insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal
service the notices of the proceedings.
ISSUES: (1)Whether or not certificate of non_forum shopping is required. (2) Whether
or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. (3) Whether or not petitioner was denied
due process.
HELD:
(1) Revised Circular No. 28-9 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Court require
a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court.
However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an
initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of
Dr. Nittschers will. Hence, respondents failure to include a certification against
forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a
ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
(2) Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which
he had estate. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher
was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding,
which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time
and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless
there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again .

Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati
City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
(3) Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees,
and executors to be notified by mail or personally. If the testator asks for the
allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr.
Nittschers children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail,
of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss
the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the
letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced
petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners
allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husbands will is conclusive only as to
its due execution. The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. Thus, petitioners claim of title to the properties forming
part of her husbands estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular
courts.
CORTES VS CA & RESELVA

G.R. No. 117417 21 September 21 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent Milagros R. Cortes, and

Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses
Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May
13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a
house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at 173 Ilaw
St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will which
was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed
Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion
before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the
property, be ordered to vacate the property and turn over to said Executrix the
possession thereof. This is the motion which the respondent court granted in the
assailed order of October 18, 1993. The Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for
having been issued beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or
exclusively to the decedent.
HELD: Probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties. Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or
right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title
adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the
(probate) court.

Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the
late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of the
three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the
settlement of Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, when
the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate
court the question of title to property. Here, the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum
of society and a separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient. When the
controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or
exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs. The case at bar
falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court: “Where estate
upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."

NERI, ET AL. VS HEIRS OF UY GR NO. 194366 10 OCTOBER 2012

FACTS: Anunciacion Neri, during her lifetime, had seven children, two 2 from her first
marriage with Gonzalo namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five 5 from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri Enrique, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
Rosa. Spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties
with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte. On
September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal
capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with
Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties,
and thereafter, conveying them of the late spouses Uy for a consideration of
₱80,000.00. On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC assailing
the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint
was later amended to include Eutropia and Victorias additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first
marriage. In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the
sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the
homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion
from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed
further the defenses of prescription and laches. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale.
It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the year prohibitory period, the sale is still
void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that
Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and
Douglas. Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by
spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that
co-ownership rights are imprescriptible. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the
RTC and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the natural guardian under parental authority, has the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the minor.
HELD: No. Children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages are entitled to
inherit from her in equal shares. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion
should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them. While the settlement of the
estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with
respect to their proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were
minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and
father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. A father or mother, as the natural
guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter such power is granted by law only to a judicial
guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured
in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
 HEIRS OF TEVES VS CA, HEIRS OF IT – IT G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999

FACTS: Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo,
Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. After they
died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children
executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the
ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate
their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-
appellants Ricardo, son of Cresenciano, and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the
RTC of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance of two parcels of land
located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of
Asuncion Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and
the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs. They alleged that
defendantsappellees, without any justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels
of land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful shares. The present controversy involves
only Marcelina Cimafranca's one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as Lot 769-
A. On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves
executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale," adjudicating unto
themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares, interests and
participations over the same in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of
P425.00. A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale” was signed by
Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share over
Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00. The two
settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. In answer to plaintiffs-
appellants' charges of fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that the assailed
documents were executed with all the formalities required by law and are therefore
binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots
in question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their
rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights. The trial court ruled
in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with
costs against plaintiffs-appellants. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Teves
valid?
2. Whether or not the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement affect its
intrinsic validity?
HELD:
1. YES. For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following
conditions mustconcur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if
there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors,
the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and
appellate courts' factual finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffsappellants is
insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the extrajudicial settlements. The
deeds are public documents and it has been held by this Court that a public document
executed with all the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the
recitals contained therein. In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the
effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its
execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the
evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute
as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be
upheld. The appellate court's ruling that the evidence presented by plaintiffsappellants
does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to overcome
the positive value of the extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which
are public documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect by
the appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal. The division of Lot 769-A
was embodied in two deeds. The first extrajudicial settlement was entered into by
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956 , while the
second deed was executed in 1959 by Maria Teves. Cresenciano was not a signatory
to either settlement. However, in contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot
6409, the two extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude
Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of
Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal shares in favor of the
eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to
Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two
documents.
2. No. In the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule
74 of theRules of Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent's estate
and declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its
intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that — [t]he requirement that a partition be put
in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and
at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object
of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such
rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement
for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. Thus,
despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are legally
effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had
no creditors at the time of her death.

TAN VS. BENOLIRAO

 GR NO. 153820 16 OCTOBER 2009

FACTS: Spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and the Spouses Reynaldo and
Norma Taningco were the co-owners of a 689-square meter parcel of land (property)
located in Tagaytay City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26423.

On October 6, 1992, the co-owners executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the
property in favor of Tan for the price of P1,378,000.00. \

Pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan issued and delivered to the co-
owners/vendors Metrobank Check No. 904407 for P200,000.00 as down payment for
the property, for which the vendors issued a corresponding receipt.

On November 6, 1992, Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. Erlinda Benolirao (his widow
and one of the vendors of the property) and her children, as heirs of the deceased,
executed an extrajudicial settlement of Lambertos estate. On the basis of the
extrajudicial settlement, a new certificate of title over the property, TCT No. 27335, was
issued on March 26, 1993 in the names of the Spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco
and Erlinda Benolirao and her children. As stated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan
had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance of the purchase price. By agreement of the
parties, this period was extended by two months, so Tan had until May 15, 1993 to pay
the balance.

Tan failed to pay and asked for another extension, which the vendors again granted.
Notwithstanding this second extension, Tan still failed to pay the remaining balance due
on May 21, 1993. The vendors thus wrote him a letter demanding payment of the
balance of the purchase price within five (5) days from notice; otherwise, they would
declare the rescission of the conditional sale and the forfeiture of his down payment
based on the terms of the contract. Tan refused to comply with the vendors demand
and instead wrote them a letter claiming that the annotation on the title, made pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, constituted an encumbrance on the property that
would prevent the vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus, he alleged that he
could no longer be required to pay the balance of the purchase price and demanded the
return of his down payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not an annotation made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court on a certificate of title covering real property considered an encumbrance on
the property?

HELD: Yes. While Tan admits that he refused to pay the balance of the purchase price,
he claims that he had valid reason to do so the sudden appearance of an annotation on
the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, which Tan considered an
encumbrance on the property. The annotation placed on TCT No. 27335, the new title
issued to reflect the extrajudicial partition of Lamberto Benoliraos estate among his
heirs. |
This annotation was placed on the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules. Sec.
4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two
(2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which
have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his
lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by
order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute
in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require,against the
bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the
deceased, or both.

Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs,
or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made. The annotation,
therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property in favor of the
excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite the
annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the
rights of excluded parties.

The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation
clearly appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully
interferes with the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the
transfer within the two-year period provided by law.

REILLO et. al vs SAN JOSE

GR 166393 18 JUNE 2009

FACTS: Quiterio San Jose and Antonina Espiritu Santo are husband and wife. Both
died intestate in 1970 and 1976 respectively. They have five children, to wit: Virginia,
Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria, and Catalina.
In 1998, Virginia with the help of her husband (Zosimo Fernando, Sr.) and her children
(Cristina Reillo et al) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where they
made it appear that Virginia was the only heir of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina.
They adjudicated among themselves the estate and then later sold it to Ma. Teresa
Piñon.
Later, the other siblings found out about what Virginia did and so in October 1999, they
filed a complaint in RTC-Rizal for the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement
as well as the subsequent deed of sale.
In their answer, Reillo et al (children of the now deceased Virginia) admitted that their
grandparents (Quiterio and Antonina) indeed had five children and that their mom isn’t
the only heir. However, they alleged that what their mom adjudicated to herself is her
inheritance; that other than the parcel of land their mom adjudicated to herself, their
grandparents have 12 other parcels of land which are under the possession of Galicano
et al; that as such, they are filing a “compulsory” counterclaim for the partition of the
other 12 parcels of land.
Galicano et al then filed a motion for the court to render judgment on the pleadings. The
trial court granted the motion. The RTC ruled that the admission of Reillo et al that there
are 4 other heirs is proof that the extrajudicial settlement is void because the other heirs
were excluded. The RTC also ruled that Reillo et al’s counterclaim is not compulsory but
rather it is a permissive counterclaim. As such, Reillo et al should have paid docket fees
therefor but they failed to do so hence their counterclaim is dismissed. The RTC then
ordered the heirs to partition the estate according to the laws of intestate succession.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Reillo et al appealed the decision of the CA on the ground that the judgment on the
pleading is void; that it is the RTC’s fault why they failed to pay the docket fees for its
failure to direct them; and that the order for partition is void because it does not come
with an order of publication pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order for partition issued by the trial court is void because
there was no corresponding order for publication pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No. The applicable rule is Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Since the extrajudicial
settlement is void, the property is reverted back to its previous state which is: that it is
part of the estate of Quiterio and Antonina. As such, the estate is deemed undivided
among the heirs. And every action to end an in division among heirs is deemed an
action for partition. Therefore Rule 69 applies and under this rule, there is no need to
publish the partition in a newspaper of general circulation.
Anent the issue of the judgment on the pleadings, the same is valid because Reillo et al
failed to raise an issue when they already admitted that there are other heirs which were
excluded in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Their allegation that the parcel of land
adjudicated by their mother is her inheritance is not tenable because the same was not
indicated in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. In fact, what was stated was that she
was the sole heir.
Anent the issue of the counterclaim, Reillo et al’s counterclaim is permissive in nature
and not a compulsory one because their claim is not “necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim”.
Their counterclaim consists of a claim that there are 12 other parcels of land owned by
Quiterio and Antonina. Such allegation is already entirely different from the action
brought by Galicano et al., hence it is permissive and it can even be brought in a
separate proceeding. As a permissive pleading, it requires the payment of docket fees
and the RTC cannot be faulted for not directing Reillo et al to do so. The payment is
incumbent upon Reillo et al and the obligation cannot be shifted to the RTC.
ANTONIO BALTAZAR et al. VS. LORENZO LAXA
 GR NO. 174489, 11 APRIL 2012

FACTS: Pacencia Regala is the testator in this case. She took in and took care of her
nephew, Lorenzo Laxa, who is a resident and citizen of the US. Before going to the US.
Pacencia, executed her will bequeathing all her known and also unkown to Lorenzo, his
wife and two daughters. The will was executed in the house of retired judge Limpin and
was witnessed by 3 witnesses, it was also read to Pacencia twice, after whic, Pacencia
signed all the pages of the will together with her witnesses. Six days after the execution
of the will, Pacencia went to the US to stay with the family of Lorenzo and there stayed
until her death. Four years after Pacencia’s death, Lorenzo filed for the Probate of the
Will of Paceencia and for issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. After
publication and there being no opposition, RTC of Guagua, Pampanga allowed Lorenzo
to present evidence. The next day, however, petitioner Antonio Baltazar filed an
opposition claiming that the properties subject of Pacencia’s will belong to Nicomeda
Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-ininterest and Pacencia had no right to bequeath
them to Lorenzo and was later joined by the other petitioners. They claim that: the will
was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Pacencia was mentally incapable of making the will and that she was influenced tricked,
and was under duress when she executed the will.
The RTC denied the request of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed as
administrator since Lorenzo is a resident of the US and Antonio’s claim as co-owner of
the properties has not yet been established.
The RTC later ruled denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will and gave
credence to the testimony of one of the petitioners that Pacencia was no longer
possesed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:Whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
HELD: Yes. Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is clear and
evident from the face of the will. All the signatures of the testatrix, her witnesses and the
notary public are present and evidence and signed in the presence of one another.
Likewise, the burden to prove that Pacencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulder of the petitioner. The state of being forgetful, as
in the case of Pacencia does not render a person mentally unsound and unable and
unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Further,
bare allegations of duress or influence of fear of threats, undue and improper influence
and pressure, fraud of trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will. It is
clear and undisputed fact that Pacencia took care and treated Lorenzo as her own son.
This kind of relationship is unusual and goes againt the allegations of petitioners.
Likewise, on the allegation of the petitioners that all of the witnesses, as well as, the
notary public be presented is court, the Court disagrees. It was thoroughly explained
why the other witnesses were not presented. It is established rule that a testament may
not be disallowed just because the attesting witneeses declare against its due
execution. The probate of the will may be allowed on the basis of the testimony of one
of the witnesses proving Pacencia’s sanity and due execution of the will, as well as on
the proof of her handwriting. Lastly, the very existence of the will is in itself prima facie
proof that the supposed testatrix has willed that her estate be distributed in the manner
she wills. This, together with the close and established relationship of Pacencia and
Lorenzo, the evidence and testimonies of witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence from the oppositor, constrained the Court to favor the authenticity of the will
and the allowance for probate.
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R.No. 176831 15 January 2010

FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his
mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that
she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the
demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was
denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from
the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier
ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of
attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with
this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court
denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this
Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy
and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and
the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is
taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance
of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the
nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce
a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution
of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in
cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.
To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private
wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in
cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature
and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the
writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of
the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it
to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
grants the demurrer.
 PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144 26 JANUARY 2011

FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the USA. On
May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she
executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under
duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act.
Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion
with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the
RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines. Â On
June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Â Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel
and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines. Â On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed
order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject
to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section
2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will
in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present
case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated
and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
ISSUE :Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.
RULING: Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries
of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816
of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. In insisting
that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for
the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where
the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioner’s stance, since this
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, et al. vs. REYES, et al.
G.R. NO. 140371-72 / 27 NOVEMBER 2006

FACTS: Petitioners Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the
disinheritance was due to Alfredo’s maltreatment to his father Segundo. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings of the will. PRs moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir. Devisee or legatee hence there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition does not apply because
Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and PRs alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs in the direct line were preterited in the will

HELD: No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.
According to the SC, it was Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included only as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo