G.R. No.

205412, September 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding accused-appellant
Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-appellant

was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling,
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived
and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their
residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several
times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof which tender directly
and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result of
which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused
his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at
around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling Police
Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand,
suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-
appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and
turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5

PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant
suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant
proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-
appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!"
PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed
the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose
Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers
informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the
market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-appellant's brother),
who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2
Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no
one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw Jose's lifeless body with
blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.6
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for
safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither did
accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that
accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also
admitted that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or
stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further
questioned as to why he did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his
father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he
was carried away by the fast flow of events.7

Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-appellant,
their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the
police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for the wake and burial of
Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of
his death.8

Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr. Lomibao
reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and
extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab wounds, resulting in his
instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken
before he conducted the autopsy.9

Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.

The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide
based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's
admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able to
establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby
sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of P30,000.00
as temperate damages.10
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors
he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.12
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.

Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the
assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his
constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.13
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and
is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers
begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission.14 As we expounded in People v. Marra15:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
(Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he
admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to
death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not
elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-
appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial
declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually
committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing.
Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the
Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.

Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that an

uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing
and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation of accused-appellants
in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy,
when they executed their extrajudicial confessions without assistance of counsel, were already
suspects under custodial investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide committed
against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition, approached
unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his hand and readily
confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to custodial
investigation by the police officers only after his confession.

Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not
in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into evidence
the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did
not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1
Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion
that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-appellant's
declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case.
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's
death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after
and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had the opportunity
to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked
to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly
to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing
his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-
appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res
gestae, accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.

Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.

To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such
as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.20 Rule 133,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4.  Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) There is more than one circumstance; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been satisfied
in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death.

2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and
surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of
the said police station.

3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his
responding mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature."
Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such
inaction is contrary to human nature.

4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his
continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.21 The
incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial evidence
anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will not disturb
but shall accord the highest respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.22

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide
- other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim.23 All the elements are
present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-
appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant
was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.

The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With
one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.24

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs
of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate damages awarded by the RTC in the
amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest
jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00
considering the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the testimony of
his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements in People v. Verde27 that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco
Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages.
The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco
Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco
Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day.
Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases
decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of documentary
evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim's
line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of
P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum wage rate for non-
agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III. We take judicial notice that
there is no documentary evidence available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver.
We thus compute the award of damages for the loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:
Gross
Net earning life
= x annual - less living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
capacity (x) expectancy
income
   
x= 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]
           3
   
  = 8.67 x 36,500.00
   
  = P316,455.00
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding accused-
appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for
damages shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until they are fully paid.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE LUGNASIN AND DEVINCIO

GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02971,
which affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio
Guerrero" wherein accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio)
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente, Devincio and
four other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin (Excelso), Elmer A.
Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter
Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:

That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN, EXCELSO LUGNASIN, ELMER MADRID, ROGELIO
BALDABA, DEVINCIO GUERRERO, and other persons whose identities ha[ve] not yet been
ascertained, while conspiring, conniving and confederating with one another, did then and there with
criminal and malicious intent, with the use of force, threat and intimidation, with firearms, take and
carry away the person of Nicassius Cordero, to the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas,
detaining him thereat, depriving Nicassius Cordero of his liberty, against his free will and consent, for
the purpose of extorting ransom money for his safe release from detention said demand for the
payment of ransom money was made on the relatives of Nicassius Cordero, and the same was
release[d] in the evening of April 24, 1999 along the South Luzon Expressway.3

When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned on March 6,
2002. Both accused-appellants made no stipulation during their respective pre-trial conferences
except for their identities and the jurisdiction of the court.

The nine other accused remain at large.

The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:

The prosecution's lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while
opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20, 1999 by
three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from
his left side and pushed him inside the car. The man who came from his right side and identified later
as Tito Lugnasin drove the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting him of his
P5,000.00 cash and asking some questions, he realized he was being kidnapped for ransom.
Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along Libis, another cohort, Celso Lugnasin,
rode with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and after paying the toll fee, they drove
on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner type jeepney before they switched
places. The jcepney driver introduced himself as Commander and drove the car. [Cordero] saw
Commander's face. He was later identified as Vicente Lugnasin. After driving for some minutes more,
they alighted, [Cordero's] abductors placed the car's sunvisor around his face and ordered him to
walk barefooted towards a small house. [Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they
negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the fourth day, Commander was
already angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released, without ransom money
being paid.

Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmarifias Quezon City denied the accusation, saying
he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and Cordero could not even
identify him. He recounted that on May 14, 1999[,] while preparing for the town fiesta celebration,
policemen came to his residence and arrested him and his brother Tito [and] cousin Excelsio for
alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were tortured, then put on display for media men to
feast on and for alleged victims to identify. After posting bail, he was later arrested for illegal
possession of firearms. He was also charged with two other cases, a bank robbery and the Mercury
Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.

Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any involvement in the
kindnap[ping] of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only in the courtroom. He recalled
that nearing Holy Week in 2002 [,] five uniformed policemen arrested him without a warrant in
Lucena City, where he used to buy smoked fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp Karingal before
being detained at the QC Jail, where he is detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999[,] he was a
sponsor at a baptism of the child of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmarinas, Cavite. On his
way home, he was accosted by police officers while urinating along the roadside. He was detained
first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires jail. He saw Vicente Lugnasin only at the
Quezon City Jail.4

The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known their intentions
when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and told him that they would
be demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.5

Ruling of the RTC

On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of "whether [or not] Cordero's identification of
Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his kidnappers is reliable" 6 promulgated its
Decision, finding both accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom described and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in conspiracy with each other and other Does, the
Court hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of Death and to indemnify jointly and
severally the private complainant Nicassius Cordero the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful, and candid
witness, whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that this was in contrast to
the accused-appellants' bare denial of their participation in the kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out
that Cordero was able to identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces before he was
blindfolded.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants' conviction with
modification as to the penalty. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal
Case No. Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty of death imposed upon appellants
is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without the possibility of parole.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were established
by the prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony should be accorded
great weight. It also ruled that Cordero's identification of his abductors conformed to the stringent
guidelines of out-of court identification, contrary to accused-appellant Devincio's assertion that it was
marked with suggestiveness.9

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it did
not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended, the Court of Appeals held
that accused-appellant Devincio's right to question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary
investigation is deemed waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.10

Addressing accused-appellant Devincio's claim that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438, entitled
"An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well
as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof were violated, the Court of Appeals pointed out that he neither offered any
evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for such allegation.11

Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
Court of Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of
parole.12

Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their conviction on the
same arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals were anchored.13

Issues

Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant's Brief:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE

PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE] IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE
APPELLANT AS ONE OF HIS ABDUCTORS.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO] 'S WARRANTLESS ARREST AS
ILLEGAL.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]'S RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE
VIOLATED.14

Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.

Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom

established.

The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,16viz.:

ART. 267.  Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of  reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a private
person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii)
the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.17

A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven
in the criminal case on review.

The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the accused-
appellants' culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants Vicente and
Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual, Cordero's positive
identification of both accused-appellants - as two of several men who abducted him from the gate of
his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a bed, who
essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which deprivation of his
liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family -collectively establish the crime
of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and
their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself.
Identification of the
Accused-Appellants.

This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants' arguments casting doubt on Cordero's positive
identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-explained, when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds
truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial
court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.18

Herein, there is nothing farfetched or incredible in Cordero's testimony. Both accused-appellants

failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as in fact, Cordero had
the unhindered view of his captors' faces before he was even blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero's
eyewitness account deserves full faith and credit.

But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from the time
Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have already affected his
memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification of the abductors could not be
discounted. He also insists that Cordero's "subsequent identification of [him],in open court should be
disregarded since the initial identification was seriously flawed,  i.e., it was characterized by
suggestiveness."19

On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an inherently weak
defense, it assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength when the prosecution's
evidence, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, is feeble, doubtful,
inconclusive, or unreliable. He says that Cordero's identification of his abductors was questionable
due to the circumstances during his abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when he was abducted,
he was instructed to go down on the floor of the vehicle and not to look at his kidnappers, he was
blindfolded, and his eyeglasses were removed.20

With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying on Cordero's
identification of them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and unreliable.

This Court disagrees.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification made by
Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.

People v. Teehankee, Jr.21 is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court identification:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. (Citation omitted.)
Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to the light
emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men approached him,
the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the men acted where they passed, where he was taken,
and even the sounds he heard. Cordero's testimonies were replete with detailed descriptions of how
he was abducted and who abducted him. To top it all, he was confident that he could identify his
abductors, as he did at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Pantaleon
Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22 and in open court.

This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.:

Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20, 1999. We observed
his demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was a careful witness, truthful and candid.
At times, we noted that he was in tears at the painful recollection of the horror he went through. His
story was supported by the evidence submitted.23

And as the Court of Appeals said, "Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces and incidents and
etch these in his memory."24 In People v. Martinez25 we held:

Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural
for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural
reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime is committed, xxx. All too often, the face of the assailant
and his body movements create a lasting impression on the victim's mind and cannot thus be easily
erased from his memory.

Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his kidnappers.
He saw both accused-appellants' faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be said that the
length of time between the crime and the identification of the accused-appellants, which was only 26
days, had any effect on Cordero's memory, to render his positive identification flawed.

Accused-appellant Devincio's contention that Cordero's out-of-court identification was marked by

suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence. The only reason he
gave for such argument was Cordero's knowledge that the persons who were being investigated in
connection with a robbery case were included in the police or photographic line-up. However, that is
not enough to strike down Cordero's identification for being tainted. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was on point when it quoted this Court's ruling in People v. Villena26 as follows:

Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused. Identification

of an accused through mug shots is one of the established procedures in pinning down criminals.
However, to avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the
photograph that would focus attention on a single person, x x x. (Citation omitted.)

As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to suggest whom he
should pick and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as follows:

Cordero They asked me to see a lineup and I said I was still very afraid of them so they showed me
different photographs and asked if I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and from a series of
photos, I was able to identify Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Guerrero and I could
not yet identify de Chaves but I saw him there walking around.28

But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero's out-of-court identification was improper, it will
have no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We have ruled as follows:
[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification was
tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
attended it. xxx.29 (Citation omitted.)

Cordero's in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both accused-appellants
in court when he was asked to identify them from among the people inside the courtroom.

It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly, and positively
identify both accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside and inside the court. Thus, his
identification of the accused is worthy of credence and weight. This Court, in People v.
Cenahonon30 said:

An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when the former
comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. (Citation omitted.)

As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-

appellant Devincio Guerrero's
Warrantless Arrest and the Violation
of His Rights Under Republic Act
No. 7438.

Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the
permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31 This being
the case, accused-appellant Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgement over his
person. He also claims that there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at
the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during
investigation.32

As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of
these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the first time on
appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and quote
below Miclat, Jr. v. People33 on this Court's treatment of an accused's belated allegation of the
illegality of his warrantless arrest:

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if
he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground
before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations
omitted.)
The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise
their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their
defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to
have waived their right to question their arrests.

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438 were
violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:

With respect to appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while he
was under custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence to
sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as stated in People vs. Buluran and Valenzuela:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since
neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show that
appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction.34 (Citation omitted.)

Damages Awarded.

The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. However, pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to modify such award as follows:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.35

"The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty to reclusion perpetua in
view of the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding, it not being dependent
on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that a qualifying circumstance
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the kidnapping."36

The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor of
Cordero. In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum,
to earn from the date of the finality of this Court's Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellants
Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero are ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from
the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide
committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent;
and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity
of the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said
Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her
face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly
caused her death.

Contrary to Law. 1

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left
her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on
February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.

Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that
the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the
old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched
her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl
to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who
was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete
fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped
the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of
concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the
other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
2

At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from
the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary
napkin.

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained as
follows:
1. Abrasions:

1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to
left.

2. Abrasions/contusions:

2.1 temple, right.

2.2 cheek, right.

2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.

2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width,
from right MCL to left AAL.

2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.

3. Hematoma:

3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.

3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.

3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

4. Lacerated wounds:

4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.

4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.

5. Fractures:

5.1 maxillary bone, right.

5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.

6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.

7. External genitalia

7.1 minimal blood present.

7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed
vaginal wall.

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for
spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
 CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries,
Face. 3

Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack
team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen
recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim
pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4

Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the
backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma
surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper
inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5

The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On
February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took
him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant
denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin
and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and
Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.  Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were
6

rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the
house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the
bags. 7

Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February 25, a
physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.  Appellant was found to sustain:
8

HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at
the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9

By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the
office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer
was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.   In the presence of the mayor, the police,
10

representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he
killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin
and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them.   He also said that the
11

devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.   After his
12

confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him.   His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 
13 14

Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio
and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and
reenacted the crime. 15

On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19,
1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and
son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at
8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he
and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined
them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police.  16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the policemen
covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed
Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks.
Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his
neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two
bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 
17

In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by

proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and
penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this
offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to
indemnify the family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and executory, the
sentence be carried out.

SO ORDERED.  18

This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant contends that:

I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE
MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;

II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED.  19

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating
team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was
also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of
the crime.

Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters
because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) . . .
 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) . . .

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed
of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.   Any confession or
20

admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him.   The exclusionary
21

rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent.   The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or
22

investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.   As intended by the 1971 Constitutional
24

Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by
the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."  25

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear
from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:

COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?

WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house of the
accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma
who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.

Q: So you had a possible suspect?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then, what else did you do?

A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that
his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the
culprit. 
26

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated.   His
27

confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's
house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:

Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked
as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these
bags?
 A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal
of the toilet.

Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were
located?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you
do?

A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know
where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.

Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?

A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really
showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir.  28

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence,
hence also inadmissible. 29

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant.
Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed
that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:

Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people
from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to
talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of
police.

Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?

A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I
will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this
to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear
what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it,
he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera.   30

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of
Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .

Court: He said to you the following words . . .

Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?

A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.

Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
 A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further
admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say,
sir. 31

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police   and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
32

Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter.   In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant
33

to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights.   Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
34

do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.   What the Constitution bars is the
35

compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.   Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
36

admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are
admissible in evidence.  37

The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on
February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives.   Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the
38

People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place
where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?

Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police
station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier,
sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I
also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.

Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for
raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was
voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on
his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he
said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was
under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?

A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime
scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the
scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or
any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is
why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that
 he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying
me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired
during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.

Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag
PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who accompanied you?

A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and

some of the relatives of the accused.

Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.

Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?

A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?

A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I
tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.

Q: Did he voluntarily comply?

A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up
to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?

A: Yes, sir.  39

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three
successive days.   His testimony is as follows:
40

Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?

A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so
that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.

Q: Were there people?

A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of
police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other
persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the
question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . .
rape with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this?
And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he
repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.

Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?

A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures
of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of
Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect
answered the same.

Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?

A: The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?

Court: Use the vernacular.

A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and
gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo
ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and
gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?

A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped
his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday
before the crime.

Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and
the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?

A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really
down physically and I think he was in good condition.

Court: So he was not happy about the incident?

A: He even admitted it, your Honor.

Court: He was happy?

A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.

Court: Was he crying?

 A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that
fell on his face.

Court: Was he feeling remorseful?

A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx  41

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994.   He also
42

testified that:

Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?

A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the
chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.

Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?

A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There
were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.

Q: How about the other representatives from the media?

A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from
the radio and from TV Channel 9.

Q: How about Channel 7?

A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.

Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also
present?

A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the
wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions
that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.

Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?

A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.

Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know
what question did you ask and the answer.

A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

Q: What was the next question?

 A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.

Q: What was the next question that you asked him?

A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim
was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.

Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on
that?

A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: "Ano iyon?"

A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.

Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the
fence?

A: I cannot remember the others, sir.

Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?

A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 43

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant.   They were not acting
44

under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did
not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime.   In fact, they asked his
45

permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of
the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family
and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual.   It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
46

addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
protect.   Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
47

individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.  48

In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto
Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen.   Allegedly,
49

the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation.  50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that
the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:

Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 
51

Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object forcibly
inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration.   His
52

testimony is as follows:

Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .

Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.

Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver
was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you
did you re-autopsy?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have
been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?

A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim
which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already
stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of
forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already
dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by
those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a dead person
we do not produce any bleeding.

Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood
at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been
inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds,
now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of
the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?

A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6
o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges
of the lacerated wounds, sir.

Q: What could have caused those lacerations?

A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small
opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
 Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?

A: It is possible, sir.  53

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of
rape   nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.   What is essential is that there be
54 55

penetration of the female organ no matter how slight.   Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by
56

the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any
injury in the first autopsy.

Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other evidence, real
and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:

(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's house;  57

(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house;  58

(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the wall.
Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house;  59

(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat rough
surface.   This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
60

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;

(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of blood type
"B," the probable blood type of the victim.   Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had
61

type "A" and type "AB."   The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood
62

type; 
63

(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain;  64

(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later found at his parents'
house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan;  65

In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of
appellant.

Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of
physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away
from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour.  66

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No.
1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne
Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING
OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE
CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO
LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack
them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed
weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."

3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no merit in
appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the
victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only
one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if
true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit
a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna
Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert,
they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence
indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he
was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588).
Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General correctly pointed out
in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which
found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V-
90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve
thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00,
and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p.
25, Rollo.)

Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and
place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)

The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder in
Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large
and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of
wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow
block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical
injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with
Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant
which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day.
She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's
suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya."
(pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same
day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck
the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece
of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the
three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from
the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim
was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were
informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the
house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in
his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau
of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.

On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against
him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.

When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was
held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A.
6425 and of Murder.

In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:

1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and

2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of
evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from
him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.

The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they
were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.

Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;"

"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace.
They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as
one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.

In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he
had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in
People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:

"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law,
1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may
be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may
be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the
fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the
head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in
the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The
conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and
his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a
hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving
full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.

Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189
SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the
heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601               November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision  dated
1

January 21, 2008 and the resolution  dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
2

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96,
Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's
(petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued
between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.  Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02
4

Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.  SP02 Javier, together
5

with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of
the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation  and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
6 7

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite"
the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.  The petitioners went with the police officers to
8

Batasan Hills Police Station.  At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
9

petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their
own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation  on the ground that
12

they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers
had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just
"invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.  The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
14 15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.  The CA ruled that the
17

word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized
that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the
denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008;  hence,
18

the present petition.

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY
INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to
the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which
actually used the word "invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime
scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge
that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners
should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought
is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition
has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the
legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance
of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity
to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,  and the 1935,  1973  and
19 20 21

1987  Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches
22

and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. " 23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke  and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
24

England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor,
England on June 15, 1215.  The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the
25

Crown to proclaim certain liberties  under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.  The declarations in Chapter 29 of
26 27

the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.  It provides:
28

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised  of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be
29

outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
Justice or Right.  [Emphasis supplied]
30

In United States v. Snyder,  the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit
31

arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.  With regard to an
32

arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based
these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the
Spanish laws.  These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws
34

then existing in the Philippines. 35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson  that Section 37  of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila,
36 37

defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,  the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local
38

ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of
England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos  that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common
39

sense and reason.  It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code  which
40 41

directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,  the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30  of the Provisional Law for the
42 43

Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the
requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as
one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case. This
provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence
to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless
arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,  the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law
45

for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is
reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents,
to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his
antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the
satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear
whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal
complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had
been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the
commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain
officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person
has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.

In Santos,  the Court cited Miles v. Weston,  which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the
46 47

street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of
a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without
a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides
reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied
with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the
arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence
of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the
same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause
without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. 48

In The US. v. Hachaw,  the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did
49

not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the
arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the
gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime
was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much
discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in
Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed it;
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and
1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the
offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed
and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission
of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an
offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the
determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964
Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the
1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-
numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964
Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not
only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the
word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the
following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable
cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as
to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable
cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall
proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,  the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does
52

not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn,  the 53

warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States  that the Fourth Amendment limited the
54

circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term
probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds." 55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and
exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a
judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting
officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life
upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of
the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on
reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not
verify such information.58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,  the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
59

which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from
probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.  In Buchanan v. Viuda
60

de Esteban,  we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
61

reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was
based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses. 62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this
stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause  to
63

issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged,  or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
64

actual facts.
65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a
warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the
spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance
within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable
cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the
parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information
that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,  the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless
66

arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too
much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes,
he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of
the criminal.
67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these
were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made
pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,  the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on
68

December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three
(3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,  one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
69

stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm.
Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing
the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting
the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as
regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,  the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that
70

there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only
a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not
present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver
of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,  the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
71

information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,  the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid
72

because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police
acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered
in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,  the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the
73

arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating
that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,  the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
74

had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,  the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from
75

the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the
information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.
The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,  there was a shooting incident. The policemen who
76

were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant
only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge
of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was
held valid.

In People v. Acol,  a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the
77

report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing
his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in
different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,  there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to
78

the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they
reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers'
invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense
just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.

In Doria,  the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the
79

arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his
wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of
the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been
reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his
residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door.
They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested
Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of
''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,  "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain
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to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene
of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could
determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element
of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding
on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard
for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by
the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.
The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for
purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the
question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when
they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.  From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
81

circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against
the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter  entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was
82

committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter
stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the
crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime
is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas
and his brother Joseph Macapanas,  although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
83

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate  that was issued by East Avenue
84

Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made
about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area;
Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect
of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on
L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty.
Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners  and
85

Atty. Generoso  lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by
86

the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated
a different version of what transpired.87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,  the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry
88

bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however,
instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.  where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the
89

police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the
police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the
arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.  This fact alone negates the petitioners'
90

argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police
immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed. 1âwphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal
circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor
conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely
academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.  Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the
91

body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the
part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary. 92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,  SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting
93

the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when
a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words,
the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge
of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators
pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore,
SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them
to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion
for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution  and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
95 96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature
of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy
disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion,
is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what
happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its
denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated
April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.