G.R. Nos.
171947-48             December 18, 2008 environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST
GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners, 
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH
JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change,
has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have
finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of
forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer
simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate
crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the
nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked
to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers,
shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies
and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry
the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the
norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past,
once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot
for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying
expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC,
the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This
environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of
omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear
and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason]
ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued
neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes
a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced
ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
 (4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be
ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted
concrete plan of action for the purpose. 
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club
followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief
of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management
Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform
content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml
when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level
for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB"
level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts
to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second
Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study
being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its
Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila
Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead
agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to
act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated,
coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation
and restoration of the bay. 
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain
adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under
its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. 
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its
wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the
proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila
Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of
toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only
of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes
from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and
 liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system
such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its
waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely
for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. 
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other
nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These
nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up
in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-
biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of
septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage
coming from septic tanks.  functions under existing laws.7
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people
through education the importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to
protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were
eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and
five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court
a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December
9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the
consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the
pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. 
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule
45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD]
1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE
ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH
AS FECAL COLIFORMS. 
ARGUMENTS
I
 [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE
CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A
MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS.  According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152
under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral
arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused,
on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to
make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the
exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is
clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the
clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean
up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token,
respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether
or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other
words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents. 
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties
as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties,
on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said
so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of
Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating
their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from
the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition.
The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the
scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation
and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects
for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
 facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis
added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria
for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the
minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in
the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and
37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among
others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and
operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.  agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set
forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is
one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or
not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether
or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be
dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes
and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies
are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: 
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper
use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of
water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s
Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution,
determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects
and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using
available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water
Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan
which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas.
Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government
Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the
following functions, powers and responsibilities: 
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-
four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually,
or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework
within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status
report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework
for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall
be reviewed by the water quality management area governing
board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is
in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water
Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it
has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned
to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested
that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various
government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as
of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with
estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.  Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of
some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to
fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
18
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,  is vested with jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the
territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several
towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as
may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the
cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over
local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and
regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and
evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to
construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally,
under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA
is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.  (6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative
Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate
and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with
local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that
fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized
and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is
charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of
water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution
for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and
aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning,
design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water
resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications. 
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to
perform metro-wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between
the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily
responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country,
DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services.
The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage
services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and
encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree
of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance
with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective
implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the
law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship,
vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made
structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon
the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to
be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the
shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any
refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and  Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable
water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or
floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP
Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the
Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires
the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has
not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions
of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall
coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines.
This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to
enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish,
develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system
in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO
513 states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered
by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions
of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the
area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the
port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port
of watercraft.27
signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the
PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at
ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain
adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well
as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are
frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open
dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of
open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management
facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA
7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities
occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle
and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that
discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG
shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal
of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and
concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the
Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the
establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water
supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA
9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned
agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a
centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly
urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system
shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the
DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper
disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these
companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.  All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on
environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118
of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher
Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the development,
management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is
directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school
curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under
Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient
and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively
achieve the country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall
pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish,
and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government,
among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention,
control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water
resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate
economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of
water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection,
water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a
comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on
pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain
the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development
objectives. 
clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate
of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.  the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be
Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution
pollution incidents?  under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements
of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code  Management Fund or to such other funds where said
Include Cleaning in General disbursements were sourced.

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:  As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of
the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to
this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in
the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment
Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific
pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the
twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g)
and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing
the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill
condition. 

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous
o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and
(PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational. groundings.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of
Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any
pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same
water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial
use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely
direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment,
removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions
of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said
Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations
that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events
requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations.
Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill
condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of
either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances,
as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.
62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal,
and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’
posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD
1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-
to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even
enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as
among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152.  as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues,
coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has
contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
"cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such
limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter
where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way
state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves
to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even
in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage."
This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when
appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade
the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay
only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not
undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off
mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment
Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up
come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners,
thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16
of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the
happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said
with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.
This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather
than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the
implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact
that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is
well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with
reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152
mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in
the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in
water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on
the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in
or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an
establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the
waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this
situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve
nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as
beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies
concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be
amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has
been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of
setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup
operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers
for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the
initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality
of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning
phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the
Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again
deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the
petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its
water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
"continuing mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to
enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River
from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-
Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River,
the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their
waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major
rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for
the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these
unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of
illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained
resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of
water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal
structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the
building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other
waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zonelonger than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.) 
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other
major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated
as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and
the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-
complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent
their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into
the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to
transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for
petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian
Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro
Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As
there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as
it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
 1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila -
the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate
are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth
and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking,
aquatic life, and the environment.  pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large
amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas,
which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives
to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous
contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated
into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more
than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant
violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced
below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid
Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any
practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs
which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be
allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no
controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of
five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no
single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards
under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA
9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and
other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste,
and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system
that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of
RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs.
4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or
machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of
petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other
human-made structure." 
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to
emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments
and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need
to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of
them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices
and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a
historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the
day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the
plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead,
daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated,
with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put
their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State,
through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection
of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners
must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to
work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must
reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by
petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a
specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing
them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13,
2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper
use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA
9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible
for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings
with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the
successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance
with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in
exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along
the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes
to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent
industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water
treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.  sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each
other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws
and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to
immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay
waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and
projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila.
The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood
control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,
Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De
Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and
in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of
sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of
the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean
Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH
shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of
its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in
the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the
General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water
quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective
to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA,
and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from
finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
 SO ORDERED. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. 
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

NARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
  

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.,

cralawIntervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.G.R. No. 174153

AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952REGISTERED VOTERS, MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
Petitioners,

- versus -
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN

T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,

Intervenor. MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson

x--------------------------------------------------------x Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson represented by its Secretary General

Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMENS

represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay,

Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson

by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD  

represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer MARIO JOYO AGUJA,and ANA THERESA

CrisostomoPalabay,JOJO PINEDAofthe HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,

Leagueof ConcernedProfessionalsand Intervenors.

Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO x--------------------------------------------------------x

of the Solidarity ofHealth Against Charter ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,

Change,DR. REGINALD PAMUGASof Intervenor.

Health Actionfor Human Rights, x ------------------------------------------------------- x

Intervenors. TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE

x--------------------------------------------------------x PHILIPPINES,

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, Intervenor.

x---------------------------------------------------------x GAT INCIONG,

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenors.

Intervenor. x ------------------------------------------------------- x

x------------------------------------------------------- x RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION MANUEL RIVERA,and RUELO BAYA,

ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA), CONRADO Intervenors.

F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, x -------------------------------------------------------- x

MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL

BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO)

FORTUNATO P. AGUAS,and AMADO and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS,

Intervenors. FOUNDATION, INC.,

x -------------------------------------------------------- x Intervenor.

  x ------------------------------------------------------- x

  JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,

by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., ANTONIO L. SALVADOR,and

Intervenor. RANDALLTABAYOYONG,

  Intervenors.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x x -------------------------------------------------------- x

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

CEBUCITY AND CEBUPROVINCE Intervenors.

CHAPTERS, x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and
PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
Intervenors.cralawcralaw
Intervenors. cralaw x -----------------------------------------------------xcralawcralaw

x --------------------------------------------------------x MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY,G.R. No. 174299

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO cralaw SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and

Q. PIMENTEL, JR.and SENATORS RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,Present:

SERGIO R. OSMEŇA III, JAMBY Petitioners,cralaw cralaw

MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

- versus -PUNO,

ALFREDO S. LIM and

QUISUMBING,

PANFILO LACSON,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Promulgated:
 
October 25, 2006
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN cralawCARPIO,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 

S. ABALOS, SR.,and Commissioners AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,  

 
DECISION
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,CORONA,cralaw
 

FLORENTINO A.TUASON,cralawJR.,CARPIO MORALES,cralaw

 

ROMEO A. BRAWNER, CALLEJO, SR.,cralaw

CARPIO, J.:

RENE V. SARMIENTO,AZCUNA,
 

NICODEMO T. FERRER, and TINGA,

John Doe and Peter Doe,CHICO-NAZARIO,cralaw
Respondents.cralawGARCIA,andVELASCO, JR., JJ.
 
The Case
cralawThese are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August
2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC') denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
 
Antecedent Facts
cralawOn 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group'), withother groups[1]
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution.On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA6735').
 
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of
the 6.3 million individuals.
 
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article
XVIII entitled 'Transitory Provisions.[6] These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication
of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in
a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR
THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
 
 
cralawOn 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition
with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.[7]
 
 
The Ruling of the COMELEC
cralawOn 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC
invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections[8]declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.[9]
 
cralawIn G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of
31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their
petition since Santiagoisnot a binding precedent. Alternatively, the
Lambino Group claims that Santiagobinds only the parties to that case,
and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the 'will of the
sovereign people.
 
cralawIn G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (Binay Group') pray that the Court
require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why
theyshould not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of
signatures and forentertaining the Lambino Group's petition despite the
permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's
petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
cralawIn his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor
General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the
petition despite the Santiagoruling. The Solicitor General proposed that
the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules 'as temporary devises
to implement the system of initiative.
Various groups and individuals sought intervention,filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino Groups petition. The supporting
intervenors[10] uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors[11] hold the contrary view and maintain that
Santiagois a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged
(1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the
signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters
supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and
not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliancewith the
requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiativepetitions to only
one subject.
cralawThe Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26
September 2006. After receiving the parties memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
 
cralawThe petitions raise the following issues:
 
1.     Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people's initiative;
 
2.     Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA
6735 'incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions' to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
 
3.     Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
 
 
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
 
 
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative.Thus,
there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply
with the basic requirements of the Constitution.For following the Court's
ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
Commision on Elections.
 
 
1.     The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
ofthe Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
 
 
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution.This section states:
 
Sec. 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
cralawThe deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain
the meaning of an amendment 'directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition, thus:
MR. RODRIGO:cralawLet us look at the mechanics. Let us say
some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the
people when they are asked to sign?
MR. RODRIGO:cralawNo, because before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this
constitutional amendment.

 
 

MR. SUAREZ:cralawAs it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare

MR. SUAREZ:cralawThat can be reasonably assumed, Madam that proposal and pass it around for signature.[13]
President. (Emphasis supplied)

   

MR. RODRIGO:cralawWhat does the sponsor mean? The draft is  

ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft?

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the 'draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment should be 'ready and shown to the
  people 'before they sign such proposal.The framers plainly stated that
'before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.The framers also
'envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must 'prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
 
MR. SUAREZ:cralawThe people themselves, Madam President.
The essence of amendments 'directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people.This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.No agent or
  representative can sign on their behalf.Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
  misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by particularly acute when, in this case, the person
signing such complete proposal in a petition.Thus, an amendment is giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
'directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it
the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
amendments. [17](Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
 
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it.If so attached, the petition must state
the fact of such attachment.This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the  
proposed amendments before signing.Otherwise, it is physically  
impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the  
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments cralawLikewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,[18]the Court of Appeals of Oregon
before signing. explained:
   
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed[14] the concept of The purposes of 'full text provisions that apply to amendments
people's initiative from the United States where various State by initiative commonly are described in similar terms.
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause.In almost all States[15] which x x x (The purpose of the fulltext requirement is to
allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people provide sufficient information so that registered
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative initiativepetition.'); x x x (publication of full text of
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. amended constitutional provision required because it
[16]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary is 'essential for the elector to have x x x the section
  which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from.
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
several decisions of various courts.Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First be required to vote in the dark.') (Emphasis supplied)
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and more  
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for
fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential
signer, without the signer having actually examined  
the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for
Moreover, 'an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the
the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the
'deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.[19] same.We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
   
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed Province: City/Municipality:
amendments.However, the deliberations of the framers of our    
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant Legislative District: Barangay:
American jurisprudence on people's initiative.In particular, the  
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the  
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the PROPOSITION:DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
a petition containing such full text.Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
as valid, requires that the people must sign the 'petition x x x as ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
signatories. GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
  PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.  
The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as  
public officials.The proponents are not disinterested parties who can I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution.My
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amendments to the people.The proponents present favorably their amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their  
proposal.The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather  
the signatures.  
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.The proponents          
bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional Precinct Name Address Birthdate
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or Number Last Name, First MM/DD/Y
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. Name,M.I.
 
1        
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court
a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The 2        
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet[20]
after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their 3        
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.The signature sheet with this Court 4        
during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached[21] to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. 5        
Pete Quirino-Quadra.
6        
 
 The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the
7         draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier
8         in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico
B. Aumentado's 'Verification/Certification of the 25 August 2006 petition,
9         as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:
10        
 
 
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my
 
personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of
____________________________________________________
Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No.
Barangay Official WitnessWitness
2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories
(Print Name and Sign)(Print Name and Sign)(Print Name and Sign)
hereto.(Emphasis supplied)
 
 
 
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it.Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments  
before this Court on 26 September 2006.
 
 
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary  
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people
the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet.Clearly, the signature sheet is not the 'petition that the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. to the present petition.However, the 'Official Website of the Union of
  Local Authorities of the Philippines[22] has posted the full text of
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature- Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,  
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's  
draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the  
COMELEC.When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their  
amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.  
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both.However, Atty. Lambino
changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S
August 2006 petition. CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
  INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUMAS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms
as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms
signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change
created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in
Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the
failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly,
ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda
through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other
pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE
MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila.[23](Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC.ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02support(s)
the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of
amending the 1987 Constitution. The proposals of the Consultative
Commission[24] are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended
petition filed with the COMELEC.
 
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect
all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the
Transitory Provisions.The proposed revisions have profound impact on the
Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do
not touch.The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only
Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction
of new Transitory Provisions.
 
cralawThe ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or
more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC.However, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino
Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the
signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC.On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the
draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
 
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
 
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering.Instead, the
Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 'inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
cralawThe Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature
sheets.Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition
before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets.The signature sheets do not also
contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated
with, the signature sheets.
 
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions
that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the 'petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC, thus:
 
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that '(w)here there is not (sic)
fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act. [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition.(Emphasis supplied)
 
 
 
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people 'the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC appears an afterthought,
made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out
that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed
changes.In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they
circulated 'the petition for initiative but failed to mention the amended
petition.This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.
 
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris  Secundum, stating that
a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition
cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand
the nature of the act.The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a
proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people.Even the
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change
must be attached to the petition.The same authority the Lambino Group
quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
 
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people.In the present initiative, the Lambino
Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the
signature sheets.The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum
pulls the rug from under their feet.
 
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with
the COMELEC.The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in
their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the
signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even
assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only
very limited copies of the petition.
 
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six
months later with the COMELEC.Atty. Lambino added that he also asked
other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed.Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the
printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these
100,000 copies.
 
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006,
the Lambino Group expressly admits that 'petitioner Lambino initiated the
printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x
x x.[25]This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond
any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the
signature sheets.
 
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage.If Atty. Lambino and company
attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition.Each signature
sheet contains space for ten signatures.Assuming ten people signed each
of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets.The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full
text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or
as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also
obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is
fatal.The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be 'directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. The signature
sheet is not the 'petition envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
cralaw
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing.They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
 
1.                 The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and
thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;[26]
 
2.                 The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely
until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections.Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office; [27]
 
3.                 Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.[28]
 
 
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the
Lambino Group's signature sheets.The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments.These
three proposed changes are highly controversial.The people could not
have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his
group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections
for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if
the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections.However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
 
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found
in the amended petition, states:
 
Section 5(2).The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
 
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament
will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections.This section
merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
 
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the
proposed changes, could have easily written the word 'next before the
phrase election of all local government officials. This would have insured
that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes.However, the absence of the word 'next allows the interim
Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections. the same petition.This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer
  only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may
their own term of office.This allows incumbent members of the House of find unacceptable.
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of  
office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the
members of the Parliament.Certainly, this is contrary to the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people v. Firestone,[29] the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
who signed the signature sheets.Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the  
6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
 
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes
fraud or misrepresentation.In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
'logrolling, which, if our judicial responsibility is to
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and
mean anything, we cannot permit.The very
his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to
proposed changes.The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
logrolling because the electorate cannot know what
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
it is voting on-the amendment's proponents'
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
simultaneously with the local elections.
iceberg.x x x xThe ballot must give the electorate fair
 
notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who
x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do
signed the signature sheets.The proposed changes mandate the interim
that.The very broadness of the proposal makes it
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
impossible to state what it will affect and effect and
The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
violates the requirement that proposed amendments
 
embrace only one subject.(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments,
the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
   
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
'surplusage and the Court and the people should simply ignore it.Far from
being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's
initiative.
   
cralawSection 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system.American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling-
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,[30] the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against 'inadvertence,
stealth and fraud in logrolling:
 
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all
of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated.There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of
an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for inadvertence, stealth and fraud in the
enactment-by-initiative process.The drafters of an
initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process.They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent
on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions,
when communicating to the public.x x x Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential
petition-signers and eventual voters.Many voters will
never read the full text of the initiative before the
election.More importantly, there is no process for
amending or splitting the several provisions in an
initiative proposal.These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly.The people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
 
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to
compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the
May 2007 elections.In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the
interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again
the Constitution.With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise
again the Constitution.
 
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution.The signature sheets
do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need
for such further amendments or revisions.The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.Certainly,
such an initiative is not 'directly proposed by the people because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
 
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's
amended petition of 30 August 2006.The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
 
Section 4(3).Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as
member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007,
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators.Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim  
Parliament after 30 June 2010.  
   
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.Thereafter, the 2.     The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President.If the interim Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30  
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members  
of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators. A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
  amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.In contrast,
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
Senators.The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not and revisions to the Constitution.Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against  
the Senators.They could not have known that their signatures would be ARTICLE XVII
used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime
Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
 
cralawAn initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most
likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.That
is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be 'directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition -meaning that the people must
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed  
amendments.On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
  Sec. 1.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
cralawThe Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly be proposed by:
propose amendments to the Constitution.This Court trusts the wisdom of
the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition.However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption:the full text of the proposed amendment is first  
shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
signed the petition.
 
 
cralawIn short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional (1)             The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Members, or
Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be 'directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.
(2)             A constitutional convention.  
MR. SUAREZ:cralawThank you, Madam President.
 

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the

Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to
us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Sec. 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed by the people through initiative x x x.
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
(Emphasis supplied)
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
  Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.

cralawArticle XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending

the Constitution.The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths  
vote of all its Members.The second mode is through a constitutional
convention.The third mode is through a people's initiative.
 
cralawSection 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
applies to '[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In
Report No. 7.This proposal was suggested on the
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only
theory that this matter of initiative, which came
to '[A]mendments to this Constitution.This distinction was intentional as
about because of the extraordinary developments
shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
this year, has to be separated from the traditional
 modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments
to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO:cralaw[I] am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ:cralawWe would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO:cralawIn other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ:cralawThat is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO:cralawI thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
 President.
 
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG:cralawMy first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision"
as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE:cralawNo, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar
as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
 
MR. MAAMBONG:cralawThank you.[31](Emphasis supplied)
 
cralawThere can be no mistake about it.The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between 'amendment and
'revision of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only
Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution.The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative
may propose only amendments to the Constitution.Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power
to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United
States.Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,[32] the Supreme Court of California
ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to
the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing
and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
amendments to the Constitution and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision.x x x xIt
 is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may
be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove.Consequently if the scope of the
proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the
measure') now before us is so broad that if such
measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then
the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought by
petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
While differing from that document in material respects, the
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.
Appling:[33]
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the
manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can
be altered by those who favor amendments, revision,
or other change only through the use of one of the  
specified means.The constitution itself recognizes
that there is a difference between an amendment
and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination
of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and
as it is used in Article IV, Section 1.The document
appears to be based in large part on the revision of
the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for
Constitutional Revision authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963
Legislative Assembly.It failed to receive in the
Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both
houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence
failed of adoption, x x x.
measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless,
a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x
x x.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a unconstitutional. x x x x(Emphasis supplied)
measure as can be submitted to the people through
the initiative.If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention
 
called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section
1. x x x x

 
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's
initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments.There can be no
deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution.A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the compliance with the clear command of the Constitution―that a people's
Constitution itself. initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
   
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an
364:[34] amendment or revision of the Constitution?If the Lambino Group's
  initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
 
cralawCourts have long recognized the distinction between an
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
amendment and a revision of a constitution.One of the earliest cases that
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
manner:
constitution in a manner other than the one provided
 
in the instrument is almost invariably treated as
[T]he very term 'constitution implies an instrument of a
extra-constitutional and revolutionary.x x x xWhile it
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
is universally conceded that the people are sovereign
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
and that they have power to adopt a constitution and
the people that the underlying principles upon which
to change their own work at will, they must, in doing
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
so, act in an orderly manner and according to the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
settled principles of constitutional law.And where the
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the
people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed
term 'amendment implies such an addition or change
the method by which the people may alter or amend
within the lines of the original instrument as will
it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in
effect an improvement, or better carry out the
violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
 purpose for which it was framed.[35](Emphasis
supplied)
 
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances.There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved.Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
 
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative
test.The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is 'so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety of
the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.[36]The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
'accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.[37]Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry.Thus, 'a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan
includes 'change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental
powers of its Branches.[38]A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that 'jeopardize the traditional
form of government and the system of check and balances.
[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles -Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.[40]Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
cralawA change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in
the present Constitution are reduced into two.This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution.A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution.Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government.
 
 
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of
the Constitution.Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
 
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from aBicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face
alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that
the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution.Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
 
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific
 parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions
that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding
original intention and plan contemplates a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions
of the document which have over-all implications for
the entire document, to determine how and to what
extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system
to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.[41]
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
In Adams v. Gunter,[42] an initiative petition proposed the amendment of
the FloridaState constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.The issue turned on whether the initiative was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several
other provisions of [the] Constitution.The Supreme Court of Florida,
striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause,
ruled as follows:
 
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature
affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of
the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all
of the states of the nation, except one, since the
earliest days.It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change.The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of
government.It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear
apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would
even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry
on government.
amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next
session should fail to submit further amendments to
revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of
appropriate amendments the people should refuse to
adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State.The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1
of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and
Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail.These examples point unerringly
to the answer.
  cralawThe Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
'amendment and 'revision is only one of procedure, not of substance.The
Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called 'revisions'
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of
changes.However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through
men and women and many sessions of the
an initiative, are called 'amendments' because the changes are made by
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968
ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation
was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
out of such endeavor.
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous
 
and up-to-date document.All of this could disappear
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in
very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
their Memorandum:
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative
 
petition here.[43](Emphasis supplied)
cralaw99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
amendment and 'revision when it speaks of
legislators and constitutional delegates, while the
  same provisions expressly provide only for
'amendment when it speaks of the people.It would
seem that the apparent distinction is based on the
actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work
  full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution
because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates are expectedto
The rationale of the Adamsdecision applies with greater force to the work full-time on the same matter because that is
present petition.The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from their occupation, profession or vocation.Thus, the
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the difference between the words 'revision and
executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adamsdid not even 'amendment pertain only to the process or procedure
touch the executive department. of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the interpreting the constitutional provisions.
Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral
to a unicameral legislature.In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no
less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on
the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.[44]There is no doubt  
that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes
in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
 
cralaw100. Stated otherwise, the difference between
amendment and 'revision cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x
x(Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
cralawThe Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that
the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would
constitute a revision of the Constitution.Thus, the Lambino Group
concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a
revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted
the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution.The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing
the fundamental law of the land.
 
cralawThe express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory.Where the intent of
the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
[45]Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration.More so, if such theory wreaks
havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in
the Constitution.Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of
the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in
American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In
Lowe v. Keisling,[46]the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory,
thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
changes to the constitution proposed by initiative.His
theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a
procedure by which the legislature can propose a
revision of the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the people.
 
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a
wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be
enacted through the initiative process.They assert
that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to 'a formal overhauling of
the constitution.They argue that this ballot measure
 proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of revising the constitution. x x x x
the original instrument, including profound impacts
on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship with a
defined group of citizens.Plaintiffs assert that,
because the proposed ballot measure 'will refashion
the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional
law, the trial court correctly held that it violated  
Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the
ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

  It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and

said: 'It is the only section of the constitution which
provides the means for constitutional revision and it
excludes the idea that an individual, through the
initiative, may place such a measure before the
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section electorate.x x x x
2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative.In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme
Court concluded that a revision of the constitution
may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2.After reviewing  
Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed
amendments, the court said:

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII,

section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions
  proposed by initiative.(Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,  

authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon
Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution.
 
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end
green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision.The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins.The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of
government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution.
cralawWhere the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change
may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years[47] is
an amendment and not a revision.Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.[48]Also, a change requiring a college
degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.[49]
 
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections
or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended.These changes do not also affect the structure of government or
the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum,
opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition
is located.
cralawHowever, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision.A change in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment.For example, the
substitution of the word republican with 'monarchic or 'theocratic in
Section 1, Article II[50] of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution.Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-
case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered.Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions.On the other hand, constitutions allow
people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not
revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states:
 
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and
Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI
are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim
up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
cralawThe basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.This rule
also applies to construction of constitutions.However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head
this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision 'shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government. The effect is to freeze the
two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one 'shall be amended,
which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
 
cralawRealizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that
the requirement of a future amendment is a surplusage.In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the
later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency.However, it is not as simple as that.
 
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
and the 'Parliamentary system of government, and the inconsistency shall Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
be resolved in favor of a 'unicameral parliamentary form of government. Constitution.
   
Now, what 'unicameral parliamentary form of government do the This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few grounds.Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled
countries with unicameral parliaments?The proposed changes could not doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
government ―the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, [51]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments.Did  
the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were
adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
 
cralawNevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for
constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will
revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments.A shift from the
not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2,
present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
Article XVII of the Constitution.To be a valid initiative, the present
requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Constitution.Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will
even before complying with RA 6735.
only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
 
 
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative
requires that the 'petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
is a revision and not an amendment.Thus, the present initiative is void and
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
voters as signatories.Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must
Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to '[A]mendments to
sign the 'petition x x x as signatories.
this Constitution.
 
 
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or
 
the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only
3.     A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
 
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for 'Raul L. Lambino
 
and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group,
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
claiming to act 'together with the 6.3 million signatories,merely attached
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.Thus, the
conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution.There
petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even
is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA 6735
comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
'incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions' to
claims as valid.
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
 
reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present
cralawThe Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a)
petition.Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiagowhich effectively
of RA 6735 stating, 'No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; x x x.The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter
totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.Since the present
initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.Thus, even if RA
6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
 
 
4.     The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in
Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en
banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiagoand People's Initiative
for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.[52]For
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC.On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal.Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
 
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimousvote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that itonly
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997.
 
 
5.     Conclusion
 
 
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost
respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation.No one can trivialize
the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation
of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.
 
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day.If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion.A
revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this
country.
 
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of
the total votes cast[53]−approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite
held on 11 February 1987.That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval
included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
 
 
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to
the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed
when they ratified the Constitution.The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will
and discarding the Constitution.This is one act the Court cannot and
should never do.As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is
sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution,
which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
 
Incantations of 'people's voice,people's sovereign will, or 'let the
people decide cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.Otherwise, the
Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative
changes by political groups gathering signatures through false
promises.Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's
stability.
 
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the 'people's
voice.However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that
'ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.The
Lambino Group thus admits that their 'peoples' initiative is an 'unqualified
 
support to the agenda of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution.This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of
'people's voice or 'sovereign will in the present initiative. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDO
  Associate Justice
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the  
Constitution.The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign  
will, is the bible of this Court.This Court exists to defend and protect the  
Constitution.To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORON
Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution.To allow such Associate Justice Associate Justice
alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.    
     
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.  
   
SO ORDERED.  
  CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO
  Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO  
Associate Justice  
   
 
WE CONCUR:
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
  Associate Justice
   
 
 
 
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOCANCIO C. GARCIA
Chief Justice Associate JusticeAssociate Justice
   
   
   
   
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 
 
 
[1] cralawIncluding Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP).cralaw
[2] cralawThis provision states: 'Requirements. x x x x
  (b) cralawA petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution
must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented
  by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
CERTIFICATION every five (5) years thereafter.

  (c) cralawThe petition shall state the following:

cralawPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before c.1. cralawcontents or text of the proposed law sought to be
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
  as the case may be;
 
 
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
c.2. cralawthe proposition;
 
 

c.3. cralawthe reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. cralawthat it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

Endnotes:
c.5. cralawsignatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. cralawan abstract or summary in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the
petition.cralaw
[3]cralawThis provision states: 'Verification of Signatures. ' The Election
Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.cralaw
[4] cralawSections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
cralawSection 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in
a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as
may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants
per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
cralaw(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
old on the day of the election, a resident of his
district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall
be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a
term of five years without limitation as to the
number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the
total membership coming from the parliamentary
districts.cralaw
[5] cralawSections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:
cralawSection 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of
State.The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the
assistance of the Cabinet.The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority
of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves.He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.cralaw
[6] cralawSections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1)The incumbent President and Vice President shall
serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution
unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the
members of the interim parliament.
(2)In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal
from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President.In case of death, permanent disability,
resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim
Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up
to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case,
they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided,
 however, that any and all references therein to shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the
'Congress' , 'Senate', 'House of Representatives' and Senate and the House of Representatives and the
'Houses of Congress' shall be changed to read incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
'Parliament; that any and all references therein to executive departments.
'Member[s] of Congress' , 'Senator[s] or 'Member[s]
of the House of Representatives' shall be changed to
read as 'Member[s] of Parliament and any and all
references to the 'President and or 'Acting President
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
shall be changed to read 'Prime Minister.
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day
of June 2010.He shall also be a member of the
cabinet and shall head a ministry.He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime
President and Vice President, with the exception of Minister and until the Speaker shall have been
Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 elected by a majority vote of all the members of the
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections interim Parliament from among themselves.
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all
other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up
to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1
(3)Within forty-five days from ratification of these
hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
System of government; provided however that any
Constitution consistent with the principles of local
and all references therein to 'Congress' , 'Senate',
autonomy, decentralization and a strong
'House of Representatives' and Houses of Congress'
bureaucracy.
shall be changed to read 'Parliament;that any and all
references therein to Member[s] of Congress' ,
'Senator[s] or 'Member[s]of the House of
Representatives' shall be changed to read as
'Member[s] of Parliament and any and all references Section 5. (1)The incumbent President, who is the Chief
to the President and or 'Acting President shall be Executive, shall nominate, from among the members
changed to read 'Prime Minister. of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister,
who shall be elected by a majority vote of the
members thereof.The interim Prime Minister shall
oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
him by the incumbent President.
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament
shall have been elected and shall have qualified.It
(2)The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials.Thereafter, the Vice President, as
Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and
shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all
 
synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials.The duly
elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of
the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the
term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.cralawcralaw

  [8] cralaw336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.cralaw

[9] cralawThe COMELEC held:
cralawWe agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has
the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime
conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the
powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of
incumbent President and Vice President.cralaw
 
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other
provisions of the Constitution particularly on
[7]As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 initiative.
(paragraph 3) and a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x

 
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
cralaw(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
xxxx

 
Sec. 2.Amendments to this Constitution may
cralawSection 5. x x x x likewise be directly proposed
cralaw(2)The interim Parliament shall provide for the election by the people through
of the members of Parliament, which shall be initiative, upon a petition of at
 least twelve per centum of the  
total number of registered The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission
voters, ofwhich every should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
legislative district must be or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
represented by at least three amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
per centum of the registered law shall have been validly enacted to provide for
voters therein. x x x. the implementation of the system.

cralawThe Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise

of this right.
cralawThus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet
 
the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non
voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
self-executory provision needed an enabling law for
per centumof the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be
its implementation.Thus, in order to breathe life
given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A. No.
into the constitutional right of the people under a
6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
system of initiative to directly propose, enact,
the Constitution.
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
 
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution,
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.
importance ofthe right of the people under a system
ofinitiative.However, neither can we turn a blind
eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in
the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the
people remains nothing but an 'empty right', and
 
that this Commission is permanently enjoined from
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
Santiago vs. Commission on Electionsstruck down
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
 
cralawConsidering the foregoing, We are therefore
constrained not to entertain or give due course to
 the instant Petition.cralaw
[10] cralawArturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel
Rivera, Ruelo Baya; Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union Congress of the Philippines; Sulong
Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.cralaw
[11] cralawOnevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L.
Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan
Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno,Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante,
Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students,Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Loretta
Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
Association(PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano
M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,Fortunato P. Aguas,
and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador and Randall
C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, CebuCity and
CebuProvince Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
and Senators Sergio R. Osmeňa III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy
Estrada,Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.cralaw
[12] cralawThis provision states: Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years.cralaw
[13] cralawI RECORD, 387-388.cralaw
[14] cralawDuring the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento made the following report (I
RECORD 389):
 
MR. SARMIENTO:cralawMadam President, I am happy that the Committee
on Amendments and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the
system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution. I made a
survey of American constitutions and I discovered that 13 States
provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the
Constitution ' Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for ordinary laws only is used in
Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota. So, I am happy that this
was accepted or retained by the Committee.
xxxx
 
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss
beginning in 1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its
constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with initiatives in the
1830s.In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode of
amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote 'direct
democracy by allowing the people to directly propose amendments
to the constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the
constitution is known as 'indirect democracy because the
amendments are referred to the voters by the legislature or the
constitutional convention.cralaw
[15] cralawFlorida requires only that the title and summary of the
proposed amendment are 'printed in clear and unambiguous
language. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of
Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No. 90160, 22 January 1998,
Supreme Court of Florida.cralaw
[16] cralawState ex. rel Patton v. Myers,127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872
(1933);Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942);
Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights,99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E.
2d 644 (1954);Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951
(1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of
Irvington, 166 N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979);State ex rel
Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10
Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2076. cralaw
[17] cralaw407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990).Affirmed by the District Court of
Massachusetts in Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and
by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F.
2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of
Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).cralaw
[18] cralaw89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).cralaw
[19] cralawStumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
 cralaw
[20] cralawExhibit 'B of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11
October 2006. cralaw
[21]Annex 'B of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra filed on 7 September 2006. cralaw
[22]www.ulap.gov.ph.cralaw
[23]www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.php.
 cralaw
[24] The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on
Charter Change can be downloaded at its official website
atwww.concom.ph.cralaw
[25] cralawThe Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.cralaw
[26] cralawUnder the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
members of Parliament shall beelected for a term of five years
'without limitation as to the number thereof.cralaw
[27] cralawUnder the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament 'shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have
been elected and shall have qualified.Also, under the proposed
Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the
interim Parliament 'shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament.cralaw
[28] cralawUnder the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament, within 45
days from ratification of the proposed changes, 'shall convene
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution.
cralaw
[29] cralaw448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.cralaw
[30] cralaw698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
 cralaw
[31] cralawI RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.cralaw
[32] 196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948).See also Lowe v. Keisling,130 Or.App. 1, 882
P.2d 91 (1994).cralaw
[33] cralaw392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964). cralaw
[34] cralaw930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.cralaw
[35] cralawLivermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).cralaw
[36] cralawAmadorValleyJointUnionHighSchool District v. State Board of
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978). cralaw
[37] cralawId.cralaw
[38] cralawLegislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509
(1991).cralaw
[39] cralawCalifornia Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109
Cal.App.4th 792, 836 (2003).cralaw
[40] cralawSee note 44, infra. cralaw
[41] cralawJoaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).cralaw
[42] cralaw238 So.2d 824 (1970).
 cralaw
[43] cralawId.at 830-832.cralaw
[44] cralawAs stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the
26 September 2006 oral arguments. cralaw
[45] cralawFrancisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10
November 2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).cralaw
[46] cralaw882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994).On the merits, the Court in Lowe v.
Keisling found the amendment in question was not a
revision.cralaw
[47] cralawSection 1, Article V of the Constitution.cralaw
[48] cralawSection 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.cralaw
[49] cralawSection 2, Article VII of the Constitution.cralaw
[50] cralawThis section provides: 'The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.cralaw
[51] Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v.
COA, 366 Phil. 273 (1999).
 cralaw
[52] cralawG.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.cralaw
[53] cralawPresidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987,
entitled 'Proclaiming the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986,
including the Ordinance Appended thereto.
G.R. No. L-28196      November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents. 

G.R. No. L-28224      November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. 

No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner. 
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224: 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.  Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.  House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
CONCEPCION, C.J.: Congress. 

G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
injunction.  President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:  Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. 
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act
No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing
plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of
Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine
Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from Constitution Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA —
printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.
General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred
funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and  until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before
the Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time,
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.  and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court —
had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:  PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review
by certiorari  of the resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision
Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent
of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be in L-28224. 
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen,
have, at least, one (1) member;  a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class
unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such
be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and  denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case
L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial
determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case. 
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-
profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the
rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions
or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement
in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the
ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission
on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was
allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the
ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought
in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House
of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render
in operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of
Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal
effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter,
nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through
one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a
respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared
that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It
is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue
submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question
whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to
the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of
the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 6 Avelino vs.
Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9In
the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in
the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on
behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of
two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground
that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to
the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments
thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people  — as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11 — to make,
and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power.12 Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act, not  as members of Congress,
but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such,
the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,13 for
their authority does not  emanate from the Constitution — they are the very
source  of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself  . 
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say
on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the
rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,14 the power to
declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character
of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of a special election, not  a general  election, in which officers of the national
the Court are unanimous on this point.  and local governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on
November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and 
THE MERITS
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:  proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification,
must be held under such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature
of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of and implications of said amendments. 
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution,
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. which provides: 

Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be
proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that
purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary.
And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is
urged that said resolutions are null and void because:  as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have
at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall
have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far

1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments,
as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are,
at best, de facto  Congressmen;  Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose —
amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both —
that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention — at the same
time; 
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall
be submitted for ratification, must be
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no
apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the
illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de
facto  Congress and/or de facto  congressmen, respectively; and that,
consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void. 
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment
within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did
actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to
make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-
unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the
undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of elections in 1938. 
the different provinces of the Philippines.18
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution,
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the particularly those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by
failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said
in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution
that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have
are de facto  officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections
the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact
that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the
justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940
rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the
become de facto officers.  effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after  the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress after subsequent  elections. 
has not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law.
The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
pursuant to which:  enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it
follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure  bodies, and
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .  that the Members thereof were de jure  officers. Pursuant to the theory of
petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the
period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices,
dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that and were de facto officers. 
Congress shall continue  to function with the representative districts existing
at the time of the expiration of said period.  Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period
without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives,
in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such
necessarily before  the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto  forfeited their seats
however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact,
nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular,
supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it
may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the
absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law
relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed
in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within
three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections
in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the
legal provisions creating Congress — with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts
as they existed at the time of said elections — remained in force, we can not
see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded
as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to
make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.  Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the
President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main
function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such
mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired,
until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in
accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or
the extinction of title thereto is not automatic. 
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are
merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions
and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for
the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that
acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished
from the officer in question — is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those
dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled
to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they
hold, before  dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or
obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the
authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments.22 One
can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result
in the absence of the de facto doctrine. 
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed
collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto  proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned
upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are
obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2)
the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned. 
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because
the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein
are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent
with Tayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being
heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case,
for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This
was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It
should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was
concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit.
Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much
less rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties,
in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was
overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as
regards the Resolutions herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are
complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith. 
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
consideration is untenable. 
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon
the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by
the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of
other circumstances — and none has brought to our attention — supporting
the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has,
oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or
context of the law warrants it.26 
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for
ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a
convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the
Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2
is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments
proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification
several years before  those that may be proposed by the constitutional
convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after  the other. In other words, they were not  passed at
the same time.  people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history
thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to
approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the
same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional
session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the
denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention
to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said
convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to
be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of
this argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom  of the
action taken by Congress, not its authority  to take it. One seeming purpose
thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to
the constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein,
without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be
done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.  to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the
Court. 
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a
General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:  They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein
referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that
three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not
negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections. 
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the
proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's
approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no
denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits
proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention
usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general
elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be
chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of
holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They
do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as
implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the
abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even
more patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers
(2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant
of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV
of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special  election.
Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a
"plebiscite," without  any "election," general or special, of public officers.
such important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the
attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter
thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their (4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may
intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not place;"
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are
likely to affect the selection of elective officials. (5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of native languages, for free distributing:" and 
which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing.
The question whether the Constitution  forbids  the submission of proposals (6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of
for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967. 
thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the
contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably
effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals
thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that
spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.  said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint,
to inform the people of the amendment sought to be made.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to
declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.  the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution
down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution,
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides: 
Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a
practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended
Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides: thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal
and provincial government office building and in each polling place
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred
the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"  and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until
after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination
and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable,
copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"  copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling
place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth
election day;"  Act No. 34, reading: 
 Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at
least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall
be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial
office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-
second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain
posted therein continually until after the termination of the
plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available
for examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite.
Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be
kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940
amendments, is of the following tenor:  refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial
government office building and in every polling place not later than
May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted
therein until after the election. At least ten copies of said
amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election
day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be
kept therein.  sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the
effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial
government office building and in every polling place not later than
February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall
remain posted therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of
the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election
day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be
kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major
political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the
Constitution — except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and,
consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took
place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made
an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly,
debates or polemics as may have taken place — on a rather limited scale —
on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the
initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our
citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot,
however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the
community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the
time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law
enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the
passage or approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the
thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in
the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase
of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the
main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No.
1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the
authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of
such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who
constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the
proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by
R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable,
however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment,
or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a
clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies
of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the
polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the
back of the ballots they will use.  the question of jurisdiction.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to
realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the
Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then,
nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the
provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their
seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of
delegates to the Convention.  I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and
esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors
affect the wisdom  of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3, not  the authority  of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike
down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set
forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of
separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme
within its own sphere. The determination of the conditions under which the
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a
matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has
been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in
enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something
better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no
law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement.
Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members
of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the
spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic
Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions
in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on
 
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J.,  concurring: 
additional observations in connection with my concurrence. Sections 2 and
4 of Republic Act No. 4913 provide: 
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after
the election. At least five copies of the said amendments shall be
kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies
in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place. The
Commission on Elections shall make available copies of each
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the
principal native languages, for free distribution.
 xxx      xxx      xxx a failure to properly submit them for ratification within the intendment of
the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not intrinsic in the law but in
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the its implementation. The same manner of submitting the proposed
approval of said amendments shall be printed in English and Pilipino amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different setting, be
and shall be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the constitutionality or
Elections: Provided, however, That at the back of said ballot there unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors
shall be printed in full Resolutions of both Houses of Congress not inherent in its provisions. For a law to be struck down as
Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict
nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, proposing the between it and the Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or
amendments: Provided, further, That the questionnaire appearing invalid, according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the
on the face of the ballot shall be as follows:  zeal with which they are carried out. To such a thesis I cannot agree. The
criterion would be too broad and relative, and dependent upon individual
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of opinions that at best are subjective. What one may regard as sufficient
Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?  compliance with the requirement of submission to the people, within the
context of the same law, may not be so to another. The question is
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of susceptible of as many views as there are viewers; and I do not think this
Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?  Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the matter is the
correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others. 
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter
shall write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must
dialect in the blank space after each question; to vote for the necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose
rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution
Pilipino or in the local dialect.  speaks simply of "an election  at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference interpretation that the petitioners would place on this provision, namely,
to extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the that it means only a special election.
aforesaid provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed
amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else
should have been required by the Act to make it adhere more closely to the
constitutional requirement. Certainly it would have been out of place to BENGZON, J.P., J.,  concurring:
provide, for instance, that government officials and employees should go
out and explain the amendments to the people, or that they should be the It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one
subject of any particular means or form of public discussion. can exercise any authority over the rights and interests of others except
pursuant to and in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 principle, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution
seems to me predicated on the fact that there are so many other issues at Association (PHILCONSA) come to this Court in separate petitions. 
stake in the coming general election that the attention of the electorate,
cannot be entirely focused on the proposed amendments, such that there is
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in
representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on
Elections, Director of Printing and Auditor General from implementing
and/or complying with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation,
assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of
Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the
Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of
Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic
Act fixes the date and manner of the election at which the aforesaid
proposed amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates
funds for said election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose
two amendments to the Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by
increasing the maximum membership of the House of Representatives from
120 to 180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision
that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by
allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional
convention without forfeiting their seats.  ratification." To join it with an election for candidates to public office, that
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are
considered together herein.  for their ratification. To prohibition being found in the plain terms of the
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1)
Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting
the proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval,
at the general election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that
purpose; (2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution,
since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when
Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being
a step in or part of the process of proposing amendments to the
Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913 violates the due process clause of
the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the
substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot
or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, such
as by stating the provisions before and after said amendments, instead of
printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the  procedure  for
amending the Constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this
Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress to determine its
conformity to the fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves
Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit,
so that the substance  or content  of said proposed amendment is a matter
of policy and wisdom and thus a political question, the Constitution
nevertheless imposes requisites as to the manner or procedure of proposing
such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths vote requirement. Said procedure
or manner, therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a
matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that
extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in proposing
amendments followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is
perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly
does not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires that the ratification be
thru an election solely  for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
is, to make it concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an
election at which the proposed amendments are submitted to the people
Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the framers of requiring
Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only of
the proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the
phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They
did not. 
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it
would not have been better to provide for a separate election exclusively
for the ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however is that
such separate and exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser,
which again, is not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure
required by the Constitution to amend the same. The function of the
Judiciary is "not to pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation".2 It is limited to determining whether the action taken by the
Legislative Department has violated the Constitution or not. On this score, I
am of the opinion that it has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for
not having been passed by Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote.  not lodged elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:  validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election to which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the
term "propose amendment" is meant to determine WHAT said amendment
shall be, then Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and
3 already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide
for how, when, and by what means the amendments shall be submitted  to
the people for approval, then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one
intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4
voting in joint session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And then in
the second sentence, it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be
submitted to the people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that by
the term "propose amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the
substance or the content or the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it is
this and this alone that is submitted to the people for their ratification. The
details of when the election shall be held for approval or rejection of the
proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not submitted for
ratification to form part of the Constitution. Stated differently, the plain
language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows that the act of proposing amendments
is distinct from — albeit related to — that of submitting the amendments to
the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting requirement applies
only to the first step, not to the second one. 
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru
an ordinary statute passed by Congress. The Constitution does not expressly
state by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power
legislative body, under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore
of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their ratification.
Since it does not "propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1,
Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely provides for how and when the
amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does
not need the 3/4 vote in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure.
Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec.
18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that "All appropriation . . . bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives". Republic Act 4913,
therefore, could not have been validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing
the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure providing for
the holding of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which must
perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends
against substantive due process. An examination of the provisions of the law
shows no violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
publication in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the
posting of notices in public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to
remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the
proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at
the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters to cast an
intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair
opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be
availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the
citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given,
and it is, the due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the
printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead
of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter
of fair opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the Constitution
is not being veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to
know them and they are available should he want to check on what he is
conclusively presumed to know. Should the voters choose to remain
ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress.
For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the Constitution as it stands has
been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would have been more
convenient for the voters if the present wording of the provisions were also
to be printed on the ballot. The same however is a matter of policy. As long
as the method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to
intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case, it is
not constitutionally defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the
proposed amendments. These are for the people in their sovereign capacity
to decide, not for this Court. 
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call
a convention and propose amendments; second, that the present Congress
is a de facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted within three
years from the last census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in
1961 are de facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose
amendments, it is argued.  words may however be added.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose
amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The term "or",
however, is frequently used as having the same meaning as "and"
particularly in permissive, affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of
the word "or" as "and" in the Constitution in such use will not change its
meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La,
442). And it should be pointed out that the resolutions proposing
amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that calling for a
convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to
amend the Constitution before a convention called for is elected, it should
not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes in this case, suffice it to
note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.  Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller,3 in its holding that certain
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the
Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration,
and not otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until
such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives
shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the
National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present assembly districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a
valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted, does
not render the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the
Constitution itself provides for its continuance in such case, rendering legal
and de jure the status quo. 
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act
4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice. 
FERNANDO, J.,  concurring: 
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion
prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that
erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few
 
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the
question is to be solved by public opinion or where the matter has been left
by the Constitution to the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as
was so clearly stated by the then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v.
Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing on the issue before it. Whatever may
be said about the present question, it is hard to speak with certitude
considering Article XV, that Congress may be entrusted with the full and
uncontrolled discretion on the procedure leading to proposals for an
amendment of the Constitution. 
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through
aspects of the amending process may be considered political. His opinion
quoted with approval the view of Justice Black, to which three other
members of the United States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself
is political in its entirety, "from submission until an amendment becomes later, constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or consider the question political and let the people decide? That assumption
interference at any point." In a sense that would solve the matter neatly. could have been indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major
The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in every case soul- premise. For many it did bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship. 
searching process of determining whether the procedure for amendments
required by the Constitution has been followed.  The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this
date and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to assure the utmost
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which compliance with the constitutional requirement would be a more
cannot be judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of appropriate response. 
possibility that a failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would
occur. In the event that judicial intervention is sought, to rely automatically
on the theory of political question to avoid passing on such a matter of
delicacy might under certain circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as
nothing less than judicial abdication or surrender.  SANCHEZ, J.,  in separate opinion:

What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the
late Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling. There is comfort in the
thought that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of the times.
It could very well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as
well as the particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the
Constitution, the parity rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view
of the grave economic situation then confronting the country would be to
avoid the existence of any obstacle to its being submitted for ratification.
Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old, American Supreme Court
opinions on constitutional questions were-invariably accorded uncritical
acceptance. Thus the approach followed by Justice Tuason is not difficult to
understand. It may be said that there is less propensity now, which is all to
the good, for this Court to accord that much deference to constitutional
views coming from the quarter.  House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to
his memory. For as he stated in another major opinion in Araneta v.
Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency Powers
Act,5 one should not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of
construction were followed. As he so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by
its results."  next November 14, 1967. Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on
the economic survival of the country, an erroneous appraisal it turned out
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice
Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable
contribution to the substance and form of the opinion which follows. 
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967. This Act
seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the
House of Representatives on March 16, 1967 with the end in view of
amending vital portions of the Constitution. 
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid
of both houses of Congress, it may just as well be that we recite in brief the
salient features thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the
apportions 160 seats. A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which
permits Senators and Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in
Congress — to be members of the Constitutional Convention1 to be
convened, as provided in another resolution — Resolution No. 2.
Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the Constitution
(Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their ratification
constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The delegates thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November 1970; the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the
amendments proposed by the convention to be submitted to the people
thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number
of members of the House of representatives under Resolution No. 1, and
that in Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen the right to
sit as members of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1,
1971. Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the
people in the general elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967,
upon the provisions of Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which reads:  deliberation in a constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by
the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses
Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen,
nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people
for approval at the general election which shall be held on
November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us —
the manner in which the amendments proposed by Congress just adverted
to be brought to the people's attention. 
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed
amendments to the Constitution may become effective, Section 1, Article XV
thereof commands that such amendments must be "approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which amendments are submitted  to the
people for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing
each other, namely, "submitted" and "ratification."  important; Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing
us. And this, because the amendments submitted are transcendental and
encompassing. The ceiling of the number of Congressmen is sought to be
elevated from 120 to 180 members; and Senators and Congressmen may
run in constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These
certainly affect the people as a whole. The increase in the number of
Congressmen has its proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They
may not look at this with favor, what with the constitutional provision
(Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make an apportionment",
without the necessity of disturbing the present constitutionally provided
number of Congressmen. People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk at
the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1,
and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal
representation. And then, people may question the propriety of permitting
the increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming
constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they may
dominate its proceedings. They may entertain the belief that, if at all,
increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper topic for
place. They probably would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables require
the people's close scrutiny. 
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the
constitutional directive that constitutional amendments be submitted to the
people for their ratification. 
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute
which may suffer amendments three or more times in the same year, it is
intended to stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's
sovereign will. 
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for
ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the basis of the spirit of the
Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the
phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within the realm of
possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths
of the Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all
that in some such situations the amendments ought to call for a
constitutional convention rather than a legislative proposal. And yet,
nothing there is in the books or in the Constitution itself. which would
require such amendments to be adopted by a constitutional convention.
And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids
that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to
the people for their ratification. 
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted
to the people for their ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of
the Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the
people, an — expression of their sovereign will — is that it can only be
amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure
ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid
before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions compare them with
the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of
their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly in
insidious influences. We believe, the word "submitted" can only mean that
the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort
to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are
not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000
citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning
of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with
respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated,
one thing is submission  and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent, consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the
people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them,
then so be it. For, the people decree their own fate.  polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified
Aptly had it been said: 
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this
respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by
Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution should beyond the
reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is
needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of
the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved
the excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which
alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficiency. . . . Changes in government are to be feared unless the
benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another
evil may succeed and a worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the
people are not sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon,
to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine
manner can it be said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate,
"the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our
answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967  —  the statute
that submits to the people the constitutional amendments proposed by
Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of
propagation of the nature of the amendments throughout the country.
There are five parts in said Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. 
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every
polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred
and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. 
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each
electors during election day. 
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in
each polling place. 
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the
principal native languages, for free distribution. 
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination
of information regarding the amendments effectively brings the matter to
the people. A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First,
the Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And
even if it reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all under
stand English? Second, it should be conceded that many citizens, especially
those in the outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial
office buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding
to court summonses. And if they do, will they notice the printed
amendments posted on the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy
again is in English (sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General)
for, anyway, the statute does not require that it be in any other language or
dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five copies are kept in the
polling place for examination by qualified electors during election day. As
petitioner puts it, voting time is not study time. And then, who can enter the
polling place, except those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the
principal native languages shall be kept in each polling place. But this is not,
as Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command because such copies
shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may be determined by
the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are available
before election, a citizen may not intrude into the school building where the
polling places are usually located without disturbing the school classes being
held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available
copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable, in
the principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is
not required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as
to people in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are
completely unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the
cities and centers of population on the merits and demerits of the
amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this case, is but a passive agency which
may hold copies available, but which copies may notbe distributed at all.
Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has more than its hands
full in these pre-election days. They cannot possibly make extensive
distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official
sample ballot submitted to this Court would show that only  the
amendments are printed at the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act
4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the
proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in extenso. People
do not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the
merits and demerits of said amendments.  effective unless they will it so through the compelling force of need of it and
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed
constitutional amendments within the meaning and intendment of Section
1, Article XV of the Constitution. 
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present
election campaign the focus is on the election of candidates. The
constitutional amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the
homestretch, and their leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided
efforts to the election of officials; the constitutional amendments cut no ice
with them. The truth is that even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to
the casting of "yes" or "no" vote would give one the impression that the
constitutional amendments are but a bootstrap to the electoral ballot.
Worse still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and local
levels, are inextricably intertwined with the results of the votes on the
plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate and conscience on the
merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments, we are quite certain
that it is the latter that will be dented. 
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to
equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is
reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had
been amended thrice  —  in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the
amendments were embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature,
which thereafter fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments were
to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have been referred to either as
an "election" or "general election". At no time, however, was the vote for
the amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with the election
officials, national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment;
the record shows that the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and
the special elections simultaneously held in only three provinces, Iloilo,
Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental  thereto.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against
indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask
that reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the alterations of
the law of the land, their true  voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best
expressed in the following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the
Constitution is the people's enactment. No proposed change can become
desire for it."4
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken
down as in violation of the Constitution. 

Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur. 

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.

REYES, J.B.L.,  J.,  concurring: 

I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To
approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a
three-fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of each legislative chamber, the
highest majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter, one higher
even than that required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all
its dire consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was evidently
exacted in order to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every
constitutional amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend the
Constitution, I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the
people's attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as
the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the Constitution,
aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as
much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any
amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted upon at an G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject.
That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, 
the case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that were vs.
submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE
issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
not. CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA,
PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,  concur. Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V.
BORRA, Intervenors.

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent
Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission
on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971,"
at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age"
in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen
years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the
subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of
such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission
(COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid
Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the
COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor
General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such
action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC
filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper
order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are
indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to
be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the
Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the
petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez
and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru
counsel, resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of
arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with the
principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests
would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number
of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more
or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only
Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de
la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor
Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have
been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of
brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and
amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their
corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae
1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some
private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly
to be affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court
acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the
extensive study that has been undertaken in this case. 
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of
1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for
the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress
held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to
the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions
and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent
portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be
composed of two elective Delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those required of Members of the House of
Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
 SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention
shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the
different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the
Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors
of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory
works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its
session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about
3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18  resolution." The said letter reads:
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention: 
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by
(male) citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and
are able to read and write, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local
elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the
age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on
other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the
sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended
funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided,
however that should there be no savings or unexpended
sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent
of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called
upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above)
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution
No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
 Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No.
6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act
of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention
implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the
printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally
sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own
security measures for the printing and shipment of said
ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered
to the Commission in time so that they could be distributed
at the same time that the Commission will distribute its
official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on
November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors'
Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order
forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were
approved by the President who then transmitted them to
the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report
on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in
the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the
order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred
to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-
Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the
Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate
Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of
the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9,
1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the
ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the
resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No.
24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the
authority of the President of the Convention to implement
Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad
Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection
with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution
No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently
approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of
eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on
November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and
tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said
resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of
such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention,
and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and
proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down
the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the
Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the
Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose
amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such
amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to
decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question
of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question
and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is
sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the
control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted
that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact,
respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly
concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that
the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the
decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774,
wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their
opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous
in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either
failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have
quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting
as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional
convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading
of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should
dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but
comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139,
157), this Court — speaking through one of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel —
declared that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given
number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution — which was being
submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the
three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law.
The force of this precedent has been weakened, however,
by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil.
818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14,
1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)
and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14,
1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision
and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed
by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum  in
the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number
of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the
party having the second largest number of votes therein of
two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members,
for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in
the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress
purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the
House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
cases that the issues therein raised were political questions
the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11,
Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV,
Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the
Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government  including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether
or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of
our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that
the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,
(And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
— acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag
v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed modified
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority,
the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral
argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what
respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same
nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the
existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called
by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which
drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a
war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an
existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As
to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is
completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such
conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No
amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention
came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session
of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1,
Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra
ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the
existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive
only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may
propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same
are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of
convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on
constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in
its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention
notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly.
While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of
its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any
degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally
beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members
can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the
laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of
Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such
Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private
property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any
tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special
session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict
or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or
between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of
powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and
cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing
Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be
assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it,
according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a
contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that
somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave
constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would
have to confess that the integrated system of government established by
our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could
ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed.
The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked
by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of
principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
check and balances and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
Constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then,
this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the
government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the
authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate
analysis then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission
to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of
the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by
which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have declined
to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This
is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the
validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon
the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may in the long
run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these
questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so
must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case,
this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of
the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did
in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of
authority between the three existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts between and among these
departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in
Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the
House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle
whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the
respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the
present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by
the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by
authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of
the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not
because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention
and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon
principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the
power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution
to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have
joined in this case.  individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition.
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on
its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed
amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage
under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for
in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of
the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the
most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court
is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not
against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-
year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress
such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by
him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted
to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to
comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of
the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or
in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees
it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the
point of whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a
plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment
proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and
form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question
implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at
this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common
knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact,
still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments
affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic
Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein
proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended section or on other portions of the entire
Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this
case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the
fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be
allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There
should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it
constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said
proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or
rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and
enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity,
under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people
is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism,
sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or
approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the
pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for
a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the
structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions,
including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being
and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well
as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural
resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and
chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the
excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably
marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth
of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want
confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law
and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly
and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this
Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of
these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to
be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of
law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in
a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government
or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the
sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting
and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties,
and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases,
We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need
for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful
change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be
the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the
Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it
has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since
its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life
expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which
opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the
seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its
members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they
see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention
may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is
not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be
to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this
case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional
duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among
them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish
to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose
upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court
considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be
untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as
signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the
Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the
Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be
necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable
violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of
constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the
Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is
founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to
the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and
certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in
that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear
that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress
pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier
in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its
internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and
members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution.
Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This
must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution
took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken
with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the
people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers
have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations
generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,
future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people
within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care
is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for
which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment
of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution
itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and
deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations,
restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves.
This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the
original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their
handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only
for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written
constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not
for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and
exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate
and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or
fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations
and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves,
in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or
conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in
the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore
and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent
as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree
the number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the
Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to
pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to
whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of
the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative
and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said
power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress.
In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute
necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth
to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of
the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and
deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is
calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or
expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case comes
to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any
can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation
or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated
by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that
there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment
now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment
the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November
8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution,
hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently
clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly
or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that
Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as
definitely provides that "such amendments  shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,"
thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites
may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the
same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the
Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution
making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as
the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and
reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and
aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a
constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out
of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them
for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the
people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its
harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its
entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits
and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And
so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of
the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or
any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its
acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding
already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what
finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final
draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be
able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which
make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment,
although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would
favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels
are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions
in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or
not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of
judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what
changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention
will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means
of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at
all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to
provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may
divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that
the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes,
if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the
voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to
the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a
possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors
themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is
to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief,
under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no
proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of
the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass
judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to
vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with
appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law
are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the
conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has
been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all
subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may
propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution
No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with
the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
MAKALINTAL, J.,  reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient
majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the
result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts
as to the validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in
support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the
urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion
on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact
that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the
other issues raised in the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a
task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to
this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ.,  concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual
inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our
individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment,
which is not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional
dimension which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of
the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in  extenso in the
main opinion, nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in
character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose
piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the people for
ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no  proper
submission of title proposed amendment in question within the meaning
and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that
the forthcoming election is not the  proper election  envisioned by the same
provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on 
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the
minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be
a  proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment.
This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be
afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments,
and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or
possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
"submitted" can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform
citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.
By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one
citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached,
then there is no submission within the meaning of the word
as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every
instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their
act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated,
one thing is submission and another is ratification. There
must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the
writers of this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and
ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification", if the concentration of the people's
attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The
framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental
character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much
stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any
amendments thereto should be debated, considered and
voted upon an election wherein the people could devote
undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or
do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be
uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things
which appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the
average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first
place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or
20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the
21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle
him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old
be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past
elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted
down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on the said
amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment
ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention
have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the
approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does
it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral
and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to render
compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not
be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a
domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately
ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already
long litany. And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are
debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided
attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by
election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and
effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been
afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been
and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of
the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional
pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus
weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed
amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment
of the words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J.,  concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice
Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the
rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the
Constitution occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms,
Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must
bow to its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the
view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by the
Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not being
controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the
circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the
powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot
discern any objection to the validity of its action there being no legal
impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done
is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our Constitution,
sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself
unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be
resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of
intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional
convention referred to by petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the
theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to
note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for
respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such
extreme position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the
primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It
cannot be denied though that in at least one American state, that is
Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the
powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are dependent on a
legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the
lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus
made subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more
vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its
holding though finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a
constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in
character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to
the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is
therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the
responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited
legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield
to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It is to be
admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of
which is Sproule v. Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892,
that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot
bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional
convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent, limited
as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or
amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and
constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are
coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the
constituent power of proposing amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy
consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid
restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the
call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise
be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion
would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to
it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three
coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers
is supreme within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly
subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate principle
that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention
and a legislative body under American law is that found in Orfield's work.
Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was
absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and
intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not
sovereign, is a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the
existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent
of its constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the
state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so
vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the
power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its
Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are
two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two
constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the
mode therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called
into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress
of the Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power.
Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would have the
people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval
or disapproval of the electorate may be obtained, the convention likewise,
to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to
assure that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted
to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not
withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to place it in an
inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and
constitutional convention are agencies for submitting proposals under the
fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other.
No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice
exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require
ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its
proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the
legislative and executive branches that could, whether by act or omission,
result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that
such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if minimal could be
avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable
constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a
constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional
restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or,
for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to
interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on
the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional
convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide
with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by
which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to
facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time inevitably brings in
its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That
would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive
mode of appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be,
for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in
it, attended by such grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article
XV providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and
thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an
election is a bar to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at
by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the
petition must be sustained as only when the convention has finished its
work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification. That is
not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the singular, but that
is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar;
they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation.
Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from
the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it
were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not
commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they
derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed.
Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not,
for me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is
provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I
do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional
Convention did seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed
submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its
validity. It might be said of course that until impressed with finality, an
amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility
in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The
spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence
I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law
when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will. In that
sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is
not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more important
consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the
principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by
the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to
my way of thinking be inconsistent with the fundamental principle that it is
in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its
authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on
Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost
sight of that the Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a
duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge
of all laws relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive
function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded
from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence
to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal,
even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any
rate, it may be implied that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it
is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a
force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to
dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from
their basic premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be
characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.
 
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J.,  reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient
majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the
result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts
as to the validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in
support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the
urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion
on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact
that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the
other issues raised in the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a
task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to
this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ.,  concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual
inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our
individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment,
which is not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional
dimension which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of
the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in  extenso in the
main opinion, nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in
character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose
piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the people for
ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no  proper
submission of title proposed amendment in question within the meaning
and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that
the forthcoming election is not the  proper election  envisioned by the same
provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on 
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on
Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the
minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be
a  proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment.
This is what he said:
 ... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be
afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments,
and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or
possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
"submitted" can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform
citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.
By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one
citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached,
then there is no submission within the meaning of the word
as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every
instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their
act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated,
one thing is submission and another is ratification. There
must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the
writers of this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and
ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification", if the concentration of the people's
attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The
framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental
character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much
stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any
amendments thereto should be debated, considered and
voted upon an election wherein the people could devote
undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or
do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be
uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things
which appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the
average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first
place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or
20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the
21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle
him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old
be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past
elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted
down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on the said
amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment
ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention
have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the
approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does
it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral
and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to render
compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not
be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a
domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately
ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already
long litany. And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are
debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided
attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by
election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and
effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been
afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been
and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of
the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional
pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus
weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed
amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment
of the words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J.,  concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice
Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the
rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the
Constitution occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms,
Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must
bow to its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the
view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by the
Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not being
controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the
circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the
powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot
discern any objection to the validity of its action there being no legal
impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done
is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our Constitution,
sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself
unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be
resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of
intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional
convention referred to by petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the
theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to
note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for
respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such
extreme position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the
primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It
cannot be denied though that in at least one American state, that is
Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the
powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are dependent on a
legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the
lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus
made subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has such a view been more
vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its
holding though finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a
constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in
character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to
the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is
therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the
responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited
legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield
to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It is to be
admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of
which is Sproule v. Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892,
that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot
bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional
convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent, limited
as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or
amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and
constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are
coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the
constituent power of proposing amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy
consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid
restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the
call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise
be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion
would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to
it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three
coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers
is supreme within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly
subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate principle
that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention
and a legislative body under American law is that found in Orfield's work.
Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was
absolute. The convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third and
intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not
sovereign, is a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the
existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent
of its constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the
state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so
vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the
power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its
Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are
two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two
constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the
mode therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called
into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress
of the Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power.
Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would have the
people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval
or disapproval of the electorate may be obtained, the convention likewise,
to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to
assure that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted
to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not
withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to place it in an
inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and
constitutional convention are agencies for submitting proposals under the
fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other.
No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice
exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require
ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its
proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the
legislative and executive branches that could, whether by act or omission,
result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that
such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if minimal could be
avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable
constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a
constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional
restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or,
for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to
interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on
the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional
convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide
with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by
which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to
facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time inevitably brings in
its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That
would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive
mode of appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be,
for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in
it, attended by such grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article
XV providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and
thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an
election is a bar to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at
by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the
petition must be sustained as only when the convention has finished its
work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification. That is
not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the singular, but that
is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar;
they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation.
Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from
the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it
were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not
commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they
derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed.
Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not,
for me, carry the day.
to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal,
even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any
rate, it may be implied that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it
is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a
force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to
dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from
their basic premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be
characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is

provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I
do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional
Convention did seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed
submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its
validity. It might be said of course that until impressed with finality, an
amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility
in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The
spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence
I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law
when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will. In that
sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is
not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more important
consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the
principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by
the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to
my way of thinking be inconsistent with the fundamental principle that it is
in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its

authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on
Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost
sight of that the Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a
duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge
of all laws relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive
function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded
from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision
that is at the core of the controversy now confronting us, thus:
Article XVI, Section 6:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to
be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. 1
With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic Act No.
6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of
House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on
December 13, 1990, it was published on December 17, 1990. 2
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the
Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at
bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order.
But in an en banc  resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required
the public respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due
course to the petition and the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect
after fifteen days following its publication, or on January 1, 1991. 3
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be
well to discuss albeit briefly the history of our police force and the reasons
for the ordination of Section 6, Article XVI in our present Constitution.
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as
the nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP). The PC was made part of the PGF but its
administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then
Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the "National
Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service
component of the AFP. 4
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police
(INP) under the Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the
local police forces as the civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by
the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of the INP, exercised
command functions over the INP. 6
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) 7 exercised administrative
control and supervision while the local executives exercised operational
supervision and direction over the INP units assigned within their respective
localities. 8
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military
component, which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and
the multiplicity in the governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police
service. 9 Moreover, the integration of the national police forces with the PC
also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior
benefits and privileges. 10
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural
errors that beset the system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained
that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
 MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a
modern police organization is to remove it
from the military. 11
xxx xxx xxx
Here in our draft Constitution, we have already made a
constitutional postulate that the military cannot occupy any
civil service position [in Section 6 of the Article on the Civil
Service 12] Therefore, in keeping with this and because of
the universal acceptance that a police force is a civilian
function, a public service, and should not be performed by
military force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting
here is that it should be separated from the military force
which is the PC. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession
because most of the key positions are being occupied by the
military So, it is up to this Commission to remove the police
from such a situation so that it can develop into a truly
professional civilian police. . . . 14
Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character"
provision that is now Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.
In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975
emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power
"to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus,
"control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
National Police Commission and the PNP were placed. 15
We do not share this view.
To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle
in Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on
the matter.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk 17 and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano
vs.  Silvosa, 18to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive." 19
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, 20he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, 21 "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours)
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
the executive department." 23
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created
under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the
Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and
controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the
Act in question adequately provides for administration and control  at the
commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to wit:
Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The
Commission shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and
training, logistical requirements, communications, records,
information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention
and crime reporting;
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate
Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the
Philippine National Police by the Chief of the PNP;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional.
appellate boards over administrative cases against
policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be
vested in the Chief of the PNP . . . Such command and
direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with respect to the units under their
respective commands, in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and
effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP may constitute such
other support units as may be necessary subject to the
approval of the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance
evaluation system which shall be administered in
accordance with the rules, regulations and standards; and a
code of conduct promulgated by the Commission for
members of the PNP. . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of
control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to
choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors
and Mayors, respectively; the power of "operational supervision and
control" over police units in city and municipal mayors; in the Civil Service
Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior
Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of
qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in
the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal mayors. 25
Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.
It is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that
the authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law, they intended that the day-to-day functions of
police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic
control, etc., would be under the operational control of the local executives
as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local
executives. 26
They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and
sanctuaries for vices and abuses. 27
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to
choose the officers in question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the
Constitution's intent.
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that
every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the
court in considering the validity of the statute in question should give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the
fundamental  will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who meet
law. 28
Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP.
Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP
Units or Forces.
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as
representatives of the Commission in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall
discharge the following functions:
a.) Provincial Governor — (1) . . .
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director
from a list of three (3) eligibles recommended by the PNP
Regional Director.
4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following
authority over the PNP units in their respective jurisdictions:
i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five
(5) eligibles recommended by the Provincial Police
Director. . . . (Emphasis ours)
full control remains with the National Police Commission.
We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is
no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51
because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives
are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies,
they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of
their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the
NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." 29 It
is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives,
the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be
recommended by PNP officials.
The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational
supervision and control exercised by the local officials. Those officials would
simply be acting as representatives of the Commission.
As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to
say that the questioned provisions, which read:
Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. — The
Appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall
be effected in the following manner:
a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. — Appointed
by the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by
the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel
and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
b.) Inspector to Superintendent. — Appointed by the Chief
of the PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors,
and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
 c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. —
Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the
Chairman of the Civil Service  Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the
Commission . . .
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. — The Civil Service
Commission shall administer the qualifying entrance
examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards
set by the NAPOLCOM.
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and
will undoubtedly professionalize the same.
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also
not in derogation of the commission's power of control over the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru
the regional appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said
mayors. This is so under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission
which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be
adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign
NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs (Section
43-d4, d5).
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's
complaints against erring officers and members of the PNP, the
establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality would all the more
help professionalize the police force.
Petitioner would likewise have this Court imagine that Section 12 of the
questioned Act, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the
Department of National Defense. — During a period of
twenty- four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its
present role of preserving the internal and external security
of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by
the President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not
exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the
primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the
AFP its primary role of preserving external security.
x x x           x x x          x x x
constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by
the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers."
That We are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A
rejection thus of petitioner's submission anent Section 12 of the Act should
be in order in the light of the following exchanges during the CONCOM
deliberations of Wednesday, October 1, 1986:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Just a few questions. The President of the
Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Since the national police is not integrated
with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the
Philippines.
MR. NATIVIDAD. They do, Madam President. By law they
are under the supervision and control of the President of
the Philippines.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, but the President is not the
Commander-in-Chief of the national police.
MR. NATIVIDAD. He is the President.
 MR. RODRIGO. Yes, the Executive. But they do not come
under that specific provision that the President is
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. No, not under the Commander-in-Chief
provision.
MR. RODRIGO. There are two other powers of the
President. The President has control over departments,
bureaus and offices, and supervision over local
governments. Under which does the police fall, under
control or under supervision?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Both, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Control and Supervision.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, in fact, the National Police
Commission is under the Office of the President. (CONCOM
RECORDS, Vol. 5, p. 296)
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed
precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national
police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the
President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated
with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject
to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-
chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during
which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the
President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to
here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions
are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is
consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that
"civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II,
Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight
Committee" under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of
some legislators as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the
Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National Defense
and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairmen of the Committee
on Public Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense in the
House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a
diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control
under Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc  or
transitory body, established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing
the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the Department of
the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will
undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid
down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as
well as the committee itself would cease altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its
creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an
encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly
belongs to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau
or office is placed under the control or authority, of the committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the
Constitution, there are the so-called independent Constitutional
Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to
be protected from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they
were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any
department of the government. 34 Certainly, they are not under the control
of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent  office called the "Commission
on Human Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is
not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX,
although it is independent like the latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be
constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).

In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory

creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the
national police force to be established thereunder.

This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as
the independent  Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on
Human Rights.

By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service,

Audit, Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution
(Human Rights) are all independent  of the Executive; but the National Police
Commission is not. 36 In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM
deliberations that this commission would be under the President, and hence
may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government.

WHEREFORE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant

petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.