MODULE 6

Case No. 1
G.R. No. 178059 January 22, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CHRISTOPHER TABUELOG y CLAOR, appellant.

The Case:
Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 010381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 16 in Crim. Case No. 10408-162 finding appellant Christopher Tabuelog guilty of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Decision:
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was
stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the
instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may
only be held liable for homicide, not murder.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the maximum imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in
its medium period, pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the range of which is
from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum imposable penalty is prision mayor the range of which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12
years. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment that should be imposed on appellant should be 10 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, up to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in line
with prevailing jurisprudence. However, we cannot sustain the trial court’s award for actual damages in
the amount of P113,776.00. While the victim’s mother, Marqueza Badinas, testified on the civil aspect of
the case, she only presented a list of expenses without submitting the corresponding receipts. The trial
court awarded the same noting that it was "agreed upon during trial." This is not allowed. The award of
actual damages is proper only if the actual amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty. It should be supported by receipts. Thus, actual or compensatory damages cannot be
awarded.

Current jurisprudence, however, allows the grant of P25,000.00 as temperate damages when it appears
that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss but the award thereof cannot be established with
certainty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01038 finding appellant guilty of murder is
MODIFIED. We find appellant guilty of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Clinton Badinas the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

Justification:
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused
to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression presupposes not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils one’s life or limb. It is the
first and primordial element of self-defense. Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked.

The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused
upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to
defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the maximum imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in
its medium period, pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the range of which is
from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum imposable penalty is prision mayor the range of which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12
years. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment that should be imposed on appellant should be 10 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, up to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Case No. 2
G.R. No. 149652 March 24, 2006

EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee.

The Case:
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela assails his conviction for the crime of homicide by the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo, Aklan (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4877, as affirmed with modification by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23348.

Decision:
The Court commiserates with our policemen who regularly thrust their lives in zones of danger in order
to maintain peace and order and acknowledges the apprehensions faced by their families whenever
they go on duty. But the use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not justified when the
fulfillment of their duty as law enforcers can be effected otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" attitude
can never be countenanced in a civilized society.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The conviction of appellant Eduardo
Baxinela for the crime of homicide is AFFIRMED but his sentence is reduced to an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum, as maximum. The awards of damages are affirmed. No costs.

Justification:
we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty. In order to avail of this justifying
circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first
condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo
had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he
confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances,
Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot
be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to
Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.

The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition
is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the
penalty lower than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Accordingly, the
Court grants in favor of Baxinela a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty by one
degree. His entitlement to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also
recognized, thereby further reducing his penalty to its minimum.

Case No. 3
G.R. No. 191913 March 21, 2012

SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Case:
Every circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against
the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to
be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.

This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Resolution dated August 25, 2010, affirming the
July 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 entitled People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac. The CA affirmed the May 23, 2007 Judgment in Criminal Case No.
10750-14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Laoag City, which convicted petitioner of
homicide.

Decision:
In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument that petitioner feared
for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen
by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken state,
disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.

Lack of Sufficient Provocation

The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the
victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent from
the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the
shooting.

All told, We are convinced that petitioner was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow
police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.21 This
rule is binding except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.22 As earlier pointed out, the trial court did not consider certain
facts and circumstances that materially affect the outcome of the instant case. We must, therefore,
acquit petitioner.

Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, We find that the prosecution was unable to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner. Even the OSG shares this view in its Comment
appealing for his acquittal.

WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated July 20, 2009
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac is ACQUITTED
of homicide on reasonable doubt.

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to immediately RELEASE petitioner from custody, unless
he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt
of this Decision of the date petitioner was actually released from confinement.

SO ORDERED.

Justification:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.––The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We explained, "Without unlawful

aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will
not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present." It would "presuppose an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person––not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude––but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. x x x There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just
speculative."
The following circumstances negate a conviction for the killing of the victim:

(1) The drunken state of the victim;

(2) The victim was also a police officer who was professionally trained at shooting;

(3) The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim;

(4) A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and

(5) The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.

As testified by the victim’s companion, SPO1 Basilio, petitioner ordered him and the victim not to leave
because they were on duty. SPO1 Basilio also confirmed that the victim was inebriated and had uttered
invectives in response to petitioner’s lawful order.