NAVARRO V.

PINEDA

Facts:
 Defendants Rufino Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales (married to Gregorio Pineda), borrowed from
plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro, the sum of P2,550.00, payable 6 months.

 To secure the indebtedness, Rufino executed a document captioned "DEED OF REAL ESTATE and CHATTEL
MORTGAGES",

 whereby Juana Gonzales, by way of Real Estate Mortgage hypothecated a parcel of land, belonging to her
registered with the Register of Deeds

 and Rufino Pineda, by way of Chattel Mortgage, mortgaged his two-story residential house, and one
motor truck, registered in his name.

 Both mortgages were contained in one instrument which was registered in both the Office of the Register
of Deeds and the Motor Vehicles Office.

 Defendants failed to pay when the mortgage debt became due and payable and failed again even after
asking for two extensions. Plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages. RTC
ruled in favor of plaintiff.

 Appellants argue that since only movables can be the subject of a chattel mortgage then the mortgage in
question which is the basis of the present action, cannot give rise to an action for foreclosure because it is
a nullity.

 The above judgment was directly appealed to the SC by the defendants assigning error to said RTC
decision when it held that the deed of real estate and chattel mortgages appended to the complaint is
valid, notwithstanding the fact that the house of the defendant Rufino Pineda was made the subject of
the chattel mortgage, for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.

Issue: Did the RTC erred in its ruling?

Ruling: No.
 The trial court did not predicate its decision declaring the deed of chattel mortgage valid solely on the
ground that the house mortgaged was erected on the land which belonged to a third person, but also and
principally on the doctrine of estoppel, in that "the parties have so expressly agreed" in the mortgage to
consider the house as a chattel "for its smallness and mixed materials of sawali and wood".

Estoppel is a bar or impediment (obstruction) which precludes a person from asserting a fact or a right or
prevents one from denying a fact. Such a hindrance is due to a person's actions, conduct, statements, admissions,
failure to act or judgment against the person in an identical legal case.

 In construing Arts. 334 and 335 of the Spanish Civil Code (corresponding to Arts. 415 and 416, N.C.C.), for
purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law, it was held that under certain conditions, "a
property may have a character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement, treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property. There can not be any question that a building of mixed materials may be the subject of a chattel
mortgage, in which case, it is considered as between the parties as personal property.

 The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of the parties. "Personal property may retain
its character as such where it is so agreed by the parties interested even though annexed to the realty.
The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property
for the purposes of said contract, is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is
based, partly, upon the principles of estoppel.

 In the case at bar, the house in question was treated as personal or movable property, by the parties to
the contract themselves. In the deed of chattel mortgage, appellant Rufino Pineda conveyed by way of
"Chattel Mortgage his personal properties a residential house and a truck. The mortgagor himself grouped
 the house with the truck, which is, inherently a movable property. The house which was not even
declared for taxation purposes was small and made of light construction materials: G.I. sheets
roofing, sawali and wooden walls and wooden posts; built on land belonging to another.

 The cases cited by appellants are not applicable to the present case. The Iya cases, 103 Phil., 972 supra),
refer to a building or a house of strong materials, permanently adhered to the land, belonging to the
owner of the house himself. In the case of Lopez vs. Orosa, (103 Phil., 98), the subject building was a
theatre, built of materials worth more than P62 000.00 attached permanently to the soil. In these two
cases and in the Leung Yee Case, supra, third persons assailed the validity of the deed of chattel
mortgages; in the present case, it was one of the parties to the contract of mortgages who assailed its
validity.
BICERRA v. TENEZA

This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing the complaint
filed by appellants, upon motion of defendants-appellees on the ground that the action was within the exclusive
(original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, of the same province.

Facts:

 Appellants were the owners of the house, worth P200.00, built on a lot owned by them. In January 1957
appellees forcibly demolished the house, claiming to be the owners thereof. The materials of the house,
after it was dismantled, were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant of the place.

 As a result of appellees' refusal to restore the house or to deliver the materials to appellants, the latter
claims that he has suffered actual damages in the amount of P200.00, plus moral and consequential
damages in the amount of P600.00.

 The relief prayed for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the house in question and/or the
materials that resulted in its dismantling; that the defendants be ordered to pay the sum of P200.00, plus
P600.00 as damages, and the costs.

 Appellants contend that the action involves title to real property and therefore is cognizable by the Court
of First Instance

Issue: Whether the action involves title to real properly

Ruling: No.

 A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. Art
415 of the Civil Code paragraph 1 provides that: The following are immovable property: (1) Land,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. This classification holds true regardless
of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is
demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise
ceases.

 It should be noted that the complaint here is for recovery of damages. This is the only positive relief
prayed for by appellants. To be sure, they also ask that they be declared owners of the dismantled house
and/or of the materials. However, such, declaration in no wise constitutes the relief itself which if granted
by final judgment could be enforceable by execution, but is only incidental to the real cause of action to
recover.
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo

Facts:
 The Davao Saw Mill operates a lumber concession in Davao. However, the land upon which the business
was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which
housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the
conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.

 Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation that the machinery and accessories are not included in the
improvements which will pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement or abandonment by
the petitioner of the land leased.

 In another action against the petitioner a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
herein. A writ of execution issued thereon, and the machinery and accessories in question were levied
upon as personalty by the sheriff.

 The plaintiff in that action proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties described
in the corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao.
 The trial judge found that those properties were personal in nature, and as a consequence absolved the
defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or not the machinery and accessories in question are personal property

Ruling: Yes.

 According to Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Civil Code, real property consists of: (1) Land,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil; (5) Machinery, liquid containers,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any
industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of
such trade or industry.

 It is, however, not necessary to spend overly much time in the resolution of this appeal on side issues. It is
machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner of any building or land for
use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the
latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the lease.

 Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

 Immovable property are those not only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases
to property of a movable nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is
applied. Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the
industry or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works.

 Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.
Ago v. CA
Facts:
 In 1957, petitioner Pastor D. Ago bought sawmill machinery and equipment from respondent Grace Park
Engineer domineering, Inc., executing a chattel mortgage over said machineries and equipments to secure
the payment of balance of the price.

 On January 28, 1959, upon petitioner’s default, parties arrived at a compromise agreement and submitted
the same in court in writing.
 Petitioner continued to default in his payments, so Grace Park Engineering, Inc. filed with the lower court
a motion for execution, which was granted.
 Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, acting upon the writ of execution issued by the lower court, levied upon and
ordered the sale of the sawmill machinery and equipment in question. However, these machinery and
equipment had been taken to and installed in a sawmill building owned by the Golden Pacific Sawmill,
Inc., to whom, petitioner alleges, he had sold them on February 16, 1959 (a date after the decision of the
lower court but before levy by the Sheriff).
 Petitioner contends that the sheriff acted illegally upon the allegedly void writ of execution by levying the
same upon the sawmill machinery and equipment which have become real properties of the Golden
Pacific sawmill, Inc., and is about to proceed in selling the same without prior publication of the notice of
sale thereof in some newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the proceedings of the sheriff in selling the sawmill machineries and equipments at public
auction with a notice of the sale having been previously published is valid.
Ruling: No. The sawmill machinery and equipment were installed in a building and permanently attached to the
ground. B consequently, the said sawmill machineries and equipment became real estate properties in
accordance with the provision of Art. 415 (5) of the Civil Code, thus: “The following are immovable property:
Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements tended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works.”
By the installment of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the
sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building or
real estate on which the same was constructed thus converting the said machinery and equipment into real
estate within the meaning of the above provision.
Considering that the machinery and equipment in question valued at more than P15,000.00 appear to have been
sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a newspaper, as required in Sec. 16 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, which is as follows: Before the sale of property on execution, notice thereof must be given
as follows: In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly describing the property for twenty days
in three public places in the municipality or city where the property is situated, and also where the property is to
be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds four hundred pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice
once a week, for the same period, in some newspaper published or having general circulation in the province, if
there be one. The sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void.

Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor

Facts: Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. It owns an electric welder machine, storm boring machine, lathe machine with motor, and decker grinder
among others. These machinery are sitting on cement or wooden platforms. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan
de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment.
It is undisputed that these machinery have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to produce
finished products for sale, nor to repair machinery, parts and the like offered to the general public
indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which petitioner has never engaged in, to date.
Respondents contend that said equipment, though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with
paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code: Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land,
and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
Issue: Whether or not said machinery are real property
Ruling: No. Article 344 (Now Art. 415), paragraph (5) of the Civil Code: Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
Said provision gives the character of real property to machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on
therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry.
Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal
elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on
the industrial purpose for which it was established.
Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are
merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service.
So that even without such tools and equipment, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on. The
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired
or serviced in another shop belonging to another.

Presbitero v. Fernandez
Facts: Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of the properties under litigation.2) Presbitero was ordered by
the lower court to pay Nava to settle his debts.3) Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out
of court. But to no avail.
Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the plantation and adhered to the
Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of Presbitero as the original plantation owner.5) The sheriff was
not able to present for registration thererof to the Registry of Deeds.6) The court then ordered Presbitero to
segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from the mass of properties belonging to the defendant
within a period to expire on August 1960.7) Bottomline, Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction
sale was scheduled.8) Presbitero died after.9) RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that
the sheriff desist in holding the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because
the notice thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Issue: Whether the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.
Ruling: They are real properties.2) Legal bases The Sugar Limitation Law xxx attaching to the land xxx (p 631)b) RA
1825xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631)c) EO # 873"plantation" xxx to which is attached
an allotment of centrifugal sugar.3) Under the express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are
accessories to the land, and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation.4) Since the levy is invalid
for non-compliance with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all

Presbitero v. Fernandez

In 1959, CA rendered a judgment against Espiridon Presbitero ordering him to execute in favor of Helen Nava a
deed of reconveyance of two lots, and to pay Nava the value of the products received by him from the 5-hectare
portion equivalent to 20 cavans of palay per hectare every year, or 125 cavans yearly, at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan, among others.

Nava attempted but failed to amicably settle the case through petitioner's son, Ricardo Presbitero. Even after this,
Ricardo Presbitero on several occasions defaulted to perform the order of the court in favor of Nava.

In 1960, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to a plantation, adhered to the Ma-ao
Mill District and registered in the name of Esperidion Presbitero as the original plantation-owner.
The sheriff furnished copies of the writ of execution and the notice of garnishment to the manager of the Ma-ao
Sugar Central Company and the Sugar Quota Administration BUT WITHOUT PRESENTING FOR REGISTRATION
COPIES THEREOF TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS.

Because of Ricardo’s continuous default, Helen Caram Nava moved for, and secured on October 19, 1960, a writ
of execution for a certain amount, and on the day following wrote the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale of
the sugar quotas. The sheriff issued the notice of auction sale on October 20, 1960.

On October 22, 1960, Espiridon Presbitero died.

On November 4, 1960, the special administrator, Ricardo Presbitero, filed an urgent motion to set aside the writs
of execution, and to order the sheriff to desist from holding the auction sale on the grounds that the levy on the
sugar quotas was invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Register of Deeds, as for real
property. If they be realty, then the levy upon them by the sheriff is null and void for lack of compliance with the
procedure prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39, in relation with Section 7, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court requiring
"the filing with the register of deeds a copy of the orders together with a description of the property.

This urgent motion was heard but the auction sale proceeded on the same date, ending in the plaintiff's putting
up the highest bid thus, the sheriff sold 21,640 piculs of sugar quota to her.

Issue: Whether the sugar quota allocations are real property

In contending that sugar quotas are personal property, the respondent, Helen Caram Nava, invoked the test
formulated by Manresa (3 Manresa, 6th Ed. 43), and opined that sugar quotas can be carried from place to place
without injury to the land to which they are attached, and are not one of those included in Article 415 of the Civil
Code; and not being thus included, they fall under the category of personal properties:

ART. 416. The following are deemed to be personal property:

xxx xxx xxx

4. In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to
which they are fixed.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent likewise points to evidence she submitted that sugar quotas are, in fact, transferred apart from the
plantations to which they are attached, without impairing, destroying, or diminishing the potentiality of either
quota or plantation. She was sustained by the lower court when it stated that "it is a matter of public knowledge
and it is universal practice in this province, whose principal industry is sugar, to transfer by sale, lease, or
otherwise, sugar quota allocations from one plantation to any other" and that it is "specious to insist that quotas
are improvements attaching to one plantation when in truth and in fact they are no longer attached thereto for
having been sold or leased away to be used in another plantation". Respondent would add weight to her
argument by invoking the role that sugar quotas play in our modern social and economic life, and cites that the
Sugar Office does not require any registration with the Register of Deeds for the validity of the sale of these
quotas; and, in fact, those here in question were not noted down in the certificate of title of the land to which
they pertain; and that Ricardo Presbitero had leased sugar quotas independently of the land. The respondent
cites further that the U.S.-Philippine Trade Relations Act, approved by the United States Congress in 1946, limiting
the production of unrefined sugar in the Philippines did not allocate the quotas for said unrefined sugar among
lands planted to sugarcane but among "the sugar producing mills and plantation OWNERS", and for this reason
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 873, issued by Governor General Murphy, authorizes the lifting of sugar
allotments from one land to another by means only of notarized deeds.

While respondent's arguments are thought-provoking, they cannot stand against the positive mandate of the
pertinent statute. The Sugar Limitation Law (Act 4166, as amended) provides —
SEC. 9. The allotment corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be
an improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto ....

and Republic Act No. 1825 similarly provides —

SEC. 4. The production allowance or quotas corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto ....

And Executive Order No. 873 defines "plantation" as follows:

(a) The term 'plantation' means any specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to which is attached
an allotment of centrifugal sugar.

Ruling: Yes.
The sugar quota allocations are accessories to land, and can not have independent existence away from a
plantation, although the latter may vary.

Indeed, this Court held in the case of Abelarde vs. Lopez, 74 Phil. 344, that even if a contract of sale of haciendas
omitted "the right, title, interest, participation, action (and) rent" which the grantors had or might have in relation
to the parcels of land sold, the sale would include the quotas, it being provided in Section 9, Act 4166, that the
allotment is deemed an improvement attached to the land, and that at the time the contract of sale was signed
the land devoted to sugar were practically of no use without the sugar allotment.

As an improvement attached to land, though not physically so united, the sugar quotas are inseparable
therefrom, just like servitudes and other real rights over an immovable. Article 415 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating what are immovable properties, names —

10. Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.

It is by law, therefore, that these properties are immovable or real, Article 416 of the Civil Code being made to
apply only when the thing (res) sought to be classified is not included in Article 415.

Contrary to Nava’s argument, the fact that the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 allows transfers of sugar quotas does
not militate against their immovability.

Neither does the fact that the Sugar Quota Office does not require registration of sales of quotas with the
Register of Deeds for their validity, nor the fact that allocation of unrefined sugar quotas is not made among
lands planted to sugarcane but among "the sugar producing mills and plantation OWNERS", since the lease or
sale of quotas are voluntary transactions, the regime of which, is not necessarily identical to involuntary transfers
or levies; and there cannot be a sugar plantation owner without land to which the quota is attached; and there
can exist no quota without there being first a corresponding plantation.

Board of Assessment Appeals v. Meralco

Facts:

In order to transmit its generated electric power, Meralco constructed steel towers at intervals, to which
insulators are attached. There were 40 steel towers, the property in question constructed on land belonging to
Meralco.

Three of which were inspected and it was found out that the ground around one of the four legs was excavate
and that there being very little water at the bottom, it was seen that there was no concrete foundation, but there
soft adobe beneath. The leg was likewise provided with two parallel steel bars bolted to a square metal frame
also bolted to each corner. The towers are made up of metal rods joined together by means of bolts, so that by
unscrewing the bolts, the tower could be dismantled and reassembled. It was also found that the square metal
frame supporting the legs were not attached to any material or foundation.

On November 15, 1955, petitioner City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real
property tax under Tax declaration Nos. 31992 and 15549.

After denying respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken by respondent to the Board
of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required respondent to pay the amount of P11,651.86 as real
property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. Respondent paid the amount under protest, and
filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA for short) which rendered a decision on December 29,
1958, ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City to
refund to the respondent the sum of P11,651.86. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, on April 22,
1959, the instant petition for review was filed.

In upholding the cause of respondents, the CTA held that: (1) the steel towers come within the term "poles"
which are declared exempt from taxes under part II paragraph 9 of respondent's franchise; (2) the steel towers
are personal properties and are not subject to real property tax; and (3) the City Treasurer of Quezon City is held
responsible for the refund of the amount paid. These are assigned as errors by the petitioner in the brief.

The tax exemption privilege of the petitioner is quoted hereunder:

PAR 9. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles,
wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter
required by law to pay ...

The word "pole" means "a long, comparatively slender usually cylindrical piece of wood or timber, as typically the
stem of a small tree stripped of its branches; also by extension, a similar typically cylindrical piece or object of
metal or the like". The term also refers to "an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by
which something is supported; as a dovecote set on a pole; telegraph poles; a tent pole; sometimes, specifically a
vessel's master.

Along the streets, in the City of Manila, may be seen cylindrical metal poles, cubical concrete poles, and poles of
the PLDT Co. which are made of two steel bars joined together by an interlacing metal rod. They are called
"poles" notwithstanding the fact that they are no made of wood. It must be noted from paragraph 9, above
quoted, that the concept of the "poles" for which exemption is granted, is not determined by their place or
location, nor by the character of the electric current it carries, nor the material or form of which it is made, but
the use to which they are dedicated. In accordance with the definitions, pole is not restricted to a long cylindrical
piece of wood or metal, but includes "upright standards to the top of which something is affixed or by which
something is supported. As heretofore described, respondent's steel supports consists of a framework of four
steel bars or strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting five high voltage
transmission wires (See Annex A) and their sole function is to support or carry such wires.

It is evident, therefore, that the word "poles", as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's
franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the
franchise was granted. The poles as contemplated thereon, should be understood and taken as a part of the
electric power system of the respondent Meralco, for the conveyance of electric current from the source thereof
to its consumers. If the respondent would be required to employ "wooden poles", or "rounded poles" as it used
to do fifty years back, then one should admit that the Philippines is one century behind the age of space. It should
also be conceded by now that steel towers, like the ones in question, for obvious reasons, can better effectuate
the purpose for which the respondent's franchise was granted.

Issue: Whether the steel towers are real property

Granting for the purpose of argument that the steel supports or towers in question are not embraced within the
term poles, the logical question posited is whether they constitute real properties, so that they can be subject to
a real property tax.

Ruling:
No. The tax law does not provide for a definition of real property; but Article 415 of the Civil Code does, by stating
the following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which tends directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works;

xxx xxx xxx

The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1, because they
do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not construction analogous to buildings
nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to
a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
place to place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined
together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the
same. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries,
receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on
the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in which the steel supports or towers are
constructed.