G.R. No.

159813 August 9, 2006

TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

"Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and
gyppers roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious exposure.
Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano "Rey" Rivera, our sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling
vegetable and meat complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.

"Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a vendor's federation, has
intimated a good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our sources believe. And our independent
eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar perception of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the
first place, he has no business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.

Issue: Won Rivera is a public officer

Held: No.

The petition lacks merit.

In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published article as one that portrays the
condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v. Reyes, 5 they challenge the finding of the two
courts below on the libelous or defamatory nature of the same article which, to them, must be read and construed in
its entirety. It is their posture that the article was not directed at the private character of complainant Aproniano
Rivera but on the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.

Petitioners’ posture cannot save the day for them.

Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us of its libelous or defamatory character. While
it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the article
in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that
the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public
market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with
derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the
very person of Rivera himself.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything
which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. 6

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual of some
of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of
the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. 8

Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market committee did not vest upon him
any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the
operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its
private proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in representation of the
association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the private sector.

Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer, which he clearly is not, the subject article still
would not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code expressly requires that it be a "fair and
true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks. " Even a mere cursory glance at the article
reveals that it is far from being that.

Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of Rivera.

The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral damages may be recovered in
case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the very publication and circulation of the subject
defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the resulting wounded feelings and besmirched
reputation sustained by complainant Rivera. The branding of defamatory names against him most certainly exposed
him to public contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial court in its judgment of conviction:

Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written against him, made more
unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who just arrived from the United States for the first
time, was confronted of the above-defamatory publication. He was worried and depressed, about the comments
against him, affecting his credibility and personality, as representative of many market organizations in Davao City.

Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the subject article, Rivera is
entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.
121. Mari v. CA
G.R. No. 127694/31 May 2000/First Division/Appeal by Certiorari
Quirico Mari – petitioner
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines – respondents
Decision by J. Pardo, Digest by Pip

Short Version: Mari choked and yelled at his superior so she slapped him with a case of slander
by deed. The Court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of disregard for the victim’s
sex. The Court explained that the victim being a woman did not per se constitute an aggravating
circumstance. It was necessary to prove that the offense was a specific insult on her womanhood.

Facts: Norma Capintoy and Quirico Mari were co-employees in the Department of Agriculture
in Digos, Davao Del Sur, though Norma occupied a higher position. In December 1991, Mari
borrowed the records of his 201 File from Norma. When he returned the records a few days later,
however, Norma noticed that several papers were missing, including official communications
from the Civil Service Commission and the Regional Office of the DA. Also missing was a copy
of a complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against Mari.

Upon instruction of her superior officer, Norma sent a memorandum to Mari asking him to
explain the missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, Mari
confronted Norma and angrily shouted, “PUTANG INA, BULLSHIT, BUGO!” He banged a
chair in front of Norma and choked her.1 With the intervention of the security guard, Mari was
“prevailed upon” to desist from further injuring Norma.

Mari’s version was that he borrowed his service record (not his 201 file 2) which contained his
personal records. The service record which he borrowed did not include the missing documents.
He acknowledged that Norma was higher in rank than him but claimed that it was Norma who
provoked him into acting the way that he did and he was only reacting to her provocation.3

Norma filed a complaint with the MTC of Digos for slander by deed, aggravated by the fact
that the offended party was a woman. The MTC convicted Mari and appreciated the aggravating
circumstance, sentencing him to an indeterminate sentence of 5 months and 11 days to 2 years,
11 months, and eleven days. The RTC affirmed the MTC in toto on appeal. On petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to
one month and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision
correctional, as maximum.

Issue: Was the proper penalty imposed on Mari? NO.4

Ruling: Conviction affirmed, penalty modified.

1 Motherfucker.
2 But a 201 file is still a personnel record. But whatever.
3 Uh, so it’s okay to do that? Fuck you.
4 There were some factual issues that I omitted.
Ratio: The Court sustained the factual findings of the MTC, which were upheld by every single
lower court on the way up. The Court took issue, however, with the way that every single lower
court erred in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

First, as to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance that was appreciated

against the accused. To begin with, the MTC did not state what this aggravating circumstance
was, as required. Concededly, the amended complaint alleged that the crime had been aggravated
by the fact that the offended party was a woman. However, the mere fact that the victim is a
woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. There was no finding that the evidence
proved that the accused in fact deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim.
There was no showing of manifest disrespect to her being a woman, or some specific insult to
her womanhood. There was no proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than that Norma
was a woman, showing insult or disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Hence, such aggravating circumstance was not proved and therefore
could not be considered in the computation of penalties.

Second, in applying the ISL, the court shall fix minimum and maximum penalties. If the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The court shall fix the minimum penalty within the
number of months or years covered by the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense without regard to any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission
of the crime. 

The court has the unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum penalty. The only
limitation is that it must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three periods or reference to the degrees
into which it may be subdivided. Then, the court shall fix the maximum period. In doing so, the
court shall now consider the attending circumstances, finding whether any modifying
circumstance attended the commission of the crime.5

Yet after lengthily discussing how to properly compute penalties for prison terms, the Court
decided that in this case the penalty wouldn’t be imprisonment but a fine because it would “serve
the ends of justice better…the offense while considered serious slander by deed was done in the
heat of anger and was in reaction to a perceived provocation.”6

5 I omitted the lengthy computation of the penalty in this case.

6 How much was the fine? P1,000.00!