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Bautista V Gonzales 182 SCRA 151
Bautista V Gonzales 182 SCRA 151
Facts:
On her amended complaint, Bautista laid down the acts that Gonzales
allegedly perpetuated thus the former praying for respondent’s disbarment.
Both submitted their exhibits and the court required them to submit their
respective memoranda. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss claiming
that the long and slow disposition of his case was a violation of his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, to which the Solicitor
General responded by saying that the delays were due to both parties’ fault
for their repeated filing of motion for extension to submit their respective
memoranda.
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their
land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction
prior to the execution of said agreement; and
The respondent wishes that his case be referred to IBP or Integrated Bar of
the Philippines by filing a supplemental motion contending that he still has
more evidence to submit.
Issue :
Ruling :
1. In the first issue, the substantive part; the respondent, in his acts of
purporting a contract making it appear that the payment for his services by the
Fortunados, will be in the form of the transfer of 50% of the value of the
property subject of litigation is a clear violation of Canons 1, 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But the other
issues that were submitted by Bautista, like those of accusation of deliberate
filing by Gonzales of cases against her to allegedly harass the later is not give
weight by the Solicitor General.
There is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the
effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the
Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section
20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of
which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by
the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule
139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the
Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the
date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353]
Wherefore in this case, the court upon finding that the respondent committed
acts of gross misconduct he was hereby suspended for six months.