Republic v.

CA and Naguit

Related topic: Land must already be A and D at the time of the filing of the application

Facts:

RTC and the Court of Appeals declared that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject
land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Issue/s: Whether it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership could even start. [NO]

Held:

Petitioner’s interpretation is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945,"
as used in the provision,qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court
noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15 

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership
going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the
right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest
of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects
the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof
of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property.

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that
of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

DP: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Republic v. Lao

Related topic: Land must already be A and D at the time of the filing of the application

Facts:

A perusal of Lao's application shows that he applied for original registration of the subject properties
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, claiming that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owners prior to June 12, 1945.

Lao presented a tracing cloth plan, supposedly approved by the Land Management Bureau of the DENR,
which allegedly showed that the subject properties indeed form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.

Issue/s: Whether Lao’s application for original registration of the subject properties should be granted.
[NO]

Held:

The petition is granted.

To reiterate, the first requisite of Section 14(1) requires that the property sought to be registered be
alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration. It bears stressing that a
notation in a survey plan indicating that a parcel of land is inside the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land
in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.

The lower courts likewise failed to consider that Lao has not even presented a scintilla of proof that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. "The well-
entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant." 23

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO). In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.24

Lao failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed approved a land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the subject
properties fall within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Lao
merely presented a tracing cloth plan, supposedly approved by the Land Management Bureau of the
DENR, which allegedly showed that the subject properties indeed form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, as pointed out by the petitioner, Lao failed to offer a reasonable explanation as to why the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes in the name of a certain Ambrocio Calo who,
however, was not even identified by Lao as one of his predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, the totality of
evidence presented by Lao failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owners since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Lao's claim of ownership of the subject properties based on the tax declarations he presented will not
prosper. It is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property
that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership. 22 As already stated, Lao failed to prove that he
and his predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the subject properties since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

DP: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 81180 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mateo Lao's Application for Original Registration of Title of Lot Nos.
206 and 208, GSS-1272, under Compostela Subdivision AP-072218-001228, is DENIED for lack of merit.
Republic v. Heirs of Sps. Estacio and Ocol

Related topic: Proof that land is alienable and disposable

Facts:

On the first ground, Republic states that heirs of Sps. Estacio and Ocol failed to present a copy of the
original certification, approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian,
which would support respondents' claim that the subject lands are alienable and disposable. The
certification of Senior Forest Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno and Chief of the Forest
Utilization and Law Enforcement Division of the DENR should not be treated as sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the law because she was not presented during trial to testify on the contents of the
certification.

In their Comment, respondents counter that the certifications issued by the DENR constitute substantial
compliance with the legal requirement, and that with their continuous possession of the subject lots for
more than thirty (30) years, they had acquired ownership over the subject lots through prescription under
Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.

In Reply, petitioner maintains that respondents failed to establish their compliance with the requisites for
original registration either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. The certifications of
Senior Forest Management specialist Corazon C. Calamno and the Chief of the Forest Utilization and
Law Enforcement Division of the DENR did not comply with the legal requirements for lack of approval by
the DENR Secretary and for lack of certification by its legal custodian. Respondents failed to establish
that the State expressly declared, either through a law or a presidential proclamation, that the parcels
ofland are no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, or that they had
been converted into patrimonial properties. Without such, the subject lots remain part of public dominion.

Petitioner further maintains that the tax declarations do not represent regular assertion of ownership
because of the large gaps in the years between declarations. Such sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner. And that, since the parcels of land are not contiguous, alleged possession and
occupation over one parcel of land cannot prove possession and occupation over the other parcels of
land.

Issue/s: Whether or not the heirs of Sps. Estacio and Ocol failed to comply with the requirements of the
law, invalidating their application and confirmation of title over the contested properties. [YES]

Held:

The certifications presented by the respondents are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable. We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the
subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR. Applicants must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. In Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,34 this Court explicitly ruled:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may
also secure certification from the Government that the lands applied: for are alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the
survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency
to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of
prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and
random such as in this case. Indeed, how can the petitioners claim of possession for the entire
prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11)
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001?50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, this Court doubts the respondents' claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners
from June 12, 1945, or earlier. The evidence presented by the respondents does not prove title thru
possession and occupation of public land under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529,
the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case.

DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 20,
2013, in CA-G.R. CV No. 96879, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
266, in LRC Case No. N-11598, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and
confirmation of title filed by respondents Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol over three
parcels of land, with a total area of eleven thousand three hundred eighty (11,380) square meters situated
at Barangay Calzada, Taguig City, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

Related topics:

- Land must already be A and D at the time of the filing of the application
- Classification of land according to ownership ad alienability
- Summary of the requirements for registration under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529
- Registration under Section 14(2)
- Summary of rules relative to disposition of public land or lands of the public domain

Facts:

Heirs of Malabanan applied for the registration of a parcel of land.

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision
of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable
could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that
the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to
whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.

Malabanan indicated that there was no other legislative intent that could be associated with the date,
June 12, 1945, as written in our registration laws except that it qualifies the requisite period of possession
and occupation. The law imposes no requirement that land should have been declared alienable and
disposable agricultural land as early as June 12, 1945.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of
the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year
period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration
on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue/s:

Whether or not the heirs of Malabanan were able to satisfy the requisite character and period of
possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June
1945, or earlier. [NO]

Whether or not the contested land was automatically converted to private property upon the subsequent
declaration of its as alienable and disposable, even without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession. [NO]

Held:

We denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

1.) Land must already be A and D at the time of the filing of the application

Justice Tinga ,speaking for Court en banc, reiterated that the law does not require that the land subject of
registration should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, or since
June 12, 1945. It is sufficient that the land is already declared as alienable and disposable land at the
time the application for registration is filed so as to entitle the possessor to registration . But while the land
was declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982 per CENRO-DENR certification, the Court
nevertheless sustained the dismissal of the application for registration for the reason that:

“There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-

in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest
that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence – the Tax
Declarations they resented in particular 0 is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves
of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.”

The Court explained why Section 14(1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed, thus:

“If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of
the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property”

2.) Classification of land according to ownership and alienability

In a subsequent resolution, dated September 3, 2013, denying reconsideration of its main decision in
Malabanan, the Court, through Justice Bersamin, gives the following insightful discussion in support of the
conclusion arrived at in said case:
 “Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration
must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of
possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of
the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite
period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

3.) Summary of the requirements for registration under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage
of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the
public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such
limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
 1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

It should be stated, however, that the phrase “agricultural land of the public domain” must be qualified and
understood to mean “alienable and disposable land of the public domain” conformably with the
amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 to Section 48(b) and (c) of the Public Land Act to the effect that
their provisions shall apply only to “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain” and, also,
consonant with prevailing jurisprudence which consistently requires that the land applied for must be an
“alienable and disposable” portion if the public domain.

4.) Registration under Section 14(2)

Properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of
the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public
domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. The
exception is where the law itself so provides. Thus, patrimonial property of the State may be subject of
acquisition through prescription.

But Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 provides that the following may apply for registration by prescription,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives, to wit:

“(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.”

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory PD No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? As held in Malabanan, it did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Decree which
governs and authorizes the application of “those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.” While as a rule, prescription does not run against the
State, the exception is where the law itself expressly provides. An example is said Section 14(2) which
specifically allows qualified individuals to apply for the registration of property, ownership of which he has
acquired by prescription under existing laws.

Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) are clearly different. Section 14(1) covers “alienable and disposable land”
while Section 14(2) covers “private property.” The distinction between the two (2) provisions lies with the
inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands.

In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, prescription under the Civil Code is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property
of the public dominion begin to run. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus,
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.

5.) Summary of rules relative to disposition of public land or lands of the public domain

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become private property. 37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

DP: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
Espiritu v. Republic (2017)

Related topics:

- Registration under Section 14(1)

- When lands of the public domain become patrimonial property of the State

Facts:

The Court notes that the subject application was filed under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.)  No. 1529, considering the allegation therein of possession and occupation in the concept
of owner for more than thirty (30) years. The trial court, however, granted the application under Section
14(1) of the same decree after finding that the petitioners were able to establish open, continuous, and
exclusive possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide  claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.

The trial court was convinced that the petitioners were able to prove that the subject land was part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In so ruling, it relied on the contents of the DENR-
NCR certification. The DENR-NCR certification presented by the petitioners certified that the subject land
was not needed for forest purposes.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. In reversing the trial court, the appellate court reiterated the
prevailing doctrine that to successfully register a parcel of land, the application must be accompanied by:
(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the alienable and disposable character of the land applied
for; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. It opined that the DENR-NCR certification presented by
the petitioners would not suffice to prove that the subject land was indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. The CA explained that under Department of Agriculture
Orders (DAO) Nos. 20 and 38, the Regional Technical Director of the FMS had no authority to issue
certificates of land classification; and that the petitioners failed to present a certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary.

Manifestly, there has been some uncertainty under what provision of law the present application for
registration is being sought because the requirements and basis for registration under these two
provisions of law differ from one another. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession,
while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Nevertheless, for the proper
resolution of the issues and arguments raised herein, the present application would be scrutinized based
on the requirements of the provisions of Sections 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Issue/s: Whether or not declaration of alienability and disposability is enough for the registration of land
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, meaning, in absence of an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial property. [NO]

Held:

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. [Note: They
cannot comply with the requirements of Section 14(1) given the circumstances surrounding the case (e.g.,
no proof of OCENPO since June 12, 1945 and the required certificates) So their best chance was with
Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529.]

1.) Registration under Section 14(1)

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) pertains to original registration through
ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide
claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in the concept
of owner. Section 14(1) proceeds from, and operationalizes Section 48(b) of CA no. 141 (Public Land Act,
as amended) which provides for the grant of the substantive right of title to land to qualified persons. It
grants occupants of public land the right to judicial confirmation of their title based on possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier
without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time.

Under Section 14(1), it is required that:

(a) the land applied for is an agricultural public land already classified as alienable and
disposable land at the time of the filing of the application for registration;

(b) the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land (OCENPO), under a
bona fide claim of ownership; and

(c) such possession and occupation must have commenced since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

There appears to be no other legislative intent that could be associated with the date, June 12, 1945, as
written in our registration laws except that it qualifies the requisite period of possession and occupation.
The law imposes no requirement that land should have been declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land as early as June 12, 1945. What is important in computing the period of possession is
that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of
adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable.

2. When lands of the public domain become patrimonial property of the State

For registration under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 to prosper, the applicant must establish the following
requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b)
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in
good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land
had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the
said 10- year or 30-year period of possession.

As regards the first and most important requisite, the Court has ruled that declaration of alienability and
disposability is not enough for the registration of land under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. There must
be an express declaration that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial property. This
is only logical because acquisitive prescription could only run against private properties, which include
patrimonial properties of the State, but never against public properties. The requirement of an “express
declaration” is separate and distinct from the mere classification of public land as alienable and
disposable.
Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which could show that the subject land had
been declared as part of the patrimonial property of the State. The DENR-NCR certification presented by
the petitioners only certified that the subject land was not needed for forest purposes. This is insufficient
because the law mandates that to be subjected to acquisitive prescription, there must be a declaration by
the State that the land applied for is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the petitioners failed to prove that they
acquired the subject land through acquisitive prescription. Thus, the same could not be registered under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

In fine, the petitioners failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to land under either Sections
14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. The CA's reversal of the July 30, 2012 RTC decision, and denial of the
petitioners' application for original registration of imperfect title over Lot No. 4178 must be affirmed.

DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 20, 2015 Decision and June 18, 2015 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101002 are AFFIRMED. The petitioners' application for
original registration of title of Lot No. 4178 in LRC Case No. 10-0026 is DENIED, without prejudice.
Republic v. Rev. Cortez Sr.

Facts:

The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez failed to prove his clear
and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island covered by the same. This is considering that
by his own admission, Rev. Cortez started to occupy the said area only in 1962. Hence, when the
property was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in possession of the 5-hectare area only
for five years or short of the 30-year possession requirement for a  bona fide  claim of ownership under the
law. The OSG thus argues that the phrase "subject to private rights" as contained in Proclamation No.
201 and Proclamation No. 447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those who have already
complied with the requirements for perfection of title over the land prior to the issuance of the said
proclamations.

Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial
as his Petition for injunction does not involve the right to possess based on ownership but on the
right of  possession which is a right independent from ownership. Rev. Cortez avers that since he has
been in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he has the right of
possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that based on this right, the writ of
injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his favor and aptly affirmed by the CA.

Issue/s: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction. [NO]

Held:

We grant the Petition.

For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final injunction.

"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act,
in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular act,
in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction."20 "It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action."

"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted
facts.23 Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled.24 "It is usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing
an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo  of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case."25 A
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order. 26 
Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for in his complaint.28 On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a
final injunction.29 

A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of an act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary
mandatory injuction.30 It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the applicant
is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. 31 Otherwise stated, it is only after
the court has come up with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act
violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is
issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be
established by the applicant with absolute certainty.32

Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the trial court’s factual findings on the matter as well
as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis applicable jurisprudence. No discussion whatsoever was made
with respect to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty his claimed right over
the subject area.

"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the
acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary that
the Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed,
it is necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute certainty.

Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of possession (jus
possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962. He
avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if
already dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory injunctive writ was
correctly issued in his favor.

Jus possessionis  or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one of the two concepts of possession
provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession, 38 this kind of
possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription. 39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a
possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just
title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.

It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession.42 The following cannot be appropriated and hence,
cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common things (res communes)  such as sunlight
and air, and things specifically prohibited by law.

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. To prove that a land
is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the
military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable or
disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. Without first
determining the nature and character of the land, all other requirements such as length and nature
of possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of
possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

DP: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. CV No. 89968 denying the appeal and affirming the July 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Aparri, Cagayan-Branch 08 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the final injunction issued in this case is ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for
Injunction in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403, DISMISSED.
Republic v. Gielczyk

Related topic: Differences between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)

Facts:

Gielczyk filed for application for original registration of the certain parcels of land.

The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for
taxation at ₱2,400.00; (b) that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage nor
encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest therein, legal or equitable; (c)
that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner
over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years, including the possession of her
predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said land by virtue of the deeds of absolute sale;
and (e) that said land is not occupied.

In the instant case, applicant-appellee was able to present tax declarations dating back from 1948. She
also presented a deed of absolute sale for Lot No. 3135-A which stated that it had the following
improvements: two (2) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree, one (1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit tree
and another one for Lot No. 3136-A showing that there were 14 coconut trees, eight (8) jackfruit trees,
and a residential building, which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio Ceniza. Furthermore,
she presented a CENRO Certification which tries to prove that the land was alienable and disposable (as
of September 1, 1965).

RTC granted the application and was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition by the Republic.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the application for original registration of the contested properties should be granted to
Gielczyk. [NO, for to prove OCENPO and absence of proof that the subject lots were declared
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; mere ta declarations not enough]

Held:

After a thorough study of the records, the Court resolves to grant the petition.

The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State declaration that the
properties in question are no longer intended for public use, public service, the development of the
national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the period of possession
and occupation required by law.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may apply
for the registration of title to land, to wit:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

In the assailed decision granting the respondent’s application for registration of title, the CA explained that
the RTC’s decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same
decree.The pertinent portion of the decision is quoted as follows:

"From the documentary evidence presented and formally offered by the applicant, the Court is convinced
that she and her predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open, complete, continuous, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands herein applied for registration of title, for a period of
over 40 years, in the concept of an owner and that applicant has registrable title over same lots in
accordance with Sec. 14, PD 1529."

A closer scrutiny will show that the questioned decision was based on PD No. 1529, Section 14(2).

The Court agrees with the CA’s finding that the RTC’s grant of the respondent’s application for
registration of title was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same
decree.

The Court further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the
registration of his property on the basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended
under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is
made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the
Civil Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.

In the instant case, applicant-appellee was able to present tax declarations dating back from 1948.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at the least constructive, possession.

The respondent attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands were declared alienable and
disposable by presenting a CENRO Certification.

However, following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,41 this CENRO
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land is alienable and disposable. While the
certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965, the respondent
should have submitted a certified true copy thereof to substantiate the alienable character of the land.

While the subject lots were supposedly declared alienable or disposable on September 1, 1965 based on
the Certifications of the CENRO, the respondent still failed to complete the 30-year period required to
grant her application by virtue of prescription.

Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes of
prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties in question are
purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent on July 17, 1995,
the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the said properties for only
29 years and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year possession period.

One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No.
2874 is the "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land by the
applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The phrase "possession and
occupation" was explained as follows:

It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
order [sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section,
his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor
can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood.

Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.

In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" does
not suffice. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has exercised acts of
dominion over the property in question. However, in the present petition, the respondent failed to
specifically show that she and her predecessors-in-interest had exercised acts of dominion over
the subject lots. Admittedly, the respondent’s best evidence to prove possession and ownership were
tax declarations and receipts issued in her name or the names of her predecessors-in-interest, but these
tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece
of land. "Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence.

From the testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself), the Court can deduce that,
besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A, the respondent did not exercise acts of
dominion over it. Neither can the Court give credence to the respondent’s claim that her predecessors-in-
interest had exercised dominion over the property since the respondent failed to present any witness who
would substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary evidence, specifically the tax declarations
and the deeds of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because the same revealed no indication of
any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the respondent exercised specific acts of
dominion.

Tax Declaration No. 29200 where the residential building was first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be said
then that it was only in 1981 when the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest exercised specific acts of
dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the respondent has
not completed the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation."

DP: WHEREFORE in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED and the
Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70078 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development

Related topic: Registration under Section 14(2)

Facts:

Respondent applied for land registration, covering a parcel of land. It was claimed that the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property since June 12, 1945.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or prior to June
12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted tax
declarations (although the earliest year the possession is traced back is 1948).

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, the
respondent claimed that per Francisca Oco’s Tax Declarations, improvements were introduced.

CA affirmed the grant of the respondent’s application given its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on the evidence submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register
the subject property in its name under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its
predecessors-in-interest commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent
acquired title to the subject property by prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the Philippines, 19 the
CA held that even if possession commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under
Section 14 (2) and possession in the concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and
disposable public land into private property.

Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D. No.
1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. [NO]

Held:

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by the respondent fell
short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act (PLA). The respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis of
either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of
evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11
thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles".9 On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified
possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for
the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and
royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
 therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received
title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said
lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted
subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of ten (10) years
prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA
until it was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a period of thirty
(30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977 that it was required that
possession and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration
of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers "alienable and disposable
land" while Section 14 (2) covers "private property". As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,10 the distinction between the two provisions lies with the
inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code,
a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1). 11

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned.12 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
following properties are of public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial
property,13 hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.14

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into
private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth". (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 15

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription
against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established .
Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot
be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

This Court disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On the premise that the application for
registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed
by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the
April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from
agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.  Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El
Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone. 22 Therefore, it
was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that
the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain, it
may not be acquired by prescription.

On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would
likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the
earliest that the respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. The
testimony of the respondent’s lone witness that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for being hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title
over an alienable and disposable public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious" in
character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, 23 this Court explained that the intent behind the use
of "possession" in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the need for actual and not just
constructive or fictional possession.

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation,
thus, requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article
1118 thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be "in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon,25 this Court
expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor
can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.26 (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove compliance with the
possession required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

DP: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision
and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the respondent’s application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.