Table of Contents

Art.3: Felonies...................................................................................................................................................6
Classification of Felonies According to the Means of Commission.............................................................6
Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133)...................................................................................................6
Manuel v. People (G.R. No. 165842).......................................................................................................9
Mistake of Fact...........................................................................................................................................12
U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)..............................................................................................................12
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)...............................................................................................14
People v. Fernando (G.R. No. L-24978).................................................................................................16
Mala in se v. Mala prohibita.......................................................................................................................18
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560)........................................................................................18
People v. Go Shiu Ling (G.R. No. 115156)..............................................................................................19
Art. 4: Criminal Liability..................................................................................................................................20
Wrongful Act Done be Different from That Intended...............................................................................20
Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)..........................................................................................................20
People v. Ortega (276 SCRA 166)...........................................................................................................21
People v. Pilda (405 SCRA 134)..............................................................................................................22
Impossible Crimes......................................................................................................................................23
People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245)......................................................................................................23
Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52)......................................................................................................................25
Art. 6: Stages of Execution..............................................................................................................................27
People v. Campuhan (G.R. No. 129433)................................................................................................27
Valenzuela v. People (G.R. No. 160188)................................................................................................29
People v. Orita (G.R. No. 88724)............................................................................................................31
Art. 8: Conspiracy...........................................................................................................................................33
People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)............................................................................................................33
People v. Comadre (431 SCRA 366).......................................................................................................35
Sim v. CA (428 SCRA 459)......................................................................................................................37
Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances...................................................................................................................40
Self-defense................................................................................................................................................40
People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007).....................................................................................................40
Soplente v. People (G.R. No. 152715)...................................................................................................42
Urbano v. People (G.R. No. 182750)......................................................................................................44
Defense of Relatives...................................................................................................................................46
Balunueco v. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)...................................................................................46
Fulfilment of a Duty...................................................................................................................................48
Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)........................................................................................................48
Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652)....................................................................................................50
Angcaco v. People (G.R. No. 146664)....................................................................................................51
Obedience to an Order..............................................................................................................................53
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03)...............................................................................53
Art.12: Exempting Circumstances..................................................................................................................55
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 Insanity/Imbecility.....................................................................................................................................55
People v. Rubiños (G.R. No. 138453).....................................................................................................55
People v. Valledor (G.R. No. 129291)....................................................................................................58
Minority......................................................................................................................................................61
Llave v. People (G.R. No. 166040).........................................................................................................61
Jose v. People (G.R. No. 162052)...........................................................................................................63
Declarador v. Judge Gubaton (G.R. No. 159208)...................................................................................65
Accident......................................................................................................................................................67
Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94).............................................................................................................67
People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74).....................................................................................................68
Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear.......................................................................................................70
Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275)..............................................................................................................70
Entrapment v. Instigation..........................................................................................................................72
People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019).................................................................................................72
People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309)..........................................................................................................74
Chang v. People (G.R. No. 165111)........................................................................................................76
Art. 13: Mitigating Circumstances..................................................................................................................78
Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances..................................................................................78
People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613).........................................................................................78
No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong...............................................................................................81
People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701).........................................................................................................81
Vindication of a Grave Offense..................................................................................................................82
People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984).......................................................................................................82
Passion or Obfuscation..............................................................................................................................84
People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438).......................................................................................................84
People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907).........................................................................................................86
People v. Malejana (G.R. No. 145002)...................................................................................................88
Voluntary Surrender..................................................................................................................................89
People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051)......................................................................................................89
Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222)......................................................................................................91
People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541)...................................................................................................93
Confession of Guilt.....................................................................................................................................95
People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)..........................................................................................95
People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)...................................................................................................97
Similar and Analogous Circumstances.......................................................................................................98
Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937)........................................................................................................98
Art. 14: Aggravating Circumstances.............................................................................................................100
Classes of Aggravating Circumstances.....................................................................................................100
People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)...........................................................................................................100
People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533)...................................................................................................101
People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695)....................................................................................................102
In Contempt or With Insult to the Public Authorities..............................................................................103
People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036).................................................................................................103

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 People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39)..................................................................................................104
Abuse of Public Position...........................................................................................................................106
Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784)...................................................................................................106
People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08)...........................................................................................107
People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043).................................................................................................108
Nighttime, Uninhabited or Obvious Place or Band..................................................................................109
People v. Villanueva (G. R. No. 135330)..............................................................................................109
People v. Ancheta (G.R. No. 70222)....................................................................................................112
People v. Baroy (G.R. Nos. 137520-22)...............................................................................................114
Recidivism................................................................................................................................................116
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368).....................................................................................................116
Reiteracion...............................................................................................................................................118
People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498).....................................................................................................118
By Means of Inundation, fire, etc.............................................................................................................121
People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470).................................................................................................121
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559).................................................................................................123
Craft, Fraud or Disguise............................................................................................................................125
People v. Labuguen (G.R. No. 127849)................................................................................................125
Abuse of Superior Strength......................................................................................................................127
People v. Amodio (G.R. No. 177356)...................................................................................................127
People v. Jamon (413 SCRA 282).........................................................................................................129
People v. Calpito (416 SCRA 491)........................................................................................................131
Treachery.................................................................................................................................................133
People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488).........................................................................................................133
People v. Piliin (515 SCRA 207)............................................................................................................135
People v. Ilo (392 SCRA 326)................................................................................................................137
Ignominy...................................................................................................................................................139
People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15).............................................................................................139
People v. Bumidang (G.R. No. 130630)...............................................................................................141
People v. Siao (G.R. No. 126021).........................................................................................................144
Aid of Minor or By Means of Motor Vehicles..........................................................................................146
People v. Mallari (404 SCRA 170)........................................................................................................146
People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508).......................................................................................................148
Cruelty......................................................................................................................................................151
People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389).....................................................................................................151
Simangan v. People (434 SCRA 38)......................................................................................................153
People v. Catian (374 SCRA 514).........................................................................................................154
Art. 15: Alternative Circumstances...............................................................................................................155
Relationship..............................................................................................................................................155
People v. Calongui (G.R. No. 170566)..................................................................................................155
People v. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392)....................................................................................................156
Intoxication..............................................................................................................................................157
People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050).................................................................................................157

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 People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954).................................................................................................159
Arts. 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies......................................................................................160
Principals..................................................................................................................................................160
People v. Batin (GR No. 177223).........................................................................................................160
People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939)..................................................................................................162
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368).....................................................................................................165
Accomplices.............................................................................................................................................167
People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)......................................................................................................167
Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762)................................................................................................169
People v. Compo (G.R. No. 112990)....................................................................................................171
Accessories...............................................................................................................................................173
People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)................................................................................................173
People v. Cui (G.R. No. 121982)...........................................................................................................176
People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022)...................................................................................................179
Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability.............................................................................................181
People v. Mariano (G.R. No. L-40527).................................................................................................181
Arts. 21-24: Penalties in General..................................................................................................................184
Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws..............................................................................................................184
People v. Evina (G.R. No. 124830-310)................................................................................................184
People v. Lazaro (G.R. No. 112090).....................................................................................................185
People v. Pacifador (G.R. No. 139405)................................................................................................186
Pardon by Offended Party........................................................................................................................187
Sta. Catalina v. People (G.R. No. 167805)............................................................................................187
Balderama v. People (G.R. No. 147578-85).........................................................................................189
People v. Dimaano (G.R. No. 168168).................................................................................................191
Arts. 25-45: Penalties...................................................................................................................................193
Reclusion Perpetua..................................................................................................................................193
People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332)......................................................................................................193
People v. Zacarias (G.R. No. 138990)...................................................................................................195
People v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 138261)...................................................................................................196
Arts. 46-77: Application of Penalties............................................................................................................197
Complex Crime.........................................................................................................................................197
People v. Latupan (G.R. Nos. 112453-56)............................................................................................197
People v. Pineda (G.R. No. L-26222)....................................................................................................200
People v. Sanidad (G.R. No. 146099)...................................................................................................202
Delito Continuado....................................................................................................................................204
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28).............................................................................204
Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266)........................................................................................206
Habitual Delinquency...............................................................................................................................208
People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556).......................................................................................................208
People v. De Jesus (G.R. No. 45198)....................................................................................................209
Arts. 89-93: Total Extinction of Criminal Liability.........................................................................................211
Death of the Accused...............................................................................................................................211

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 De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579).............................................................................................211
People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007)...................................................................................................212
People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843).................................................................................................214
Prescription of Offenses...........................................................................................................................215
Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)..................................................................................................215
Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 881).....................................................................................................217
Caniza v. People (159 SCRA 16)...........................................................................................................219
Amnesty...................................................................................................................................................221
People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)...............................................................................................221
Arts. 100-103: Civil Liability..........................................................................................................................224
Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785)....................................................................................................224
Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons................................................................................................227
Nueva Espana v. People (460 SCRA 547).............................................................................................227
Pangonorom v. People (455 SCRA 211)...............................................................................................230
Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)........................................................................................................232
Probation Law (P.D. No. 968).......................................................................................................................234
Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747).......................................................................................................234
Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044)...................................................................................................236
Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203).......................................................................................................238
Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612).................................................................................................................239
Francisco v. People (434 SCRA 122)....................................................................................................239
Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220)..............................................................................................................241

Art.3: Felonies

Classification of Felonies According to the Means

of Commission

Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133)

Facts:

Victim Cantre and Sañano, together with two

other companions had a drinking spree in a videoke
bar at ten o’clock in the morning of February 4, 1996.
Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their
respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and
Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao.
Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is
suspecting the latter as the one responsible for
throwing stones at his house on previous night. After
being hit, bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a
stone which is as big as man’s fist, ran toward Cantre,
and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of
his back. When Cantre turned his attention to the
petitioner, Sanano tried pacify the two. Both Cantre
and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses.
When Cantre arrived at his house, he complained of
the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the
stone. At that night, he again complained of backache
and also of stomachache. He’s condition immediately

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became worst, and at around three o’clock in the
following morning, Cantre died.
Right after his death, Cantre was examined by
Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer
and made a findings that the cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food
poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family requested for
an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim
by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and
autopsy and reported that the cause of the death was
traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered
from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to
his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument,
such as a stone.
Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to
pacify the victim but the latter refused and pulled out
eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was
about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and
threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the
victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone
was in defense of his companion.
The RTC rendered a decision, which was later
affirmed by the CA, holding that petitioner was
criminally liable for homicide and that the act of
throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one
and the accused committed a felony which caused the
death of the victim and held that the accused is
criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended. Hence, these case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to
kill the victim and thus liable for homicide?
Decision:
While the Supreme Court is in accord with the
factual findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that
there is ample evidence proving that the death of the
victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen
which is the result by the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with
the RTC and the CA as to the determination of the
appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner
should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies
felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and
(2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are
distinguished from each other by the existence or
absence of malicious intent of the offender.
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of
the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the
omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
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another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the
offender to another person is "unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act
performed without  malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.
939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in
good conscience, attribute to petitioner any malicious
intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and
in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain
the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional
crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court
finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide  under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The prosecution did not establish that
petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim
Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very
least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to
this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive
away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim
Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was,
as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built
than the victim Cantre.
Manuel v. People (G.R. No. 165842)
Facts: This is a case filed against Eduardo Manuel for
bigamy by Tina B. Gandalera. Complainant allege that
she met the petitioner in Dagupan City sometime in
January 1996. When he visited her in Baguio, as one
thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
Petitioner proposed marriage and even brought his
parents to assure that he is single. Tina finally
accepted the marriage proposal and they were married
on April 22, 1996. In their marriage contract, it
appeared that Eduardo is “single”. However, their
happy relationship turns into a disaster, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only
twice or thrice a year. One day, petitioner took all of his
cloths, left and never returned. Out of curiousity, Tina
went to NSO in Manila where she found out that
petitioner had been previously married to Rubylus
Gaña. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when they exchanged their own vows.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he informed
Tina of his previous marriage, but she nevertheless
agreed to marry him. He abandoned her when he
noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck,
suspecting it that it come from another man. Eduardo
further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina..
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus
for more than 20 years. After trial, the court rendered
judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that
his first marriage had been dissolved because of his
first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy and that even if
the private complainant had known that Eduardo had
been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy. Eduardo appealed the
decision to the CA maintaining his contentions. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he
did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. Hence, these case.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has criminal
intent to contract on the second marriage to be liable
for bigamy?
Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the
prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner
married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is
presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when
he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the
petitioner to prove his defense that when he married
the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-
grounded belief  that his first wife was already dead, as
he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration
also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good
faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in
such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge
his burden.
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony
cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not
appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such
phrase is included in the word "voluntary."
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Malice is a mental state or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury. When
the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
proved to have been done or committed by the
accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a
consideration of the whole evidence.
Mistake of Fact
U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
Facts:
Defendant herein a chinese man named Ah
Chong is employed us a cook at Fort Mckinley. At that
time there were rumours and accounts of frequent
robbing of homes in the area.
On the night of the killing, Ah chong before
going to bed, and afraid of the rumoured robberies
taking place in the vicinity locked himself in their room
by placing wooden blocks and chairs for the purpose
of thwarting robbers in case they tried to rob him.
After having gone to bed, he was awakened
by the noise of someone trying to open the door. Ah
Chong for his part called out twice, “Who is there, but
to no avail”. Fearing that the person trying to enter was
robber Ah Chong leaped from his bed and shouted “If
you enter the room I will kill you”. But at that precise
moment, he was suddenly struck by the chair that he
had placed in the door, and believing that he was
being attacked he seized a knife and struck it on the
supposed assailant/robber, who was killed by the blow.
However the deceased was not a robber not intruder it
turned out that the person was his roommate, trying to
enter their room.
Issue:
Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable?
Decision:
NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted on the basis
of honest mistake of fact. Where the facts been as Ah
Chong perceived them to be, he would have been
justified in killing the intruder under Article 11 of the
Revised, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides for a valid self-defense of his person. If the
intruder was indeed a robber, forcing his way to enter
the room, unlawful aggression would be present. Also
the necessity means to avoid or to repel the attack
would be reasonable. Using the knife to defend
himself. And lastly Ah Chong gave no provocation at
all to warrant such aggression. The Supreme Court
Held that there is nothing unlawful in the intention as
well in the act of Ah Chong, his act would not have
been a felony if the real scenario was the facts he
believed them to be.
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint filed
against herein respondent for Gross ignorance of the
law in rendering his decision in a criminal complaint for
bigamy.
On 1965 Lucena Escoto contracted marriage
with Jorge de Perio Jr. Both of which were Filipino
Citizens. However on February 15, 1978 the two
acquired a Decree of Divorce in Texas, USA.
On June 4, 1987 the same Lucena Escoto
contracted marriage with herein complainants brother
Manule P. Diego, celebrated at Dagupan.
Judge Castillo held in this case the acquittal of
Ms. Escoto on the basis of good faith on her part. That
Ms. Escoto believing that her previous marriage had
been validly dissolved by the divorce decree acquired
in a foreign country and that she was legally free to
contract the second marriage. That according to Judge
Castillo as an ordinary laywoman , she entertains the
impression that she can contract a subsequent
marriage. Furthermore Judge Castillo stressed that
knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly
from her since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude
should not be confused with criminal intent.
Issue:
Whether or not mistake of fact to cut-off the
criminal liability of Ms. Escoto was validly taken up by
Judge Castillo?
Decision:
No. As carefully distinguished by the Supreme
Court in its previous decisions that mistake of fact,
which would could be a valid defense of good faith in a
bigamy case, from mistake of law, which does not
excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. In
People vs. Bidtu the Supreme Court held that even if
the accused, who had obtained a divorce decree under
Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in
contracting her second marriage she was not
committing any violation of law, and that she had no
criminal intent, the same does not justify the her act.
The Court further that it is sufficient to say that
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact
that one doe not know that his act constitutes a
violation of law does not exempt him from the
consequence thereof.
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People v. Fernando (G.R. No. L-24978)
Facts:
The residents of Barrio of Municahan of the
Municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the
presence of 3 suspicious looking persons prowling
around the town, suspecting them as moro prisoners
who recently escaped from Jail.
Fernando the accused herein was a
policeman, when passing in front of the house of
Remigio Delgado he was called by the latters daughter
and said to him that her father wanted to talk to him.
Remigio told Fernando that 3 unknown and suspicious
looking fellows were prowling around the house,
dressed in blue same as those purportedly worn by the
escapees. Fernando stayed in the house talking to the
daughter of Remigio,, both seated in a bench near the
window. At about 7 o’clock in the evening , there
appeared a figure in the dark about 4 meters from the
stairs, a person in dark clothes, calling Mang Miong.
Fernando and the daughter of Remegio had no idea
who was calling. Fernando asked the man what he
wanted but instead of answering the question the man
continued to the walk with bolo in hand. Fernando
upon seeing this took out his revolver and fired a
warning shot. Thereafter having fired a shot into the air
the man continued his ascend to the stairs, Fernando
took a shot at him. However it was found out that the
unknown man was Buenaventura Paulino, nephew of
Remigio.
The trial court held that Fernando was guilty of
the crime of murder. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernando is criminally liable for
his acts?
Decision:
Yes. But not for the crime of murder. The
accused being agent of the law, to whom notice was
given of the presence of the suspicious looking
persons who might be the escapees. The appearance
of a man unknown to him, dressed in clothes as that of
the escaped convicts, and calling to the owner of the
house, of which the daughter of the owner of the
house did not also recognized, caused the accused to
suspect that the unknown man was one of the
escaped convicts, and after firing a warning shot, the
man still did not halt his advance with bolo in hand. In
the midst of the circumstances and believing that the
man was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and
first fired into the air and then at the allege intruder. At
that psychological moment when the forces of far and
the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not
able to take full account of the true situation. However,
a circumstance that should have made him suspect
that the man was not only a friend but a relative when
the man called “Nong Miong, and in not asking the
daughter of the owner of the house who was it who Even granting that Comia acted in good faith,
was calling to her father with such familiarity, he did he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime
not use the ordinary precaution that he should have with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack
used before talking such fatal action. Hence he is of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
liable for homicide through reckless negligence. circumstances. As held inPeople v. Lo Ho Wing:
Moreover, the act of
transporting a prohibited drug
is a "malum prohibitum"
because it is punished as an
Mala in se v. Mala prohibita offense under a special law. It
is a wrong because it is
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560) prohibited by law. Without the
law punishing the act, it
cannot be considered a
Facts:
wrong. As such, the mere
commission of said act is what
Petitioner Former President Joseph Estrada
constitutes the offense
was prosecuted for a crime of violation of RA 7080 (An
punished and suffices to
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
validly charge and convict an
amended by RA 7659. Thus, he questions the
individual caught committing
constitutionality of the said Law. One of the issues that
the act so punished,
was raised in the petition is whether Plunder as
regardless of criminal intent.
defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,  and if so,
Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held:
whether it is within the power of Congress to so
The rule is that in acts mala in
classify it.
se  there must be a criminal
intent, but in those mala
Issue:
prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was
Whether or not Plunder is a crime malum
intentionally done. "Care must
prohibitum?
be exercised in distinguishing
the difference between the
Decision:
intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate to act."
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659
that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se.  For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
Art. 4: Criminal Liability
in se  and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case Wrongful Act Done be Different from That Intended
of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or
of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to Facts:
the inherent wrongness of the acts.
On Nov. 13,1995, Dante Andres and
People v. Go Shiu Ling (G.R. No. 115156) Randyven Pacheco invited Wilson Quinto and Edison
Garcia to go fishing with them inside a drainage
culvert. However, only Quinto joined the two, Garcia
Facts: remain in a grassy area about two meters from the
entrance of the drainage system. After a while,
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finds Pacheco came out, went back again, and emerged
accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiring again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid
with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of the boy’s lifeless body down in the grassy area and
Art. III, Section 14 in relation to Article IV, Section 21 of went to the house of Wilson’s mother and informed her
the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as that her son had died. After more than three months,
amended). the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed and the NBI
performed an autopsy thereon. An information was
Issue: later filed with the RTC changing Andres and Pacheco
with homicide.
Whether or not a crime for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime malum prohibitum? Issue:
Decision:

9|Page
 Whether or not the accused has criminal
liability for the death of the victim?
Decision:
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to prove
the guilt of the accused is criminality liable although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial and
appellate courts that the proximate cause of the death
of the victim was not cause by any wrongful act of the
accused. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove
the corps delicti which consists of criminal act and the
defendant’s agency in the commission of the act. This,
the prosecution failed to do.
People v. Ortega (276 SCRA 166)
Facts :
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia
and a certain John Doe were changed with murder for
the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a
witness, the victim answered the called of nature and
went to the back portion of the house where they were
having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him
and later they heard the victim shouting for help and
when they ran towards the scene he saw the accused
on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with a long
bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia
brought the victim to a well and dropped him and
placed stones into the well. The trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
appealed averring that the trial court erred in holding
them criminally liable because at the time the victim
was dropped into the well, he was still alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held
criminally liable for the death of the victim which is not
attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally
liable for the direct natural and logical consequences
of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is
more serious than that intended. The essential
requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as
follows :
1. the intended act is felonious ;
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony;
and
3. the unintended graven wrong was
primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts.
10 | P a g e
People v. Pilda (405 SCRA 134)
Facts:
Accused Edman Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba and
Rene Pilola were changed with murder for the death of
Joselito Capa. Rene Pilola devised stabbing the victim
and interposed the defense of alibi. The trial count
found all the accused guilty and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua. Rene Pilola appealed the decision
by contending that there was no conspiracy and he
may not be held criminally liable as principal by direct
participation. He argued that the prosecution failed to
prove that he conspined with the others in stabbing the
victim to death. He asserts that he is merely an
accomplice.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant may be held
criminally liable as principal by direct participation in
the absence of proof of conspiracy?
Decision:
The court in applying paragraph 1, Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code ruled that even if two or more
offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or
murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals
by direct participation if they perform overt acts which
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the
victim. They are all criminally liable although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended by reason of their individual and separate
overt criminal acts.
Impossible Crimes
People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245)
Facts:
In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico
was walking with a classmate along Roque Street in
Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man
(Domasian) who requested his assistance in getting
his father's signature on a medical certificate.Enrico
agreed to help and rode with Domasian in a tricycle to
Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and
started to cry when, instead of taking him to the
hospital, Domasian flagged a minibus and forced him
inside, holding him firmly all the while. Domasian told
him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father.
Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and
handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique
Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the
driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two
barangay tanods. The tanods went after the two,
Somehow, Domasian managed to escape, leaving
Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a
passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were
riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking
for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same
day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope
containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1
million for the release of Enrico and warned that
otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the
handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it
with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to
the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination.The test showed that it bad been written
by Dr. Samson Tan. Domasian and Tan were
subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon.
Issue:
Whether or not the sending of the ransom note
was an impossible crime?
Decision:
No. Even before the ransom note was
received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act cannot
be considered an impossible crime because there was
no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had
already been consummated when Domasian deprived
Enrico of his liberty.
Moreover the trial court correctly held that
conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in
detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by
Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared toward
the attainment of the common ultimate objective
Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52)
Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig went to Mandaya's
house in Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked
him to go with them to the house of Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He
told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the four men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
11 | P a g e
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room.It
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire.
Issue:
Whether or not said act constitutes an
impossible crime?
Decision:
Yes. The factual situation in the case at bar
present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment and
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order
to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime.Factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar
belongs to this category.
In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or
physical impossibility and legal impossibility.
To uphold the contention of respondent that
the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the
provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of
the offense will be treated as an accident independent
of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
Art. 6: Stages of Execution
People v. Campuhan(G.R. No. 129433)
Facts:
 On April 25, 1996 at around 4pm while Ma.
Corazon Pamintuan was downstairs busy preparing
drinks for her two daughters, she heard Crysthel, one
of her daughters crying, “Ayo’ko, Ayo’ko” prompting
her to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo inside
her children’s room kneeling in front of her four-year
old daughter, whose pajamas were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees.
Primo was apprehended and was charged
with statutory rape.
The trial court found him guilty and sentenced
him to the extreme penalty of death. In convicting the
accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the
testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short
pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas and panty were supposedly “already
removed" and that Primo was “forcing his penis into
Crysthel’s vagina.”
Issue:
Is Primo guilty of Consummated rape?
Decision:
Judgment modified into attempted rape.
In People vs. Dela Pena, the SC clarified that
the decisions finding a case for rape even if the
attacker’s penis merely touched the external portions
of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full
penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an
erection, had a limp of flaccid penis, or an oversized
penis which could not fit into the victim’s vagina, the
Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated
on the basis of the victim’s testimony that the accused
repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her
vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her
vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the
middle part of her vagina.
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases
does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required
to be “touched” by the penis, are by their natural situs
or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some
degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated
rape.
12 | P a g e
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has
not been confined to the oft-quoted “touching of the
female organ,” but has also progressed into being
described as “the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum,” or “the bombardment of
the drawbridge.” But to the SC's mind, the case at bar
merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
potency," or a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
Under Art.6, in relation to Art. 335, of the
Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted
rape – and only of attempted rape – are present in the
instant case; hence, the accused should be punished
only for it.
Valenzuela v. People (G.R. No. 160188)
Facts:
Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were
charged with the crime of theft.
On 19 May1994, Valenzuela and Calderon
were seen outside the Super Sale Club inside the SM
Complex along North Edsa by Lorenzo Lago, SM
Security Guard. Valenzuela was hauling a push cart
with cases of Tide detergent and unloaded
these cases of Tide in an open parking space
where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela went inside
the supermarket again and came back with more
cases of detergent.
Thereafter, Valenzuela left the parking lot and
haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and told the driver to
go to the area where Calderon was waiting. Calderon
loaded the cases of Tide and boarded the taxi.
Lago saw all of this and proceeded to stop the
taxi. When Lago asked for a receipt of the
merchandise, the two accused reacted by fleeing on
foot. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene.
Valenzuela and Calderon were both
convicted by the trial court of consummated
theft.
It was only Valenzuela who filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The
Court of Appeals rejected this contention, hence, this
Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty
only of frustrated theft?

Decision:
Petition dismissed. Under the statutory
definition of theft, free disposal of the stolen items is
not a constitutive element of theft.
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of theft is defined as follows. “Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without force or violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take the property
of another without the latter’s consent xxx”
On the face of the definition, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft
– the taking of personal property of another. It is also
clear from the definition that in order such taking may
be qualified as theft, there must further be present the
descriptive circumstances that the taking was with
intent to gain; without force upon things or violence
against or intimidation of persons; and is was without
the consent of the owner of the property.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft
is susceptible of commissions in the frustrated stage,
the question is again, when is the crime of theft
produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in
the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to to its taking by
one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it
is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely disposed
of the property stolen since the deprivation from the
owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution.
Indeed the SC, after all, held that unlawful
taking is deemed complete from the moment of the
offender gains possession of the thing even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same.
People v. Orita (G.R. No. 88724)
Facts:
In the early morning of March 20, 1983,
Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year old freshman student at
the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house
from a party. All of a sudden, appellant held her and
poked a knife to her neck. Appellant dragged
complainant up the stairs and with the Batangas knife
still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's
room.
After removing his clothes and ordering her to
remove hers, the appellant began to rape the
complainant. However as they were in a position
where he continued to poke the knife to her, appellant
could not fully penetrate her.
13 | P a g e
Upon changing positions, the complainant
managed to dash into the next room. However, the
appellant chased her until she jumped out of a window
and ran to a nearby municipal building where two
policemen were on duty. Upon being told what
happened, the policemen rushed to the boarding
house, however, they failed to apprehend appellant.
The complainant was brought to a hospital
where she was examined. The medical Certificate
stated Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude findings: “No visible
abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the
vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding
vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;”
The trial court convicted the accused of
frustrated rape.
The accused contends that there is no crime
of frustrated rape and the Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring
that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.
Decision:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rapeand sentenced to reclusion perpetua.There is no
debate that rape can be attempted and consummated.
Our concern now is whether or not the crime of rape
can be frustrated. The requisites of a frustrated felony
are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that
the felony is not produced due to causes independent
of the perpetrator's will.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished (consummated). In the consummation of
rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. 
In the case of People v. Eriña, We found the
offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ
of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a
"stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated
in Our subsequent decisions. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides, in its penultimate
paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is
attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape
is a dead provision.  Issue:
There was no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the victim, but
neither was it ruled out. However the medical
certificate stated that the vulva was erythematous
(which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin
due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and
tender. However, Dr. Zamora’s (in place of Dr Abude)
testimony is merely corroborative and is not an
indispensable element in the prosecution of this case.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's
testimony if credible.  design. The conspiracy in the instant case was
Art. 8: Conspiracy
People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)
Facts:
On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in
Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a “benefit disco dance” was
held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito
and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva
and Roel Ngujo, attended.
 At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were
together and drank all through the night with some
friends. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and
prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that
it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin
and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies
home.
Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would
just follow. Wilson was behind them at a distance of 7
to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the house of
Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the
two victims in front of his house and frisk them.
Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and
Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them
towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug,
Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and
Mario and together they proceeded to the airport
runway.
Wilson, hidden behind a bush, said he could hear
Benjamin plead for his life. A few seconds later, Jed
took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot
Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As
Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees
since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held
Roel while Juanito started stabbing him using a
Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel.
The lower court and Court of Appeals find that
there was conspiracy and convicting them despite their
defense of alibi.
14 | P a g e
Can there be a conspiracy based on the
foregoing facts?
Decision:
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime.Neither it is necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has
to be shown is that all the participants performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and
sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at
the old airport tower and walking together with them
towards the runway where appellants and Jed
performed acts in unison with each other as to
unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design. 
Anent Mario’s defense of alibi, despite
corroboration from Exequiel Aranas, it is still an
inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a
positive identification from a witness found credible by
the trial court. Absent arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of significance and
influence, we will not interfere with the credence given
to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario and that
of Exequiel, as assessments of credibility are generally
left to the trial court whose proximate contact with
those who take the witness stand places it in a more
competent position to discriminate between true and
false testimony. Moreover, as correctly discussed by
the Court of Appeals, the distance between the scene
of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out is
not so far away as to prevent him from being physically
present at the place of the crimes or its immediate
vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.
People v. Comadre (431 SCRA 366)
Facts:
At around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995,
Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,Rey
Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking
spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father,
Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in
Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime
Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the terrace
listening to the conversation of the companions of his
son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the
others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three
stopped in front of the house. While his companions
looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which
fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately
fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.
 The object, which turned out to be a hand
grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit
by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.  Dagupan City to get the Nissan Pathfinder from his
The undisputed facts show that when Antonio
Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on
without uttering a single word of encouragement or
performed any act to assist him. The trial court held
that the mere presence of George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense
of security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the
existence of conspiracy.
Issue:
Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing
facts?
Decision: Similar to the physical act constituting the
crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule
that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual
cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval
of an illegal act is required.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of
the crime does not make him a conspirator for
conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the
commission of the crime and must therefore be set
free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as
well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that
they performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime.
Sim v. CA (428 SCRA 459)
Facts:
Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire
supplier. He had been dealing with accused Elison
Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is engaged in the
same business of selling tires and rims.
In March 1998, private complainant talked to
Elison and expressed his interest in buying a vehicle.
Elison told him that he knew someone who sells
vehicles at a cheap price, and that he had bought a
Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price.
Private complainant then asked Elison to ask if there
was an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month later, Elison
called private complainant to inform him that he was
15 | P a g e
able to find a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to
inspect the vehicle together.
On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to
friend, petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told
Elison that the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by
a customer in payment of a debt and had been used
only for a year.
Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to
San Pablo City. Private complainant at first did not like
the vehicle since it was not the brand he was looking
for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the
vehicle as the latter was also interested in it.
Private complainant decided to buy the 1997
Nissan Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00.
The amount was paid in five checks issued by Fe
Ilagan. One check was dated May 6, 1998 in the sum
of P350,000.00, and four checks in the sum of
P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6
and September 6, all in 1998.
Elison gave private complainant photocopies
of the Certificate of Registration (C.R.) and Official
Receipt (O.R.) issued by the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as one
Henry Austria. After a week, Elison brought the deed
of sale which private complainant signed without the
signature of the owner, Henry Austria. After private
complainant signed the deed of sale, he gave it back
to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for
signing by the owner/vendor and transfer of
registration in the name of private complainant.
On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and
delivered to private complainant the deed of sale
signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new
C.R. and O.R. issued by the LTO of Lingayen,
Pangasinan in the name of private complainant. The
checks given by private complainant in payment of the
vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his name at
Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks were
debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the
registration papers from Elison, private complainant
was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder.
On October 28, 1998, private complainants
vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping
operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR
NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers
were inspected and thereafter brought to Camp
Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car."
Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged
and convicted with estafa. Further the court also ruled
that conspiracy is present. With this, the accused
appealed.
Issue:
 Whether there was conspiracy between
petitioner and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private
complainant Jay Byron Ilagan?
Decision:
Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be
deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before,
during and after the commission of the crime, which
are indicative of a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed
implied when the malefactors have a common purpose
and were united in its execution. Spontaneous
agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at
the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient
to create joint criminal responsibility.
In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that
conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown
as clearly as the commission of the crime. However,
conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but
may take the form of circumstances which, if taken
together, would conclusively show that the accused
came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided
to carry it out with their full cooperation and
participation.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court,
petitioners actions in relation to the fraudulent sale of
the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant clearly
established conspiracy as alleged in the information,
which acts transcend mere knowledge or friendship
with co-accused Elison. Notwithstanding the fact that it
was only Elison who dealt with or personally
transacted with private complainant until the time the
sale was consummated, by his own testimony
petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively
cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating
the fraud upon private complainant. That petitioner is a
conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is
evident from the fact that as between them, both knew
that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under
the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the
registered owner.Petitioner, together with Elison,
clearly deceived private complainant in order to
defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the
latter’s damage and prejudice. In addition, the acts of
petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to
private complainant as having the necessary authority
to possess and sell to the latter the vehicle so that he
could collect from him P480,000.00 only to renege on
that promise and for failure to reimburse the said
amount he collected from private complainant, despite
demand, amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315,
par. 2 (a).
Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances
Self-defense
People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007)
16 | P a g e
Facts:
Sanchez's account of the facts shows that he
and Jamero were tenants of adjacent lots located in
San Jose, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur. At about
7:00 o'clock in the morning of September 4, 1993,
Sanchez saw Jamero destroying the dike which served
as the boundary between the two lots. Sanchez
confronted Jamero and told the latter that he was
encroaching on his land. Jamero struck him with a
shovel. The shovel got stuck in the mud so Jamero
resorted to throwing mud at Sanchez. Fighting back,
Sanchez hacked Jamero with a bolo, resulting in the
latter's death. Sanchez then proceeded to the
municipal building to surrender upon the advice of his
son-in-law.
According to the OSG, Jamero's attack on
Sanchez was unsuccessful because the latter was
able to evade it and Jamero's shovel got stuck in the
mud. Jamero fled toward the ricefield when Sanchez
unsheathed his bolo. Sanchez pursued him and struck
his head with a bolo. Jamero fell down but was able to
stand up again. He ran away but after a short distance,
fell down again. Sanchez approached him and stabbed
him several times. Not satisfied, Sanchez pushed
Jamero's face down into the knee-deep mud. After
Jamero's aggression ceased when he fled and left his
shovel stuck in the mud, there was no longer any
justification for Sanchez to go after him and hack him
to death.
Issue: Whether or not unlawful aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting
self-defense?
Decision:
There
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
unless the accused proves the first essential requisite
—unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden
and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person – a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude is not sufficient. There must be actual physical
force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a
threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as
to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury.
Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute
aggression warranting self-defense.
In this case, the twin circumstances of
Jamero's shovel getting stuck in the mud and his
running away from Sanchez convincingly indicate that
there was no longer any danger to the latter's life and
limb which could have justified his pursuit of Jamero
and subsequent hacking and killing of the latter.
Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression
by Jamero and the prosecution's evidence conclusively
showing that it was Sanchez who was the unlawful
aggressor completely discounts Sanchez's claim of
self-defense. Even incomplete self-defense by its very
nature and essence would always require the
attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the
victim which must clearly be shown.
Soplente v. People (G.R. No. 152715)
Facts:
The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched
the amateur singing contest being held near the Sta.
Cruz Chapel. While engrossed with the singing
contest, they were approached by two persons from
the group of Leyson who then tapped Nicanor’s
shoulder. They insisted on bringing Nicanor along with
them so Nicanor called for Rogelio’s help. The latter
immediately intervened to stop the two from harassing
Nicanor.
At about past eleven o’clock in the evening
(11:00 p.m.), before the conclusion of the amateur
singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor decided to go
home. At past midnight, Bukay (their cousin’s wife)
asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in
looking for her children who had watched the singing
contest. They obliged but before they had gone about
three hundred meters, Nicanor separated from them to
buy cigarettes from a nearby store. Rogelio and Bukay
went onwards but at a distance of about fifty meters
from the stage, Rogelio stopped and Bukay proceeded
alone to look for her children. A few minutes later,
Bukay appeared with the children and they all headed
home.
While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly
found himself surrounded by around ten persons led
by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to run and the latter
immediately scampered away. Leyson drew his gun
and fired at Rogelio but the latter was able to parry it
by tapping the base of Leyson’s hand holding the gun.
Forthwith, Rogelio stabbed Leyson once. He was
kicked by Notarte immediately after he stabbed
Leyson. Rogelio also stabbed Notarte. Rogelio
managed to escape after that and he sought refuge in
the house of Susing (their cousin).
Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susing’s
house and Rogelio voluntarily gave himself up. The
knife he used was also turned over to the police. He
was brought to the police substation at Lagao.
Issue:
Whether or not our laws on self-defense are
suppose to approximate the natural human responses
to danger.
Decision:
At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio
could not have been obliged to view Notarte, or any
other member of the posse for that matter, as a less
menacing threat than Leyson. We have to understand
that these events occurred spontaneously in a matter
17 | P a g e
of seconds or even simultaneously. Rogelio bore no
superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the
events from unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able
to assess with measured certainty the appropriate
commensurate response due to each of his
aggressors. Even those schooled in the legal doctrines
of self-defense would, under those dire circumstances,
be barely able to discern the legally defensible
response and immediately employ the same. Our laws
on self-defense are supposed to approximate the
natural human responses to danger, and not serve as
our inconvenient rulebook based on which we should
acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril.
It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have
discerned the appropriate calibrated response to
Notarte’s kicking when he himself was staring at the
evil eye of danger. That would be a gargantuan
demand even for the coolest under pressure.
Urbano v. People (G.R. No. 182750)
Facts:
Petitioner
Urbano testified being, in the afternoon of September
28, 1993, in the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic.
He was with Tomelden and several others, including
Dominador Navarro, Chairperson of Lingayen Water
District. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered
goat’s meat and drank beer. When it was time to
depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden,
then seated in another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted
petitioner, telling the latter he had no business
stopping him from further drinking as he was paying for
his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to
his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner
saw that Tomelden had already consumed 17 bottles
of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for
three and a half hours before returning to the LIWAD.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden
allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him
"sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarro’s
tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then delivered
several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of
which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner
maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the
latter’s blows.
Thereafter, Tomelden went to the hospital
several times complaining of dizziness, headache, and
other pains. The last time he went to the hospital,
things turned for the worst. Tomelden died due, per Dr.
Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
Orje Salazar, their co-worker, attests to the
provocative acts of Tomelden and to his being the
aggressor.

Issue:
Whether or not the victim’s insulting remarks
directed at the accused, and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constitute sufficient provocation?
Decision:
When
the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating
circumstance or as an essential element of self-
defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the
provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit
the wrongful act and should immediately precede the
act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1)
when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor;
(2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not
sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate and
immediate to the act of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting
remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation.
This is not to mention other irritating statements made
by the deceased while they were having beer in
Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and
challenged to a fist fight.
Defense of Relatives
Balunuecov. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)
Facts:
On May 2, 1982 at around 6:00 o’clock in the
evening Amelia Iguico saw accused Reynaldo, his
father Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all
surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando Flores
chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the
five (5) individuals in hot pursuit, Servando scampered
into the safety of Amelia’s house. Meanwhile Senando
went out of the house fully unaware of the commotion
going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo
turned his attention on him and gave chase. Senando
instinctively fled towards the fields but Reynaldo,
Ricardo, and Armando cornered him and ganged up
on him. To shield him from further violence, Amelia put
her arms around her husband but it was not enough to
detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was
also hit on the leg.
In his defense, accused Ricardo invoke
defense of relatives. He testified that at that time he
was fetching water he heard somebody shout. When
he hurried to the place, he saw his brother Ramon
18 | P a g e
embracing Senando who was continuously hacking
Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the
ground and as if further enraged by the intrusion, he
turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo
screamed, "tama na yan, mga kapatid ko ‘yan." But the
assailant would not be pacified as he hacked Ramon
on the chest. At this point, Servando, the brother of
Senando, threw an axe at him but Reynaldo picked it
up and smashed Senando with it.
The trial court found the accused guilty of
homicide and frustrated homicide. According to the
trial court, the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and
calculated to extricate himself from the predicament he
was in. Further, the trial court added that the wounds
allegedly received by Ricardo in the hands of the
victim, Senando Iguico, if at all there were any, did not
prove that Senando was the aggressor for the wounds
were inflicted while Senando was in the act of
defending himself from the aggression of Ricardo and
his co-conspirators.
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction
of accused Ricardo with modification that his
conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, should
be for attempted homicide only.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid defense of
relatives?
Decision:
Petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance
of defense of relatives under Art. 11, par. (2), of The
Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of this
justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful
aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, the one
making the defense had no part therein.
Of the three (3) requisites of defense of
relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua
non, for without it any defense is not possible or
justified. In order to consider that an unlawful
aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that
an attack or material aggression, an offensive act
positively determining the intent of the aggressor to
cause an injury shall have been made; a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to
justify the commission of an act which is punishable
per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on
the ground that it was committed in self-defense or
defense of a relative. It has always been so recognized
in the decisions of the courts, in accordance with the
provisions of the Penal Code.
Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has
the burden of proving these elements by clear and
convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution, for even if the prosecution evidence is
weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has
admitted the killing.
In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly
failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a
positively strong act of real aggression on the part of
the deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-
serving allegations, there is nothing on record that
would justify his killing of Senando.
Fulfilment of a Duty
Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)
Facts:
On July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening,
a certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting,
“Magnanakaw…Magnanakaw.” Several residents
responded and thereupon chased the suspect who
entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and proceeded to
the rooftop of Abacan’s house.
At about 9:00 o’clock that same evening, the
desk officer of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station,
upon receiving a telephone call that a robbery-holdup
was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately
contacted and dispatched to the scene the crew
including herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun.
With the permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun,
and two others went to the rooftop of the house
whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge.
The three policemen, each armed with a
drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw
a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At
that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking
ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the
man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras
(Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.
Contreras died from the gunshot wound.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting in question was
done in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office?
Decision:
No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal
Code may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or
offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
Concededly, the first requisite is present in this
case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a
robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of
the crime was in accordance with the performance of
his duty. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate
19 | P a g e
death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of
the due performance of his duty as a policeman is
essential to exempt him from criminal liability.
To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty,
without more, do not completely justify the petitioner’s
firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as
one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery
then in progress, was performing his duty as a police
officer as well as when he was trying to effect the
arrest of the suspected robber and in the process,
fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man.
However, in the absence of the equally necessary
justifying circumstance that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty, there can only be
incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652)
Facts:
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a
pub drinking with two other policemen in as early as
11:00 p.m. of October 18, 1996. At around 12:00 a.m.
to 12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between
the deceased Sgt. Lajo and another customer at the
pub but eventually the two were able to patch things
up. While on his way out, Lajo was followed by
Braxinela with a gun already drawn out. From behind,
Baxinela held Lajo’s left arm and asked why he was
carrying a gun. Thereafter an explosion coming from
Baxinela’s gun was heard. Lajo, still standing, took two
steps and then fell down.
Issue:
Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly
be invoked by the petitioner?
Decision:
No. In order to avail of this justifying
circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or
the offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of a right or office. While the first condition is present,
the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to
investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked
behind his waist in a public place. This was what
Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the
entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the
desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty
by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The
shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due
performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no
serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in
the pub.The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela
the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v.
Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition is
fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty
lower than one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed.
Angcaco v. People (G.R. No. 146664)
Facts:
At around 4 o'clock in the morning of
September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother
Noel Bergante and his cousin Freddie Ganancial were
awakened by the sound of gunfire while they were
asleep in their house. Petitioner John Angcaco and his
co-accused were serving a warrant of arrest issued on
Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in connection
with a robbery case. Noel informed the policemen that
his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto
Princesa. One of them ordered the men in the house
to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and
later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe
and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden.
Once they were outside the house, Noe and
Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the
right side and accused Ramon Decosto on the left
side. Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and
warned them not to run. Noe and Freddie joined Noel
Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying,
"You are tough," and pushed him. Then, shots rang
out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and
Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial turned
around and dropped to the ground face down.
Issue:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of
fulfilment of duty is applicable in this case?
Decision:
No. For this justifying circumstance to be
appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that
the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a
duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such right or office.
In this case, the mission of petitioner and his
colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto
Bergante. The standard procedure in making an arrest
was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and
to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him
of the charge against him, and, second, to take the
arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here
that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such
duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to
prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner
and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto
Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to
how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already
stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted
20 | P a g e
person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in
his house. As regards the second requisite, there can
be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial
was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be
made on Restituto Bergante.
Obedience to an Order
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03)
Facts:
Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in the total
amount of P55 Million of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency
as General Manager and Acting Finance Services
Manager, respectively, of MIAA.
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena
over the phone to pay directly to the president's office
and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week
later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,
then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential
Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction, directed to pay
immediately the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial
payment of MIAA's account with said Company signed
by the then President Marcos.
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal
instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help
of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55
Million of MIAA funds
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as
described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of
the ordinary" and "not based on the normal
procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared
to support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid
in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million
was presented.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners’ defense of
good faith is tenable?
Decision:
Yes. It is settled that this is a valid defense in a
prosecution for malversation for it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused.To constitute
a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made
such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent,
or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal
intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of is
innocent.Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the
withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is
something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena's superior — the former being
then the President of the Republic who unquestionably
exercised control over government agencies such as
the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a
say in matters involving inter-government agency
affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing
payment of liability of one entity to another and the
manner in which it should be carried out. And as a
recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the
highest official of the land no less, good faith should be
read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor
any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship
between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is
the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment
of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to
another (PNCC).
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a
public officer from the crime of malversation.
Art.12: Exempting Circumstances
Insanity/Imbecility
People v. Rubiños (G.R. No. 138453)
Facts:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting
of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for
parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one
shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating
circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here
is reclusion perpetua, not death.
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,
appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and
the fetus inside her. When arraigned on July 27, 1995,
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded
not guilty. After due trial, the RTC convicted him.
Appellant does not refute the factual
allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his
21 | P a g e
wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by
interposing the defense of insanity.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in not
giving probative weight to the testimony and
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza
finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from
psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia,
paranoid type?
Whether or not the court a quo erred in
disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that insanity
presupposes that the accused was completely
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will
at the time of the commission of the crime. A
defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense
of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the
fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity
be considered.
The presumption of law always lies in favor of
sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
every person is presumed to be of sound mind.
Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.
Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the
crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals
that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no
substantial evidence that appellant was completely
deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said
that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and
without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be
sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had
hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son
Lorenzo Robiños.
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of
what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to
her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed
her.
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to
responding law enforcers how he had just killed his
wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and
remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had
realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at
the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of
what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando
Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when
the latter confessed to the former and to the police
officers, and even showed to them the knife used to
stab the victim. Clearly, the assault of appellant on his
wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the
atrocity of his act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of
the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of
insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his
allegedly unsound mental condition after the
commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-
year-old son Federico Robiños, all the other defense
witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of
his insanity after he had already been detained in
prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the
time of the commission of the offense, or the accused
must have been deranged even prior thereto.
Otherwise he would still be criminally
responsible. Verily, his alleged insanity should have
pertained to the period prior to or at the precise
moment when the criminal act was committed, not at
any time thereafter.
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground
for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence
must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If
the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the
commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should
have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily,
the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate
that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or
freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or
avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is
required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the
defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required
to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
People v. Valledor (G.R. No. 129291)
Facts:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the
afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos
Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He
was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom
together with his first cousin, then 25-year old Elsa
Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and
Antonio Magbanua. Roger was working at his table
and seated on his bed while Elsa was across the table.
22 | P a g e
Antonio was on the left side, while Simplicio was
seated near the door, on the right side of Roger.
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the
room; uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and
immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was
able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on
the right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed
Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, "Ako akabales
den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter,
accused-appellant fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio
and Antonio unharmed.
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified
that sometime in 1980, accused-appellant suspected
him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant
courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one occasion, Elsa
spat on and slapped accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was
anchored on the following facts:
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City
Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa City interviewed
accused-appellant and thereafter made the following
conclusions and recommendation, that subject patient
be committed to the National Mental Hospital, Metro
Manila for proper medical care and evaluation soonest.
The defense offered in evidence the April 27,
1992 medical findings on accused-appellant by Dr.
Guia Melendres of the National Center for Mental
Health, pertinent portion of which reads: In view of the
foregoing history, observations, physical mental and
psychological examinations the patient Enrico Valledor
y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or
Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This is a
thought disorder characterized by deterioration from
previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination,
ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness,
poor judgment and absence of insight. Likewise, he is
found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance
Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This is characterized by
a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use
indicated by continued use despite knowledge of
having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational,
psychological or physical problems.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
convicting the accused despite the fact that when he
allegedly committed the offense charged he was
mentally ill, out of his mind or insane?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that in considering a
plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is
that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind.
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were
done unconsciously.
 Since the presumption is always in favor of
sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to
the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. An insane
person has no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity
may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the
alleged deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The
vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives
and emotions of a person, and through which we
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to
discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime.
The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably
show that accused-appellant was not legally insane
when he perpetrated the acts for which he was
charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to
accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger
and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the
nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio
Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise
inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-
appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words,
"Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa)
after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly
left the room after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be
said to be performed by one who was in a state of a
complete absence of the power to discern. Judging
from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware
and in control of what he was doing as he in fact
purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two
other people were also inside the room, one of them
was nearest to the door where accused-appellant
emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His
obvious motive of revenge against the victims was
accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the
words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally,
his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the
incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he
has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing
incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his
clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not
sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the
time of the commission of the crime. As consistently
held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does
not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is
legally so." Then, too, the medical findings showing
23 | P a g e
that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental
disorder after the commission of the crime, has no
bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental
condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense.
Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was
legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should
be held liable for his felonious acts.
Minority
Llave v.People (G.R. No. 166040)
Facts:
On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her
mother, the victim, who was only 7 years old at that
time, proceeded to their house, where the accused
waited for her, and accosted her; he proceeded to
sexually abuse her, while the victim cried for help.
A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and
came to the scene; the accused fled, and the vendor
told the victim to tell her parents what happened.
Together with her parents, the victim went to
the police and reported the incident; the vendor also
testified to what he saw during that time.
The medical examiner found no injury on the
hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish
discharge between the labia minora; there was also
fresh abrasion of the perennial skin at 1
o’clock position near the anal opening.
The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring
that he acted with discernment, but crediting him with
the special mitigating circumstance of minority.
Issue:
W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim, and if yes, whether he acted with discernment,
being a minor of age more than 9 years old but less
than 15?
Decision: YES
Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge.  Hence,
even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the
private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion
that the rape was consummated.
While it is true that medical examiner did not find
any abrasion or laceration in the private complainant’s
genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s
testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her.
The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is
a young girl as in this case.
The court have held that when the offended party is
young and immature, from the age of thirteen to
sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their
account of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the
matter to which they testified is not true.
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong.
The accused, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near
the vacant house to insure that passers-by would not
be able to discover his dastardly acts.
Jose v. People (G.R. No. 162052)
Facts:
Accused was arrested in a drug buy-bust operation
conducted by the police; accused was a passenger in
the car of Zarraga, whom allegedly made the deal with
the undercover in the said operation. They claimed
that they were kidnapped by the police and asked
ransom for their release from one of the accused’s
wife.
The trial court found them guilty, and credited in
their favour the preventive imprisonment they had
undergone.CA reduced the penalty on petitioner since
he was 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense.
Issue:
W/N petitioner acted with discernment and that
prosecution failed to allege in the information that he
acted with discernment?
Decision: NO
For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable,
the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence,
that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such circumstantial evidence may include the
utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during
and after the commission of the crime relative thereto;
the nature of the weapon used in the commission of
the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal
of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
 The only evidence of the prosecution against the
petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-
accused, when the latter inquired from the poseur-
buyer, if he could afford to buy shabu.
There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what
was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and
at the time he handed over the same to his cousin.  one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile.
Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the
petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used
young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.
24 | P a g e
Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between
two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to
commit it.  Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the
parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from
what is wrong.  Since the prosecution failed to prove
that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-
accused.
Declarador v. Judge Gubaton (G.R. No. 159208)
Facts:
The accused, a 17-year old, minor, stabbed a
teacher, wife of the complainant, 15 times; he was
charged with murder aggravated by evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, to which
the accused plead guilty to the crime charged.
In view of the accused’s plea, RTC rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty, but the sentence
was suspended by the judge automatically because
the accused was a minor at that time; he was ordered
to be committed to the Regional Rehabilitation for
Youth.
The husband of the victim, herein petitioner,
claimed that in Art. 192 of P.D. No. 603, the benefit of
a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile
who was convicted of a crime punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess in jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the
sentence of the accused?
Decision: YES
The benefits of P.D. No. 603 shall not apply to
a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension
of sentence under its provisions or to one who is
convicted for an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense
by the Military Tribunals.
Furthermore, it shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with law who has once enjoyed suspension of
sentence or, when at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, the juvenile is already 18 yrs. old.
The disqualification is based on the nature of
the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor,
and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial.
It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible
Rep. Act No. 9344 only amended the
disqualification of those juveniles in conflict with law,
who at the time of the promulgation of judgment, was
already 18 years old, and allowed the benefits to apply
to them. The other disqualification in P.D. No. 603
remains unchanged. Hence, the accused is still
disqualified under law to benefit from such suspension
of sentence.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia
should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have
in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to
have enacted the new act with reference thereto.
Accident
Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94)
Facts:
The accused Toledo was charged with
homicide for the killing of one Ricky Duarte. Toledo
insisted that when he killed the victim, the same was
purely accidental. He claimed that the victim was so
drunk that the same charged at the door of his house.
This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when
he tried to prevent Ricky from entering, he accidentally
hit the latter whereby killing him.
But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty.
And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein
this time, he claims that his actions were purely on
self-defense. It was done when the victim attacked him
and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed
Duarte.
Issue:
Should the Court find his actions exempting
and/or justifying?
Decision:
The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as
accidental self-defense. The accused cannot claim the
death purely accidental and when the findings of the
lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his
defense by alleging that what happened was purely
self-defense.
The two defenses perpetuated by the accused
are totally inconsistent with each other. Although in the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is
excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an
unlawful aggression which could have killed or injure
him. And so, such acts are not in tune with ACCIDENT
which presupposes an act which was not even
contemplated or planned but purely accidental.
25 | P a g e
People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74)
Facts:
The accused Concepcion is a police officer
charged with murder for the killing of one Lorenzo
Galang. According to testimonies of both parties’
witnesses, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the
barangay hall because he was so drunk and unruly at
the town plaza and was continually disturbing the
peace.
The accused then came to the barangay hall
apparently to question Galang. But herein lies the
differences in the testimonies. The prosecution
witnesses (2 of them) testified that while interrogating
Galang, Concepcion suddenly fired two shots past the
ear of the victim without injuring him. But later on, he
hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which
wounded Galang in the thigh and then Concepcion
fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest
and killed him.
But according to the accused, he was merely
pacifying Galang when the victim became so unruly
that the accused fired two warning shots. But instead
of scaring Galang, the latter tried to grab the gun from
the accused. Two shots were accidentally fired which
hit Galang thus causing his death.
The accused claims that he should be
exempted because he was just performing his lawful
duty as a police officer and that the shooting was
purely accidental.
The trial court found Concepcion guilty.
Issue:
Should the accused be exempted from
criminal liability due to accident?
Decision:
Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that
the prosecution has theburden of proof to establish the
guilt of the accused. However, once the defendant
admits the commission of the offense charged, but
raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the
burden of proof is shifted to him.  By invoking mere
accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden
of proving that he is entitled to that exempting
circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code.
Unfortunately for the accused, his testimony
was too full of inconsistencies which failed to
discharge the burden . For one, Concepcion claims
that when the victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was
hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. But then he
claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by
grabbing the BARREL OF THE GUN”. This was very
inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that
a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a
police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his
waist.
Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically
testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim with
the M-16 rifle.
And so, the finding of guilt by the lower court
was proper.
Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear
Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275)
Facts:
This case stemmed from the filing of
7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty
before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and
issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account
or for value to Editha L. Vecino several post-dated
checks. The said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the checks or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within
five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.  
Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury.”  She claims that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release of her mother whom the
hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would
not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.
The trial court rendered judgment against Ty.
Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and reiterated her
defense that she issued the checks “under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury.”   The appellate
court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification.  It set aside the penalty of imprisonment
and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty
thousand pesos P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is
tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liability?   between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29,
Decision:No.
26 | P a g e
Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting
circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than
or at least equal to that committed.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated.  If the evil
sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated
or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable
It must appear that the threat that caused the
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future
injury is not enough.  It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable
fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting
not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape.
The fear harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent.  Ty claims that she was compelled to issue
the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly
demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged, for fear that her mother’s health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of
the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide.  This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
Entrapment v. Instigation
People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019)
Facts:
On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00
o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco,
Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the
Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos,
Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about
the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay
Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who
later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria.
P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to
look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with
appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the
surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco
that a confidential asset found by the team had already
negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth
of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123
Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan
2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-
bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team
leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided
with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the
appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the
confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house
and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door
and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1
Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later
handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant
who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu.
Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter,
which was the pre-arranged signal to the other
members of the buy-bust team that the sale was
consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two
marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested
on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was
allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and
from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon
laboratory examination of the item bought from
appellant, the same yielded positive for
methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing
0.041 gram.
The accused was charged of violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The Court of
Appeals promulgated the assailed decision denying
the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not instigation was the act which
preceded Sta. Maria’s arrest?
Decision:
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways
and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while
executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be-defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-
principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the
mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to
commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the
law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution. The legal effects of
entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does.
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime
that facilities for its commission were purposely placed
in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
"decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the
act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the offense is one habitually committed,
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct.
The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the
informant utilized by the police merely furnishes
evidence of the course of conduct. The police received
an intelligence report that appellant has been
habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction
27 | P a g e
with the appellant. There was no showing that the
informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309)
Facts: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Yap supervising agent
of the Dangeroud Drugs Division of the NBI, received
an information that certain Roberto Pacis was offering
to sell ½ kilo of shabu for the amount of P950 per gram
or a total of P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous
Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty.
Yap and Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to
handle the case. The two officer and an informant went
to the house of the appellant at 375 Caimito Ville,
Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They
negotiated the sale of ½ kilo of shabu. The total price
was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that the
payment and delivery of shabu would be made the
next day at same place.
On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the
informant went to appellant’s house. Appellant handed
to Atty. Yap a paper bag, the latter saw a transparent
plastic with white crystalline substance inside.
Appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap introduced
Congzon to get the money from the car. When
Congzon returned, he gave the “boodle money” to
Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant. Upon receipt of
payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI
agents and arrested him.
The trial gave full credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the “buy-bust” operation that
led to the appellant’s arrest was valid?
Decision:
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted
to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
instigation on the other hand, instigators practically
induce the would- be defendant into the commission of
the offense and become co- principals themselves. It
has been held in numerous cases by this Court that
entrapment is sanctioned by law as legitimate method
of apprehending criminal elements engage in the sale
and distribution of illegal drugs.
The records show that the operation that led to
the arrest of the appellant was indeed an entrapment,
not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and
credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in the regular manner. In
entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration
of an incident by the prosecution witnesses who are
officers of the law.
 Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the
following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what
he had sold was a dangerous drug. The elements
were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows
that the appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI
agents posing as buyers.
Chang v. People (G.R. No. 165111)
Facts:
Chang was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati
who was tasked to examine or investigate tax returns
of private corporations and companies operating within
Makati and determine the sufficiency and insufficiency
of the income tax assessed on them and collect
payments, San Mateo was the Chief Operations,
Business revenue Examination, Audit division, Makati
Treasurer’s office.
The examiners found that Group Developers,
Inc. (GDI) incurred a tax deficiency inclusive of penalty
in the amount of P494,601.11. The assessment notice
was received by Mario Magat, Chief Operating Officer
of GDI. Magat was later able to talk to San Mateo via
phone. On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo met
for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. Chang later joined
the two, the three agreed that if GDI could pay
P125,000 by the end of May 1991, the assessment
would be ‘resolved’.
On June 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch
with San Mateo and Chang at the Makati Sports Club.
Magat tried to convince the two that GDI wanted to pay
the correct amount of tax to the municipality. He was
advised by San Mateo and Chang, however, that GDI
had only two options: Pay the P494,601.11 to the
municipality or P125,000 to them.
On June 12, 1991, Magat met with the NBI
Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco who advised him to
file a complaint with the NBI. Magat thus gave a sworn
statement. After several days, Magat contacted San
Mateo and asked him if their position was still the
same to which the latter said yes. Magat thereafter told
San Mateo that he would deliver the P125,000 on June
19,1991 at the Makati Sports Club.
On June 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI
that payment was to be made that day around
lunchtime. The NBI formed a team to conduct an
entrapment. The genuine money as well as the boodle
money and the envelope where the money was placed
were then laced with fluorescent powder.
San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his
table. Chang arrived and joined the two. Magat told
Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and
asked them if they could give him the Certificate of
Examination showing that GDI has no more tax
liability. Chang handed the Certificate while Magat
gave the brown envelope. At that instant, the NBI
agents announced that they were being arrested.
28 | P a g e
The Sandiganbayan convicted San Mateo and
Chang of violation of sec 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid entrapment
operation?
Decision:
Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at
the time of the commission of the offense. The
prosecution, not only established creditably how the
offense charged was committed. It is established just
as creditably how petitioners conspired to commit the
crime.
There is entrapment when law officers employ
ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.
There is instigation when the accused is induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the
two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens reoriginates from the mind of
the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests
to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it was
clearly established that the criminal intent originated
from the mind of the petitioner. Even before the June
19, 1991 meeting took place, petitioners already made
known to Magat that GDI only had two options to
prevent the closure of the company, either to pay the
assessed amount of P494,601.11 to the Municipality or
to pay the amount of P125,000 to them.
Art. 13: Mitigating Circumstances
Incomplete Justifying or Exempting
Circumstances
People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613)
Facts:
On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C.
Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard
heading south and Generoso Miranda was driving his
car in the same direction with his uncle, Manuel
Miranda. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan.
Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way,
causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's
path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso,
slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated
and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front,
Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five
times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept
blocking his lane. When Tangan slowed down to make
a U-turn, Generoso passed him, pulled over and got
out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his
car and got out. Generoso and Tangan then
exchanged expletives. Then Tangan went to his car
and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.
According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary
Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the
accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and
when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused
pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the
accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda,
the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of
about a meter. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso
Miranda causing the latter to fall. Manuel Miranda
grappled for the possession of the gun and during their
grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of
the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the
gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from
her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel
Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in
red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly
the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson
Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the
accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to
grapple for possession of the gun and during the
grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to
wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at
the back of the car of the accused. The accused lost
the possession of the gun after falling at the back of
his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell,
and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.
Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground
bloodied. Manuel looked for the gun and ran after
Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him
to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the
policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there
found two ladies, Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina
Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel
suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in
his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General
Hospital but he expired on the way.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. However, the information
was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed
firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm. Tangan entered a
plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to
quash the information for illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to
quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said
petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two
cases was ordered.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal
possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
29 | P a g e
self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances
of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated
in his favor; Tangan was released from detention after
the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in
the homicide case.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased
the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His
subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to
cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution,
alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the
Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the
appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting
accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in
his favor any mitigating circumstance. 
Issue:
Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete
self-defense?
Decision:
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a
justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance;
hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the
information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it
may be successfully appreciated, however, it is
necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-
defense be present, particularly the requisite of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful
aggression by itself or in combination with either of the
other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete
self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there
can never be self-defense, complete or
incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or
repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no
basis.
The element of unlawful aggression in self-
defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not sufficient. The exchange of insulting words and
invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no
matter how objectionable, could not be considered as
unlawful aggression, except when coupled with
physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on
the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete
self-defense falls.
No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong
People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701)
Facts:
 Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty
of the crime of Murder in the death of Alfredo Senador.
Callet used a 9-inch hunting knife in stabbing the latter
on the left shoulder near the base of the neck causing
Senador’s death shortly thereafter. Callet appealed
his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City (Branch 30) gravely
erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance
of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong thereforehis liability should be mitigated.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet be
mitigated in that he had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The
lack of “intent” to commit a wrong so grave is an
internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon
used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted
and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the
accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the
victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to
defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do
what he actually did, and he must be held responsible
therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
Vindication of a Grave Offense
People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984)
Facts:
In the evening of October 11, 1997, Anthony
went to the house of Dennis and invited the latter for a
drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of
Dennis and went to a nearby store and started drinking
with a companion named Porboy Perez. The three
proceeded to Shoreline. In a cottage, Anthony tried to
let Dennis drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony
bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times.
Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to
stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis
got up and ran towards their home.
Upon reaching home, he got a knife. Alarmed
by the action of Dennis, his mother shouted. Manuel,
his father, tried to scold his son and confiscate from
him the knife but failed to do so, resulting to Manuel’s
incurring a wound in his hand. He went back to the
cottage. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony ran towards the
creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him. When
he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with fishing
net and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him
and continued stabbing him resulting to the latter’s
death. After stabbing, Dennis left and went to Camp
Downes and slept there. The next morning, Dennis
voluntarily surrendered himself to Boy Estrera, a well-
known police officer.
30 | P a g e
The trial court rendered a judgment convicting
Dennis for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery
or evident premeditation and appreciating three
mitigating circumstances. His father Manuel was
acquitted. Not satisfied with the judgment, Dennis
appealed his case.
Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of
having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense is appreciated?
Decision:
The Supreme held that the mitigating
circumstance of having acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense was properly
appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and
almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful
aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed
Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which
the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance.
However, the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from
the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense.
These two circumstances arose from one and the
same incident, i.e., the attack on the
appellant by Anthony, so that they should be
considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
Passion or Obfuscation
People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)
Facts:
Segundina Cayno was engaged in the
business of selling rummage goods. Early in the
morning of October 21, 1996 her son, Jerry Cayno
went to the “dap-ayan” or barangay hall, in front of the
Tadian Public Market to display the goods for sale.
After displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took
over. Before noontime, while Nancy and Julie were
plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant
Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt,
Segundina. Upon seeing him, Nancy went to a
distance of about two meters while Julie was still near
Segundina. Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and
uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy
did not hear what he said because of her distance from
them while Julie could not make out the conversation
because of the sound coming from a running motor
engine. What they only heard was Segundina’s
answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice “koma-
an ka tay baka mahigh bloodac” (“you get out because
I might suffer high blood”). They saw appellant leave.
When appellant returned about 3 to 5 minutes after,
Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of
her were Nancy and Julie, they did not notice
appellant’s return, especially Segundina who had her
back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach
Segundina from the back, Julie thought that he would
just box his aunt because she did not see the knife,
which was wrapped in his blue jacket. Then appellant
suddenly made a thrusting motion and he stabbed
Segundina on the left portion of her back. He then ran
away leaving the knife at the victim’s back with the
jacket he had covered it with, hanging by the knife’s
handle. Appellant surrendered to the police
authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder.
The appellant does not deny stabbing Cayno.
However, he maintains that neither treachery nor
evident premeditation attended the commission of the
crime. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty of the
crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the actuation of the accused
can be properly appreciated as passion or obfuscation
in his favour?
Decision:
For a person to be motivated by passion and
obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act that
would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to
overcome reason and self-control. There is passional
obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus
so powerful as to overcome reason. In asking the
appellant to leave, the victim did not do anything
unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the
appellant was utterly humiliated by the victim’s
utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that
remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The
victim’s utterance was not the stimulus required by
jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome
reason and self-restraint.
People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)
Facts:
Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28,
1995, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes and Jose
Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to
deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay
Green Valley, Ormoc City. After delivering copra
around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed
back to Barangay Esperanza. While they were along a
trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter
suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation
surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose
Boholst who was then walking ahead of his
companions. Jose grabbed Carlito’s right hand and
elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm.
While the two were grappling for possession, the gun
fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground.
At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo
Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively,
31 | P a g e
emerged from the banana plantation each brandishing
a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him
several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but
Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo,
then, turned to Simon and Edgar and shouted “huwes
de kutsilyo”. Upon hearing the same, Simon and
Edgar ran.
Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial
court rendered its Judgment, finding Marcelo Bates
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke
the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation?
Decision:
Passion and obfuscation may not be properly
appreciated in favor of appellant. To be considered as
a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must
arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment.
In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated
upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first
time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time
that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo
hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at
Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything
else after that, he could have validly invoked the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead,
Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already
prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking
Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of
anger in the spirit of revenge.
People v. Malejana (G.R. No. 145002)
Facts:
Prosecution’s witness Andres Madrid
narrated that on July 28, 1990 at around 7:15 p.m.,
while he was seated in front of his jeep parked at the
side of the road at Marisfoque, Pilar, Sorsogon in the
company of Janus Roces, Antonio Sy, Samuel
Andrade, Bernarda Sy, Jose Belmonte and Ernesto
Francisco, he saw appellant at about 30 meters away
heading towards their direction. Upon reaching their
group, appellant asked them where Roces was. When
he noticed Roces who was sitting at a distance of 1
meter beside Madrid, appellant brandished an armalite
rifle and fired a shot into the air. Then he pointed the
barrel of the gun at Roces and fired five (5) times,
hitting Roces thrice. After the victim fell to the ground,
appellant left the scene of the incident and went ot his
house about 150 meters away. Madrid and his other
companions tried to assist Roces but discovered that
the latter was already dead, presumably from the
gunshot wounds that were inflicted upon him by
appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the defense was able to
establish that accused was entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation?
Decision:
Passion and obfuscation similarly cannot be
appreciated in favor of the appellant. To be entitled to
this mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present: 1) There should be an act both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind, 2) The act that produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. The
bare assertion that the victim and appellant had an
argument does not provide justifiable basis for
applying to him this mitigating circumstance. The
cause that produced the passion and obfuscation has
not been established nor proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The defense advance mere
speculations and conjectures to gloss over the fact that
there is lack of proof of the cause. Courts are not
permitted to render judgments upon guesses or
surmises. Suspicion, it has been said, cannot give
probative force to testimony which in itself is
insufficient
Voluntary Surrender
People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051)
Facts:
On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted
in an Information for Murder allegedly committed as
follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around
10:00 o’clock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy.
Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon,
with intent to kill and with the qualifiying circumstance
of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said
bolo, suddenly and without warning one Norman
Conception y Habla while the latter was unarmed and
completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused the
victim’s death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999,
appellant pleaded “Not Guilty” to the charge therein.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Appellant, on his defense admitted that he
hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he did the
same in self-defense. Furthermore, appellant also
claimed that Norman is taller than him; that he was
forced to kill Norman because the latter insulted him
and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan
City to surrender to police when he was apprehended
by the barangay officers in Lipa City.
32 | P a g e
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the
accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran,
Jr. is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender?
Decision:
Appellant is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Article 13,
paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that
the offender’s criminal liability may be mitigated if he
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his
agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of
voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not
been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the
surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that
the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the
hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City
just before he was turned over to the police by a
certain Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant
had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same
was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the
hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to
the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman
Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the bext day, to his
sister in Lipa City. It took him three long days to
surrender to the police authorities. Moreover, the flight
of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was
apprehended by the barangay officials are
circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity
that characterizes the mitigating circcumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222)
Facts:
In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged
petitioner with Frustrated Murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 24 th day of September 1986, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack
one Arsenio Ugerio on the head twice with a bolo
thereby inflicting the latter: hacking wound, head,
resulting in (1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; (2)
depressed comminuted skull fracture, right parieto
occipital with significant brain laceration; operation
done; craciectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy;
right parieto occipital; dural repair; debridement, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence
thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not
committed by reason of causes independent of the will
of the accused, that is, by the timely medical
attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio which
prevented his death. When arraigned on February 9,
1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de
parte, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the
accused Peter Andrada guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Peter Andrada is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
Decision:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that
petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was
apprehended by responding police officers in the
waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and
Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous,
made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to
save them the trouble and expenses that would be
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here,
the surrender was not spontaneous.
People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541)
Facts:
In an Information dated July 28, 1992,
appellant, Ricky Quimzon and three oher persons,
namely Salvacion Lascarom, Canoto Cabero and
Edgardo Detona were charged with the crime of
murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or
about the 7th day of March 1992, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philipines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another with treachery and abuse of superior strength,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniuosly attack, assault, strike, stab and wound
one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as
“pisao” which accused provided themselves for the
33 | P a g e
purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said
Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the different parts
of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.
Appellant surrendered to the police authorities
on August 18, 1994 while his other co-accused remain
at-large. When arraigned on September 28, 1994,
appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the
accused Ricky Quimzon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant Ricky Quimzon is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
Decision:
It appears in the Commitment Order, dated
August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal Trial Judge
of the MTC of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant
“voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of
PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994.” An
examination of the records reveals that it can not be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surreder to be
appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply
with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually
arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity
and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because the accused acknowledges
his guilt or wishes to spare them the trouble and
expense concominant to his capture.
The surrender of appellant was far from being
spontaneous and unconditional. The warrant of arrest
is date June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including
appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Palo, Leyte to achieve
the case. It took appellant two years before he finally
surrendered to the police. In between said period,
appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail
Bond without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the
motion had been acted upon by the trial court. This
act of appellant may be considered as a condition set
by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus
preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from
being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Confession of Guilt
People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)
Facts:
On 18 November 1996, William Montinola,
armed with an unlicensed Cal .380 Pistol Llama
deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence
against or intimidation of persons, with intent of gain,
take and carry away cash amount of P67,500.00
belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot
the victim on the neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal
cases were filed against Montinola and he was later on
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with
homicide and death for illegal possession of firearm.
Issue:
Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on
the killing perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the
robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with
homicide?
Decision:
Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said
Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A.
8294, while Montinola’s case was still pending. R.A.
8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. The Court held “In recent
cases, we ruled that there could be no separate
conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely
as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or
murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will
be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from
a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm,
it shall be given retroactive effect.” Pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an unlicensed
firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in the
homicide or murder committed. “At any rate, even
assuming that the aggravating circumstances present
in the commission of homicide or murder may be
counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery
with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the
special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime
was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be
given retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him.”
The Court further held “Under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties.
Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be
applied when the commission of the deed is attended
by one aggravating circumstance. If we would apply
34 | P a g e
retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable
penalty would be death. Conformably with our ruling in
People v. Valdez, insofar as the new law would
aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and
increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death,
it would not be given retroactive application, lest it
would acquire the character of an ex post facto law.
Hence, we shall not appreciate that special
aggravating circumstance. There being no modifying
circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant
WILLIAM.”
People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247)
Facts:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial
court of murder qualified by treachery and was
sentenced to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas
Lavares and several companions, including Dawaton
were drinking in the house of the accused’s uncle.
Already drunk, Leonidas Lavares decided to sleep
while the accused and his companions continued
drinking. Dawaton awakened Lavares by stabbing him
at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing
Lavares until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away
to the house of his other relative, where he was later
on arrested by the police.
Issue:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed
by the trial court upon the accused was correct?
Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in not considering the alternative
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused.
“Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication
of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender commits a felony in a
state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony.
Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.The
allegation that the accused was drunk when he
committed the crime was corroborated by the
prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking
companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at
the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at
least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four
(4) shared another bottle of gin at the house of Amado
Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its
contents.” The Court further stated that “Under Art. 63,
par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
(2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the
commission of the act is attended by a mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing
but there existed the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.”
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
Similar and Analogous Circumstances
Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937)
Facts:
Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed
on from one person to another and each person was
responsible for the care and custody of the said cow.
At the time the cow got lost, it was under the care and
custody of Gardenio Agapay. Agapay took the cow in
the mountain of Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his
hut, at around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he came
back to get the cow at past 9 in the evening, the cow
was gone. However, Aagapay saw footprints that led
to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. Vallejos told
Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the cow.
Agapay and Maria were instructed by Narciso
to get the cow and on their way to Florenitno Canta’s
house, they saw Exuperancio. The latter told them
that if it was really Narciso who was the owner of the
cow, he should get it himself. Exuperancia
accompanied the two to his father’s house and both
recognized the cow but Florentino was not home.
Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay that he would call
them the next day to talk about the matter with his
father. Exuperancio never called. The matter was
reported to the police and Narciso and Exuperancio
were called for investigation. Exuperancio admitted
taking the cow but claims that he was the real owner of
the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985.
However, Narciso presented a certificate of ownership
issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal
treasurer, in which the cow was described as two
years old and female. Then, the petitioner also
presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
dated February 27, 1985 and a statement executed by
Franklin Telen, who was the janitor at the treasurer's
office of the municipality, that he executed the
certificate of ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The
trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty
of the offense charged. Exuperancio filed a Motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
Appeals and affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts were correct
in sentencing Exuperancio to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of
35 | P a g e
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay
the costs?
Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of
§2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in
imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The
trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a
special law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
However, as held in People v. Macatanda,P. D. No.
533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is
in terms of the classification and duration of penalties
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating
that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of
theft of large cattle. In fact, §10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act
No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions
of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions,
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with
this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and
no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be
fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.
e.,prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in
its maximum period.
Art. 14: Aggravating Circumstances
Classes of Aggravating Circumstances
People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)
Facts:
Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence
of Reclusion Pertpetua for raping certain Ms.
Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts,
Gerardo took advantage of the time when the
victim’s mother was not around. He would
likely forced Maritess to have carnal
 knowledged against her will and even poked a
knife at her while doing the deed in the victim’s
dwelling and threthened the victim to kill her
family should she tell her parents what
happened. On November 13, 1991 when the
appellant arrived at the Catcharro residence
he proceeded inside the bedroom of Maritess,
the latter ran out of the bedroom and told her
mother not to leave her because her Papa
Gerry might raped her again. Surprised by
what he heard, the following day Maritess was
brought to Tacloban City Medical Center for a
check-up and found to have lacerations to the
victims genitalia. Contrary to the facts above,
appellant claimed that the night of the incident
he was working as porter until 10 PM, thus it
cannot be said that he committed the crime
accused of him. Based on the information
submitted, aggravating circumstances of use
of weapon and dwelling were not alleged.
Issue:
Whether or not aggravating
circumstances proved during trial but was not
alleged in the information may be considered?
Decision:
The supreme court held in the
negative. Although the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a weapon and the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling were
proven, these aggravating circumstances
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty
because they were not alleged in the
information as mandated by Rule 110,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.  Although the crimes
charged were committed before the effectivity
of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should
be applied retroactively being favorable to the
appellant.
Katrina Garcia
2006-0127
People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533)
Facts:
On January 16, 1998 brothers Servillano and
Michael Ferrer went to Tidbits Videoke bar singing and
drinking beer. On the same evening Jaime Palaganas
and Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived.
The two groups occupied separate tables. After the
Ferrer’s singing Jaime Palaganas started singing and
was joined by Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and in
mocking manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a fight
ensued between Ferrer’s and Palaganas. Ferdinand
ran towards his house and sought help from his
brother Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he
was stoned by the Ferrer brothers. As they were
continuously stoned the appellant Ferdinand suddenly
pulled the trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial
36 | P a g e
court rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime of Homicide and Frustrated homicide but not
guilty of violation of COMELEC RES. 2958.
Issue:
Whether or not violation of COMELEC RES.
2958 may be considered as Special aggravating
circumstances which will negate consideration of
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender?
Decision:
With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on
6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in
murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic
aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294
applies to the instant case since it took effect before
the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998.
Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the
petitioner in the instant case should be designated and
appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance
and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
Katrina Garcia
2006-0127
People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695)
Facts:
Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of
murder for killing Anchito Nano. In this case Efren
alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at their house and
upon arrival it started to destroy the house and that the
her wife was shouting for help. Efren immediately look
for something to protect his family but found a bolo.
He approached Anchito but the latter tried to hacked
him but he was able to hacked him first on the right
side of his neck resulting to the death of the victim.
Thereafter Mendoza went to Municipal Hall of Vinzon
and voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed
that it was self defense. The autopsy revealed that
location of the wounds found on the body of the victim
came from the back of the victim’s body. The court
ruled rejecting appellant’s self defense. This court
finds that the accused was not in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend
himself by means which appeared unreasonable by
using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset
by the aggravating circumstances of treachery?
Decision:
 The Supreme Court held in the negative. A
qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the
crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the
other hand, does not affect the designation of the
crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while
a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a
mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance
may not. 32
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a
generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served
to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the
same time be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary
surrender.
Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
In Contempt or With Insult to the Public Authorities
People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036)
Facts:
Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas of Sta.
Cruz Putol, San Pablo City was pronounced dead on
arrival on October 15, 1996 at San Pablo City District
Hospital. The autopsy report showed that the cause of
death was shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot
wounds at the back of the victim.
Hernando De Mesa was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder by the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
pay the costs and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
Treachery, nighttime, in contempt of or with assault to
public authorities, were appreciated by the trial court
as aggravating circumstances attending the case
thereby qualifying the crime committed to murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in
determining the nature of the crime committed and the
corresponding penalty to be imposed?
Decision:
Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove
the presence of anyqualifying aggravating
circumstance whereby the crime committed is only
homicide for which the imposable penalty provided by
the Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal.
Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law
may now be applied and absent any aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be
imposed is prision mayor in its medium period as
37 | P a g e
minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum.
Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39)
Facts:
Renato Tac-anand Francis Escanowere close
friends being classmates in high school and members
of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the
gang on the advice of his mother who saw that Renato
carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things
started turning sour between the two, and came to a
head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier altercation on
that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He
entered the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso
Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After
locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was
later able to hit him in the head as he was running to
the door with his classmates to escape. After this,
Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher
unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked him for
help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still
alive. Renato immediately re-entered the room and
saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?"
Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis
and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back
below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest
just above the right nipple.
Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of
firearms under P.D. No. 1866. An amended
information for murder was subsequently filed
aggravated by the use of illegal possession of
firearms.
Issues:
Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm
is a special aggravating circumstance in crimes of
homicide and murder?
Decision:
No.Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the use of an unlicensed firearm is not an
aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of
homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua.
The character of the instrument used in taking or
destroying human existence is not one of those
included in the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On the other hand, under an information for
unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition, P.D.
1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty
for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was
used to destroy human existence. Though it is not one
of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be
considered to increase the penalty imposed because
of the explicit provision of the said special law.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
Abuse of Public Position
Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784)
Facts:
On July 21, 1992, siblings Diosdada Montecillo
and Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of
Mabini and Harrison Streets. A mobile patrol car
stopped in front of them and a policeman alighted.
The policeman frisked Mario and took Mario’s belt. He
motioned Mario to enter the car. Mario obeyed and
was followed by Diosdada. While inside the car, the
policemen told Mario that he would be brought to the
Bicutan police station where he would be interrogated,
mauled and heckled for carrying a deadly weapon.
They told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying
a deadly weapon was P12,000. The Montecillos were
asked how much they had and then Diosdada was
asked to alight from the car. The driver followed her,
took P1,500 from her wallet and instructed her to tell
the others that she only had P3,500. Inside the car,
they were told to put all her money on the box. The
Montecillos were told to get off at Harrison Plaza.
38 | P a g e
From there, they went home. The 3 policemen,
Fortuna, Garcia, and Pablo, were charged with robbery
and were found guilty of having conspired in
committing the crime with intimidation of persons.
Issue:
Whether or not abuse of public position should
be taken as an aggravating circumstance by the mere
fact that the accused were police officers?
Decision:
The Supreme Courted held that the lower
courts failed to appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of “abuse of public position.”
Being police officers, it placed them in a position terrify
the Montecillos to surrender their money as bail. It
was on the account of their authority that convinced
the Montecillos that they had committed a crime and
that they would be taken to the police station. Had
they not been police officers, they would have not
convinced the Montecillos into giving them their
money.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08)
Facts:
On November 25, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez
and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a
motorcycle. A motorcycle was speeding behind them
and as they were about to cross the bridge, they heard
gun shots firing behind them. As they turned around,
Jerry identified PO3 Renato Villamor and Jessie
Maghilom riding the motorcycle behind them. Shots
were fired at them and Jerry sustained wounds on the
abdomen and elbow while Jelord died on the spot. The
trial proceeded against PO3 Villamor while Maghilom
was still at large. During trial, the Trial Court found the
PO3 Renato Villamor guilty of having commited
Murder aggravated by the circumstance of taking
advantage of his public position.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied
the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating
circumstance of “taking advantage of public position”
under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code was improperly applied.
A public officer must use the influence that is
vested in his office as a means to realize the purpose
of the crime to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. The question “Did the accused abuse
his office to commit the crime” must be asked in order
to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating
circumstance.
No proof was shown that Villamor took
advantage of his position of being a policeman when
he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence,
prestige or ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even
without occupying a public position, the accused could
have committed the crime.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043)
Facts:
On February 11, 1994, Jimmy Lumague, Tino
Magayac and Manuel Magayac, were preparing for
fishing along with other persons. Tino Magayac,
pushed Jimmy for no reason. When Jimmy asked
why, Tino proceeded to hit Jimmy at the back. Hours
later, Tino hit Jimmy at the stomach and Manuel
proceeded to hit Tino as well. The fight, however, was
intervened. The next day, Jimmy and Manuel
exchanged blows. They were, again, separated from
each other. On February 12, Manuel, while carrying a
long rifle, approached Jimmy. As the Jimmy was
trying to leave, he was shot by Manuel right on his
stomach. Jimmy fell on the ground and was shot at
the back several times. Afterwhich, Manuel
surrendered to the PC Mobile Force. An
information for Murder with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of public position as a member of the
CAFGU. The Trial Court found him guilty of Murder
aggravated by cruelty and taking advantage of public
position, appreciated by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstance of taking
advantage of public position should be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance considering the facts of
the case?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that in the
commission of the offense, there was no aggravating
circumstance, specifically “abuse of public position”.
Considering the facts of the case, Manuel was
a member of the CAFGU and the weapon used to
shoot Jimmy was a government issued M-14 rifle.
These, however, do not necessarily prove that Manuel
took advantage of his public position as a member of
the CAFGU when the crime of murder was committed.
39 | P a g e
Nighttime, Uninhabited or Obvious Place or Band
People v. Villanueva (G. R. No. 135330)
Facts:
For automatic review by the Supreme Court is
the judgment of 12 May 1998, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-46026-A, finding accused-appellant Camilo
Villanueva (hereafter Camilo) guilty of the crime of
rape committed on the victim, Nia Gabuya (hereafter
Nia), and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty
of death and to pay Nia moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.
In an amended Information dated 16 January
1998, Camilo was charged with rape as defined and
penalized in R.A. No. 8353. The accusatory portion of
the indictment states:
That at midnight of 4 December 1997, in Cebu
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, with deliberate intent,
with force and intimidation upon person, did then and
there willfully, feloniously and unlawfully have carnal
knowledge with Nia Gabuya, a minor of only 11 years
of age and step-daughter of the said accused, against
the latter’s will. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issues:
Whether the private complainant Nia Gabuya
was really raped by the accused Camilo Villanueva on
4 December 1997 at around midnight?
Whether the testimony of the private
complainant Nia Gabuya is not tainted with material
inconsistencies and grievous falsity?
Whether the testimony of the private
complainant is enough to convict the accused for a
crime punishable by death?
Decision:
The issue of credibility raised in the three
assigned errors should be resolved against Camilo.
Nia clearly testified that Camilo raped her. She
recounted the details of her harrowing experience in a
credible, convincing and straightforward manner.
The prosecution was able to establish with
moral certainty the fact of penetration, although
incomplete. In order that the crime of rape may be said
to be consummated, the successful penetration by the
rapist of the female’s genital organ is not
indispensable. Penile invasion, it has often been held,
necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the
briefest of contacts under circumstances of force,
intimidation or unconsciousness, even without
laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our
jurisprudence. It would, in fine, be enough in a
conviction for rape that there is an entrance of the
male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the
female organ. Neither the penetration of the penis
beyond the lips of the vagina nor the rupture of the
hymen is indispensable to justify conviction.
Consequently, the finding that Nia’s hymen is
intact does not disprove that rape was committed.
Even the fact that there was no reddening or
hematoma in the external genitalia does not render the
occurrence of rape improbable. The doctrine is well
settled that the absence of external injuries does not
negate rape.Even Camilo’s claim that the sperm found
in the vagina of NIA was not his because he has
undergone vasectomy, is inconsequential. The
absence of spermatozoa is not an essential element of
rape. This is because in rape, the important
consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.
On the issue of inconsistencies and
discrepancies, these things on minor matters neither
impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness’
honesty. Such inconsistencies, which may be caused
by the natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the
witness because they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.
Camilo has moral ascendancy over Nia, being
the common-law spouse of her mother and the man
who acted as her father since she reached the age of
reason. Nia’s tender age and Camilo’s custodial
control and domination over her had rendered her so
meek and subservient to his needs and desires, thus,
becoming an easy prey to Camilo’s lecherous
advances. Moreover, Camilo threatened her with a
knife.
For rape to exist it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation employed be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary
that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the
victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough
that it produces fear that if the victim does not yield to
the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when
she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
It is this form of intimidation which explains why there
are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the
victim fought off her attacker.
Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, any
physical overt act manifesting resistance against the
act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or
where the offended party is so situated as to render
her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be
accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts
40 | P a g e
punished in the new Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
People v. Ancheta (G.R. No. 70222)
Facts:
Juan Ancheta was charged in the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, with the crime of
robbery with arson, committed in conspiracy with two
other persons who could not be tried with him because
they were then at large. He asks for a reversal of the
decision convicting him of the crime of arson and
sentencing him to the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua plus civil indemnity in the sum of P40,000.00
for the properties burned.
On 25 August 1980, at about 11 o'clock in the
evening, Ancheta and his two companions awakened
Teresa Gorospe, forced their entry into her house,
demanded the amount of P1,000.00, and burned her
house when the money was not delivered. Later, while
the house was in flames, the Ancheta, brandishing a
bolo, prevented the people from approaching and
putting out the fire by warning them that he had thirty
companions.
Issues:
Whether or not there was conspiracy between
and among the accused?
Whether or not the penalty imposed on
Ancheta was proper?
Decision:
On whether or not there was conspiracy
between and among the accused. The Supreme Court
agreed that there was a conspiracy among the
accused-appellant and his two companions when they
forcibly entered the house of Teresa Gorospe and
burned it after their demand for P1,000.00.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act
through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding
severally or collectively. It is settled that conspiracies
need not be established by direct evidence of acts
charged, but may and generally must be proved by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purpose to
be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy
is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain
acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an
apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common
between them.
The conspiracy having been established, it
should follow that the accused-appellant is as guilty as
his companions of the crime of arson, even if it be
conceded that he was not the one who actually poured
the kerosene and ignited it to burn Teresa Gorospe's
house. When there is a conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all and visits equal guilt upon every
conspirator.
On whether or not the penalty imposed on
Ancheta was proper. Under Article 321 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed "if the offender
shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse,
hut, shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied
at the time by one or more persons. .... "
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime
was correctly appreciated because it was sought by
the defendants to facilitate the commission of the
offense and their subsequent escape. Evident
premeditation should also have been applied because
the offenders had deliberately plotted the crime, as
early as 9 o'clock of the night in question, or two hours
before they actually burned the house.
With these aggravating circumstances and no
mitigating circumstances to offset them, the proper
penalty as imposed by the trial court is reclusion
perpetua. The civil indemnity of P40,000.00 is allowed,
but the costs of the suit shall be adjudged in toto
against the accused-appellant and not to be shared, as
ordered by the trial court.
People v. Baroy (G.R. Nos. 137520-22)
Facts:
The Supreme Court, in its Decision
promulgated on 9 May 2002, affirmed the conviction of
both appellants for three counts of rape with the use of
a deadly weapon. The penalty imposed upon them by
the trial court was, however, reduced from death to
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, because
aggravating circumstances had neither been alleged in
the Information nor sufficiently proven during the trial.
Appellant Alfredo Baroy has since then filed a
Motion for a partial reconsideration of the Court’s
Decision. He claims that he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority and, hence, to a
penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. He
presented various pieces of conflicting documentary
and testimonial evidence during the trial. He now prays
for the consideration and giving weight to his Birth
Certificate as the best evidence of his age. His Birth
Certificate shows that he was born on 19 January
1984, while the crimes in question were committed on
March 2, 1998.
Issue:
Whether or not Baroy's Certificate of Live Birth
sufficiently proves his minority when he committed the
crimes?
Decision:
41 | P a g e
The Motion has merit.
Baroy’s Birth Certificate -- the authenticity of
which was confirmed by the NSO -- outweighs the
other evidence submitted to prove his date of birth. “A
birth certificate is the best evidence of a person’s date
of birth.”
The earlier evidence submitted by appellant
during the trial did not conclusively prove his age.
However, since the OSG did not object to the belated
appreciation of Annex “A” and left the matter to the
sound discretion of this Court, we resolve to rule in
favor of the accused.
If the accused alleges minority and the
prosecution does not disprove his claim by contrary
evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact.”
Based on his Birth Certificate, it is clear that
Baroy was only fourteen (14) years old when he
committed the crime of rape. Hence, a reconsideration
of the Court’s 9 May 2002 Decision is proper.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that “when the offender is a minor x x x under fifteen
years x x x a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.”
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed
by Baroy is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty
two degrees lower is prision mayor.Additionally, Baroy
is entitled to the benefits granted by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Recidivism
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)
Facts:
Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot
were indicted for murder in an information and that the
commission of the foregoing offense was attended by
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
The case against appellant’s co-accused,
Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence to identify him with
certainty.Appellant was arraigned on February 21,
2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-
trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued
thereafter.
When the body was discovered in the evening
of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for
Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12,
2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the
following year.
 On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered
judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and
imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. The
Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for
the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. Considering the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby
sentenced to the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as
an aggravating circumstance, to be alleged in the
information?
Decision:
The Court, however, finds that the trial court
erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that
appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he
had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in
partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was
appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating
circumstance which increased the imposable penalty
from reclusion perpetua to death.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in
the information and to attach certified true copies of
the sentences previously meted out to the
accused.This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The
complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism
was not alleged in the information and therefore
cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the
imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
Reiteracion
People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498)
Facts:
On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a
resident of Manila, arrived in Basey, Samar, and
stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita
was fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also
42 | P a g e
known as Meling, and by the latter’s common law
husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as
Elming. Upon being told by Meling that they would be
going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with Meling
and Elming to the couple’s house in Sitio Catuhaan in
Barangay Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita
stayed with Meling and Elming together with their two
(2) small children in a house consisting of only one
room without any partition.
In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining
witness Marita Cajote slept at one end of the room with
the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the
other end. At about two o’clock the following morning
Marita was awakened by the weight of accused who
was already on top of her. The accused who was
holding a bolo told her to keep quiet or he would kill
her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Marita’s
hands with his right hand. With his left hand accused
lowered Marita’s pants as well as her panty down to
her knees. Marita shouted for help but her sister
Meling just wrapped her head with their mosquito net
and pretended to be asleep. Marita struggled
continuously against the advances of the accused but
he was much stronger, while she was getting weak.
The accused first inserted his fingers into Marita’s
private part and later succeeded in inserting his penis
into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from
Marita and hit Elming in the eye. Elming boxed Meling
on the mouth and kicked her when she fell on the floor.
Elming went back to Marita and continued with his
beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak
to resist. Elming inserted his fingers first and then his
penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2)
children of Meling cried. Meling who was holding her
youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape
her younger sister.
The trial court convicted him as charged and
sentenced him to death. The Office of the Solicitor
General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to
show any compelling or justifiable reason to set aside
his conviction for rape and his penalty of death, citing
Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of
Qualified Rape.
Decision:
The Solicitor General is correct in finding the
accused guilty of rape. The bare denial of the accused
and his common-law wife cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. Denial when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a
credible witness on affirmative matters. No woman,
especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a
public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to have the culprit apprehended and punished. The
Court likewise agrees with the finding of the trial court
that Marita’s positive identification of the accused as
the person who raped her was given in a categorical,
straightforward and spontaneous manner which
rendered it worthy of faith and belief.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the
stand of the Solicitor General, the accused can only be
convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the
penalty of death. Although the circumstance of
relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was
alleged in the Information, evidence for the prosecution
clearly showed the lack or absence of such
circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused
and Merly Tagana, sister of the victim Marita Cajote,
were mere common-law husband and wife and were
not legally married at the time of the rape. The
accused and the victim cannot be said to be related by
affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the
commission of the crime.Neither can the accused be
convicted of qualified rape on the basis of the
circumstance that the rape was committed in full view
of the relatives of the victim within the third degree of
consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance
was not pleaded in the Information or in the Complaint
against the accused.
Facts:
On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused of
setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the
destruction of his employer’s house and the death of
six persons including his employer Roberto Separa
Sr., some seven adjoining residential houses, were
also razed by fire. 
She was apprehended by the Barangay
Chairman and was brought to the Barangay Hall. She
was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was
also burned, as the housemaid of the Separas and
upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside
accused-appellant’s bag. Thereafter, accused-
appellant confessed to the Barangay Chairman.
On January 9, 2001, an information was filed
before the RTC of Manila, charging the accused-
appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple
homicide. The RTC as well as the Court of Appeals
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arson with multiple homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of
the crime of destructive arson or simple arson?

The records show that the crime was Decision:

aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of
The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been The crime committed by the accused-appellant
convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of is Simple Arson and not Arson with Multiple Homicide.
homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex
illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. There are two
1989 where his sentences were later commuted to laws that govern the crime of arson where death
imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. results therefrom – Article 320 of the Revised Penal
He was granted conditional pardon by the President of Code and Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1613,
the Philippines on 8 November 1991.Reiteracion or quoted hereunder, to wit:
habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is
present when the accused has been previously Revised Penal Code
punished for an offense to which the law attaches an Art. 320.
equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to Destructive Arson – xxxx If as
the second offense or for two or more offenses to a consequence of the
which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already commission of any of the acts
discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of penalized under this Article,
simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is death results, the mandatory
reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single penalty of death shall be
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the imposed.
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to Presidential Decree
the crime, such as in the instant case. No. 1613
Sec. 5. Where
The Decision of the trial court convicting the Death Results from Arson – if
accused ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming of Qualified by reason of or on the
Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he is convicted occasion of the arson death
instead only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to suffer results, the penalty of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed.

By Means of Inundation, fire, etc. Both laws provide only one penalty for the
commission of arson, whether considered destructive
People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470) or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The

43 | P a g e
reason is that arson is itself the end and death is
simply the consequence.
The case falls under simple arson since from a
reading of the body of the information it can be seen
that it states that “the accused, with intent to cause
damage, xxx deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house, xxx that by reason and on the
occasion of the said fire, xxx which were the direct
cause of their death xxx.” It is clear that her intent was
merely to destroy her employer’s house through the
use of fire.
When fire is used with the intent to kill a
particular person who may be in a house and that
objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is
murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that
fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is
to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the
main objective is the burning of the building, the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of
arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)
Facts:
At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of
Robert’s father, Jaime Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on
the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation
of the companions of his son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and
the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The
three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an
object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants
immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby
school.
The object, which turned out to be a hand
grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robber Agbanlog and his companions were hit
by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.
They were all rushed to the hospital for medical
treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before
reaching the hospital for wounds sustained which the
grenade explosion inflicted. Robert’s companions
sustained shrapnel injuries.
The appellants were arrested the following day
but denied any participation in the incident, claimed
they were elsewhere when the incident occurred and
that they had no animosity towards the victims
whatsoever.
44 | P a g e
After trial, the court a quo convicted appellants
of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder for having conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and
by means of treachery and with the use of an
explosive.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of explosive qualifies the
crime to murder?
Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the
victims?
Decision:
Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies
the crime to murder. The information alleges that both
treachery and the “use of explosive attended the
crime.
Since both circumstances can qualify the killing
to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is
perpetrated with treachery and by means of
explosives, the latter shall be considered as a
qualifying circumstance.  Not only does
jurisprudencesupport this view but also, since the use
of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason
dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify
the offense instead of treachery which will then be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed
facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act
of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a
single word of encouragement or performed any act to
assist him.
A conspiracy must be established by positive
and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
crime itself.  Mere presence of a person at the scene
of the crime does not make him a conspirator for
conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the
commission of the crime and must therefore be set
free.  Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as
well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that
they performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio
Comadre must answer for the crime.
Craft, Fraud or Disguise
People v. Labuguen (G.R. No. 127849)
Facts:
The deceased Bonifacio Angeles was
engaged in buying cows and selling them to the public
market. One day, the accused Vivencio Labuguen
went to him and told him that he knows of three big
cows for sale and that the place where they are is
near. Believing on such declaration, he took money
from his cabinet at his house amounting to P40,000
and then drove in his motorcycle with the accused to
see the cows. On their way to see the cows, they have
been seen together by several witnesses who later on
identified them in court as the victim and the accused
respectively. The accused according to the witness
was wearing a jacket and with a handkerchief tied on
his forehead. One of the witnesses, a driver of a
minibus testified that while driving on his way to his
destination, he saw a man behind the ‘talahibs’ and he
noticed that he was wiping something from his head
and right face. It was the same man whom his
conductor identified as the one who stopped their bus
and rode on it. His conductor testified further that he
noticed that the man’s jacket was soaked with blood
including his pants and that he did not talk when asked
where he was headed to and instead just gave his
fare. The conductor even noticed that there was a lot
of money on the breast side pocket of his jacket and
that one bill was even falling. The man then alighted
from the minibus after reaching his destination without
saying any word. Later that afternoon, a news broke
out that a man’s body was found dead in the middle of
the ricefield. He was later on identified as Bonifacio
Angeles. Based on the strength of the testimony of the
witnesses, complaint and information were filed
against Vivencio and the Regional Trial Court found
him guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced with the penalty of death. The case was
brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has correctly
appreciated the employment of generic aggravating
circumstance of fraud and craft in the commission of
the crime even if not alleged in the information?
Decision:
Though not alleged in the Information, the
generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft
were properly appreciated by the trial court. Craft
involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of
the offender. When there is a direct inducement by
insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. By
saying that he would accompany the victim to see the
cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was
able to lure the victim to go with him.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is reclusion
45 | P a g e
perpetua to death Applying Article 63 of the same
Code, the imposable penalty under the premises is
death in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of craft and fraud and the absence of
any mitigating circumstance.
Four members of the Court are steadfast in
their adherence to the separate opinion expressed in
People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty. However, they bow to the majority opinion that
the aforesaid law is constitutional and therefore, the
penalty prescribe thereunder has to be imposed.
Abuse of Superior Strength
People v. Amodio (G.R. No. 177356)
Facts:
On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard
Avila Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog Videoke
Restaurant in Quezon City, went out of the restaurant
to invite customers. He noticed that three of the
attackers, whom he later identified as accused-
appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were regular
customers of their restaurant. He saw Lo-oc hold the
shoulders of the victim while Marino and Amodia took
turns in beating the victim.As a result of the beating,
the victim fell on the ground where Roda immediately
approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the
back of his head. One of the maulers was about to
deliver another blow on the victim but Roda was able
to stop him, thereafter the appellants then went inside
the restaurant and drank one bottle of beer each.But,
Roda did not immediately report the incident because
he was threatened by accused-appellants who were
still hanging around the area.
Later, in the early morning of the same day,
there were already some barangay tanods and police
officers investigating the incident.The victim, later
identified as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the
Quezon City General Hospital and died at around 5
o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003.
Upon the advice of a person from the La Loma
Police Station, Roda went to Camp Karingal in Quezon
City to report what he had witnessed.The police then
filed an investigation report which became the basis for
the filing of an Information against accused-appellants.
However, accused-appellants pleaded not
guilty to the charge against them by denying
involvement in the death of the victim and averred alibi
as their defense.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which in its decision affirmed the trial court’s
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the killing was qualified by the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength?
Decision:
No.The qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength had not been sufficiently proved. To
appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, what should be considered is
whether the aggressors took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. Mere superiority in number is not enough to
constitute superior strength. There must be clear proof
that the assailants purposely used excessive force out
of proportion to the defense available to the person
attacked.
In this case, although the victim was
unquestionably outnumbered, it was not shown that
accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined
strength to weaken the defense of the victim and
guarantee the execution of the crime. Notably,
accused-appellants took turns in boxing the victim.
When the victim fell, the prosecution witness was able
to hold him, preventing accused-appellants from
further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply
turned away. To be sure, had accused-appellants
really intended to use their superior strength to kill the
victim, they would have finished off the victim, and
probably even the lone prosecution eyewitness.
People v. Jamon (413 SCRA 282)
Facts:
Information was filed dated September 15,
1998 against appellant charging him with murder for
shooting Victoria Tacla at her left chest with the use of
a gun, thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her untimely death.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as eyewitness Pilar
Evangelista Tacla, the appellant’s wife and the victim’s
own mother as well as Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra, Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), also testified.
On the witness stand, Pilar said that on July 9,
1998, at around 9 o’clock in the morning, she had a
heated altercation with appellant.Appellant warned
Pilar that once they moved out, she could never set
foot in her daughter’s house again and he added in a
threatening manner, with his eyes bulging that if Pilar
came back to Victoria’s house, he would beat her up.
46 | P a g e
However, when appellant presented, he
declared that the shooting was unintentional.
The court disbelieved appellant’s claim of
accidental shooting whereby convicting the appellant
based on the evidence of the parties.Furthermore, the
court concluded that abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime.
.
Issue:
Whether or notthe killing was attended by
abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime as
murder?
Decision:
Yes.The prosecution sufficiently proved the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
and selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime.
In the present case, the victim was a woman
with a smaller build. She was unarmed. Appellant was
a fifty-one-year-old male, in the prime of his life, and
armed with a deadly weapon. The killing indubitably
constitutes an instance of abuse of superior strength,
hence the offense is qualified to murder, and not
merely homicide.Thus, the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength, as alleged in the
information, attended the fatal shooting of Victoria
Tacla.
People v. Calpito (416 SCRA 491)
Facts:
That on or about the 21st day of November,
1990, appellant Francisco Calpito armed with a deadly
weapon, with intent to gain did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and
intimidation on the person of Florentina Villas rob, take
and carry away a shoulder bag containing cash in the
amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to
P30,000 belonging to Florentina Villas.
The appellant attack and stab with the said
weapon Florentina Villas and Israel Montilla inflicting
wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death
and a wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated
medical attendance on him for a period of 5-7 days
and which incapacitated him from performing his usual
work for the same length of time.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty
and waived pre-trial. But on June 15, 1993, appellant
was re-arraigned and after being appraised of the
consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed
his plea to one of guilty.
The court a quofinding the charge of Robbery
with Homicide unsubstantiated by evidence, convicted
appellant of the crime of murder.
Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that the trial court erred in
convicting him of Murder instead of Homicide and in
failing to apply the mitigating circumstance of minority.
The court denied the motion and affirmed
appellant’s conviction for murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing to murder?
Decision:
Yes.A perusal of the facts of the case readily
reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the
crime.  In several cases, this Court has ruled that this
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of
the parties. It is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the
latter selected or took advantage of in the commission
of the crime. In a recent case, it was held that an
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an
abuse of the aggressor’s superior strength. The
circumstance must apply with more reason in the
present case, where the abuse of superior strength is
evident from the notorious disparity between the
relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed
woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a
knife.
Treachery
People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488)
Facts:
On the night of April 10, 1996, victim Mateo
Lactawan, and his friend Andrew were drinking beer
when he got involved in a fist fight with other people
drinking alcohol in the nearby store. That was when
Luz, Mateo’s wife arrived in the scene of the crime and
saw that a group of men were attacking his husband.
Among the other aggressors who continuedly boxed
Mateo who’s already lying on the ground, Luz saw
Niel struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Lito
stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic
head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to
Mateo’s death. Niel Piedad claims that the attack on
the victim was made upon an impulse of the moment
and was not the product of deliberate intent; while Lito
Garcia contends that treachery cannot be appreciated
47 | P a g e
inasmuch as the attack was preceded by a quarrel and
heated discussion.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery must be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance?
Held:
Yes. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make. For
treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must
prove: a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself, and b) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
While it is true that the victim herein may have been
warned of a possible danger to his person, since the
victim and his companion headed towards their
residence when they saw the group of accused-
appellants coming back for them after an earlier
quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is
decisive is that the attack was executed in such a
manner as to make it impossible for the victim to
retaliate.
In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any
chance of defending himself from the concerted
assault of his aggressors, even if he was forewarned
of the attack. Mateo was obviously overpowered and
helpless when accused-appellants’ group numbering
around eight, ganged up and mauled him. More
importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated
the sudden landing of a large concrete stone on his
head. The stone was thus treacherously struck.
Neither could the victim have been aware that Lito
came up beside him to stab his back as persons were
beating him from every direction. Lito’s act of stabbing
the victim with a knife, inflicting a 15-centimeter-deep
wound shows deliberate intent of using a particular
means of attack. Considering the location of the
injuries sustained by the victim and the absence of
defense wounds, Mateo clearly had no chance to
defend himself. In view of the foregoing, treachery was
correctly appreciated by the trial court.
People v. Piliin (515 SCRA 207)
Facts:
On 19 November 1997, Rodrigo arrived at the
gate of his house aboard on an owner-type jeep he
was driving. His wife, Norma Zayenis (Norma), who
was inside the house at the time, went out to open the
gate. When Rodrigo was about to park his jeep, a
man, later identified as Piliin, suddenly approached
him, poked his gun, and fired at him, hitting the left
side of his neck. Rodrigo fell unconscious and the man
quickly ran away. By reason of the gunshot wound, the
victim thereafter died. Piliin confesses killing Rodrigo
and implicated Yu and Caballes as his co-perpetrators.
However, After trial, appellant was found guilty for
murder. The two other accused, Yu and Caballes were
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
During the stage of appeal, Piliin argues that
the prosecution failed to establish the existence of
treachery. According to him, the witness failed to see
the inception of the attack because she was in the act
of opening the gate for her husband when the latter
was shot. She lacked knowledge of the attending
circumstances prior to the shooting incident. Hence,
the trial court’s finding of treachery becomes
speculative.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery must be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance?
Decision:
Yes. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in their execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defenses which the
offended party might make. To establish treachery, two
elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted
the particular means of attack employed. The essence
of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on
the victim which renders the latter unable and
unprepared to defend himself by reason of the
suddenness and severity of the attack. Appellant’s wife
witnessed the incident from its inception up to its
consummation.
In this case, the victim was about to park his
car when appellant suddenly appeared and shot him
without any warning. The attack was so sudden that
the latter had no opportunity to repel it or defend
himself. It can readily be inferred that the manner of
the attack adopted by appellant manifested treachery.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the weapon used and the nature of the injury
inflicted, which pertained to the lone gunshot fatally
wounding appellant, established that appellant
deliberately and consciously adopted the particular
mode of attack to ensure the commission of the
offense with impunity.
People v. Ilo (392 SCRA 326)
Facts:
48 | P a g e
Amadeo, a witness declared that on the night
of July 23, 1997 he and the accused had a drinking
spree in the latter’s house. Moments later, appellant
and his live-in partner Virginia had a heated argument.
Accused Ilo kicked her several times.Ilo rushed to the
kitchen, got hold of an old frying pan and struck
Virginia with it. She fell on the floor. Amadeo tried to
placate his friend but was rebuffed anew. Ilo got hold
of a stone used as tripod in cooking and smashed
Virginias head with it. Consequently Virginia died.
Thereafter the trial court rendered a decision finding
the Ilo guilty of Murder. On appeal, Appellant argues
that the injuries inflicted by him on the victim were
spur-of- the- moment reflexes during a passionate
lovers quarrel, spawned by jealousy. He avers that the
prosecution failed to prove that the killing of Virginia by
the Ilo was the product of a preconceived plan. He
further contends that his actuations were triggered by
the provocation emanating from the victim herself.
Hence, appellant contends that he is guilty only of
homicide and not of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding
that treachery attended the killing of the victim ?
Decision:
NO.Treachery is not presumed. The
circumstances surrounding the murder must be proved
as indubitably as the crime itself. To constitute
treachery, two conditions must be present, namely: (1)
the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend or to
retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption
of the means of execution. The Court held that
treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant did not
make any preparation to kill the victim in such a
manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible
or difficult for the victim to defend herself. The
prosecution must prove that the killing was
premeditated or that the assailant chose a method or
mode of attack directly and especially to facilitate and
insure the killing without danger to himself.  The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate
and without warning done in a swift and unexpected
manner of execution affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
There is no treachery where the attack is neither
sudden nor preconceived and deliberately adopted but
just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of
the offender. To establish treachery, the evidence
must show that the offender made some preparation to
kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or
difficult for the person attacked to defend himself. The
mode of attack must be planned by the offender and
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.
There is no treachery when the killing results from a
verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant
such that the victim was forewarned of the impending
danger. 
 The prosecution failed to discharge its burden.
The prosecution failed to adduce evidence as to the
relative positions of appellant vis--vis the victim. Taking
into account the sequential continuity and rapidity of
the events resulting in the death of Virginia, it cannot
be gainsaid that appellant made preparations to kill
Virginia and adopted a mode of attack as to make it
impossible or difficult for her to defend herself.
Ignominy
People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15)
Facts:
On December 28, 1999, at 6:00PM, two armed
men suddenly entered Barnachea residence in
Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. The two
ordered a 12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to
drop the floor by hitting him in the back with the butt of
a long gun. They hurriedly proceeded to the living
room and shot Jessie’s uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and
continued shooting in the kitchen hitting his mother
Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr.,
and his cousin Rubenson Abance.
His eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, who
then was in his uncle’s house, noticed a stainless jeep,
with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables
dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai"
parked in front of the fence of their house. Also, the
jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors, Russel
Tamba and Francisco Andrada.
The incident was immediately reported to the
police and at around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was
intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by
the police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were
the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the
vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were
thereafter brought to the Aringay police station and
then turned over to the Bauang police. Jessie was able
to identify two of the eight appellants by the name of
Cachola and Amay as the two assailants who entered
the house. The next day a paraffin test was conducted
on the appellants.
The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome
and merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one
gunshot wound on her head and three on her body;
Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his
body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms;
Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on
his body, and with his penis excised;Rubenson, one
gunshot wound on his head and a stab wound that
lacerated his liver.
RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
the affirmance of the conviction for murder of
appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the
other appellants for failure of the prosecution to
49 | P a g e
establish their identity and participation beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not excising of penis amounts to
ignominy that can aggravate the offense charged?
Decision:
NO. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is
required that the offense be committed in a manner
that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus
adding to the victim’s moral suffering. Where the victim
was already dead when his body or a part thereof was
dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the
accused.
In this case, the information states that
Victorino’s sexual organ was severed after he was
shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot,
therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating
circumstance.
SC sustained the conviction of Cachola and
Amay but the rest of the six appellants were acquitted
for the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
People v. Bumidang (G.R. No. 130630)
Facts:
On September 29, 1996, at 2:00AM, accused
Bumidang loudly called Melencio Imbat (father of the
victim) to open the latter’s door. Melencio, an
octogenarian who was sleeping at that time, hurriedly
opened the door as the accused threatened to kill
them if the door was not opened. The accused entered
and asked the old man to bring him upstairs where he
and his 56-year old unmarried daughter Gloria was
sleeping. When they were in the room, the accused
got a spear at the side of Melencio’s bed and ordered
the latter to lie in a prone position as he headed the
daughter’s bed. Gloria arose and screamed for help
but his old father was in no strength to help her and
remained in a prone position as told by the accused.
The accused approached Gloria and poked the
spear at her. She recognized him because he was
lighting the room with a flashlight. The accused
ordered her to stand up and removed her pajama, with
the panty going along with it. While the accused was
removing her clothes, she sat and struggled. The
accused then removed his short pants and became
completely naked. He used the flashlight to examine
her genital. He placed the spear beside her and
whenever she attempted to move, he would point the
spear at her. The accused then went on top of her,
inserted his penis into her pudenda, held her breasts
and kissed her until he became sated. The accused
threatened the father and daughter that he will kill
them if they will report it to the authorities. Then he
went to the door and left after satisfying his lust.

Despite the threats, Gloria reported the incident to
a Kagawad who handed a note to be given to the
authorities (security). The accused was immediately
arrested.
On October 1, 1996, Gloria submitted herself to a
vaginal examination of Dr. Quines, confirming a
laceration of the hymen at 6:00 o'clock but no
spermatozoa were obtained. The laceration was about
3 to 5 days old at the time of the examination.
On 8 October 1996, a complaint for rape was filed
before the MCTC of Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva
Vizcaya, and found a prima facie case against
Bumidang. The records were forwarded to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor.
When it reached RTC, it rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code and was sentenced to death by lethal injection.
Issue:
Whether or not dwelling, nighttime and
ignominy shall be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances of the crime of rape?
Decision:
YES. The trial court correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. There was a
clear violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of
abode when Gloria, who apparently did not give any
provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is
considered an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to
human abode.
Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when
(1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is taken
advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the
commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's
immunity from capture.
In this case, other than the fact that the crime
was committed at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
nothing on the record suggests that Bumidang
deliberately availed himself or took advantage of
nighttime nor proved that Bumidang used the darkness
to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall
be taken into account if means are employed or
circumstances brought about which add ignominy to
the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was
committed in a manner that tends to make its effects
more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral
suffering.
In this case, it was established that Bumidang
used the flashlight and examined the genital of Gloria
before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed
50 | P a g e
in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts
clearly show that Bumidang deliberately wanted to
further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and
compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was
appreciated in a case where a woman was raped in
the presence of her betrothed or of her husband or
was made to exhibit to the rapists her complete
nakedness before they raped her.
SC sustained RTC’s decision finding Baliwang
guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
People v. Siao (G.R. No. 126021)
Facts:
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00PM, accused-
appellant Rene Siao, in his residence, ordered Reylan
Gimena, his family’s 17-year old houseboy, to pull
Estrella Raymundo, their 14-year old housemaid, to
the women’s quarters. Once inside, appellant Siao
pushed her to the wooden bed and asked her to
choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite.
Appellant lit the candle and dropped the melting candle
on her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her
back on the bed w/ her head hanging over one end.
Appellant then poured sprite into her nostrils
as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun
pointed to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet
and hands w/ an electric cord or wire as she was made
to lie face down on the bed. As Siao pointed his pistol
at her, he ordered Estrella to undress and commanded
her to take the initiative on Gimena. Not understanding
what he meant, appellant motioned to her poking the
gun at her temple. Gimena was then ordered to
remove his shorts. He did not do so but only let his
penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of Estrella
and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy
and shouted for help twice. Siao then ordered Gimena
to rape Estrella. At first, Gimena refused because he
has a sister. However, Siao said that if they would not
obey, he would kill both of them.
Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and
intimidated at gunpoint by Siao to have carnal
knowledge of each other. They performed the sexual
act because they were afraid they would be killed. Siao
commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3 diff positions
(i.e. missionary position, side-by-side and dog position
as narrated vividly in the case), pointing the handgun
at them the whole time. Thereafter, Siao warned them,
“If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers.”
Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the
whole event. He asserts that she retaliated through
this accusation because Estrella herself was accused
of stealing many of his family’s personal effects.
Issue:
 Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating
circumstance of the crime of rape, is attendant to
justify the award of exemplary damages?
Decision:
YES. The RTC overlooked and did not take
into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been
held that where the accused in committing the rape
used not only the missionary position i.e. male
superior, female inferior but also the dog position as
dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven in the
case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
attended the commission thereof.
Still, SC respected RTC’s finding of facts and
found any inconsistencies in the witnesses’
testimonies inconsequential considering that they
referred to trivial matters w/c have nothing to do w/ the
essential fact of the commission of rape that is carnal
knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even
if it was pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena
ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30 mins, w/c does
not conform to common experience, rape was still
present from the evidence because rape is not the
emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however
slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape.
Moreover, even if the house was occupied by many
people at the time of the crime, rape was still
committed because lust is no respecter of time and
place. And Estrella’s and Gimena’s decision not to flee
proves only the fear and intimidation that they were
under because Siao was after all their “amo” or
employer who threatened to kill them or their family if
they did not succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as
amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of
a deadly weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the
offended party moral damages, w/c is automatically
granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the
amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy justifies the
award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230
CC. Judgment affirmed w/ modification of damages
awarded.
Aid of Minor or By Means of Motor Vehicles
People v. Mallari (404 SCRA 170)
Facts:
Based on the accusatory portion of the
Information filed against Rufino Mallari, he was
accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph Galang
with an Isuzu Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that the said
incident was preceded by an altercation between
51 | P a g e
Rufino Mallari and Joseph Galang when the latter
admonished the former not to drive fast while passing
by the latter’s house. To end the situation Joseph,
together with his brothers, who were also present at
that time, asked for apology from Rufino. However, the
conflict did not end there because when dusk came
and while Joseph was watching basketball game with
his wife, Rufino arrived with some companions and
attacked Joseph with bladed weapons. They chased
him and when Joseph was able to run away, Rufino
pursued him with the use of the Isuzu Canter Elf truck.
When he caught up with him, he bumped him which
resulted in his instant death. The doctor who
conducted the medico-legal inspection of the cadaver
testified that Joseph’s cause of death was “crushing
injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident”.
The trial court found Rufino liable with murder and
sentenced with the penalty of death after considering
the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle in
committing the crime. The case was brought to the
Supreme Court pursuant to the requirement of
automatic review of cases penalized with death
penalty based on Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code. Rufino argued that the use of a motor vehicle
was only incidental, considering that he resorted to it
only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to
catch up with the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of
use of motor vehicle was correctly appreciated by the
trial court in imposing the death penalty?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately
used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up
with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that
the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate
the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muñoz cited by Rufino
finds no application to the present case. In the said
case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the
accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying
the body of the victim to the place where it was
dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which
caused the latter’s death. In the present case, the truck
itself was used to kill the victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
a person who kills another “by means of a motor
vehicle” is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor
vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we
shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended
by some mitigating circumstances and there is
 no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
In the present case, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery,
which were alleged in the information, were not
proved. What was proved was the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender through the
testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not
rebutted by the prosecution.
In view of the absence of an aggravating
circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be
the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508)
Facts:
On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe
Requerme was driving a motorela, together with his
wife Rosita and another passenger, Engr. Wilfredo
Achumbre, who is the deceased in this case. The
deceased was picked up by them on their way home
and requested them to bring him to his house. While
on their way, a white vehicle, which was later on
identified as a Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No.
722, intentionally hit and pushed the motorela that they
were riding and violently kept pushing it causing it to
turn around facing the direction from where it came
from and fell on its right side. Rosita testified that
while she was struggling out of the motorela she
noticed that the white vehicle went up the elevated
catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit
when he was already at the railing (barandilla). Then
she observed that the white vehicle drove away
without even caring to see what happened to them.
The spouses/victims were brought to the police station
while the Achumbre was brought to the hospital who
was declared dead on arrival. It was later on found out
upon investigation that said incident was predicated on
the earlier fight which transpired between Achumbre
and the driver of the motor vehicle, Thadeos Enguito,
the accused in this case. As a result of the death of
Achumbre, his wife filed a criminal complaint against
the accused. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty
with the crime of Homicide with Less Serious Physical
Injuries, taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle which was
alleged in the information. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter modified the crime to Murder due to
the aggravating circumstance. The accused went to
the Supreme Court imputing error on the decision of
the Court of Appeals with respect to the declaration of
the crime of Murder against him on the ground that he
did not intentionally choose the motor vehicle he was
driving as a means of committing the offense, and that
at most, the vehicle was the only available means to
stop the deceased from escaping. He argued that it
was his intention to apprehend and surrender the
deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling
him but in the process, he killed the deceased.
52 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance
of use of motor vehicle should be considered in this
case?
Decision:
The indictment against accused-appellant is
murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use
of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the
same was perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's
claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres
van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his
actuations. By his own admission, he testified that
there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing.
Accused-appellant could have easily sought the
assistance of the police instead of taking the law into
his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already
noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the
motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not
stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased[16] who was
hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the
Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used the
vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more
than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the
incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the
police mobile patrol which was following him.
Appellant contends that he should have been
convicted of the crime of homicide with two (2)
mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and
voluntary surrender; and had the charge been
homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that
these mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated
in his favor. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very
angry" while he was following, bumping and pushing
the motorela which was in front of him. He was
previously mauled by the deceased and he was
allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted
on him. When he regained consciousness, he claims
that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he
was mauled. Clearly, accused-appellant's state of mind
after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre
to death was such that he was still able to act
reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police
mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to
the dastardly act which resulted in the death of
Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses
Requerme. For passion to be considered as a
mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show
causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to
overcome reason. The turmoil and unreason which
naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind
of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows that
accused-appellant was further pursued by the police.
Appellant himself testified that he stopped his vehicle
just after the police mobile stopped but admitted
having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3
Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender
but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was
already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3
Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos
Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being
driven by accused-appellant already destroyed and the
right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was
running flat. Clearly, accused-appellant could have
eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his
vehicle suffered a flat tire.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence
or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the
case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime committed by accused-appellant is the complex
crime of murder with less serious physical injuries.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum
period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The
crime was committed in 1992 where the penalty for the
crime of murder, which is the most serious crime, was
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty
for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of
murder with less serious physical injuries considering
that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be
affected by the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance. And, consonant with the
ruling in People vs. Muñoz that Article III, Section 19
(1) of the 1987 Constitution did not change the period
of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals
was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Cruelty
People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389)
Facts:
Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as Pablo,
together with his father Orlando Guerrero, Sr.,
nicknamed Dino, was accused of murder. The
accuseds, conspired, confederated and mutually
helped one another, with deliberate intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without
justifiable cause, attack, assault, club, beheaded and
cut off the penis of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which
caused his death thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of his lawful heirs.
Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty.
Orlando interposed self-defense while his father, Dino,
denied any complicity in the killing.
53 | P a g e
According to the the witness, Jacalne, he was
informed that one Dino Guerrero was inside the house
nearby. Dino Guerrero came out with his hands
extended forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately
frisked and handcuffed him. Before Dino was
handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that it
was his son who had killed the victim. Thereafter, Dino
was brought to the police station for custodial
investigation.
Further, Jacalne testified that appellant
Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at the scene of the
crime during their investigation. But upon their return to
the police station, appellant was already there. [11
Appellant admitted killing the victim, according to
Jacalne, by clubbing the victim first with the wooden
stick, and then cutting his head and his penis with a
knife.
Another withness, Ireneo Acierto, appellants
brother-in-law, testified that while he was resting in his
house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he
heard someone screaming. When he looked out from
his window, he saw that the person screaming was his
sister-in-law, Ana. He went out of the house and went
near the porch of the Guerreros, where he saw
Ernesto Ocampos head about to be severed by
appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed
the same on the right side of the victims trunk. After
that, appellant cut off Ernestos penis. Ireneo noticed
that while the head was being severed, the victim was
lying down on the floor, but not moving. Ireneo then
told appellant, That is enough, bayaw. Stop it.
According to the witness, his wife Ana was also
saying, That is enough, Manong. Appellant angrily
turned to Ireneo, telling him not to interfere or else he
might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went away
after that. Ireneo did not see his father-in-law, Dino, at
the time of the incident and did not know where Dino
was.
The trial court convicted Orlando Guerrero, Jr.
of murder while his father Dino was acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of cruelty
and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to
classify the killing as murder despite failure of the
prosecution to allege the same in the information
Decision:
The information alleges the qualifying
circumstances of (1) treachery and (2) evident
premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in
the perpetration of the crime, where there was
deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and the
offender had scoffed at the victims corpse.
On treachery and evident premeditation, the
trial court found that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law. [
we hold that in the present case, the trial court did not
err when it found neither treachery nor evident
premeditation. However, the trial court found there was
cruelty as well as outraging or scoffing at the corpse,
thus, qualifying the crime to murder.
Simangan v. People (434 SCRA 38)
Facts: On February 10, 1980 at about
8 pm, Simangan and four other men
wearing fatigues knocked on the door
of the store owned by Ernesto and
Sofronia. The couple was having
dinner with their daughter Lorna.
Simangan asked Ernesto to guide
them on the road as they were not
familiar. Ernesto agreed, he then
ordered his houseboy Romeo to
accompany him in guiding the group
of Simangan. The next morning,
Romeo reported to Sofronia that
Ernesto is dead. Ernesto was found
near a creek, he sustained 10 stab
wounds.
Issue:
Whether or not Simangan is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision:
Yes. The testimonies of
Romeo and Sofronia are credible.
Thus, Simangan’s conviction is
affirmed. It is found that Simangan
stabbed Ernesto 10 times, three of
which were fatal. But the number of
stab wounds does not qualify as an
aggravating circumstance against
Simangan for it must be proven that
Simangan intended to exacerbate the
suffering of Ernesto. Nigh time is also
not appreciated as it was included in
the original information.
People v. Catian (374 SCRA 514)
Facts:
PEDRO CATACUTAN alias "Pedro Duling"
was accused of murder and frustrated murder.
The trial court adjudged the accused guilty of
murder qualified by treachery for the death of Ligaya
Santos. For the injury sustained by Renato Licup, the
accused was adjudged guilty of attempted murder only
because Licup would not have died even without
medical attention. Nocturnity was not considered
because the site of the shooting was well lighted and
for lack of evidence to indicate that nighttime was
54 | P a g e
purposely chosen to facilitate the commission of the
crimes. Recidivism was also considered because the
accused "admitted that in 1963 he was convicted of
murder and frustrated murder for which he was
sentenced to serve 8 years to 14 years imprisonment.
As a matter of fact, he was granted parole and at the
time of the incident he was a parolee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in
concluding that there was treachery?
Decision:
The record shows that the appellant had a
previous misunderstanding with Ligaya Santos; and
that when he suddenly attacked her he was with a
group of armed men so that there was present not only
the element of surprise but also the advantage of no
risk to himself.
Aleviosa was certainly present.
Art. 15: Alternative Circumstances
Relationship
People v. Calongui (G.R. No. 170566)
Facts:
Calonqui was found guilty for two counts of
rape. On January 1, 1998 about 2 am in Tagbong,
Camarines Sur, Calonqui was able to rape the 13 year
old girl Maricel in the latter’s house. On September 26,
1998 at about three in the morning, the accused again
raped the victim. Both rape incidents were witnessed
by the brother of Maricel.
Issue: 
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and relationship be appreciated against
Calonqui and the latter circumstance as an alternative
circumstance?
Decision: 
Calonqui and Maricel live under the same
shelter as they are first cousins. At the time of the
incident, both are living in the same house and in the
same room. Therefore, the supposed aggravating
circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated as
there was no trespass to the sanctity of the house of
the victim on the part of Calonqui, while the
aggravating circumstance of relationship is likewise
cannot go against Calongui, even as an alternative
circumstance, as being first cousins is not within the
concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, his conviction is nonetheless
affirmed.
People v. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392)
Facts:
Prosecution, with the testimony of a lone eye-
witness, who happened to be the son of the victim,
along with the admission of guilt, found Cesar Marcos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing
of his elder brother, Virgilio, as aggravated by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
During Appeal, the Solicitor General insisted that
since the accused is a brother of the victim, the
alternative circumstance of relationship must be
considered in determining the imposable penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of
relationship shall be considered in the imposition of the
proper penalty?
Decision:
In order that the Alternative Circumstance of
relationship may be taken into consideration in the
imposition of the proper penalty, Paragraph 2 of Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b)
ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or
adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in
the same degree, of the offender.
Relationship is Mitigating in Crimes against Property,
while it must be considered as Aggravating in Crimes
against Persons where the offended party is a relative
of a higher degree than the offender or when in the
same degree or level, as in brothers.
Therefore, the Alternative Circumstance of
relationship shall be considered as Aggravating.  mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of
Intoxication
People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050)
Facts:
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in
the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench
outside her house. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa
came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen
Ibuña. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by
accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn
to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn was about to
go upstairs, accused followed her and successively
stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn,
but was overpowered by the accused. Junilla shouted
for help and the accused run away. She was brought
to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
55 | P a g e
On August 12, 1998, the provincial prosecutor
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur,
Branch 29, an Information for murder against accused
George Cortes y Ortega. Accused admitted that he
stabbed Edlyn and enter the plea of guilty of the said
crime. The prosecution presented evidence to prove
the presence of intoxication as aggravating
circumstances. The accused on the other hand
presented evidence proving the alternative mitigating
of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court rendered
decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence to suffer
the penalty of Death.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the
accused was aggravated by reason of intoxication?
Decision:
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered
either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if
it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is
habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating
circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to
mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a
quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission
of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of
obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person
must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and
not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to
reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
Accused argues that in the absence of any of
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information and considering that there was one
guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion
perpetua. The Solicitor General agrees with the
accused that "the only aggravating circumstance
present was treachery which qualified the killing to
murder and that there were two mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication, not
habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not
death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6759
People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954)
Facts:
On September 27 1998, appellant, Damaso
Delima (Damaso), Damaso’s son Delfin and three
other unidentified individuals were having a drinking
spree in Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. Anthony (damaso’s
another son) joined the group. At around 6:00 p.m.,
Mondigo, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked
Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the ground
unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A
witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing
shouts coming from the scene of the crime, rushed to
the area and there saw appellant repeatedly hacking
Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to
ward off appellant’s blows. Damaso later died from the
injuries he sustained. Anthony sustained wound on his
left temporal area.Appellant was charged before the
RTC with Murder and Frustrated Murder. TheRTC
found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of
Damaso and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking
of Anthony, mitigated by intoxication.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in giving
credence of alternative circumstance of intoxication to
mitigate the crime?
Decision:
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with
the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated
his crimes because "the stabbing incident ensued in
the course of a drinking spree." For the alternative
circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a
mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that
the intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a
plan to commit a felony and the accused’s
drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the
only proof on record on this matter is appellant’s
testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin
attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of beer."
The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such
liquor appellant imbibed, and the absence of any
independent proof that appellant’s alcohol intake
affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that
appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he
committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.
Arts. 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies
Principals
People v. Batin (GR No. 177223)
Facts:
Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio testified
she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at
the gate to their compound, looking towards her and
her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of
the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from
inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as
the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting:
"Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the
gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards
the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and
handed the gun back to him. When she shifted her
glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor
ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil
responded by drawing the gun from his waistline,
raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing
56 | P a g e
twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio
fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter
landing on top of her.
Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the
street, went between the parked white car and yellow
taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who
were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay,
banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak,
banatan mo na."
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the
father made him liable as principal by inducement?
Decision:
The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired
in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable
because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses
that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he
instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo
na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice – were
credible and sufficed to prove Castor’s indispensable
cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly,
Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of
Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing,
was.
While Castor was indeed heard to have
shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as
reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from
firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony
that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to
shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly
stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted
"Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession
of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at
the spouses.
As concluded by the trial court, the
circumstances surrounding Castor’s utterance of
"Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the
same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force
him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These
circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between
the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins
grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag,"
Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil – a
crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins
concerning the commission of a felony.
Conspiracy may also be deduced from the
acts of the appellants before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments.Even if we pursue the theory that the
defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the
same. Castor’s argument is that "(h)is alleged
utterance of the words ‘Sige, banatan mo na’ cannot
be considered as the moving cause of the shooting
and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by
inducement.

Inducement may be by acts of command,
advice or through influence or agreement for
consideration. The words of advice or the influence
must have actually moved the hands of the principal by
direct participation. We have held that words of
command of a father may induce his son to commit a
crime. The moral influence of the words of the father
may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases
in which the same words coming from a stranger
would make no impression. There is no doubt in our
minds that Castor’s words were the determining cause
of the commission of the crime.
People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939)
Facts:
The appellant drove the passenger jeepney
with his cohorts on board looking for Luable and
Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in
the opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle
and sideswiped Geronimo. And when Geronimo fled,
the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When
the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned
to the passenger jeepney and drove it to where his
cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged
them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene
along with his cohorts, leaving the hapless Geronimo
mortally wounded.
After trial, the court rendered judgment
acquitting Ramon, but convicting the appellant of
murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted
homicide for attempting to kill Luis.
The appellant avers that he and his brother
Ramon had no motive to kill Geronimo. The appellant
contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were
not in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The
appellant noted that according to the testimony of the
witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and
merely yelled to his companions who ganged up on
Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo na, at
huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!"
The appellant further posits that the
prosecution witnesses were not even in accord as to
where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant
argues that because of the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, it
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the
said charges.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the
appellant when the witnesses testimony didn’t confirm
who chased and stabbed the victims?
Decision:
57 | P a g e
Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the
deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or
whether the accused merely incited his companions in
the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa
Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of his
liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of
the jeepney has been established.
In order to hold an accused guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively
participating in the actual commission of the crime,
or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by being present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators as to move them to executing the
conspiracy."
The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that
where there are several accused and conspiracy has
been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint
who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound.
Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as
to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is
not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the intent and character of
their participation because the act of one is the act of
all.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that there is conspiracy when two or more person
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved
that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it
has been accomplished and unless abandoned or
broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. Each conspirator is
responsible for everything done by his confederates
which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part
of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging
in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces
a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law,
chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator
unless such act differs radically and substantively from
that which they intended to commit. When a
conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of
indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its
content and membership, so be it that they fall within
the common purposes as he understands them."
All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond
cavil of conspiracy between the appellant and the
principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus,
criminally liable for the death of the victim, although
there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the
latter.
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)
Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the trial court of
the crime of murder for the death of Rosemarie
Tallada, with aggravating circumstance of recidivism
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and
sentenced to the extreme penalty of death.
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in
the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant
alleged that he only held down Rosemarie’s legs to
prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was
killed by another man he identified as Joselito Pacot,
he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao
Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a
house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could
spend the night. He offered his brother’s house which
was under his care. In the evening of February 6,
2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the
house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang,
Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went
home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned
to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had
ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were
already grappling with each other and Pacot was
strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of
heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door.
Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated
just the same so he closed the door as ordered and
helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the woman" as "her
feet kept hitting the walls."
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie
was already motionless. Pacot wanted to dump the
body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide.
Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in
cement for which Pacot gave appellant P500.Pacot left
the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000.
58 | P a g e
At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete
mixture and cast the dead body in cement.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is liable as a
principal?
Decision:
The rule is that any admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case
does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or no such
admission was in fact made. There was never any
such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellant’s self-serving,
exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the
crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. Assuming
for the sake of argument that Pacot was the
mastermind, appellant’s admission that he participated
in its commission by holding Rosemarie’s legs made
him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the
commission of a crime are considered principals by
direct participation if the following requisites are
present: 1.) they participated in the criminal resolution
and 2.) they carried out their plan and personally took
part in its execution by acts which directly tended to
the same end.
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or
more persons are said to have participated in the
criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the
time of the commission of the crime. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime,
it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.
It is well-settled that a person may be
convicted for the criminal act of another where,
between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose
and intention in the commission of the crime
charged. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the
crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the commission
of the crime showing that they acted in unison with
each other pursuant to a common purpose or design.
Accomplices
People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)
Facts:
An information for the murder of Roderick
Ferol was filed against accused-appellant Restituto
Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore,
Francisco Gregorio, and one John Doe. The Court
found that the prosecution evidence has established
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused
Restituto Roche for the crime of murder but could not
make a pronouncement as to the guilt of accused
Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and
therefore could not be arraigned.Finding that the
prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of
accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore,
both accused were acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant should
held liable for the killing of Roderick Ferol on the
ground of conspiracy?
Decision:
No. In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified
that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico
Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.Apart from
Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies
are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to
prove that accused-appellant directly participated in
the commission of the offense or performed an act
which would show community of purpose with Dorico
Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-
appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it
was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto),
this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in
conspiracy with Dorico Caballes.
For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual
planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a
condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be
proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear
and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the
time the malefactors were committing the crime, their
actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among
them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the
victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was
established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts
which yield the reasonable inference that the doers
thereof were acting with a common intent or design.
Therefore, the task in every case is determining
whether the particular acts established by the requisite
quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference.
Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-
appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved
to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault
on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico
59 | P a g e
Caballes borne out of the desire to get even with him
for the offense committed against his brother. In no
way can such act be attributed to accused-
appellant.Neither can accused-appellant be held liable
as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following
requisites must concur in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice: (a) community of
design, i.e.,  knowing that criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
There is no evidence to show that accused-
appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act
to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In
fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of
Dorico Caballes plan to attack and kill Roderick Ferol.
Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty
required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot
uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. Our legal culture
demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable
doubt before any person may be convicted of any
crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the
facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.
Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762)
Facts:
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide alleging in
the two informations filed that said accused was
conspiring and confederating with one Alberto
Almojuela in the killing of Ricardo Quejong Bello, by
stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting
him with a gun at the back.
The trial court found Abarquez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide.
Abarquez filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. However the Court of Appeals rejected
Abarquez’s allegation that he was merely at the crime
scene to pacify the quarreling parties.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s
evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an
accomplice. He further alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and
the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures.
Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses
against him.
Issue:
 Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
prove that fact that Abarquez was an accomplice in the
killing of Ricardo Bello?
Decision:No.
Two elements must concur before a person becomes
liable as an accomplice:
(1) community of design, which means that the
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the
criminal design of the principal by direct
participation; and
(2) the performance by the accomplice of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the
crime.Mere commission of an act, which aids
the perpetrator, is not enough.
The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act
intended to be executed. It is therefore required in
order to be liable as an accomplice; that the accused
must unite with the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation.
The court held in one case that the mere
presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be
interpreted to mean that he committed the crime
charged.
In convicting Abarquez in this case, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the
testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by
Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from
helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela.
Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez
concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design. "Tumigil"
literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping
Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to
Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely
talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because
Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that
time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action as an attempt
to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation
was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted
that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or
reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not
shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquez’s act of trying
to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to
Almojuela.
People v. Compo (G.R. No. 112990)
Facts:
60 | P a g e
Mauricio Gonzaga and Lemuel Compo were
charged conspiring in the murder of Procopio Dales
.
Based on the statements of Libardo, Gonzaga,
PO3 Pedro Wate, and the post mortem findings the the
Court held the accused Mauricio Gonzaga and Lemuel
Compo guilty of the crime of murder punished under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
each one of them to suffer an imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused Lemuel Compo filed with the trial
court a notice of appeal. In this appeal, accused-
appellant imputes a single assignment of error to the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness
Librado that he saw Lemuel carrying an Indian Pana is
sufficient to establish the latter is an accomplice to the
crime?
Decision: No.
The court held that the prosecution failed to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Basically, accused-appellant Lemuel was convicted
based on the testimony of the conductor of passenger
bus Gilberto Libardo who saw Lemuel carrying an
“Indian Pana” and a flashlight. Without any testimony
positively identifying accused-appellant as the
assailant nor any evidence directly linking him as the
author of the crime, Lemuel Compo cannot be
convicted of the murder of Dales.  The accused-
appellant deserves an acquittal and must forthwith be
given back his liberty.
The testimony of witness Mauricio Gonzaga,
states that Lemuel was merely present before the
stabbing incident, holding a flashlight. No other overt
act was established to prove that Lemuel shared and
concurred with the criminal design of Mauricio.  The
mere presence of Lemuel, who was not shown to be
armed, at the scene of the crime does not connote
conspiracy. 
Singularity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish conspiracy.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in
the commission of the crime, with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and
purpose.Conspiracy transcends companionship.The
presence and company of Lemuel were not necessary
or essential to the perpetration of the murder.
Neither can Lemuel be considered an
accomplice.  Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a
principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.  To be convicted as
such, it is necessary that he be aware of the criminal
intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or
intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the
efficacious execution of the crime.
The prosecution, however, failed to present
convincing evidence establishing that accused-
appellant Lemuel knew of the other accused's intent to
kill Dales.  Again, his mere presence at the scene of
the crime and his flight therefrom with the other
accused are not proof of his participation in the crime.
The quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution
to support a conviction has not  been reached with
regard to accused-appellant Lemuel. The oft-repeated
truism that the conviction of an accused must rest not
on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of
the prosecution’s evidence applies.He must, therefore,
be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Accessories
People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)
Facts:
On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan
Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin
Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca,
Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo
Tolentino called them. When asked what it was all
about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his
house located just across the road. Once they were
inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his
plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather.
Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free
Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings
being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed
Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of
Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to
Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go
home and wait for Hernan.
Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived.
He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice
he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and
Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room.Later,
Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand
entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards
the kitchen. When about an armslength away from
Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on the
right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious
and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo
immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help
him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out
of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both
appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then
carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the
creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo
successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the
body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing
the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three
immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and
Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other
61 | P a g e
people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed
whatever Tolentino told them.
On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was
arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused
Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied
killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as
the one who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to
Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered
the former as the killer of Sagario.
However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial
court's decision had become final and executory on his
part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-
stricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole
responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and
retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant
Jonathan Fabros.
The trial court held that the prosecution's
evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the
person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and
later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the
killing was qualified by treachery and attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
The court a quo  observed that overt and
positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros)
manifested his approval of the killing and the
concurrence of his acts with those of the other
accused.8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a
co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible
for the murder.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros)
should be convicted as an accessory?
Decision:
Appellant cannot be convicted as an
accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code
defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of
the commission of the crime and did not participate in
its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took
part subsequent to its commission by any of three
modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory,
the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge
of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent
participation in it by any of the three above-cited
modes.
 Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the
concealment or the destruction of the body of the
crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must
have been done in order to prevent the discovery of
the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present
case.
In his testimony, appellant stated that because
he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he
refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the
victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left
thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the
charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct
prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his
own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a
crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting
the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.
The presumption of innocence in favor of
appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.
People v. Cui (G.R. No. 121982)
Facts:
In the evening of December 5, 1990, ten (10)
armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and
Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The
Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of the
family-owned business, were able to see the faces of
the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia and two of his
men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other
robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks
over their heads. The robbers carted away cash and
jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
They also blindfolded and forcibly abducted seventeen
(17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the
Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) for her release.Johnny Lim turned
over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the
afternoon of the next day at an arranged meeting
place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.
Initially, the Lim’s kept the crime a secret. But
on the third day, they reported the kidnapping to the
Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan District
Command (Cebu Metrodiscom). The Metrodiscom
Intelligence Security Team (MIST) conducted an
investigation and Johnny Lim identified one of the
suspects as Toto Garcia.
Toto Garcia was known as the leader of a
group of armed robbers called the Baong Gang. The
gang's base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot,
Pardo, Cebu. When the police learned that Eduardo
Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they
decided to interrogate him.
Upon Basingan's interrogation, he identified
Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and Edgar as the three (3)
who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two
(2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata
62 | P a g e
Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos
and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed
outside the Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as
the chief plotter of the crime at bar, and revealed that
his neighbor and close family friends, the spouses
Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan.
Basingan said he was asked to join the plot and was
assured that he would not be under suspicion because
he would be placed at gun point together with the other
members of the Lim household when the crime is
committed. However, he refused to join the plot during
the December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the
residence of the Cuis in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City.
Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as godfathers
of each other's children but he was unmoved. At the
meeting were Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey,
Sadam and the Cuis.
On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a
sworn statement reiterating these revelations in
writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their
complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit. Assistant
Prosecutor Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an
information for Kidnapping with Ransom against
Basingan, the Cuis, and the members of the group of
Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn
statement.On the same day, Basingan and Leonilo Cui
were arrested. 
On March 14, 1991, Joselito "Tata" Garcia,
Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso,
referred to by Basingan as "Laring" and "Leos",
respectively, were arrested in the neighboring Negros
Island. The next day, however, Tata Garcia died due to
"hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot
wounds." Upon presentation of his death certificate,
the trial court ordered his name deleted from the
information.
After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor
Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of the
Cuis was only that of accomplices amended the
Information downgrading the charge against the Cui’s
as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of
Stephanie Lim.
On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso
and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not
guilty. On June 27, 1991, Basinga escaped from the
prison. Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis,
Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia.
On February 13, 1992, Beinvenido
Nacario, alias "Rey Nacario", was arrested. On
arraignment on April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty.
However, on May 5, 1991, he, too, escaped from
detention and remains at large to this date.
On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested
before the trial court that, per newspaper report, Toto
Garcia had been killed in Davao. Thus, on December
6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso,
Sarte, Basingan and Nacario. 
Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal on May
19, 1994. The Cui’s filed theirs on May 31, 1994. 

Issue:
Whether or not the Cui’s are liable as
accessories?
Decision:
Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime those
who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein
by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to
profit by the effects of the crime, without having
participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an
accessory requires the following elements: (1) that he
has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2)
that he took part in it subsequent to its commission by
any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. These twin
elements are present in the case of the Cui’s, and
indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the
case.
The Court held that the Cui’s profited from the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as
accessories.
People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022)
Facts:
On September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was
clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of
appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at
Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim
was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the
ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant
Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes
and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and
underwear, including the piece of wood be used in
clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards,
he went to the municipal building and reported to the
police authorities that Bernardo had died in an
accident. The police authorities together with the
Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a
photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the
investigation. They found the body of the deceased
Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the bamboo
ladder. Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and
ears. There were bloodstains on the floor of the
bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the
beddings of the deceased. The bloodstains led to the
bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be
found on the steps of the ladder. When questioned by
the police, Josefina revealed that the assailant of her
husband was Ricardo Verzola.
Upon her request, she was brought to the
Office of the Chief of Police of Bangued, where at
about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29,
1969 she gave a written statement narrating the
circumstances surrounding the incident in question
and pointing to appellant Verzola as the assailant of
her husband. In that extra-judicial statement, she
stated that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the
63 | P a g e
evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo
Verzola went to their house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued
Abra entered the room where she was sleeping with
her husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had
carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo Molina
woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was
the moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting
him on the head several times that afterwards, she
heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs
and the voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving
and warning her not to say anything about the incident.
She looked out of the door and saw her husband
already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This
statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge
Francisco T. Valera.
On that same morning, appellant Verzola was
picked up by the police and brought to the municipal
building, and there he also executed a written
statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several
times. Both appellants admit that it was appellant
Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim.
The trial court convicted Verzola as principal
and Josefina Molina as an accessory to the crime of
murder.
Issue:
Whether or not assisting the principal in
bringing the body of the deceased to the ground will
make one an accessory to the crime?
Decision:
An accessory does not participate in the
criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of
the felony, but with knowledge of the commission of
the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3)
ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b)
by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the
crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by
assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal
of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public
functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
Even if she assisted her co-appellant without
duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body
down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving
said body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an
attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime.
The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime,
the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to
prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar,
the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place
where it was easily visible to the public. Under such
circumstances there could not have been any attempt
on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body
of the crime. Thus, Josefina Molina is acquitted.
Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability
People v. Mariano (G.R. No. L-40527)
Facts:
That on or about and during the period from
May 11 and June 8, 1971, in San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano,
being then appointed as Liaison Officer by the then
incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco,
acting for and in behalf of the municipality and
authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess
property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said
municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the
following items with a total value of $717.50 or
P4,797.35, involving the duty of making delivery of
said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said
accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of
the said items and far from complying with his
aforesaid obligation and in spite of repeated demands,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said items valued at
$717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the said
USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the said sum of $717,50 or P4,797.35. On
February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his
counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information on the
following grounds:
1. That the court trying the cause has no
jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person of
the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
3. That it contains averments which , if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification.
In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that
the items which were the subject matter of the
Information against him were the same items for which
Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco was indicted before a
Military Commission under a charge of malversation of
public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had
been found guilty and that inasmuch as the case
against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by
the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him.
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued
an Order granting the motion to quash on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows:
Considering that the Military Commission had
already taken cognizance of the malversation case
against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject
matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the
case involving the subject properties had already been
heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military
Commission, and as such this Court is without
jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject
matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied)
64 | P a g e
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
but did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the
motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can be held liable for
estafa?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent
court gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction
over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with
the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor
Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and
malversation are two separate and distinct offenses
and in the case now before the SC the accused in one
is different from the accused in the other.
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or
judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the
constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the
question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First
Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved
on the basis of the law or statute providing for or
defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary
Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided
that Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months,or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.The
offense of estafa  charged against respondent Mariano
is penalized with arresto mayor  in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, or
imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the
penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been
committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano,
falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first
instance.
The above of course is not disputed by
respondent Judge; what he claims in his Order is that
his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the
military commission and because the latter tribunal
was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter,
respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That
statement of respondent court is incorrect. In People
vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice
now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically
reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is
rightly contended by the Solicitor General that at the
time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December
18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said
court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular
provision of which was not affected one way or the
other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law.
The Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction
over the crime of estafa.
Arts. 21-24: Penalties in General
Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws
People v. Evina (G.R. No. 124830-310)
Facts:
Gerardo Evina was found guilty by the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City (Branch 9) of two
counts of simple rape and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The
crime of rape was committed on November 3, 1991
and on November 7, 1991, in the City of Tacloban
against Marites Cacharo while she was sleeping in her
bedroom. Evina tied Marites’s hands with a big
handkerchief and poked a knife at her. This special
aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were both
proven during the trial. However, these were not
alleged in the information.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances
be considered in fixing the penalty?
Decision:
The aggravating circumstances cannot be
considered in fixing the penalty because they were not
alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Although the crimes charged were
committed before the effectivity of the said rule,
nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively
being favorable to the appellant. Although the
aggravating circumstances in question cannot be
appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty
in this case, they should, however, be considered as
bases for the award of exemplary damages,
conformably to current jurisprudence.
People v. Lazaro (G.R. No. 112090)
Facts:
Lazaro was charged, tried and convicted for
two separate crimes of illegal possession of
firearms/ammunition and homicide under Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 which was the governing law at the time
the crime was committed in 1991. The two separate
cases, Criminal Case No. 91-3487 (for homicide) and
Criminal Case No. 91-3483 (for illegal possession of
firearm) were not tried jointly, although filed in the
same trial court. Republic Act No. 8294 has since
amended P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for
simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession and
65 | P a g e
considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as
an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime
involved in the case at bench was committed on May
5, 1991. In view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act 8294 to Presidential Decree 1866,
separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal
possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal
possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be rightfully
convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
separately from the crime of homicide under RA 8294
(amending PD 1866).
Decision:
No. As a general rule, penal laws will
generally have prospective application except where
the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In
this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant
Lazaro from a separate conviction for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law
should be given retroactive application.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Lazaro should
be spared from a separate conviction for the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of
the present review. Accused-appellant Lazaro was
hereby acquitted of the said crime and the case was
dismissed.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
People v. Pacifador (G.R. No. 139405)
Facts:
On October 27, 1988, Arturo F. Pacificador
then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation, a government-owned
corporation, and therefore, a public officer was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The crime was committed from
December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila
by Pacificador. After his arraignment, the respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription
of the offense. Sandiganbayan on November 10, 1998
dismissed the Information against the respondent on
the ground of prescription. The Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Solicitor General was denied by
the Sandiganbayan. Republic Act No. 3019 provides
for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall
prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that
prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable
under the said statute was only ten (10) years.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime had not yet
prescribed as the special law governing the same have
been amended increasing the prescriptive period from
ten (10) to fifteen (1) years.
Decision:
The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15)
years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as
amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case
for the reason that the amendment, not being
favorable to the accused, cannot be given retroactive
effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986
or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. The crime had
already prescribed when the Information in this case
was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27,
1988.It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases
that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of
crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is
to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into
account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes
which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of
the state in favor of the offender.
Pardon by Offended Party
Sta. Catalina v. People (G.R. No. 167805)
Facts:
Lorenzo Ballecer entered into a joint business
venture with Arnold Sta. Catalina involving importation
of Jute sacks from China. Petitioner told that he had a
ready buyer in the Philippines which was willing to buy
the jute sacks at P12.25 per piece. Convinced,
Ballecer ordered one container to Sta. Catalina.
Thereafter, Ballecer and Sta. Catalina
proceeded to Citytrust Bank to open a letter of credit.
They were required to post a marginal deposit
amounting to P100, 000. The two went to United
Coconut Planters Bank to encash a check. After the
encashment, they went back to Citytrust but arrived
after banking hours. Sta. Catalina suggested that the
money be deposited in his account which Ballecer
agreed.
Few days after, while preparing the supporting
documents for the letter of credit, Ballacer found that
there was an overpricing on the cost of the jute sacks.
Realizing that his business venture was losing
proposition he asked Sta. Catalina to return the P100,
000, however, the latter failed to return the money
despite repeated verbal and formal demands made by
the former.
Sta. Catalina as defense alleged that there
was no misappropriation of the money. He further
claimed that the said money was spent and used for
the office expenses, salaries and other expenses of
the office which both of the occupy.
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The trial court convicted Sta. Catalina for the
crime of Estafa. Aggrieved, he appealed the decision
of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. However,
the public prosecutor filed a manifestation stating that
Ballecer is no longer interested in pursuing his
complaint and the case should be decided based on
Ballecer’s Affidavit of Desistance. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the judgment of
conviction by the trial court. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Ballacer will justify the dismissal of the
action?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that an Affidavit of
Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action, once the action has been instituted in court. In
the case at bar, Ballecer made the so-called pardon of
Sta. Catalina after the institution of the action, almost
two years after the trial court had rendered its decision.
The court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance especially when executed as an
afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who had given it later on changed
his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Balderama v. People (G.R. No. 147578-85)
Facts:
Rolando Balderama and Rolando Nagal are
employees of the Field Enforcement Division of LTO.
On the other hand, Juan Armamento is the operator of
SJ Taxi. On July 14, 1992, the team of Flying Squad
flagged down one taxi owned by Armamento. They
impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was
defective, however, upon inspection and testing by the
LTO the results showed that the meter was functioning
normally.
Feeling aggrieved, Armamento filed a
complaint for Bribery and violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. He
alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four
LTO officers had been collecting protection money
from him in exchange of non-apprehension and non-
impounding of his vehicles.
Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Information for
violation of Direct Bribery and Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. During the pendency of the action,
accused De Jesus died. The cases against him were
dismissed but the hearing proceeded against
Balderama, Nagal and Lubrica.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision,
convicting Balderama, Nagal and Lubrica for the above
violation. They filed a motion for reconsideration but
were denied by the former. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Armamento’s affidavit of
recantation will result to the dismissal of the
complaint?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the complaint
shall not be dismissed. A recantation or an affidavit of
desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation.
The court looks with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that
an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after
conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves
only scant attention.
The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits
of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses,
usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Only when there exist special
circumstances in the case which when coupled with
the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the
testimony or statement given, can retractions be
considered and upheld.
In this case, there is indubitably nothing in the affidavit
which creates doubts on the guilt of the accused
Balderama and Nagal.
People v. Dimaano (G.R. No. 168168)
Facts:
Maricar Dimaano is the daughter of the
accused Edgardo Dimaano. A complaint was filed by
Maricar charging Edgardo with two counts of Rape and
one count of attempted rape. Maricar alleged that she
was only 10 years old when her father Edgardo started
sexually abusing her. It was only on November of 1995
that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of
January 1, 1996.
Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame
upon the advised of a relative. The Medico-Legal
Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the
complainant and found her to have suffered deep
healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin
state.
67 | P a g e
On the other hand, the accused denied such
accusations. He contended that he could not have
raped Maricar because he was always in the office. He
claimed that it was impossible for him to rape his
daughter because there were other people in the
house. He further argued that had he raped Maricar,
then she would have not accompanied him to the
Paranaque Police Station to apply for police clearance.
The trial court rendered its Decision,
convicting Edgardo of the crime of Rape. Aggrieved,
he appealed his case before the Court of Appeals but
the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the voluntary and due
execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by Maricar is a
ground for the dismissal of the complaint against
Edgardo?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that by itself, an
Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action, once the action has been instituted in
court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute
privilege to decide whether the rape charge should
proceed, because the case was already filed and must
therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.
The court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance, especially when executed afterthought.
The unreliable character of this document is shown by
the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after
going through the trouble of having the accused
arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts and
recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn
around and declare that she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case.
In the case at bar, Maricar repudiated the
affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no
lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature
and had shown her resolve to continue with the
prosecution of the cases.Arts. 25-45: Penalties
Reclusion Perpetua
People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332)
Facts:
On September 23, 1994, 13-year-old Maricel
B. Talisay, together with her minor brothers Jun and
Joey slept side-by-side at their store. Their parents
were caretakers of a beach house and needed to
sleep there at that time. At 3:00 in the morning, a
ticklish sensation and stabs of pain in her vagina
awakened Maricel. When she woke up, she saw the
accused, Noli Novio, naked on top of her. Her duster
was rolled up to her neck and her panty has already
been removed by the accused. Noel Novio was able
to penetrate his penis inside Maricel’s Vagina.
Meanwhile, Maricel’s parents were awakened
by their neighbor and reported to them that a man was
inside their store. Nenita, Maricel’s mother
immediately got hold of her bolo and flashlight and
proceeded to their store. Nenita saw a man’s sandals
at the doorstep. Nenita knocked and called out to
Maricel and ordered her to open the door. Despite
repeated demands to open the door, Maricel was not
able to do so. Nenita was able to forcibly open the
door and beamed the flashlight to Maricel and saw
Noel Novio on top of her. The accused was holding
the hands of Maricel with his left hand and covered her
mouth with his right hand. Nenita mounted to hack
Novio with her bolo but the accused immediately took
his jogging pants and ran away leaving his shirt, wallet,
underwear and sandals. Nenita immediately reported
the incident to the barangay and went to the police for
investigation. Maricel submitted herself to medical
examination right after the incident.
Noli Novio denied the allegations and argued
that Maricel and him are sweethearts. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape and sentenced him to 30 years of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim the sum
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the cost of these  proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in
imposing the proper penalty for the crime of rape?
Decision:
No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty
imposed by the trial court is void. Under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, the prescribed penalty for simple rape is
reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court sentenced
the appellant to thirty years of reclusion perpetua. The
penalty imposed by the trial court is void.Although
under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a
range of twenty years and one day to forty years, by
nature, the penalty remains a single and indivisible
penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal
portions. If the law prescribes reclusion perpetua as a
single and indivisible penalty for a felony, the trial court
is mandated to impose said penalty, absent any
privileged mitigating circumstances conformably with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court is
not authorized to vary the penalty provided for by law
either in the character or the extent of punishment
inflicted.
There was no need for the trial court to specify
the duration of thirty years of reclusion perpetua
whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any proper
68 | P a g e
case. The Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code which pertinently provides that, in
applying the so-called “three-fold rule,” i.e., that
“(w)hen the culprit has to serve two or more
penalties, . . . the maximum duration of the convict’s
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him” – “the duration of
perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years.” The imputation of a thirty-
year duration to reclusion perpetua in Article 70 is, as
this Court recently held, “only to serve as the basis for
determining the convict’s eligibility for pardon or for the
application of the three-fold rule in the service of
multiple penalties.
People v. Zacarias (G.R. No. 138990)
Facts:
Sergio Pelicano, Sr., on direct examination,
testified that on June 23, 1993 at about 12:30 in the
morning while waiting for his son, he heard a
commotion outside his house. When he looked
outside, he saw Christopher Sacay, son of his long-
time friend, being chased by Sammy Zacarias, Rodel
Zacarias, Wally Ticalo and Rene Matugas. The boy
ran towards the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Pelicano followed the group and when he was only
about 10 meters away from the four men, he saw
Rodel Zacarias hold the victim while the rest took turns
in stabbing and hacking the boy.However, Ticalo
claimed that on the day of the said incident, he was
working in the farm and had a drinking spree with the
owner of the farm until 10:00 in the evening. The
owner of the farm even contended that the town where
his farm was was far distant from the town where the
stabbing incident took place. The trial court sentenced
Ticalo to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the death of Christopher Sacay
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in
finding Ticalo guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
No, the Supreme Court is not convinced with
the contention of Ticalo, however, a word, in passing,
about the manner the trial court imposed the penalty.
In the scales of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately
higher than reclusion temporal which has a duration of
twelve years and one day to twenty years. The
minimum range of reclusion perpetua should then, by
necessary implication, start at 20 years and 1 day
while the maximum thereunder could be co-extensive
with the rest of the natural life of the offender. Article
70, however, provides that the maximum period in
regard to the service of sentence shall not exceed 40
years. Reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible
penalty and, when it is the prescribed penalty, should
be imposed in its entirety, i.e., reclusion perpetuasans
a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing direction, carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua,its duration in years, Latupan entered the house of Ceferino and started
in fine, need not be specified. chasing Ceferino's wife, who was able to run.

People v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 138261)
Facts:
On May 23, 1993, at 7:30 in the evening in
Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City, Montano Banez, while
strolling in the plaza, saw the victim Jonathan ‘Jojo”
Alkuino. Since Jojo was a former resident of the
barangay, Banez invited him to have a drinking spree
in the nearby store. The two sat side-by-side and were
exchanging stories when Pedro Ramirez suddenly
came up to them. Ramirez hit Jojo on the right side of
his body just below his ribs. Jojo was immediately
brought to the hospital and was still alive on arrival but
died the next day due to hypovolemic shock or
massive blood loss. The trial court found Ramirez
guilty of murder and sentencing him to "suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.”
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in
specifying the length of imprisonment in the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua?
The house of Emilio Asuncion known as “Emy”
was 100 meters from Ceferino's house. He reached his
house and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground
with several stab wounds on her body and his 3
children (Leo, Jaime, and Jose) wounded. Doctors
treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime, However, Jose
was transferred to another hospital due to seriousness
of his wounds. Jose was declared dead on arrival.
On May 25, 1993, at arraignment, accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge of frustrated murder.
During the pre-trial conference of the four cases
(Criminal Case No. 379-T, Criminal Case No. 380-T,
Criminal Case No. 381-T, Criminal Case No. 382-T),
accused offered to change his plea of not guilty to
guilty of the complex crime of double murder and
frustrated murder.
On August 25, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision finding the accused Latupan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Double
Murder and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment
and to indemnify the heirs.
Issue:

Decision: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting

accused-appellant of the complex crime of double
No, the Supreme Court held that in sentencing murder?
appellant "to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years
reclusion perpetua." There was no justification or need
for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment,
because reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty.
The significance of this fundamental principle was laid
down by the Court in People v. Diquit, "Since reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum,
medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its
entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion
perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person
sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by
reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he
shall be considered by the Chief Executive as
unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code)."

Arts. 46-77: Application of Penalties

Complex Crime

People v. Latupan (G.R. Nos. 112453-56)

Facts:

On April 29, 1991, Ceferino Dagulo heard

shouts of a woman and a child coming from the north.
He saw accused Gerardo Latupan walking in his

69 | P a g e

Decision:
The trial court, erred in convicting accused-
appellant of the "complex crime of double murder" and
separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
The instant case does not fall under any of the
two mentioned instances when a complex crime is
committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose
Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo
Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from
several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death
of two persons does not result from a single act but
from two different shots, two separate murders, and
not a complex crime, are committed."
Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a
complex crime of double murder, but for two separate
counts of murder, and separate counts of physical
injuries.
People v. Pineda (G.R. No. L-26222)
Facts:
On July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home
of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were
asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22)
and paliuntod(homemade gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza
fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the
door of the house, entered therein, and let loose
several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor
children of the couple and wounding Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal
cases: Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo, moved
for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case."
Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same
incident and motivated by one impulse."
Respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to
unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the
other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be
dropped from the docket."
The City Fiscal moved for reconsideration
upon the ground that "more than one gun was used,
more than one shot was fired and more than one
victim was killed." Thereafter, the defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied
the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the
acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of
70 | P a g e
continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by
different and separate sets of shots, moved by one
impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime
though the series of shots killed more than one victim;"
and that only one information for multiple murder
should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five
cases instead of one."
Issue:
Whether or not there should be one
information, either for the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery
with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide or
should the five indictments remain as they are?
Decision:
Four separate crimes of murder and a
frustrated murder result from the firing of several shots
at five victims. The crimes are not complex. Five
information should be filed. There is a complex crime
where one shot from a gun results in the death of two
or more persons, or where one stabbed another and
the weapon pierced the latter’s body and wounded
another, or where a person plant’s a bomb in an
airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a
number of persons are killed. When various victicms
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.
People v. Sanidad (G.R. No. 146099)
Facts:
On 16 January 1999, Marlon Tugadi, Jun
Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito
Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip,
Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac,
Tagum, Abra, on board a passenger jeepney driven by
Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the town of
Lagangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the
residents in a drinking spree that lasted the following
morning.
Accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce
Manuel alias Pambong and several other residents of
Lagangilang joined them in drinking. Marlon Tugadi
and accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies
and members of the CAFGU before then.
On 17 January 1999, Jimmel Sanidad and his
companions finished drinking and left. Shortly after, the
group of Marlon Tugadi also stopped drinking and
headed home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the
same jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo.
As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a
classic case of ambuscade suddenly and without
warning unleashed a volley of shots at the
jeepney.Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with
the exception of Rolando Tugadi, survived the ambush
and suffered only minor injuries.
Apparently shaken and dazed by their
terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a culvert on the side
of the road and did not come out until the police
arrived at the scene. Apparently shaken and dazed by
their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid on the side of the
road and did not come out until the police arrived at
the scene.
An Information for murder with multiple
attempted murder and malicious mischief was filed
against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel
alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter Doe. The defense
of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi.
The trial court disregarded the defense
interposed by the accused and convicted them of the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder, and sentenced them to death.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty
of complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder and imposing upon then the supreme penalty
of death?
Decision:
The Supreme Court fully agreed with the lower
court that the instant case comes within the purview of
Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of
complex crimes, provides that when "a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex
crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.
Although several independent acts were
performed by the accused in firing separate shots from
their individual firearms, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed victim
Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that
accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every
one of the victims separately and distinctly from each
other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a
single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as
a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in
frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not
able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual
acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked
upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to
a single complex offense.
71 | P a g e
Delito Continuado
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28)
Facts:
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute and/or cause
the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past
AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of
certain parcels of land,” Ombudsman Investigators
Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio
Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that
based on their findings, the following may be charged
with falsification of public documents and violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019:
petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-
RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head
of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department in charge of Land
Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-
RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land
Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo Nasser and
Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by a panel
of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued on March
30, 2001 a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to
file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts of
violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty.
Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise
recommended that the complaint against petitioner be
dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding
investigation on his liability.
After conducting clarificatory hearings, the
investigating panel issued a Memorandum,
recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be
charged with 148 counts of estafa through falsification
of public documents, and one count violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman
approved the recommendation of the Panel of
Prosecutors. Petitioner and his co-accused filed their
respective Motions for Reconsideration of the
investigating panel’s June 15, 2004 Memorandum.The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It likewise denied
the motion for the consolidation of the cases,
considering that the other cases filed were pending in
its other divisions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution which was denied again by the
Sandiganbayan. Motion to Quash was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not only one information for estafa
should be filed for all these cases?
Held:
The petition has no merit.The Sandiganbayan,
for its part, sustained the contention of respondents
and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s
and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are
addressed to the sound discretion of the Prosecutors
based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes
committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single
crime consisting of series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution.
When required to comment on the motion of
petitioner and his co- accused for a consolidation of
the charges filed against them before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected
thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes
committed by the accused as there were sales
contracts forged by them.  Held:
Indeed, the determination of what charges to
file and who are to be charged are matters addressed
to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the
matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner
and his co-accused under the Informations pending in
the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito
continuado or classified as concurso de delitos;
orinvolve separate crimes under the category of
concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such
factual issues should be resolved after trial on the
merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked
to determine whether the several sales contracts
executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set
afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by
an uninterrupted force however long a time it may
occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the
determination of the trial court, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan.
Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266)
Facts:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the
Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA
162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the
ground that said case was intended solely to harass
her as she was then a presidential candidate. The
petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan
(First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
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arraignment on November 13, 1992. The
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to
defer the arraignment. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill
of particulars. According to petitioner, unless she was
furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post
the corresponding bail bonds. Hence, the filing of the
instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 32 Amended Informations
may be admitted?
The petition is denied.
The Court find that, technically, there was only
one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her.The 32 Amended Informations charge
what is known as delito continuado or "continued
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous
crime."
The original information charged petitioner
with performing a single criminal act - that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not
qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The
original information also averred that the criminal act :
(i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law -
Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on
a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The
32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the
allegation of the original information, except that
instead of the word "aliens" in the original information
each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the
offenses were committed on the same period of time,
i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32
aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when
the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the
hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March
11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the
sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the
32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371
to 18402) into one information charging only one
offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698.
Habitual Delinquency
People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556)
Facts:
The appellant was charged in the lower court
with the crime of theft of articles valued at P 585.15
and, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six
months and one day of prision correccional and, being
a habitual delinquent, to an additional penalty of two
years, four months and one day of prision
correccional. The appellant is a recidivist and plead
guilty to the crime of theft. He is also a habitual
delinquent, this being his third conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not recidivism, as inherent in
habitual delinquency, should still be taken into
consideration in fixing the principal penalty?
Decision:
Yes, recidivism should still be taken into
consideration in fixing the principal penalty even
though it is inherent in habitual delinquency. The
appellant in this case is a habitual delinquent, this
being his third conviction. Recidivism, although
inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be
considered in fixing the principal penalty. There is no
doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing
additional penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish
him more severely. However, the result would be
otherwise if, for imposing the additional penalty,
recidivism could not be considered as an aggravating
circumstance in fixing the principal penalty. In the
instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty is present. If the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism is not to be taken into
consideration for imposing the additional penalty for
habitual delinquency, the mitigating circumstance
would require that the penalty prescribed by law be
imposed in it minimum period. The imposition of the
additional penalty would make the penalty lighter,
instead of more severe, contrary to the purpose of the
law.
People v. De Jesus (G.R. No. 45198)
Facts:
Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of theft of
an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P 2.65 committed,
according to the information, on April 28, 1936. He was
therein sentenced to one month and one day of
arresto mayor with accessory penalties, to indemnify
Francis Liwanag the value of the umbrella which was
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not recovered, and being a habitual delinquent, the
additional penalty of two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional.
The accused plead guilty of the crime imputed
to him in the information filed against him. It was
alleged in the information that he is a habitual
delinquent, having been convicted by final judgments
of the crimes of theft and qualified theft on January 4,
1933 and November 18, 1935 respectively, the date of
his last release being January 10, 1936.
Due to his admission of guilt of the crime
imputed to him in the information, it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that when one pleads guilty of the
crime imputed to him in the information, it is
understood that he admits all material facts alleged
therein, not excluding those alleging his former
convictions of other crimes.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstance of recidivism
can be and must be twice taken into consideration, first
as an aggravating circumstance, and second as a
qualifying circumstance or one inherent in habitual
delinquency?
Decision:
Yes, recidivism can be considered as an
aggravating circumstance in determining the principal
penalty and as a qualifying circumstance in habitual
delinquency.
As to the principal penalty, there is the rule
that in cases in which the penalty prescribed by law
contains three periods, the courts must take into
consideration, in the application of said penalty, the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances established at
the trial if they do not appear to be compensated by
other circumstance. It is reiterated in People vs.
Melendrez that the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism, even in cases of habitual delinquency,
should be taken into consideration in the application of
the principal penalty in the corresponding period.
The proposition that if recidivism is considered
an inherent or qualifying circumstance of habitual
delinquency it should not be taken into account in the
imposition of the principal penalty, seems to be
untenable because it is based upon the erroneous
assumption that habitual delinquency is a crime. It is
simply a fact or circumstance which, if present in a
given case, gives rise to the imposition of the
additional penalties prescribed therein.
As to the additional penalty, if we must rely
upon the spirit and letter of the law, we would say that
the purpose of the latter in establishing it was to
prevent those for the second time or more commit the
crimes from relapsing thereafter at least during the
period fixed thereby. The lower court correctly ruled in
imposing the additional penalty.

Arts. 89-93: Total Extinction of Criminal Liability
Death of the Accused
De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579)
Facts:
On February 8, 1995, in the City of Makati,
petitioner De Guzman, stole several pieces of jewelry
valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine
Gongora.The trial court rendered its decision finding
de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
imposed a penalty of imprisonment, as well as the
penalties accessory thereto. The Court further finds
the accused De Guzman civilly liable and orders her to
pay the private offended party. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of
damages. During the appeal in the Supreme Court, on
January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a
Manifestation informing the Court that the petitioner
passed away on January 13, 2003.The death of the
petitioner resulted from a vehicular accident, as
indicated in the Certificate of Death attached thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of
the petitioner is extinguished by reason of her death?
Decision:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.Although both the trial and the appellate
courts found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of
last resort and challenge the findings of the two courts
below. The judgment of conviction was pending review
until her untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet
attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to
dismiss the instant petition for review. The Court is
dismissing the case because there is no longer a need
to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower
court’s decision has thus become ineffectual.
Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007)
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before
Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991.
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Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital
due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General
expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
Decision:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only  the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto  in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench,
we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843)
Facts:
On August 4, 1992, at Capulaan, Villasis,
Pangasinan, the accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with long
firearms, attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y
Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
An Information, dated March 9, 1993, was filed
charging appellant Pedro Abungan, together with
Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at
large), with murder.
The trial court rendered a decision finding
Abungan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.
During appeal, in a letter dated August 7,
2000, however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director
of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that
Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the
NBP Hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of
the appellant is extinguished by reason of her death?
Decision:
In the present case, it is clear that, following
the case of People vs.Bayotas, the death of appellant
extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because
he died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability
arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto)
was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that
his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a
separate civil action against his estate, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.
Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz
2007-0388
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Prescription of Offenses
Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)
Facts:
Cawili and his business associate Tongson
borrowed from Panaguiton (petitioner) sums amounting
to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of
them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon
presentation.Panaguiton made demands to pay but to
no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24,
1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutor’s
Office.
Tongson moved to drop his name from the
case as his signatures were allegedly falsified. Case
against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding
that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the
chief state prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation.Tongson moved for
reconsideration but denied.
In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for the action has prescribed pursuant to Act
3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of
statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She
claims that the filing of the complaint on August 24,
1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the
law refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the
prosecutor’s office tolled the prescriptive period?
Decision:
Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutor’s
office tolls the prescriptive period for violations of
BP22.When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary
investigation of cases was done by the justices of
peace, and not by agents of the executive department
(i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time
is that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of
peace (a judicial process). However, since then, the
conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to
the function of the executive department.
Today, the term proceedings must be
understood to mean either executive or judicial
proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of
investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll
prescription.
To rule otherwise would deprive the injured
party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays not under his control. As seen in this case,
various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his
cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep on their
right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of
circumstances beyond their control.
Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 881)
Facts:
Sometime in April 1985, Caridad Dorol
mortgaged her property--an agricultural land located in
Bacon, Sorsogon to her cousin Recebido.Dorol and
Recebido did not execute any mortgage document, but
instead, the former gave to the latter a copy of the
Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 which was done by
Juan Dorol (father of Caridad).
On September 9, 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the
house of Recebido to redeem such property, wherein
Recebido refused to allow claiming that Dorol has
already sold to him the land on 1979. Dorol, on the
other hand, insisted that the transaction between them
was not a sale, but a mere mortgage.
Caridad Dorol, then, went to the Office of the
Assessor in Sorsogon and verified the existence of a
file Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 in which she
knew that the property was already registered in
Recebido’s name.A comparison of the specimen
signatures of Caridad’s other documents and that in
the questioned Deed of Sale was done, and NBI
Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas found out that
in the latter’s signature was falsified.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Sorsogon filed the information indicting Recebido for
Falsification of Public Document with the Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon.
The trial court rendered the decision convicting the
petitioner of the crime and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years
and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum
and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.
The defense of prescription was raised only during
the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime charged had already
prescribed at the time the information was filed?
Decision:
No. Prescription, although not invoked in the
trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal. Hence,
the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash
the information does not give rise to the waiver of the
petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter
including during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged
has not prescribed. The petitioner is correct in stating
that whether or not the offense charged has already
prescribed when the information was filed would
depend on the penalty imposable therefore, which in
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this case is “prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00
pesos.”
Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is
a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine
imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the
penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall
prescribe in ten years. The issue that the petitioner has
missed, however, is the reckoning point of the
prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression
that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started
at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate.
Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period
of prescription shall “commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents.
Caniza v. People (159 SCRA 16)
Facts:
OnMarch 20, 1974, Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila filedan Information for falsification of
public documentsallegedly committed on Nov. 5,
1968 by Caniza.
On May 24, 1974, Caniza filed Motion to
Quash sayingthat allegations in the information did
not constitute an offense, and that the information
contained averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification.TheTrial court granted
Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza.
Fiscal’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was
denied.
On June 13, 1979, a second
Informationwas filed charging Caniza with
substantially the same offense as that charged under
the previous information.Caniza moved to quash this
second information on the grounds that 1) the offense
charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first
Information had been on the merits, 3)the allegations
of the second Information did not constitute and
offense.
The judge issued an order denying the
motion to quash. He also denied Caniza’s motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged had
already prescribed?
Decision:
No. 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had
elapsed between November 5, 1968 (the date of
commission of the alleged offense) and March 20,
1974 (date of filing the first information); 4 years, 2
months and 12days had elapsed between April 3,
1975 (date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscal’s
 motion for reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date
of filing of the second information). A total of 9 years,
6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the
time the second Information was filed in court.
Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of
public document committed by a private individual
-the offense with which petitioner Cañiza is presently
charged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect,
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further:
“Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run
fromthe day on which the crime is discovered by
theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents,
andshall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
orinformation, andshall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted,or are justifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him.”
Amnesty
People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)
Facts:
On August 16, 1990, an
Information for murder was filed
against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie,"
et al., for killing Alfredo Arevalo.
Accused-appellant Jose
Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with
Murder for the killing of one Rudy de
Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag
under Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672,
respectively.
On January 20, 1998, the
lower court rendered its decision
convicting the herein accused-
appellant.
Thus, Accused-Appellant filed
his appeal. However, while his appeal
was pending, he applied for amnesty
under Proclamation No. 724 amending
Proclamation No. 347, dated March
25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty
to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other
Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Furtherance of Political Ends, and
Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." His application was
favorably granted by the National
Amnesty Board.
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After a careful verification and
evaluation on the claims of the
applicant, the Local Amnesty Board
concluded that his activities were done
in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It,
thus, recommended on 20 May 1998
the grant of his application for
amnesty.
The Commission, in its
deliberation on the application on 22
October 1999, resolved to approve the
recommendation of the Local Amnesty
Board.
The Office of the Solicitor
General, in its letter dated June 23,
2000 to the National Amnesty
Commission, requested information as
to whether or not a motion for
reconsideration was filed by any party,
and the action, if there was any, taken
by the NAC.
In his reply dated June 28,
2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote,
among other things, that there has
been no motion for reconsideration
filed by any party.
Accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty
under Proclamation No. 724 on May
17, 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of
amnesty in favor of Jose Patriarca, Jr.
- while the various criminal cases filed
against him were pending - shall
completely extinguished his criminal
liability?
Decision:
Amnesty commonly denotes a
general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grant to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some
breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished
by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
In the case of People vs.
Casido, the difference between
pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the
Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should
take judicial notice. Pardon is granted
to one after conviction; while amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does 'not work
the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon,'
and it 'in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence'
(Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed
no offense."
This Court takes judicial notice
of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It
serves to put an end to the appeal.
Arts. 100-103: Civil Liability
Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785)
Facts:
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with
having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege
that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof,
78 | P a g e
[respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette
Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if
they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations.
Having been convinced by them and because of the
close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the
latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month,
she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the
accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00,
[respondent] gave [petitioner a open dated Hermosa
Savings Bank (HSLB) with the assurance that if the
entire amount is not paid within one (1) year,
[petitioner] can deposit the check.
In June 1997, [petitioner] together with
Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums
[above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to
acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6,
1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks
in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00
since all the money given by her to [respondent] came
from Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for
having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon
[respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint
for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
[respondent].
Issue:
Whether respondent remains civilly liable to
her for the sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she
asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the
aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans
have not been paid?
Decision:
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has
a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State
because of the disturbance of the social order and (2)
as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion,
espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender either
because there are no damages to be compensated or
there is no private person injured by the crime). What
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of
everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether
or not punishable by law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it
the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.
The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto  is
that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
crime being one of the five sources of obligations
under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal
charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because
the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution
(proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of
evidence). In order to be completely free from civil
liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact
that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is
based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he
did not commit the act complained of. It may only be
that the facts proved did not constitute the offense
charged.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the
following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared
the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in
nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted.
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe
any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA,
her supposed civil liability had already been fully
satisfied and extinguished by payment. The
statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that
respondent, who was acquitted from the charges
against her, had already been completely relieved of
civil liability.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received
the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but
argues that the same were applied to interest
payments only. It however appears that [petitioner]
was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of
interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash
payments [made] were recorded at the back of the
cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting
as testified to by [respondent] and her employees,
Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the
daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7
to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her
obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of
P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she
stopped making further payments when she realized
that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that
[respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00,
inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is
definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount
she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts
were never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation
in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on
her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of
the Civil Code].
By and large, the obligation of [respondent]
has already been extinguished long before the
79 | P a g e
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to
apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing
obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing
obligation was extinguished after full payment was
made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and
convincing documentary evidence of payment
presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.
Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons
Nueva Espana v. People (460 SCRA 547)
Facts:
Petitioner Nueva Espana was found guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting into double homicide
when the passenger bus he was driving rammed into a
Honda motorcycle driven by Reynard So with Nilo
Castro as passenger resulting into the death of both.
An aggravating circumstance was also imposed as
Espana also left the scene of the crime without lending
assistance to the victims.
During trial, the father of So and the mother of
Castro were both called on to testify as to the earning
capacity of the two. So’s father claimed that his son
was earning P80,000 a month while Castro’s mother
said that his son was bringing in P8,000 a month. So’s
father additionally testified that the funeral expenses
incurred by them was P87,000 while Castro’s mom
stated that they spent P30,000 for the funeral.
As a result the trial court, besides imprisonment,
awarded the following amounts to the heirs of the
victims:
 TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM REYNARD SO
 1)       P2,997,000.00 – indemnity for loss of
earning capacity of victim
 2)       14,200.00 – for expenses of the
wake
 3)       20,000.00 – for funeral parlor
 4)       12,000.00 – for the tomb
 5)       53,000.00 – for cost of burial site
 6)       30,000.00 – for attorney’s fees
 7)       200,000.00 – for moral damages
 8)       100,000.00 – for exemplary damages
 P3,429,200.00 – TOTAL AMOUNT
 TO THE HEIRS OF VICTIM NILO CASTRO
 1)       P1,728,000.00 – indemnity for loss of
earning capacity
 2)       20,000.00 – for funeral expenses
 3)       200,000.00 – for moral damages
 4)       50,000.00 – for exemplary damages
 P1,998,000.00 – TOTAL AMOUNT
 The court based the amount of loss of earning
capacity based on the formula used by the Supreme
Court as illustrated:
As to the civil liability, particularly the
indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the
victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme
Court is:
“Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x
gross-living expenses annual (50% of gross
annual income)”
Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was
earning P80,000 a month at the time of his death when
he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity
should be computed as follows:
x = 2 (80 ― 30) x [P960,000.00 ―
P480,000.00)
3
x = 33.4 x P480,000.00
x =          x P16,032,000.00
With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was
earning P8,000.00 a month when he died at the age of
twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were:
x = 2 (80 ― 26)    [P96,000.00 ― P48,000.00]
3 liability may be enforced only upon a motion for
x = 36 x P48,000.00
x = P1,728,000.00
As a result, petitioner appeals to the CA but the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court
regarding the damages, Consequently, the CA
declared that Vallacar Transit Inc., should not yet be
held subsidiary liable for the liability of the petitioner as
its driver. Thus, this petition for review with the SC.
Issue:
Was the award of damages amounting to P8
million proper?
Decision:
The SC modifies the award of damages mostly
to the fact that loss of earning capacity should be
properly adduced and supported by competent
evidence to prove the same. This rule also applies to
the funeral and burial expenses. In the case at bar, the
lower courts based their award for damages solely on
the testimony of SO’s father and Castro’s mother, even
though both of them never substantiated the amounts
claimed with receipts, papers and other evidence. And
so the award is modified as follows:
80 | P a g e
To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So
are entitled to the following:
P   50,000 — civil indemnity ex delicto
     73,000 — actual damages
     25,000 — temperate damages    
50,000 — moral damages
     25,000 — exemplary damages
     30,000 — attorney’s fees
P 253,000 — TOTAL
The heirs of Nilo Castro are also entitled to the
following:
P    50,000 — civil indemnity ex delicto
       50,000 — temperate damages      
50,000 — moral damages
       25,000 — exemplary damages
       30,000 — attorney’s fees
P  205,000 —  TOTAL
The SC meanwhile adopts the pronouncement of
the Court of Appeals regarding the subsidiary liability
of petitioner’s employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. An employer
may be subsidiarily liable for the employee’s civil
liability in the criminal action if it can be shown that: (1)
the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties and (3) the accused is insolvent. However,
subject to prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary
subsidiary writ of execution against Vallacar Transit,
Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.
Pangonorom v. People (455 SCRA 211)
Facts:
Pangonorom was the driver of a passenger
bus owned and operated by MMTC which collided with
a Gemini Isuzu car driven by Carlos Berba, resulting
into the damage of the car and physical injuries
obtained by Berba.
Pangonorom was found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting into damage to property and
physical injuries.
The trial court awarded damages amounting to
P42,000 but was silent as to the subsidiary liability of
MMTC. Consequently, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court and also found MMTC subsidiary liable
for the amount notwithstanding the fact that the
judgment of the trial court was silent as to said matter.
Issue:
Did the CA err in not holding MMTC not
subsidiary liable despite the fact that the RTC did not
mention anything to that effect?
Decision:

The SC ruled that even when the dispositive
portion of an RTC decision does not expressly
pronounce subsidiary liability of the employer, they are
deemed written into the judgment whenever
applicable.
But, he subsidiary liability of the employer
arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action. In the present case, there exists an
employer-employee relationship between petitioners,
the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry,
and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof
here of Olimpio’s insolvency.  The judgment of
conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality.  extinguished unless the court itself finds that civil
This being so, no writ of execution can issue against
him to satisfy his civil liability.  Only after proof of the
accused-employee’s insolvency may the subsidiary
liability of his employer be enforced.
In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak
of enforcing the employer’s subsidiary civil liability
unless it appears that the accused-employee’s primary
liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because
of insolvency.  This fact cannot be known until
sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have
become final.  And even if it appears prima facie that
execution against the employee cannot be satisfied,
execution against the employer will not issue as a
matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement of
a judgment will have to be followed.  Once the
judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final
and executory, and after the writ of execution issued
against him is returned unsatisfied because of his
insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution
be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for
that precise purpose.  It is still too early to hold the
MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee
considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio’s
insolvency.
Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)
Facts:
Petitioner Quinto is the mother of an 11-year
old boy named Wilson who died while going inside a
drainage with the respondents Andres and Pacheco,
who were also of the same age.
What was clear according to a witness who
was a friend of the victim was that the three of them
(Wilson and the respondents) went inside the drainage
filled with water. First to emerge was Pacheco who
immediately went home, and then next to come out
was Andres who was already carrying the dead body
of Wilson.
After being charged with homicide, the trial
court the respondents not guilty and also found the
81 | P a g e
same not civilly liable because of the absence of
preponderance of evidence to prove liability. QUinto
appealed the civil aspect of the decision which the CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Petitioner comes to the Court and raises the
following issues: 1) Does extinction of criminal liability
carry with it extinction of the civil liability; and 2) was
the prosecution able to establish preponderance of
evidence.
Decision:
The civil action based on delict is not
liability did not arise. In the case at bar, the trial court
was very clear that the prosecution was not able to
establish a preponderance of evidence to find the
respondents liable.
As to whether preponderance of evidence
should have been considered, the trial court and the
CA was correct in their findings. Preponderance of
evidence should not be based on the fact that the
evidence of the defense is weaker. The evidence
presented must be strong enough to SUFFICIENTLY
SUSTAIN THE CAUSE OF ACTION.
In the case at bar, the prosecution single
prosecution witness testified that the hematomas on
the alleged victim may have been caused by either
hitting with a blunt object or slipping and falling on the
hard pavement.
Even the friend of the deceased testified that
the drainage was so dark and this was the reason that
he did not come with the other boys inside.
And so, the possibility of slippage by Wilson
was very much a possibility.
Probation Law (P.D. No. 968)
Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747)
Facts:
Petitioner, as President and General Manager
of the company, humiliated his employees and blurted
out invectives against the latter. He was charged with
multip[le grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees
who were allegedly the recipient of the said invectives.
He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out
of 5 cases filed against him. Petitioner elevated the
judgment from the MeTC to the RTC; however, the
latter affirmed his conviction, with modification,
accrediting to him the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no
avail also.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to

avail of probation?

Decision: NO

Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its

benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included.
Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act
of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the
state which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for
the offense of which he stands convicted.
The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any
of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless
the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly
expressed, and no person should benefit from the
terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
 That an appeal should not bar the accused
from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely
to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear
and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which
states that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts:
Petitioners were found guilty by the RTC, of
violation with Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, for having found
in possession of forest products without permit. They
appealed the decision to the CA, but it affirmed their
conviction, with modifications as to the penalty
imposed by the lower court; from 2-8 years to 6
months to 1 year.
Petitioners applied for probation but was
denied by the trial court, and subsequently affirmed by
the CA.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner can still apply for
probation?NO

The penalties imposed by the MeTC were Whether or not Fransisco v. CA applies in this
already probationable. Hence, there was no need to case?YES
appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Decision:

The fact that petitioners put the merits of their

 The multiple prison terms are distinct from
conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that
each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit
their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an
set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to
incorrect penalty.  Certainly, the protestations of
probation, unless he is otherwise specifically
petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not
disqualified.
complete innocence, and do not simply assail the
propriety of the penalties imposed.  
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of
six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on
For sure, petitioners never manifested that
the assumption that those sentenced to higher
they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just
a wrong penalty – to reduce it to within probationable
because of their demonstrated capability for serious
range.  Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so
wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious
after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners
consequences of the offense they might further
should be precluded from seeking probation.
commit. 
By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso
Considering that the multiple prison terms
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of
should not be summed up but taken separately as the
the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to
totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
should have immediately filed an application for
accused who, although already eligible, does not at
probation as he was already qualified after being
once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in
convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
his appeal.
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the
verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC Although it has been suggested that an appeal
to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, should not bar the accused from applying for probation
plainly, the law considers appeal and probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within
mutually exclusive remedies. the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not

82 | P a g e
yet prepared to accept this proposition, especially
given the factual circumstances of this case.  Had the
petitioners’ appeal from the decision of the trial court
raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon
them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have
been more sympathetic to their plight.  Unfortunately,
their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.
Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted for violation of an
ordinance against peddling fish outside of market, as
well as for the crime of resisting and disobeying an
agent of a person in authority.
Petitioner filed an application for probation, but
subsequently withdrew it and filed a notice of appeal.
MTCC granted the withdrawal of application for
probation butdenied her notice appeal for being filed
out of time.The court ordered petitioner to furnish the
City Prosecutor’s Office a copy of her memorandum
and the assailed judgement of conviction. Petitioner
failed to do so, and the court dismissed her special
civil action for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing
the petition for certiorari on ground of petitioner’s
failure to comply with the earlier Order of the same
court?
Decision: NO
The fact that the City Prosecutor’s Office has
not yet entered its appearance is no justification to
petitioner’s adamant and continued insistence not to
comply with a lawful order of the court. Every court has
the power to enforce and compel obedience to its
orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings
pending before it.
Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final when the accused has applied for
probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968, which in part provides
that the filing of an application for probation is deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no
more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to
appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing
of an application for probation.
Maria Criselda Fojas
2010-0226
Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612)
Francisco v. People (434 SCRA 122)
Facts:
83 | P a g e
Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita
Rodriguez. Pacita, through her brother Macarion, sold
to petitioner Ernesto Linghon several pieces of jewelry
stolen from Rodriguez. The Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, found petitioner Ernesto
Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
corresponding to the latter, and to pay the
corresponding value of the subject pieces of jewelry.
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution failed
to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the
charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of
jewelry to him.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial court’s decision finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic)
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the
Anti-Fencing Law?
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing
are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have shown that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the
part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another. Macario Linghon testified that he sold the
jewelry to petitioner. “Although the well-entrenched
rule is that the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction,
it is required that such testimony must be credible and
reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario
to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight.” The
Court further held “It bears stressing that, in the
absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution
is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from
which it can be concluded that the accused should
have known that the property sold to him were stolen.
This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to
prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and,
(b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable
penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the
value of the property.”
Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220)
Facts: of corpus delicti.The Court held that accused Tan
could not be held guilty because there was no showing
Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal at all that the accused knew or should have known that
Industries; upon inventory, she found that several the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.
pieces of equiptment were missing. Manuelito Mendez
was a former employee of Lim, who left her
employment before Lim found out that her goods were
missing. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was
arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and
his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the
complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such
as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws.
Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant’s
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as
the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the
amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop,
and they split the amount with one another. Tan was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as
Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the
stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of
P18,000.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution has

successfully established the elements of fencing as
against petitioner?

Decision:

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No.

1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential
elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the
accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals
in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have
shown that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the
accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The
Supreme Court stated that there was no sufficient
proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. The
theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim
did not complain to the public authorities of the
felonious taking of her property. She sought out her
former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed
that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such
confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence
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