CASE 1: G.R. No.

160273             January 18, 2008

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z.

NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B.
SALA, petitioners, 
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-
profit and non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in
Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.

Facts: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a
non-profit and non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in
Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors. 

Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of

CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and
Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member.
The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.

Respondent purchased the propriety share of a certain Dr. Butalid. Consequently, on September 6,
1996, CCCI issued proprietary ownership certificate no. 1446 to respondent. During the meetings of the
CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent’s application for proprietary membership was deferred.
On behalf of respondent, Edmund Misa, wrote CCCI a letter of consideration but to no avail. This prompt
respondent to file with the Regional Trial court a complaint for damages against petitioners. After trial
RTC rendered its decision which rendered in favor of plaintiff: to wit, ordering the defendants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of 2,340,000 as actual or compensatory damages,
5,000,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, 1,000,000.00 as way of attorney’s
fees and 80,000 as litigation expenses and costs of suit. On appeal, the court’s decision affirmed the trial
court’s with modification. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the
motion for oral arguments but to no avail. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not in disapproving respondent’s application for proprietary membership with
CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, (2) whether their liability is joint and
several.

HELD: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Stated in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human relations
the restrictions thus: (Article 19) Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 also
states that, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitations on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. The trial court held that petitioners committed fraud and evident
bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages. As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum
absque injuria or damage without injury, the same is misplaced when there is an abuse of a person’s
right, as in this case. However, the award granted are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish the
another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions,
the amount of damages must be reduced. Lastly, the petitioners are to be held guilty and pay the
damages jointly and severally liable for damages as provided in Section 31 of the Corporation Code, to
wit: Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall
be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. So ordered

CASE 2: G.R. No. 192073

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 and UNICAPITAL, INC., Respondents.

FACTS: In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz, obtained
an P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital, P12,000,000,00 of which was acquired on July 24,
1997 and the remaining P6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997. The said loan was secure by
promissory notes and a real estate mortage registered in the name of Dela Cruz as per Transfer
Certificate of Title. Prior to the transactions, Plus Builders, Inc (PBI), a real estate company, was
already interested to develop the subject property into a residential subdivision. Then, the loadn
and mortgage over the subject proper was later modified into an option to buy real property and,
after further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this
purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr., as her attorney-in-fact. However, even before URI
and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie
Yu informed unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property and they did not
sell the same and that Dela Cruz’s title was a mere forgery. When they conducted further
investigations, it revealed that indeed the title under the name of Dela Cruz was actually of
dubious origin. PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, jr.,
seeking the return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property.

Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a complex action for declaratory relief and latr
amended to Complex action for injunctive relieve against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez,
PBI General Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz. He
claimed that the incessant demands made upon him by Unicapital and
PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject
property constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected
his personal and professional life. He also averred the threats of the
latter against him and even required him to sign blank deeds of sale and
commit a violation of Batang Pambansa Blg. 22., classifying the
foregoing as ultra vires acts which should warrant sanctions under
Corporation laws, Revised Security Act, and related laws. He prayed that
he only be declared as agent of Dela Cruz and Unicapital, URI, and PBI
be enjoined from harassing and coercing him, speaking about him in
derogatory manner and to pay damages. For their part, they pointed out
that Consing Jr.’s complaint suffers from a defective verification and
requirements and, thus, should be dismissed, but to no avail. CA affirm
in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petitions for
review on certiorari in GR. Nos. 175277 and 175285.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s

denial of Consing, jr.’s motion for consolidation.

HELD: The CA’s ruling is proper. It is hornbook principle that when or two or more
cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle
the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which
otherwise could be disposed of in a single suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of
the Rules which provides:

SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. The court
observes that the subject cases, although they involve the same parties and proceeding
from a similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since they proceed from
different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No.
1759 is an injuction and damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right
and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages suit based on
actionable documents, i.e. the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case
would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are
separate and distinct from the other. Consequently, the petition in GR No. 192073 must also
be denied. So order.

CASE 3: G.R. No. 132344           February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, 

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
FACTS: Plaintiff was enrolled in University if the East, College of Law, herein petitioner from
1984 up to 1988. In his first semester of his last year, he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He then
enrolled for the second semester and also filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade given him by Professor Ortega which was approved bythe dean after
payment of the required fee. When he took the exam, Professor Ortega graded him five (5).
Respondent name appeared in the tentative list of candidates from graduation. However,
the name of the respondent also appeared in the invitation with an annotation stating that it
provides a tentative list degree will be conferred upon the candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports. He then attended the ceremony and
participated on the same event. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination.
However, when he enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University, having
learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.

Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, menta
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights
when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s
negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. On the other hand, petitioner denied liability arguing
mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he complete the requirements for a
Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment with modification. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo can validly claim for moral and actual damages?

HELD: Yes. The reason for this is that when a student is enrolled in any education or
learning institution, a contract of education is entered to between said institution and the
student. However, professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered
merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school’s commitment under the
contract. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient
notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already
complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be
included among those who will graduate. The institution of learning involved herein is a
university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practised what it inculcates in
its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code. Art 19 was inended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to provide specifically

Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to
comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements
for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied
all requirements for the course.
statutory law. However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved
on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to
be eligible for the bar examinations. Costs against petitioner.

CASE 4: G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy,
represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING,Petitioners, 
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.

FACTS: Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. He
belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. On November 14,
2013 their class had a lesson examination on Operations Research at 1:30-3:00pm, being
there 4th class. While the 5th period class starts at 3:05-4:05. Five days after the exam, the
professor from 5th period class issued a delinquency report against Cudia because he was
late or 2 minutes in his class which a copy was received by Cudia. In his explanation report,
Cudia reasoned out that he came directly from his 4th period class and they were dismissed
a bit late by their instructor. On December 19, 2013, Major Hindang, the CTO of Cadet
Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. The latter
immediately clarified his alleged violation. When he expressed his intention to appeal he
was advised to put the request in writing. However, Maj Leander sustained the penalty
imposed.

Several days passed, Cadet Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC
for violation of the Honor Code. On january 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct
a preliminary ivestigation on the reported violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. He was found guilty
of violating the honor code by a 9-0 votes. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal. On february 8, 2014, the Commandant of Cadets
affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superinendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadel ICL Cudia for violation of the First
Tenet of Honor Code (lying). On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the
PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay
and allowances and pending approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from
future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify to any
entrance requirements to the PMA. Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services
of the Public Attorney’s Office in Baguio City. On February 28, 2014, Cudia’s parents filed a
complaint before the CHR-CAR alleging human rights violations against him. While the
CRAB upheld Cudia’s dismissal, the CHR issued a resolution holding that Cudia’s human
rights were violatied. Hoewver,on June 11, 2014, the Offiice of the President sustained the
former and the AFP Chief of Staff. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the Philippine Military Academy, The Honor Committee and the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
cadet first class Aldren Jeff P. Cudia from the academy in utter disregard of his right to due
process;
2. Whether the Philippine Military Academy, the Honor Committee and the Cadet Review
and Appeals Board Committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first class
aldrin Jeff Cudia lied, thereby violating the Honor Code.

3. Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independely conducted by the

commission on Human Rights is of such great weight and persuasive nature that the
honorable court may honor, uphold and respect.

HELD: 1. No. Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his
acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from
the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set
forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.  We218

adopt the ruling in Andrews wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It
quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:

The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has
violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers
there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part
of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's
transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit
severe method of preventing men who have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career
officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more
compassionate --or even more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial
to the question of whether the harsher penalty violates due process.

2. No. Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty
cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines
Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1)
delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA
Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does
not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little
lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been
considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured themselves ever
since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that only those
who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA.
As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military "to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
3. The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and,
therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends
only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. As
held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights and a number of subsequent cases, the CHR is
only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to
adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate is not
the same as adjudication.

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold
what is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most
challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and
right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is
his honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think
twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is
championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights
and privileges.Wherefore, the Petition is denied. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin
P. Cudia from the Philippine Military is affirmed.

CASE 5: G.R. No. 183824               December 8, 2010

MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.

FACTS: On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-

Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla alleging that her marriage with respondent in
1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with
one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Pending the setting of the case for ararignment, herein
respondent moved to qush the information on the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared
null and void by the Regional Trial Court Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on April 26, 2007 and
that the decision became final and executory. He argued that since the first marriage had
been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to
speak of. Petitioner maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the
essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner
and respondent on November 18, 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a
second marriage on February 16, 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been
committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.

The court quashed the motion. The prosecution moved for reconsideration of the said order
on the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are
not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. tan, this Court
has already settled that “(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is no explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.” The court denied the motion
for reconsideration stating that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullty of
marriage.On July 21, 2008, the court dismissed the petition for nullity of mariiage for failure
of herein respondent to submit his pretrial brief. Respondent, however challenged the
orders issued by the Court before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact
contrary to those alleged in the information.

HELD: Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence
contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudencek, the court agrees with the petitioner. It is axiomatic
that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the
ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental
test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged,
if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law.

The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such
judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent
marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. 

Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even
after taking into consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier
recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the new allegations are
admitted by the prosecution; (2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the
grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy; and (3) when facts
have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed
the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a
motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said
facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be
weak even to support possible conviction xxx."

With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the
first marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings in People v.
Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab
initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to
establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared
void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid
marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.

Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code,
which was promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few
years before respondent’s subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991. 

The specific provision, which reads:

ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.

While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different.

In Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared void ab
initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract
through a private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity
before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigois not
applicable to this case.