124 Phil.
763 mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code,
[ G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966 ]
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ENRICO PALOMAR, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived
and laid the ground-work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex
station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by
the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and
the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos
bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight
with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the “Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the
qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-
prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-
prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500
and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this
final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; P1,500 for third; and P650 as consolation
prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
"SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. - No matter belonging to any of the
following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or
be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts;
(a) Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining
to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders. - Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of
any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of
the Bureau to return to the person, depositing same in the mails, with the word 'fraudulent'
plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class
mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such
person or company."
"SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service. - The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution
of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that
any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money
or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal
money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such
person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the
remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company or its agent."
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored
to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within
the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration on the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before
(Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is
equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the
use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the
contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its
representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory
relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered
declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the
parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as
Annex B of the petition do not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar
the public distribution of said rules by the mails."
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first,
whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and, second,
whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take
these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available
to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute * * * to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the * * * statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this
Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R.
No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G.,
No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The
gravamen of the appellant’s stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex) as a business enterprise of
some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate
means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage
for its products, in contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of
the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof -
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right
aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed.
To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance
clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and
construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in
the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the
correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications
in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence
with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with
which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have
to be issued against it and all its representatives".
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the
challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid.
There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on
the other, concerning a real - not a mere theoretical - question or issue. The contenders are
as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the
divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance
its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to
transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the
appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30,
1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can
rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the
fears of others" - which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was,
has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a
positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284
Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a
given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for
declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the
assumption that, in the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions
can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not
feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is
precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into
the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at
hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is
anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet
been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or
contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues
susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the
propriety - nay, the necessity - of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the
asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead
(III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be
conceded. Paraphrasing the language to Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal.
Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the
appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between
undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether
the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced
with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not
only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order
with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be
vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the
appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally
unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality
with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1,
Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) - which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law - we cannot see in
the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand
down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a
declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound.
But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, “Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law * * * shall form a part of the legal system" (article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable,
the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby
but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no
misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is
not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487,
where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that
if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief
action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In
pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin
vs. Arnebergh, supra.; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-
mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.
Happily this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate",
Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the above-mentioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that -
"* * * while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with
the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term 'lottery’ extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of
a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. United States
[1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart
and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs.
Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233,
ante.)"
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are
too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently, as the
appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the
element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened
inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yardstick in the
following terms -
"In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the
party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. "
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in
which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus -
"No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy
anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liters the Caltex gas pump with the hood at
your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from___to ___, and win valuable prizes x x x."
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry
form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we heed the stern
injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real
element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs.
Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to
be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the
privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex
product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A
contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion,
would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be
encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing
entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived
by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d.,
99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in
return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the
contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris
Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
"The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive,
some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing, does not supply
the element of consideration. - Griffith Amusement Co. v. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W.
2d., 844." (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is
equally proscribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on
the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here
invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive
justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon
Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme,
though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which
that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest -
wanting in consideration as we have found it to be, is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit
words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that
the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54
C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga.
App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being
extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the
opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award
by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is
prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. State, 235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan &
Sec. Co., 129 Ga., 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex. rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater
Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin.
Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the
prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration
(E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563,
565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs.
Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo. 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S.,
851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases,
perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the
specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54
C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs.
People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been
specifically eliminated by statute (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from Zaldivar, and  Sanchez, JJ., concur.
this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon
the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association
with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known
principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis - which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied
upon although only in so far as the element of chance is concerned - it is only logical that the
term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,
there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort
to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail
fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable.
As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent
that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason
behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held -

"Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute 'lottery', if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated
thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases,
perm, ed., p. 695, underscoring supplied),

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in
the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails
for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

 SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-34568, March 28, 1988 ]
RODERICK DAOANG, AND ROMMEL DAOANG, ASSISTED BY THEIR FATHER, ROMEO
DAOANG, PETITIONERS, VS. THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE,
ANTERO AGONOY AND AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the
respondent judge* in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
"Wherefore, Court renders judgement declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos
be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero
Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and
maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla
and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla'
and 'Marcos' be changed with 'Agonoy', which is the family name of the petitioners.
"Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.
"Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners" [1].
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec.
Proc. No. 37[2].
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served
upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly
nespaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City [3].
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Romel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code[4].
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented.
Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendered its decision, granting the
petition for adoption[5].
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art.
335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
"Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxxxx xxxxx".
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondent judge held that "to add
grandchild or grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate to (sic) the
legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez [6], that the
adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the
family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce an indirect,
permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a
subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned
therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not
include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous
on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an
ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction [7].
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously
intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt.
The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the
pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have
legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the
petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adaptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have
no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of
paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship [8]. The present tendency, however, is
geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that
objective[9]. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt [10].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
EN BANC [ G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010 ]
MILAGROS E. AMORES, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May
14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner's Petition
for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens' Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
 In her Petition for Quo Warranto[1] seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged
that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of
the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his
change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as
to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have
entered a general denial pursuant to public respondent's Rules. [2]
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, [3] dismissed petitioner's
Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which
the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of
Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated
July 9, 2007.  It also found the petition which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time,
the reglementary period being 10 days from private respondent's proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941,
public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral
party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a
multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondent's shift of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of
RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated August
6, 2009,[4] petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari. [5]
Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the
application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions,
fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-
60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not enough basis
for private respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007, especially considering that he
admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment,[6] private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated
her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a
member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007
elections will expire on June 30, 2010.  While the petition has, thus, become moot and
academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical value. [7]
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioner's
Petition for Quo Warranto  was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2)
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in considering petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-
day reglementary period provided in its Rules[8] from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the
May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations, [9] it was by no measure a
proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC[10]  after revisiting the formula for
allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent's
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. 
Alternatively, since petitioner's challenge goes into private respondent's qualifications, it may
be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure.  Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.[11]
On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement
for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election,
and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent's interpretation that Section 9 applied
only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.  There is only room for
application.[12]
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election , so
it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth
sector nominee.  Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act,
it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995.  There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first
three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987.  Under this
interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two
months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not
have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent's ratiocination that after the third
congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9
of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector.  This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus.  When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. [13]
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support
for public respondent's ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent's
shift of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.  Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat:
Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his
new party or organization.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and
sectoral affiliation.  And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-
list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.  Hence, a
nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for
nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six
months before the elections.  Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is the plain
meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention.[14]
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth
sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May,
2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. [15]  Moreover, he did not change
his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having
found that he shifted to CIBAC's overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on
March 17, 2007.[16]
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of
no moment.  A party-list organization's ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a
party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the
compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared
ineligible to hold the same.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 dated
August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE.  Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is
declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list
organization CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R No. L-28463, May 31, 1971 ]
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
presents. Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the
Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code[1] as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard
(darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines,
they are merely waste and not the product, which is the flour produced.[2] That way, it would not be
liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent Commissioner of
Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, but was unsuccessful. The same fate is in store
for it, as the construction it would place on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote
from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention the policy of theAct. We affirm.  obeyed. It is as simple as that.[10]
In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was
an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of
P7,948.00 as wharfage dues, the facts were set forth as follows: "Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is
a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard
(darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964,
inclusive, petitioner exported pollard and/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels
engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater. The respondent assessed the petitioner
by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid
by petitioner under protest"[3] The only issue, in the opinion of respondent Court, is whether or not such
collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. The main contention before respondent Court
of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or government facilities [were]
utilized in exporting the pollard and/ or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law. "[4] On
the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for
wharfage dues "upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade
regardless of the non-use of government-owned or private wharves."[5] Respondent Court of Tax
Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of
the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our decision in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing
Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs.[6] It did not feel called upon to answer the question now before us
as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its memorandum.  attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its
construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are not
"products of the Philippines," coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from abroad,
and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had become
waste. "[7] We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm the decision of respondent Court
of Tax Appeals.    defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied,
collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on
products of the Philippines • * *exported from the Philippines, acharge of two pesos
pergross metric ion as a fee for wharfage * * *." One category refers to what is
imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. Even
without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. Petitioner
appeared to have entertained such a notion. In its petition for review before
respondent Court it categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the
manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of milling the wheat grain into
flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad." [8] It does
take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner
calls '"waste" resulting from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in
petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as
stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them."[9] Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a doctrine
precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be
   
2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification.
While statutory construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at
will and rely on one's predilections as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted.
The search must be for a reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the
reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."[11] To paraphrase Frankfurter,
interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the utmost effort
should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory
language in its total context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time
and time again as to the limits of judicial freedom in the construction of statutes to
accept the view advanced by petitioner.
 
3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring
fidelity to the legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrated. Its
objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the
language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be
argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that other
exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent
pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff
and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is
desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of
the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but
construction has never recommended itself. It does not now. [12]
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27,1967 is affirmed. With
costs against petitioner.
 SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. L-25316, February 28, 1979 ]
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT
UNION, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY,
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
DECISION FERNANDO, J.:
In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would
seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by
Section 62 of Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof:
"* * * (1) A member of a co-operative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing
laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to
deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may
be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative
in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-
operative. (2) Upon the execution of such agreement the employer shall, if so required
by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand
or any part of it remains unpaid, make the deduction in accordance with the agreement
and remit forthwith the amount so deducted to the co-operative."[1]
To show that such reliance is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for
petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "The petitioner contends that under the above
provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first
priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can
be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which
provides that obligations of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act
2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of
the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the
same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had not been enacted, the
employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union
for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the
employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to
write something into the law which does not appear therein. In other words, the mandatory
character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but
this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If
the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit
unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the
New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of
credits."[2]
Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee,
which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it
could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to
petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as
Exhibit '3' and Exhibit 'P', which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of
the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of
Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit '3', [and] Exhibit 'P', respondent, in effect,
implemented the said provision of law."[3]
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its
face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.
1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023, quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There
is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise
any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law.
That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the
legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: [4] "It has been
repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is
nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect." [5]
2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear
legal right. The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this
petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a suit of this
character. In J. R. S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, [6] this Court held: "Mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the
performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of
a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled." [7] The opinion continued
in this wise: "According to former Chief Justice Moran, 'only specific legal rights may be
enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not
well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view,
Viuda de Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated:
'This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must
be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that
petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing demanded and that it must be the legal
duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in
a subsequent opinion: 'It is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by
mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ
not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.' To the same effect is the formulation of such
doctrine by former Justice Barrera: 'Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases.
It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.'"[8] So it has been since then.
[9]
 The latest reported case, Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, [10] this Court
speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also
been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases." [11]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
234 Phil. 443
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 68729, May 29, 1987 ]
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND KAYUMANGGI RADIO NETWORK
INCORPORATED, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) ordered petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Incorporated
(RCPI) to desist from operating its radio telephone services
in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 1957 under its legislative
franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23, 1957.
In 1968, the petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon.  In 1971,
another radio telegraph service was put up in San Jose, Mindoro followed by another
in Catarman, Samar in 1976.  The installation of radio telephone services started 1971 in San
Jose, Mindoro; then in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.
In a decision dated June 24, 1980 in NTC Case. No. 80-08, private
respondent Kayumanggi Radio Network Incorporated was authorized by the public
respondent to operate radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and in San
Jose, Mindoro.
On December 14, 1983, the private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that
the petitioner was operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.  The petitioner, on the other hand, counter-
alleged that its telephone services in the places subject of the complaint are covered by the
legislative franchise recognized by both the public respondent and its predecessor, the Public
Service Commission.  In its supplemental reply, the petitioner further stated that it has been
in operation in the questioned places long before private respondent Kayumanggi filed its
application to operate in the same places.
After conducting a hearing, NTC, in its decision dated August 22, 1984 ordered petitioner
RCPI to immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone
services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order No. 546, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities and
services including radio communications.
On September 4, 1984, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in
an order dated September 12, 1984.
On October 1, 1984, the present petition was filed raising the issue of whether or not
petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio
stations including radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
The petitioner's main argument states that the abolition of the Public Service Commission
under Presidential Decree No. 1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications
Commission under Executive Order No. 546 to replace the defunct Public Service Commis-
sion did not affect sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146,
as amended).
The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as follows:
"Section 13 (a) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the exercise of its
authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force: xxx.
"Section 14.  The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:
xxx                   xxx                   xxx
"(d) Radio companies except with respect to the fixing of rates;
xxx                   xxx                   xxx
"Section 15.  With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public
service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate
from the Public Service Commission, known as ‘certificate of public convenience, or
‘certificate of convenience and public necessity,’ as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.  xxx"
We find no merit in the petitioner's contention.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, reorganizing the executive
branch of the National Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its
functions were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows:  the Board of
Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks.  The
functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of
the Public Service Law, as amended.  With the enactment of Executive Order No. 546
on July 23, 1979 implementing P.D. No. 1, the Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to
the National Telecommunications Commission (Sec. 19(d), Executive Order No.
546).  Section 15 of said Executive Order spells out the functions of the National Telecom-
munications Commission as follows:
"Sec. 15.  Functions of the Commission.  - The Commission shall exercise the following
functions:
“a.  Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and
services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph system,
radio and television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
“b.  Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public
service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the
operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates
are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a
participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper
arbiter of such charges or rates;
“c.  Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph
systems and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and
television broadcasting systems;
“d.  Sub-allocate series of frequencies of bands allocated by the International
Telecommunications Union to the specific services;
“e.  Establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards, specifications in all cases related to
the issued Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same;
“f.   Coordinate and cooperate with government agencies and other entities concerned with
any aspect involving communications with a view to continuously improve the
communications service in the country;
"g.  Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to
encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these
activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible;
"h.  Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities;
“i.    Undertake the examination and licensing of radio operators;
"j.    Undertake, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and
transceivers; and
"k.   Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
It is clear from the aforequoted provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from
the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer
exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing
executive orders.  The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive
Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be
sustained.
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting
in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and
accepted by every authority since (State v. Twin Village Water Co., 98 Me 214, 56 A 763
(1903)).  Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of
the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue
of its police power through its administrative agencies.  We ruled
in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission  (70 Phil. 221) that:
"xxxstatutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being proper exercise by the State of
its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its
passage, but likewise to those already established and in operationxxx"
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. 1 insofar as it amends
the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be
bound by its provisions.  The petitioner cannot install and operate radio telephone services on
the basis of its legislative franchise alone.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can
operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is
erroneous.  Section 1 of said statute reads:
"Section 1.  Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the provisions, not
inconsistent herewith, of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six, entitled
‘An Act providing for the regulation of radio stations and radio communications in the
Philippine Islands, and for other purposes;’ Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred
forty-six, known as the Public Service Act, and their amendments, and other applicable
laws, there is hereby granted to the Radio Communications of the Philip pines, its successors
or assigns, the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the
Philippines, at such places as the said corporation may select and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications may approve, radio stations for the reception and transmission
of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony, including both coastal and
marine telecommunications, each station to consist of two radio apparatus comprising of a
receiving and sending radio apparatus.” (Underscoring ours).
Section 4(a) of the same Act further provides that:
"Sec. 4(a).  This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder he exercised
by the grantee until the Secretary of Public Works and Communications shall have allotted to
the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license
for such case." (Underscoring ours).
Jose, Mindoro.  Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner
possesses a franchise to put up and operate a radio communications system in certain areas
is not an insuperable obstacle to the public respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an
applicant desiring to extend the same services to those areas.  The Constitution mandates
that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can franchise be granted except that
it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the
common good so requires.  (Art. XII, sec. 11 of the 1986 Constitution).  There is an express
provision in the petitioner’s franchise which provides compliance with the above mandate (RA
2036, sec. 15).
In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact,
and conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate
in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro.  As a rule, the Commission's findings of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon this Court.  We may modify or ignore
them only when it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a
conclusion.  (Halili v. Daplas, 14 SCRA 14).  The petitioner has not shown why the private
respondent should be denied the authority to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro.  It
has not overcome the presumption that when the public respondent disturbed the petitioner's
monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to public interest and the common good.
WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public respondent dated August 22, 1984 is
hereby AFFIRMED.  The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas
where it desires to operate.  It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory
norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it.  The law,
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.  (Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, 51 SCRA 381).

The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone
services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971.  The same is true as regards the radio telephone
services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.  No certificate of
public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the
public respondent when such certificate was required by the applicable public utility
regulations.  (See Executive Order No. 545, sec. 15, supra.; Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. City of Davao, 15 SCRA 75; Olongapo Electric Light and Power Corp. v.
National Power Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-24912, promulgated April 9, 1987.)

It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the
private respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 94147, June 08, 1994 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE RODOLFO
TOLEDANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 69, IBA, ZAMBALES AND SPOUSES
ALVIN A. CLOUSE AND EVELYN A. CLOUSE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of
the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A.
Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on
March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States
of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala
was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his
consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to
the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the
minor, respondent judge rendered a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse
and Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by
adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child
of the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental
authority to the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of
P.D. 603 as amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the
petition was filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this decree of
adoption be recorded in the corresponding government agency, particularly the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the Local
Civil Registrar is hereby directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor
adopted by the petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED."[2]
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN
AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz:
"(3) An alien, except:
(a)          A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b)      One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c)          One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law."
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In
the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States
of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private
respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on
February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She
lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and
wife. It reads:
"Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1)     When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2)     When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.[3]
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and
Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. [4] Executive Order
No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that
both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. [5] It was so crafted to
protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by
requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before.
Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. [6] This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal
situation.[7] As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.[8]
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it
mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was
silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the
necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances -
(1)  When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2)      When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly
find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this
Code."[9]
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is
only room for application.[10]
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. [11] Adoption is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a
useful and happy life.[12] It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that
should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.[13] Executive Order 209 likewise upholds
that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince
any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by
private respondents who are aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC [ G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986 ]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, ARID MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.  The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.  In
the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some
of these decrees, declaring in the dispostive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that deci-
sion.[1] Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.[2]
In the Comment[3] required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was
a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did
not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.  This elicited a
Reply[4] refuting these arguments.  Came next the February Revolution and the Court
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.  Responding, he submitted that issuances intended
only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not
have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official
Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it
was not supported by eight members of this Court.[5]
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2.  Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.  This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.  This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.  An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, [6] is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether.  The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.  Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not
know of its existence.  Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed.  One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all.  It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, [the legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly.  An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative
of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.  It surely cannot be said that
such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all
the people.  The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice.  In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires  act of the legislature.  To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.  Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.  Neither is
publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.  All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.  The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms.  Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule
but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.  As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.  This is not
even substantial compliance.  This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. [7] The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette[8] and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. [9] One reserved his vote[10] and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should
be made.[11] It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.  Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly.  The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law.  As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code.  The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists.  If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical.  That is not our function.  That function belongs to the
legislature.  Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided
by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.  There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties, that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.  This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.  This is once again an
open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance.  This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom
of expression and their right of suffrage.  This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets.  Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.  The furtive
law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
EN BANC [ G.R. No. L-30642, April 30, 1985 ]
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MINORS
ROMULO AND NESTOR S. FLORESCA; AND ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO
S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSOS. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.
FLORESCA AND CARMEN S. FLORESCA; LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ IN
HER OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN LINDA, ROMEO,
ANTONIO, JEAN AND ELY, ALL SURNAMED MARTINEZ; AND DANIEL MARTINEZ AND
TOMAS MARTINEZ; SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, IN HER OWN BEHALF
AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD AND
DANBLO, ALL SURNAMED OBRA; LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VTLLAR, IN HER
OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN EDNA, GEORGE AND
LARRY FFL, ALL SURNAMED VILLAR; DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, IN
HER OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN EDITHA, ELIZABETH,
DIVBVA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR AND AURELIO, JR., ALL SURNAMED LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILDREN JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS AND FELIX, ALL SURNAMED
ISLA, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION AND HON. JESUS P. MORFE,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XM, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28,1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
runnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government
rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for
the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
"x x x                           xxx                         x x x.
"9. That for sometime prior arid up to June 28, 1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and
reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions
for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter
violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government
pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area
at the mine above Block 43-S-l which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of
broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at
its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with
the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately
500,000 cubic feet of broken ores, rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders,
blasted through the runnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials;
machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels
all of its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph
represented by the plaintiffs herein;
"10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on
the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued
within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a
great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not
rescued due to defendant PHELEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter
disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
"x x x                          xxx                              x x x.
"13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above
referred to, in their Report of Investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B'hereof, but also failed
completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection
of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made,
during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after
taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its 11th Annual Report for the year ended December 31,
1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966;
"x x x            xxx            x x x."
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Fhilex alleging that the causes of action
of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968
to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code
allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
"Art. 2176 - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
"Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
"(b) Art. 1173 - The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
"Art. 2201.    xx          xx        xx.
"In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
"Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence."
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June
27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said
order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of
June 27, 1968 and   allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved    to
reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and
ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation
has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected
deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was
negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence result in work-connected deaths or
injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVBL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT."
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the. Civil Code on damages,
particularly Articles 2176,2178, 1173,2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of
the lives of its employees working underground.  They also assert that since Philex opted to
file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those
contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see
the distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They
point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting
from injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease,
without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under
the Civil Code which petitioner pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability
for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the
regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively
under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.— The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer Under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury x x x.
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, x x x ."
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held
that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in
the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from
the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because
Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to
comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it
points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the
payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito
Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil
Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Arty. Edgardo
Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as
corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Aifairs Department, and
Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared
as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
"Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death
under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say,
whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of
his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts."
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion mat an injured
employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover
damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court
on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Arty. Angara
believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected
injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, while Arty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of
the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the
Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty.
Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Arty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the
remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the
remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular
court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.
In the resolution of September 7,1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the
aforesaid petitioners are concerned, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case.
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in
the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825.000.00) pesos. Petitioners did
not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to
compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees
died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint
instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to
protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the
death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether
or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations
in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to
bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable
for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is
fraud or bad faith, read:
"Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-con tracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
"In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation."
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from
that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to
mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence,
an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.
Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or
work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs.
Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of
the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has
sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of
another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered.
While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the
deceased or injured employee that the death or injury work-connected or work-aggravated;
and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA
308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact
that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision
for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the
right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand
(P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical
expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an
additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the
employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the
prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid). In the case at bar, the
amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to
an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the
industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer.
Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer depends on breach of contract or tort. The
Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees
or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the
victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment
(Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the
worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by
virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacafia vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously.
In Pacafia WE said:
"In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Mufioz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third-party tortfeasors
in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that
the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.
"As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against
the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation
Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First
Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are
much more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the
injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against
the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity
obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of
proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury,
and of having to establish the extent of the damnge suffered; issues that are apt to be
troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on particular remedy,
petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is
rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6
aforequoted. if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against
the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein
petitioner, the excess  accrues to the latter."
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Mufioz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to
third-party tortfeasor. said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has
been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement
reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated
May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely
Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Satumino Martinez submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of
Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez
whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec). Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968
(pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed
under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the
then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular
court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the
Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of
the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the
lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant
case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social
justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as
implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201. 2216, 2231, and 2232 of the New
Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
"SEC. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II).
"SEC. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors,
and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and
capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration" (Art.
XTV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the
dignity, welfare, and security of all the people; " "x x x regulate the use x x x and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits;'" "establish, maintain,
and ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health, housing, employment,
welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of
living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "x x x afford protection to labor, x x x and
regulate the relations between workers and employers x x x, and assure the rights of workers
to x x x just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art.  n,  1973   Constitution, italics
supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of
the New Labor Code, thus:
"ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy.— The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work" (Italics supplied).  Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the
New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the
New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by
RA. No. 772 on June 20,1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been
superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which
took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice
enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the
New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the
social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr.
Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette,
with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain Subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections" (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed.  1638, italics supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both
die New Labor Code and the Civil 'Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of
the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1,1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2,
Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail."
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that: "In case of doubt,
all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.— The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury (italics supplied).
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to
injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner
prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement."
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.— The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury.
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries
received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the
benefits of the Workmen s Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should
such law be more favorable to them (As amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 772)."
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable
provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
"Art. 173. Exdusfveness of liability.— Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages
on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title
shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other
laws whose benefits are administered by the System, during the period of such payment for
the same disability or death, and conversely" (italics supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C. A. No. 186, as amended,
R. A. No. 610, as amended, R. A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits
are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as afore-quoted, Article 173 of the New
Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code
provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from
negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages
recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the
New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service
Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d], and [e] of the New Labor
Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part
of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
"Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines."
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera, ruled:
"Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of
the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect" (65 SCRA 270,  272-273, [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The afore-quoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and
after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20,1952, limited the right of
recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided
for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in
the 1970 case of Pacafia vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the
Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor
for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.   Said 
Pacafia case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as
against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia
vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724. June 30, 1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs.
Munoz Palma (104 Phil 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacafia case was
concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and
Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the
first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not
even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same
interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacafia, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the
doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice
guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the
American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union.
Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's
Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own
laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article
U of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer.
The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To
relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton
fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against
the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and
his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the
consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and
therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply
with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and
health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions' of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New
Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining
employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor
Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the absolute laissez-faire doctrine
of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia,
Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due
to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices
(beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for
production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-
political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superseded by the benign Christian
shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not
adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization,
each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as
atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case ofPrisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1, 150 reprint 1030)
invoked by   the dissent.   The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic
royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalists and egoistic
reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule
humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker
as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have
to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the sen'ant
never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than
he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked
the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood
on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws."
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in
certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill
in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the human
mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the
American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to
legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and
the statutes.
Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but
denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The
Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to
concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash
Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view.
Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
department to say what the law is" (Marbury vs. Madison 1 Cranch 127 1803), which was re-
stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it
is" (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9,
1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for
the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law."
(The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone,
"The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S.
1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice
Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or
strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers.  It is
correctly termed no-fault liability.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the
life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer
remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee, whose death, ailment or injury
is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety
measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise
word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW
88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that:
"Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of
its efficacy, x x x Precedents established in those times exert an unhappy influence even
now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted,
although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific
Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs.
Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852-853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other, x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions
it is still more obvious that they must be received with, a certain latitude or our government
could not go on.
"To make a rule conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free
from it is to legislate - yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two
competing principles of policy shall prevail.
"x xx.
"It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling
words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action
with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it
ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution
requires."
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but
grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by
the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial
tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice
Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl
Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of
the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have
not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the
interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or
oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual
welfare, particularly the lowly workers or   the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost
among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon
vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the
accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to
extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These
rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the
peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led
by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double
jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial
decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both
provisions, the second is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily included or is necessarily included in the
first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also
developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before
People vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163
US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked
in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal
protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended
by the whites — equal facilities in the same school which was extended to public parks and
public buses. De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs.
Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity
leave to working women — according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case
of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949),
Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee
of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the
working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was
vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel, vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L.
ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in
the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding
eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on
political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial
decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra; Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385;
Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a
separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of
political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the
American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is
limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There
are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of
powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions, expressly
vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any
legislative enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, de la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez.
, on leave. Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Gutierrez, J., Please see attached dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., :
A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX
Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,
however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article
2196 of the Code, found in Title XVm - Damages, that:
"COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH,
INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS."
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Mufioz Palma, etc., et al., 104
Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
"Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on
words. The term 'compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the
sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or
aggravated by or in the course of employment, x x x."
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law," not the Code itself, which has to
apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law," in reference to the
complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies,
as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of
one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option
to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received
compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the
Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a   "finished transaction."
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to
exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the
Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to the "election of
remedies,"because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction."
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be
allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second
election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election
he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. This was not done
in the case before the Court.
B.
There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez
upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1.  The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was
approved on December  10,  1927  and took effect on June 10,
1928.  It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
"Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the
law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws
of Hawaii, 1925)." [Morabe & niton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy
under the Act is exclusive. The following is stated in 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation
Text, pp. 266, 267.
"Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis - The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol.  1, p.
713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's wilful intention to injure
himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive. (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)"
2.  In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.— The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury." (Paragraphing and italics
supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provisions:
"A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-
making body must be sought, first of all, in the words of the statute itself, read and considered
in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to
good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Courts,
therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of
words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense." (Espino vs. Cleofe, 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to
injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment." (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively" is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the
Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4.  It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than
within the Act itself.  Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
"SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.— In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall
be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer,
under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; x x x" (Italics
supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 6 were to allow the injured
employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have
formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That
that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue
the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.
5.  There should be no question but that the  original first paragraph  of Section  5  of  the 
Workmen's  Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or
employee, or   his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent
recourse neither to the Civil Code nor  to  any other law relative to the liability of the
employer. After 1927, there   were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to
amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act would not be
exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the legislative's continuing
intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.

(a)  The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:,
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively)
to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner
prescribed in this section be presumed to include such agreement.)"
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the italicized words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end
of the paragraph:
"Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them."   (Italics supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At
that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of
Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or
under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an
injured employee without regard to  the presence   or absence of negligence on the part of  provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
the employer.  The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo
vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount
payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A [1] was
included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the
compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of the employer.
That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an
employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20,1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was
again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under
the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the lawmaker, the
Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the
Complaint.
[1]
 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.— In case of the employee's death, injury or
sickness due to the failure of the employer to comply with any law, or with any order, rule or
regulation of the Workmen's Compensation Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or
should the employer violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-
nine and its amendments or fail to install and maintain safety appliances, or take other
precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease, he shall be liable to pay
an additional compensation equal to fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act.
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., :
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damage suits based
on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history
of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court
which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the
early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits
to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in
a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by
the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host
of common law defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to  know what
he entered into when he accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley v.
Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and
the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the
servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of
employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risk of employment that he should
discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily
raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only
to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault - either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee - is disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified,
expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents
could more readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employer's liability acts
were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved
inadequate. Legislative reform led to workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a
compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the
injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of
damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-determined
amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of
rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which
he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on
compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the
overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual
workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their
entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
"An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding
of the acts and the cases interpreting them.
"By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the
avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with
the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modem
industry. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the
employer, existing tort principles offered some measure of redress. Even here, however, the
woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts
litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability
depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed
officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were
uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn between
friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on
the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept
a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as
contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a
substantial damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee
or his dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx                               xxx                                   xxx
"Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy
the product of a business-whether it be in the form of goods or services — should ultimately
bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the productx x x.
xxx                               xxx                                   xxx
"Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident
loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of
commerce in the form of increased price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate
consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected, no
producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
"In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties
it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure
that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus
predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from  the broad economic viewpoint, x
x x.
"Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects:
Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable
according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts
alike work these two major changes, irrespective of how they may differ   in   other
particulars.
"Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which
are of more importance both to him and to society. The employer give up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his
former right to full damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials,
represented by compensation.
"The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized.
The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of
weekly compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to
be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any
compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of
compromise established in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors
the employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of
extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by
the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and
apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout    the various   jurisdictions   must be
attributed to this."
(Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation, American Casebook Series, pp.  63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and
diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the
trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the
integrated scheme was enacted into law. We have a system whose parts must mesh
harmoniously with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some
parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered.
For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of
compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was
formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can
arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment compensation, can still elect to
file damage suits for industrial accidents, (industrial accidents.) It was precisely for this
reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.— The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer  under  the Civil Code and other laws  
because of  said injury x x x."
Article 173 of the Labor Code also provides:
"ART. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.— Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages
on behalf of the employee  or his dependents."
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies
and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund
will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or ge! insurance for that purpose, a major study
will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor
victims and their families. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers
who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the
victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
SUPREME COURT marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
Manila father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
EN BANC never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
 
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
vs. individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents. best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
PANGANIBAN, J.: longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
finances.
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
recent case of Santos vs.  Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific was born on July 29, 1986;
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio,  on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
Code.
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
The Facts wife.

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal
of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as
a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison
testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul
(sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions? assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
A Yes, Your Honor. provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
The Court has no more questions.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
blemishes of the beloved. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
essential obligation of marriage.
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
which they followed up with written memoranda. occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
decision.
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
emphasizes the  permanence, inviolability and solidarity
provides:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological nature. 14
psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.,  concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of
the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-
Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the
duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do
not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J.,  separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute
so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due
to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was
to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
 (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in
a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and
is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment,
called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable
of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.  The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of
marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
 As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v.  Court of Appeals  cited
in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months'
sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by
the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation
described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action
in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.
 
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his  ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code
of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a
few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of
the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.,  concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of
the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-
Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the
duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do
not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J.,  separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute
so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due
to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was
to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in
a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and
is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment,
called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable
of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry.  The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of
marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v.  Court of Appeals  cited
in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months'
sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by
the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation
described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action
in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
 psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.
 
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his  ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code
of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
 only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a
few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of
the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

332 Phil. 56
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 123169, November 04, 1996 ]
DANILO E. PARAS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994.  A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November
13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner’s opposition.  On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election,
this time on December 16, 1995.  To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed
before the Regional  Trial Court  of  Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP
Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order.  After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC
approval.[2]
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction.  On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and
required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the
petition.  In view of the Office of the Solicitor General’s manifestation maintaining an opinion
adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required
comment.  Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.[3]
Petitioner’s argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January
13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In
support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621,
where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains
that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for
barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election.  We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. [4] The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during
his term of office.  Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office.  Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term.  And if the SK election which is set by R.A.
No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview
of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government
Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. [5] An interpretation should, if possible, be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.[6]
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local and separate concurring opinions.
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x"

Moreover, petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

"We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than
fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in
‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’ x x x" [8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in
this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local election.  The proscription is due to
the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. 
The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.  It would, therefore,
be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May
1997.[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. 
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall
election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority
151 Phil. 451
[ G.R. No. L-34964, January 31, 1973 ]
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND TAN KIM LIONG, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS,
VS. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VIII, AND VICENTE G. ACABAN, RESPONDENTS-
APPELLEES.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and
March 27, 1972, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No.
75138, is whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405.[*]
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the
collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the
defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the
Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20,
1970 a judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation.
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and
served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank's cashier invited
the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was
alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the
plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan
Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether
or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest
Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow
any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but
was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply
with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy
of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the
two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
"Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
"Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to
any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said
deposits.
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of
not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the
discretion of the court."
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall
within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned
orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the
bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.
Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of
judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to
satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law.
It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B
Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became
Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
"Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee
on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being
held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000,000 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
"Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence
declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he
has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
"Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or
garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a
preliminary attachment issued by the court and this preliminary attachment is for garnishment
or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such
attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that
prohibited by this amendment or by this law?"
"Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather the inquiry
is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of
the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a
deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.
"Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
"Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
"Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of
the deposit.
"Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
"Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or
attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
"Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
"Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as
the substantive law on the matter is amended?
"Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
"Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability
of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed . . . in the
execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the
investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
"Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
"Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the
deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment
may be executed?
"MR. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the
Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes."
x x x         x x x         x x x         x x x
"Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a
sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the
satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that
the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
"Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I
replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.
"Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
"Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27,
1955)
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the
two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the
deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to
conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment
of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their
assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurs.
Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., did not take part.
[*]
 An Act Prohibiting Disclosure of or Inquiry into, Deposits with any Banking Institution and
Providing Penalty Therefor.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. L-30061, February 27, 1974 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE JABINAL Y
CARMEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas,
in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by
law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of
Our ruling in People vs. Mapa.[1]
The Complaint filed against the accused reads:
"That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a
revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells
without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same."
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after
which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and
the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit.  He,
however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas
and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the abovementioned Officials as claimed by
him.  His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
"Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an
effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the
province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,
you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take
effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position.  As such Secret Agent,
your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make report thereon to me once or
twice a month.  It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall
be considered sufficient ground for the automatice cancellation of your appointment and
immediate separation from the service.  In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking
your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind:   — ROHM-Revolver
Make:  — German
SN:      — 64
Cal:     — .22"
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling
activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might
affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these
duties he was temporarily authorized to possess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 Sn-64, for
his personal protection while in the performance of officials duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decisions in People vs. Macarandang[2] and People vs. Lucero.[3] The trial court, while
conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm
described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27,
1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that
the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed
and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances
the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People vs. Macarandang, supra, People vs. Lucero, supra,
and People vs. Mapa,  supra.  In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to
possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment
from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition.  We there held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue
any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating
to the issuance of license to possess firearms.  In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused
was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must
be deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said military
commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.  In Mapa, expressly abandoning the
doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of
conviction on the following ground:
"The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, 'it shall be unlawful for any
person to x x x possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition.' (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised
Administrative Code.) The next section provides that 'firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,' are not covered
'when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.' (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
"The law cannot be any clearer.  No provision is made for a secret agent.  As such he is not
exempt. x x x."
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Governor in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine
on the matter was that laid down by Us in People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs.
Lucero (1958).  Our decision in People vs. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only
in 1967.  The sole question in this appeal is:  Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of
Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?  The Solicitor General
is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system ***." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate.  The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by
a competent court has the force of law.  The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court.  It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.  This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved.  Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act
which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted,
with costs de oficio.
545 Phil. 168
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 168617, February 19, 2007 ]
BERNADETTE L. ADASA, PETITIONER, VS. CECILLE S. ABALOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Bernadette L.
Adasa, seeks to nullify and set aside the 21 July 2004 Decision [1] and 10 June 2005
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions
of the Department of Justice (DOJ).  The Resolutions of the DOJ reversed and set aside the
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, which found on reinvestigation
probable cause against petitioner, and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
to withdraw the information for Estafa against petitioner.
The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent Cecille S.
Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, against
petitioner for Estafa.
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received and
encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and
consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay
the proceeds of the checks.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and
encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent.
In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however, recanted and
alleged instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks which are the
subject matter of the complaints and encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the
country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations
for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article
315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, respectively.
This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case No. 8782.
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782
issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a
reinvestigation.
After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a
resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the finding of probable cause against petitioner.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner
entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.[3]
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August 2001
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to
withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file    a
“Motion to Withdraw Information” on 25 July 2002.
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ
arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of
DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and    the
aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot,
and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead
deny it outright.  Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the
grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration
opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary
of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused
has already been arraigned in court.  This is due to the permissive language “may” utilized in
Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned.
Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting petitioner’s “Motion
to Withdraw    Information” and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.  No action was taken by
respondent or any party of the case from the said order of dismissal.
Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.  Respondent raised the following issues before the appellate court:
 1.  Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving due
course to petitioner’s petition for review despite its having been filed after the latter
had already been arraigned;
2.  Whether or not there is probable cause that the    crime of estafa has been
committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof;
3. . Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has been rendered moot
and academic by the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No.
8782.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted respondent’s petition and
reversed the Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 70 which states “[i]f an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned,” ruled that since petitioner was arraigned before she filed the petition for review
with the DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such petition.  It added that when
petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to reinvestigation
and right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence of probable cause
or the lack of it, cannot be dealt with by it since factual issues are not proper subjects of a
Petition for Certiorari.
In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of the trial court
dismissing the subject criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ did not
render the petition moot and academic.  It said that since the trial court’s order relied solely
on the resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void as it violated the rule which enjoins the trial
court to assess the evidence presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely solely
on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of
the case.
Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals’ ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
setting forth the following grounds:
1.  that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 is
permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal
despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned;
2.  that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be given
great weight and respect;
3.  that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions rendered pursuant to a
preliminary investigation, not on a reinvestigation;
4.  that the trial court’s order of dismissal of the criminal case has rendered the instant
petition moot and academic;
5.  that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted despite her protestations;
and
6.  that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified or recalled by virtue of the trial court’s order of
reinvestigation.[4]
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision.  This time, however, it tried to construe
Section 7 side by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and attempted to reconcile
these two provisions. According to the appellate court, the phrase “shall not” in paragraph
two, first sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to wit:
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall
not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.  x x x.  (Emphasis
supplied.)
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition.  Applying the principle in statutory
construction - that when a statute or provision contains words of positive prohibition, such as
“shall not,” “cannot,” or “ought not” or which is couched in negative terms importing that the
act shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute or provision is mandatory, thus
rendering the provision mandatory – it opined that the subject provision simply means that the
Secretary of Justice has no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him
when arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the petition for
review.
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads:
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution.  He may, motu proprio
or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; x x x.
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word “may” in Section 12 would seem to
imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the
fact that the accused has been arraigned.  This provision should not be treated separately,
but should be read in relation to Section 7.  The two provisions, taken together, simply meant
that when an accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for
review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or
even give due course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it outright.  The appellate court
added that the word “may” in Section 12 should be read as “shall” or “must” since such
construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the rule as
gathered from the context.
As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the Court of Appeals
stated that the same should not be given weight since it was erroneous.
Anent petitioner’s argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular applies only to original
resolutions that brought about the filing of the corresponding informations in court, but not to
resolutions rendered pursuant to a motion for reinvestigation, the appellate court simply
brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the circular questioned.
It also rejected petitioner’s protestation that her arraignment was forced upon her since she
failed to present any evidence to substantiate the same.
It is petitioner’s contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right
to preliminary investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial court’s order or
reinvestigation.  On this score, the Court of Appeals rebuffed such argument stating that there
was no “supposed waiver of preliminary investigation” to speak of for the reason that
petitioner had actually undergone preliminary investigation.
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or petition for
review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned.  It asserts
that the fact of arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal or petition for review
before the DOJ “is not at all relevant” as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the appeal or
Petition for Review before it.  In support of this contention, petitioner set her sights on the
ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul,[5] to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court.  Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court.  The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it.  The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence.  A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.  It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. 
(Emphasis supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[6] which stated:
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable
ruling of the investigating prosecutor.  It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court.  x x x.  (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to
review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases.  The Secretary of Justice is only
enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court.  In any case, the
grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
The Court is unconvinced.
A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does not concern the
issue of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ after arraignment.  Verily, the
pronouncement therein has to do with the filing of a motion to dismiss and the court’s
discretion to deny or grant the same.  As correctly pointed out by respondent, the
emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the entire paragraph which relates to
the duty and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine for itself whether or not to dismiss a
case before it, and which states that such duty comes into play regardless of whether such
motion is filed before or after arraignment and upon whose instructions.  The allusion to the
Secretary of Justice as reviewing the records of investigation and giving instructions for the
filing of a motion to dismiss in the cited ruling does not take into consideration of whether the
appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment.  Significantly, in
the Crespo case, the accused had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for
review was filed before the DOJ.  Undoubtedly, petitioner’s reliance on the said case is
misplaced.
Also unavailing is petitioner’s invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of
Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals.  As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of
Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into account of whether the appeal or petition
before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment.  Just like in the Crespo case, the
accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not yet
been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed before the DOJ.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the provisions of DOJ
Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction.  First, the rule that the
provision that appears last in the order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail.
Second, the rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the
officers who enforce it should be given weight.  Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalo’s
Statutory Construction[8] where the word “shall” had been construed as a permissive, and not
a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule [9] of
procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be
resorted to.[10]  Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ
to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to
interpretation is necessary.
Petitioner’s reliance to the statutory principle that “the last in order of position in the rule or
regulation must prevail” is not applicable.  In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle cannot apply because, as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 7 and
Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70.  Section 7 of the circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition
outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or
when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.  If an
information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not
be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.  Any arraignment made after
the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of
review.  (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. – The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the
appealed resolution.  He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied
with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the
proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question;
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal.  (Emphases supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find application, the same
presupposes that “one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another
part without nullifying one in favor of the other.”  In the instant case, however, Section 7 is
neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12.  As can be seen above, Section 7
pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the
options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on what the
DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is either clearly
without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused has already been
arraigned,  i.e., he may dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or manifestly intended
to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has already been arraigned, the Secretary shall
not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal.  Under said section, the DOJ
may take any of four actions when disposing an appeal, namely:
1.  reverse the appealed resolution;
2.  modify the appealed resolution;
3.  affirm the appealed resolution;
4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances and incidents
attendant thereto.
As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the grounds are provided for in
Section 12 and, consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent circumstances and the
facts of the case in order to determine which ground or grounds shall apply.
 
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that
arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as
one of the grounds for its dismissal.  Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the
arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for
dismissal under Section 12, must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein.  In
other words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioner’s reliance on the principle of contemporary construction, i.e., the DOJ is
not precluded from entertaining appeals where the accused had already been arraigned,
because it exercises discretionary power, and because it promulgated itself the circular in
question, is unpersuasive.  As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the
officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to
great weight by the court in the latter’s construction of such rules and regulations.  That does
not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling or binding.  For equally
settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances
where the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously
given the statute a different interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon
to implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected when the
true construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous,
the same must be declared null and void.  Such principle should be as it is applied in the
case at bar.[11]
Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word “shall” is
misplaced.  It is petitioner’s view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore
the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ.
To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which
reads:
For instance, the word “shall” in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that “banks or
other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability
of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more than two per centum for ten years such
(backpay) certificate” implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning because of the
phrase “subject to availability of funds.”  Similarly, the word “shall” in the provision to the
effect that a corporation violating the corporation law “shall, upon such violation being proved,
be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings” has been construed as “may.”[12]
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is not
applicable to the provision in question.  In the cited passage, the word “shall” departed from
its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions:  by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to the charge. [17]
“subject to the availability of funds” and “upon such violation being proved.”  No such
proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject circular.  Hence, the
word “shall” retains its mandatory import.
At this juncture, the Court of Appeals’ disquisition in this matter is enlightening:
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a
discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being outrightly
dismissible, such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the
accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has
been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result
would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust.  For then, the action of the
Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would
only allow a great waste of time.  Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in
relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed
objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but
would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory. [13]
In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to whether
the DOJ rightfully entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the accused prior
to its filing, has been rendered moot and academic with the order of dismissal by the trial
court dated 27 February 2003.  Such contention deserves scant consideration.
It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the
Resolutions of the DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance of the
petition for review filed by petitioner.  Having been rendered in grave abuse of its discretion,
the Resolutions of the DOJ are void.  As the order of dismissal of the trial court was made
pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said order was likewise void.  The rule in this
jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect, and that all
proceedings or actions founded thereon are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective
for any purpose.[14]  That respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from
the dismissal order of the trial court is of no moment.  Since the dismissal was void, there was
nothing for respondent to oppose.
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was improvidently
conducted.  Again, this contention is without merit.  Records reveal that petitioner’s
arraignment was without any restriction, condition or reservation. [16]  In fact she was assisted
Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to
have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.[18] This precept is also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases
of review of such reinvestigation.  In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the
charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the
right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary.  Thus, with the arraignment of the
petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review
because petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same.
Lastly, while there is authority[19] permitting the Court to make its own determination of
probable cause, such, however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As earlier
stated, the arraignment of petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation.  Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause. 
For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause.
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be
subject of, a petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts.   This being
the case, this Court cannot review the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor
on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause. [20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July
2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are AFFIRMED. 
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to appeals from
original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not apply in the instant case where an
appeal is interposed by petitioner from the Resolution of the City Prosecutor denying her
motion for reinvestigation.  This claim is baseless.

A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to
limit its application to appeals from original resolutions and not to resolutions on
reinvestigation.  Hence, the rule stating that “when the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish”[15] finds application in this regard.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984 ]
INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), PETITIONER,
VS. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of respondent
Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G. Inciong, in NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-76 entitled
"Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (complainant-appellee), vs. Insular
Bank of Asia and America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"xx xx.
 "ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc  of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a
new judgment promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit" (p. 109, rec.).
The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:
 On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment
of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both
parties, the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18, NLRC rec.).
 On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-
entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for payment of holiday pay. Pertinent portions of
the decision read:
 "xx xx.
 "The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on
unworked regular holidays as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208, to wit:
'Art. 208. Right to holiday pay. –
 ‘(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail
and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers.
 ‘(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of
July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.
 'xx xx.'
 "This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees
was computed in the past with the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes of
determining the deductible amount for absences incurred. Thus, if the employer uses the
factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of monthly paid employee, this gives
rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not include payments for unworked regular
holidays. The use of the factor 303 indicates the number of ordinary working days in a year
(which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52 Sundays and the 10 regular
holidays. The use of 251 as a factor (365 calendar days less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays, and
10 regular holidays) gives rise likewise to the same presumption that the unworked
Saturdays, Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid. This being the case, it is not amiss to
state with certainty that the instant claim for wages on regular unworked holidays is found to
be tenable and meritorious.
 "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
 “(a) xx xx.
 “(b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular holidays since
November 1, 1974" (pp. 97-99, rec., Italics supplied).
 Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying their holiday pay up to and including January, 1976.
On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated amending, among
others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay to read as follows:
 "Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers;
 
“(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall
be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and
 “(c) As used in this Article, 'holiday' includes: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of
November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December, and the day designated by law for
holding a general election."
Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the
implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads:
 "SEC. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. -- Employees who are uniformly paid by
the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than
the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the
month whether worked or not.
 "For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum
wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve" (Italics supplied).
On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now
Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule, pertinent portion of which read:
 "xx xx.
 "The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include
payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.
 "Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate
controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this:
If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum
wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be
already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his
monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to
the ten (10) paid legal holidays. x x x" (Italics supplied).
Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing
Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of holiday
pay to all its employees.
On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter's
decision of August 25, 1975, whereby the respondent bank was ordered to pay its employees
their daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.
On September 10, 1975, respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of
execution alleging, among others, that: (a) its refusal to pay the corresponding unworked
holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, dated August
25, 1975, is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules
implementing P. D. 850; and (b) that the said award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which
took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy Instruction No. 9 of the Department of
Labor, considering that its monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and
their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and that no deductions are made
from the monthly salaries of its employees on account of holidays in months where they occur
(pp. 64-65, NLRC, rec.).
On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of execution,
issued an order enjoining the respondent bank to continue paying its employees their regular
holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the judgment is already final and the findings
which is found in the body of the decision as well as the dispositive portion thereof is res
judicata or is the law of the case between the parties; and (b) that since the decision had
been partially implemented by the respondent bank, appeal from the said decision is no
longer available (pp. 100-103, rec.).
On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited order of Labor
Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations Commission, reiterating therein its
contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution. Respondent bank
further alleged for the first time that the questioned order is not supported by evidence insofar
as it finds that respondent bank discontinued payment of holiday pay beginning January,
1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).
On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution en
banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 "In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss, respondent's
appeal; to set aside Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October 1976 and, as
prayed for by complainant, to order the issuance of the proper writ of execution" (p. 244,
NLRC rec.).
Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979 or
almost eight (8) months after it was promulgated, while copies were served on the
respondent bank on February 13, 1979.
On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion
for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution, alleging therein the following:
(a) that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in dismissing the
respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without passing upon the merits of the appeal; and
(b) that the resolution appealed from is contrary to the law and jurisprudence (pp. 260-274,
NLRC rec.).
On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and alleged
the following grounds: (a) that the office of the Minister of Labor has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 1391; (b) that the labor arbiter's
decision being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the
petitioner; and (c) that the decision of the labor arbiter dated August 25, 1975 is supported by
the law and the evidence in the case (p. 364, NLRC rec.).
On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying that
a writ of execution be issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending appeal of
the case with the Office of the Minister of Labor. Respondent bank filed its opposition thereto
on August 8, 1979.
On August 13, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order which states:
"The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to
designate a SocioEconomic Analyst to compute the holiday pay of the employees of the
Insular Bank of Asia and America from April 1976 to the present, in accordance with the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 25, 1975" (p. 80, rec.).
On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado
G. Inciong, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which states:
 
"ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc  of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a
new judgment promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit" (p. 436, NLRC rec.).
Hence, this petition for certiorari charging public respondent Amado G. Inciong with abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The issue in this case is: whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding payment of
regular holiday pay can still be set aside on appeal by the Deputy Minister of Labor even
though it has already becone final and had been partially executed, the finality of which was
affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission sitting en banc, on the basis of an
Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the Ministry of Labor long after the
said decision had become final and executory.
WE find for the petitioner.
I
WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing
rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void
since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, they in effect
amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 11, rec.).
Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides:
 
"Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. -- (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers. x x x x."
The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled
out under Article 82 thereof which reads:
 
"Art. 82. Coverage. – The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments
and undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial
employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on
him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers
who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
"xx xx" (Italics supplied).
From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded
from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay
promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said
benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules, Section 2, which
provides that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of
working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not."
Public respondent maintains that "(T)he rules implementing P.D. 850 and Policy Instruction
No. 9 were issued to clarify the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. As interpreted, 'unworked' legal holidays are deemed paid insofar as monthly paid
employees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the statutory minimum wage,
(b) their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and (c) no deduction is made
from their monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur. As explained in
Policy Instruction No. 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to
benefit principally daily paid employees. In case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary
did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit'" (pp.
340-341, rec.). This contention is untenable.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is
clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar,
the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear
and explicit – it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy
Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the
benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every
worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory
directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that
the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most
beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112).
Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by
Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations.
Public respondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, as
expressed by the Secretary of Labor in the case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v.
The Chartered Bank (NLRC Case No. RB-1789-75, March 24, 1976), is to correct the
disadvantages inherent in the daily compensation system of employment -- holiday pay is
primarily intended to benefit the daily paid workers whose employment and income are
circumscribed by the principle of "no work, no pay." This argument may sound meritorious;
but, until the provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is amended by another law,
monthly paid employees are definitely included in the benefits of regular holiday pay. As
earlier stated, the presumption is always in favor of law, negatively put, the Labor Code is
always strictly construed against management.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive
officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such
construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and
void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in
action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme
Court in Modern Role, C. B. Swisher, 1958, p. 36).
Thus, in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981) where the Secretary of Labor enlarged the
scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree granting increase in
emergency allowance, this Court ruled that: 
"x x x x the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority when he included paragraph (k) in
Section 1 of the Rules implementing P.D. 1123. 
"xx xx xx. 
"Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the
Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void, as ruled by this Court in a long line of
cases x x x x. 
"'The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment, may be found in the early case of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908. Then
came in a 1914 decision, United States vs. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119) delineation of the
scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely
to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.' In 1936, in People vs. Santos,
this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount to an
excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a
doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act
must prevail and must be followed.' Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling
Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the
matter thus: 'A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate
wisdom x x x. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.' 
“‘It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all
executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the
Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe
the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its
terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from its provisions.
No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency ‘cannot amend an act of Congress.' Respondents can be sustained,
therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were
in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of Rights provides'" (Phil. Apparel Workers
Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, 463, 464, citing Teozon vs. Members
of the Board of Administrators, PVA, 33 SCRA 585; see also Santos vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al.,
109 Phil. 419; Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil. 295; Sy Man vs. Jacinto &
Fabros, 93 Phil. 1093; Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259).
This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable Workers
Union (TUPAS) vs. The National Labor Relations Commission and American Wire & Cable
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 53337, promulgated on June 29, 1984.
In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor
Code and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor must be declared
null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong had
no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular holiday pay as directed
by the Labor Code.
II
It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975,
had already become final, and was, in fact, partially executed by the respondent bank.
However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61
SCRA 49, November 13, 1974, he can annul the final decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since
the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing rules of the Labor Code pursuant to
P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April 23, 1976
by the then Secretary of Labor are facts and circumstances that transpired subsequent to the
promulgation of the decision of the labor arbiter, which renders the execution of the said
decision impossible and unjust on the part of herein respondent bank (pp. 342-343, rec.).
This contention is untenable.
To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public
respondent is not a labor case wherein the express mandate of the Constitution on the
protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that, "All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor"; and Article 1702 of
the Civil Code provides that, "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer."
Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the
members of petitioner union of their vested right acquired by virtue of a final judgment on the
basis of a labor statute promulgated following the acquisition of the "right".
On the question of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued
prior to its promulgation, this Court, through Associate Justice Claro M. Recto, said: 
"xx xx xx. 
"We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Said order, being unappealable, became
final on the date of its issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be
deprived thereof by a constitutional provision enacted or promulgated subsequent
thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal laws favorable to the accused,
have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or modifying vested rights, or altering
contractual obligations” (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63
Phil. 324, Italics supplied).
In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "x x x
when a court renders a decision or promulgates a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect." Thus, the
amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code) cannot be
given retroactive effect as to modify final judgments. Not even a law can validly annul final
decisions (In re: Cunanan, et al., Ibid.).
Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the public respondent are not analogous to
that of the case at bar. The case of De Luna speaks of final and executory judgment, while in
the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed. Just as the court is ousted of its
jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment it becomes final, the court also loses its
jurisdiction to annul or modify a writ of execution upon its service or execution; for, otherwise,
we will have a situation wherein a final and executed judgment can still be annulled or
modified by the court upon mere motion of a party. This would certainly result in endless
litigations thereby rendering inutile the rule of law.
Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary
because it did so under pain of levy and execution of its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find no
merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its voluntariness in complying
with the decision of the labor arbiter by not appealing to the National Labor Relations
Commission as provided for under the Labor Code under Article 223. A party who waives his
right to appeal is deemed to have accepted the judgment, adverse or not, as correct,
especially if such party readily acquiesced in the judgment by starting to execute said
judgment even before a writ of execution was issued, is in this case. Under these
circumstances, to permit a party to appeal from the said partially executed final judgment
would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality of judgments long enshrined in this juris-
diction.
Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "x x x execution shall issue
as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal x x x or if no appeal has been
duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of labor arbiters who are exercising
quasi-judicial functions since; "x x x the rule of execution of judgments under the rules should
govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise provided in other laws"
(Sagucio vs. Bulos, 5 SCRA 803) and Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that "x x x
decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrators are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10)
days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. x x x."
Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment and the judgment becomes final ipso jure (Vega vs.
WCC, 89 SCRA 143, citing Cruz vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 436, 440, January 31, 1978; see
also Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 621; Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, decided jointly,
77 SCRA 297; Vitug vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 436; Ramos vs. Republic, 69 SCRA 576).
In Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31, 1961,
where the lower court modified a final order, this Court ruled thus:  rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint since he knew for a fact
"xx xx xx.  by the respondent bank.
"The lower court was thus aware of the fact that it was thereby altering or modifying its order
of January 8, 1959. Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did, we are
constrained to hold, however, that the lower court had no authority to make said alteration or
modification. x x x.  equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could
"xxx xx xx. 
"The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of cannot
offset the demands of public policy and public interest -- which are also responsive to the
tenets of equity -- requiring that all issues passed upon in decisions or final orders that have
become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and definitely closed, for, otherwise,
there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice,
which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order, by settling justiciable controversies with finality.  and void and confers no rights" (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil.
"xx xx xx." 
In the recent case of Gabaya vs. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 405, 406, March 30, 1982, this Court
said: 
"xx xx xx. 
"In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil. 237), it was categorically stated that the rule is absolute
that after a judgment becomes final, by the expiration of the period provided by the rules
within which it so becomes, no further amendment or correction can be made by the court
except for clerical errors or mistakes. And such final judgment is conclusive not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as
to any other admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose (L7044, 96
Phil. 526). In the earlier case of Contreras and Ginco vs. Felix and China Banking Corp., Inc.
(44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be adhered to regardless of any possible
injustice in a particular case for ‘(W)e have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation
to the over-mastering need of certainty and immutability of judicial pronouncements.' 
"xx xx xx."
III
The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the members of
the petitioner union of their rights acquired by virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law. Public respondent completely ignored the
that the judgment of the labor arbiter had long become final and was even partially executed
A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under
the due process clause of the Constitution (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First
Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324). A final judgment is "a vested interest which it is right and
not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice" (Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W. 2d 785, 791).
It is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy
language of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "x x x acts of Congress, as well as
those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory
provision to the contrary notwithstanding” (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110
Phil. 118, Italics supplied). And "(I)t has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).
Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due
process, the action of public respondent Amado G. Inciong is a clear example of deprivation
of property without due process of law and constituted grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated November 10, 1979.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER RICARTE T.
SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.
COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA.
SO ORDERED.
114 Phil. 555
[ G.R. No. L-16704, March 17, 1962 ]
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
DECISION
BARRERA, J.:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the
following tenor:
"Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will
take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration  all bonuses and overtime
pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the
Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will
be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory
to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7,1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and
bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions, and submit ting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper
interpretation of the term compensation for the purposes of such computation, their
observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of
the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages Counsel Further questioned the
validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not
a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and ; publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether of not Circular No. 22 is a rule or
regulation, as contemplated in Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social
Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or
gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law,
p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanction) intended by
the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product; of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit. p. 194.)
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit. pp. 195-
197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for
it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term. "compensation"
contained Section .8(f) ,of Republic Act. No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as
follows:
"(f) Compensation — All remuneration, for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration, paid, in ;any medium other than) cash except (1) that part of the renumeration
in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
(3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally
required to do so,"
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
"(f) Compensation — All renumeration for employment include the cash value of any
renumeration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the renumeration in
excess of P500.00 received during the month."
It will thus be seen that whereat) prior to amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this
given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded or exempted from the Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in
definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in
the; effect of suck deletion or elimination. Circular No, 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission,, of the, law as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not In view of the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
already in the.law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the appellant. So ordered.
Commission as to how the law should be construed.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Baustista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
The case of People vs. Jolliffe ( G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation.
What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a
circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is
decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any
circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or
regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.

The case of People vs. Que Po Lay ( 50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable
to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees
if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the
employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but
for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27 (e) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 1161.

We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the
System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining
the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication
in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its
Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old
law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation"
paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be
included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in
previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the
wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the
employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be
considered compensation, under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the
employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their
well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in
a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can
not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and
another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic