LOCATING ERWIN STRAUS

Erling Eng

The Husserlian project begins by establishing a critical dis-

tance between itself and latter nineteenth century science. Start-
ing from the philosophy of arithmetic, disclosing psychologism
in contemporary notions of logic, attempting "philosophy as a
rigorous science", Husserl climaxes his work by relating the
modern cultural crisis to science as it took shape in Galileo's
and his successors' understanding of the relations among man,
mathematics, and Nature.
Historically a like tension has related human and nature-
oriented disciplines, if only in the latters' refusal to admit as
science anything not in conformity with their own image. An
example of this was the ruling out of court of mesmeric phe-
nomena by Benjamin Franklin and others, because they were
inexplicable in terms of magnetism, whose animal form they
had been considered. Accompanying such exclusions, a variety
of teleological agents, complementary to the newly postulated
mechanisms, were proposed. These ranged from Blumenbach's
nisus formativus or Bildungstrieb through Schopenhauer's "will
as world and idea", to Nietzsche's "will to power" and Bergson's
"elan vital." The same occurs in Freud's thought when he shifts
from the extremely mechanistic account of his early "Scientific
Project" to his later notion of an evolutionary sexual libido.
And even though his own understanding of psychoanalysis sought
to reconcile the difference between mechanism and purpose, his

1
principles of Eros and Thanatos remain ambiguously tendencies
of nature and poles of individual experiencing. Freud's insistence
on the autonomy of psychoanalysis vis-a-vis biology, along with
his effort to utilize Lamarck for the self-understanding of psycho-
analysis, indicate an effort on his part to realize an A ufhebung
of the tension between biology and psychology in psychoanal-
ysis. But this he did not live to accomplish, if indeed it is ac-
complishable. The tension between human and nature-centered
science remains both as the condition and the problem of his
project.
This tension can scarcely be avoided in psychiatric and
neurological practice where the doctor, while informed in physics
and chemistry, anatomy and physiology, is at the same time
faced with human distress. Here the issues are as old and diffi-
cult as Job. In the implicit as well as explicit way the physician
symbolizes the possible meanings of failure and suffering, he
cannot avoid the issue of human freedom as it enters into his
interpretation of what makes it possible for a person to become,
and remain, a patient. For his own attitude, even beyond his
wishes, is recognized as a therapeutic influence.
In many ways the problems of Husserlian phenomenology
resemble those with which medicine has been concerned ever
since Hippocrates. I shall spare you the texts, only reminding
you that "phenomena" and "epoche" terms were familiar to
the philosopher physicians of antiquity.' The issues of phenom-
ena, epoche, and intersubjectivity refer to problems of the med-
ical attitude no less than Husserlian phenomenology, even though
in a different way.
The eighteenth century marks a change in this tradition. This
is evidenced in the appearance of newly-coined terms like "psy-
chiatrist" and "biology" in the first years of the nineteenth centu-
ry.2 Both represent the enterprise of new special sciences, as the
shared world of sensory experience, like the earth itself, becomes
increasingly divided up into separate domains of interest. New-
ton, through rendering the movements of heavenly bodies intelli-
gible through mathematical understanding, disabused his age of
its clinging belief in the authority of the pre-Galilean, pre-Coper-
nican, world. From having been a unity apparent to the senses,
the world is now replaced by mathematical equations and the
ideal unity of science. At the same time, the everyday world

2
becomes increasingly defined in terms of technological fruits of
this new knowledge.
In antiquity weight was understood as inseparable from place
in the world of everyday experience. The four elements of the
cosmos occupied natural places in a hierarchical order which
was at the same time an ontological one. Earth lay at the basis,
fire rose to the heights, with water and air between. Man's phys-
ical make-up with its four humors was conceived in accord with
this order. In ancient thought man's uprightness was understood
as suspension from above, whence all originated. Such a 'dangling
man' can be followed from Plato, through Aristotle to Plotinus
and beyond. Here are some texts:

"... we are creatures not of earth but of heaven, where the soul was first
born, and our divine part attaches us by the head to heaven, like a plant by
its roots, and keeps our body upright." (Plato, Timeaus, 90).

Aristotle conceived of the heat rising from the heart, toward

its natural place in the empyrean, as responsible for man's up-
rightness :

"Again, if the soul moves upward it will be fire, and if downwards, earth;
for these two movements belong respectively to these two bodies..." (de
anima 406a 27-28).
"(there is) a great deal of heat and blood in the region around the heart
and the lung. This too explains why man is the only animal that stands up-
right." (de part. an. 653a 31-32).
"Heat, again, tends to make the body erect, and thus it is that man is the
most erect of animals..." (de part. an. 669b 5-6).

In Plotinus' late hellenic characterization man is pendant

from the centre of the world as if his toes were dipping in water:

"In our present state - part of our being weighed down by the body as
one might have the feet under water with all the rest untouched - we bear
ourselves aloft by that intact part and in that hold through our own centre
to the centre of all centres, just as the centres of the great circles of a sphere
coincide with that of the sphere to which we all belong." (Enn. VI, 9, 8).

Following Galileo and Copernicus, this perpendicularity from

above is finally rendered obsolete with the Newtonian concep-
tion. Now human uprightness can only be conceived in opposi-
tion to the earth's gravity. Thus for Hegel:

3
"The absolute gesture of man is the upright posture ... he raises himself
3
up through the energy of his will." (Encycl.)3

With this the "muscular sense" is thematized; and it will be-

come the dominant emphasis in nineteenth century psychophys-
iology. In philosophy this appears as an emphasis on the will, from
Fichte, through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche. In France Destutt
de Tracy and Maine de Biran ground the experience of self in
muscular tonus. And it was primarily Newtonian gravity, the tie
of this with magnetism, and of magnetism with "galvanism",
that provided the inspiration for the newly emerging neurology.
One of its contributors, Thomas Laycock, wrote in 1860:

"Man maintains himself in an erect position in opposition to the force of

gravity, and contrary to the law of gravity. This he effects either by a voli-
tion or unconsciously. In either case, Mind is the universal element in the
act, the vital forces the particular element."4

You may judge for yourselves how closely the following agrees:

"In getting up, in reaching the upright posture, man must oppose the forces
of gravity. It seems to be his nature to oppose, with natural means, nature
in its impersonal, fundamental aspects. However, gravity is never fully over-
come ; upright posture always maintains its character of counteraction. It
calls for activity and attention."5 5

The passage is from Erwin Straus's classic paper "The Up-

right Posture". Although it can be considered certain he never
laid eyes on Laycock's work there is a meaningful thread linking
the statements of Laycock and Straus. Laycock was an impor-
tant teacher of Hughlings Jackson, and it happens that Erwin
Straus also quotes Jackson in the paper from which his words
were taken. And there is more, on which I shall touch later.
That Erwin Straus' meditation on the upright posture in-
cluded an implicit concern for those meanings obscured by the
transformation of the ancient into the modern conception of
man as upright appears in an unpublished 1963 letter. There he
says he expected to find his view of the primacy of motility over
desire confirmed in the De Anima, but that he was surprised to
find that Aristotle had confined the topic of motion to the
Physics. Whereupon he asks:

4
"Could it be that the problem of getting up and the emancipation from
gravity was not considered by Aristotle, because of"6the cosmological organi-
z
zation of space - that will say, we are all 'unten'?

This, of course, is confirmed by the preceding quotations.

But if man's experience of his membership in the world was
to begin with disturbed by redefinition of the cosmos in terms
of the mathematical laws of gravity, a meditation now on the
meanings of human uprightness as the anthropological basis for
the knowledge of universal gravitation can restore the openness
of the supposedly closed windowless monad. The consequence
of this is to reverse the absolutistic emphasis on Newtonian
stimulus-response relations, to realize as Erwin Straus observes
in his 1975 paper "The Monads Have Windows", that:

"We certainly do not step on optical stimuli! Neither do we walk on opti-

cal stimuli projected outward! We set our feet on solid ground, the subjec-
tum (hypokeimonon), in the Aristotelian sense of the word, visible
in advance and felt in contact."original

In the same essay he quotes and modifies Hughlings Jackson's

view to show how it is only in the life-world that "causality of
stimuli and intentionality of experience can be reconciled":

"Paraphrasing Hughlings Jackson's statement, 'The nervous system knows

no muscles, it only knows movements', I would prefer to say, 'We don't
move our muscles, we move our limbs in relation to the environment open-
ed to us in sensory experience."$ 8

That is, it is only in the waking world of the senses that we

can move our limbs in relation to the world.
An understanding of this view calls for a revision of histori-
cal judgments. The primacy of the world for understanding
bodily movement enhances the importance of Hughlings Jack-
son (1835-1911), the founder of modern neurology. It also plac-
es in a new light his important influence on Freud, the neurolo-
gist, in his studies on aphasia. The latter's psychoanalysis, me-
diating biology and psychology, has been seen by Binswanger as
an extension of Jacksonian conceptions.'
Hughlings Jackson has been famed and defamed for the phil-
osophical reach of his assumptions, and this appears to have
played a part in the tendency to his historical neglect. In addi-

5
tion to Laycock (who took his medical degree in G6ttingen in
1839 and who, along with a background in Cambridge Platonism,
also mediated an influence of contemporary German philosophy)
Jackson's greatest expressed indebtedness was to Spencer's par-
adigm of development with its reciprocal possibilities of "evolu-
tion" and "dissolution". It was also Herbert Spencer who ground-
ed the reality of the other in muscular resistance. It may be
noted too, in a phenomenological context, that Herbert Spencer
was one of the reading interests of the early Husserl.'o
Jackson adopted Spencer's ideas of the temporal reciprocity
of evolution and dissolution from his Principles of Psychology
(1855), using them to relate the structure of sensory and motor
disturbances to impairments of the central nervous system. His
concept of the central nervous system was that of a hierarchical-
ly ordered series of levels extending from representation, through
re-representation, and re-re-representation.l1 As you may notice,
these terms can be understood psychologically no less than
physically or physiologically. This is also the Spencerian assump-
tion, which, in allowing for reciprocal analogy is not simply
identical with traditional, say Leibnizian, psychophysical paral-
lelism. Each of the two categories of mental and physical are
organized vertically in time, "sedimented", Husserl might have
said. The extremes of such vertical temporal organizations are
reciprocally implicating. In addition to this vertical reciprocity
of meaning, there also exists a transverse relationship between
the categories as such. That is, the physical may be taken as
analogically representative of the mental, just as the mental can
serve to represent the physical category analogically. This af-
fords the possibility of two different dimensions of analogical
representation of meaning, one along the evolutionary time di-
mension and transversely, between mental and physical catego-
ries. It is very much as if one had introduced time into Plato's
schema of the Divided Line, divided upper and lower parts of
the line, and placed them alongside one another. Jackson's mod-
ification, relative to Plato's Divided Line, also represents the
way in which the experience of the world has become divorced
from cosmic naturalism. A consequence of this is to open up
the monad inherited from the breakup of the ancient cosmology
to subjectivity from below, even while participating in the world.
This is the direction of Freud, after Jackson.
Hughlings Jackson, in his clinical readings of the relation-

6
ships among neurological lesion, consciousness and behavior, re-
assumed the primacy of a world shared by himself and his pa-
tient. It is a world to which we secure access in waking up and
standing up, 'taking a stand' out of timeless, subjectless and ob-
jectless sleep, out of the streaming of consciousness. It is the
waking world which forms the chiasma, so to speak, between
the orders of psychology and physiology, a moving temporal
present which includes past and future, structure and function.
All change, whether physiological or psychological, passes
through our existence in and of the world as represented by
their analogical tie, from which and to which they diverge and
converge.
The encompassing whole that is changed and which changes
comprises man and world. Within this the task is to realize a
conception of man that allows for unity of experience as well as
for the creative disjunctions inseparable from lived temporality.
Such a conception overarches every structural adaption to spe-
cific circumstances, including modes of adaption at different
ages of development. In terms of Jackson's ladder model for the
central nervous system, and for his implicit psychology, the
highest level represents not only all of the comportments of the
lower, earlier realized levels, but potentially the still unrealized
possibilities of the primordial level. Governed by the whole in
the moving present, there is a reciprocity between the extremes
of this ladder in both mental and physical categories that is also
reminiscent of the three-in-one structure of Husserl's inner time-
consciousness. Here the analogical tie itself would be represented
by the moving moment as well as by the life-world, in the Hus-
serlian perspective.
As evolutionary this thought has a relation to that of Dar-
win, but in an unusual way. Darwin's "nature", instead of being
in the world, is rather endowed latently with the character of
world itself; it is through post-Incarnation nature endowed with
the openness of divine creation that "natural selection" occurs.
Nature is 'occultated' creation. We can see this from Darwin's
perplexed fascination with primary movement in nature to the
very end of his life, which he conceived of as the source of many
variations required for the working of "natural selection". Thus
the essential "worldlessness" of the Darwinian conception of
evolution. Darwin opposed creation as accomplished once and
for all, but was unable to recover anything like the Greek telos

7
of purpose, aim, direction in the modern scientific conception
of nature. I.e., he could not account for the movement by which
he displaced the static account. This mere inversion of "the
primary world of the senses" may be seen in Darwin's image of
living movement as downward and as plant, not animal, move-
ment. This is in significant contrast to "the upright posture" of
Erwin Straus, with its complementary movements both of up-
wardness and downwardness, activity and possivity. At the end
of his 1880 publication The Power of Movement in Plants, Dar-
win wrote:

"We believe that there is no structure in plants more wonderful as far as its
functions are concerned, than the tip of the radicle ... It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that the tip of the radicle ... acts like a brain of one
of the lower animals; the brain being seated within the anterior end of the
body, receiving of the sense-organs and directing the several
movements." IT impressions
(p. 572-3).

It was here, where Darwin recovered a sense of the world as

open through his image of inverted uprightness, that he could
realize the world of wonder as one also inclusive of, and not
merely subordinate to, mechanism.
A backward look now before returning to the contribution
of Erwin Straus. Starting from the tension between Husserlian
phenomenology and the imperialistic truth claims of science, we
considered its parallel in the tension between the human mean-
ing of a patient's distress and its definition in medical treatment.
Such a tension between man's experience of his world and its
scientific account was enhanced by the Copernican revolution
as well as by the mathematical Newtonian formulation of gravi-
tational laws. Now, in a world whose visible import has with-
drawn into mathematical laws, man's uprightness grounding
even vision demonstrates the primacy of freedom and responsi-
bility. Thus, the emphasis on man's opposition to gravity and
the muscular sense in the nineteenth century. This new sense of
human uprightness, firmly expressed by Herder, was taken up
by Hegel and Schelling, passed from Laycock and Spencer to
Jackson on to Freud, to Straus and to Henri Ey, through whom
it reaches into presentday psychiatry, across its entire spec-
trum.13 Its relation to psychology is much less clear. It would,
elsewhere, be possible to show how emphasis on the muscular
sense passed over into twentieth century behaviorism via its

8
translation into electrical activity and marriage with British as-
sociationism. Suffice it here to say that the active opposition to
gravity must be presupposed for stimuli conceived on the model
of the electrical stimulation of points in the brain by Hitzig and
Frisch in 1870 and Ferrier in 1873. This soon occupied neurolo-
gists to the neglect of prereflective uprightness and awakeness.
For the subject of such stimulation to be able to give a report
he must first of all be awake. Moreover, the experimental sub-
ject is placed much in the position of Pavlov's dog, immobilized
by a harness, and forced to respond.

II

Each contributor to phenomenology appears to have a par-

ticular theme around which his meditations center. For Erwin
Straus, this could be "lived movement." From his 1935 paper
of that title to his all but last paper "The Monads Have Windows"
in 1975, he spoke out of an awareness of original movement
that remains continuous through all of its constituted forms.
Human movement is inseparable from being awake. It is the
moment of opposition, above all the opposition to gravity, that
is important for Erwin Straus. It is the opposition in which the
deeper tie is disclosed. This affirmation of the moment of sepa-
ration in uprightness is quite different from the ancient emphasis
on the way in which it represented "like to like", i.e. mimesis of
an upright cosmos. This uprightness is one in spite of gravity,
'despite everything'. Only to this active separation from earth
does the earth make answer by giving support. Resisted, it per-
sists as ally, endowing the human figure with the force of nature.
Such a force contrasts with that of Darwin's radicle, growing
downward. In and through this opposition, man takes his stand
in the stream of change, constituting the world as such. Kinesis
that gives distance rather than orexis or desire, is primary. Desire
itself is born of separation, and seeks only to put an end to the
present in which I open, and am opened to, the world.
It is in and through our opposition to gravity that the world
is revealed to us, both attractively and disagreeably. A striking
passage from Michael Faraday (1791-1867) lecturing to chil-
dren at Christmas in 1859, Darwin's year, expresses the way in
which man's uprightness connotes a world of forces for whose

9
understanding and mastery he makes himself responsible. Be-
cause it is Faraday who is speaking it also suggests indirectly
how electrical activity of the central nervous system could
endow stimulus - response conceptions in psychology with sur-
plus ontological meaning:

"Let us now consider, for a little while, [he said to his youthful group,]
how wonderfully we stand upon this world. Here it is we are born, bred,
and live, and yet we view these things with an almost entire absence of
wonder to ourselves respecting the way in which all this happens. So small,
indeed, is our wonder that we are never taken by surprise; and I do think
that, to a young person of ten, fifteen, or twenty years of age, perhaps the
first sight of a cataract or a mountain would occasion him more surprise
than he had ever felt concerning the means of his own existence; how he
came here; how he lives; by what means he stands upright; and through
what means he moves about from place to place. Hence, we come into this
world, we live, and depart from it, without our thoughts being called spe-
cifically to consider how all this takes place; and were it not for the exer-
tions of some few inquiring minds, who have looked into these things and
ascertained the very beautiful laws and conditions by which we do live and
stand upon the earth, we should hardly be aware that there was anything
wonderful in it. These inquiries which have occupied philosophers from
the earliest days, when they first began to find out the laws by which we
grow, and exist, and enjoy ourselves, up to the present time, have shown
us all that this was effected in consequence of the existence of certain
forces, or abilities to do things, or powers, that are so common that no-
thing can be more so; for nothing is commoner than the wonderful powers
by which we are enabled to stand upright - they are essential to our exist-
ence every moment." 14

The Newtonian inspiration of this paragraph is not at first

apparent. But in a later passage Faraday follows this up by
pointing out the reciprocal attraction of bodies:

"It is not that the earth has any particular attraction toward bodies which
fall to it, but, that all these bodies possess an attraction every one toward
the others 5

At the same time that I stand up I also draw the world up to

me. Thus Erwin Straus: "Upright posture as counteraction can-
not lack the forces against which it strives".16 And "There is a
gyrostatic system of balance, holding the legs as much as being
carried by them". 1 This evokes even more than the man with
the heavenly orbits in his head of the Timaeus; it also suggests
the androgynous sphere of Aristophanes' recital in the 5'ympo-

10
sium. Human verticality is eccentric to the earth, only to dis-
cover its own autonomy at the heart of experience.0ut of macro-
cosmic patterns of movement, we recover the orbits of the mi-
crocosm through whose cooperation they are manifested. These
discoveries are possible only in and through the contraposition
of being awake and standing up. The senses serve to order, like
the orbits of the soul in Timaeus, the contingencies of experi-
ence, in a world whose logos has, to an unprecedented degree,
become mathematical and theoretical.
The movement achieved in uprightness is inseparable from
an horizon of meaning to be realized. Horizon too is separation,
rooted in that uprightness. With loss of there is for-
feiture of horizon, loss of time. In the naturalattitude upri htness man tends
to lose awareness of the horizon as rooted in his own upright-
ness ; when he identifies horizon with the world itself, he suffers
an impairment of uprightness. The sick person tends to refer his
failure of strength to the faults of the world, while natural man
tends to exalt the power of the world, deprecating his own ini-
tiative.
That our own defect is able to return to us from the world,
just as the possibilities of the world answer to our invitation, re-
veals just how deep a continuity exists between man and world.
Bodily structures,by virtue of their developmental character, con-
note past worlds. Worlds betoken structures to be of experience
and body. That "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" means
simply that development involves recovery of past experience;
new experience draws on the past as a resource, transforming it
into new forms and powers.
This deep tie between uprightness and sensory perception,
above all in vision, is supported by a remarkable similarity of
focal themes in Newton and Straus. Newton's two principal
works were the Principia, on the laws of gravity, and Opticks on
the composition of light. Although his works were published
years apart it is known that his experiments with gravity and
light were performed about the same time.l8 Similarly, the work
of Erwin Straus has focussed on the spectrum of the senses to-
gether with the sense of gravity, in our lived opposition to it.
In lived movement both occur together. Erwin Straus has re-
minded us of how in waking up we get up, to find a world re-
vealed opposite us by light that comes toward us, light that is
something like a greeting in answer to our initial movement of
opposition. Light and gravity were also poles of human experi-

11
ence for Schelling, something like a post-Newtonian reinstate-
ment of the ancient vertical opposition of fire and earth in the
cosmic scale of elements.'9 Schelling to be sure is more in the
mythic mode. The thought of Erwin Straus is primarily aisthetic
in the Greek sense of aisthesis which includes both sensation
and perception. It is to a psychology in the aisthetic mode that
his work introduces us. His conception of man's position is one
which stresses the inseparability of ontological and epistemolog-
ical questions in experience. Membership and cognition are inter-
laced. Through opposition to gravity we are not only within the
world but over and beyond it; within this diremption the spheres
of the senses are opened up. Separation reveals, in the course of
successive recoveries of distance from the unions achieved in my
own recurrent movement, ever deeper implicit ties between I
and Allon. In this regard Straus' conception accords with the
actual course of modern science. It is the separation which en-
ables the continuing pursuit of meaning in the discovery, within
the recurrent separation, of ever more intricate continuities be-
tween man and world.
In this perspective a rather different understanding of the
problematic of "alienation" than is common today emerges. Im-
plicated in the kind of distance manifested in uprightness is an
ineluctable exposure to responsibility, accompanied by a tacit
urgency for its intentional fulfillment. 20 If such uprightness
provides the distance in which man's development and use of
tools can flourish,21 it also opens him up to that Other, in time
as well as in space, from which new meanings of his earlier acts
and attitudes can be revealed. Thus the presence of the correla-
tive moral sense of "uprightness", a meaning Erwin Straus has
pointed out.22
Further, the distance expressed and sustained in human up-
rightness not only imposes the requirement that, later or sooner,
one must recognize the consequences of one's acts from the
Other retroflectively, with accompanying self-redefintion, but
that the inability or refusal to do this accounts for the possibili-
ty of "repression" and "the Unconscious". Impinging on the
Other and others, man, for better or for worse, repeatedly redis-
covers himself from the answers given him, individually and col-
lectively, from the world. So too the intimate involvement of
"superego" as well as "ego ideals" with human uprightness. It
has been all but ignored that Freud originally derived "repres-

12
sion" from man's upright posture,23 and that he never apparent-
ly deviated from this view. As late as 1930 he wrote:

"The diminution in importance of olfactory stimuli seems itself, however,

to be a consequence of man's erecting himself from the earth, of his adop-
tion of an upright gait, which made his genitals, that before had been cov-
ered, visible and in need of protection and so evoked feelings of shame.
Man's erect posture, therefore, would the beginning of the mo-
mentous process of cultural evolution." represent

A "pathic" rather than the "gnostic" emphasis of Erwin

Straus, but nonetheless stressing the tie of uprightness, distance,
reciprocity, and moral value.
It is a vastly enriched sense of Minkowski's "anthropo-
cosmic conflict" that the opus of Erwin Straus endows us with.2s
In the modern world he rediscovers it in a new topos, or place.
This opposition, lost among reified metaphors in sciences where
measurements, formulae, and instruments substitute for a world
accessible to the senses, remains pristine in awakeness and up-
rightness. A psychology inconsiderate of this tie in our experi-
ence is cousin to psychosis, while a philosophy that ignores it
has forgotten its origins.

NOTES

1 Cf. Kudlien, F. Herophilos und der Beginn der medizinischen Skep-

sis. Gesnerus, 21, 1964, 1-13; Dumont, Jean-Paul. Le scepticisme et le
phenomene, Paris: Vrin, 1972, p. 105-129, 179-182; Patrick, Mary M.
Greek Skepticism, Univ. Calif. Press, 1969, p. 11-14.
2 nouveau dictionnaire etymologique. Larousse, 1964.
3 Cited in
Baeyer-Katte, Wanda von. Leib und Leiblichkeit in Hegels
Philosophie. Jb. Psychol. med. Anthropol., 11, 1964, 22.
4 Laycock, Thos. Mind and Brain. Edinburgh, 1860. 2nd ed. New
York, 1869. vol. I, p. 222.
5
Straus, Erwin. The upright posture. Psychiat. Q., 26, 1952, 7.
6 Letter to Victor
Gourevitch, May 1, 1963.
7 Straus, Erwin. The monads have windows. In: Phenomenological
in honor of Herbert Spiegelberg. Nijhoff,1975, p.135.
persgectives; Essays134.
Op. cit., p.
Binswanger, L. Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsatze. Bern: Francke,
1955.lo Bd. II, p. 95-96.
Holenstein, Elmar. Phanomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur
und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei Husserl. Nij-
hoff, 1972, p. 235-237.

13
 11 Selected
writings of John Hughlings Jackson. New York: Basic Books
1958. Vol. II, p. 53.
12
Darwin, C. The Power of Movement in Plants. New York, 1880, p.
572-3.
i3
Ey. Henri. Des id6es de Jackson a un modele organo-dynamique en
psychiatrie. "Rhadamanthe", Privat, 1975.
14
Faraday, M. A course of six lectures on the various forces of matter
and their relations to each other. New York: Harper, 1860, p. 14-15.
is
op. cit., p. 26-27.
16 n.
5, op. cit. p. 8.
n. 5. op. cit. p. 14.
18
Cohen, I. B. Art. "Newton". Dict. Sci. Biogr. X, 43-44. New York:
Scribner's, 1974.
19
Schelling, F. W. J. Werke. Miinchen: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung
1958. vol. 4, 110-111; 170-184. Also cf. Zeltner, Hermann. Schelling.
Frommann's Verlag, 1954, p. 132-133.
Stutt?art:
2 Cf.
Buber, M. Urdistanz und Beziehung. Lambert Schneider, 1951.
21 Cf.
Bruzina, Ronald. Toward a philosophy of technology; reflec-
tions on themes in the work of Erwin Straus. See this issue.
22
Straus, Erwin. The upright posture. In: Phenomenological Psycho-
logy.2 Basic Books, 1966. p.137.T
Freud, S. Letter to Fliess, Nov. 14, 1897. Standard Edition, I, 268-
269 and n. 2, p. 271. Also cf. S. E. 10, 247-8; 11, 189.
24
Freud, S. Civilization and its discontents. Standard Edition, 21, 99 ff.
and 105 ff.
25
Minkowski, E. Vers une cosmologie. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1936,
p. 197.

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