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September 1951 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1951 > September 1951 Decisions
> G.R. No. L-4922 September 24, 1951 - MANUEL MONTILLA, ET AL. v. ZOILO
HILARIO, ET AL.

090 Phil 49:

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-4922. September 24, 1951.]

MANUEL MONTILLA, as Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur, and FAUSTINO S. TOBIA,
Petitioners, v. HON. ZOILO HILARIO, as District Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur, and HON. FLORO CRISOLOGO, Respondents.

Dominador D. Pichay and Manuel D. Villanueva, for Petitioners.

Ernesto Ricolcol for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEY’S-AT-LAW; DISQUALIFICATION OF CONGRESSMEN FROM

APPEARING AS COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES. — From the context of section 17,
article VI, of the Constitution and the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, the relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the
disqualification in the Constitution, must be direct and not accidental. To fall into
the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense,
the offense can not exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance
the crime defined and penalized in Chapters 2 to 6, Title 7, of the Revised Penal
Code. The fact that, as alleged, the accused public officers made use of firearms
which they were authorized to carry or possess by reason of their positions, could
not supply the required connection between the office and the crime charged
(murder). Firearms however and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of
murder or homicide. Incidentally, this might serve as a warning against
disqualifying a lawyer-legislator on the basis of what is alleged and not on the
nature of the offense itself. The prosecutor could do this by the simple expedient
of making the necessary averments, even though, as a matter of fact, there was
no evidence that the office held by the defendant had anything to do with the
offense.
DECISION

TUASON, J.:

Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution bars Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from, among other inhibitions, appearing as counsel
before any court "in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This case comes before us on a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, and involves the consideration of the scope of the aforequoted
constitutional provision. The provincial fiscal and the private counsel for the
complainants seek to have set aside an order of Judge Zoilo Hilario of that court
overruling their objection to Congressman Floro Crisologo’s intervention as
defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 129 "for murder with (and) frustrated
murder" against the municipal mayor and three members of the police force of
Santa Catalina, Ilocos Sur.

The information charges that the defendants, "taking advantage of their

respective public positions conspiring together . . ., did then and there . . . assault,
attack and shoot with their firearms" several persons "with the intent to kill" and
did kill one Claudio Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three others.

From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official
positions of the accused were connected with the offenses charted. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes were
"personal with political character." It does not even appear, nor is there assertion,
that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the
performance of their official functions.

Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention, the relation between the crime and the office
contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To
fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal
sense, the offense can not exist without the office. In other words, the office must
be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code.

Public office is not of the essense of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.

Incidentally, this might serve as a warning against disqualifying a lawyer-legislator

on the basis of what is alleged and not on the nature of the offense itself. Were
the petitioners’ proposition sustained, the result would be that in every case in
which the accused is a public officer or employee, the prosecution could at will
keep a member of Congress from entering an appearance as attorney for the
defense. The prosecutor could do this by the simple expedient of making the
necessary averments, even though, as a matter of fact, there was no evidence
that the office held by the defendant had anything to do with the offense.

By the same token, the fact that, as alleged, the defendants made use of firearms
which they were authorized to carry or possess by reason of their positions, could
not supply the required connection between the office and the crime. Firearms
however and wherever obtained are not an ingredient of murder or homicide.
The crime in question, for example, could have been committed by the
defendants in the same or like manner and with the same ease if they had been
private individuals and fired with unlicensed weapons. Murders or homicides by
private persons with guns, licensed or unlicensed are the general rule and by
public officers the exception.

Tested by its consequences, the petitioners contention on this point is, like the
contention discussed in the preceding paragraphs, untenable. Little reflection will
show that by this contention the right of legislators to appear as counsel would
depend on whether the weapons used were the offenders’ property or part of
their official equipment; and since this matter is extraneous to the definition of
the crime of murder, the attorneys’ qualification or disqualification would lie at
the mercy of the prosecuting officer. Surely, it could not have been the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to make the operation of the provision in
question hang on a factual consideration so slender and uncertain; on a
contingency that could only be determined after the trial was over, when the
attorneys’ services were no longer needed.

The petition is denied without costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,
concur.
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