1.

ALINSUG VS RTC- “THE MAYOR’S VENGEANCE” Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to
attend to family matters. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor.
Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on for
"a simple misconduct. - Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government
or another municipality or city within the province. Municipality’s authority to employ a private attorney
is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and
represent it(Guia v. The Auditor General)But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not
necessarily. It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in
that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then
been underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On
the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without,
however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.

2. HERRERA VS COMELEC- WON apportionment of the province does not comply with the requirements
set by Law and the constitution. No- R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division
into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of listed
or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, Comelec did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of
inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population
as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office. during the two
consultative meetings as required by Comelec Resolution No. 2313. Appended to respondent Comelec's
Comment are the attendance sheets where the names and signatures of those who attended the
consultative meetings and the corresponding barangay and/or group which they represented appear
and which belie petitioners' allegation that there was no valid representation. Under Comelec Resolution
No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped together to form the first district and
the second district is composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166
requires that each district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory. "Contiguous" and/or
"adjacent" means "adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching
along boundaries often for considerable distances." 3 Not even a close perusal of the map of the Province
of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance. On its face, the map of Guimaras indicates that
the municipalities of Buenavista and San Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along
boundaries and are connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern part of
Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east portion of the province. It would be different if the towns
grouped together to form one district were Buenavista and Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and Sibunag.
In that case, the districting would clearly be without any basis because these towns are not contiguous
or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia and Sibunag are at the southern and
southeastern part of the province
3. RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN- Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered
into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of
Barangay Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the
pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due process. They
submit that "the issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to
either accept a settlement or adjudicate and decide on "the written explanation for the purpose
lifting/settling the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior
to its conversion into a disallowance.
At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is
the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-
compliance with law or regulations. 10 Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which
is unlawful or improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the
account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. 12 A notice
of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for
some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on
transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow
after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.As stated in Section 82,
supra, however, the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not
satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned."
The ninety day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may
nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown."Clearly, petitioners
misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First, petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance.
Second, the "written explanation" referred to in said section is "for the purpose of lifting the suspension
or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a
disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Section 44.6.4.,
therefore, finds no application in this case.Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file
a complaint before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) when, from the evidence obtained during
the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not
resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office
before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right
to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is
concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront
the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the
same defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the
preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondents'
motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve themfrom liability during the pendency
of the preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of
such decision. The prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its proper weight. It bears stressing
that the exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of
the complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first involves the
determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative aspect
of the expenditure of publics

4. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. V. SANGGUNIAN PANGLUNSOD NG DUMAGUETE

- “EPAL NA SANGGUNIAN PANGLUNSOD”There being no provision in the Local Government Code
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to
punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
It becomes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II
and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committee.As already discussed, the difference
lies in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local
legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply information which
may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may be conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an
electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.The power to inquire into the efficiency of
the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the franchising powers of the NEA

5. GORDON VS VERDIANO- “singka epal” conflict between the Food and Drug Administration and the
mayor of Olongapo City over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drug stores in
the said city. that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to the grant of
a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is
imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is conformable to the national policy
and the laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to
a drug store not previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's permit is mandatory once it is shown that
the FDA has licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not a necessary consequence. For
while it may appear that the applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and policies, this
fact alone will not signify compliance with the particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like
zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted
under the general welfare clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is
to be issued by his office. Should he find that the local requirements have not been observed, the mayor
must then, in the exercise of his own authority under the charter, refuse to grant the permit sought. The
indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer
thereof to the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without permission from
the petitioner. On this matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested with the mayor. The
condition violated related more to the location in Olongapo City of business establishments in general
than to the regulation of drug stores in particular. It therefore came under the petitioner's jurisdiction.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site of the drug store only if it would impair the health or
other interests of the customers in contravention of the national laws or policies, as where the drug store
is located in an unsanitary site. But the local executive would have reason to object to the location, even
if approved by the FDA, where it does not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance intended to promote the
comfort and convenience of the city residents.
. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in the address given and not elsewhere. No
hearing was necessary because the transfer without the mayor's permission is not disputed and was in
fact impliedly admitted by the private respondent.
Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could also have been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites of the
two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of their respective permits) were it not for the fact
that such permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy
Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
6. ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY VS CA “Business Permit vs. License to practice”
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a
license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local
authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular
profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some
form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a
natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.The Supreme Court ruled that a business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of
business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a
profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative
agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

7. SJS VS ATIENZA- “The Mayor who doesn’t follow their own ordinance” Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance. . It reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. On the other
hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." >20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty
to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason
for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the
highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
8. MUNICIPALITY OF STA FE. PALITY OF ARITAO”LGC and the boundaries”- petitioner Municipality of
Sta. Fe, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the
Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. . As far as
boundary disputes are concerned, the 1987 Constitution is the latest will of the people, therefore, the
same should be given retroactive effect on cases pending before courts after its ratification. It mandates
that "no province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people
expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over
previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as
settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the
latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that
Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

9. VICTORIA VS COMELEC- “paraparaan” - Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the
Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the
governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana's position as vice-governor
should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner
and private respondent.For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
election.The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who
actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
10. LABO VS COMELEC- “Filipino who married an Australian and won the elections”

Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the
Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of
Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.
- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The
Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.
- The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino
citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because
of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment
of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.
- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen.
The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have
been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply
to questions of citizenship.

Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was
elected.
Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor
because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not
entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

11. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC (1989)-Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect
and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition
for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of
the Constitution.Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not
and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he
had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer’s entire tenure.Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified
from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
12. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC(1996) we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government
Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and
effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective.
Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume
his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred,
his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of
law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that
lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

13. TORAYNO VS COMELEC- WON private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at
least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship.AFFIRMATIVE
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the
three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat
of the provincial government was located. In June 1997 he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our
ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City
for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any
bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot
participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the
purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component
city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the
entire province — and vice versa — especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in
this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of
the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial
government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid
residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the
governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period,
could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to
adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted
not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves
— their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their
common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they
seek. In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro
City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.