2018 17th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications/ 12th

IEEE International Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering

Browser Analysis of Residual Facebook Data

Taylor Cloyd Trey Osborn Brian Ellingboe

Department of Information Systems and
Cyber Security, College of Business
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
taylor.cloyd@my.utsa.edu
Department of Information Systems and
Cyber Security, College of Business
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
trey.osborn@gmail.com
Department of Information Systems and
Cyber Security, College of Business
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
brian.ellingboe@my.utsa.edu

William Bradley Glisson Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Department of Computer Science Department of Information Systems and Cyber Security,
College of Science and Engineering Technology College of Business
Sam Houston State University University of Texas at San Antonio
Huntsville, TX, USA San Antonio, TX, USA
glisson@shsu.edu raymond.choo@fulbrightmail.org

Abstract—As social media applications such as Facebook
become an integral part of our society, they are also becoming an
important source of information in a digital (forensics)
investigation. In this paper, we examine the potential to recover
artifacts of forensic interest after three popular browsers, namely:
Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Internet Explorer, have been
used to access Facebook. Findings from this research will
hopefully contribute to a better understanding to mobile device
and app forensics.
Keywords—Digital forensics, Mobile forensics, Mobile app
forensics, Browser forensics, Facebook forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued assimilation of social media into all aspects
of life is blatantly visible in today’s networked societies. Statista
estimates that by the end of 2019 there will be approximately
2.77 billion social media users worldwide and that this number
will increase to around 3.02 billion by the end of 2021 [1]. This
escalation creates opportunities for legitimate revenue streams,
dissemination of false news and augmentation of digital
investigation capabilities. It was also estimated that revenue
from social media will reach 39 billion Euros by the end of 2019
[2]. Gartner predicts that individuals in mature markets will
consume more “fake news” than factual information by 2022
[3]. As social media application (app) functionality increases,
new opportunities for residual data generation emerge. A recent
article indicates that Facebook is testing the ability to upload 24-
hour self-deleting logs from desktop browsers [4].
The reality is that social networking apps can be used in
today’s society for a host of unpleasant and/or potentially illegal
activities like bullying, stalking harassment and slander.
Coupling this reality with research indicating that residual data,
in general, is increasingly being introduced into legal contexts,
along with the legal implications for researchers, raises
questions about the way that browsers interact with social media
sites and the types of residual data that are resident after these
interactions [5-7]. A recent article in government technology
acknowledges that information posted publicly on social media
sites is legally admissible in criminal investigations [8]. While
postings on social media outlet prompts investigations into
everyone from high school students to police officers [9, 10],
questions arise as to how evidence is acquired when social
media data is either not public or has been removed from a
particular social media site. Web browsers, such as Mozilla
Firefox, Google Chrome and Internet Explorer, provide end-
users with access to their social media accounts across a wide
range of devices. This perverseness makes them interesting from
an investigation perspective. In addition, forensic artifacts from
browsers may complement evidence from the analysis of the
specific social network app, such as Facebook.
As noted by Statista [11], Facebook is the dominate social
media provider. These queries prompted a preliminary
investigation into the forensic analysis of residual information
that is resident on browsers that have interacted with the
Facebook social networking platform. Specifically, in this
paper, we investigate Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and
Internet Explorer browsers that interact with Facebook over a
two-week timeline. Individual categories are documented for
comparison purposes to indicate which browsers retain the
largest amount of data.
The contributions of this research are two-fold.
1. Provides a proof-of-concept that different browsers
retain various amounts of data when they interact with
social media sites.
2. Contributes to discussions about documentation and
evidentiary artifacts generated through social media
interactions while highlighting the importance of
verifying residual data artifacts.

2324-9013/18/31.00 ©2018 IEEE 1440

DOI 10.1109/TrustCom/BigDataSE.2018.00200
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section reviews related literature on social media and browser
forensics. The third section presents the research methodology.
The fourth section presents findings for the individual browsers.
The final section draws conclusions and outlines opportunities
for future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
As researchers and practitioners alike become increasingly
becoming concerned with the residual data generated via social
media interactions, residual data visibility in everyday life is
bound to increase accordingly. Previous research indicates that
residual data generated on devices can be used as a proxy to data
that is being stored in cloud environments [12-15]. Since many
of these devices have browser capabilities, researchers are
investigating social media services [16-21], specific browser
forensics [22-26], and specific social media forensic
opportunities [4, 27-30].
The importance of digital forensics, particularly in the
context of social media forensics, is visible not only in news
articles but in research activities as well. Weiss and Warner [17]
presented the results of their efforts to track criminals through
Facebook activities. They successfully used a Facebook
Application Programmer Interface (API) to query groups for
specific key words. They reported that their activities led to the
nine arrests by law enforcement. It was noted that the tool they
created need open access to selected groups. If they did not have
open access, then they attempted to join a group in order to
execute their code.
Taylor et al [16] made the point that both companies and
individuals are utilizing these services and that these networking
applications can also be abused. The authors pointed out that
online information can be changed by a suspect prior to an
analyst capturing relevant information. Hence, they went on to
make the point that a range of devices from the suspect may need
to be examined during an investigation. The authors also pointed
out that the acquisition of evidence form a variety of platforms
presents difficulties.
Yusoff et al [26] specifically looked at the extraction of data
from mobile device running Mozilla Firefox that interacted with
social media services. The social media services that the
researchers interacted with included Twitter and Facebook.
They located account credentials from Facebook and Twitter in
the device’s volatile memory.
In 2011, Oh et al [31] put forth the idea that forensic analyst
should be able to collect evidence from multiple browsers
through the analysis of log files. In order to achieve this, they
developed a tool that worked with Internet Explorer, Firefox,
Chrome, Safari and Opera. Their tool handles necessary
decoding and time zone translations as needed. It also attempts
to account for deleted logs by caring out deleted information.
The authors did note that at the time of publication that it only
worked on a Windows OS.
Specific research efforts that explicitly studied Facebook
forensic issues include efforts to extract Facebook actives that
include friends, news feeds, postings to walls group messages,
and chats [30]. Other researchers have specifically examined
1441
Facebook’s chat to gain an understanding of specific artifacts
that are of interest for extraction and reconstruction[28]. The
researchers did note that Arabic conversations had to convert to
Unicode to be retrieved in searches. This is an indication that
there is the potential for missed evidence if chats occur in other
languages. Other researchers are interested in inferring
information from uploaded images to Facebook [27]
Additional research by Mulazzani et al. [32] utilizes
Facebook API’s to extract data and cluster information without
interacting with the provider. The researchers did note that this
approach is easier with the user’s credentials. Previous research
has also investigated live memory data procurement from
desktops that have interacted with Facebook [29]. The reality is
that solutions of this type require hardware access, which may
or may not be realistic depending on circumstances. A real-
world, viable scenario for this type of interaction would be
forensic investigations in organizations. However, it does
surface recurring incident response and digital forensics
investigations issues in organizations. For this type of
investigation to take place, organizations need to recognize that
there has been an incident and have policies, standards and
procedures in place to handle an investigation [33, 34].
A number of other studies have emphasized the importance
of the browser in social media interactions along with examining
specific residual data generated by various browsers. For
example, Mendoza et al [35] studied how Google Chrome,
Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Apple's Safari
implemented their web storage, as well as how web storage
artifacts could be a source of information not present in other
browser artifacts. The authors then presented a proof-of-concept
tool, designed to facilitate the analysis of web storage artifacts
on Windows platform.
Focusing on portable web browsers, Choi et al [36]
demonstrated how the use of such browsers can be detected via
examining the ‘UserAssist’ key value and prefetch file.
Existing browser forensics literature, such as the study of
Mahaju and Atkison [37] who evaluated the effectiveness of five
web browser forensics analysis tools for Firefox, provide
instructional information that is relevant to extracting data.
However, there is currently minimal or up-to-date research that
examines the extraction of a range of data from multiple
browsers that have interacted with a specific social media
provider. Thus, this is the focus of this paper.
III. METHODOLOGY
This research investigates the residual artifacts resident in
three different browsers that have interacted with Facebook. The
browsers selected for the experiment are Firefox Version 43.0.4,
Google Chrome Versions 61.0.3163.100 and Internet Explorer
(IE) Version 11.0.9600.18124. All of the browsers were set to
public where applicable. The investigation of private or
incognito mode is considered out of scope for this investigation.
This research investigates the residual artifacts resident in
three different browsers that have interacted with Facebook.
Any tool could have been used to examine the browsers after
interacting with Facebook. As a matter of convenience, the
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Version 4.1.0.12 was utilized for the TABLE II. FIREFOX
data acquisition. Actions Performed - FF Evidence Found - FF Category Found % - FF
Account Creation 2 2 100%
The experiment took place in three stages that included Image Upload 2 2 100%
Facebook profile creation, data generation and data extraction. Text Write 38 12 32%
The evidence was determined to be discovered if there was a Searches
Chat Messages
4
6
4
0
100%
0%
match between keywords found and the activities performed, as Wall Posts 24 4 17%
well as by the matching of the recorded date/time stamps. Profile Information 4 4 100%
Text Read 18 11 61%
In the profile creation stage, three Facebook accounts were Wall Posts/Comments 12 10 83%
created using three separate browsers. The three accounts that Chat Messages
Profile/Page View
5
1
0
1
0%
100%
were created on each browser were Fred Fox, Chris Chrome and Login 1 1 100%
Bob IE. The data generation stage consisted of a number of Session End/Logout 0 0 0%
photo uploaded, comments, statuses, and created groups. The Total 61 28 46%

actions performed in this stage are summarized in Table 1 –

Actions. These activities were recorded in a Microsoft Excel Paths that were utilized to locate residual data from the
spreadsheet. To extract the data in the third stage, FTK was Mozilla Firefox browser included:
utilized for this procedure.
• FBFirefoxImage1.001/Partition2/NONAME[NTFS]/[root]/
Users/Administrator/AppData/Roaming/Mozilla/Firefox/P
TABLE I. ACTIONS rofiles/6hj921xl.default/places.sqlite.
Category Description • Evidence/FBFirefoxImage1.001/Partition 2/NONAME
Account Email or Facebook account sign-up/creation [NTFS]/[root]/Users/Administrator/AppData/Local/Mozill
Creation a/Firefox/Profiles/6hj921xl.default/cache2/doomed

Image Image was uploaded or posted on the website • Evidence/FBFirefoxImage1.001/Partition 2/NONAME

Upload [NTFS]/[root]/Users/Administrator/AppData/Local/Micro
soft/Windows/WebCache/WebCacheV01.tmp
Text Write Action involving text that was input by the
user
Text Read An action involving text that was
viewed/read by the user, but not typed by the
user viewing it.
Login User logs on to Facebook. Start of a session.
Session Manual user log out of Facebook
End/Logout

IV. RESULTS: A SNAPSHOT

In reference to the Firefox browser, FTK recovered 28 out
of the 61 actions performed (46% recovery). It is interesting that
while six individual categories recovered 100 percent of the
information that was input into the browser, seven categories
defined in the experiment did not have complete recovery of the
data. Regarding the high-level categories, only 32% of the text
writes and 61% of the text reads were recovered. The detailed
results are presented in Table II - Firefox.
It is interesting to observe that several residual data artifacts
were recovered by accessing the “Mozilla Firefox Browse
History” in the Internet/Chat Files section of FTK. Specific
keywords and date/time information to confirm the information Fig. 1. Firefox History
found. A sample of the information recovered from the Firefox
browser history is presented in Fig. 1.
The FTK extraction of the Google Chrome browser
identified 33 activities out of a total of 54 actions performed
(61%). The detection of text writes was slightly higher and
slightly lower with text reads with the Chrome browser than the
residual data recovered from the Firefox browser. Chrome
recovered 52% of the text writes and 53% of the text reads.

1442
Detailed extraction results for the Chrome browser are available TABLE IV. INTERNET EXPLORER
in Table III - Google Chrome. During the analysis of the Actions Performed - IE Evidence Found - IE Category Found % - IE
extraction result it was observed that two paths provided Account Creation 2 0 0%
Image Upload 3 3 100%
valuable residual artifacts that included: Text Write 8 4 50%
Searches 4 4 100%
• FacebookChrome .001/Partition 1/NONAME [NTFS]/ Chat Messages 1 0 0%
[root]/sers/FTKuser/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Wall Posts
Profile Information
3
0
0
0
0%
0%
Data/Default/History Text Read 11 5 45%
Wall Posts/Comments 4 1 25%
• FacebookChrome .001/Partition 1/NONAME [NTFS]/ Chat Messages 3 0 0%
Profile/Page View 4 4 100%
[root]/Users/FTKuser/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/Us Login 2 2 100%
er Data/Default/Cache Session End/Logout 1 0 0%
Total 27 14 52%

TABLE III. GOOGLE CHROME

Actions Performed - GC Evidence Found - GC Category Found % - GC
Account Creation 2 2 100% V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Image Upload 2 2 100%
Text Write 29 15 52% Our analysis of the data gathered from the Mozilla Firefox,
Searches 3 3 100% Google Chrome, and Internet Explorer browsers using FTK
Chat Messages 4 0 0%
Wall Posts 14 5 36% supports the idea that different browsers retain varying amounts
Profile Information 8 7 88% of information about social media interactions. Findings from
Text Read 15 8 53% this study suggested that chat messages can be challenging to
Wall Posts/Comments 6 6 100%
Chat Messages 3 0 0% locate, while login information was consistently available across
Profile/Page View 6 2 33% all three browsers. In this experiment, Google Chrome retained
Login 4 4 100%
the most information while Mozilla Firefox saved the least
Session End/Logout 2 2 100%
Total 54 33 61% amount of residual data.
This research raises the question of artifact validation when
users have interacted with social media sites from different
The FTK extraction of the IE Browser identified 14 out of devices that potentially use different browsers. The initial results
the 27 actions performed (52%). Login information (Login) and of this experiment indicated that browsers retained different
image uploads (Image Upload) were the two categories where residual data artifacts when interacting with social media sites.
evidence was retrieved at a 100% rate. Session start, or Login This scenario potentially impacts an investigation from an
information was available and indicated the session start date evidence perspective and an overall cost perspective. If an
and time. The three images that were uploaded during our analyst needs to validate a user’s social media actives, then they
evidence generation were all found during the analysis. plausibly will be required to attempt to identify, locate and
Evidence of the email account creation in Internet Explorer extract information manually. Consequently, this increases the
could not be found. The session end or manual log off time that they spend on an individual case.
information also could not be found during the analysis. There are a number of potential extensions to this research,
Actions involving text that was input by the user (Text such as the following.
Write) left behind evidence that was found at a 50% rate. Of the Forensic taxonomy of browser apps: Future work will build
Text Write evidence, text that was input into Facebook’s search on this experiment to investigate the viability of validating
tool was found 100% of the time. Evidence of chat messages and residual data gathered from multiple end user devices (e.g.
wall posts to Facebook user profiles could not be found. Actions Android, iOS and Windows Phone devices) using multiple
that involved text that was viewed or read by the user (Text browsers, including lightweight browsers (e.g. Dolphin,
Read) was found at a rate of 45%. Of this category, evidence of Maxthon, Puffin, and UC), that have interacted with social
viewing a Facebook user’s profile or event page was found at a media websites. This will allow us to present a taxonomy of
rate of 100%. Evidence of chat messages could not be found, forensic artifacts that can be recovered from different browser
and a very limited amount of wall post or comments to wall posts apps using different forensic tools like Encase, Sleuth Kit and
could be found. Detailed extraction results for the IE browser Autopsy which is similar to forensic taxonomies for Android
are available in Table IV. and Windows specific apps [15, 38-40]. It is envisioned that the
future taxonomy will list the artifacts down the left side of the
Table V presents the location where evidence was found for table. The first row across the top will identify the individual
particular actions. A large portion of the residual data was found browsers like Firefox, Chrome, and IE. The second row will
in the ‘Temporary Internet Files’ and the ‘AppData’ folders. identify specific social media sites, i.e., Facebook, WhatsApp,
Some residual data items were also recovered from unallocated Snapchat, etc. Individual cells will intersect the artifacts with
space. specific social media sites in order to indicate the tool that was
used and the percentage of the artifact that was recovered.

1443
 TABLE V. IE RESIDUAL DATA LOCATIONS Forensically sound data extraction toolkit: Future work
Evidence will also investigate designing a forensically sound data
Action Description Action Details Evidence Location
Description extraction toolkit that can be used to automate the collection of
uploaded profile
C:\Users\trey.osbor
data from browser applications on personal computers, laptops,
Found image n\AppData\Local\Te
photo
mp\adtemp\ad_tm mobile devices and virtual machines.
facebookIEimage.00
1\Partition
Machine learning-aided forensics: Another extension of
2\NONAME this work is to explore the use of machine learning algorithms to
searched for chris Found keyword
chrome search
[NTFS]\[root]\Users aid investigators in the identification and establishment of action
\Administrator\App
intent. The result of this future work could perceivably provide
Data\Local\Microsof
t\Windows\Tempor data that encourages additional investigation, creation, and
searched for and Found evidence of implementation of more efficient and effective solutions for
sent chris chrome being a friend with extracting social media residual data.
accepted friend Found evidence of
request from fred Fred Fox profile
fox including From

logged into found session

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