***Child Soldiers Neg***

Foreign Aid CP
Core
 1NC
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its
international humanitarian and foreign aid to countries with child soldiers.

The counterplan solves the root cause of child soldier recruitment and solves
stability
Alena Zafonte 17, master’s in political science from Northeastern University, 9-30-2017,
“Foreign Aid Prevents Child Soldier Recruitment,” The Borgen Project,
https://borgenproject.org/child-soldier-recruitment/
According to new numbers released by the United Nations, the number of child soldiers recruited to fight across the Middle East and
North Africa has more than doubled in one year, rising from 576 in 2014 to 1,168 in 2015. UNICEF notes that the real number of child
soldiers recruited into these conflicts is likely significantly higher, as many cases go undocumented.

The most notable increases were found in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, which have suffered ongoing violence for years. Civilian
infrastructure in these areas has been under attack for significant periods of time, eliminating basic services
families need to survive. As resources dwindle, families are forced to send children to work in what
are often unsafe conditions. Furthermore, ongoing violence creates unrest within communities, making them
more vulnerable to radicalization. This is of particular importance for children, as they are less capable of
resisting indoctrination by extremists.
Of the 28 million children throughout the region who are in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, 90
percent of these live in areas where violence persists. This indicates that a significant population of children
are at risk for child soldier recruitment as they live in areas of conflict, lack access to basic necessities
and likely do not have the means to gain an education. In many cases, families have elected for their children
to join the fight as a measure of protection. While in the past most child soldiers were assigned roles as guards, cooks or
similarly inactive roles, recent reports point to minors participating actively in violence.

The case of South Sudan, where the United Nations reports 18,000 child combatants recruited over the past four years, is also alarming.
Many former child soldiers report consciously deciding to join the conflict, though they may not have understood what was going on. In
education
an interview with the Guardian, several former child soldiers with the Cobra Faction in South Sudan recalled that their
and standard of living had been poor and local violence inspired them to join the fight . They
explained that they were drawn to the rhetoric espoused by the militia, though they did not fully understand its implications.

Rebel commanders in South Sudan have claimed that they are forced into child soldier recruitment and that it is not a voluntary choice.
Their logic is that due to the lack of education, infrastructure, food and other key factors, children are left to
stagnate. By recruiting them to fight, they are then able “to achieve something better.”

This mindset is precisely why foreign aid is a key tool in stemming the growth of child soldier recruitment. Both
the international community and those who participate in child soldier recruitment note that the practice results largely
from the lack of education and basic goods and services. Employing foreign assistance to stabilize
communities through providing food and clean water and creating the infrastructure necessary for reliable
functioning would minimize the opportunities and incentives for indoctrination .

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that “terrorism really flourishes in areas of
poverty, despair and
hopelessness, where people see no future.” Child soldier recruitment flourishes here as well, which is why
the use of aid as a preventative measure can prevent increases in child soldiers in the future.
The CP promotes US leadership and national security
Vin Gupta and Vanessa Kerry 18, assistant professor at the Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation at the University of Washington and director of global public policy at Harvard Medical
School, 4-11-18, “Foreign Aid Makes America Safer,” Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/11/foreign-aid-makes-america-safer/ If you’re reading this
Ella you have to switch to policy
American leadership is on the decline in the eyes of global leaders. Sadly, public bluster and daily rhetoric
continue to degrade America’s global image and create a healthy dose of skepticism about Washington’s intentions, even among
the staunchest U.S. allies.

Nowhere is that more obvious than in the Trump administration’s drastic action in cutting the once-
ambitious efforts of U.S. global diplomacy, international aid, and public health infrastructures. This includes both sweeping budget
reductions and replacing leaders with political spin operations. In March, U.S. President Donald Trump proposed a 33 percent cut in the
budget for the United States Agency for International Development on the grounds that the president was aiming for “efficiency and
effectiveness” in U.S. aid efforts and to prioritize the overarching security and economic needs of American citizens. This rhetoric
reveals a profound misunderstanding of how closely foreign aid is intertwined with the security,
health, and economic interests of the United States.
Many critics have argued that justifications for foreign aid are based on anecdotal data and a misguided belief in the power of aid dollars
to transform the governance of aid-dependent countries. But history demonstrates that programs
from the Marshall Plan to
the Peace Corps have had a deep and lasting impact. Even the Department of Defense has recognized the
importance of soft power through its focus on programs aimed to “win the hearts and minds” of U.S.
adversaries.
Yet, while no one will dispute that the Marshall Plan was a key cog in postwar Europe’s reconstruction, the perceived absence of hard
data on aid’s effectiveness has allowed skeptics to question how the United States furthers its soft power in the modern age. However,
the data exists.

Along with colleagues, we recently published the results of a broad empirical study that asked the following question: Have countries in
sub-Saharan Africa become more stable as a direct result of U.S. federal aid dollars? We specifically looked at development assistance for
health and analyzed the years from 2005 to 2014, a period that saw the rise of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and a
concomitant increase in other financial commitments to global health programs.

Countries that received the highest levels of per capita health aid enjoyed near-immediate results in terms of
improved state stability metrics , including higher quality of governance, lower degrees of
corruption, enhanced social cohesion, and a more vibrant civil society . Moreover, the results were all the more
impressive because the focus countries of health aid were all destabilized by some of the highest levels of global disease burden from HIV
and other communicable pathogens.

Our findings suggest that when lower- and lower-middle-income nations facing overwhelming health challenges receive significant
support for their health systems, there are immediate benefits for state stability . In other words, giving health aid
to countries with the highest rates of HIV, tuberculosis, or malaria, as is the mission of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,
not only saves lives but also appears to facilitate the rise of more peaceful societies .
This link between health aid and peace underpins the concept of “strategic health diplomacy,” which has gained greater currency in the
past decade since the roll out of the presidential AIDS program. Former Sens. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) have long
championed the doctrine as a bipartisan, effective, and efficient approach to enhancing global security. In a 2015 white paper, they
showed how indices of economic growth and human development improved at higher rates among countries that were recipients of the
relief program than in nations that did not receive such aid.

Collectively, these studies underscore the argument that health aid canserve both strategic and humanitarian
purposes. Sadly, the debate on the value of foreign aid remains another tug of war between populists and globalists. Unfortunately,
foreign spending has become an easy political target in many countries at a time when economic inequality is increasing. Even though
the United States ranks 20th among the 28 richest economies in terms of relative aid spending, earmarking just 0.17 percent of gross
national income for foreign development assistance as of 2015, populist politicians don’t hesitate to target it as misdirected spending.
The reality is that there is not a domestic versus international trade-off. Investment in health and development abroad
has clear security benefits for Americans at home. In another empirical analysis we also recently completed, we
observed over the period from 2008 to 2014 that nations that posed a greater threat to U.S. national security
interests received less health aid dollars annually than those posing a lesser threat.
Solvency
 Solves---Instability---2NC
The CP solves–reduces instability that leads to child soldiering and terrorism
Zachary Kilhoffer 16, Master’s Degree (summa cum laude) in International
Relations from Webster University, April 2016, “Purchasing peace: The foreign aid
terrorism nexus,” International Relations Department of Webster University,
https://books.google.com/books/about/Purchasing_Peace.html?id=yitbAQAACAAJ
Hi Ronik
Moyo (2009) has commended certain educationalaid efforts that offer “conditional cash transfers”. These forms of payments have had
great success in Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru in promoting school attendance . Moyo wrote, “ ...studies
show the schemes have been instrumental in decreasing malnutrition, increasing school attendance, and
decreasing child labour” (p. 150-151). Azam and Thelen (2008) also found that education aid is particularly effective at
combatting terrorism in their quantitative analysis. We would therefore expect an increase in education aid to result in a reduction of terrorism:
HI: Education aid is negatively correlated with terrorism.

Health aid, beyond simply improving general health conditions, has been found to have significant positive externalities. For example,
health aid can allow children to attend school more frequently and adults to work more
consistently (Young and Findley 2011). Health aid tends to be cost effective, and a number of successful campaigns, such as the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, have saved and improved millions of lives (Young and Findley 2011). There is also a
gender component because health aid often targets sexual health and child mortality (Young and Findley
2011). Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2005) found that foreign aid can improve human welfare through certain expenditures. Their
methodological approach, however, failed to control for endogeneity, which may bias the results (Williamson 2008). Williamson (2008)
considered the refocusing of foreign aid on human development over economic development with a particular eye on health, finding that
foreign aid is an ineffective tool at improving human welfare. While corruption is tied to rent seeking behavior and widely assumed to
prevent the efficacy of foreign aid, one study shows an interesting counterpoint in health aid. Dietrich (2010) argued that even
the
most corrupt governments have an incentive to comply with donor objectives in the health sector,
where compliance is cheap. Dietrich (2010) found strong and robust evidence in favor of this argument .
Again, even prominent foreign aid critic Thomas Dichter (2003) has praised certain health programs, such as the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) efforts to eradicate smallpox. Because health aid may reduce certain motivations for terrorism, we would expect
an increase in health aid to result in a reduction of terrorism: H2: Health aid is negatively correlated with terrorism.

Conflict aid is aimed at preventing the occurrence or recurrence of war. This could impact terrorism by
increasing regime stability, and therefore improving societal welfare in societies affected by conflict (Young and Findley 2011). In certain
circumstances, conflict aid can improve economic development, particularly a few years after conflict has ended and the ability to absorb
aid is approximately double the normal capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). There is some evidence that conflict aid can
prevent disruptions to the recipient country’s educational system, which is important to prevent
the conscription of students into military roles , civilian casualties, and the mass flight of
refugees (Lai and Thyne 2007) Furthermore, conflict aid may reduce the possibility that governments violate
the rights of their citizens, increase civil and political rights, as well as increase social and economic
rights (Meyer 1998). We would therefore expect an increase of conflict aid to result in a reduction of terrorism:

Funding key to child soldier prevention and rehabilitation

Jonathan Kolieb 18, PhD (Law), University of Melbourne, LL.M. (International Law) and M.A.
(International & Area Studies), University of California, Berkeley, 2-7-18, “When Soldiers Go Back to
Being Children,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/12/when-soldiers-go-back-to-
being-children/ Follow me on Instagram @t.kinzy and check out pwestpathfinder.com
Finally, UNICEF and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict need more support
from national governments interested in safeguarding children’s rights. Together with civil society organizations, they
are working to educate armed forces to promote better treatment for children in conflict . They are also
developing ever more sophisticated mechanisms for gathering and publicizing information on violations of
children’s rights. Increased funding from participating governments would help accelerate
these efforts . The money could also support the post–conflict work to rebuild children’s lives and
communities. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former child soldiers have been a
particular focus of the U.N., but it has had only mixed success , in part due to a lack of resources . Aside from

tending to the physical and psychological effects that often endure long after hostilities end, countries also need to
rebuild schools and other institutions.
Above all, there is perhaps a singular, shared lesson to be learned from Sudan and Colombia’s progress in protecting children during war,
and, by contrast, Yemen’s continued slide into humanitarian catastrophe. That is: In preventing and resolving armed
conflicts and rebuilding after them, all parties need to have a clear-eyed focus on protecting and championing
children’s rights. Protecting children affected by armed conflict is a moral imperative. They are the most vulnerable and innocent
victims. When it came together in July to discuss this issue, the U.N. Security Council titled its debate: “ Protecting Children
Today Prevents Conflicts Tomorrow.” That is true, and we can do a better job of it.
 Solves---Leadership---2NC
Foreign aid specifically is key to US soft power
Beth Duff-Brown 19, communications manager for the Stanford Center for Health
Policy/Center, 5-16-19, “Foreign aid for public health bolsters America’s ‘soft power’,” Stanford
Medicine News Center, https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2019/05/foreign-aid-for-public-
health-bolsters-americas-soft-power.html Yusuf my guy how’s it going

Compared with other types of foreign

aid, investing in health is uniquely associated with a better opinion of the
United States, improving its “soft power” and standing in the world, the study said.
Favorability ratings of the United States increased in proportion to health aid from 2002 to 2016 and rose sharply
after the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the launch of the President’s Malaria Initiative in
2005, the researchers reported.

Their findings were published online May 16 in the American Journal of Public Health. The
lead author is postdoctoral
scholar Aleksandra Jakubowski, PhD, MPH. The senior author is Eran Bendavid, professor of
medicine.
“Using data on aid and opinions of the United States, we found that investments in health offer a unique
opportunity to promote the perceptions of the United States abroad, in addition to disease burden relief,” the authors
wrote. “Our study provides new evidence to support the notion that health diplomacy is a net win for the United States and
recipient countries alike.”
The Trump administration, however, has proposed a 23% cut in foreign aid in its 2020 budget, including large reductions to programs
that fight AIDS and malaria overseas.

The Stanford researchers believe their study is the first to add heft to the argument that U.S. health aid boosts the “soft
power” that wins the hearts and minds of foreign friends and foes .
“Our study shows that investing in health aid improves our nation’s standing abroad, which could have important downstream
diplomatic benefits to the United States,” Jakubowski said. “Investments
in health aid help the United States accumulate soft
power. Allowing the U.S. reputation to falter would be contrary to our own interests .”
A policy debate

Many politicians and economists consider spending U.S. tax dollars on foreign aid as an ineffective, and possibly harmful, enterprise that
goes unappreciated and leads to accusations of American meddling in other countries’ national affairs.

The U.S. government, for the past 15 years, has contributed more foreign health aid than any other country, significantly reducing disease
burden, increasing life expectancy and improving employment in recipient countries, the authors wrote. Still, this generosity has
historically constituted less than 1% of the U.S. g ross domestic product.
“Our results suggest that the dollars invested in health aid offer good value for money,” the researchers wrote. “That is, the relatively low
investment in health aid (in terms of GDP) has provided the United States with large returns in the form of improved public
perceptions, which may advance the U.S. government’s ability to negotiate international policies that
are aligned with American priorities and preferences.”

Foreign aid key to checking Chinese influence

Ari Benkler 17, political consultant, Harvard Institute of Politics, 11-7-17, “Security Through the
Generosity of Foreign Aid,” Harvard Political Review, https://harvardpolitics.com/world/security-
through-the-generosity-of-foreign-aid/ Hello noted sister of noted kool kid Kolin MkAuliffe
Catherine MkAuliffe

Though the liberal argument in favor of foreign aid is compelling, it is not the only potential line of attack. Increased foreign aid
spending is also defensible from the perspective of the mainstream foreign policy establishment in the military
and the political center. In May, China hosted foreign dignitaries in Beijing to celebrate its “One Belt, One Road” program, which will
pump more than $150 billion annually in infrastructure spending into the economies of countries like Laos,
Pakistan, Serbia, and Kenya, along with roughly 60 other nations. While the investment provides much needed infrastructure to
developing countries, it is also self-serving as it seeks to draw these nations more tightly into China’s economic
and political sphere.

The United States has also historically invested in foreign nations for reasons of security, the most
prominent example of this being the Marshall Plan. In the context of the early Cold War, the move was seen as
necessary step to curb Soviet influence in Western Europe. In an interview with the HPR, Joshua Kurlantzick, Senior
Fellow for East Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, mentioned foreign aid at the start of the Cold War as the core of America’s “soft
power” strategy. In the context of both the United States and China, Kurlantzick was doubtful of foreign aid’s political efficacy, arguing the
unpopular foreign policies of both powers might undermine their development efforts. However, when combined with popular foreign
policy, soft power projection and foreign aid could allow nations to wield considerable influence abroad. Given that danger of
China outpacing the United States in its aid efforts, the national security establishment should be as
supportive as the left of an increased foreign aid budget. Some already are, and the current distribution of foreign aid reflects
their political clout. According to Lundsgaarde, “It is worth noting that U.S. aid allocation decisions have long been linked to the
promotion of security interests. Afghanistan’s position at the top of the list of recipients of U.S. official development assistance provides
an obvious example of this.”

Problems on the Far Right Though the left is relatively supportive of foreign aid and the center at least acknowledges its use in some
cases, the far right has seemingly rejected it outright. Lundsgaarde noted this phenomenon in Europe: “Anti-immigrant parties may not
consider addressing root causes of migration via aid to be a priority for various reasons. They may have a short-term outlook and narrow
focus on keeping immigrants out of the country and therefore prioritize border control measures as a policy response.”

This xenophobia has been linked to domestic economic insecurity, which, according to economists like Joseph Stiglitz, is bound up in the
problems with globalization. Though Stiglitz does not advocate throwing out the global economic community entirely, he does emphasize
the necessity of policies that promote domestic economic security.

However, such policy efforts will not go far enough without policies that also support growth,
development, and political
stability in poorer countries, which is only possible through substantial increases in foreign aid . In
order to ensure political stability at home, Western policymakers must accept that at a certain level, immigration becomes politically
untenable. In order to both preserve an open global community and defeat radical domestic movements, the West must pursue a
development-focused foreign policy that seeks not to build walls but rather to make them obsolete.
 Solves---Root Cause---2NC
Foreign aid can solve the root of terrorism – addresses structural motivations
Micah Zenko 17, August 9, 2017, “Why Cutting Foreign Aid Benefits Terrorists”, Council on Foreign
Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-cutting-foreign-aid-benefits-terrorists
President Donald J. Trump’s proposed budget for the 2018 fiscal year includes cuts in funding for USAID and developmental assistance
programs. The budget plan would decrease funding for the State Department and international programs, including USAID, by more than
eleven billion dollars, or almost 30 percent. Meanwhile, the Defense Department would receive an increase of fifty-two billion dollars,
inflating its budget by roughly an additional 10 percent. These proposals demonstrate the Trump administration’s focus on the use of the
military to advance U.S. interests overseas. Terrorism
is President Trump’s top foreign policy priority, but
cutting foreign aid and relying on the military will not help the United States combat it.
Terrorism is not a problem for the military alone; its political and economic roots demand
instead a USAID-led effort.
Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Terrorism is largely predicated on inequality in political and economic systems. Fourteen years ago, Robert
Pape, professor at the University of Chicago, found that suicide terrorist organizations were organized almost exclusively around the goal
of expelling foreign occupiers. This conclusion, still valid today, underscores the importance of the political context surrounding the
creation of terrorist organizations, and discounts the assumption that terrorists do not have legitimate political goals.

Moreover, certain political systems exacerbate grievances that lead to terrorism. Regimes that depend on foreign powers for military
backing and funding are more likely to be responsive to the priorities and preferences of their outside backers, not to those of their own
citizens. Terrorist
groups capitalize on the local population’s feelings of disenfranchisement,
promising to empower those who join their organizations. Exclusion from economic gains, making
individuals believe that elites are not sharing revenue, may also be another significant factor
driving extremism. As inequality drives individuals to look for alternative forms of governance, many terrorist groups
promise new, more inclusive systems in which power and financial gains are shared more equally.
Addressing the political and economic reasons why many people join terrorist organizations
requires smart aid policy and a well-resourced USAID. Indeed, many military leaders have recognized this fact.
This past February, over one hundred retired generals and admirals sent a letter to congressional leaders denouncing the
administration’s proposed cuts to foreign aid, writing “we know from our service in uniform that many of the crises our nation faces do
not have military solutions alone.”

Aid is clearly not a cure-all for terrorism, and Trump is correct to question its effectiveness. There are many examples of ineffective
foreign aid projects; U.S. aid to Pakistan in the early twenty-first century is one such example. Much of the funds intended for
counterterror operations and training in Pakistan in the mid 2000’s were instead diverted by the military for private gain or for
alternative purposes. Moreover, studies have found that, in certain regimes, foreign aid can actually increase terrorist activity, as
governments that benefit from counterterrorism assistance have an incentive to maintain a perpetual threat of terrorism to ensure funds
continue to flow.

However, the
United States should not give up on foreign aid simply because some projects have
been failures. Indeed, there have been many examples in which foreign aid has stabilized
countries or eliminated the threat of terrorism, such as Indonesia, where aid helped foster the political stability
that stamped out any sparks of terrorist activity. Foreign aid can give the United States leverage and the ability to encourage
governments to reshape unequal, overly-centralized countries into more egalitarian societies in which ethnic groups share power and
economic benefits fairly. For example, a recent study found that governance and civil society aid can reduce domestic terrorism. The
United States should learn how to give aid in productive ways that encourage leaders to share revenue and political power, while
preventing itself from being portrayed as a manipulative foreign occupier.

As the famous adage goes, if the only tool you have is a hammer, you will treat everything as if it were a nail. The 2018 budget will leave
the United States holding a hammer, but terrorism is not a nail. Guns cannot defeat economic inequality, military
operations will not eliminate political corruption, and airstrikes will not reverse government
oppression. It is difficult to convince terrorist groups that the United States is not an occupying power by sending in more troops and
conducting more operations in places like Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. History has demonstrated that the U.S. military cannot create
a competent state on its own.
Cutting aid is short-sighted and counterproductive. Instead, the
United States should more effectively advance its
interests by reevaluating its programs and experimenting on new methods of distributing aid.
U.S. assistance addresses the conditions producing terrorism in ways that the military can never do, and the United States should expand
its focus beyond simply eliminating terrorist groups; it should work to address the systemic inequality that gives rise to these groups in
the first place.
 AT: Aids Authoritarian Governments
Foreign aid is key to democracy promotion
Nic Cheeseman 19, Professor of Democracy and International Development, 1-14-2019, “Why
there’s a case for giving foreign aid to authoritarian regimes,” The Conversation,
https://theconversation.com/why-theres-a-case-for-giving-foreign-aid-to-authoritarian-regimes-
109677 Greetings, Jonathan Ma
I argue that four main justifications can be made for sending aid to authoritarian states, and that even the most evangelical democrat
must accept two of them. Different principles It’s useful to start by seeing things through the eyes of a committed democrat. If
governments and individuals care about democracy enough to not give aid to authoritarian regimes, then
presumably they also care about having more democracies in the world . But the same governments and
individuals can hardly expect to influence foreign states if they don’t engage with them. And , engaging
in trade and other aspects of cooperation without supporting the building blocks of democracy – education,
civil society, the rule of law – is likely to do more harm than good. So, don’t even the most committed democracies
have an obligation to provide aid to democratic initiatives in authoritarian states? This might be called the
“democratising” principle: we can justify giving money to non-democracies as long as we can see that it’s
helping them to move in the right direction . Support to electoral commissions in countries like Nigeria and Ghana,
for example, helped to smooth the first transfer of power in these countries. Things get even more complicated when considering the
situations the most vulnerable citizens of authoritarian states may find themselves in. These might include famine, civil war or a deadly
disease outbreak. The current Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo is an excellent example. Why should they suffer
because of their repressors’ actions? We might call this the “humanitarian” principle: it’s OK to give aid money to non-democracies as
long as it’s used to help those in desperate need rather than to strengthen the government. Of course, the moment we move away from a
focus on democracy to recognise that democratic states have a number of goals, including promoting their own safety and well being,
things get ever murkier.

Motives behind giving aid Aid has never just been about helping people. It’s also, realistically, about gaining influence in
the world and exercising soft power. Providing aid money can generate valuable access and generate
a sympathetic cohort of people who can be called upon to further down the line. This might be called the “self-
serving” principle: we should only send aid money to authoritarian states when it promises to strengthen our international
standing in the long-run. Note: this might not be quite as selfish an argument as it first seems, because what better way is
there to increase a donor country’s ability to promote democracy abroad in the future, than to expand the
international influence of democratic states ? Democrats might also not want to apply “democracy” criteria to aid if
they think that this will make it harder for other countries to economically develop. For example, if it is true that in some contexts strong
authoritarian governments will be more stable than weak democracies, it might make sense to tolerate them on the basis that they are
more likely to achieve development and lift people out of poverty - an argument that’s often made in reference to Paul Kagame’s Rwanda.
This might be called the “one thing at a time” principle: democracies should give money to non-democracies whenever it’s clear that
authoritarian rule has a better chance of improving ordinary citizens’ standard of living. As with self-interest, this argument can loop
back to strengthening global democracy in the long-run.This is because many researchers have argued, effective
national
infrastructure, a strong economy and respect for the rule of law are required to facilitate a smooth
process of democratic consolidation. It turns out, then, that you don’t have to be someone who doesn’t believe in
democracy, or promoting it abroad, to want to give aid money to authoritarian regimes. Instead, committed democrats may
have good reasons not to want to channel all of their aid budgets to other democratic states. Even if you
reject one or two of the arguments above, you may have to accept others.
 AT: Reintegration not key
Reintegration support is key to prevention, but funding is lacking
Virginia Gamba 18, United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, “Side
Event on Reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups and armed forces,”
United Nations, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/side-event-on-reintegration-of-children-
formerly-associated-with-armed-groups-and-armed-forces/ Does this count as a weird thing Abby?

We are holding this meeting to explore how reintegration programs contribute to the well-being of children coming out of armed groups
and forces, and to hear more about their impact on their communities. Reintegration
is an important step both in
protection and prevention. By helping these children, we also help ensure they do not return to an
armed existence and we help break the cycle of violence that is all too common in conflict situation.
As you know, I am just back from Myanmar. There I discussed this issue with our colleagues at UNICEF, who—despite intense challenges
in other parts of the country—are doing an amazing job with the children being released by the Tatmadaw army. A large part of my
engagement was advocating with the Government to finalize implementation of the Joint Action Plan to end and prevent the recruitment
and use of children by the national army. Since 2012, over 800 children and young adults recruited as children have been released from
the Tatmadaw. In accordance with the Action Plan, they received reintegration services provided by UNICEF, ILO and NGO partners. They
have been provided with education and vocational training to find a place in a society where poverty has been an important
driving factor for underage recruitment.
In Myanmar, there are currently 7 non-state parties to conflict listed by the Secretary-General for recruitment and use of children. Boys
and girls who escape or are released from these armed groups face an uncertain future, with little or no opportunities to benefit from
services to rebuild their lives.

Unfortunately, the challenges faced by the children of Myanmar are not unique. In every country on my agenda, we know of missed
opportunities – due to lack of resources, capacity, or access – to help the most vulnerable recover from the
trauma of war. These are also missed opportunities to prevent them from falling back into violence .
We all agree on the importance of reintegration, but, in a world faced with multiple and complex crises, we still struggle to find adequate
resources for the short- and long-term support of children recovering from the trauma of war.

The mere fact that today’s event is co-sponsored by so many Member States speaks volumes about our common desire to change this
situation.

In a few minutes, you will hear Kabba Williams talk about his personal experience with reintegration programs in Sierra Leone. I know
he will speak more eloquently than any of us could about the importance of providing education and vocational training to learn the
skills needed to adapt to civilian life.

I would like to set the stage for him by highlighting other guiding principles for our action.

First and foremost, the best interest of the child must be at the heart of any program established for boys and girls. Working with
communities is also key, to overcome stigma and to help children reunite with their families. The provision of physical and mental health
support to overcome the long-term effects of war is the cornerstone of these efforts.

The specific needs of girls cannot be overlooked. Too often, they are hidden victims of conflict who suffer stigma, rejection by their
families and communities, in addition to psychological and physical consequences of sexual violence and other abuse. Equally, boys may
need specialized programs—so our call is for gender-sensitive programming to tailor assistance most appropriately to meet the needs of
the children.

Allow me to speak about solutions.

Conflict has evolved—so it is time to reconceptualize reintegration and its role in preventing future conflict . I
strongly believe that reintegration support should be fundamental to emergency, recovery and
peacebuilding efforts. It should also be part of our work to prevent conflict. Currently, despite the best efforts of UNICEF,
national authorities, NGOs and others, it is often a very small part in overall recovery efforts, and not at the core of restabilizing and
rebuilding societies torn apart by war. One recent study by the Clingendael Institute of the Netherlands demonstrated that in the DDR
triad, Demobilization and Disarmament received massively more funding than Reintegration. For children, this has particularly dire consequences.
We are all looking towards 2030 and how we can coalesce support around 16 Sustainable Development Goals. The theme of children and
their well-being is at the center of many of them. By taking a harder look at the importance of reintegration programs in conflict and
post-conflict settings, we will better understand how paying attention to this small but strategic piece of the puzzle will help us reach
those Goals. An important element that I will be focusing on in the coming months and years is that of treating children involved as
agents of change—Kabba here personifies that ethos and has an inspiring story to tell.

But the reality remains: year in, year out, thousands of boys and girls need support for reintegration in places like the Central African
Republic, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, and many other challenging environments.

Providing adequate, meaningful and long-term services is a huge task. With resources currently available, this is
sometimes a mission impossible. Most importantly, reintegration and rehabilitation efforts must be sustainable through time and
cannot depend on just international efforts. Capacity building and resources
for national sustainable reintegration
and rehabilitation efforts must also be supported sooner rather than later.
Executive CP
Core
 1NC
Text: The United States executive branch should prohibit foreign military
sales and direct commercial sales to countries where child soldiers are used.

Executive action solves the case

Rachel Stohl 17, senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the
nonpartisan Stimson Center, Shannon Dick, research assistant with Stimson's Managing Across
Boundaries Initiative, 4-26-17, “President Trump, you can stop the use of child soldiers,” CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/opinions/trump-child-soldiers-opinion-stohl-dick/index.html

While it is unclear how broadly the Trump administration will define human trafficking, one of the most tragic forms of
trafficking is the recruitment and use of children in government militaries and government-supported armed groups. The administration
should therefore integrate child soldier prevention policies into its broader anti-trafficking efforts .

Under President George W. Bush, the United States took positive steps to stop the horrific practice of
using children in combat. The 2008 Child Soldiers Prevention Act prohibits US arms sales and military training to foreign
governments that recruit and deploy child soldiers in their national militaries or government-backed armed groups.

The United States is one of the few countries to condition military assistance on a government's record of child soldier use. Each year, as
part of the Trafficking in Persons report, the State Department releases a list of governments complicit in the recruitment and use of
child soldiers. Any country listed is prohibited from receiving certain US military aid under the law.

The Child Soldiers Prevention Act is intended to convince governments to stop using child soldiers by leveraging access to highly desired
military weapons, training and assistance. While the act does not prohibit all US military assistance, it does limit the largest US arms sales
and military assistance initiatives, including the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military Financing
programs.

Under the law, however, the president can employ "national interest waivers," allowing identified countries to still receive US military
assistance. The United States has issued such waivers to authorize more than $1.2 billion in otherwise prohibited assistance. Of the 56
opportunities to block military assistance, the United States offered full or partial waivers to offending governments nearly 60% of the
time. Rationale for the waivers has ranged from political considerations to supporting counterterrorism operations.

By comparison, it has only withheld an estimated $61 million -- or roughly 5% -- of military assistance since the 2008 act took effect

The liberal use of the waivers has undermined the purpose of the law, eliminating an important incentive for foreign governments to
professionalize their militaries and stop exploiting children.

In the coming months, theTrump administration has an opportunity to reshape how the United States
confronts this challenge and demonstrate leadership on the issue of child soldiers. Specifically, there are three key
steps the administration can take to strengthen US commitment to preventing the use of children in conflict.

First, the administration should ensure the Child Soldiers Prevention Act list is as comprehensive as
possible. This year marks the first time the Trump administration will make its determinations on countries using or supporting the
use of child soldiers. A broad approach would help avoid loopholes that have been used in the past to
exclude countries known to use child soldiers, such as Afghanistan.

The State Department has long maintained that identification on the list sends a strong message to offending
governments and can result in changed behavior. And there is some evidence it has been effective. This listing likely
encouraged the government of Chad to adopt prevention measures and demobilize exiting child soldiers
from its armed forces. The Trump administration would do well to embrace that perspective and ensure it sends a
strong message to offending governments.
Second, the administration should be more judicious in the use of national interest waivers. In the past,
waivers were often granted to countries repeatedly identified on the Trafficking in Persons list -- such as South Sudan -- absent
noticeable changes in behavior. Habitual use of national interest waivers sends the wrong message to
governments, implying countries can continue to recruit children with impunity.

Third, the Trump administration should demonstrate US commitment to stop human trafficking in all
its forms. The United States has largely relied on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act to underscore the importance of preventing the
recruitment and use of child soldiers. Yet this approach is needlessly narrow. As government
officials discuss human
trafficking during interactions with foreign counterparts, the use of child soldiers should be included .
Solvency
 Solves---CSPA Loopholes---2NC
Trump is uniquely positioned to reform CSPA loopholes
Rachel Stohl 17, senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the
nonpartisan Stimson Center, Shannon Dick, research assistant with Stimson's Managing Across
Boundaries Initiative, 11-6-17, “What America Can Do to Stop the Practice of Child Soldiers,” The
National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-america-can-do-stop-the-practice-
child-soldiers-23069

In 2017, the State Department identified eight countries that recruit and use children in their national militaries or government-
supported armed groups: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The
president, however, can choose to waive the CSPA’s prohibitions—in part or in full—and allow these identified countries to continue to
receive U.S. weapons and military assistance. The 2017 list itself was controversial and marked the Trump administration’s
first missed opportunity to seriously address the issue of child soldiers , as the list omits Afghanistan, Iraq and
Myanmar—three countries with notorious and perpetual use of child soldiers.

The Trump administration’s second strike on child soldiers is evident in the issuing of the national security
waivers. In a presidential memorandum, Trump waived CSPA prohibitions for five of the eight countries
identified on the State Department’s child soldiers list . In so doing, Trump effectively gave a pass to
governments that routinely exploit children in their national militaries or government-supported armed groups.

The administration waived all prohibited arms and assistance to Mali and Nigeria, authorizing at least $1.4 million in U.S. military
assistance despite their records of child soldier recruitment and use. The administration also waived PKO assistance to the DRC and
South Sudan. Somalia had PKO assistance, international military education and training assistance, as well as assistance that would have
been prohibited under the CSPA but that is used for 10 U.S.C. § 333—foreign security forces: authority to build capacity waived. These
waivers will allow the provision of $3 million in peacekeeping operations assistance for the DRC, more than $110 million in peacekeeping
operations and military training for Somalia, and $25 million in peacekeeping operations for South Sudan. In a shift from previous years,
the Trump administration did not waive international military and education training assistance for the DRC, thereby blocking $375,000
in assistance requested for FY18.

Although Sudan, Syria and Yemen did not receive waivers, they are currently not slated to receive any sanctionable assistance from the
United States in FY18.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s failure to take a stand against the abusers of children
is not unique . During the Obama administration, the United States routinely waived the CSPA’s
prohibitions and authorized more than $315 million in arms sales and more than $1.2 billion in military
assistance to countries with known human rights abuses against children in armed conflict. The Obama
administration withheld approximately $8 million in arms sales and $56 million in military assistance—amounting to roughly 2.6
percent of the total amount of arms sales and less than 5 percent of the amount of military assistance that would otherwise have been
prohibited by the CSPA. With this year’s waivers, the Trump administration has continued a familiar pattern, authorizing nearly $140
million in military assistance, or ninety-nine percent of U.S. military assistance that would have otherwise been prohibited by the CSPA.

The Trump administration appears poised to carry on the Obama administration’s unfortunate legacy as it
pertains to preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In this way, the Trump administration risks
abandoning its promise to get tough on the human trafficking issues. Many of the countries on the CSPA list are
repeat offenders, and the continued provision of waivers—particularly full waivers—undermines the CSPA’s intended purpose. Until
the Trump administration uses the waivers as intended , when there is a legitimate national
security issue at stake, governments on the CSPA list will continue to receive the wrong message—namely that
they can exploit vulnerable children with impunity.
 AT: Congress Key
Congress has limited influence on US foreign policy
Sarah Margon 18, Washington director at Human Rights Watch, 2-13-18, “Giving Up the High
Ground - America’s Retreat on Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/13/giving-high-ground-americas-retreat-human-rights
Mom I made it on Open Evidence are you proud
Congress, for its part, has already resisted a number of presidential initiatives in the interest of human rights. In May, a bipartisan group
of 15 senators sent Trump a letter urging him to "ensure that America remains a leader in advocating for democracy and human rights."
Congressional committees are using aid allocations and authorization bills to push back against the executive branch. Individual
members of Congress are drafting legislation, holding hearings, and meeting with foreign officials to stand up for human rights in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Russia, and elsewhere. In December, the Treasury Department, under pressure from Congress,
imposed sanctions on 13 individuals from Belgium, China, the Dominican Republic, Gambia, Guatemala, Israel, Myanmar, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan for corruption and human rights abuses.

But these efforts can only go so far. Petition gathering by like-minded countries is less effective without the most powerful
country on earth. State and local governments can only do so much to work around the federal government. And although Congress
controls the power of the purse, it has far less influence on foreign policy than the executive branch. And
all the while, the White House's attacks on immigrants, health care, minority communities, and the justice system will
continue to diminish American credibility on human rights overseas. Simply put, unless it changes
course dramatically, the Trump administration and the president himself will remain one of
the greatest threats to human rights in decades.

Congress gets circumvented–executive action key to solve

Jason Szep 17, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and Reuters U.S. National Affairs Editor, Matt
Spetalnick, Reuters Washington Correspondent, 11-21-17, “U.S. diplomats accuse Tillerson of
breaking child soldiers law,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tillerson-
childsoldiers/u-s-diplomats-accuse-tillerson-of-breaking-child-soldiers-law-idUSKBN1DL0EA
What’s up Sarah and Ulaa

The views expressed by the U.S. officials illustrate ongoing tensions between career diplomats and the
former chief of Exxon Mobil Corp appointed by President Donald Trump to pursue an “America First” approach to diplomacy.

INTERPRETING THE LAW

The child soldiers law passed in 2008 states that the U.S. government must be satisfied that no children
under the age of 18 “are recruited, conscripted or otherwise compelled to serve as child soldiers” for a country to be
removed from the list. The statute extends specifically to government militaries and government-supported armed groups like
militias.

The list currently includes the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Mali, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

In a written response to the dissent memo on Sept. 1, Tillerson adviser Brian Hook acknowledged that the three countries did use child
soldiers. He said, however, it was necessary to distinguish between governments “making little or no effort to correct their child soldier
violations ... and those which are making sincere - if as yet incomplete - efforts.” Hook made clear that America’s top diplomat used what
he sees as his discretion to interpret the law.

‘A POWERFUL MESSAGE’
Foreign militaries on the list are prohibited from receiving aid, training and weapons from Washington
unless the White House issues a waiver based on U.S. “national interest.” In 2016, under the Obama administration,
both Iraq and Myanmar, as well as others such as Nigeria and Somalia, received waivers. At times, the human
rights community chided President Barack Obama for being too willing to issue waivers and exemptions,
especially for governments that had security ties with Washington, instead of sanctioning more of those countries.

“Human Rights Watch frequently criticized President Barack Obama for giving too many countries waivers, but the law has made a real
difference,” Jo Becker, advocacy director for the group’s children’s rights division, wrote in June in a critique of Tillerson’s decision.

The dissenting U.S. officials stressed that Tillerson’s

decision to exclude Iraq, Afghanistan and Myanmar went a
step further than the Obama administration’s waiver policy by contravening the law and effectively
easing pressure on the countries to eradicate the use of child soldiers.

The officials acknowledged in the documents reviewed by Reuters that those three countries had made progress. But in their reading of
the law, they said that was not enough to be kept off a list that has been used to shame governments into completely eradicating the use
of child soldiers.

‘UNCONSCIONABLE ACTIONS’

Ben Cardin, ranking Democrat on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Tillerson on Friday saying there were “serious concerns
that the State Department may not be complying ” with the law and that the secretary’s decision “sent a powerful message
to these countries that they were receiving a pass on their unconscionable actions.”

The memo was among a series of previously unreported documents sent this month to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
State Department’s independent inspector general’s office that relate to allegations that Tillerson violated the child soldiers law.

Legal scholars say that because of the executive branch’s latitude in foreign policy there is little
legal recourse to counter Tillerson’s decision. Herman Schwartz, a constitutional law professor at American University
in Washington, said U.S. courts would be unlikely to accept any challenge to Tillerson’s interpretation of
the child soldiers law as allowing him to remove a country from the list on his own discretion. The
signatories to the document were largely senior policy experts with years of involvement in the issues, said an official familiar with the
matter. Reuters saw a copy of the document that did not include the names of those who signed it. Tillerson’s decision to remove Iraq and
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, from the list and reject a recommendation by U.S. officials to add Afghanistan was announced in the
release of the government’s annual human trafficking report on June 27.
 *AT: Perm Do the CP
Sanctions are uniquely entrusted to Congress – normal means is for the plan
to go through the Congress
Benjamin Alter 18, special adviser to the Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial
intelligence. 3/27/18, “Sanctions Are Congress’s Path Back to Foreign Policy Relevance,”
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sanctions-are-congresss-path-back-foreign-policy-relevance hi it’s
Tyler you’re not allowed to read this card if you support capitalism
This episode sheds light on an important fact: Sanctions
are a foreign policy tool uniquely entrusted to Congress
by the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall “regulate commerce with foreign nations.”
Unlike the other major levers of U.S. foreign policy—diplomacy and military force, over which the Constitution divides control between
Congress and the executive—the president has no inherent power to impose sanctions or to refuse to
implement congressionally mandated sanctions. As sanctions continue to grow in importance,
becoming the default U.S. policy response to a range of international crises, Congress will enjoy newfound potential to
shape U.S. foreign policy in ways that have eluded it for decades.
Iraq Relations DA
Core
 1NC
US-Iraq relations strong now because of security ties –– counterterror fight
solidified relations
Stratfor 19, geopolitical intelligence platform, 3/4/2019, “Like It or Not in Iraq, U.S. Ties Are Here
to Stay”, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/it-or-not-iraq-us-ties-are-here-stay
But above all else, the enduring severity of thecounterterror fight is what has kept — and will continue to keep —
relations between Iraq and the United States as firm as they are. While the territorial caliphate of the Islamic State is
largely defeated, the U.S. Defense Department recently assessed that the group was still a potent force in Iraq, adding that it could
also resurge in Syria without appropriate pressure to keep it down. This sobering assessment has solidified Iraq's

dependence on both U.S. forces and Iranian-backed militias, which are both integral in helping Baghdad on the front line of its
grueling counterterror fight. Therefore, as long as Iraq’s security concerns remain acute, the country's ties with
Washington are unlikely to break.

Ending arms sales destroy US-Iraq relations –– Iraq wants American arms
–– refusal undermines US leverage and leads to fill-in
Kenneth M. Pollack 11, former CIA intelligence analyst and PhD in political science from MIT,
11/15/2011, “American Policy Toward Iraq After 2011”,
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/american-policy-toward-iraq-after-2011/

For this reason, Washington should welcome Iraq’s desire[s] to develop a long-term military-to-military
relationship and buy American weaponry. Iraq’s generals would like to return to the glory days of
1988-90, but one thing that they do not want to recreate, if they can avoid it, is their reliance on Soviet military hardware. Iraqis
have long recognized that Western (particularly American) weaponry is superior , and as such, they
have coveted it. Since the fall of Saddam and the Iraqi military’s subsequent exposure to the U.S. military, that desire has only
grown. It should also be noted that there is not any perception on the part of Iraqi generals and their political counterparts that the
United States is forcing them to buy American materiel as payback for America’s efforts in rebuilding the country. Rather, the Iraqis
want American equipment . By the same token, they are quick to point out that if the United States won’t sell
them what they want, they will go elsewhere and with their oil money, they will find Russian, Chinese,
European, or other sellers.

For their part, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rulers also want[s] to see a
close military-to-military relationship
continue between the United States and Iraq, coupled with large-scale arms sales. More than anyone else, the
GCC states recognize that reliance on American arms and American training and assistance makes their militaries dependent on the
United States for logistical support, intelligence, command and control, and a variety of other requirements. GCC officials say quite
openly, albeit only in private, that an
extensive Iraqi-American arms and security relationship is the best
insurance they can get that Iraq will never threaten their countries with its conventional might
again.

Moreover, refusing Iraq one of the most important benefits that many other American partners and allies receive will
seriously undermine America’s ability to influence Iraq in the future. Excluding Iraq from the key
security benefits that so many other U.S. allies receive is as clear a statement as America could possibly make that it
does not regard Iraq as a partner, let alone an ally, and that Iraq is outside America’s sphere of interest. The White House will
have no basis to complain when Iraq’s leaders make strategic calculations to America’s disadvantage if the U.S. has thus explicitly
communicated its lack of interest in Iraq’s security and, in fact, its belief in Iraq’s fundamental unimportance to American security
interests.

Fear from weak relations with Iraq spillovers to regional allies – causes panic,
conflict, and Iranian domination
Kenneth M. Pollack 17, former CIA intelligence analyst and PhD in political science from MIT,
10/3/2017, “US Policy Toward Iraq”,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS06/20171003/106400/HHRG-115-AS06-Bio-PollackK-
20171003.pdf
Although Iranian and American interests overlap in important areas despite this, we need to accept that the Iranian regime
regards us as their principal adversary and treats us as such. We may not like it. We may wish to change it. We
may think it gratuitous or misguided, but we cannot change it. We have tried repeatedly, but the leadership in Tehran is not interested.
And as a result, all across the Middle East, Iran aggressively pursues policies harmful to the United States. The
Iranian regime is not our friend, and it works hard to do harm to us in a range of venues. We should be loath to see Iraq fall under
Tehran’s sway.

Moreover, abandoning
Iraq to the Iranians would terrify and infuriate our regional allies. The Israelis
would be alarmed that Tehran’s possession of a contiguous land route from Iran to Lebanon and
the Golan Heights would presage new Iranian attacks on Israel—especially once the last embers of resistance to
Iran’s Syrian ally have been snuffed out. Indeed, the recent Israeli airstrike against Syrian regime bases appear intended to deter and
diminish future Syrian-Iranian attacks on Israel as the regime regains control of Syria.

Likewise, the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs would fear that if Iran were allowed to dominate Iraq, it would use Iraqi territory as a base
(and Arab Iraqis as agents) to expand its influence, stoke internal unrest, and intimidate them and other Sunni-dominated Arab states
like Jordan and Egypt. In the past, we have consistently seen that when our Gulf Arab allies feel threatened by Iran and
fear that the United States is not adequately protecting them, they generally overreact and take aggressive actions
themselves. In many cases, like the GCC intervention in Yemen since 2015, they lack the capability to execute
the missions they take on, making the situation far worse, rather than better. Especially at this moment, when it is
so important to American interests that Saudi Arabia and other Arab states concentrate their resources and energy on domestic reforms,
we cannot afford to create potentially ruinous external distractions. Walking
away from Iraq to risk renewed
internal conflict and/or Iranian domination could only be a tragic, and utterly unnecessary mistake
for the United States, especially when we have just achieved so much and could use this opportunity to do so much more to secure
American interests in the Middle East.

Iran domination in the Persian Gulf overthrows the regional order – gives
them control of oil and gas –– guarantees a global catastrophe
Ali Shihabi 19, founder of the Arabia Foundation with BA in Princeton University and MBA in
Harvard Business School, 6/5/2019, “Saudi view: Iran seeks to dominate its region”,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/05/opinions/us-power-stop-iran-dominance-shihabi/index.html
Critics of the Trump administration's aggressive posture toward the Iranian regime operate under the erroneous assumption that the
Islamic Republic has abandoned its revolutionary roots and is maturing into a normal state that is defending legitimate interests in a
treacherous region. This is a dangerous fallacy. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's
revolutionary nature and
expansionist intent have remained constant and its military capabilities have only improved. The US
is the only power capable of preventing Iran from attaining the regional hegemony it desperately seeks, and Washington has a clear
geopolitical and economic interest in doing so.
While Tehran has long argued that it requires defensive depth, which it conveniently defines as extending all the way to the
Mediterranean and Red seas, this is mere pretense.

Iran today possesses the region's largest and most capable missile arsenal , and its proxy Hezbollah is well-
equipped to deter powerful Israel. Thanks to close ties to many of the militias that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq,
Tehran has achieved considerable power and influence in Baghdad.

Elsewhere, its regional network of highly-trained, well-armed, and ideologically-aligned proxies allow the Islamic Republic to project its
clout far beyond its borders. Hezbollah is growing increasingly powerful in Lebanon, client Shi'a militias prop up Assad in Syria, and the
Houthis, who are a close ally, dominate Yemen after overthrowing its internationally-recognized government in 2015. Other states
in the region do not pose an existential threat . Israel's military is too far away, the UAE's armed forces are too small,
and Saudi Arabia, with only about 20 million nationals compared to Iran's 83 million cannot possibly hope to dislodge the Iranian regime.

In truth, Iran's argument that it is a victim surrounded by implacably hostile foes, has never really held water. Iranian officials forget, for
example, that they chose to take US diplomats hostage rather than respond positively to President Carter's diplomatic overtures after
their revolution. They no longer recall that it was Ayatollah Khomeini who ratcheted up tensions that ultimately sparked the Iran-Iraq
War by calling on the Iraqi people to “beware your leaders and make revolution until victory” and backing Shi'a dissidents in Arab Gulf
states. Five years after the late Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah moved to normalize ties with Iran, the Tehran-backed Hezbollah in the
Hejaz bombed a housing complex in the Saudi city of Khobar killing 19 US servicemen. In 2015, Kuwaiti officials uncovered an Iranian-
backed terror cell in Abdali, along with a weapons cache later described as "the largest discovered in [the country's] history," after years
of striving to build good diplomatic relations with Iran.

For a "normal power," these acts of aggression may seem irrational. But for an aspiring hegemon like Iran, they are entirely rational.
Historians have argued that "the French Revolution turbocharged...French nationalism by infusing it with a messianic ideological
impulse," driving it to export its revolution in order to overthrow the European monarchic order. The same can be said of Iran after
1979.

From day one, Khomeini made it clear that it was incumbent on Iranians “to export our revolution.” His close disciples still run the
country in partnership with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose militant cadres are totally indoctrinated in the radical
ideals of the 1979 revolution and are utterly committed to the preservation of these ideals at home and their proliferation abroad.
Iranian policy is dictated by these "children of the revolution," not the powerless pragmatists whom the regime only tolerates so it can
present a moderate facade to Western audiences. Last month, in fact, President Rouhani suggested to a gathering of parliamentarians and
political activists that his government's ability to direct Iran's foreign policy is limited.

To project its power, the

Iranian regime has redirected scarce capital from infrastructure, health care, and education to a “resistance
economy” that expends billions in foreign conflicts, as well as enormously costly nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, while providing the bare minimum for its people. The goal is to subvert and, if possible, overthrow the existing
regional order. Just last week, an editorial in the regime mouthpiece, Kayhan, called once again for eliminating the "cancerous growth" that is the
Saudi monarchy.

The United States is Tehran's "number one enemy" because Iranian leaders view the US as the only power capable
of thwarting their ambitions. Evicting US forces from the region would allow Iran to realize its primary goal of establishing its
dominance over the Persian Gulf, positioning it to coerce and extract maximum political and economic concessions from neighboring
Arab oil producers.

Most importantly, a US military withdrawal from the region could enable Tehran to hold world energy markets and, by association, the
entire global economy hostage. US government officials rightly fret over Russian control of one-third of European gas imports and the
influence this gives Moscow over European capitals. The United States went to war to prevent Saddam from seizing the 10% of global oil
reserves then controlled by Kuwait. Iranian hegemony and military dominance across the Persian Gulf region would
give Tehran influence over, perhaps even control of, over half the world’s oil wealth and 40% of its natural
gas reserves. As oil and gas are global commodities, the United States' emergence as an energy powerhouse will not
shield it (and certainly not its key trading partners) from the potentially catastrophic risks associated with such an
ominous outcome.
Uniqueness
 UQ---Relations High---2NC
US-Iraq relations at a peak – US contribution key
Douglas Ollivant 18, Managing Partner and the Senior Vice President of Mantid International, LCC,
a global strategic consulting firm a post in Baghdad with a Ph.D. in political science at Indiana
University, 4/24/2018, “Iraq After ISIS: What To Do Now”,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/iraq-after-isis-what-do-now/
And yet now things are good for the United States in Iraq. The U.S.’s key contribution to defeating ISIS in
Iraq, its support during the financial perfect storm, and its renewed role as a liberal counterweight
to Iran’s far less welcome interference, have improved the U.S.’s standing in the country to the
extent that the American brand in Iraq is currently very positive.
Iraq and the United States have, over the last fourteen years, achieved something very rare in the
history of bilateral partnerships: defeating and bringing to justice a supposedly immovable tyrant,
seeing off a brutal and tenacious insurgency that preyed upon its own people, developing a
heavyweight producer on the global economic scene, keeping predatory neighbors at bay, and
building a legitimate and accountable government in a land that had mostly known dictatorship[s]
and empire. Most recently, we have together destroyed a well-funded and organized Caliphate that at one time controlled one third
of the national territory and threatened the federal capital.

All of this was done while more than quadrupling Iraq’s GDP per capita,54 avoiding communitarian conflict, and building a functioning
and ever more established democracy of singular depth in the Arab world and a beacon to the beleaguered peoples of neighboring Syria
and Iran.

It is no coincidence that at the very moment when Iraq’s feeling of nationhood has never been
stronger, U.S. prestige in Iraq is also at a peak. The last time the United States and Iraq together won a major victory, in
2008, the U.S. left much too completely and much too soon. The military withdrawal was accompanied by a dramatic diplomatic
downgrading. The result was catastrophic. With much hard work done last year, both Iraq and the relationship have rebounded
dramatically. Now we must avoid the mistakes of 2011 and build further upon this valuable alliance.

US-Iraq relations is tied together by the Strategic Framework Agreement

– military ties key
Douglas Ollivant 18, Managing Partner and the Senior Vice President of Mantid International, LCC,
a global strategic consulting firm a post in Baghdad with a Ph.D. in political science at Indiana
University, 4/24/2018, “Iraq After ISIS: What To Do Now”,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/iraq-after-isis-what-do-now/
SFA = Strategic Framework Agreement
The United States and Iraq are tied together by shared history. Since 2003, the relationship between these two
countries has been forged in war and occupation, but also in liberation, victory, and rebuilding. As laid out in the Strategic
Framework Agreement of 2007 (SFA), Iraq and the U.S. are committed to a “ long-term
relationship of cooperation and friendship .”11The United States maintains ties to Iraq in three critical areas: military-
to-military ties, diplomatic and cultural ties, and economic ties. In each of these areas there is great opportunity and potential in a post-
ISIS Iraq, but also areas for improvement.

Military-to-Military Ties

Military-to-military ties make up a key aspect of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. Ensuring a secure and
prosperous post-ISIS Iraq will require further development of these ties. The military relationship is
comprised of two basic elements: equipping and training, and advising. In each of these areas there is a need for improvement. In the
short term, priority should be given to the regeneration of the Iraqi National Army, and in particular its
Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS). The “Golden Division,” as the CTS is popularly known, was the go-to force for most of the
anti-ISIS fight, suffering 40 percent casualties in the Mosul battle alone, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.12 The U.S. built
the CTS in the decade after 2003 and must now re-rebuild it [CTS]. The Baathist, criminal, and jihadi
elements at the heart of ISIS and its predecessors in the Sunni insurgency will not disappear once
ISIS gives up its last pockets of territory, and the CTS will have to be strong.

US-Iraq relations is firmly built on appreciation and military assistance ––

maintaining good relations key
Sarkawt Shamsulddin 19, member of Iraqi parliament and Foreign Affairs Committee and senior
leader of the New Generation Movement, 2/21/2019, “How to rebuild the US-Iraq alliance in a post-
ISIS environment”, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/how-to-rebuild-the-
us-iraq-alliance-in-a-post-isis-environment
The United States and Iran are frequently at odds, most recently over Iran’s nuclear program and its backing of the Syrian regime. But
when it comes to Iraq, they’ve recently had a common agenda. Both Washington and Tehran supported the Iraqi government during the
fight against the Islamic State, and they both stood with Baghdad to curb the Kurdistan Region’s independence bid in September 2017.
But now, the conflict between Washington and Tehran is threatening to spill over and damage Iraq’s delicate internal stability, just at a
time when we need stability more than ever. Iraqis
by and large are grateful to the U.S. for its sacrifices in
overthrowing the former regime of Saddam Hussein, and were grateful once again when U.S.
soldiers fought alongside the Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, and police during the three-year campaign to
liberate Iraq’s cities and countryside from ISIS.
Nevertheless, we value Iraq’s independence and sovereignty and do not want it to become merely a field of competition between Iran
and the U.S. We are sick of war, displacement, and sectarian violence. Following the defeat of ISIS in Iraq, our priorities are to rebuild our
shattered infrastructure, improve public services, and create some measure of harmony in our divided society. That is why it President
Donald Trump’s recent statement that the U.S. mission in Iraq would shift from fighting terrorism to “watch[ing] Iran” are distressing.
The Strategic Framework Agreement that the U.S. signed with Iraq enables the U.S. military to operate on Iraqi soil. It specifies that “The
United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request
permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.” Trump’s comments run dangerously close to violating the spirit, if not the
letter, of this agreement. They suggest not only activities that would confront Iran, our eastern neighbor, but also hostile engagement
with the government of Syria to our west, as well as with Hezbollah, one of the most important political parties in Lebanon. The Strategic
Framework Agreement can only be changed by mutual consent of Iraq and the U.S. Any unilateral decision by Washington to shift the
mission or deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq would be catastrophic. But there is a way to prevent that. First, the Trump administration
should treat Iraq as a respected strategic ally. Acting unilaterally undermines that relationship and, in doing so, could harm the ability of
the administration to pursue its strategic policy goals.

Second, the administration should work with Baghdad to reinvigorate the Strategic Framework Agreement and strengthen bilateral
relations in a post-ISIS context. This should primarily focus on economic and trade cooperation, as there is much to be gained by both
America and Iraq from robust economic ties.

Third, the administration should respect Iraq’s neutrality with regard to U.S.-Iran tensions. Iraq values its relationship s with
both powers and placing too much pressure on one end of the scales could affect an increasingly delicate balance. Washington is
understandably concerned about the perceived threats posed by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. But there are ways to mitigate this threat
through cooperation and diplomacy with Baghdad. The Iraqi government, too, seeks to integrate the militias into a
centralized command and control structure. Popular support for the militias is fading as the ISIS
threat recedes. The Iraqi police and army [has] become stronger as a result of their partnership
with U.S. trainers. Many militia fighters have already returned home. But they may regain popular support if they are seen as
standing up to US violations of Iraqi sovereignty. We want the United States to see us as partners and to respect Iraqi sovereignty. We
don’t want to be seen as an inferior people from a “war-torn” country. Callous disregard for protocol and diplomatic respect, like when
Trump failed to meet with any senior Iraqi figures during his surprise visit over Christmas, have prompted calls for legislation in the
parliament to force the Iraqi government to end the U.S. presence in Iraq. We want[s] to avoid that and maintain a positive,
mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S. But it must be one based on respect for Iraqi sovereignty, neutrality
with regard to disputes between Iran and the U.S., and economic progress.
Links
 Link---Arm Sales Key---2NC
Arms sales key to US-Iraq relations – primary security cooperation tool that
increases interdependence
Alonzo J. Jones 14, supervisory intelligence officer and Iraq subject matter expert on Iraqi political
and military affairs, 8/25/2014, “Iraq Stability: Foreign Military Sales in a New War Environment”
Both the United States and Iraq benefit from FMS deals. This government-to-government method for selling defense articles, services,
and training enhances U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral
defense relations , supporting coalition building, enabling joint training programs. When the USG
sells a fighter-jet package to Iraq, it in effect enters the two nations into a possibly decades-long
security agreement for training, maintenance, and upgrade support. 35 This long-term intangible
benefit is one reason why FMS is a primary security cooperation tool for the USG as security
cooperation increases interdependence between two nations and reduces the chance of conflict .

Arms sales key to long-term relations – Iraq has agreed to regulations

Brett McGurk 13, US deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran, 11/13/2013, “U.S. Foreign Policy
Toward Iraq”, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/217546.htm
To combat this threat more effectively, the Iraqis hope to purchase U.S. equipment. We are confident that this
equipment, pursuant to a holistic strategy that we have developed together, can be used effectively and with precision against AQ/ISIL
targets. The Iraqi delegation led by Prime Minister Maliki, in a joint statement following their meetings at the White House,
pledged “strict compliance with U.S. laws and regulations on the use of such equipment.” By working
with Congress, we further believe that sales of U.S. equipment will strengthen a long-term strategic
relationship with the Iraqi military – through training, spare parts, joint exercises, logistics, and interoperability with U.S.
forces and regional partners.

Iraq values US FMS –– committed to strong relations due to security

US Department of State 19, leader of foreign policy issues, 5/21/2019, “U.S. Security Cooperation
With Iraq”, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-iraq-2/
Since 2003, the Department of State has approved more than $23 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Iraq. The Iraqi Government has used
national funds to finance the vast majority of these government-to-government transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles. Iraq values the
FMS system because of its transparency and reliability . This partnership has demonstrated Iraq’s
commitment to building a strong and enduring defense and security relationship with the United States.
Internal links
 Generic – oil/stability/security
Iraq is vital to the US – key to stability, petroleum, Iran containment, and
security
Anthony H. Cordesman 19, professor of national security at Georgetown University,
2/12/2019, “The Strategy the U.S. Should Pursue in Iraq”,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategy-us-should-pursue-iraq
The future security and stability of Iraq is a vital United States national security interest. Iraq is a
critical component to any kind of stability in the Gulf and to the secure flow of petroleum to the global
economy. It is a key to containing Iranian influence , and enhancing the security of our Arab security
partners and Israel. It is a key to countering the image that the United States invaded Iraq for the wrong reasons in 2003 and left it
weak, divided, and unstable. And, Iraq is a key to countering the increasing fears on the part of our regional security
partners that the U.S. is leaving or reducing its security role in the Gulf.

The U.S. cannot afford to leave a power vacuum in Iraq. It must deal with Iraq's remaining security problems and
military weaknesses, and deal with its grave political divisions, problems in governance, and years without effective economic growth
and development. At the same time, the U.S. needs to recognize that it faces very real rivals for influence in Iraq, and a
nation that has a long and strong history of nationalism and sensitivity to foreign pressure – despite its deep sectarian and ethnic
divisions.

Middle East instability is centered around Iraq – Iraq key to bridge divides and
establish stability
Michael Wahid Hanna 18, senior fellow at The Century Foundation, 4/18/2018, “Iraq Is Still the
Key to U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Arab World”,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/24583/iraq-is-still-the-key-to-u-s-efforts-to-
stabilize-the-arab-world
In cumulative terms, Iraq has the potential to help bridge current regional divides and establish a
functional model of equilibrium. It is where the regional order was shattered, but because of its centrality, its
demography and its existing relationships, it is also the most likely candidate to manage the countervailing
pressures and sectarian polarization that have destabilized the Middle East over the past 15 years.
Competition in Iraq among the U.S., Iran and the Gulf states is inevitable, but it does not have to have winners and losers, or take the form
of militarized conflict. Establishing an arrangement that acknowledges those realities would represent an important regional precedent. 
 US-Iran War

Iraq key to US-Iran negotiations – maintaining a fine line key to prevent war
Qassim Abul-Zahra 19, Iraqi security expert and Baghad-based reporter, 5/26/2019,
“Iraq offers to mediate in crisis between its allies Iran, US”,
https://www.apnews.com/1a77fc00ca5f42afa806207474046d52

Iraq offered to mediate in the crisis between its two key allies, the United States and Iran, amid
escalating Middle East tensions and as Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers steadily unravels. Iraqi foreign minister,
Mohammed al-Hakim, made the offer Sunday during a joint news conference in Baghdad with visiting Iranian counterpart Mohammad
Javad Zarif. “We
are trying to help and to be mediators ,” said al-Hakim, adding that Baghdad “will work to
reach a satisfactory solution ” while stressing that Iraq stands against unilateral steps taken by Washington.

In recent weeks, tensions between Washington and Tehran soared over America deploying an aircraft carrier and B-52
bombers to the Persian Gulf over a still-unexplained threat it perceives from Tehran. The U.S. also plans to send 900 additional troops to
the 600 already in the Mideast and extending their stay. The crisis takes root in President Donald Trump’s withdrawal last year of the
U.S. from the 2015 nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers that capped Iran’s uranium enrichment activities in return to lifting
sanctions. Washington subsequently re-imposed sanctions on Iran, sending its economy into freefall. Trump has argued that the deal
failed to s sufficiently curb Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons or halt its support for militias throughout the Middle East that the
U.S. says destabilize the region, as well as address the issue of Tehran’s missiles, which can reach both U.S. regional bases and Israel.
Zarif, who was been on a whirlwind diplomatic offensive to preserve the rest of the accord, insisted that Iran “did not violate the nuclear
deal” and urged European nations to exert efforts to preserve the deal following the U.S. pullout.

Speaking about the rising tensions with the U.S., Zarif

said Iran will be able to “face the war, whether it is
economic or military through steadfastness and its forces.” He also urged for a non-aggression
agreement between Iran and Arab countries in the Gulf.

The Shiite-majority Iraq

has been trying to maintain a fine line as allies Tehran and Washington descended
into verbal vitriol. The country also lies on the fault line between Shiite Iran and the mostly Sunni
Arab world, led by powerhouse Saudi Arabia, and has long been a battlefield in which the Saudi-
Iran rivalry for regional supremacy played out.

Iraq key to regional conference to deescalate US-Iran tensions –– EU agrees to

proposal
Associate Press 7-13-19, international news association, 7/13/2019, “EU supports Iraq-
proposed conference on US-Iran tensions”, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/eu-supports-
iraq-proposed-conference-on-us-iran-tensions
BAGHDAD — The European Union supports an Iraqi proposal to hold a regional conference amid rising
tensions between the United States and Iran, the group’s foreign policy chief said Saturday. Iraq is
an ally of the two rival nations, which are on a collision course as the Iran nuclear deal threatens to unravel. Iraq has
offered to mediate between Tehran and Washington , while Iran has pressed European parties to the nuclear
agreement to offset the effects of U.S. sanctions. Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini, on her first visit since 2014, said the EU shared
with Iraq the approach to dealing with the difficult situation, adding that the priority is to avoid escalation and any miscalculations that
could lead to “dangerous consequences” for Iraq and beyond. She said the EU is ready to support the regional conference idea “in all ways
that could be useful.” She said there is a need to de-escalate and find avenues for dialogue. Avenues of the “unknown … can be dangerous
for everybody,” Mogherini said.

Iraq is under pressure to prevent its territories from becoming a battleground for the spiraling tension
between Iran and the U.S., both power brokers here. The U.S. maintains military bases and more than 5,000 troops in Iraq. Iran backs
powerful Iraqi militia groups, who played a key role in fighting Islamic State militants, and some of them are openly against U.S. presence
in Iraq. A series of unclaimed attacks on U.S. interests in recent weeks caused jitters and sparked Iraqi government decrees clearly
designed to prevent a confrontation in its territories. “The region is not prepared for a new war. We are still fighting terrorism. It is an
unfinished war,” said Iraq’s Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Hakim, speaking alongside Mogherini. He said Iraq should not be a scene
for this conflict “but should have a supportive role in resolving this crisis with other Arab countries, particularly
Kuwait and Oman.” The Emir of Kuwait visited Iraq last month to discuss the rising tension; while Oman has also offered to mediate
between the two rivals. Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman Ahmed al-Sahaf said the idea of a regional conference is being developed but
the issue was raised with foreign delegations that visited Iraq. Mogherini also met with Iraq’s prime minister and president.
Impacts
 Iran seize Oil

Iran’s military is capable of impacting and controlling the Strait of Hormuz –

strait is key to global oil market
John Miller 19, President and CEO of two Washington based national security firms and Highly
Qualified Expert and Senior Mentor to the US Naval War College as a member of the US Naval
Academy Foundation Board of Trustees, 3/6/2019, “Iran’s new threat to ships in the Gulf”,
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/03/iran-new-anti-ship-missile-test
The 24 February launch of a cruise missile from an Iranian submarine portends a significant increase in the risk calculus of ships, both
military and civilian, that routinely sail in the Arabian Gulf. Millions
of barrels of oil exit through the Strait of
Hormuz each day en route to India, China, Japan and other nations who rely on imported petroleum
products to fuel their economies. Of equal regional importance are the tonnes of food and goods
that sail into the Gulf to support thriving populations. Stability in the Gulf is an ongoing global
concern and the introduction of submarine-launched cruise missiles from indigenously produced
Iranian submarines challenges the stability of the maritime environment.  It is important to bear in mind that
Iran’s professed military improvements – usually backed up with video that is of suspect origin and accuracy – often prove to be less
successful than first claimed. While that may or may not prove to be the case here – as experts review the provided video of the launch –
the likelihood that Iran has developed and tested a submarine-launched cruise missile capability should concern any who find Gulf
stability of interest.

Iran’s asymmetric naval capabilities

Iran operates several classes of submarines – Russian-produced Kilo craft, North Korean-designed but indigenously
produced Ghadir submarines, and Iranian-designed and -produced Qaeem, Fateh and Nahang boats. The 24 February demonstration
purportedly involved a Fateh submarine launching a version of the Nasr-1 anti-ship missile, itself a copy of the Chinese C-704. The Nasr-1
has a range of about 30km and can cripple ships of up to about 1,500 tonnes, such as a corvette or coastal merchant ship. The successful
production and employment of an Iranian produced anti-ship cruise missile from an Iranian-produced submarine is a significant event
that potentially challenges the stability of the entire Gulf region. The Fateh submarine is not an enormously capable craft. Iran has a
limited number in service, and it’s not clear whether every Fateh it intends to produce will possess a cruise-missile capability. But the
Gulf is a small and crowded maritime space and not a friendly body of water for conducting anti-submarine warfare. The environment
favours relatively small diesel submarines with a limited capability to attack surface ships, and the introduction of that capability by Iran
is a matter of concern.  Conventional wisdom has it that Iran[’s] would not be well served and has no desire to become involved in a
direct confrontation with the United States in the Gulf. While that may ultimately be true, its activities
are suggestive of a
regime that is skillfully plotting to challenge the US’s maritime dominance in the Gulf and to ensure
regime survival in the event of a major confrontation with the US and coalition nations in the
region. Aside from the latest development of a submarine-launched anti-ship missile, Iran is modernising its air-defence capabilities
through the acquisition of an advanced, Russian-produced S-300 air-defence system, improving its over-the-horizon surveillance
capabilities – especially through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, and continuing its acquisition of high-speed craft for use in anti-
ship swarm tactics.  It is certain that in the long run Iran cannot control the Gulf, nor defeat a concerted US-led coalition effort to ensure
the stability of the region and the successful conduct of global commerce. But that is not to say that the regime can’t generate a threat or
negatively impact the vital global trade routes of the Gulf. Iran’s ability to attack merchant vessels – not as it did during the
1980s Tanker Wars with mines and long-range (and poorly aimed) surface-to-surface missiles, but with short-range submarine-launched
anti-ship missiles – is a potential game changer and a capability that deserves attention. It is important to note
that Iran has apparently produced a submarine capable of launching an anti-ship cruise missile while being subject to decades of
international sanctions designed to limit its ability to project power. The US, United Nations and European Union should consider what
this significant accomplishment portends and develop a comprehensive strategy for moving forward. 

Wake-up call

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was designed to limit Iranian nuclear-weapons development, but it failed to include restrictions
on ballistic-missile development (covered in an existing UN resolution) and malign Iranian behaviour throughout the region. The lack of
a truly comprehensive approach to Iranian activity and intentions was the primary reason the Trump administration withdrew from the
nuclear deal – regardless of the wisdom of doing so.  The demonstration of yet another weapon that threatens maritime security should
motivate all parties invested in stability in the region to monitor closely Iranian arms-development and military activities, to better study
and understand Tehran’s long-term ambitions, and to develop strategies and capabilities to counter Iran’s prolific asymmetric-military
advances. This need applies to all facets of Iran’s activities that destabilise the region, not just those in the maritime domain.  Iran’s latest
military demonstration serves as a wake-up call: Iran
continues to build capacity to match its intentions to
genuinely and negatively impact stability in the Gulf region.

Iranian hostility can double global oil prices even without war – insurance
rates are rising and Iran has nothing to lose
Associate Press 7-21-19, international news association, 7/21/2019, “Iranian hostilities could
cause spike in global oil prices”, https://www.autoblog.com/2019/07/21/iran-tensions-raise-oil-
fuel-prices/

Seizures of oil tankers and other hostile Iranian measures in the Strait of Hormuz are already
raising insurance rates for shipping companies and could eventually reduce tanker traffic in the
vital waterway, with a spike in global oil prices a serious risk even without war, energy and maritime
experts say. On Friday, Iran seized a British-flagged oil tanker in the narrow passageway that carries one-fifth of the world's crude
exports and a second Liberian-flagged ship was briefly detained. Britain's foreign minister promised a "considered but robust" response.
"If this kind of problem continues, you might see people start to shy away from the (Persian) Gulf or try to reflag — not be a British
tanker," said energy economist Michael Lynch. The
near-term impact will fall most heavily on the shipping
industry in the form of higher insurance rates, said Lynch, president of Strategic Energy & Economic Research Inc.
Richard Nephew, a Columbia University researcher who wrote a book on sanctions, agreed that the tanker seizure and a pair of minor
but mysterious attacks on tankers that preceded it — and for which Iran denied responsibility — could create "a real risk premium" for
companies that operate in the Gulf and insurers that underwrite them. Lawrence Brennan, a maritime attorney and Fordham University
professor, said Saturday that so-called "war risk" maritime insurance rates have already risen since May — and Iran could wreak
havoc with global oil supply were it to decide to mine the strait or otherwise move to choke other
nations' oil exports through Hormuz. The risks will only rise because Iran's leaders, as their
economy strains under U.S. sanctions, "feel they have little to lose if they are mischievously
provocative" and engage in sabotage, intimidation and other acts short of war , said Larry Goldstein, director
of special projects and former president of the industry-backed Energy Policy Research Foundation. "This could get out of hand, easily
out of hand and it's hard to know where this is going to go."

On Friday, Iran's Revolutionary Guard impounded the British tanker Stena Impero with helicopter-borne commandos for allegedly
violating international shipping regulations. An Iranian news agency said the Liberian-flagged Mesdar was briefly detained and then
released after being told to comply with environmental rules. Friday's seizure was retaliation for the July 4 seizure for alleged sanctions-
busting of an Iranian tanker by Gibraltar, a British territory. It marks a sharp escalation of regional tension triggered by the Trump
administration when it withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and imposed severe restrictions on Iranian oil exports and other
sanctions. Many of the 2,000 companies operating ships in the region have ordered their vessels to transit Hormuz only during the
daylight hours and at high speed. But only a handful of the companies have halted bookings. The tensions
in the Gulf also
pushed oil prices slightly higher. Brent crude, the international standard, rose 0.9% to $62.47 a barrel on Friday, while
benchmark U.S. crude gained 0.6% to settle at $55.63. Goldstein said the fact that oil prices haven't risen more reflects an overly calm
attitude in a market that feels it "doesn't know what's happening and ... will play it very close to the vest day to day. There is very
little forward planning going on."
The risk to global oil markets "looks acute no matter how you slice it," said Kevin Book, managing director of Clearview
Energy Partners, LLC, noting that U.S. State and Defense department officials discussed on Friday multinational military escorts for ships
traversing the Strait of Hormuz to and from ports of major oil producers including Saudi Arabia. " Ifyou put more combat
ships into a small place you are increasing the risk of confrontation and that alone increase the risk
of oil prices," he said. While the United States is energy self-sufficient, the economies of countries including China, Japan and South
Korea depend heavily on Gulf oil, which supplies about one-third of seaborne oil shipments. " A doubling in oil prices if there
is no oil for the rest of the world is not unimaginable," said Brennan, the maritime lawyer, a former Navy captain.
Iran’s influence on oil price can knock the world into a recession – Iran
interceptions of UK oil tankers are taking a toll on markets
Andrew Janes 7-19-19, oil editor at Bloomberg News, et al., 7/19/2019, “How a Persian Gulf
Conflict Could Impact Commodities Markets”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
07-19/how-a-persian-gulf-conflict-could-impact-commodities-markets
Surging oil and gas prices, skyrocketing insurance costs and attacks on energy and banking
infrastructure are likely to follow quickly if Iran’s interception of two U.K.-linked tankers spirals
into outright war. A lengthy conflict in the Persian Gulf could help tip the U.S. and global economies
into recession and even accelerate the worldwide move away from fossil fuels. Here’s what some top oil,
commodity and geopolitical analysts see as the most likely outcomes.

Will the Strait of Hormuz be shut down?

In a limited confrontation the flow of oil and other commodities should continue through the strait, with the caveat that certain oil
tankers could be targeted by Iran, said Ian Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting
firm. In a major war, Iran could shut the strait and lay mines . A concerted effort will be made to keep the strait open, and
before any military strike begins, a plan to protect ships will have been worked out with other regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia,
said Ole Sloth Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank A/S. Insurance costs will skyrocket, or there will be no cover at all, and
ship owners with no cover may be reluctant to risk their vessels. The idea the Strait of Hormuz would close is “nonsense,” said Fereidun
Fesharaki, chairman of energy industry consultant FGE and an adviser to Iran’s government in the 1970s. If a ship is sunk in the strait, it
might close for a couple of weeks, but then traffic will resume. If the Iranians try and shoot everything that passes, then the British,
French and everyone will get involved. “The Iranians know if they do that they will lose big, although their proxies could put mines in the
strait.”

How would oil and gas prices react?

Oil could jump to $100 a barrel or higher immediately after a war breaking out, but would likely settle closer to $80 once
some resilience of exports from the region is demonstrated, said Ken Medlock, a senior director at Rice University’s Center for Energy
Studies in Houston. While the rise of U.S. shale might mute the impact a bit, it can’t offset any major disruption in the Middle East. Crude
could spike toward $90 a barrel before eventually collapsing amid the negative impact on global demand, Hansen said. The level it
reaches will depend on the ability to maintain safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. In the case of a full regional conflict, oil will rise
past $100 a barrel and could even go to $150, Bremmer said. If there are only limited strikes, oil might reset at around $80. Liquefied
natural gas prices may rise more than oil prices due to the fact that a greater proportion of global flows pass through the Strait of
Hormuz than for oil. “Whatever the spike you get in oil, you will likely get twice the spike in spot LNG,” David Hewitt, an oil and gas
analyst at Macquarie Capital Ltd., said in June. The market is largely discounting the chance of war at the moment, Fesharaki said. If
there’s a major attack and reprisals, Brent could go to $90 to $100 a barrel. LNG would be impacted as well, but the market is
oversupplied and is dominated by Qatar, which has good relations with Iran, so it’s unlikely to be targeted by Tehran.

How vulnerable is Middle East energy infrastructure?

Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates is most vulnerable to a conflict because its oil installations are in a small area, unlike in Saudi
Arabia where they’re very spread out, Fesharaki said. “Their fields are close by, the offshore ones can be hit immediately. Once they
throw a few missiles, foreign companies will evacuate, and if they don’t have foreign workers, they can’t produce the oil.”

There would likely be an increase in Iranian cyber-attacks on energy and banking targets in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., Bremmer said.

What will be some of the indirect effects?

Japan, India and South Korea would be some of the most vulnerable economies to a Persian Gulf war due to
their heavy dependence on the region’s crude. India imports more than 80% of its oil and around two-thirds of that comes from the
Middle East. Every 10% increase in the price of a barrel of crude widens the nation’s current-account deficit by about 0.4% of gross
domestic product, Sonal Varma, chief India economist at Nomura Holdings Inc., said in late June. Higher oil prices will push the U.S. and
global economies toward recession, Hansen said. Industrial metals will take a hit from the economic downturn and gold should move
higher despite a stronger dollar. The current global move away from fossil fuels would also be intensified. A Middle East war could
accelerate the move away from oil as it would remind people they’re reliant on a dangerous place, Fesharaki said. “Oil is dying by itself
over the next 10-15 years, this would just be a kick in the butt.”
 Iraq Oil

Disrupting Iraq’s oil supply wrecks the global economy

Sheldon Filger 14, Canadian-American writer, 6/13/2014, “Iraq Crisis Threatens Global Economy”,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iraq-crisis-threatens-global-economy_b_5492840

A disruption in the supply of Iraq’s oil on the world market could create a cascading effect on oil
prices , already at $110 per barrel and climbing. It should be remembered that in the summer of 2008 oil’s climb to a price north of
$140 per barrel was a key element in the unleashing of the global economic crisis, from which a feeble recovery is still underway. The
global economy is fragile and vulnerable to another oil shock.

Among all the calculations being weighed in Washington, Tehran and elsewhere, policymakers must understand that the growing
signs of disintegration of the unified Iraqi state, among other crises in the Middle East, may
foreshadow a repetition of the oil price crisis of 2008. The unraveling of the American-installed Iraqi political
structure may be a harbinger to a return to oil scarcity and elevated oil prices, with all the attendant negative effects on the global
economy.

Iraqi oil key to global oil market – conflict devastates global economy
James West 14, deputy editor, digital, 6/19/2014, “Here’s What the Battle Over Iraqi Oil Means for
America”, https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/06/iraq-obama-baiji-oil-fracking/
2. The Iraq crisis is already affecting oil and gasoline prices. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the country has steadily
increased its oil production. It’s now the  second biggest producer  of crude oil in OPEC, exerting a growing
influence on the global price of oil . And while the White House said Wednesday that there have been no “major disruptions
in oil supplies in Iraq,” the crisis has clearly spooked the global market . Bloomberg reported last week that
one international benchmark used by traders surged above $114 a barrel for the first time in nine months.

USA Today reported that even before the battle over the Baiji refinery, Iraq’s oil production had already fallen by about 10 percent, or
300,000 barrels a day, since March. The China National Petroleum Corporation, the giant state-run company that is the biggest foreign
investor in Iraq’s oil industry, is now nervously watching for any threats to its $4 billion worth of oil interests.

And there are signs that oil market worries are already being reflected at your local gas station.

“I warned people on my Facebook, friends and family,” says Robert Rapier, an energy analyst and regular columnist for the Wall Street
Journal. “I said: If you need to get gasoline, go get it now, because gasoline prices will be going up this week.”

3. But long-term impacts on global oil supply are unlikely, unless the insurgency spreads. For now, the insurgency is limited to the part of
the country north of Baghdad. Unless there’s an increased threat of instability in the south, deeper and longer-lasting seismic shocks to
the world energy market are unlikely, according to Luay al-Khatteeb, an energy and politics analyst with the Brookings Doha Center and
a senior adviser to the Iraqi parliament. While Baiji is the country’s largest refinery, the overwhelming bulk of oil production in Iraq is
centered around the city of Basra, in the country’s south, “far from the fault lines,” he said. Khatteeb called the recent oil price increases
“baseless,” adding that “there is zero threat whatsoever to oil production.”

But if the conflict does spread[s]

south, the effect on oil markets could be severe.  “If all Iraq’s
production got taken off line, for example, I’m pretty sure you’d see oil prices [rise] very quickly to $120,
$130, maybe even higher,” Rapier said.
Moreover, the battle for the Baiji plant is likely to make the situation in Iraq worse because Baiji mainly refines oil for the domestic
market. “The lack of oil products is likely to further the misery and discontent and my prediction is that a lot of that will be directed
toward the central government,” said James F. Jeffery, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former US
envoy to Baghdad, as reported by the Wall Street Journal.
 US-Iran War

US-Iran war is a global crisis – Middle Eastern chaos, global terror attacks,
cyberwars, economic devastation, proxy wars, and millions dead
Alex Ward 7-8-19, associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security that develops strategies to address the most important security challenges
facing the US and the world, 7/8/2019, “’a nasty, brutal fight’: what a US-Iran war would look like”,
https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq
The US could try to enter Iran the way Saddam Hussein did during the Iran-Iraq war, near a water pass bordering Iran’s southwest. But
it’s swampy — the Tigris and Euphrates rivers meet there — and relatively easy to protect. Plus, an invading force would run up against
the Zagros Mountains after passing through, just like Saddam’s forces did. It’s for these reasons that the private intelligence firm Stratfor
called Iran a “fortress” back in 2011. If Trump chose to launch an incursion, he’d likely need around 1.6 million troops to take control of
the capital and country, a force so big it would overwhelm America’s ability to host them in regional bases. By contrast, America never
had more than 180,000 service members in Iraq. And there’s the human cost. A US-Iran war would likely lead to
thousands or hundreds of thousands of dead . Trying to forcibly remove the country’s leadership,
experts say, might drive that total into the millions . That helps explain why nations in the region hope they won’t see a
fight. Goldenberg, who traveled last month to meet with officials in the Gulf, said that none of them wanted a US-Iran war. European
nations will also worry greatly about millions of refugees streaming into the continent , which would put
immense pressure on governments already dealing with the fallout of the Syrian refugee crisis. Israel also would worry about Iranian
proxies targeting it (more on that below). Meanwhile, countries like Russia and China — both friendly to Iran — would try to
curtail the fighting and exploit it at the same time, the Century Foundation’s Hanna told me. China depends heavily on its
goods traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, so it would probably call for calm and for Tehran not to close down the waterway. Russia
would likely demand restraint as well, but use the opportunity to solidify its ties with the Islamic Republic.

And since both countries have veto power on the UN Security Council, they could ruin any political legitimacy for the war that the US may
aim to gain through that body.

The hope for the Trump administration would therefore be that the conflict ends soon after the opening salvos begin. If it doesn’t, and
Iran resists, all that’d really be left are a slew of bad options to make a horrid situation much, much worse.

How Iran might try to win the war

Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart left his post as the No. 2 at US Cyber Command earlier this year, ending a decorated four-decade career. Toward the
end of it, he spent his time at the forefront of the military intelligence and cybersecurity communities. If anyone has the most up-to-date information on how
Iran may fight the US, then, it’s Stewart. “The Iranian strategy would be to avoid, where possible, direct conventional force-on-force operations,” he wrote

for the Cipher Brief on July 2. “They would attempt to impose cost on a global scale , striking at US interests through cyber
operations and targeted terrorism with the intent of expanding the conflict, while encouraging the international community to

restrain America’s actions.” In other words, Tehran can’t match Washington’s firepower. But it can spread chaos in the
Middle East and around the world, hoping that a war-weary US public, an intervention-skeptical
president, and an angered international community cause America to stand down. That may seem like a huge
task — and it is — but experts believe the Islamic Republic has the capability, knowhow, and will to pull off such

an ambitious campaign. “The Iranians can escalate the situation in a lot of different ways and in a lot of different places,” Hanna told me. “They
have the capacity to do a lot of damage.” Take what it could do in the Middle East. Iran’s vast network of proxies  and elite units —

like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — could be activated to kill American troops, diplomats, and citizens

throughout the region. US troops in Syria are poorly defended and have little support, making them easy targets, experts say. America also has
thousands of civilians, troops, and contractors in Iraq, many of whom work in areas near where Iranian militias operate within the country. US allies

would also be prime targets. Hezbollah, an Iran-backed terrorist group in Lebanon, might attack Israel with rockets
and start its own brutal fight. We’ve heard this story before: In 2006, they battled in a month-long war where the militant group fired more
than 4,000 rockets into Israel, and Israeli forces fired around 7,000 bombs and missiles into Lebanon. About 160 Israelis troops and civilians died, according
to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and about 1,100 Lebanese — most of them civilians — perished, per Human Rights Watch, a US-headquartered
advocacy organization. It also reports about 4,400 Lebanese were injured, and around 1 million people were displaced. But that’s not all. Iran
could
encourage terrorist organizations or other proxies to strike inside Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and other Gulf nations. Its support for Houthis rebels in Yemen would mostly certainly
increase, offering them more weapons and funds to attack Saudi Arabia’s airports, military bases, and energy plants. Experts note that the Islamic
Republic surely has sleeper cells in Europe and Latin America, and they could resurface in dramatic and violent ways. In 1994, for example, Iranian-linked
terrorists bombed the hub of the Jewish community in Argentina’s capital, Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and injuring roughly 300 more. That remains the
largest terrorist attack in Latin America’s history, and the possibility for an even bigger one exists. Last year, Argentina arrested two men suspected of
having ties with Hezbollah.

But Chris Musselman, formerly the National Security Council’s counterterrorism director under Trump, told me the US and its allies
may have the most trouble containing the proxy swarm in Western Africa . “We could see a conflict that
spread quickly to places the US may not be able to protect people, and it’s a fight that we are grossly unprepared for,” he told me, adding
that there’s a strong Hezbollah presence in the region and American embassy security there isn’t great. Making matters worse, he
continued, the US isn’t particularly good at collecting intelligence there, meaning some militants could operate relatively under the radar.
“This isn’t really a law enforcement function that US can take on a global scale,” he said. It would require that countries unwittingly
hosting proxies to lead on defeating the Iranian-linked fighters, with US support when needed. The chaos would also extend
into the cyber realm . Iran is a major threat to the US in cyberspace. Starting in 2011, Iran attacked more than
40 American banks, including JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America. The attack made it so the banks had trouble serving its customers
and customers had trouble using the bank’s services. In 2012, Iran released malware into the networks of Saudi Aramco, a major oil
company, which erased documents, emails, and other files on around 75 percent of the company’s computers — replacing them with an
image of a burning American flag. In the middle of a war, one could imagine Tehran’s hackers wreaking even more havoc. “ I
would
expect them to have begun selected targeting through socially-engineered phishing activities
focused on the oil and gas sector, the financial sector and the electric power grid in that order ,”
Stewart wrote. “There may be instances now where they already have some persistent access. If they do, I expect they would use it, or
risk losing the access and employ that capability early in the escalation of the crisis.”

Recent reports indicate that Iranian

cyberwarriors have stepped up their online operations , with a
particular emphasis on preparing to attack US firms. Among other moves, they’re aiming to trick employees at major
businesses to hand over passwords and other vital information, giving them greater access to a firm’s networks. “When you combine this
increase with past destructive attacks launched by Iranian-linked actors, we’re concerned enough about the potential for new destructive
attacks to continue sounding the alarm,” Christopher Krebs, a top cybersecurity official at the Department of Homeland Security,
told Foreign Policy on July 1. All of this — proxies
striking around the world, cyberattacks on enterprise —
would happen while Iran continued to resist conventional American forces . In the Strait of Hormuz, for
instance, Iranian sailors could use speedboats to place bombs on oil tankers or place mines in the water to destroy US warships. The
Islamic Republic’s submarines would also play a huge part in trying to sink an American vessel. And the nation’s anti-ship missiles and
drones could prove constant and deadly nuisances. Should US troops try to enter Iranian territory on land, Iranian ground forces would
also push back on them fiercely using insurgent-like tactics while the US painfully marches toward Tehran. Put together, Brewer notes
succinctly, a US-Iran war would be “a nasty, brutal fight.”

Aftermath: “The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious”

Imagine, as we already have, that the earlier stages of strife escalate to a major war. That’s already bad enough. But assume for a
moment not only that the fighting takes place, but that the US does the unlikely and near impossible: It invades and overthrows
the Iranian regime (which National Security Adviser Bolton, at least, has openly called for in the past). If that happens, it’s worth
keeping two things in mind. First, experts say upward of a million people — troops from both sides as well as Iranian men, women,
and children, and American diplomats and contractors — likely will have died by that point. Cities will burn and smolder.
Those who survived the conflict will mainly live in a state of economic devastation for years and some,
perhaps, will pick up arms and form insurgent groups to fight the invading US force. Second, power abhors a
vacuum. With no entrenched regime in place, multiple authority figures from Iran’s clerical and military circles, among others,
will jockey for control. Those sides could split into violent factions, initiating a civil war that would bring more carnage
to the country. Millions more refugees might flock out of the country, overwhelming already taxed nations nearby, and

ungoverned pockets will give terrorist groups new safe havens from which to operate. Iran would be on the
verge of being a failed state, if it wasn’t already by that point, and the US would be the main reason why. To turn the tide, America may
feel compelled to help rebuild the country at the cost of billions of dollars, years of effort, and likely more dead. It could also choose to
withdraw, leaving behind a gaping wound in the center of the Middle East. In some ways, then, what
comes after the war
could be worse than the war itself. It should therefore not be lost on anyone: A US-Iran war would be a bloody
hell during and after the fighting. It’s a good thing neither Trump nor Iran’s leadership currently wants a conflict. But if they
change their minds, only carnage follows. “The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious,” Hanna told me.

US-Iran war will be a nightmare – worse than Iraq war –– unleashing havoc
beyond compare
Ted Galen Carpenter 19, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, “How Iran
Would Battle the U.S. In a War (It Would Be Bloody)”,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-iran-would-battle-us-war-it-would-be-
bloody
Iran may be especially effective if it adopts that course. Indeed, just in the narrow military sense, Iranian
capabilities are far
from trivial. Retired Admiral James Stavridis notes that Iran has “exceptionally strong asymmetric warfare
capability” in several areas. “Cyber [attacks], swarm small-boat tactics, diesel submarines, special forces
and surface-to-surface cruise missiles are all high-level assets ,” Stavridis stated. “They are also very
experienced at employing them in the demanding environment of the Middle East .”

Beyond utilizing its direct military capabilities, Tehran

might well call upon its network of Shia political and
military allies in the Middle East to create havoc for the United States. Iran maintains very close ties with
Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Shia militias in Iraq. The residual U.S. force deployed in the latter country could be especially
vulnerable to harassment and lethal attacks. And one should not ignore or discount the potential role of the angry, oppressed Shia
majority in Bahrain. If their seething discontent at the Sunni-controlled regime that Washington backs explodes into outright conflict, the
Trump administration could find it increasingly difficult to continue basing the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

Going to war against Iran would be no minor matter, and President Trump is irresponsible to act in such a flippant manner. Attacking
Iran could trigger a prolonged, costly nightmare in both treasure and blood. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI), a
Democratic presidential candidate, likely is prophetic that a war against Iran would make the Iraq War look
like a cakewalk. Tehran certainly has a multitude of ways to retaliate for U.S. aggression and to
escalate the bilateral confrontation. U.S. leaders would be wise not to venture farther down that perilous path.
 US-Iran Nuclear War

US-Iran war goes nuclear – administration war hawks seek decisive victory
– risk is off the chart 
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi 19, political scientist and visiting scholar at Harvard University and previous
advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, 7/2/2019, “A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?”,
https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/

Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that
carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear weapons. Iran’s assortment of
asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be effective against the United States— nearly assures
such a confrontation. The current US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration may well think it to be in the best
interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf—
and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal.
We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following
reasons:

The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take
an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared
“economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries.

In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf.
This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if
need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US
forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in
a showdown with a menacing foe like
Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear
force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.
Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for
Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited
nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would
be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war.
If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region, defang the
Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil
flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United States
significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a
strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing.

Undoubtedly, there are several significant negative consequences to a US use of nuclear weapons, opening the way for other nuclear-
armed states to emulate US behavior, and for many other non-nuclear weapons states to seek their own nuclear deterrent shields. There
would also be a huge outcry in the international community causing the US global image to suffer.

Will such anticipated consequences represent sufficient obstacles to prevent a limited U.S. nuclear strike on Iran? With President Trump,
who counts on “bomb Iran” billionaire Sheldon Adelson as one of his main campaign contributors, the threshold for using
nukes certainly seems to have been lowered.
How the United States and Iran came to the brink. President Donald Trump complicates the situation by stating that the United States is
not seeking war with Iran, while repeatedly threatening to annihilate it. In July of 2018, in response to a statement by Iran’s President
Hassan Rouhani, Trump tweeted, “NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE
LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.”  On May 19, 2019, Trump fired another incendiary
volley, threatening the “official end” of Iran in a U.S.-Iran war. Then Friday June 21, 2019 the day after Iran shot down a US military
drone, the President said “I’m not looking for war and if there is, it’ll be obliteration like you have never seen before. But I am not looking
to do that. But, you (Iran) can’t have nuclear weapons.” In an interview with NBC’s Chuck Todd.

Citing Iran’s military threat, the Trump administration continues to enforce relentless economic sanctions under the guise of a
“maximum pressure” strategy, designating Iran’s revolutionary guard a terrorist organization. The administration also is ramping up the
US military presence in the Persian Gulf, sending several warships, a Patriot missile battery, an expeditionary force of marines, and
nuclear-capable B-52 strategic bombers to the region. The United States has also withdrawn all “non-emergency” personnel in Baghdad
and Erbil. These actions add fuel to the growing fear of war—a war sure to involve Iraq, home to both US military bases and powerful
battle-hardened pro-Iran Shiite militias.

War could break out in a variety of ways: As a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz (a choke
point for the daily transfer of some 19 million barrels of oil) , a preemptive strike on Iran’s military and nuclear
facilities (in light of Iran’s stated intention to resume aspects of its nuclear activities, banned under the 2015 nuclear agreement ), an
application of the 9/11 legislation on Authorization of Military Force against al-Qaeda (accusing Iran of
being in league with al-Qaeda terrorists) , or in response to perceived Iranian mischief (such as the recent sabotage on
board several Saudi and UAE merchant ships).

The United States and Iran are not the only regional players, and care must be taken to understand the context and implications of
events. As pointed out by a number of US experts in the wake of the most recent attacks on oil tankers, regional rivals such as Saudi
Arabia have much to gain from a breakout of war between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. has echoed the Saudi accusations against Iran and
extended them to include blaming Iran for the Yemenis Houthi rebels’ drone attack on a Saudi pipeline on May 14th.

Accusations are one thing, but the big question is, will the Trump administration heed Saudi Arabia’s call for a “US surgical strike” on
Iran?  Both the Saudis and Iranians harbor hegemonic ambitions in the region. The Saudis are pushing for a limited US strike to eliminate
some of Iran’s formidable naval and missile capabilities, thus weakening their regional rival. But even a limited US strike would increase
the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets in the region, both directly and indirectly through multiple
proxy forces.

Iran’s military commanders have warned that the US military fleet is within range of Iran’s short-
range missiles. Iran has reportedly affixed anti-ship missiles on hundreds of its fast boats, as part of an asymmetrical
“swarming” tactic. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has also instructed the country’s military
forces to commence preparations for war.
It is worth recalling that Iran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower.  Iran has also devoted considerable attention
to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities, including shifting its formal strategy to an “offensive-defensive” posture—meaning that if the
United States moves offensively against Iran, Iran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United
States. An example of an offensive-defensive move would be if the United States were to use its airbases to launch nuclear-capable B-52
strikes on Iran, Iran could counterattack the US base in Qatar, irrespective of friendly ties with the country.

Iran is in many respects a “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses
thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks, some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships,
submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran
will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US
conflict escalation to nuclear war.

The risk of nuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a present and clear danger to world
peace, requiring the mobilization of the international community to intervene.
Turns
 Fill-in
Russia and China seek influence in Iraq – plan causes fill-in
Anthony H. Cordesman 19, professor of national security at Georgetown University,
2/12/2019, “The Strategy the U.S. Should Pursue in Iraq”,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategy-us-should-pursue-iraq

Russia will probably exploit any opportunity to gain influence in Iraq and weaken the U.S. position,
and is already competing with the U.S. to provide arms transfers to Iraq. SIPIRI estimates that Russia provided
20% of all Iraq arms imports between 2012 and 2017 versus 57% from the U.S.
(http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php), and the CRS reports that Russia has discussed much larger sales – many of
which would require Russian in-country support (CRS R44984).

The new U.S. National Security Strategy issued in 2017 and 2018 calls for a U.S. focus on the threat from both Russia and China, and Arab
sources indicate that China has already become more active in seeking to expand its influence in Iraq.
Even some Iraqis who do support strong ties to the U.S. already see Russia and China as ways of countering over-dependence on the U.S.

Ending US arms sales guarantees fill-in

Brett McGurk 13, US deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran, 11/13/2013, “U.S. Foreign Policy
Toward Iraq”, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/217546.htm
Time may not be on our side. Iraq has acute demands, money to supply those demands, and while it prefers
U.S. equipment and the multi-decade relationship that comes with our foreign military sales program,
strategic competitors are now lining up to meet Iraqi demands if we cannot deliver. Case in point is the
delivery earlier this month of four Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters. We believe that it is in America’s strategic interest to
supply military systems to Iraq, as opposed to Russia or other competitors, and we look forward to working with
Congress to address all outstanding questions with respect to foreign military sales.
 Terror
Iraq counter-terror successful – US support key
David M. Witty 18, retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and Foreign Area Officer in the Middle
East, October 2018, “Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter Terrorism Service”,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf
The Counter Terrorism Service succeeded in the war against the Islamic State, although this was partly due to
the intense coalition assistance it received. Indeed, coalition air support for CTS operations was one of the major factors in the
conventional defeat of IS, and the
service also depended heavily on coalition nations for assistance with
training, equipment, and combat advisors. It is doubtful that the service would have been successful
without this support, a reality with important implications for future U.S. backing to Iraq’s security
forces and the CTS in particular.

For the United States, the CTS’s performance signals the success of its “by, with, and through” strategy of
turning to surrogate forces, allies, and partner nations during wartime , a strategy based on minimizing direct
U.S. involvement in ground operations. Yet while limiting U.S. and other coalition nations’ casualties, the CTS—which along with other
ISF entities provided the boots on the ground—nearly became combat ineffective, or even destroyed, during the IS war. On the flip side,
this scenario highlights one of the most remarkable triumphs of the CTS: its ability to continue functioning even in the face of devastating
losses. While military analysts have no consensus on how many casualties a unit can endure before it becomes combat ineffective,
estimates usually range between 25 and 35 percent.1 The CTS sustained casualties far beyond this level, with losses in
Mosul reaching at least the 50–60 percent range. But the service kept functioning nonetheless. The CTS is
unique not only in the Iraqi context, but quite exceptional when compared to other forces
worldwide as well. This is a tribute to the CTS-administered Academia, which was able to replenish severely depleted ranks—
notwithstanding a drop in quality—and a tribute to CTS personnel in general, who believed that a collapse of the service
would mean the collapse of Iraq.

Iraq’s Counter Terror Service gives US leverage over Iranian presence –– Iraq
key against IS
David M. Witty 18, retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and Foreign Area Officer in the Middle
East, October 2018, “Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter Terrorism Service”,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf
In Iraq, the CTS can serve as a paradigm for a nonsectarian force that is both professional and capable. The service can
further
exemplify the success of an Iraqi security apparatus free from Iranian penetration. And it can stand as
an enduring nexus in the U.S.-Iraq military relationship, granting the United States clout in the country
against a rising Iranian presence.
As this paper has elaborated, the CTS succeeded in large part because it was a small force outside the traditional military structure and
was not prone to the levels of corruption and bureaucracy plaguing the Defense Ministry. This model of a small, elite force apart from
such bureaucratic ministries could be used by other regional countries facing terrorism challenges. But in potentially applying this
model, they must ensure that the new force does not become a second military that assumes the roles of traditional security ministries in
need of reform.

To reduce internal tensions within the CTS and ease institutional rigidity, a new generation of leaders should now step into the most
senior ranks and lead the service into its next phase, as a dedicated counterterrorism force not focused on liberating cities but on
preventing that need from arising. The current top CTS leaders have been in place since 2007. They have done more than their share of
the mission, and they can now honorably step aside and allow fresh perspectives to emerge. The hard part will be ensuring that these
rising officers are committed to reducing the aforementioned administrative rigidity. They can do this by encouraging decentralized
decision making by their subordinates at the lowest possible levels while still maintaining oversight functions to avoid subordinate
malfeasance.

In the same way that Iraq should be grateful for U.S. support, the
United States should fully comprehend that no nation
killed more Islamic State fighters at a greater cost to itself than Iraq, and this victory should not be squandered by
either country. The Islamic State is again spreading in Iraq, as are powerful militias. U.S. leaders must therefore
use strong measures to enable the CTS to fully give up its conventional role, retrain, and refocus on what its name implies,
counterterrorism . CTS leaders have said it will take decades to counter the ideology that led to the Islamic State. They should
start right away with this next—and perhaps most crucial—phase in the war against the jihadist enemy
AT:
 AT: Terrorists get US arms
Arms sales vital to counter-terrorism operations and end-user monitoring ––
promotes Iraqi trust over time
Alonzo J. Jones 14, supervisory intelligence officer and Iraq subject matter expert on Iraqi political
and military affairs, 8/25/2014, “Iraq Stability: Foreign Military Sales in a New War Environment”

The United States remains Iraq's preferred FMS provider and provides emergent equipment and
support to Iraq during the fight against ISIL while continuing long lead-time FMS production. Although
Iraqi leaders are often frustrated with FMS timelines, they realize they can depend on the United States for immediate support when
needed, and quick FMS response to ISIL threats encourages faith over longer FMS timelines. Iraq will
continue to conduct FMS deals with other countries, primarily Russia, for a variety of reasons including diversification and price.
However, Russia's FMS influence in Iraq is not a threat to U.S. interests.

Despite the risk of some U.S. equipment falling into ISIL possession or used by Shia militia under the guise ofiSF, U.S. to Iraq FMS remains
the primary security cooperation tool. U.S.
FMS strategy in Iraq should focus on counter-terrorism
operations, increase end-user monitoring of U.S. equipment , and increase direct commercial sales
to defeat ISIL in a new war context. The recommendations seek to inform U.S. policymakers on future U.S. FMS strategy to
Iraq and other countries where FMS agreements do not address asymmetric threat requirements or meet expected delivery timelines.

The U.S. and Iraq should first prioritize FMS arms transfer and training for CT and border security operations given the nature of the fight
against ISIL. The ISF and most of the government remain in an old war mindset. There must be appreciation for fighting ISIL in a new war
context and procurement should focus on weapons and training to that end.

Next, the United States should increase U.S. liaison officer and foreign national presence and capability to monitor end-user agreements
and decrease transfer of U.S. equipment to adversaries including ISIL and Shia militia. This is difficult considering constrained resources
and a limited U.S. presence on the ground in Iraq. However, given the urgency of the fight against ISIL, the Iraqi government likely would
be amenable to an increased OSC-1 presence.

Last, the United States should increase DCS to help alleviate USG administrative program management burden and mitigate buyer
frustration with the FMS process and timelines. Allow the Iraqi government to work directly with U.S. vendors, provided U.S. oversight
mechanisms are in place. In a best-case scenario, increasing DCS may free up U.S. resources to aid in end-user
monitoring.
 AT: PMF/armed groups threat
Iraq warns armed groups against provocation – protecting American interests
amid tension is their priority
Alissa J. Rubin 19, Pulitzer Award winner and Baghdad Bureau chief for The New York Times,
5/20/2019, “Iraq, Fearing Another U.S. War, Warns Militias Against Provocation”,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-war-militias.html
BAGHDAD — In the Trump administration’s recent bellicose talk about Iran, Iraqis hear eerie echoes of the months just before the
American invasion of Iraq. Iraqi officials, wary of another war on their land, say they have warned armed groups tied
to Iran to refrain from taking any action that could provoke American retaliation. “The last two days
there have been continuous meetings with all the groups to convey the Iraqi government’s message
that if anyone does something, it is their responsibility, not Iraq’s ,” said Sayed al-Jayashi, a senior member of
Iraq’s National Security Council. “The Iraqi government is responsible for protecting American interests in
Iraq,” he added. “We will become the enemy of anyone who does something against American
interests.”
In the past two weeks, the Trump administration has said, repeatedly and publicly, that Iran and Arab Shiite militias aligned with it were planning to strike American troops in the
region, and that the threat had increased recently. In response, the administration dispatched an aircraft carrier, long-range bombers and an antimissile battery to the Persian Gulf
and updated plans for a war with Iran. On Wednesday, the State Department ordered a number of its “nonemergency” personnel in Iraq to leave the country. The United States has not
revealed any evidence supporting its assessment of an increased threat, though on Wednesday officials described what they said were photos of missiles being loaded onto Iranian
boats. Allies of the United States have said that while Iran and its confederates may pose a danger, it is unclear whether there is a serious threat against American forces. The claims
have led many in the region to draw parallels to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in 2003 based on false claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
There are about 30 militias in Iraq with at least 125,000 active-duty fighters and varying loyalties. Many worked in tandem with the Iraqi military in fighting the Islamic State, and all
report to the prime minister’s office. The concern in Iraq is focused on the handful of groups with strong ties to Iran. Several are close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and have
members who trained in Iran. “Unfortunately we have groups that want to be more Iranian than Iran itself,” said Salah al-Obaidi, the spokesman for the populist cleric and power-
broker Moktada al-Sadr. “We have concerns about the possibility that the government cannot control the pro-Iranian groups, and this will be a big problem in Iraq.” He said the
government needed to take a stronger stand against those groups. “There is still no plan on the ground about what the government will do,” he said. “In the military there has to be
strict rules and if anyone breaks the rules or does anything outside the plan, they are punished, and the government has not done that.” Iraq, he said, cannot “be the place where
America and Iran settle their scores.” The parallels to 2003 do not escape anyone, but then important American allies like Britain and Japan supported the Bush administration in
going to war; now the Trump administration’s hostility to Iran is a far lonelier stance. Mr. Trump has long called the Iraq war a mistake, and has said that American forces should
withdraw from the Middle East and other parts of the world. But his national security adviser, John R. Bolton, has advocated military strikes against Iran and regime change there. As a
State Department official in 2003, he was seen as one of the more hawkish voices on Iraq.

On the streets of Baghdad, many Iraqis say that if there is an armed conflict between Iran or its proxies and the United States, it is more
likely to take place in the Gulf rather than on Iraqi soil. Unlike the Iraq of 2003, Iraq today is an American ally .
“I am not afraid of a war between Iran and the United States,” said Ali Selim, 55, a barber who was drying his towels outdoors. “Then the American target was Iraq. This time it’s Iran,”
he said, adding that the militias would not risk their own survival by provoking American retaliation because at the end of the day they are Iraqis. Others dismissed the increased
tensions between the United States and Iran as empty saber-rattling. “It’s just talk, just threats,” said Salim Abu Hassan, 48, a worker who had just delivered a shipment of baby scales
to a medical supply store. He said he had fought in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and was in Baghdad when the United States attacked 16 years ago. “Iran and America are each one
trying to shout louder than the other.” Mr. al-Jayashi, the Iraqi security council member, also said he believed that the Iranian government did not want war. But he said he worried
about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps acting on its own and possibly encouraging the armed groups it has fostered in the region to act on its behalf. It can be difficult to discern
Iran’s intentions since its elected leadership and government often sound reasonable, but the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force, whose leader Qassem Soleimani is in regular
touch with Iraqi figures, take a far more antagonistic stance toward the United States. However, Mr. al-Jayashi and other senior Iraqi officials said Iran’s only request to Iraq has been
to prevent the United States from using its soil to launch an attack on Iranian territory. A senior Iraqi official who asked not to be identified said that the Americans had no plans to do
that. The official said that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who visited Iraq last week, told Iraqi leaders that the United States respected Iraq’s sovereignty and that it would not launch
attacks on Iran from Iraq. The State Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Mr. Pompeo’s message to the Iraqis. Mr. Pompeo said that he had discussed
the “importance of Iraq ensuring that it’s able to adequately protect Americans in their country.” According to the official, Mr. Pompeo did not address whether the United States would
launch an attack on Iraqi soil against an armed group that struck the United States, a scenario now under discussion at the Pentagon. On Sunday, the United Arab Emirates reported
that four oil tankers had been damaged in attacks off the Emirati coast. Two of them belonged to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. — longtime antagonists of Iran’s — as well
as the United States, have refrained from making public accusations or revealing what they know about the incidents, but privately, their officials have made clear that their suspicions
focus on Iran. American officials said Monday that there was no definitive evidence linking Iran or its proxies to the attacks. But the British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, warned this
week of “the risk of a conflict happening by accident with an escalation that is unintended on either side.” Such an escalation spilling into Iraq, which has been at war for most of the
time since the American invasion, is a horror many Iraqis wish to believe could not happen again. “I remember the destruction and the looting and the burned and destroyed
buildings,” said Emad Hassan, 45. “We thought they came only to liberate Iraq, but they occupied it.”
 AT: Iraq unaccountable/Iraqi threat
US arms sales decreases threats as Iraq’s military operations are held
accountable –– history proves
Kenneth M. Pollack 11, former CIA intelligence analyst and PhD in political science from MIT,
11/15/2011, “American Policy Toward Iraq After 2011”,
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/american-policy-toward-iraq-after-2011/
The more that the United States remains Iraq’s paramount military partner, the less likely (or even able)
the Iraqi armed forces will be to threaten neighboring states. The modern military history of the Arab states
makes clear that Arab allies of the United States become completely dependent on the United States
and lose the capacity to project power without American support (and therefore approval). Today,
Jordan, Egypt, and all of the GCC states coordinate all of their major, external military activities with the United States. They rarely
try to project power beyond their borders because they are effectively unable to do so without
American support; a situation deepened by their tendency to buy weapons platforms at the expense of logistics and other support
functions. Moreover, on a number of occasions, Washington has been able to prevent its Middle Eastern allies
from launching military operations because of these countries’ dependence on the United States. Such
was not the experience of Arab states who relied on the Soviet Union, China, or other countries for their military support, and today
there is little to suggest that Russia, China, or any other country would even try to use their arms
sales to head off a war.
 AT: US not dependent on Iraq oil
Iraqi oil still affects US economy –– US security is global
James West 14, deputy editor, digital, 6/19/2014, “Here’s What the Battle Over Iraqi Oil Means for
America”, https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/06/iraq-obama-baiji-oil-fracking/
5. But the United States is still tied to global oil markets, and that means what happens in Iraq can
have an economic impact here. One thing every expert I spoke to agreed on is this: Even with decreasing oil imports, the US
is inextricably linked to world markets. That means that if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate,
the US economy may not be immune. 

“The cost to the United States of a big oil shock…will be lower than they were [in the past],” Duffield said. “Our
main
vulnerability is not so much the direct impact on oil, but the impact on the rest of the world’s
economy, if there’s a big oil supply disruption.” He added that “as long as the world oil market is pretty highly
integrated, the US is vulnerable to an oil supply disruption in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf,
regardless of the amount of oil it imports from the region.”

Why? Because even

though the United States has reduced its use of Middle Eastern oil, many of America’s
key trading partners have not. “The oil production in Iraq has risen for seven years in a row,” Rapier said, and that oil is
going somewhere. Much of it’s going to Asian economic powerhouses whose economies are deeply tied to our own.

“The United States, strategically, is a major trading power,” said Anthony Cordesman, an energy analyst with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. “It is particularly
dependent on the import of manufactured goods from three
countries which are extremely dependent on energy imports. Those happen to be China, South
Korea, and Japan.”

That’s why Middle Eastern oil still plays an important role in US policy, says Cordesman. “It is precisely because US security is
global. It is not a matter of direct US dependence [on foreign oil],” he said. “Because what really counts is global
prices, and what counts is the steady and predictable flow of oil to a global economy.?”
 AT: No US-Iran war
Miscalculations, guesswork, and mistrust brews up conflict – full-blown US-
Iran war is near
Alex Ward 7-8-19, associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security that develops strategies to address the most important security challenges
facing the US and the world, 7/8/2019, “’a nasty, brutal fight’: what a US-Iran war would look like”,
https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq
A deadly opening attack. Nearly untraceable, ruthless proxies spreading chaos on multiple continents. Costly miscalculations. And
thousands — perhaps hundreds of thousands — killed in a conflict that would dwarf the war in Iraq. Welcome to the US-Iran war, which
has the potential to be one of the worst conflicts in history. Washington and Tehran remain locked in a months-long standoff with no end
in sight. The US has imposed crushing sanctions on Iran’s economy over its support for terrorism and its growing missile program,
among other things, after withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal last year; Iran has fought back by violating parts of the nuclear
agreement and downing an American military drone. To hear President Donald Trump tell it, that last incident brought the US within 10
minutes of launching warplanes and dropping bombs on Iran. Had Trump gone through with the planned strike, it’s possible both nations
would now be engaged in a much more violent, much bloodier struggle. Importantly, both country’s leaders say they don’t want a war.
But thepossibility of one breaking out anyway shouldn’t be discounted, especially since an Iranian
insult directed at Trump last month led him to threaten the Islamic Republic’s “obliteration” for an
attack on “anything American.” In other words, Tehran doesn’t have to kill any US troops,
diplomats, or citizens to warrant a military response — it just has to try . Which means the standstill between
the US and Iran teeters on a knife edge, and it won’t take much to knock it off.

So to understand how bad it could get, I asked eight current and former White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, as well as
Middle East experts, how a war between the US and Iran might play out. The bottom line: It would be hell on earth. “This would be a
violent convulsion similar to chaos of the Arab Spring inflicted on the region for years,” said Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s
Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, with the potential for it to get “so much worse than Iraq.”

How the US-Iran war starts

US-imposed sanctions have tanked Iran’s economy, and Tehran desperately wants them lifted. But with few options to compel the Trump
administration to change course, Iranian leaders may choose a more violent tactic to make their point. Iranian forces could bomb an
American oil tanker traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for the global energy trade aggressively patrolled by
Tehran’s forces, causing loss of life or a catastrophic oil spill. The country’s skillful hackers could launch a major cyberattack on regional
allies like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Israel could kill an Iranian nuclear scientist, leading Iran to strike back and drawing
the US into the spat, especially if Tehran responds forcefully. Or Iranian-linked proxies could target and murder American troops and
diplomats in Iraq. That last option is particularly likely, experts say. After all, Iran bombed US Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and
killed more than 600 US troops during the Iraq War. Taking this step may seem extreme, but “Iran could convince itself that it could do
this,” Goldenberg, now at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, told me. At that point, it’d be nearly
impossible for the Trump administration not to respond in kind. The recommendations given to the president would correspond to
whatever action Iran took.

If Tehran destroyed an oil tanker, killing people and causing an oil spill, the US might destroy some of Iran’s
ships. If Iran took out another US military drone, the US might take out some of Iran’s air defenses. And if Iranian-backed militants
killed Americans in Iraq, then US troops stationed there could retaliate, killing militia fighters and targeting their bases of operation in
return. The US could even bomb certain training grounds inside Iran. It’s at this point that both sides would need to communicate their
red lines to each other and how not to cross them. The problem is there are  no direct channels  between the two
countries and they don’t particularly trust each other. So the situation could easily spiral out of control. Messaging “is
often more important than physical action,” Jasmine El-Gamal, formerly a Middle East adviser at the Pentagon, told me. “Action without
corresponding messaging, public or private, could most certainly lead to escalation because the other side is free to interpret the action
as they wish.” Which means the initial tit-for-tat would serve as the precursor to much more bloodshed .
“What are we going to be wrong about?”

You may have heard the phrase “the fog of war.” It refers to how hard it is for opposing sides to know what’s going on in the heat of
battle. It’s particularly difficult when they don’t talk to one another, as is the case with the US and Iran. Which means that the way the
US and Iran interpret each other’s next moves would mainly come down to guesswork . Eric Brewer, who
spent years in the intelligence community before joining Trump’s National Security Council to work on Iran, told me that’s when the
Pentagon and other parts of the government rely heavily on their best-laid plans. The problem, he noted, is that wars rarely play out as
even the smartest officials think they will. A guiding question for him, then, is “what are we going to be wrong about?” Here’s one
scenario in which the US might get something wrong — and open up the door to chaos: After America launches its first set of retaliatory
strikes, Iran decides to scatter its missiles to different parts of the country. Now the Trump administration has to figure out why Iran did
that. Some people in the administration might think it’s because Tehran plans to attack US embassies, troops, or allies in the region and is
moving its missiles into position to do so. Others might believe that it was merely for defensive reasons, with Iran essentially trying to
protect its missile arsenal from being taken out by future US strikes.

Without a clear answer, which interpretation wins out comes down to which camp in the Trump administration is the most persuasive.
And if the camp that believes Iran is about to launch missile strikes wins, they could convince the president to take preemptive action
against Iran. That could be a good thing if they were right; after all, they’d have made sure Iran couldn’t carry out those planned attacks.
But what if they were wrong? What if the other camp guessed correctly that Iran was merely moving its missiles around because it was
scared the US would strike once more? In that case, the US would have bombed Iran again, this time for essentially no reason — thus
looking like the aggressor. That could cause Iran to retaliate with a bigger attack, setting off a spiral that could end in full-scale war. Iran
could make a grave error too. Imagine Trump sends thousands of troops, say 25,000, along with advanced warplanes to the Middle East
in the hope that they’ll deter Iran from escalating the conflict any further. Tehran could just as easily read that buildup as preparation for
a US invasion. If that’s the case, Iranian forces could choose to strike first in an effort to complicate the perceived incursion. Of course,
cooler heads could prevail in those moments. But experts say the political pressures on both Washington and Tehran not to be attacked
first — and not to be embarrassed or look weak — might be too strong for the countries’ leaders to ignore. “Unintended civilian
casualties or other collateral damage is always possible, and it is not clear that this administration — or any administration —
understands what Iran’s own red lines are,” El-Gamal, now at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, told me. “As such, the
greatest risk of a full-blown war comes from one side miscalculating the other’s tolerance” for
conflict. If that proves true, and the US and Iran officially escalate their fighting to more than a few
one-off attacks, it’s war.
 AT: No miscalculations
Risk of miscalculation high now –– tension in Strait of Hormuz rising –  Is near
Alex Ward 7-12-19, associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security that develops strategies to address the most important security challenges
facing the US and the world, 7/12/2019, “The US has a risky new plan to protect oil tankers from
Iranian attacks”, https://www.vox.com/2019/7/12/20691689/usa-iran-tanker-strait-hormuz-
british

The Trump administration is planning to send US Navy ships to help escort oil tankers in the Gulf in
order to protect them from possible Iranian aggression. But some experts warn the move could cost
a lot of money and risk pulling the US and Iran into a war neither wants. According to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford and Gen. Mark Milley, the man tapped to replace Dunford, the US is working to build an
international coalition whose navies will work together to protect oil tankers moving through the Strait of Hormuz — a vital waterway
for the global energy trade — and adjoining seas. The current plan is for the US to send “command and control” ships to the area that will
help lead the effort and for other countries’ vessels to do the actual escorting of the tankers. “Escorting in the normal course of events
would be done by countries who have the same flag, so a ship that is flagged from a particular country would be escorted by that
country,” Dunford told reporters Tuesday. “What the United States is uniquely capable of providing is some of the command and control,
some of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.” It’s unclear exactly how involved the US ships will actually be in the
operations, though, and which countries the US plans to work with. It’s also unclear exactly whose oil tankers this new coalition will be
tasked with protecting.

This new effort is a response to a recent spate of suspected attacks on oil tankers in recent months that the US and others have blamed
on Iran (a charge Iran denies). Six oil tankers sailing through that region have been damaged since May in apparent sabotage operations
amid a months-long standoff between the US and Iran. And just this week, the United Kingdom said it had thwarted an Iranian attempt
to block a British tanker from proceeding in the Strait of Hormuz. According to the Washington Post, the tanker was approaching the
northern entrance to the strait when the British naval ship accompanying it “was forced to position herself between the Iranian vessels”
and the ship, a government statement said. Tehran has also denied any involvement in that episode. These incidents are why some
experts say the Pentagon’s plan, if enacted, may be necessary right now. “Given the current situation, this probably makes sense to deter
future Iranian attacks,” Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, told me.

This all sounds very similar to when the US in 1987 escorted Kuwaiti ships traveling through the Gulf while the Iran-Iraq war raged.
Then-President Ronald Reagan proceeded with the operation, known as Operation Earnest Will, despite congressional concern that
doing so might get the US involved in conflict. It’s possible President Donald Trump may receive the same backlash — especially since
escorting ships is much harder in practice than it sounds in theory.

The danger of escorting ships in troubled waters

Military planners during the Reagan years worried about the challenges of sending American ships to the Gulf during such a tense time.
In heated debates, US officials worried about what would happen if an Iranian vessel approached an American-escorted tanker. Should
America shoot first or second? Ultimately, a decision was made to allow US Navy ship captains to take all necessary measures to protect
the vessel they were escorting from attack. That didn’t satisfy everyone in the Reagan administration — some worried about a captain
making a costly mistake — but that was the final order. These are the kinds of discussions and debates the Pentagon will now need to
have about what US Navy ships can and can’t do to defend the tankers they’re helping protect. It’s a complicated, expensive,
and risky endeavor, experts tell me. Retired Navy Vice Adm. Michael Franken, who served on a US warship during Operation
Earnest Will, told me there aren’t enough vessels to escort every single tanker individually, one by one. That means multiple tankers may
have to wait outside the entrances to Gulf waters until an escorting ship can take a group together, making it more complicated to protect
them all. And, of course,
the more US Navy ships there are in the region, the more likely it is that
something could go wrong. “A greater US presence also means higher risk of an inadvertent run-in
or miscalculation at sea that leads to conflict,” says Goldenberg, now at the Center for a New American Security think
tank in Washington, DC. “Iran will likely try to avoid a direct confrontation with the US military, but it will continue to test the
limits. We should expect it to continue on occasion to target non-American ships with mines or use
provocative harassment tactics from its small boats.” Mines, which can be triggered by sound, pressure, or
magnetism, make the operation especially dangerous. It’s possible that even an escorted ship hits a
mine — or one is planted on it — causing an explosion and potential loss of life. Franken, now at the Stimson Center
think tank in Washington, was on a warship behind SS Bridgeton, a supertanker traveling through the Persian Gulf in 1987, when a mine
blew part of it up. He told me he worries about what the US response would be if something like that happens again. “ Mining
in
international waters is an act of war,” he said. It’d be hard at that point for the Trump administration
to ignore the bombing, potentially leading Washington and Tehran to war. That’s why Franken has a word of
warning for the Pentagon: “Beware of what you’re walking into, because nothing good happens in the Strait of Hormuz.”
 AT: Drone shooting proves no war
The administration is preparing for war – drone shooting escalated tensions –
killing one US member triggers confrontation
Alex Ward 6-20-19, associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security that develops strategies to address the most important security challenges
facing the US and the world, 6/20/2019“Iran shoots down US military drone, increasing risk of
war”, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq
US officials tell a different story. They say the military drone was flying in international airspace over the Strait of
Hormuz, a crucial maritime passage for the global energy trade that’s aggressively patrolled by Iran, before the drone came crashing
down. “Iranian reports that the aircraft was over Iran are false ,” Navy Capt. Bill Urban, a spokesperson for US Central
Command, said in a Thursday morning statement. “This was an unprovoked attack on a US surveillance asset in international airspace.”

The downed surveillance drone was an RQ-4A Global Hawk, Urban added, an aircraft that costs roughly $130 million. Ulrike Franke, a
drones expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, tweeted Thursday that the “[t]he Global Hawk is the biggest drone in use in
the world” and “also flies very high” — about 10 miles up — “and is thus supposed to be very difficult to shoot down.” President Donald
Trump is unhappy with Iran’s action, tweeting Thursday morning that “Iran made a very big mistake!” It’s also possible that Iran tried to
shoot down a second drone but missed, according to Fox News. There seems to be a pattern: Last week, the US military said Iran tried to
strike a US drone with a missile as well. This isn’t the first time Iran has taken out a US military drone. In 2011, for example, the
country brought down a US spy drone flying about 140 miles into the Islamic Republic’s territory, going so far as to show footage of it on
state television. The US, though, claimed the aircraft simply crashed. The difference now is that both sides agree a drone was forcibly
destroyed at a time when tensions are incredibly high between the US and Iran. The Trump administration accuses Iran of severely
damaging six oil tankers since May and having plans to attack Americans in the Middle East. Tehran, meanwhile, has threatened to no
longer abide by parts of the 2015 nuclear deal, which experts say is likely in an effort to get the US to remove tough sanctions on its
economy. The US withdrew from that agreement last year and reimposed financial penalties on the country. While Iran usually avoids a
direct conflict with America, Benham Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Washington think tank told me, in
this case “Tehran is gambling that Washington won’t respond forcibly here.” That bet might not pay off.

The biggest issue now “is how we maintain deterrence without risking full-fledged war,” a Pentagon official told me on the condition of
anonymity. “I don’t know if that’s possible in this heated environment.” The
Trump administration is preparing for
war According to the Washington Post on Wednesday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has delivered a private message to
Iran: The killing of just one US service member will lead to an American military response. No one
died in the drone attack — it’s a remotely piloted aircraft, after all — so the drone incident doesn’t cross Pompeo’s red line. But some US
officials worry this latest incident puts Washington and Tehran on a collision course. “Controlled escalation
between two old adversaries who don’t talk directly is tricky business. All variables point to war,” the Pentagon official told me, adding
that Trump’s “two top advisers are ready to start shooting and we in the department don’t have leadership.” The official was referring to
Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton, who many say are setting the scene for a fight with Iran.
A Politico report last week detailed how Bolton and members of his National Security Council staff are calling lower-level Pentagon
employees and inserting themselves into the chain of command. “Bolton is driving all things policy,” an unnamed former defense official
told Politico, a characterization the Defense Department rejects. That same Washington Post story notes how Bolton
“has
dominated Iran policy, keeping a tight rein on information that gets to the president and sharply reducing meetings in which top
officials gather in the White House’s Situation Room to discuss the policy.”

As for Pompeo, he met with Marine Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, the head of US troops in the Middle East, this week to discuss Iran. That’s unusual: That kind of
meeting is typically attended by the Pentagon boss, not America’s top diplomat. What’s more, he’s seemingly making the case that a 9/11-era law that
authorized the US military to fight al-Qaeda and its allies gives the current administration permission to fight Iran too. There is little public evidence, though,
that Tehran and the terrorist group actively work together. But even Pompeo is quick to point out that President Donald Trump doesn’t actually want a war
with Iran, which could mean the US won’t respond forcibly to the drone’s downing. “The only thing stopping [a war] is the preference of Trump not to get
involved in the region again,” the Pentagon official also told me. “But we all know he’s erratic and can change his mind easily.” The US on Tuesday said it
would send an additional 1,000 troops to the Middle East to counter Tehran, adding to the many thousands already in the region. It’s possible both sides find
a way out of the tit-for-tat escalation that has only grown in recent weeks. When I asked Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass if the US-Iran
standoff is a bona fide crisis, he said, “It could turn out to be, but for now it falls short of being a crisis. Much depends on whether the administration offers
Iran an offramp” — like a revised nuclear deal — “and then whether Iran takes it in exchange for some relief from sanctions.” But as long as Iran shoots
drones out of the sky and damages tankers while the US continues to impose sanctions, it’s likely that matters between the two countries
will get worse before they get better. “If it becomes a crisis,” Haass said, “it will have been one largely brought about by the administration.”
Afghanistan Relations DA
Core
 1NC

Strong relations and arm sales are key to Afghanistan counterterrorism and
stability
Nicholas A. Glavin 18, a MALD candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, 3-20-2018, "Sustaining U.S. Counterterrorism Pressure in Afghanistan", National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/sustaining-us-counterterrorism-pressure-
afghanistan-24999"
The United States has conducted sixteen years of counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan at a high-
operational tempo, which has helped to prevent a catastrophic terror attack from occurring on the
homeland. The last one occurred on September 11, 2001. However, in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, Al Qaeda has
focused on its regeneration, ISIS-Khorasan has become “operationally emergent,” and the Haqqani Network is now “externally enabled.”
The rise of these terror threats signals the need for improvements in U.S. counterterrorism
policy in Afghanistan . Within ten months of transitioning to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, U.S. Special Operations Forces
conducted a large-scale operation in the Shorabak District of the Kandahar Province, which was aimed at destroying two training camps
belonging to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. One of the training camps spanned thirty square miles.
The existence of these camps shows how rapid malign actors, such as Al Qaeda’s regional franchise, can exploit under-governed areas in
Afghanistan—even with a persistent U.S. presence in Kandahar. Thus, in an area
where as many as twenty terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan “creates the largest concentration of terrorist and
extremist organizations in the world,” sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure will prevent
violent extremist organizations like Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base from which to
plan terror attacks on the United States.
In such a volatile and complex security environment, the United States must have a credible host-nation
partner force that can target terrorist leaders, nodes and facilitators. This is a precondition to Secretary Mattis’s
vision of success in Afghanistan . The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are at the forefront of the fight to

deter armed groups’ exploitation of Afghan territory , conducting 80 percent of the Afghan National Army’s offensive
operations. As some experts postulate, it is “much cheaper for the United States and its allies to support [the ANDSF]
than it is to deploy large numbers of U.S. and other NATO soldiers.”

Simultaneously, given the pervasive instability and unpredictable turbulence in which violent extremist organizations thrive,
it is in the interest of the United States to maintain a high-end , albeit small, counterterrorism
capability to unilaterally address threat networks . Such an enduring security commitment would
signal to Islamabad that Pakistan need not prepare for a post–United States Afghanistan, diluting its
incentives to support armed groups that degrade the gains of NATO and the Afghan government.
Strengthening partners and weakening adversaries will lead to conditions that are ripe to
achieving and sustaining a politically acceptable end-state .

The plan ends aid to Afghanistan National Police forces

Luz Solano-Flórez 18, LLM from Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 6/12/18,
“ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF USING CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN”,
https://borgenproject.org/addressing-the-issue-of-using-child-soldiers-in-afghanistan/
Despite evidence of young boys participating in combat, the Taliban claims that to participate in military operations they have to prove
“mental and physical maturity.” Although
child soldiers in Afghanistan are mostly used by the Taliban, they
are also used by the Afghan National Police as cooks and guards at checkpoints. Parents often do not oppose this since
the boys could be the sole provider for their families.

Girls in the War

The number of girls considered to be child soldiers in Afghanistan is minimal. Danielle Bell, the head of the Human Rights Unit at the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, addressed this when she said, “In five years of monitoring and reporting, the U.N. has
verified one case of child recruitment of a girl who was a trained suicide bomber.” Although they are not trained as soldiers, girls are
often taken and forced into sex slavery for military groups.

The 2008 Child Soldiers Prevention Act prohibits the U.S. from giving military assistance to countries that use child soldiers. Jo Becker,
the children’s rights advocacy director at Human Rights Watch, has criticized the U.S. for ignoring child soldiers in Afghanistan, saying,
“The United States has paid hundreds of millions of dollars to support an Afghan militia that
recruits and uses children to fight the Taliban.” Using children for military combat is both a violation of international
law and a war crime and the United States government should take proper action against it.

They’re vital to fighting Afghani terrorist groups

Ali Ashraf 19, Professor of International Relations at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh Ph.D. in
public and international affairs from the University of Pittsburgh, 5/7/19, “The Global War on
Terrorism, Domestic Imperatives, and Paramilitary Police Units: Lessons from South Asia,”
https://icct.nl/publication/the-global-war-on-terrorism-domestic-imperatives-and-paramilitary-
police-units-lessons-from-south-asia/

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the newly established PPUshave a direct role in combating transnational
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, ISK, and the Taliban. In Afghanistan, PPUs are an integral
component of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). The ANSF was formed as part of the U.S.-
led coalition’s ‘transition’ strategy to indigenise the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations against both the foreign al-Qaeda militants and the local Taliban militias. After the
withdrawal of a large majority of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014, the ANSF, including its PPUs (e.g.
ANCOP [15,000 personnel] and GDPSU [1,000 personnel]), acquired a major role in combating al-Qaeda, the

Taliban, and the newly emerged ISK . The fight against al-Qaeda, IS, and their local affiliates has similarly driven the
growth of elite police units in several Pakistani provinces. In 2010, the Sindh province formed the SSU (3,000 personnel); in 2014, the
Punjab province established CTD (1,200 personnel), and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province created SCU (150 personnel). As
violent
extremism perpetrated by homegrown and transnational militant groups increases in Pakistan, these
newly formed PPUs have grown more visible in the country’s law enforcement landscape.

Global nuclear war

Rubin 11—Director of Policy and Government Affairs @ Ploughshares Fund [Joel Rubin (Former congressional aide for two
senior Democratic Senators on foreign policy, defense, and appropriations issues. Diplomat at the State Department in both Near Eastern
Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, “Nuclear Concerns After the Afghanistan Withdrawal,” Huffington Post, Posted: 07/07/11 12:26 PM
ET, pg. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html]

Yet many of the underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an
American withdrawal. In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran
bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States must take into account the
potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in
Afghanistan.¶
As much as we may like to, we
can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave
stable systems and relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional
tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear
security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. ¶

We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen
against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s
because we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan.¶

Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in the region for
the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to become to South and Central Asia
in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan . To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives
must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. ¶

First, current levels of regional

insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly
conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal.
These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering
Afghanistan must be part of this discussion.¶

Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan . While it is clear
that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still

essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode . We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study
Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact
while the United States moves out.¶

Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a
major security concern justifying our
continued involvement in the region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise
in importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to

prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons .¶ Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S.
must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent
potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as
happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set
off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange .¶

Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. The
key here is to leave in a way that
promotes regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts .
To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of
insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a
watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a
responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of
a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world .
Uniqueness/Links
 UQ---Relations High---2NC
Afghan relations strong now because of US strategic partnership and interests
in counterterror
Mohammad Naser Sidiqee 19, Development practitioner, observer of Afghan political history and
lecturer at Dunya University of Afghanistan, 5-28-2019, "Cooperation Between US and Afghanistan
Crucial for Bringing Peace", Globe Post, https://theglobepost.com/2019/05/28/afghanistan-us-
coorperation/
In a general sense, there are two areas of particular interest to the United States. First, the U.S. wants to ensure that
Afghanistan will never again become a haven for international terrorists – a crazy expectation of the
Taliban. Second, the U.S. wants to withdraw its troops from the country .
So far, the U.S.-led peace talks with the notorious Taliban have only provided the latter with
new political, military, and diplomatic relevance . The American approach has also failed to discredit the
insurgents and get them to agree to a ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue, which are the other two major components of the framework.
The United States’ failures to secure minimum concessions from the Taliban on matters of serious concern to the Afghan people mainly
stem from a lack of coordination with the Afghan government. The U.S. has been treating the Taliban and the Afghan
government, the conflict’s two main parties, in complete isolation from each other while presuming that
bringing the two antagonists to the negotiation table is likely to complicate the process further.
This has stirred debate between political figures and the public at large in Afghanistan. If the United States, even before concluding
the so-called Framework Agreement, have heretofore made a tremendous compromise by engaging in direct talks
with a terrorist movement, it must treat the Afghan government with equal gestures .
The Taliban, by engaging in these talks, are seeking to increase their own political relevance as well as undermine the legitimacy of the
Afghan government. If theUnited States cannot secure a commitment from the Taliban on a ceasefire, it
should at least create a synergy with the Afghan government that will leverage the effects of all
national and international formats into a coordinated, synchronized, and comprehensive peace effort.
Before the Peace Jirga, the U.S. and Afghan governments were struggling to gain access to the people’s considerations. The Peace Jirga changed this and gave
counsel to Afghan and U.S. officials while also giving hope to millions of Afghans who have lived through years of violence and destruction.

The demands and advice of the Afghan people, conveyed through the official 23-clause communique, appear to have created a synergy between all actors
without upsetting their natural balance. It cautions against regressing on the achievements of the post-2001 era, including the Afghan Constitution, the
Republican political system, and human rights while underscoring the possibility of constitutional amendments after a political settlement. It also calls for a
scheduled and responsible withdrawal of international troops. Such an outcome should serve as a vehicle of increased collaboration
between the U.S. and Afghan governments in their efforts to bring peace .
Need for Common Basis
Winning the trust and confidence of the Afghan people is of paramount importance if the United
States wants not just to end its longest war but also leave a noble legacy behind, at least this time. However,
the U.S. not only overlooked the significance of Loya Jirga but also seems to reprimand the Afghan government for hallmarking it as a
historic achievement of the Afghan people.

The Afghan government has listed its reservations with regards to the ongoing U.S.-led peace talks
with the Taliban. Referring to the “principally agreed upon framework,” the Afghan people are asking the U.S. and their own
government why the United States is discussing troops withdrawal with the Taliban while the country has signed both the Strategic
Partnership Agreement and Bilateral Security Agreement with the Afghan government. These two agreements were
primarily signed to not only allow the United States and NATO forces to maintain their
military presence in Afghanistan but also lay the foundations of a lasting counter-terrorism
strategy.
One can argue that thinking that the U.S. would uphold those two agreements is pure naivety. If the Donald J. Trump
administration can unhesitatingly and unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal,
abandoning these two agreements could happen at breakneck speed .
However, if the allied forces’ purpose in Afghanistan is to play the role of a key enabler of the Afghan
people and government to become an incontrovertible member of the global democratic
community, scrapping those agreements will at best have unexpected and at worst damaging
effects . Moreover, its impacts will likely be felt not only in the immediate future but also much further ahead in time.
One thing must be made very clear. Only the Afghan people and government can ensure the
sustainability of the nascent democratic institutions in Afghanistan , and the U.S. must enlarge
the circle of its ongoing talks with the Taliban to put their potentials to work.
 UQ---Using Child Soldiers---2NC
US provides military aid to groups that uses child soldiers in Afghanistan –
Afghan National Army, Afghan Local Police, and Afghan National Police
Lauren Chadwick 16, Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from Columbia University,
Scoville peace fellow at the Center for Public Integrity, “Afghan Forces Use Child Soldiers, and the
U.S. Still Gives Them Money”, 8/3/16, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/03/afghan-forces-use-
child-soldiers-and-the-u-s-still-gives-them-money/

Investigators for the United Nations found 48 child soldiers in Afghanistan last year, with more
than one-fourth working for government-backed forces such as the Afghan National Army and
the Afghan Local and National Police . But that news somehow never made an impact in Washington.
In an annual report released on June 30 that names 10 foreign countries known to use and recruit child soldiers, the U.S. State Department didn’t include
Afghanistan — a country with forces labeled as “persistent perpetrators” by the U.N. in a report issued just two months earlier.

The discrepancy is partly a matter of legal interpretation but mostly one mired in international politics, it turns out.

Countries that employ child soldiers in their armed forces are barred from receiving specific types of U.S. military assistance or weapons, under a U.S. law
enacted in 2008. But President Barack Obama’s administration says Afghanistan is not subject to the law because its Local Police force — which uses child
soldiers and experts say operates like a militia or paramilitary group — is not part of the armed forces.

This claim has allowed the U.S. Defense Department to give the Afghan Local Police a total of $ 470
million as of April 2015, according to a tally made by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. But nonprofit groups and
independent experts on Afghanistan and the use of children in armed conflict say the administration has misinterpreted the U.S. law or abused some
ambiguities in its text.

“Not including Afghanistan sends out the message that children who have been recruited by police forces deserve less protection,” said Charu Lata Hogg, an
associate fellow at the London-based Chatham House who has worked extensively on the issue of child soldiers. “More children are likely to be recruited and
used by militias than the military themselves.”

Even if the decision is not a violation of the law, it constitutes a breach of the “spirit of the law,” said Jo Becker, the children’s rights advocacy director at
Human Rights Watch in New York.

The law states that certain types of military assistance and armaments cannot flow to countries with “government-supported armed groups” that use child
soldiers. It also makes clear that these groups include “paramilitaries, militias, [and] civil defense forces.” The law does not explicitly mention police,
however. Child soldiers are defined as those under the age of 18 who are recruited by such groups to work as soldiers or perform other tasks, including
working as cooks or porters.

In 2015, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani signed a presidential decree criminalizing the recruitment of child soldiers, but the problem persists, experts say. In
2015, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani signed a presidential decree criminalizing the recruitment of child soldiers, but the problem persists, experts say. The
U.N. report, which included Afghanistan in a list of 14 countries that use and recruit child soldiers, noted that the number of verified cases last year was
double that in 2014. It said the majority
of the cases involved the Taliban and other armed groups, but five
children were in the Local Police, five in the National Police, and three in the National Army .

ANDSF uses child soldiers and uses US arms to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban
Rachel Stohl 16, Managing Director and directs Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program,
Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., consultant for Oxfam,
Project Ploughshares, SIPRI, the Small Arms Survey, and World Vision, served as a Scoville Fellow at
the British American Security Information Council in D.C., professor in the Security Studies Program
at Georgetown University, M.A. in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, B.A. in political science and German from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 6/30/16, “Afghanistan Missing from Obama Administration’s Annual Child Soldiers List”,
https://www.stimson.org/content/afghanistan-missing-obama-administration-annual-child-
soldiers-list
The omission of Afghanistan, however, is disappointing. Indeed, the use of child soldiers in Afghanistan spans across more than a decade
of war in the country, in which both the
United States and the United Nations have documented the use of
child soldiers in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including the Afghan
National Police, the Afghan Local Police, and the Afghan National Army . For example, the State
Department’s 2015 human rights practices country report for Afghanistan reported that ANDSF and pro-government
militias recruited and used children for military purposes. Although the Human Rights reports are not the only
source of information for the TIP report — which is compiled separately — the United States government has a track record of
recognizing the Afghan government as having recruited and used child soldiers. Additionally, the United Nation’s annual children in
armed conflict report revealed that “thirteen
verified recruitment cases were attributed to the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces: five to the Afghan Local Police; five to the Afghan National
Police; and three to the Afghan National Army” this year alone.
The 2016 TIP report, while acknowledging credible evidence of child soldier recruitment by the ALP in 2015 and 2016, does not list
Afghanistan on the CSPA list and claims that, “Although the ALP is a government security force in Afghanistan, it falls outside of the
armed forces of the country as defined by the CSPA.”

But this distinction is nebulous at best. Police forces in Afghanistan fill more than traditional police roles. Indeed, they are central players
in counter-terrorism operations and often take direct part in combat, conducting security operations akin to military operations and
sometimes fighting alongside regular armies. They often face similar, if not identical, experiences as that of the Afghan military, including
risks of attack by enemy forces.

Further, the CSPA covers governmental armed forces and government-supported armed groups — including paramilitaries, militias, or
civil defense forces – that recruit and use child soldiers. The term “including” is not limited to the groups described in the act. Thus, given
that the activities of the Afghan National Police/Afghan Local Police are similar to those undertaken by the Afghan military, it is wholly
appropriate for the Afghan Local Police to be covered by the CSPA.

The omission of Afghanistan has more to do with national security than human rights . Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan has been a national security priority for the United States. As the United States

seeks to support the Afghan government and its capabilities to fight insurgent groups such as al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, the administration has repeatedly placed its security interests over the plight of the most vulnerable.

Afghan security forces are recruiting and using child soldiers

U.S. Department of State 19, 6/20/19, “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan”,
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/afghanistan/
The Government of Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating some allegations of official complicity in trafficking, establishing five new Child
Protection Units (CPUs) to prevent the recruitment of children into the Afghan National Police (ANP), and partnering with an
international organization to finalize and publish standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification and referral to care.
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period. Afghan
security forces continued to unlawfully recruit and use child soldiers and exploit boys in bacha bazi with
impunity. Members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) reportedly
recruited boys specifically for bacha bazi by enticing them and by promising food and money. Authorities continued to
refer the majority of trafficking cases to mediation in lieu of criminal prosecution and penalized sex trafficking victims for “moral
crimes.” Sex trafficking victims reported prosecutors and judges solicited sexual favors from them while investigating their cases.
Officials conflated trafficking and smuggling, could not confidently identify trafficking victims, and relied on NGOs and foreign donors for
nearly all victim assistance. Therefore Afghanistan was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.
 Link---ANP K2 CT---2NC
ANP was armed and trained by the West to perform counterterror operations
Kelsey Smith 17, Associate Editor of the Observer Contributor Network, 11/21/17, “Law and
Order in Afghanistan—or Lack Thereof,” https://observer.com/2017/11/afghan-national-police-
focus-on-combatting-taliban-over-rule-of-law/
The Obama administration’s desire for complete U.S. troop withdrawal inadvertently cemented the
militarization of the Afghan National Police. As the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the
U.S. government’s leading oversight authority on Afghanistan reconstruction, reports, “ Under the U.S. counterinsurgency
strategy, the role of the ANP in security operations became more prominent… In this role, the ANP
served on the front line against heavily armed insurgents .” Serving as the “hold” function in the
U.S.’ “clear, hold and build” COIN strategy, the police were tasked with holding territory cleared by
U.S.-Afghan military operations.
Former commander of the International Security Assistance Force General John Allen, who led U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan
from 2011 to 2013, told Observer of the role of the police in counterinsurgency, “I wanted the army to be the leading edge, and I wanted
the Afghan police to be the trailing edge.”

This approach meant the West armed the Afghan National Police as light infantry, with AK-47s, light machine guns,
and military standard light combat vehicles, making them a fully paramilitary force . The police were then

stationed in remote posts, tasked with keeping terrorists at bay and stabilizing the area .
Internal Links
 I/L---Instability---2NC
Ending US aid in Afghanistan emboldens the Taliban -- exacerbates global
refugee crisis – instability spills over
James Dobbins 19, chair in Diplomacy and Security at the RAND Corporation, special assistant to
the president for the Western Hemisphere, special adviser to the president, 1/9/2019,
“Consequences of a Precipitous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan”, RAND Corporation,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE326/RAND_PE326.pdf
The Taliban Will Lose Interest in Negotiating Peace with the United States . The Taliban’s main goal in
recently energized talks with the United States is a negotiated timetable for a U.S. military withdrawal (Mashal, 2018). American
leaders want the Taliban to forswear ties with extremist groups, help deny such groups access to Afghan territory, and become
part of a new Afghan political and security architecture that is agreed upon among Afghans. If Taliban leaders
receive or come to expect a cost-free U.S. withdrawal, they will have little incentive to bargain with
the United States or with the U.S.-backed Afghan government.

The Taliban Will Extend Its Control over Territory and Population but Encounter Resistance The Taliban
will consolidate its hold on the rural, Pashtun dominated south and east; continue its current aggressive push into the non–majority-
Pashtun north and west of the country; and begin concerted efforts to take and hold urban areas, particularly
provincial capitals. U.S. air support, including American forward air controllers on the ground, has been critical in denying the
Taliban control of major population centers. As the Afghan national armed forces lose mobility, firepower, U.S.
air support, and cohesion, the population will increasingly look to local commanders and ethnic
and tribal ties for protection . The Taliban will look to press its advantage, both in traditional strongholds
and in non-Pashtun areas where the Taliban has invested effort recruiting over the past decade . The
growing strength of former president Hamid Karzai and his allies, which may include the Kandahar security apparatus of the recently
assassinated Abdul Raziq, could make the southeast and its gateway to Kabul a more contested area than the Taliban anticipates. On the
other hand, the splitting of Tajik and Uzbek communities by recent infighting and by the Taliban may
mean that the north and west are significantly more contested than in the past. Thus, the future map of political control may not precisely
resemble the ethnic map. A Taliban band of control may emerge that is pushed farther west than it has been historically, but that also
pushes up through the center of the country with growing pockets in the north. Likewise, there may be a Pashtun resistance to the
Afghanistan Will Descend into a Wider Civil War In the aftermath of a precipitous
Taliban in the southeast.
U.S. withdrawal and well before the Taliban could threaten the national capital, it is quite possible that a clash
would develop among non-Taliban elements for control of the capital. Between 1992 and 1996, in what became known as the Battle of
Kabul, the city was repeatedly besieged, bombarded, and fought over by multiple foreign-backed, heavily armed forces. Much of the city
was destroyed by shell fire, rockets, and bombs. In one month alone, 2,000 inhabitants were killed. As recently as 2014, an electoral
dispute occasioned an attempted coup d’é tat and nearly led to the emergence of two rival claimants to the presidency. One side was Tajik
dominated and the other Pashtun-dominated, and both had access to elements of the army and police. A
violent Well before the
Taliban could threaten the national capital, it is quite possible that a clash would develop among
non-Taliban elements for control of the capital.
schism was avoided only after the personal intervention of the U.S. President and Secretary of State ,
and there were then more than 30,000 American troops in the country. In the aftermath of the troop withdrawal, Kabul will not be the
only city to be contested. In such a multi-sided conflict, the
fighting will become more urban than rural , more stand-
and-fight than hit-and-run, and more reliant on heavy weaponry likely to cause civilian deaths and major
damage to basic infrastructure, much of it financed by the United States . No matter who ultimately
prevails in this wider civil war, the major advances that Afghans have achieved in democracy, press
freedom, human rights, women’s emancipation, literacy, longevity, and living standards will be rolled back
throughout the country. Civilian Deaths Will Rise Sharply, and Refugee Flows Will Increase Despite the ongoing war with the
Taliban, Afghanistan has not recently experienced significant levels of intercommunal violence and ethnic cleansing. A wider civil
war in Afghanistan will see a return to high levels of inter-ethnic violence redolent of the 1979–2002
period. Civilian deaths will spike, and refugee flows will increase significantly. This will , in turn,

exacerbate the global refugee crisis . In 1980, just after the Soviet invasion, the population of Afghanistan was 13
million. More than half this number fled the country during the ensuing anti-Soviet war and ended up mostly in Pakistan and Iran. Today,
the population of Afghanistan is three times larger than it was in 1980. Travel is cheaper, so more Afghans are able to afford it. Today’s
refugees are not stopping in poor neighboring countries but moving on to more- prosperous lands. Already, Afghans are the
second-largest source of refugees worldwide after Syria (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018).
As the security situation in Afghanistan worsens , these numbers could rise dramatically, further
threatening social cohesion and political stability in regions as far as Europe . Extremist
Groups, Including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, Will Gain Additional Scope to Organize, Recruit, and
Initiate Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Regional and Homeland Targets The Islamic State is active in Afghanistan, and so are
several other designated terrorist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. A widening civil war in

Afghanistan will create numerous seams between governed areas into which Al Qaeda and
the Islamic State can stream and even gain local control .

Strong relations are the only way to signal threats to fight instability and
maintain counterterror capability
Nicholas A. Glavin 18, a MALD candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, 3-20-2018, "Sustaining U.S. Counterterrorism Pressure in Afghanistan", National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/sustaining-us-counterterrorism-pressure-
afghanistan-24999"
The United States has conducted sixteen years of counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan at a high-
operational tempo, which has helped to prevent a catastrophic terror attack from occurring on the
homeland. The last one occurred on September 11, 2001. However, in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, Al Qaeda has
focused on its regeneration, ISIS-Khorasan has become “operationally emergent,” and the Haqqani Network is now “externally enabled.”
The rise of these terror threats signals the need for improvements in U.S. counterterrorism
policy in Afghanistan . Within ten months of transitioning to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, U.S. Special Operations Forces
conducted a large-scale operation in the Shorabak District of the Kandahar Province, which was aimed at destroying two training camps
belonging to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. One of the training camps spanned thirty square miles.
The existence of these camps shows how rapid malign actors, such as Al Qaeda’s regional franchise, can exploit under-governed areas in
Afghanistan—even with a persistent U.S. presence in Kandahar. Thus, in an area
where as many as twenty terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan “creates the largest concentration of terrorist and
extremist organizations in the world,” sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure will prevent
violent extremist organizations like Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base from which to
plan terror attacks on the United States.
In such a volatile and complex security environment, the United States must have a credible host-nation
partner force that can target terrorist leaders, nodes and facilitators. This is a precondition to Secretary Mattis’s
vision of success in Afghanistan . The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are at the forefront of the fight to

deter armed groups’ exploitation of Afghan territory , conducting 80 percent of the Afghan National Army’s offensive
operations. As some experts postulate, it is “much cheaper for the United States and its allies to support [the ANDSF]
than it is to deploy large numbers of U.S. and other NATO soldiers.”
Simultaneously, given the pervasive instability and unpredictable turbulence in which violent extremist organizations thrive,
it is in the interest of the United States to maintain a high-end , albeit small, counterterrorism
capability to unilaterally address threat networks . Such an enduring security commitment would
signal to Islamabad that Pakistan need not prepare for a post–United States Afghanistan, diluting its
incentives to support armed groups that degrade the gains of NATO and the Afghan government.
Strengthening partners and weakening adversaries will lead to conditions that are ripe to
achieving and sustaining a politically acceptable end-state .
 I/L---Internal Links---2NC
US arm sales helps fight the global war on terror---Sales to Afghanistan fuels
battles against terrorist organizations
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey 18, associate professor at the Schar School of Policy
and Government at George Mason University, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy", https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy

Few tools have been used in pursuit of so many foreign policy objectives as arms sales. The U nited S tates has sold weapons
to its NATO allies to ensure their ability to defend Western Europe; to friendly governments around the world facing
insurgencies and organized crime; to allies in the Pacific (buffering them against China’s rising military power); and to both Israel and
many of its Arab neighbors in efforts to maintain regional stability and influence over Middle Eastern affairs. The
U nited S tates
has used arms sales, as well as the threat of denying arms, in efforts to influence human rights policies, to help
end conflicts, to gain access to military bases, and to encourage fair elections. Since 9/11, the new central focus of U.S.
weapons sales has been to bolster the global war on terror .36

Despite their many uses, arms sales impact foreign affairs through two basic mechanisms. The first involves using
arms sales to shift the balance of power and capabilities between the recipient and its neighbors, thereby helping allies win
wars or deter adversaries, promote local and regional stability, or buttress friendly governments
against insurgencies and other internal challenges.37 During the Cold War, American arms sales became part of a broader
strategy to deter the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States sold weapons
to Afghanistan and Iraq to bolster their ability to defeat the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Islamic
State . By selling advanced weaponry to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, the United States hoped to balance rising Chinese
power and promote regional stability. Although the specific objectives differ, at root the causal mechanism is the same: using arms
sales to shift the balance of power in a direction more favorable to American interests.38
The second mechanism involves using arms sales to generate leverage over the conduct of other nations. As the producer of the
world’s most advanced and sought-after weaponry, the U nited S tates can dictate, at least to some degree,
the conditions under which it will agree to sell certain weapons.39 As Andrew Shapiro puts it, “When a
country acquires an advanced U.S. defense system, they are not simply buying a product to enhance their
security, they are also seeking a relationship with the U nited S tates… . This engagement helps build
bilateral ties and creates strong incentives for recipient countries to maintain good relations with the
U nited S tates.”40
American influence is thought to be most potent in cases where the United States provides a nation with a large share of its military
capabilities. In the wake of U.S. pressure to halt Israeli defense exports to China, for example, an Israeli official acknowledged, “If the
United States, which provides Israel with $2 billion in annual military aid, demands that we will not sell anything to China — then we
won’t. If the Americans decide we should not be selling arms to other countries as well — Israel will have no choice but to comply.”41

The United States has used arms sales to try to encourage states to vote with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro-
Western and pro-U.S. foreign policies, to convince Egypt and Israel to accept peace accords, and to gain access to military bases in places
such as Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and the Philippines. After the Cold War, the
United States also sought to tie
arms transfers to human rights and democratization efforts in client states.42
Arms sales remain attractive to presidents for three main reasons. First, arms sales are less risky than
sending American troops, providing explicit security guarantees to other nations, or initiating direct military intervention,
even long distance.43 In cases where allies or partners are likely to engage in conflicts with their neighbors, providing weapons
rather than stationing troops abroad can lessen the risk of American entrapment in crises or conflicts. Taiwan is an
example of this sort of arms-for-troops substitution. On the other hand, in instances where the United States has an interest in conflicts
already underway, arms sales can be used in attempts to achieve military objectives without putting American soldiers (or at least
putting fewer of them) in harm’s way. This tactic has been a central element of the American war on terror, with
sales (and outright transfers) of weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to support the fight against the Taliban,
al Qaeda, and ISIS , as well as to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen.44 In both situations the reduction of military risk, in
particular the risk of American casualties, also helps reduce the political risk. Presidents who would otherwise
abstain from supporting a nation if it entailed sending American troops can sell arms to that country without the political fallout that
sending America troops abroad would incur.

US pressure in Afghanistan key to counter terrorism – sustained presence and

adaptation to threats in territory, credible host nation partner, and cheaper than
troops
Nicholas A. Glavin 18, Program Officer at U.S. Department of State, Master of Arts in Law and
Diplomacy and International Security/International Law at Tufts University – The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, 3/20/18, “Sustaining U.S. Counterterrorism Pressure in Afghanistan”,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/sustaining-us-counterterrorism-pressure-afghanistan-24999

The United States has conducted sixteen years of counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan at a high-
operational tempo, which has helped to prevent a catastrophic terror attack from occurring on the
homeland. The last one occurred on September 11, 2001. However, in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, Al
Qaeda has focused on its regeneration, ISIS-Khorasan has become “operationally emergent,” and the
Haqqani Network is now “externally enabled.” The rise of these terror threats signals the need for
improvements in U.S. counterterrorism policy in Afghanistan. Within ten months of transitioning to Operation Freedom’s
Sentinel, U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a large-scale operation in the Shorabak District of the Kandahar Province, which was aimed at
destroying two training camps belonging to Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. One of the training camps spanned
thirty square miles. The existence of these camps shows how rapid malign actors, such as Al Qaeda’s regional franchise, can exploit under-
governed areas in Afghanistan—even with a persistent U.S. presence in Kandahar. Thus, in
an area where as many as twenty
terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan “creates the largest concentration of terrorist and
extremist organizations in the world,” sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure will prevent
violent extremist organizations like Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base from which to plan
terror attacks on the United States.

In such a volatile and complex security environment, the

United States must have a credible host-nation partner
force that can target terrorist leaders, nodes and facilitators. This is a precondition to Secretary Mattis’s vision of success
in Afghanistan. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are at the forefront of the fight to deter armed
groups’ exploitation of Afghan territory, conducting 80 percent of the Afghan National Army’s offensive
operations. As some experts postulate, it is “much cheaper for the United States and its allies to support
[the ANDSF ] than it is to deploy large numbers of U.S. and other NATO soldiers.”

Simultaneously, given the pervasive instability and unpredictable turbulence in which violent extremist organizations thrive, it
is in the
interest of the United States to maintain a high-end, albeit small, counterterrorism capability to
unilaterally address threat networks. Such an enduring security commitment would signal to Islamabad
that Pakistan need not prepare for a post–United States Afghanistan, diluting its incentives to support
armed groups that degrade the gains of NATO and the Afghan government . Strengthening partners and weakening
adversaries will lead to conditions that are ripe to achieving and sustaining a politically acceptable end-state.

However, regional actors may serve as spoilers with the aim of protecting national interests in Afghanistan and increasing the costs of the United
States’ extended presence. Reports of Moscow’s arming of the Afghan Taliban—purportedly under the guise of combating ISIS-Khorasan—add
fuel to the conflict. This strategy, a component of what the United States views as irregular warfare doctrine, seeks to “subvert, coerce, attrite, and
exhaust an adversary” as opposed to pursuing a defeat through conventional means. Similarly, Iran portrays the Afghan Taliban “not only as the
lesser of its enemies but also as a useful proxy force” to take advantage of a growing security vacuum. These state actors can exploit these
relationships as levers of influence by providing material support to the Taliban to pressure the United States and pursue their geopolitical
objectives.

The new U.S. strategy of “R4+S”—regionalize, realign, reinforce, and reconciliation, plus sustain—provides the best course of action to attain
Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s vision of “winning.” This vision relies on achieving a state of security in which the Afghan government, with
international help, could reduce violence to a point where “local security forces can handle it.” Maintaining
a persistent
counterterrorism platform within Afghanistan to support unilateral efforts and better enable the battle-
tested ASSF will lead to more effective counterterrorism operations. This effort will help create a
force nimble enough to adapt to emerging threats to U.S. interests and support host-nation efforts to
deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory. There are advantages to preventing terrorists from
establishing a safe haven to plot or direct attacks against the United States while at the same time
ensuring the survival of a non-Taliban government. Those advantages are worth the cost of maintaining
an enduring presence in Afghanistan, and those goals are attainable—but they will not come without consequence.

Arms sales are key to South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan to pressure peace
talks with the Taliban
DOD 19, U.S. Department of Defense, 7/12/19, “DOD Releases Report on Enhancing Security and
Stability in Afghanistan”, https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-
View/Article/1904051/dod-releases-report-on-enhancing-security-and-stability-in-afghanistan/

The principal goal of the South Asia Strategy is to conclude the war in Afghanistan on terms
favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. During this reporting period, the United States and
its partners used military force to drive the Taliban towards a durable and inclusive political
settlement. There have been some notable developments—the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
emerged from the most hard-fought winter campaign since 2002, the U.S. continues to engage in
“fight and talk” approach with the Taliban, and despite atypical levels of violence and heavy losses, ANDSF recruitment
and retention outpaced attrition for the first time in several reporting periods.

Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilizad remains

engaged in exploratory talks with the Taliban aimed at a settlement that reduces U.S. cost in
Afghanistan while safeguarding U.S. counterterror ism interests . Increased military pressure
on the Taliban, international calls for peace, and Khalilizad’s engagements appear to be driving the
Taliban to negotiations. Any durable peace settlement must include guarantees and mechanisms
that protect U.S. counterterrorism interests, a reduction in levels of violence, and an intra-Afghan
dialogue that leads to an inclusive political settlement and an understanding that the future
development relationship between the international community and the future Afghan
government, and a drawdown of foreign forces in Afghanistan.
The ANDSF remain in control of most of Afghanistan’s population centers and all of the provincial
capitals, while the Taliban continue control large portions of Afghanistan’s rural areas, and
continue to attack poorly defended government checkpoints and rural district centers. Terrorist
and insurgent groups continue to challenge Afghan, U.S. and coalition forces.
During the reporting period, the ANDSF increased operational tempo and reduced or consolidated checkpoints. The Afghan Special
Security Forces curbed misuse, met growth milestones, and increased the number of independent operations it conducted. Finally, the
Afghan government instituted a number of leadership changes that are helping them move the ANDSF towards becoming a more
professional force. However the
Afghan security forces will continue to require sustained train, advise and
assist efforts and financial support to overcome shortfalls.
Impact
 Nuke War Impact---2NC
Afghan instability causes nuclear war
Carafano 10 – James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage
Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in
Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2
http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-
wa/
We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget
that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets
saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in
Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America . They went on a conventional- and nuclear-
arms spending spree . They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several
times over . State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we
live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are t he world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in
the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear
war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their
nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and
technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own . The
resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With
multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe
in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war . The list goes on.
There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic
calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States.
Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the
United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny
EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

Afghanistan instability causes great power war

Michael Wesley 10, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, previously
Professor of International Relations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University,
and Visiting Fellow at the University of Hong Kong and Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, China,
2/25/10, “Stability in Afghanistan: Why it matters,”
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A-stable-Afghanistan-Why-we-should-
care.aspx?COLLCC=1623959933&

Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the
dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self-sufficient and more
vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations
getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting
national ruin.

This dynamic has changed the nature of strategic competition towards a competitive manipulation of
interdependence. Moscow, in that very Russian way, has made this explicit by trying to perpetuate Europe's reliance on Russian
gas. The flip side of Pax Americana is the threat of a crippling blockade against those with whom Washington is displeased.
The countervailing impulse is to try to reduce one's rivals' ability to manipulate one's own interdependence. Witness Europe's witless
attempts to construct an internal energy market, America's quest for energy independence, and China's decade-long diplomatic
campaign to avoid possible containment.

There are two regions that have become the focus of this strategic dynamic . Both are vital strategic
thoroughfares and resource basins. Both are shatter-zones of smaller, internally fragile states wedged among the Asian
giants. They are Central Asia and Southeast Asia. And given where they are located, the stability and
independence of these sub-regions is a global public good.

The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is
why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war,
intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own
efforts to exert influence and control.
China and Russia realised this danger in relation to Central Asia's northern tier in the mid-1990s and
eventually created the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The SCO is founded on a shared fear – the emergence of either Western-
leaning democracy or Muslim theocracy in the 'stans – and a shared hope – that Moscow and Beijing can mitigate their strategic
competition and collectively reap the gains from Central Asia's resource holdings while directing their strategic attention away from
their Central Asian frontiers.

But Central Asia's southern tier has benefited from no such clear thinking . Beijing's support for Pakistan has
kept India strategically bottled up under the Himalayas for decades, while Indo-Pakistani hostility has led Islamabad to seek strategic
depth in Afghanistan. India's response has been to try to deny that strategic depth, and China has every reason to try to block the recent
countermove by New Delhi into Afghanistan. This is a complex and dangerous dynamic made chronically unstable by its
cyclical structure.

To avoid the worst possible outcome , all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a
stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of
Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and
southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China
and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.
 Russia Deterrence I/L---2NC
NATO failure in Afghanistan destroys deterrence against Russia
Paul D. Miller 12, director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents
Bush and Obama, assistant professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense
University and director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the College of International
Security Affairs, March/April 2012, “It’s Not Just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region,”
World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-
qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region

A bad end in Afghanistan could have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, leaving the
organization’s future, and especially its credibility as a deterrent to Russia , in question. It would not
be irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that if NATO cannot make
tough decisions, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly, it cannot defend
Europe. The United States and Europe must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to
its operations in Afghanistan—one that both persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance
and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.

Nuclear war
Thomas Frear 14, Researcher at the European Leadership Network, previously held posts at the
Russian Institute of Oriental Studies and within the British Parliament; Łukasz Kulesa, Research
Director at the European Leadership Network; and Ian Kearns, co-Founder and Director of the
European Leadership Network, November 2014, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military
Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014,”
http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/files/2014/12/Dangerous-Brinkmanship.pdf
This mix of beefed-up military postures along the NATO-Russia border, more aggressive Russian
activities, and the readiness of Western forces to show resolve in the face of the challenge, is ripe with
potential for escalation . In the current environment, any incident that results in a loss of life or in
extensive damage to one side or the other would be likely to provoke a response involving an increased alert level, higher
tempo of military operations in border regions, or even direct punitive military action. This could feed a spiral of growing
tensions that may be difficult for any side to completely control or stop .
4. AVOIDING UNINTENTIONAL ESCALATION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The threat of escalation embedded in current developments needs a concerted crisis management response.
Recomendation 1: The Russian leadership should urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its more assertive military
posture, and Western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading Russia to move in this direction.

Russia should return to its pre-March 2014 patterns of behaviour. Some will argue that this is unlikely but the Russian leadership most
likely understands the prohibitive costs of a direct military conflict with NATO countries and has a strong interest in avoiding such a
direct confrontation, the end consequences of which could not be predicted.

Nevertheless, Russian leaders

currently seem to be assuming that Western countries would back off
from direct confrontation if an incident spirals out of control , and therefore Russia can continue with a more
assertive policy. This is an unwise assumption and a gamble at best.

Besides that, Russian actions have resulted so far in an unprecedented mobilization of NATO and adjustments of Swedish and Finnish
defence policy, contrary to any Russian expectations of appeasement. A key challenge for Western diplomacy now
therefore is to
combine clear red lines in relation to Russian behaviour, increases in NATO force deployments and a
strengthened deterrence posture, with efforts to persuade Russia to end its military posturing in its
own, as well as everyone else’s, national security interests.

This is all the more important because current crisis management arrangements are inadequate. The NATO-Russia Council has barely
met since the crisis in Ukraine erupted. Despite some phone contact between senior Russian and NATO military officials, there are also
currently few, if any effective exchanges of information on military deployments in the Euro-Atlantic area. EU-Russia crisis management
arrangements also do not exist.

While many have commented on the fact that we have entered a new period of confrontation in relations with Russia, few have
commented on the need for that confrontation to be managed or on the steps necessary to manage it.

In our view, a diplomatic dialogue with Russia about the danger of what is going on is vital. In addition, a number of additional crisis
management steps now need to be understood and operationalised, not only in Moscow, but across the Euro-Atlantic area. These include:

Recomendation 2: All sides should exercise military and political restraint

Civilian leaders in all of the countries concerned need to emphasise and continuously reiterate a default message of military restraint and
ensure that message runs right through the military chain of command. The NATO leadership specifically should make
sure that its procedures for handling incidents involving the Russian military and other agencies are
universally understood and interpreted throughout the Alliance and are guided by the principle of restraint and
adequate response . The less ambiguity there is in terms of rules of engagement, the better.
In addition, political leaders in the entire Euro-Atlantic area must remember that Ukraine is not the only potential flashpoint in Russia-
West relations. There are unresolved conflicts surrounding Moldova/Transdniestria; Georgia/South Ossetia/Abkhazia; and
Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. It is in no-ones interest that one or more of these should erupt. Political leaders in both
NATO and Russia must use all their influence to ensure none of the local actors involved take steps that could trigger a new wave of
escalation.

Recomendation 3: All sides must improve military-to-military communication and transparency

All sides should also make sure that reliable channels of communication exist at bilateral and NATO-Russia level to be used for rapid
communication in the event of a serious incident. These channels could be used to investigate the incident itself and to communicate to
the other side the nature and scope of measures being taken in response to it.

The overall level of predictability regarding armed forces’ activities in the border areas should also
be increased in order to reduce the current level of tensions . Both sides could and should expand on transparency
and confidence and security building measures agreed in the OSCE framework, such as those in the Vienna Document. It may also be
useful to begin work on a sub-regional regime for the Baltic Sea area, involving additional mechanisms for consultation in the case of
unusual military activities, information exchange on troop deployments and exercise schedules, inspections and evaluation visits, and
notification and observation of exercises.

Some will argue that these measures are difficult to see in the current political climate, but by taking them, political
leaders can take the fear and threat of a short warning military attack by one party on another off the table. The alternative is to
perpetuate a situation in which mistrust, fear and shortened leadership decision times characterise a
volatile standoff between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance . To perpetuate
that reality in the circumstances described in this report is risky at best . At worst it could prove catastrophic .
China Fill in DA
Core
 1NC
Russia and China seek influence in Iraq – only continued support prevents fill
in
Anthony H. Cordesman 19, professor of national security at Georgetown University,
2/12/2019, “The Strategy the U.S. Should Pursue in Iraq”,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategy-us-should-pursue-iraq

Russia will probably exploit any opportunity to gain influence in Iraq and weaken the U.S. position, and
is already competing with the U.S. to provide arms transfers to Iraq. SIPIRI estimates that Russia provided 20% of all Iraq arms
imports between 2012 and 2017 versus 57% from the U.S. (http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php), and the CRS reports that Russia has discussed much larger sales
– many of which would require Russian in-country support (CRS R44984).

The newU.S. National Security Strategy issued in 2017 and 2018 calls for a U.S. focus on the threat from
both Russia and China, and Arab sources indicate that China has already become more active in
seeking to expand its influence in Iraq. Even some Iraqis who do support strong ties to the U.S. already see Russia and
China as ways of countering over-dependence on the U.S.
The Challenge of Creating Iraqi Security and the Defeat of the ISIS "Caliphate"

Given this background, the United States must be prepared to deal simultaneously with both
Iraq's ongoing security problems, and its equally deep problems in politics, governance, and
economics. In the case of security, U.S. strategy cannot be based on the assumption that breaking up the ISIS "Caliphate" has provided Iraq
with real security, and effective military and internal security forces.

Iraq has made serious progress since the near collapse of its forces during the initial phase of the ISIS invasion. However, it remains a weak
military power by regional standards, and one with uncertain internal unity and internal security
capacity. It could only defeat the ISIS "Caliphate" with massive support from U.S. and coalition
airpower and direct "train and assist" support from U.S. forces aiding its land combat units – along with the support of Shi'ite
popular militias – many of which had support from Iran.

Ending arms sales causes Russia and China fill in – that hurts U.S interests and
leadership
U.S Fed News 19, 6/13/19 “SASC CHAIRMAN INHOFE SPEAKS ON THE FLOOR AGAINST JOINT
RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL REGARDING ARMS SALES TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR”, US Fed
News
These two Arabian Peninsula states are important American partners in countering Iran and
combating ISIS, among other terrorist groups.
Bahrain hosts about 7,000 U.S. personnel, as well as the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. personnel, as well as the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid
Air Base.
Through these arms sales, we can improve cooperation, enhance interoperability and help our
partners defend themselves and American troops in the region.
But more important, if we renege on these arms sales, we will undermine the National Defense
Strategy, which has strong, bipartisan support.
Recall that the top NDS priority is competing with Russia and China, which seek to undermine
U.S. interests by coming between us and our long-standing partners.
So make no mistake: if our partners can't rely on us for their defensive needs, they will look
towards Russia and China.
So I ask my colleagues who support this resolution: Do you expect Russia and China to ensure the
freedom of navigation in the Middle East against Iranian threats? Will Russia and China lead the
coalition that defeated ISIS? Will Russia and China deter Iran from attacking our partners and
troops in this region?

Any China rise will result in great power war

Tellis 14 [Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without
Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,”
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf]
This transition will not occur automatically if China’s GNP one day exceeds that of the United States. Rather, the
threat of supersession will be more gradual as continuing Chinese economic growth—at levels superior to
the expansion occurring in the United States— steadily enables Beijing to acquire all the other accoutrements
that make for comprehensive national power. On current trends, China will consistently accumulate
these capabilities over the next two decades. It certainly aims to do so, at the latest, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding
of the People’s Republic of China and the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared China’s intention to become a fully
developed nation. Acquiring the appropriate foundations of power will position China to achieve, first, strategic
equivalence with the United States, thus transforming the international system into a meaningfully bipolar
order. Then, depending on Beijing’s own fortunes, China may possibly surpass Washington as the center of gravity in
international politics. Irrespective of which outcome occurs—or when—either eventuality would by

definition signal the demise of the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the
Second World War. Even if during this process a power transition in the strict vocabulary of realist
international relations theory is avoided—a possibility because China’s per capita income will lag behind that of the
United States for a long time even if it acquires the world’s largest GNP— Beijing’s capacity to challenge Washington’s
interests in multiple arenas, ranging from geopolitics to trade and from advancing human rights to protecting the
commons, will only increase as its power expands. In other words, China will demonstrate how a rival
can, as Thomas J. Christensen phrased it, “[pose] problems without catching up.”8 As Avery Goldstein has persuasively
argued, these hazards could materialize rather quickly because China is currently pursuing

provocative policies on territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas .9

That these disputes, which a former U.S. official described as involving “uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks,”10 do not
appear prima facie to implicate a systemic crisis should not be reassuring to the United States because
every serious contestation that occurs in future Sino-American relations will materialize against the
backdrop of a possible power transition so long as China’s growth rates —even when diminishing—
continue to exceed those of the U nited S tates. This dynamic, as William R. Thompson has pointed out, can
produce extended “crisis slides” in which even “relatively trivial incidents or a string of seemingly minor
crises” may suffice to escalate what was up to that point a precarious structural transformation into

full-fledged geopolitical polarization and major war .11 Since the relative disparity in Sino-
American economic performance is likely to persist for quite some time, even trifling quarrels will push
bilateral ties ever more concertedly in the direction of greater abrasion as accumulating Chinese power further
constrains U.S. freedom of action.
UQ
 UQ---US Ahead---2NC
Chinese arms sales are growing now but it is not yet dominating
Ron Matthews et al 17, Ron Matthews is Chair of Defence Economics at the Centre for Defence
Management and Leadership, Cranfield University and the Defence Academy of the United
Kingdom, 9/27/17 “Why the World Should Fear China's Military (Exports)”, The National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-world-should-fear-chinas-military-exports-
22494
Chinese arms sales are growing. Across 2012–16, they accounted for 6.2 per cent of the global arms
trade, up by an impressive 74 per cent compared to 2007–11. In fact, over 2012–16, China’s arms
exports raced ahead of those from Germany, France and the United Kingdom, making China the
world’s third biggest arms exporter.
This is not a short-term aberration, but a long-term trend. Between 2000 and 2015, Chinese arms
exports expanded by a factor of 6.5. In 2016, China shipped US$2.1 billion in arms, marginally
behind France’s US$2.2 billion, but well ahead of the United Kingdom’s US$1.4 billion. While China’s
2016 market share is well below that of the United States at 33 per cent, the gap is gradually closing
with Russia (23 per cent), and has disappeared altogether with France (6 per cent), Germany (5.6
per cent) and the United Kingdom (4.6 per cent).
China’s arms exports have been criticised for lacking global appeal since 72 per cent of all exports
in the last five years went to just three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Yet, this
criticism is unfair. Such dependence on a few core customers affects both mature and ‘new entrant’
arms exporters alike.
Russia was the world’s second biggest arms exporter across 2012–16 but relied on just four
countries — India, Vietnam, China and Algeria — for 70 per cent of those sales. Likewise, 71 per
cent of UK arms exports go to India, the United States and Saudi Arabia (which alone accounted for
half of all UK sales across 2010–15).
Detractors argue that China’s weapons are only attractive to poorer nations because its older
weapons are cheaper. While there is some truth in this argument, it needs qualification. China has
been successful in diversifying its customer base and now exports arms to 55 countries worldwide,
covering Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Many of China’s clients are indeed
developing countries. For example, two-thirds of the countries situated in the world’s poorest
continent, Africa, procure weapon systems from China, and much of it is basic military equipment.
But times are changing. Chinese arms are no longer relics from a bygone Soviet era. The PLA has
been replacing old Soviet platforms with improved ‘indigenous’ models and is now exporting
modernised platforms, including Type-99 MBTs, J-10 fighters and Yuan-class submarines to
Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
China has also adapted, innovated and engaged in systems integration in a determined bid to move
up the technology ladder, developing, for instance, credible and competitive unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and anti-ship cruise missiles. Raised technological sophistication combined with
relatively low procurement cost has led to increasingly cost-effective arms exports. Their
attractiveness to more discerning buyers has been translated into a sales portfolio in which 25 per
cent of China’s customers are now positioned in the upper middle/higher income country
categories, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
 UQ---Brink Now---2NC
Iraq is still buying from the U.S now, but it is looking to diversify if dissatisfied
with the U.S – empirics prove
Clayton Thomas 17, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, 10/11/17, “Arms Sales in the
Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy”, Congressional
Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf
Since 2011, the United States has proposed more than $28 billion in foreign military sales to Iraq, including a $2.3 billion sale of 18 F-16s in 2011 and a $4.8 billion sale of 24 Apache
helicopters in 2014 that has not been implemented.77 Sales continued after the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da’esh) swept into northern Iraq in

While Iraq has

July 2014, with $2.4 billion for 175 Abrams tanks proposed in December 2014 and nearly $2 billion for F-16 munitions in January 2016.

purchased major weapons systems from the United States, it has also periodically shown an
interest in diversifying the sources from which it obtains arms. Iraq has finalized major arms
purchases from smaller suppliers, such as South Korea and the Czech Republic, and has a considerable amount of
Russian-origin equipment, a legacy of its past supply relationship with the Soviet Union. A $4.2 billion arms deal between Iraq and Russia was announced in
October 2012 but was reportedly put on hold a few weeks later,78 but one component of the deal, an order of Mi-28 Havoc “Night Hunter” attack helicopters, has actually been

Details of a potential $2.5 billion deal with China, first reported in late
delivered and is in use against IS forces.79

2016, for the HQ-9 air defense system (among other orders) have not been officially clarified.80
73 Florence Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies,” European Union Institute for Security Studies,
Chaillot Paper No. 141, March 2017

74 Theodore Karasik and Adam Dempsey, “UAE Struggling to Build World Class Defense Industry?” Lexington Institute, April 26, 2017.

75 Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “The UAE’s Defense Horizons,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2, 2017. 76 Aidan Lewis, “Covert Emirati support
gave East Libyan air power key boost: U.N. report,” Reuters, June 9, 2017.

77 Figure calculated from DSCA Major Arms Sales Archives.

78 Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq scraps $4.2 billion Russian arms deal, cites graft,” Reuters, November 10, 2012.

79 “Iraq Receives Final Mi-28 NE Military Helicopters From Russia,” The Moscow Times, June 29, 2016.
Congressional Research Service 16 first reported in late 2016, for the HQ-9 air defense system (among other orders) have not been officially clarified.80

in February 2014, it was reported that Iraq had agreed, in November 2013, to purchase approximately $200 million
worth of weapons (including mortars, ammunition, and light and medium arms) from Iran, allegedly spurred by frustration
on the part of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki about the slow pace of deliveries from the United States. Some
observers viewed the deal, which appeared to violate a then-operative U.N. ban on the sale of Iranian weapons to
any other state (UNSCR 1747), as both a message to the United States and a bid for greater support from
Iran.81 Iraqi officials have acknowledged and welcomed Iranian military assistance and advice to their national security forces since 2014, likening
Iranian support to support received from other foreign parties, including the United States. Iran is also widely-believed to be supplying some Shia militias
fighting the Islamic State alongside Iraqi forces, including some forces of concern to Iraqi national government officials and the United States.
Link
 Link---Fill In---2NC
U.S disengagement from the Middle East allows China rise – trying now
Michael Singh 18, Michael Singh is the Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and managing director at The
Washington Institute, June-July 2018, “China in the Middle East: Following in American Footsteps?”,
Washington Institute,https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/china-in-the-
middle-east-following-in-american-footsteps
China’s mounting involvement in the Middle East has been less ostentatious than Russia’s, yet is likely to be more significant in the long run. As
China’s economy has grown, so have its economic interests in the Middle East, which for Beijing is a
source of energy and investment, as well as a destination for Chinese capital and workers.
Beijing has dispatched naval
Following the well-trod pattern of emerging powers, Chinese diplomats and soldiers have followed in the wake of its merchants.

forces to protect trade routes and to evacuate citizens caught amid regional strife, as well as special
envoys for Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other issues to ensure China’s place at the
diplomatic table. American disillusionment and disengagement from the region and the resulting
vacuum in international leadership has arguably increased both the urgency and appeal of
these activities for Chinese leaders.
Chinese and American interests in the Middle East are strikingly similar. The states of the Persian Gulf supply China with a significant portion of its imported oil and natural gas, a
dependency that is likely to grow in coming years. The United States, in contrast, has become increasingly self-sufficient with respect to its energy supply; however, global energy
prices and thus the global economy remain susceptible to shocks originating in the region, and US allies in Asia and elsewhere are critically dependent on Middle Eastern supplies.
Likewise, both the United States and China have been the victim of terrorist attacks directed or inspired by groups based in the Middle East and have sought to address the problem at
its source. For the United States, this has meant a campaign of counter-terrorism operations alongside diplomatic and economic pressure targeting states that sponsor terrorist
groups. Beijing for its part has sought cooperation with the Syrian government regarding foreign fighters from its Uyghur minority.

These overlapping interests and a common desire to foster regional stability have not, however, resulted in any strategic convergence between the US and China. Gone are the days of

While the US has

Chinese support for guerrilla movements like Yasser Arafat’s PLO, yet wide gaps remain in the American and Chinese approaches to the region.

intervened proactively in the region, both militarily and politically to bolster friendly governments, promote democratic and pro-market reform, and
counter threats to American interests, Beijing has striven to secure smooth diplomatic relations with just about all

governments of the region, even those otherwise ostracised by the community of nations. This
tendency, combined with a reflexive opposition to the assertion of American power in global affairs,
has given China a broad set of shallow relationships, and has positioned it, intentionally or not, as the defender of regimes such as
that of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Yet just as the United States’ strategy is shifting, so too is China’s. As

its economic and political profile in the region has
grown, China has tried harder to exercise leadership—convening diplomatic conferences on
issues like Syria and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and has increasingly taken sides in the Middle
East’s disputes. As elsewhere, it has also fostered deep economic ties and embedded itself in the
region’s critical infrastructure. Beijing’s main ally is shaping up to be Iran, which not only offers potential access
by land to the region’s energy supplies, but is the only state on the Gulf littoral not locked into a security relationship with Washington.

Thus far, American concern regarding China-Iran cooperation has focused on the threats posed by the
latter—Chinese assistance for Iran’s nuclear and missile programme, for example. But with an
increasing focus on inter-state strategic competition, it is possible that this concern will grow to
encompass the ways in which Iran facilitates Chinese efforts to out-compete the United States
globally. This, in turn, feeds into the American perception that there exists a global bloc of revisionist
states determined to weaken the US-led international order.
How US policy in the Middle East will shift as a result of mounting global great power competition remains uncertain. American fatigue with the Middle East
and competing priorities elsewhere might tempt US policymakers to continue to disengage
from the region, leaving regional
powers to shoulder greater burdens and external actors to seize further opportunities. Amid
increasing great power rivalry, however, concerns about ceding strategic ground to China and others may grow
to outweigh any stratagem of burden-shifting.
Ending US arms sales guarantees fill-in
Brett McGurk 13, US deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran, 11/13/2013, “U.S. Foreign Policy
Toward Iraq”, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/217546.htm
Time may not be on our side. Iraq has acute demands, money to supply those demands, and while it prefers
U.S. equipment and the multi-decade relationship that comes with our foreign military sales program,
strategic competitors are now lining up to meet Iraqi demands if we cannot deliver. Case in point is the
delivery earlier this month of four Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters. We believe that it is in America’s strategic interest to
supply military systems to Iraq, as opposed to Russia or other competitors, and we look forward to working with
Congress to address all outstanding questions with respect to foreign military sales.
 China Arms Sales Key
Increasing Chinese arms sales increase their influence---part of their endgame
strategy
Ron Matthews et al 17, Ron Matthews is Chair of Defence Economics at the Centre for Defence
Management and Leadership, Cranfield University and the Defence Academy of the United
Kingdom, 9/27/17 “Why the World Should Fear China's Military (Exports)”, The National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-world-should-fear-chinas-military-exports-
22494
Is there something different, something special, that distinguishes China’s arms export strategy
from its Western counterparts? The answer is a resounding yes. First and foremost, Western
strategists should not be under any illusion that export revenue is the primary goal. Rather,
Beijing’s end-game is longer-term geo-political and strategic influence. The search for regional and
global influence is the critical aim of Chinese economic diplomacy. It reflects a more narrowly
focused aspect of Beijing’s soft power framework, embracing foreign aid, foreign direct investment,
overseas educational programs and, importantly, arms sales.
China’s arms export model operates according to a carefully-crafted strategy based on three
principles: promoting the legitimate self-defence capability of the recipient country; strengthening
the peace, security and stability of that country and region; and non-interference in its internal
affairs.
Beijing’s long-standing approach of linking non-interference to arms sales rests on the view that a
customer’s political, military and human rights record lies outside the contractual arrangements.
The ‘no questions asked’ policy attracts the opprobrium of Western states, but there is no disputing
its effectiveness in selling guns and securing influence. The policy particularly appeals to second-
and third-tier military states suffering excessive dependence on US or Russian weaponry. Chinese
arms offer poorer states the opportunity to diversify arms sources, regain a degree of sovereignty
over military capability and reduce strategic vulnerability to arms embargoes.
The Chinese arms export model has several other significant features. From a Chinese strategic
perspective, it leverages strong client-state relationships and in the process bolsters Beijing’s
influence, particularly among neighbouring states. It is no accident that China’s arms sales to
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar indirectly act to contain the potential threat of Asia’s
other mega-power, India. Chinese arms are also competitively packaged. Pricing is low compared to
Western models. Chinese drones, for example, reportedly cost 10–20 per cent of the near-
equivalent US version. Finally, China is amenable to technology transfer through defence offset,
supporting client states to indigenise maintenance, repair and overhaul activities and even produce
components.
While it may not yet be the dominant player, China’s arms export strategy has proved effective in
taking market share from competitor nations. China has also begun to encroach into higher income
markets, especially where technological sophistication is not required. There is a long-term
strategy at work here, driven by diplomatic and geostrategic objectives, not commercial gain.
Impacts
 Impact---US China War---2NC
A rising China would result in a U.S-China war
Jonathan Broder 16, Jonathan Broder writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from
Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades, including 12
years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before moving to Washington,
Broder spent 20 years as an award-winning foreign correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia,
China and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press. Broder’s writing also has
appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post and Smithsonian magazine. He's
a frequent commentator on foreign affairs for NPR and Al Arabiya TV, 6/22/16, “THE 'INEVITABLE
WAR' BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA”, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-
war-nuclear-submarines-china-united-states-barack-obama-xi-473428
Though little talked about in the West, many
Chinese officials have long felt that war between Washington and
Beijing is inevitable. A rising power, the thinking goes, will always challenge a dominant one. Of course,
some analysts dismiss this idea; the costs of such a conflict would be too high, and the U.S., which is far stronger militarily, would almost certainly win. Yet
history is riddled with wars that appeared to make no sense.

conditions
Today, the maritime dispute between the U.S. and China has become the most contentious issue in their complex relationship, and
seem ripe for a military clash between the two countries: This summer, an international court will rule on a Philippine
challenge to China's claim to the disputed waterway, and for the first time, Beijing appears poised to send nuclear-armed
submarines into the South China Sea.
On one level, the dispute is about territory. Beijing insists that nearly the entire sea—from its islands, reefs and submerged rocks to its fish and underwater energy reserves—
historically belongs to China. The U.S., however, regards the South China Sea as international waters—at least until rival claims by several neighboring countries can be resolved. Until
then, Washington contends, only the U.S Navy can be trusted to ensure freedom of navigation in those waters, which include some of the world's most important shipping lanes.

The larger conflict, however, revolves around China's emergence as a major regional power and
America's insistence on policing the Pacific. It also involves the system of international rules and
institutions that Washington and its allies crafted after World War II. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly complained this
system favors America and prevents Beijing from taking its rightful place as the dominant power in
Asia. And at a time when China's economy is slowing, Xi is under increased pressure at home to
find other ways to demonstrate China's advances under his leadership. A clear reassertion of Beijing's control over the South
China Sea after more than a century of foreign domination would do just that. Failure to do so, however, analysts say, could threaten Xi's grip on power.

China says its claim to the South China Sea dates back thousands of years. But historians date the modern dispute back to about 130 years ago, when various European countries took
over the waterway. Over the next century, the sea formed part of French Indochina, then Japan's Pacific empire, and after World War II, the U.S. Navy acted as its caretaker. But in the
1970s, oil and gas deposits were discovered under the sea bed, prompting the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan to stake their own claims to the region. Those
countries have since seized 45 islands. Since 2012, China has occupied seven shoals and, through land reclamation operations, turned them into man-made islands with landing strips
and missile defenses.

"History matters," says Fu Ying, a former ambassador to Britain and now spokeswoman for the National People's Congress, China's parliament. In recounting China's litany of foreign
invasions, beginning in the 1840s with Britain's seizure of Hong Kong and ending with Japan's brutal occupation of China before and during World War II, she notes that the Chinese
remain acutely aware of the country's past humiliation. "The people won't tolerate it if we lose territory yet again," says Fu. "We've lost enough."

Wary of an armed conflict, U.S. President Barack Obama has responded by quietly permitting Beijing to operate in the South China Sea while building up military and economic
relations with China's neighbors in hopes of weakening its influence. And despite the administration's repeated vows to sail continuously through the disputed waters, it has mostly
avoided them. "We've done a lot sailing in the South China Sea but in areas that aren't claimed by anybody," says Bryan Clark, a retired Navy veteran who last served as a special
assistant to the chief of naval operations.

Critics of Obama, including Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, say such nonintrusive voyages easily could be construed as acknowledgement that China has a valid claim.
McCain and others have called on Obama to get tougher with Beijing and conduct more aggressive operations in the disputed waters.

China's neighbors, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, have also urged Obama to be more aggressive, and they've offered U.S. forces the use of their bases. But there's a limit to how
far they want Washington to go. While they may resent Beijing's bullying, China is their largest trading partner and a major source of funding for infrastructure projects such as roads,
railways and ports. Bilahari Kausikan, a senior Singaporean diplomat, notes that small Southeast Asian countries must navigate a path between China and the United States by
constantly playing one against the other, hedging their bets and sometimes deferring to Washington or Beijing. "We see nothing contradictory in pursuing all...[of these] courses of
action simultaneously," he says.

The Obama administration is bracing for trouble this summer when an international court in the Hague rules on the Philippine challenge to China's claim to the South China Sea. The
ruling is expected to go against Beijing, which has declared it won't accept any decision from the court. China says it's willing to talk one-on-one with the Philippines, as well as with
the other countries with rival claims—a position that would give Beijing a clear advantage over its smaller neighbors. The U.S. wants China to negotiate with these claimants
collectively, and Beijing has told Washington to butt out. "Our view is the U.S. is stoking the dispute and using it to bring its forces back the Pacific," said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Liu Zhenmin during a meeting with a small group of visiting American and British reporters in May.
For U.S. officials, the big question is how China will react to an unfavorable ruling. Some fear Beijing will step up its land reclamation operations. Others worry it will restrict the air
space over the South China Sea and begin intercepting unidentified aircraft—a policy that would force it to confront the U.S.'s spy flights. Or they could do something even more
provocative. "The [Chinese] military is urging the leadership to put it in fifth gear, step on the gas and give the finger to the world," says a U.S. official, asking for anonymity under
diplomatic protocol.

Obama has warned Xi that such measures would prompt a substantial American response, including military action. Some regional experts say Beijing may counter an unfavorable
ruling with tough rhetoric to mollify people at home, but take no actions before September, when China hosts the G-20 summit.

But once that gathering is over, the dispute could become much more volatile. U.S. officials are particularly worried about a Chinese
plan to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South China Sea for the first time.
Chinese military officials argue the submarine patrols are needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans
to station a defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from both North Korea and China, and the Pentagon's development of

ballistic missiles with new hypersonic warheads that can strike targets anywhere in the world in
less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese military officials say, these American weapons threaten to neutralize China's
land-based nuclear arsenal, leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for
any nuclear attack.
The implications would be enormous. Until now, China's nuclear deterrent has centered on its land-based missiles, which are kept
without fuel and remain separate from their nuclear warheads. That means the country's political leadership must give several orders before the missiles are
fueled, armed and ready to launch, giving everyone time to reconsider. Nuclear missiles on a submarine are always armed
and ready.
 China Fill-in !---Turns HR
Chinese sales will be worse for human rights---arms sales allow them to
increase influence
Steven Aftergood 5/3/19, directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, "Rising China Sells
More Weapons”, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/china-weapons/
“In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s fastest-growing arms supplier
during the past 15 years,” according to the 2019 China Military Power report published by the Department of Defense. “From 2013
through 2017, China was the world’s fourth-largest arms supplier, completing more than $25 billion worth of arms sales.” “Arms
transfers also are a component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of military, economic
aid, and development assistance to support broader foreign policy goals,” the Pentagon report said . “These include securing
access to natural resources and export markets, promoting political influence among host
country elites, and building support in international forums.” Needless to say, the U nited S tates and other countries
have long done the same thing, using arms exports as an instrument of foreign policy and political
influence. Up to a point, however, US arms sales are regulated by laws that include human rights
and other considerations. See U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, CRS In
Focus, May 2, 2019. To assist soldiers in identifying Chinese weapons in the field, the US Army has produced a deck of “playing cards”
featuring various weapons systems. “The Worldwide Equipment Identification Playing Cards enable Soldiers to be able to readily identify
enemy equipment and distinguish the equipment from friendly forces. Cards can be used at every level and across all services.” See
Worldwide Equipment Identification Cards: China Edition, US Army TRADOC, April 2019.

CCP policy influence leads to atrocities---abuses in Tibet prove

Kenneth Roth 19, executive director for human rights watch and federal prosecutor in New York
and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC., "World Report 2019: Rights Trends in
China", Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-
and-tibet

Authorities dramatically stepped up repression and systematic abuses against the 13 million
Turkic Muslims, including Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs, in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. Authorities have carried out
mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment of some of them in various detention facilities, and
increasingly imposed pervasive controls on daily life. New regulations in Tibet now criminalize even traditional
forms of social action, including community mediation by religious figures . In Hong Kong, a region promised
“a high degree of autonomy” under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments hastened their efforts in
2018 to undermine people’s rights to free speech and political participation. Human rights defenders continue to endure
arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and enforced disappearance . The government maintains
tight control over the internet , mass media, and academia. Authorities stepped up their persecution of
religious communities, including prohibitions on Islam in Xinjiang, suppression of Christians in Henan province, and increasing
scrutiny of Hui Muslims in Ningxia. Authorities increasingly deploy mass surveillance systems to tighten control
over society. In 2018, the government continued to collect, on a mass scale, biometrics including DNA and voice samples; use such
biometrics for automated surveillance purposes; develop a nationwide reward and punishment system known as the “social credit
system”; and develop and apply “big data” policing programs aimed at preventing dissent. All
of these systems are being
deployed without effective privacy protections in law or in practice, and often people are unaware
that their data is being gathered, or how it is used or stored. In 2018, animated by the global #MeToo movement, a
number of Chinese women stepped forward exposing people who they said had sexually harassed

them. Government censorship dampened subsequent public outrage.

 China Fill-in = Heg
China will fill any American vacuum---that guarantees their hegemony
Zhifan Luo 17 - University at Albany-SUNY, "Intrastate Dynamics in the Context of Hegemonic
Decline: A Case Study of China's Arms Transfer Regime," Journal of World - Systems Research;
Pittsburgh Vol. 23, Iss. 1, (2017): 36-61. DOI:10.5195/JWSR.2017.600
Although not necessarily agreeing with Arrighi's argument that China is the most likely hegemon-in-waiting, this paper does view China as a lesser power
that could compete for influence in an opening created by U.S. decline. But is this currently happening? If so, how is China accomplishing this? Or, if it is a
future possibility, what future plans could make this a reality? Many authors have attempted to answer these questions (e.g. Swaine, Daly, and Greenwood
2000; Goldstein, A. 2003, 2005; Hung 2008, 2014). This paper contributes to this ongoing debate by examining China's arms transfer activities from a
historical perspective. I argue that the way in which China
uses arms transfer has evolved through three phases,
reflecting changes in its grand strategy from a nationally-focused agenda to a globally-focused
one. Specifically, in Phase One, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, China used gifts of arms to compete
with the Soviet Union and to expand influence among Third World countries. Limited within the periphery
and semi-periphery of the world system (Wallerstein 2010), this strategy was mainly driven by the newly-born regime's concern over its relative isolation.
In Phase Two, between the late 1970s and the end of the 1990s, China retreated from this strategy and used arms exports mainly to assist national
developmental projects. Onlyin Phase Three, beginning in the 2000s, does evidence support the emergence
of a global strategy that attempts to extend China's economic, political, and possibly military
outreach . This strategy does not mean that, due to space opened by U.S. decline, China has fully
cemented itself as a global power vying for hegemony. However, it does illustrate that China has
organized itself internally to formulate a globally-focused agenda . In the medium-term, China could
extend its influence in regions where U.S. domination is relatively weak. China's political
institutions' growing capacities to formulate, carry out, and maintain a coherent global strategy , as
shown in Phase Three, contrast with the decline in such capacities on the part of the United States , as some recent
work has argued (Mizruchi and Hyman 2014; Lachmann 2014b).
 Russia Fill-in = Heg
Arms exports key to Russian heg
Richard Connolly 17, associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House,
senior lecturer in political economy and director of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian
Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham, et al., “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter The
Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia,” Chatham House,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-
arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf
Defence-industrial production is one of only a few technology-intensive economic sectors in which Russia can be considered a world leader.
President Vladimir Putin has affirmed the potential of defence-industrial activity to ‘serve as fuel to feed the engines of
modernization in [Russia’s] economy’.2 However, there has not always been sufficient domestic demand to
keep these engines running. In the 1990s, when defence procurement was drastically reduced, arms exports kept many

enterprises afloat.3 Even today, after five years of rapid growth in Russian defence spending,
export markets remain important to Russian firms. These markets are not only a source of current
income, but also a potential source of future sales to compensate for the anticipated decline in
domestic demand over the next few years.4 The defence industry is also socially important, as it accounts for a significant share of
employment in Russia. With around 2.5 million workers, it is responsible for over 3 per cent of total employment, and around one-third of employment in
Arms
manufacturing, with defence-industrial research and development (R&D) and production occupying a dominant place in many cities and regions.5

exports perform political functions . First, they help support defence-industrial production in
areas where domestic demand may be insufficient to maintain production lines . This helps preserve
a wider spectrum of production capabilities than might otherwise be possible, as was the case during the 1990s.
Exports can also be profitable for producers because government spending may contribute towards development costs. Second, armaments

exports can serve as a useful instrument of foreign policy. By supporting the formation of linkages with politically aligned
states, the Soviet Union used arms sales to expand its spheres of influence and create a more favourable political and strategic situation.6 For the Soviet
Union, ‘[p]olitical goals were the dominant factor when the decision to export conventional arms was taken’.7 Arms
exports today help Russia
achieve a wide range of national security objectives, including supporting its image as a global
power , maintaining an independent foreign policy, expanding its influence in the regions to
which it is able to export arms, and initiating and strengthening defence relations.8
 AT: No Escalation/No !
Empirics prove escalation---perception of US interference causes China to use
nuclear weapons.
Caitlin Talmadge 18, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and
a core faculty member of the Security Studies Program, “Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of
Control”, November/December 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-
15/beijings-nuclear-option
The danger lies in wartime
developments that could shift Chinas assumptions about U.S. intentions . If
Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to
destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited
nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear
weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal.
It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose-on an unpopulated area or at sea-as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a

redline.If such escalation appears far-fetched, China's history suggests otherwise . In 1969,
similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year,
Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area . Less than two
weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft . The conflict quickly escalated
beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to
pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that
the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its
nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise . On three separate
occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China
suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons .
Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its
rudimentary nuclear forces on alert-a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an
unauthorized or accidental launch . Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally
agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong , but the 1969
conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet
arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China's, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs Chinas today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned,
the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China
signaled that
it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating
retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months
earlier. This pattern could unfold again today .

Even aside from armed or nuclear conflict---U.S.-Sino war still causes

extinction---global warming co-op is key
Michael Klare 2/19/2019, Five College Professor of Program in Peace and World Security Studies
at Hampshire College in Amherst, "War With China? It’s Already Under Way”,
americanempireproject.com/blog/war-with-china/

As Admiral Davidson suggests, one possible outcome of the ongoing cold war with China could be armed
conflict of the traditional sort. Such an encounter, in turn, could escalate to the nuclear level , resulting in
mutual annihilation. A war involving only “conventional” forces would itself undoubtedly be
devastating and lead to widespread suffering, not to mention the collapse of the global economy. Even if a
shooting war doesn’t erupt, however, a long-term geopolitical war of attrition between the U.S. and China will,
in the end, have debilitating and possibly catastrophic consequences for both sides. Take the trade war, for
example. If that’s not resolved soon in a positive manner, continuing high U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will severely curb Chinese
economic growth and so weaken the world economy as a whole, punishing every nation on Earth, including this one. High tariffs will also
increase costs for American consumers and endanger the prosperity and survival of many firms that rely on Chinese raw materials and
components. This newbrand of war will also ensure that already sky-high defense expenditures will
continue to rise, diverting funds from vital needs like education, health, infrastructure, and the
environment . Meanwhile, preparations for a future war with China have already become the number one priority at the Pentagon,
crowding out all other considerations. “While we’re focused on ongoing operations,” acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan
reportedly told his senior staff on his first day in office this January, “remember China, China, China.” Perhaps
the greatest
victim of this ongoing conflict will be planet Earth itself and all the creatures, humans included, who
inhabit it. As the world’s top two emitters of climate-altering greenhouse gases, the U.S. and China
must work together to halt global warming or all of us are doomed to a hellish future . With a war
under way, even a non-shooting one, the chance for such collaboration is essentially zero . The only way to save

civilization is for the U.S. and China to declare peace and focus together on human salvation.
Leadership Advantage
China Rise Good
 Turn---1NC
The liberal international order fails---middle eastern instability, European
nationalism, and Russian tensions prove
John J. Mearsheimer 19, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political
Science at the University of Chicago. 4/29/2019, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal
International Order” , https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00342,

Midway through the first decade of the 2000s, serious cracks began to appear in the l iberal i nternational o rder,
which have since steadily widened. Consider what has happened in the Greater Middle East. By 2005,
it was evident that the Iraq War was becoming a disaster, and the U nited S tates had no strategy for
stopping the fighting, much less turning Iraq into a liberal democracy. At the same time, the situation in Afghanistan began
to deteriorate, as the Taliban came back from the dead and took aim at the U.S.-installed
government in Kabul. The Taliban has grown stronger with time, and the war in Afghanistan is now the longest war in U.S. history,
lasting longer than the American Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War combined. Moreover, there is no
apparent path to victory for the U nited S tates. In addition, Washington and its allies pursued regime
change in Libya and Syria, which ended up helping precipitate deadly civil wars in both countries.
Furthermore, in the process of helping wreck Iraq and Syria, the Bush and Obama administrations played a crucial
role in creating the I slamic S tate of I raq and S yria, which the United States went to war against in 2014.

The Oslo Peace Process, which once seemed so promising, has failed, and the Palestinians have virtually no
hope of acquiring their own state. With Washington's help, Israeli leaders are instead creating a Greater
Israel, which, as two former Israeli prime ministers have said, will be an apartheid state.40 The United States is also
contributing to the death and destruction in the civil war in Yemen, and gave its consent when the Egyptian military overthrew a
democratically elected government in Egypt in 2013. Far from
incorporating the Greater Middle East into the
liberal international order, the U nited S tates and its allies inadvertently have played a central role in
spreading illiberal disorder in that region.
Europe, which appeared to be the brightest star in the liberal galaxy during the 1990s, was in serious trouble by the late
2010s. The EU suffered a major setback in 2005 when French and Dutch voters rejected the proposed Treaty for Establishing a
Constitution for Europe. Even more damaging was the Eurozone crisis, which began in late 2009 and lingers on. Not only has the
crisis exposed the fragility of the euro , but it also created intense animosity between Germany and
Greece, among other political problems.41 To make matters worse, Britain voted in June 2016 to exit the
EU, and xenophobic right-wing parties are growing more powerful across Europe. Indeed, fundamentally
illiberal views are commonplace among leaders in Eastern Europe. As a January 2018 article in the New York Times put it: “The Czech
president has called Muslim immigrants criminals. The head of Poland's governing party has said refugees are riddled with disease. The
leader of Hungary has described migrants as poison … [and] Austria's new far-right interior
minister suggested concentrating migrants in asyl um centers—with all its obvious and odious echoes of World
War II.”42

Finally, a civil war began in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine that involves Russia, which seized Crimea from Ukraine in
March 2014, causing a serious deterioration in relations between Russia and the West . Both sides have built
up their military forces in Eastern Europe and routinely engage in military exercises that escalate suspicions and tensions between them.
This crisis, which largely resulted from EU and NATO expansion, coupled with the West's efforts to
promote democracy in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, and maybe even Russia itself, shows
no signs of ending anytime soon.43 Given this state of affairs, Moscow is on the lookout for opportunities to
sow discord in the West and weaken the EU and NATO.
Cracks have also opened up in the transatlantic relationship, especially with Trump's arrival in the
White House. Trump is contemptuous of almost all the institutions that make up the liberal
international order, including the EU and NATO, which he famously described as “obsolete” during the 2016
campaign.44 In a letter sent to European leaders shortly after Trump assumed office, a leading EU policymaker said that the new
president posed a serious threat to the EU's future.45 A few months later, just after Trump moved into the White House, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, a deeply committed Atlanticist, warned that Europe could not depend on the
U nited S tates the way it once did. Europeans, she said, “really must take our fate into our own hands.”46 Transatlantic relations
have only worsened since then, and the likelihood of a turnaround in the foreseeable future seems remote.

The 2007–08 global financial crisis not only did enormous damage to many peoples’ lives, but it also called into question the competence
of the elites who manage the liberal international order.47 In addition to the deterioration in relations between Russia and the West,
there are worrying signs of potential conflict with China, which is determined to change the status quo regarding the East China Sea, the
South China Sea, Taiwan, and the China-India border. Unsurprisingly, the United States is now more interested in containing rather than
engaging China. In fact, the Trump administration recently said that admitting China into the WTO was a mistake, as Beijing's
protectionist policies clearly show that it is unwilling to play by that institution's rules.48

Finally, thenumber of liberal democracies has been declining since 2006, reversing a trend that once looked
unstoppable.49 Relatedly, soft authoritarianism appears to have become an attractive alternative to
liberal democracy, a development that was almost unthinkable in the early 1990s. And some leaders extol the virtues of illiberal
democracy, while others govern countries that are committed to political systems based on deeply held religious beliefs. Of course,
liberal democracy has lost some of its appeal in recent years, especially because the United States’
political system often looks dysfunctional. Even serious scholars worry about the future of American democracy.50

In sum, the liberal international order is crumbling .

China’s shifting towards global hegemony---US abdication of the liberal order

is key---Trump specifically gives them the opportunity
Pä r Nyrén 19, research fellow at the Institute for Security and Policy Development’s Stockholm
China Center. 6/27/2019, “China’s Liberal Hawk: Yan Xuetong’s Vision for Chinese Benevolent
Dominance”, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/chinas-liberal-hawk-yan-xuetongs-vision-for-
chinese-benevolent-dominance/
However, Western
liberalism (西方自由主义 xīfā ng zìyó u zhǔ yì) is no longer leading international norms, and
we are moving to a state where international norms are no longer respected. Power will be
redistributed around the world instead of focused in the West.
Protectionism and economic sanctions will be the primary means of competition among major powers, as nuclear weapons will continue
to successfully deter conflict.

U.S. supremacy is ending , and the unipolar state of the post cold war period will be replaced by a
bipolar system (两极格局 liǎ ngjí gé jú ), possibly within five years. Yan believes a multipolar world is not possible: China and the
U.S. are the only players, and the world is destined to be bipolar (pun intended by me, but not Yan).

Western countries are ceasing to influence international politics in a unified manner, and at some
point, “the political concept of ‘the West’ will no longer objectively suit the study of i nternational
r elations.”

On Trump: “Fromthe standpoint of international relations, within the next two years, one of the biggest
problems we will face is how to deal with Trump’s unpredictability. Because he essentially makes
decisions according to his own, there is little continuity between these decisions, and it is very difficult to predict.”
Taiwan independence and the concomitant “risk of a full-fledged standoff between China and the United States” is Yan’s biggest worry for
the next ten years.

Xi Jinping is doing his best to ensure that China does become one of our world’s bipolar powers, and
very soon. On Sunday, Xinhua News Agency published notes from Xi’s address at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign
Affairs ( English , Chinese ).

Xi said the years 2017 to 2022 — the period between the 19th and 20th Party congresses — are “a historical juncture for realizing the
two centenary goals of China, and of great significance in the historical progress of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The use
of “historical juncture” (历史交汇期 lìshǐ jiā ohuì qī) rather than a previous Party favorite, “period of strategic opportunity” (战略机遇期
zhà nlü è jīyù qī), is seen by noted China watcher Bill Bishop (paywall) as “a big deal” that “shows a recognition that the security
environment is no longer benign and signals a belief that while China’s external challenges are more complicated the opportunities for
China are even greater than they were just a year ago.” Bishop sees more Chinese assertiveness ahead.

Chinese leadership is key to solve a litany of existential crises

Bruno Macaes 19, a Portuguese politician, political scientist, business strategist, and author. He
studied at the University of Lisbon and Harvard University, where he wrote his doctoral
dissertation under Harvey Mansfield. He is currently a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Hudson
Institute in Washington, 2019, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order, page 175

Seen from Beijing, the new world order would be replacing a model whose failures have become
all too obvious.  State Councilor Yang Jiechi observed in November 2017 that it had become “increasingly difficult
for Western governance concepts, systems, and models to keep up with the new international
situation. Western-led global governance, he argued, had “ malfunctioned ,” and the accumulation of
“various ills” showed the system had reached a point “beyond redemption.”21 Humanity is facing huge natural,
technological, economic, social, and security challenges. Solutions to these problems will require us
to pool resources, plans, and development mechanisms across the world, but existing models seem increasingly
unable to deliver them. Collective decisions to fight climate change are weak and insufficient. Many
countries have entered long periods of state failure or civil wars and the international community seems closer to giving up on peace
efforts altogether than to brokering a negotiated solution. As a
result, terrorism has become an existential threat
to many societies and the number of refugees worldwide keeps growing. Western efforts arguably
made things worse, as in the case of recent military interventions in the Middle East. Global tensions are as high as in the worst
moments of the Cold War, with the difference that we now lack an adequate framework to address and minimize them. Chinese
authorities thus have some ground to argue that the world as a whole is facing a dire governance crisis, that the
West has run out of ideas and therefore that it is perhaps time for others to take up the task.
“Western countries have frequently been limited by their own theories of international
cooperation, either believing it requires the presence of a hegemon to be viable, or that it can only take place under the
auspices of Western democratic models. The model of international cooperation that China
advances, meanwhile, is naturally non-hegemonic and open to a diversity of political systems.”22
Following the 19th Party Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated on the CPC’s approach to global leadership, stating that “ China
will actively explore a way of resolving hotspot issues with Chinese characteristics and play a
bigger and more constructive role in upholding world stability.”
 UQ/Link---General---2NC
China’s staking global leadership now
Elizabeth C. Economy 18, C. V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations, distinguished fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. MA from
Stanford and PhD from UMich in political science. May/June 2018, “China's New Revolution”,
https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution?
utm_campaign=reg_conf_ email&utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fa_registration
Standing onstage in the auditorium of Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, against a backdrop of a
stylized hammer and sickle, Xi Jinping sounded a triumphant note. It was October 2017, and the Chinese leader
was addressing the 19th Party Congress, the latest of the gatherings of Chinese Communist Party elites held every five years. In his three-
and-a-half-hour speech, Xi,
who was appointed the CCP’s general secretary in 2012, declared his first term
a “truly remarkable five years in the course of the development of the party and the country,” a time in which China
had “ stood up, grown rich, and become strong .” He acknowledged that the party and the country still confronted
challenges, such as official corruption, inequality in living standards, and what he called “erroneous viewpoints.” But overall, he insisted,
China was headed in the right direction—so much so, in fact, that he recommended that other
countries draw on “Chinese wisdom” and follow “a Chinese approach to solving the problems
facing mankind.” Not since Mao Zedong had a Chinese leader so directly suggested that others should emulate his country’s model. 
Xi’s confidence is not without grounds . In the past five years, the Chinese leadership has made notable
progress on a number of its priorities. Its much-heralded anticorruption campaign has accelerated,
with the number of officials disciplined for graft increasing from some 150,000 in 2012 to more than 400,000 in 2016. Air quality in
many of China’s famously smoggy cities has improved measurably. In the South China Sea, Beijing
has successfully advanced its sovereignty claims by militarizing existing islands and creating new
ones outright, and it has steadily eroded the autonomy of Hong Kong through a series of political and legal maneuvers. Across Asia , it
has enhanced its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive regional infrastructure
plan. All the while, the Chinese economy has continued to expand, and in 2017, GDP grew by 6.9
percent, the first time the growth rate had gone up in seven years.

But Xi’s ambitions extend beyond these areas to something more fundamental . In the 1940s, Mao
led the communist revolution that created the contemporary Chinese party-state. Beginning in the late 1970s, his successor,
Deng Xiaoping, oversaw a self-proclaimed “second revolution,” in which he ushered in economic
reforms and the low-profile foreign policy that produced China’s economic miracle. Now, Xi has
launched a third revolution . Not only has he slowed, and, in many cases, reversed, the process of “reform and opening up”
set in motion by Deng, but he has also sought to advance the principles of this new China on the global
stage. Moreover, in a striking move made in March, the government eliminated the constitutional provision limiting the president to
two terms, allowing Xi to serve as president for life. For the first time, China is an illiberal state seeking
leadership in a liberal world order.

Trump’s isolationist policies give China the opportunity to assert dominance

as a global leader---the plan reverses this by signaling moral authority
Flynt L. Leverett and Robert Sprinkle 17, professor of International Affairs and Asian Studies
at Penn State; Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. 1/22/2017, “China
steps up as US steps back from global leadership”, https://theconversation.com/china-steps-up-as-
us-steps-back-from-global-leadership-70962 (w2)

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s appearance at last week’s World Economic Forum shows global
leadership is shifting, not
drifting, toward Beijing . The most vigorous defense of globalization and multilateral cooperation
was mounted not by an American statesman, but by the president of the P eople’s R epublic of C hina.
“The problems troubling the world are not caused by globalization,” Xi declared. “Countries should view their own interest in the broader
context and refrain from pursuing their own interests at the expense of others.”

Speculation is mounting that the

U nited S tates, with Donald Trump cast in the role of president, will ignore
international challenges, renounce global responsibilities and  abandon friends and allies.

As Washington greets a new administration disinclined to play a worldwide role, Beijing

increasingly accepts opportunities to lead. Xi and his colleagues understand that their country’s domestic development
and global ascendance require steady engagement and honest efforts abroad.

Yes, China has “done the right thing” before. It has restricted antibiotics in food-animal agriculture, created a new infrastructure-
development bank for Asia, aided previously exploited African countries and promised to end its internal ivory trade.

But never before has China so forthrightly stepped up when the U nited S tates appears to be stepping
away. As scholars of Chinese strategy and the intersection of science and politics, we see how Beijing’s ambitions and
interests will affect its engagement on a range of important international issues .
The case of climate change

Climate change policy is one good example of this trend. Commentators warn that Trump’s pledge
to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement would let China “off the hook” for curbing carbon
emissions. In fact, China put itself “on the hook” in Paris for reasons having little to do with the United States.

China’s most urgent atmospheric problem is not carbon dioxide. It’s combustion toxicity from burning coal, oil and biomass. The Chinese
these days don’t look through their air; they look at it. And what they see, they breathe.

Combustion toxicity has degraded China’s air quality so much, by Chinese assessments, as to destroy 10 percent of GDP annually since
the late 1980s and cause hundreds of thousands of premature deaths every year. And air pollution has become China’s single greatest
cause of social unrest.

In response, China is closing its old coal-fired power plants, and the new ones it’s building are much farther away from
its prosperous and politically influential eastern cities. Other fossil-fueled industries are being put farther away, too. China has
also contracted with Russia to buy huge amounts of natural gas, whose combustion emits lots of CO2 but not a lot of toxic air pollutants.

These moves will expose fewer people, especially prosperous urban dwellers, to toxic air pollution.
On their own, though, these moves will not do much to meet carbon targets and restrain warming.

In an even better bet to clear its air, China is moving to add more nuclear, hydroelectric, solar and wind
turbine generating capacity. Greenpeace estimates that during every hour of every day in 2015, China on average installed
more than one new wind turbine, and enough solar panels to cover a soccer field.

Solar panels in Jiangsu Province, China. REUTERS

China is already the world’s leading producer of renewable energy technologies. More remarkably, it is
also the leading consumer. And in January, it announced plans to invest an additional  US$360 billion in
renewable power between now and 2020. That’s $120 billion a year.
These renewable power measures are being taken to fight China’s number one problem – air pollution – but they will also automatically
cut China’s carbon emissions. If it can manage political rivalries among local power companies and upgrade its electrical grid to handle
all that solar and wind capacity, then China is likely to meet its Paris commitments earlier than currently required.
Defecting from Paris would not help China address its air pollution problem. Defection would, however,
reinforce the presumption that U.S. leadership is indispensable – a presumption Beijing is loath to
perpetuate.
A savvier and more probable move is for China to assert – for the first time on a major global issue –
moral authority . Chinese diplomats are already reassuring the world that China will keep and even expand its climate
commitments. This message conveys Beijing’s resolve not to let multilateral greenhouse gas mitigation
collapse, and show the way out of a crisis whose agreed solution is threatened by others’
malfeasance.
National interest in global leadership

If sustained, such action will mark a critical inflection point in

China’s global role. It will become less a challenger
to an established order, and more a champion of a common cause. The U nited S tates will risk being
regarded as aloof and unreliable and, following its 2016 election, even politically unstable.
Likewise, Beijing is asserting greater leadership in other areas once led by Washington. With the demise
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Washington negotiated with 11 Asian countries excluding China, Beijing is promoting its
own Pacific trade-and-investment framework excluding the United States.
Even more grandly, Xi is articulating an alternative vision for global economic growth. The model focuses on physical investment,
especially in transportation and IT infrastructure. In this, it is linked to the new Silk Road project, through which China is expanding
linkages across Eurasia by integrating railways, ports and information networks into transnational corridors. The Chinese approach also
does not rely on portfolio investment and central banks exertions to drive growth – a sharp contrast to Western policies.

Ceding global moral authority to China would be a high price for America to pay for the pleasures of political posturing. Yet
a China leading by example would have a greater stake in its own reputation, and the greater that
stake becomes the more engaged China becomes. Such a China, we believe, could profoundly
benefit the world.
 UQ---Rise Fast---2NC
China rise is inevitable and happening quickly---2020 is the deadline of US
leadership---Signaling doesn’t overcome structural issues
Christopher Layne 1/1/18, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and an Intelligence
Community Associate, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California,
Berkeley, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana”,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf
Today the military, economic, institutional and ideational pillars that have supported the Pax Americana are
being challenged by China. This raises two fundamental and intimately connected questions: if China surpasses, equals or even
approximates the United States in these dimensions of power, can the Pax Americana endure?

And, if it cannot, what will replace it? Posing these questions raises the contentious issue—contentious at least in the US—of whether
American power is, in fact, declining. During his abortive 2012 run for the Republican presidential nomination, Jon Huntsman—
President Obama’s Ambassador to China, and now President Trump’s Ambassador to Russia—succinctly expressed the prevailing view
of the US foreign policy establishment when he said: ‘Decline is un-American.’

Leading US security studies experts agree. These primacists argue that the extent of China’s rise—and hence of
America’s decline—are, like premature reports of Mark Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated. Primacists believe the international
system is still unipolar, and that US power will keep it that way for a long time to come.

This claim is increasingly dubious. Indeed, the case made by the ‘ declinists’ of the 1980s—notably Paul Kennedy,
Robert Gilpin, David Calleo and Samuel P. Huntington—looks stronger every day.23 Contrary to the portrayal of their argument
by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that America’s post-Second World War power
advantages had already dissipated, or that the United States was on the brink of a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they
pointed to domestic and international economic drivers that, over time, would cause American economic power to diminish
relatively, thereby shifting the balance of power .
21 Michael Mandelbaum, The case for Goliath: how America acts as the world’s government in the 21st century (New York: PublicAffairs,
2005). 22 Barry Posen, ‘Command of the commons: the military foundations of US hegemony’, International Security 28: 1, Summer
2003, pp. 5–46. 23 Kennedy, Rise and fall; Robert Gilpin, The political economy of international relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987); David Calleo, The imperious economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Samuel P. Huntington,
‘Coping with the Lippmann gap’, Foreign Affairs 66: 3, ‘America and the world 1987’, May–June 1988, pp. 453–77. Christopher Layne 94
International Affairs 94: 1, 2018

In essence, the declinists believed that the United States was experiencing a slow—‘termite-like’—decline
caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy that were gradually nibbling at its foundations.24 Kennedy
himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on the US world role in the early twenty-first century.
As he wrote: The task facing American statesmen over the next decades … is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there
is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and
smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage.25
The unwinding of the Pax Americana Decline may be ‘un-American’, but that does not mean it isn’t
happening. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ has turned out to be rather—well, momentary.26 The Great Recession
that began in 2007–2008 did not end America’s unipolar ascendancy. It did, however, focus attention on, and accelerate, the ebbing of
American power—the evidence of which has cumulated rapidly over the ensuing ten years.

This slippage
of US dominance is chipping away at each of the four pillars on which the Pax Americana was erected:
military power; economic power; institutions ; and soft power . As these pillars erode, it becomes
increasingly doubtful that the Pax Americana can endure.

China’s challenge to American military power

Until now the dominant view within the US foreign policy establishment has been that military strength is the
one area in which America’s advantage is insurmountable (at least within any meaningful time-frame). American military power
is considered by US policy-makers and many security studies scholars to be the geopolitical trump card—no pun intended—that will
ensure continuing American dominance even if China closes the economic and technological gaps separating it from the United States.27
However, some within the foreign policy establishment are beginning to question this viewpoint. Important
recent studies of the Sino-American military balance suggest that some analysts are taking a fresh look
at the question of how long it will take China to catch up with the US militarily .
China and the United States face different grand strategic challenges. As selfstyled global hegemon,
America must be able project decisive military power to the three regions it considers vital to both its security and its
prosperity: Europe, the Middle East and east Asia. In contrast, China’s strategic goals, at least for now, are more
limited. China aims at dominating its own geographic backyard: that is, it seeks regional hegemony in east and
south-east Asia, which have become the focal points of Sino-American geopolitical competition.

24 The concept of ‘termite decline’ was suggested to me by Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute. 25 Kennedy, Rise and fall, p. 534
(emphasis in bold italics added). 26 Charles Krauthammer, ‘The unipolar moment’, Foreign Affairs 70: 1990–1, pp. 23–33. 27 See e.g.
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, America abroad: the United States’ global role in the 21st century (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016). The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana 95 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018

Even if China is not at present able to mount a global challenge to the US, there is evidence that it is
beginning to draw level with the United States in regional military power in east Asia.

In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding
frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-
American military rivalry in east Asia are not favourable for the United States: ‘Although China has not closed the
gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who
track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change … was striking .’29

In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment
will be almost on an equal footing with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and
training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that
by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded .30 He predicts that the
2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point China will be able to challenge the
regional status quo.31
 UQ/Link---Soft Power---2NC
Soft power is the only barrier to Chinese leadership---increasing US soft power
impedes China’s rise
Chi Wang 18. Former head of the Chinese section of the US Library of Congress, currently
president of the US-China Policy Foundation. 3/8/2018, “Xi Jinping’s strong leadership style has its
risks, but also advantages”, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/2136235/xi-jinpings-strong-leadership-style-has-its-risks-also
Xi hopes to paint himself as a benevolent, paternal leader of China. The people, however – along with
international leaders – may not be quite as enamored as Xi had hoped. Xi’s position relies on his power and control
over freedom of speech rather than on the propaganda for which China is usually so well known.
China has long struggled with its image abroad. The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing marked China’s new era of
soft power , where it had the opportunity to show off its new status as a modern, economically powerful country . Since Xi stepped
into the presidency five years later, he has built on that foundation. The image of China as a benevolent world
economic leader, through projects like the “Belt and Road Initiative” and investments in developing
countries like Libya and Sudan has been projected by state media and politicians alike. 
The use of soft power is also directed at citizens at home. Xi encourages Chinese people to embrace traditional values. In speeches over
the past few years, he has painted an image of the Chinese nation as a family – and he is the father. 

Perhaps this is indicative of his desire to reclaim national unity; his contribution to China shaking off past humiliations. China wishes to
reconcile its old greatness as the Middle Kingdom with its new position in a modern world, and merging old values with new economic
leadership is a uniquely Chinese style of leadership. Perhaps Xi wants Confucian filial piety and deference. 

Despite China’s best efforts, however, soft power, both at home and abroad, is failing. American
media continues to report negatively on Chinese politics and the economy, and the country is viewed with
suspicion. 

Despite the friendship Xi and US President Donald Trump appeared to strike up in 2017, Trump

has reneged on his
previous willingness to work with China on trade. Instead , he has placed tariffs on Chinese
imports and labelled China a strategic competitor. 
Reactions within China to the announcement on term limits have ranged from comedic, on internet forums, to acknowledgement that
there will be “no limits” to Xi’s power from political analysts in Beijing. 

American media is, of course, interested in reporting any alarming news about China. America prides itself
as a world leader in democracy and freedom. At a time when the US is also facing questions
about its own unpredictable leadership , it is nice to have a finger to point at someone else’s problems. Still, this
fear may point to underlying concern in America about the erosion of democracy worldwide – and
especially at home.

As Western countries struggle to find leadership, Xi sees a vacuum he can fill. If he remains stable,
China will become stronger, too. To be fair, Xi has indeed been a strong leader for China. To the Western world, Xi appears a
bully; in China, authoritarian leadership is the norm. Xi may be an authoritarian leader, but he is not the kind of dictator that Mao was.

Although Xi has so far avoided the upheaval of rebellion or government purges, he is trying to
control 1.4 billion people with disciplinary rule under one man. It is possible, as Xi may believe, that implementing full
democracy would lead to chaos or anarchy. No one else in Xi’s Politburo or top-level leadership is a strong leader. If there must be
one leader, Xi is likely to be the best man for the job.
 Impact---Laundry List---2NC
Resisting Chinese dominance is the only scenario for conflict---Trump’s
retrenchment solves---that’s key to solve a litany of crises
Robert Muggah and Yves Tiberghien 18, PhD from Oxford in political science, advises
various UN agencies, the IADB, the World Economic Forum Global Risk Report, and the World Bank;
associate Professor of Political Science, Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at UBC.
2/12/2018, “The future global order will be managed by China and the US - get used to it”,
https://www.weforum .org/agenda/2018/02/the-future-global-order-will-be-managed-by-china-
and-the-us-get-used-to-it/
At least three competing versions of the future world order crashed together at the World Economic Forum's gathering in Davos last
month. Therewas the one peddled by a combative Donald Trump calling for a full-scale US retreat
from the current order. Another one came from Chinese leaders who proposed a new global
economic system built around Beijing . Meanwhile, Canada's Justin Trudeau and France’s Emmanuel Macron urged
western leaders to double down on the current liberal order. It would be a mistake to dismiss their speeches as empty grandstanding.
This debate is deadly serious. The outcomes will likely determine the future of global stability and the
security and prosperity of everyone. If the leaders of major countries and international
organizations cannot see eye to eye, we are in for a very rough ride. Rather than withdraw, what is needed more
than ever are new ideas, institutions and blueprints to navigate the coming storm. We are living in abnormal times. The
global liberal order is in an advanced state of meltdown . And as the world rapidly shifts from a uni-polar to a
multi-polar reality, the international system itself is exposed to profound instability. If not handled with extreme care, the potential for a
major collapse is real. The
question is whether our world leaders are capable of fully understanding what
is happening in real time and can muster the collective action to set new rules of the road. The old
global liberal order served as the bedrock of peace and stability since 1945. It was purposefully designed by the US and its western allies
to prevent armed conflict and the economic nationalism giving rise to it. It is composed of the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the G20 and a thicket of treaties and
agreements. While experiencing its ups and downs, it set the rules for a stable positive-sum game. While
virtually everyone
agrees that a rules-based system is essential to managing security and trade, a power struggle is
underway over who writes and enforces them. The spectacular rise of China over the past two decades and the relative
decline of the US mean that sparks are bound to fly. Yet most westerns are only dimly aware of what’s occurring since the rug was so
quickly pulled out from under them. The potential for catastrophic miscalculations - including US trade actions against China - are rising
with potentially devastating cascading effects to the global economy. To get to grips with the seismic shifts underway, consider these five
facts. First, China is in the process of surpassing the US economically. By one measure, 35 per cent of world growth
from 2017 to 2019 will come from China, 18 per cent from the US, 9 percent from India, and 8 per cent from Europe. By 2050, the top five
largest global economies are most likely to be China, India, the US, Brazil, and Indonesia. Is the
west even remotely prepared
for this kind of world? Second, China is leading the largest urbanization and infrastructure
development scheme on earth. Already in its fifth year, the $900 billion "One Belt and One Road" (OBOR)
project includes new roads, shipping lanes and building projects  stretching to over 65 countries. The
idea is to literally rewire global trade from China throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. While details are hazy, OBOR is
being financed by Chinese state banks, with a modest strategic contribution by a new Chinese-backed AsianInfrastructure Investment
Bank in partnership with other institutions Third, China
is set to become a global green powerhouse. China
signalled its intention to take the lead on climate change reduction after signing the 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement. By 2025, most new cars in China will be fully electric vehicles. China is aggressively cutting coal usage.
Already, over 60 per cent of high speed rail in the world is in China (10 times the length in Japan, for example). China also recently
committed to achieving blue skies in all of its major cities within three years. The changes are already being felt: Beijing
air is 30 per cent cleaner  this winter than last winter.  Fourth, China is also setting the global pace on a digital
economy, including cashless payments. In major cities, up to 90 per cent of all commercial and retail transactions in convenience stores
and cafes are occurring through Alipay and Wechat. E-commerce delivery in large Chinese cities through Alibaba is the currently the
fastest in the world. One company, Alibaba, racked up sales of $25 billion in just one day - dwarfing the returns of so-called Black Friday
and Cyber Monday in the US. Finally, Chinese universities are also vaulting to the top of the international rankings. Two schools - Peking
University and Tsinghua University - just leapfrogged from well below the top 200 to the top 30 within five years. There are anther 40
universities that are not far behind and set to enter the elite universities in the coming years. While Chinese are still seeking out
educations in elite schools in North America and Western Europe, soon they won't have to. All the while, the west seems to
be asleep at the wheel . There is a certain irony in our current predicament. On the one hand, the world is experienced
unparalleled levels of prosperity and connectivity, due in no small part to the US-backed global liberal order. Yet these advances are
associated with ever greater complexity and systemic risks, increasing the liberal order's vulnerability to collapse. The world's global and
national institutions are increasingly incapable of managing stresses to the system. Democracies, it turns out, lack the incentive systems
to address higher-order and longer-term imperatives. Faced
with threats ranging from climate change to massive
technological change, the world is in desperate need of stable and able global governance. And yet there
is surging opposition to precisely liberal governance due to rising inequalities and frustration with the perceived failures of the liberal
order. Francis Fukuyama and Jan-Werner Muller view populism and the rise of parochial economic nationalism as among the gravest
threats to future stability. The risk of a disorderly collapse of the system is more real than ever. If
we are to survive the global
geopolitical transition, we must first accept that the era of US hegemony is over . Instead, the
world is shifting to a new multi-polar order with the US and China at its center. We need to restore and
rebuild stable institutions and rules that acknowledge the changed context. They will need to be more inclusive, representative, and
legitimate. The role of international mechanisms of cooperation (i.e. G20), regional organizations, non-state actors - especially financial
and philanthropic actors - will also need to be elevated. What's more, cities are claiming their place - witness the U20 of the world's
largest cities to be formally launched in October 2018.

Chinese hegemony solves a litany of global problems

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American
Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for
the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?
id=4491
As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international
power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance
concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a
bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution.
A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The
“shortcomings” of the existing global
governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant
forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance
system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions
intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation.
These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their
fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any
wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference
factor to global governance.

Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind . Over the years of development, the
strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the
international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the
contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun
policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western
governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as
the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern , in addition to their lack
of representation and inclusiveness.
Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With
the
diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance
has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming
complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven
by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the
beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global
economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and
international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit,
such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of
these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement.

B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order . Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western
countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for
changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The
US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing
hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing
order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic
despair and political dejection.
Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in
safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics
and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world
and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there
is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the
transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the
efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate
the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics
in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and
development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of
international order.

C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any
country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by
the “Western-Centrism”, the
Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority , conflicting
with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing
peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today,
including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of
globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to
“integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and
integration among civilizations.
Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi
Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both
Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow
together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another” ,
which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western
civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and
depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion
and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”,
etc. China
will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and
with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world
order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through
mutual learning, integration and encouragement.
D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an
inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full
of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively
great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out
innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the
national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best
explains China’s confidence.

When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and
courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having
clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and
dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In
sum, China will actively seek
understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-
cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner . Second, China’s discourse is featured as a
combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with
the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical
speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the
Chinese solution
is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full
of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering
mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system” , and “providing a brand new option for the nations
and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”.

II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance

Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating
opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to
the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It
has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound
way.

A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the
party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of
the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world
from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned
from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise
interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the
world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new
concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community
with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win,
enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the
world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the
joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese
solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion
in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international
organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the
road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community.

B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global
governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized
and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance system characterized as both extensive and
unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the
existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China
sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance , which should act as the leader of
global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively
promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20,
BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation
and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security
mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog
mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the
establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for
developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship
between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”,
which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank , manifesting the
increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic
and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus,
in leading the transformation of the global governance
system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged
in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but
has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability .
C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Manyof the problems facing global governance today are deeply
rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as
the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the
beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make
efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade
openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the
efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems
accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance
system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the
whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient
capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation” , while having the ability to
make the world listen to its voice more attentively.

With regard to the subject of global governance, China

has advocated that what global governance system is
better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the
hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of
mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and
differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own
backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by
all countries concerned. China
has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security,
maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a
“grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena” ; we cannot “set up a stage
here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts
should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the
emerging economies on global governance.

Over the past 5 years, China

has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the
center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance .
By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS
Summit, China has used these platforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the
world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with
the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development
strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows
its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international
issues, China
abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible
major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the
Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful
resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility
and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as
assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital
of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze , which has shown the
simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries.

D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the
important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is
transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of
the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country
and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began
policy coordination with them, as China
should comply with historical tide and continue to support the
increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has
pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching
importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership
network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent
the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice,
including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization;
promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and
representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and
industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and
helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate
change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.
 Impact---Climate Change---2NC
Chinese leadership is key to mitigate climate change
The Climate Reality Project 18, a non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. focused
on climate advocacy and education. 6/4/2018, After the Airpocalypse – 5 Ways China is Becoming
a Global Climate Leader ”, https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/after-airpocalypse-5-
ways-china-becoming-global-climate-leader
How did the world’s biggest polluter become the world’s leader on climate?
It all goes back to the “Airpocalypse.”
Not too long ago, many in some of the Chinese cities were going about their business engulfed in a
cloud of pollution. The gray haze could be so dense, that buildings and trees would quite literally disappear in front of your eyes.
And stepping outside, even for just a minute, required wearing a facial mask to avoid directly
breathing the toxic air.
How to Keep Climate Action on Track After the Paris Agreement

The source of much of that pollution wasn’t hard to find either: coal-fired power plants and vehicles on the road.
Since the early 2000s, China’s economy had been growing rapidly, powered largely by coal.

The unchecked use of coal on such a huge scale didn’t take long to generate real problems. In 2005, China surpassed the United States to
become the world’s biggest CO2 emitter (a title that the country has held since the 20th century). And in 2008, 16 of the 20 most polluted
cities in the entire world were in China, according to the World Bank.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

In 2013, the Chinese government finally decided that enough was enough, introducing a national
action plan to curb air pollution, including a set of coal consumption limits for key regions including Beijing and the Pearl
River Delta.

In 2016, China released its national plan for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and
committed to lowering the country’s carbon intensity of GDP by 60–65 percent (below 2005 levels) by
2030 in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to Paris Agreement. As the world’s second-largest economy – and
home to nearly 1.4 billion people – that’s a big deal to the world.
GROWING PAINS AND GROWING PROGRESS

It hasn’t all been smooth sailing. Emissions are still rising as the country continues to grow. And although China has halt many coal
projects over the past years, environmentalists have called it out for investing coal energy in other countries such as Turkey and Pakistan
to satisfy its immense need for energy.

On the other hand, China

has made real progress. Between 2013 and 2017, Chinese cities cut the amount
of fine pollution particulates(PM2.5) in the air by an average of 32 percent. And the capital Beijing has seen a
lot more sunny days as PM 2.5 concentration dropped 54 percent in the fourth quarter of 2017, in comparison to the same period of
2016.

On a global level, there’s also good news. China has been instrumental in keeping the Paris
Agreement process going, continuing to curb emissions and expand renewables even as the US
(another huge polluter) has dramatically backed down at the federal level.
So how’s China done it? There’ve been many steps, but five have been especially key.

1. Bye-Bye, Coal
China has been slowly (but surely) moving away from coal energy. Last year, the government
announced plans to cancel  103 new plants and closed the very last coal plant located in the capital,
Beijing.
From 2014 to 2015, coal consumption reduced after a decade of steady increase.

2. Putting a Price on Carbon

One of China’s most impressive moves was to launch the world’s largest national carbon trading market in 2017. The
goal is to
encourage companies to become greener by allowing them sell or buy excessive carbon emissions.
The first phase of the project only covers the power generation sector, but the initiative is expected to expand across many other areas of
the economy.

3. Clean Bus Rides

China is showing the world how to move many people around quickly and cleanly.   Around 17 percent of the country’s municipal buses
are electric, and the city Shenzhen holds the record for the globe’s largest electric bus fleet, with all of its 16,359 buses had gone electric
last year. The achievement was only possible due to government subsidies. But in the long run, operation and maintenance costs of
electric buses are significantly lower than those fueled by diesel.

4. Making the Investment in Renewables

Moving away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy is not just an effective way to clean up
the planet. It’s also a good investment.

In 2017, China
invested a staggering US$ 126.6 billion in renewable energy – 45 percent of the total
worldwide investment . The country has been using a whole lot of green technology internally  – nearly doubled its
solar generation from 2016 to 2017. But it also has its eyes on a much larger international market.
5. New Forests

China is so keen on green that it’s deploying soldiers to plant trees across the country. The goal is to
replant many of the forests that were cut down for industrialization and farmland, all with an eye to removing carbon from the
atmosphere on a massive scale and doing it naturally.

Sowing seeds is actually one of the country’s Paris Agreement goals – China wants to increase forest stock volume by
4.5 billion cubic meters by 2030, from its 2005 level. China is also planting a different kind of forest on its buildings to
help sequester carbon.
 
THE TAKEAWAY

The catalyst was the sight of millions choking on industrial and power sector pollution, but the
result has been one of the
most influential for emissions reduction and energy transformation the world’s ever seen.
Five steps in the process have been critical: Cutting coal Putting a price on carbon Cleaning up public transit Investing in renewables
Conserve and rebuild the forest

The good news is that it doesn’t take a public health crisis for countries to embrace these and other practical solutions. The
world’s
second-largest economy has already shown they work, and now it’s time for other nations to
follow its lead.

Warming causes extinction

Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of
the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in
Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem
collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50
In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading,
and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our
assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries ( climate
change, global freshwater
cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks . This is because of intrinsic positive
feedback loops , substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences
of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield
surprises . In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the
provision of food and water , and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest.

Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the
collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North
American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of
1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically,
1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato
blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside
Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields).

Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought
and water scarcity , as well as flooding . Climate change can even impair water quality because it is
associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in
higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge.
Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and
nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease .

Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as
global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential
for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious . Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between
climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster
reef building and coral reefs . Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral
reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy
(Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more
severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge
—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms .

A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables
of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by
definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are
exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society
will have a
hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of
an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events . How likely is it
that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not
regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-
related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive
flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane
Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs
now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This
change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure
and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go
unnoticed by most people.

4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes

Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has
been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human
ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent
environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate
without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans
consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed
12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear
message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc.
send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm.

In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there
are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans . The
consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency ; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming
is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly,
unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback
loops . In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more
CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on . Table 2 summarizes
the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized
into carbon cycle , biogeochemical , biogeophysical , cloud , ice-albedo , and water vapor
feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of
these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically
and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri,
Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future
scenarios.

Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial
increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans
and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate
change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the
atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern
when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation
increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—
thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil,
leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002).

Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires , as a result of higher temperatures and persistent
drought conditions. The
expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with
climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence
(Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin
et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000
acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic
fire
embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-
guard and produce a true apocalyptic event . Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new
vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and
ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming.

Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective
snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo
feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by
flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011).
The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a
warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967).

Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the
atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in
clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less
warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate
projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and
warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical
properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most
circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing
greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a
positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, &
Norris, 2009).

The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that
runaway climate change , and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility.
Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough
explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this
list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered
positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks . The many environmental crises
humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted
because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete
scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

It turns conflict and makes nuke war inevitable

Jü rgen Scheffran 16, Professor at the Institute for Geography at the University of Hamburg and
head of the Research Group Climate Change and Security in the CliSAP Cluster of Excellence and the
Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability, et al., April 2016, “The Climate-Nuclear Nexus:
Exploring the linkages between climate change and nuclear threats,”
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/file/2016/01/WFC_2015_The_Climate-Nuclear_Nexus.pdf
Climate change and nuclear weapons represent two key threats of our time. Climatechange endangers ecosystems and
social systems all over the world . The degradation of natural resources, the decline of water and food
supplies, forced migration, and more frequent and intense disasters will greatly affect population clusters, big and
small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat

multiplier ” in already fragile regions. This could contribute to a decline of international

stability and trigger hostility between people and nations . Meanwhile, the 15,500 nuclear weapons that
remain in the arsenals of only a few states possess the destructive force to destroy life on Earth as we know multiple
times over. With nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the
risks of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or intent remain plentiful and
imminent .
Despite growing recognition that climate change and nuclear weapons pose critical security risks, the linkages between both threats are
largely ignored. However, nuclear and climate risks interfere with each other in a mutually enforcing way.

Conflicts induced by climate change could contribute to global insecurity , which, in turn, could
enhance the chance of a nuclear weapon being used , could create more fertile breeding grounds
for terrorism, including nuclear terrorism , and could feed the ambitions among some states to
acquire nuclear arms . Furthermore, as evidenced by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme weather events,
environmental degradation and major seismic events can directly impact the safety and security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a
nuclear war could lead to a rapid and prolonged drop in average global temperatures and
significantly disrupt the global climate for years to come, which would have disastrous implications for agriculture,
threatening the food supply for most of the world . Finally, climate change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy
pose threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and nuclear power accidents and
the lasting impacts on the climate, environment and public health by carbon emissions.
 AT: China Rise Causes Violence
Trump’s abandoning of liberal norms creates a window for Chinese leadership
that creates a new form of multilateral cooperation based in national
sovereignty—the plan reverses this by restoring US image.
Yan Zuetong 19, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at
Tsinghua University, January/February, “The Age of Uneasy Peace,” lexis.

China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United
WHAT CHINA WANTS

States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In
material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent
estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s

What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United
import capacity and its currency’s global strength.

States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part
around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition ,
questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The
Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal , attempting to strong-arm friends
and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it
ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council. It is still unclear if this

retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s
tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways

that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago . Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s
relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic
cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two
countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global
power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like. At the top of
Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—
and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly
advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of
domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export
volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its
part. Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access
to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that
will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this
number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution
—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange
for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China

Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a

lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.

revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a
global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States.
Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S.
markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable
diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the

day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and
expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United
States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.
NEW RULES? Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order.

American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain
and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the
sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with
China. In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because
the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of
a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s
presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot
died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic
partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms. Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the
two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to
make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their
disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical. To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief
among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has
questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure
independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by
coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese
independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an

Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its

approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries.

approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China
will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law . In recent years, some have
interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping

China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-
interpretations are wishful thinking:

increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating
to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online
regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and
norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in
the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the
apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining

Increased Chinese clout may also bring

stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea.

attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions
and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing:
wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened,
benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other
countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese
leadership .
Heg Bad
 Heg Defense---1NC
Primacy’s not key to peace
Christopher Preble 16, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
8/31/16, “NO MORE OF THE SAME: THE PROBLEM WITH PRIMACY,”
https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/no-more-of-the-same-the-problem-with-primacy/
Such expenditures might still be justified if they were instrumental in keeping Americans safe. But, in fact, primacy is based on a
number offaulty premises , including: (a) that the United States is subjected to more urgent and prevalent
threats than ever before; (b) that U.S. security guarantees reassure nervous allies and thus contribute to global
peace and stability; and (c) that a large and active U.S. military is essential to the health of the international
economy.
Primacists hold that the United States cannot adopt a wait-and-see attitude with respect to distant trouble spots. They believe that
the security of all states are bound together and that threats to others are actually threats to the
United States. Primacists believe that instability and crises abroad will adversely affect American interests if they are allowed to fester.
“The alternative to Pax Americana—the only alternative—is global disorder,” writes the Wall Street Journal’s Bret Stephens, with
emphasis. Because
any problem, in any part of the world, could eventually threaten U.S. security or U.S. interests,
primacy aims to stop all problems before they occur .

This assumption is based on a very selective reading of world history, grossly exaggerates the United States’ ability to
control outcomes, and underplays its costs. It also miscasts the nature of the threats that are facing us.

Tech nology has not evaporated the seas , allowing large land armies to march across the ocean
floor. Meanwhile, potential challengers like China face more urgent problems that will diminish their desire
and ability to project power outside of their neighborhood. They can cause trouble in the South China Sea, but that does not
mean they can or will in the South Pacific or the Caribbean. China’s economic troubles and rising popular unrest, for example, could
constrain Chinese military spending increases and focus Beijing’s attention at home. Causing
problems abroad would
threaten critical trading relations that are essential to the health of the Chinese economy.
Primacists argue that we cannot rely on oceans to halt nuclear missiles that fly over them or cyberattacks
in the virtual realm. And terrorists could infiltrate by land, sea, or air, or they could be grown right here at home. But our own
nuclear weapons provide a powerful deterrent against state actors with return addresses, and a massive,
forward-deployed military is not the best tool for dealing with terrorists and hackers . The hard part is
finding them and stopping them before they act. That is a job for the intelligence and law enforcement communities, respectively. And
small-footprint military units like special operations forces can help as needed.

There have always been dangers in the world, and there always will be. To
the extent that we can identify myriad threats
that our ancestors could not fathom, primacy compounds the problem . By calling on the United States to deal with so
many threats, to so many people, in so many places, primacy ensures that even distant problems become our own.

Primacy’s other key problem is that, contrary to the claims of its advocates, it inadvertently increases the risk
of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals because they are confident that the
United States will rescue them if the confrontation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard, or what MIT’s Barry Posen calls
“reckless driving.”

Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when our safety and vital national interests are not
threatened would reduce the likelihood that our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior in
the first place. Plus, a more restrained foreign policy would encourage others to assume the burden of
defending themselves.
Such a move on the part of our allies could prove essential, given that primacy has not stopped
our rivals from challenging U.S. power . Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government’s efforts to
expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of
problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation . U.S. efforts at regime change and talk of an “axis
of evil” that needed to be eliminated certainly provided additional incentives for states to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions
(e.g., North Korea).

Meanwhile, efforts intended to smother security competition or hostile ideologies have destabilized vast
regions, undermined our counterterrorism efforts, and even harmed those we were ostensibly trying to help. After U.S. forces deposed
the tyrant Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered. The civil war in Syria, and the problem of the
Islamic State in particular, is inextricable from the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The situation in Libya is not much better —
the United States helped overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which originated in Iraq, has
now established a presence in Libya as well, provoking still more U.S. military action there. It is
clear that those interventions
were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure, yet primacists call
for more of the same .

Lastly, primacists contend that U.S. military power is essential to the functioning of the global economy. “U.S.
security commitments,” explain leading primacists Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “help maintain an
open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations.” The United States sets the rules of the game and punishes
those who disobey them. If the United States were less inclined to intervene in other people’s disputes, the primacists
say, the risk of war would grow, roiling skittish markets. But such claims exaggerate the role that U.S.
ground forces play in facilitating global trade, especially given the resiliency and flexibility of
global markets in the face of regional instability. Moreover, primacists ignore the extent to which past U.S. military
activism has actually undermined market stability and upset vital regions. Smart alternatives to primacy feature a
significant role for the U.S. Navy and Air Force in providing security in the global commons while
avoiding the downsides of onshore activism.

In conclusion, America’s
default foreign policy is unnecessarily costly and unnecessarily risky . Its
defenders misconstrue the extent to which U.S. military power has contributed to a relatively
peaceful international system , and they overestimate our ability to sustain an active global
military posture indefinitely.
The United States needs an alternative foreign policy, one that focuses on preserving America’s strength and advancing its security, and
that expects other countries to take primary responsibility for protecting their security and preserving their interests. America’s leaders
should restrain their impulse to use the U.S. military when our vital interests are not directly threatened while avoiding being drawn into
distant conflicts that sap our strength and undermine our safety and values.

US leadership causes nuclear war with great powers ---Only way to avoid
conflict is peaceful decline
Leo Keay, 2/22/18, MA Student at Sciences Po studied at University of Oxford , “Sleepwalking into
Thucydides's Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony”,
https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sleepwalking-thucydidess-trap-perils-us-hegemony
The threat of great power warfare is the defining geopolitical question of this age. The 2018 National
Defence Strategy (NDS) describes the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with revisionist great powers as “the central
challenge to U.S. prosperity and security”.[1]

China is America’s chief competitor; seeking to rectify its “century of humiliation”, Beijing aspires to
regional influence and power across East Asia. Its growing military capabilities, especially its anti-access/area denial
technologies, are intended to achieve strategic dominance in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, it seeks geo-economic
influence over the region (and beyond) by becoming the leading provider of infrastructural investment and advanced industrial products
to its neighbours.[2]

The most sophisticated analysis of this issue consists of Graham T. Allison’s notion of the “Thucydides’s
trap”. Drawing on the Greek historian’s maxim that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made
war inevitable ”, Allison contends that the growth of a rising power’s capabilities relative to those of a
ruling power greatly increases the probability of war . This occurs for two reasons: “ rising power
syndrome ”, whereby the ascending polity exhibits a hubristic sense of self-importance and aggression; and
“ ruling power syndrome ”, whereby the established power suffers from a paranoid sense of insecurity
at its own decline.[3]
Nevertheless, Allison does believe that Thucydides’s
trap can be avoided. In four out of his sixteen historical case studies,
ruling powers did peacefully accommodate rising powers.
One notable example was the “Great Rapprochement” between Britain and the US at the end of the nineteenth-century.[4] Britain
conceded supremacy in the Western hemisphere to the US because it faced a more direct threat to its imperial possessions and naval
supremacy from Germany. Britain therefore sacrificed its vested interests in one domain to preserve its vital interests in another.[5]

Allison recommends that Washington pursue a similar course, prioritising the avoidance of nuclear
war over its strategic and economic primacy in the Pacific.[6]
While Professor Allison’s effort to draw lessons from history is praiseworthy, his analysis of the “Great Rapprochement” misses an
important point. Unlike twenty-first century America, nineteenth-century Britain was not a hegemon. Despite its naval superiority,
Britain was never a significant land power in continental Europe.[7] It was instead a leading member of a multipolar great power system.
For this reason, London was used to making significant concessions to other states in order to protect its vital interests. In the 1880s, for
instance, it sacrificed zones of informal influence in West Africa to France and East Africa to Germany, in order to safeguard its core
possessions of Egypt and South Africa. Accordingly, the “Great Rapprochement” was yet another pragmatic trade-off which came
naturally to British statesmen.

The US’s position today is different. Since

the end of the Cold War it has enjoyed global hegemony,
underpinned by its unipolar military capacity and its extensive alliance network. Consequently, Washington
is prone to regard any accommodation of Beijing’s ambitions as a unilateral retreat rather than a necessary
compromise.
President Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) exemplifies
this outlook.[8]China’s ambitions are described
as “antithetical to U.S. values and interests ”. Both states are engaged in “a geopolitical competition
between free and repressive visions of world order”,[9] whereby China seeks to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific
region”.[10]

Washington’s alliance commitments further intensify its rivalry with Beijing. Any failure to side with partners
such as Japan and the Philippines in a confrontation with China would weaken the credibility of America’s security
guarantees. The NSS therefore calls for “sustained U.S. leadership” against China, providing a “collective response that upholds a
regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence”.[11] America, therefore, appears to be suffering from an acute
case of “ruling power syndrome”: the stakes of hegemony are so high that any significant concession to Beijing would
irrevocably compromise Washington’s position.

This is not a unique situation, unipolarity led Napoleon to declare war against Russia in 1812. After coercing all
other powers to participate in the continental blockade against Britain, he could not tolerate Russia’s refusal to cooperate. Despite his
personal friendship with Tsar Alexander, Napoleon could only see Russian policy in hostile terms, concluding in 1811 that “war will come
about, though I don’t want it, neither does he, and though it is equally against the interests of France and of Russia. I have seen this
happen so often before”.[12]
Rigid alliance structures also magnify the risks of great power conflict. On the eve of the First World War, Europe
was divided between the “Dual Alliance” of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the “Triple Entente” of France, Russia
and Great Britain. It was the unshakeable nature of each bloc’s security commitments that transformed Austria-Hungary’s
invasion of Serbia into a global military conflict.

The only way to avoid future conflagrations is to adopt an attitude of radical humility .
America’s leaders must accept that the tectonic shifts of geopolitical power cannot be reversed, only managed so as
to minimise friction. This is more profound than the distinction between vital and vested interests suggested by Allison. It requires
the ruling power to fundamentally scale down its ambitions to those of a great power.

The US must cease to aspire to global hegemony , and instead aim for limited dominance. President Obama had the
foresight to appreciate this. As he explained in his 2015 NSS: “America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not mean we can
or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world […] our resources and influence are not infinite”.[13]

One possible solution could be to return to the fundamentals of nineteenth-century US grand strategy, the Monroe Doctrine.

Washington’s priority should be to preserve its strategic autonomy in the Western hemisphere. Consequently, it must continue to
safeguard its security in the Pacific by maintaining its military bases and honouring its alliance commitments there.

Nevertheless, Washington should ultimately be prepared to cede ascendancy in East Asia to Beijing. Chinese naval
dominance within the First Island Chain should be accepted as a fait accompli. Furthermore, the US’s alliances should be
defensive pacts providing limited support against unprovoked aggression, not blank cheques offering unconditional assistance.
These decisions might appear to compromise the world order that Washington has long worked to sustain. Nevertheless, the costs of
losing global hegemony must be weighed against the benefits of retaining limited dominance .

Not only would the US avoid war with China , it would be better placed to secure Beijing’s
cooperation over numerous issues of mutual interest, chiefly economic growth, international security and nuclear non-
proliferation . The US would therefore retain immense influence over world politics, but less as a lone sheriff than a co-
partner with China. Much will depend, however, on whether future American leaders embrace the wisdom of humility or yield to
the arrogance of power.

Transition from unipolarity will be peaceful---the coming order is multiplex,

not multipolar
Amitav Acharya 17, professor of international relations at American University, 9/8/17, “After
Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,”
https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/
Multiplexity, Not Multipolarity
Many punditssee the emerging world order as a return to multipolarity, but this is misleading. There
are at least five major differences between prewar multipolarity and the emerging twenty-first-century world order. First,
prewar
multipolarity was largely a world of empires and colonies. The primary actors in world politics were the great
powers, and those were mainly European, though the United States and Japan joined the club in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
In contrast, the contemporary world is marked by a multiplicity of actors that matter. These are not
only great powers, and not even just states, but also international and regional institutions,
corporations, transnational nongovernmental organizations, social movements, transnational
criminal and terrorist groups, and so on.
Second , the nature of economic interdependence today is denser, consisting of trade , finance, and
global production networks and supply chains, whereas prewar multipolarity was mainly trade-
based.

Third , contemporary economic interdependence is more global compared to that in the nineteenth
century, when it was mostly intra-European, with the rest of the world in a situation of dependence
on the European empires.

Fourth , there is far greater density of relatively durable international and regional institutions
today, whereas pre–World War I Europe had only one—the defunct European Concert of Powers—
and the interwar period only had the short-lived and failed League of Nations.
Fifth, challenges to order and stability have become more complex. The traditional challenge to
world order, interstate conflict, has declined steadily since World War II and now stands at a
negligible level. Meanwhile, intrastate conflicts and transnational challenges have grown
considerably. Arguably, the biggest threat to the national security of many countries today comes
not from another state but from a terrorist network. Moreover, issues such as climate change,
human trafficking, drugs, and pandemics do not respect national boundaries and are magnified by
interdependence and globalization, further complicating the mosaic of security challenges facing
the twenty-first-century world.

The emerging world order is thus not a multipolar world, but a multiplex world.18 It is a world of
multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a
part of what is on offer. A multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema—one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors,
directors, and plots all under the same roof. Trump and Brexit have shown that there are serious variations and differences in the script
of world order even within the West—not just between the West and the rest, as is commonly assumed. At the
same time, a
multiplex world is a world of interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not a singular global
order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and
globalisms.
A multiplex world is not defined by the hegemony of any single nation or idea. This does not necessarily mean the United States is in
decline—this is still arguable. But it does mean that the United States is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate the
institutions of global governance and world order in the manner it had for much of the post–World War II period. And while elements of
the old liberal order will survive, they will have to accommodate new actors and approaches that do not bend to America’s commands
and preferences.

Crosscutting Globalisms, Not Liberal Hegemony

It is wrong to say that globalization is over. Instead, in a multiplex world it will take, and is already taking, a different form. Globalization
may become less driven by trade and more by developmental concerns. This might give more space to the initiatives of the emerging
powers, which tend to focus more on infrastructure than on free trade. Thus, the new globalization could well be led less by the West and
more by the East, especially China and India, as it had been for a thousand years before European colonialism. On its own, China may not
be able to lead globalization outright, but it has the potential to reshape it with initiatives like the One Belt, One Road strategy and the
AIIB.

Moreover, the new globalization will be anchored more by South-South linkages rather than North-South ones. This is already
happening: According to the United Nations Development Programme, the South has increased its share of global output from one third
in 1990 to almost a half today, and it has increased its share of world merchandise trade from 25 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in
2010.19 And South-South trade jumped from less than 8 percent of world merchandise trade in 1980 to about 25 percent in 2014.20
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South-South flows in foreign direct investment now constitute
over a third of global flows.21 These trends could reshape globalization.

Due to the prominence of China and other emerging powers, the new globalization might also be more respectful of sovereignty,
especially compared to the Western-led globalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has been associated with
colonialism and direct and indirect military intervention to secure Western economic and strategic interests (a long list of examples
would include the Suez and numerous interventions in Latin America). This is not to say that emerging powers do not use force or violate
sovereignty. With its growing overseas investments, China will be tempted to abandon its professed policy of noninterference and to use
force or coercion in support of its economic and strategic goals. But
in line with the outlooks of the emerging powers,
the new globalization is likely to be more economic and less political or ideological (especially
compared to the West’s promotion of democracy and human rights ).
G-Plus, Not G-Zero, Governance

Many of Trump’s stated policy positions suggest a nationalist, inward-looking U.S. foreign policy. His policies on trade and security are
undermining global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, and disrupting climate change
negotiations. In many ways, this may push the system of global governance to be even less U.S.- and Western-centric. But here, too, as
noted earlier, the post-war architecture of global governance was already moving in that direction. Global governance has
already begun accommodating the growing roles of private bodies (corporations, foundations, etc.), civil society
groups, and regional arrangements, thus reducing the position of formal intergovernmental organizations. And the emerging powers
have already been clamoring for a greater voice and leadership in existing institutions while also creating new global and regional
mechanisms, such as the BRICS-initiated New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (a financial mechanism), the
AIIB, China’s OBOR and its Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia mechanism, and India’s own plans for
infrastructure development in South Asia, to name a few. And while the demand for global governance will remain, the architecture will
continue to fragment and decenter, confirming the onset of the multiplex world.

The maintenance of world order depends on regional orders. As Henry Kissinger argues, “The contemporary quest for world order will
require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one
another.”22 Yet developing such inclusive, open regional orders is a critical challenge. This would require creating new regional
mechanisms and supporting those that already exist but are constrained by a lack of resources. While some liberal thinkers see
regionalism (not including the European Union) as a threat to world order, there are many regional initiatives that, if recognized and
strengthened, could actually support world order. For example, ASEAN+3’s Chiang Mai initiative on finance has allowed those countries
to better cope with short-term liquidity problems, supplementing the existing capacity of the International Monetary Fund.23 As another
example, though the Obama administration feared the Chinese-inspired AIIB would be a competitor to the World Bank, its structure and
rules mimic those of established multilateral institutions, and its management includes persons from Western countries. Thus, it is more
likely to complement rather than compete with the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. In
a fragmented and pluralistic
world, exploring local and regional initiatives in diverse issue areas that complement older but
fragmenting global institutions could be one of the most promising ways to build world order in the
twenty-first century.
A multiplex world will not be free from disorder, but it is also not necessarily doomed to be what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel
Roubini call a G-Zero World —“one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and
economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda ”24— simply because of the
loss of a predominant U.S. leadership role . Leadership-sharing between the Western powers and the
emerging powers is more attainable than (hard) power-sharing. A world less dependent on U.S. leadership—but without a complete
U.S. retreat into isolationism—will still find ways to cooperate. It will still come together in crisis, as happened at the
G-20 summit after the 2008 global financial crisis, or to combat common perils, as happened with
the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.25 The latter was made possible not because of
proactive U.S. leadership but because of common understanding among the Western nations, the
emerging powers (led by China), and civil society groups . Importantly, the agreement avoided the traditional
Western legalistic sanction-based approach in favor of a softer, voluntaristic approach that is characteristic of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations.

A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social
movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them.
 Link---Backlash---2NC
American power is seen as threatening to other countries---Consensus flows
neg
Dorothy Manevich and Hanyu Chwe, 8/1/17, Research analyst for Pew Research Center
conducting international issue polling, Research Assistant for Pew Research Center, Network
Science PhD Student, “Globally, more people see U.S. power and influence as a major threat”,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/01/u-s-power-and-influence-increasingly-
seen-as-threat-in-other-countries/
Concerns about American power and influence have risen in countries around the world amid steep drops in
U.S. favorability and confidence in the U.S. president.

Across 30 nations surveyed by Pew Research Center both in 2013 and this spring, a median of 38% now say U.S. power
and influence poses a major threat to their country, up 13 percentage points from 2013.
Concerns about U.S. power as a threat are comparable to worries over Chinese and Russian power in
much of the world. About three-in-ten around the globe name China or Russia as a major threat.

It’s worth noting that worries about all three countries trail concerns about other tested threats. People are much more likely to feel
threatened by ISIS and climate change, in particular, but also by the condition of the global economy, cyberattacks, and refugees from
countries like Iraq and Syria.

Nevertheless, the proportion of the public that views American power as a major threat to their
country grew in 21 of the 30 nations between 2013 and 2017. The largest increases occurred in Spain (42 percentage
points), Chile (34 points), and Turkey and Ghana (28 points each).

Just in the past year, perceptions of the U.S. as a major threat have increased by at least 8 percentage points among
several long-standing American allies, including Australia (13 points) and the UK (11 points). Concern about
U.S. power is up 10 points in Canada, Germany and Sweden, and 8 points in France and the Netherlands.

In other countries, however, fewer people see the U.S. as a major threat compared with four years ago. In Poland and India, for example,
the share of people who believe U.S. power is a large concern for their country decreased by 8 percentage points. And in Russia, the
Philippines and Jordan, perceptions of American power as a major threat did not change between 2013 and 2017.

U.S. power and influence ranks as the top threat in only one country – Turkey (72%) – where it ranks 8 points
higher than the second-greatest concern, refugee displacement from countries like Iraq and Syria. (Due to security
concerns, the survey did not ask people in Turkey about the threat posed by ISIS.)

In Japan, people see China and the U.S. as almost equally threatening : 62% of Japanese respondents see the U.S. as a
major threat while 64% say the same for China. On the other hand, fewer than one-in-five in Israel (17%) and Poland (15%) say
American power is a major threat.

America’s neighbors , Mexico and Canada, both see the U.S. as more threatening than either
China or Russia . In Mexico, a 61% majority perceives U.S. power as a major threat. And in Canada, 38% feel threatened by the
U.S. This figure exceeds Canadians’ threat ratings of Russian and Chinese power (30% and 25%, respectively).

Concerns about U.S. power and influence differ by demographic groups across a number of key U.S. allies. In
Australia, for example, women are 20 percentage points more likely than men to feel American power is a major threat. Women are also
considerably more likely to view the U.S. as a major concern in Canada (16 points), Japan (11 points), the UK (11 points) and France (10
points).

Those on the ideological left are also more likely than those on the right to see U.S. power and influence as a large concern. In the
UK,
for example, 52% of those on the left see American power as a major threat to their country. Just 29% of Brits on the
right agree. The left-right gap is 22 percentage points in South Korea, 20 points in Canada, 18 points in Australia, 13 points in Greece, 11
points in Sweden and 8 points in the Netherlands.

US leadership is hated by countries---Trump proves decline with America first

policy---Decline has been happening and will continue---Overwhelms the aff’s
signal
Sintia Radu 2/28/19, International Affairs Reporter, “The World Continues to Disapprove of
America's Leadership”, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-28/the-
world-continues-to-disapprove-of-americas-leadership

JANUARY 2017 MARKED THE beginning of the transition in U.S. foreign policy from multilateralism to
putting itself first , at times against even its allies' interests. Throughout the past two years, the administration of
President Donald Trump has taken isolationist actions, such as leaving behind the Trans-Pacific
Partnership trade deal, announcing it will withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change and
criticizing long-term allies like Canada and the European Union.
All of these actions have had consequences, experts say, with the new world order seeing America's role
changing – and not for the better.
After previously reporting a decade-high level of disapproval of U.S. leadership in 2017 (43 percent in more
than 130 countries), Gallup, the Washington, D.C.-based global polling firm, released a new survey on Thursday
showing that the world still doesn't seem fond of U.S. foreign policy . The poll of adults in 133
countries, including the U.S., showed the median level of disapproval of American leadership remains at 40
percent. In contrasts, U.S. citizens' approval of American foreign policy lingered around the same decade-low level of 30 percent
recorded in 2017.

"We saw the most precipitous decline in the transition from the Barack Obama administration to the first year
of the Trump administration (in 2017)," says Julie Ray, managing editor for world news at Gallup and author of the report. Such an
immediate decline is unusual, Ray says, since "we typically see that there's a honeymoon period after a new leader takes office and then
followed by cooling down period."

Negative views of U.S. foreign policy are shared by the majority of the countries in the Gallup study, and
significant drops of at least 10 percentage points were recorded in five of the 133 countries polled -- Macedonia, Slovakia, Cambodia, Iran
and Turkey.

"The scoresin Iran, Turkey and Cambodia notably were the lowest on record for these three countries in the past
decade, with approval dropping to 8 percent in Iran, 14 percent in Turkey and 39 percent in Cambodia," the report states.
 Link---General---2NC
US leadership is bad and turns their scenario---Causes globalization of US
interests---Makes promotion impossible and threatens war with China and
Russia---Trump is unique
Henry R. Nau 8/8/18, professor of political science and international affairs at Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University, “Return of the Balance of Power”,
https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/return-balance-power-33877
That the
United States abandoned nationalism for globalism after World War II is hardly surprising. Its
preponderant power explains a lot. What was unique was American nationalism: it was intrinsically
internationalist. American nationalism built a Western world premised on liberal (or republican) values
and institutions, something which no authoritarian power would have done. It did not try to preserve its empire; it deliberately
accepted relative decline by helping other countries grow faster than the United States. It also supported liberal institutions, the
necessity of opposing parties within democratic countries and contentious politics among democratic countries (today’s conflicts
between the United States, eu and Japan). Liberal meant competition , not centralization. This strategy began with the
defeated powers, Germany and Japan, and continued throughout the postwar era with each succeeding generation of developing nations.
Most recently, it included America’s greatest gamble of all: China and India. Imagine an authoritarian Russia or China pursuing such
policies, then or today. This is the essential difference between liberal and authoritarian nationalism.

It is helpful to recall this postwar policy because it created the globalism we have today—a globalism that
does not reject nationalism but is based on liberal nationalism. America’s third chance comes in a world that is
vastly better than the world of 1919. There is no need to find safety from this world by withdrawing. Nor is there a need for the
United States to assume disproportionate burdens. There are other powerful liberal nations capable of
sharing leadership responsibilities. The United States can focus on overlapping not overarching interests. It can ask other
democratic nations to do more, and it can use its relative leverage of geographic distance and open markets to achieve a more equitable
balance of burdens and responsibilities.

Globalism tends to make all conflicts universal ; nationalism prioritizes conflicts on a nation’s
borders. Regionalism mediates between the two. Most conflicts today are not universal. Terrorism is not a global war like the Cold
War; nor is it primarily a territorial matter located in a single spot (though a caliphate did and could once more emerge). Russia’s threat
does not extend to Asia and Cuba as the Soviet threat did during the Cold War; it centers on restoring the former Soviet space in the
Caucasus, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states. And while China’s threat is increasingly global, its military
capabilities are still largely local (e.g., South China Sea) and its economic capabilities are constrained by its dependence on
world markets—an entanglement with the United States that never existed in the case of the former Soviet Union. China and
Russia might still combine to pose a global threat, but they no longer have a common ideology as they did under
communism. They have common interests in opposing the Western liberal order and might use Iran
and North Korea as regional conflicts to project Russian influence into the Middle East and Chinese
influence into Asia.

PRESIDENT TRUMP seems to be finding his way to this new combination of globalism and nationalism . He
is more nationalist than any president since Franklin Roosevelt in the mid-1930s. But because the world is different
and better, he also accepts realist aspects of the world that did not exist in the 1930s. He accepts the new world as it is with its Cold War
democratic alliances, not the old world of authoritarian nationalism as it was under the balance of power. Yes, he sharply
criticizes the alliances, but he does so to make them stronger, not weaker. He wants the allies to do more, not the United States to
do less. He has increased both U.S. defense spending and U.S. NATO contributions.

Trump even evinces some aspects of a conservative internationalist approach, defending the option of freedom
in places like Ukraine and the Korean peninsula while not expecting authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, China
and Russia to become free any time soon. He
clearly rejects multilateralism and the liberal internationalist tradition: “I
am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down, and will never enter America into any
agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs .” That’s why liberal internationalists who champion
centralized institutions accuse him of undermining the Western liberal order.

Trump defines America’s security interests nationally and regionally . He rejects the global war on
terrorism and would like to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, and he firmly resists new
troop commitments in Syria or Yemen. He prefers a nationalist strategy of offshore interventions to combat terrorism,
now supported by many realists as well. Intervene if necessary to defeat or keep terrorists from controlling territory, but do not

nation-build or promote democracy . Encourage local nations to provide the necessary boots on the ground. The quick
military defeat of isis by offshore capabilities and Trump’s diplomacy to rally Saudi Arabia and other local nations to counterbalance Iran
epitomize this localized approach.

US leadership is bad and makes conflict more likely---Minor powers

proliferate nuclear weapons---Balancing guts the ability to exercise power---
Empirics flow neg
Nuno P. Monteiro 12/28/12, Director of International Security Studies and Associate Professor
of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064
Defensive Dominance

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status
quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global
distribution of power.60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the
unipole’s intentions.

First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may
spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities.

Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may
lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely
to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical
examples . To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions.61 There are a couple of reasons,
however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo.

First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue non-revisionist goals. This is
particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes,
“Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry

about its future behavior . . . . The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in
making foreign policy choices.”62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in
bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other
great powers.
Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great
power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by
definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s
intentions.63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the
unipole and minimize the chances of conflict but at the price of their external autonomy.64
Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to benefit greatly from
being part of the unipolar system.65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor
powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus,
most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor.66

International Security 36:3 24

As Colin Elman argues, power preponderance trumps all other dimensions that go into a state’s calculus of threat, making the unipole
threatening regardless of its location and intentions, as well as the offense-defense balance. Accommodation,
however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole
should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—
resisting the unipole.
The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still,
structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy
of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers,
however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor
powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for
regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely
to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers.67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows,
countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant.

This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s
and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973.68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities
were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching
attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable .69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing
were lower relative to those of Bandwagoning.

In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be
able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor.70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors
exist.71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate
the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security
needs given that they possess prevent them from doing so. In any case, should a major power start balancing
against the unipole, the world would be witnessing a dynamic that would potentially lead to the end of unipolarity, a
possibility that belongs to discussions of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace.

only limited power-projection capabilities.72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position
of extreme selfhelp.

There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy , (2) uncertainty about
other states’ intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential
great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all
states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to
recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the
capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of
offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their
capabilities through internal balancing.
To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails,
recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric
strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear
weapons .73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers.
 Link---Soft Power---2NC
US soft power is bad---Gives rise to political elites who causes instability---
Causes regional chaos, civil wars, and nationalism
Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone, 4/15/9, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of Pittsburgh, Associate Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University
received Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Pittsburgh, “Democracy Aid, Democratization
and Civil Conflict: How does Aid Affect Civil Conflict?”, file:///C:/Users/cguti/Downloads/SSRN-
id1456753.pdf
II. DEMOCRATIZATION, CIVIL CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY AID

The fact that democracies do not fight each other is one of the most well established findings of International Relations (e.g., Maoz and
Abdoladi 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum
2003; Ray 1998; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Weede 1992). It is safe to argue that no other empirical regularity identified by
International Relations scholars has found as much resonance within the policy community as the “democratic peace” proposition. The
rise in the democracy promotion efforts by the international community since the 1990s is a testament to this
argument (e.g., Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999; Diamond 1995).

Within this context, when Mansfield and Snyder proposed that democratization is a violent process, it inevitably
initiated a controversial debate in the literature. In a series of articles and books, Mansfield and Snyder (1995a, 1995b, 1997,
2002, 2005, 2007, 2009) argued that although mutually democratic states may be peaceful in their relations with one another, the
path to democracy can be a violent one: i.e., democratizing states are more likely to get involved in
wars than consolidated regimes.
There have been several compelling criticisms of Mansfield and Snyder’s argument mostly on methodological grounds (e.g., Enterline
1996; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Narang and Nelson 2009; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). Recent work by
Mansfield and Snyder (2002, 2005, 2009) has refined and significantly improved upon the research design and addressed most of the
empirical criticisms and the findings still hold, i.e., democratization is positively associated with violent conflict.
As Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2007) note, most theoretical and empirical treatments of the democratization-conflict
link have occurred with a focus on interstate wars. In From Voting to Violence, Snyder (2000) provides one of the first
exclusive systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict, particularly ethnic
conflicts. Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable
to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends

to create divisions in the society and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’
polarizing tactics. According to Snyder, before democratization, the public is not politically active and hence its sense of
belonging to a nation is relatively weak (35).3
Democratization increases the feeling of nationalism, especially with the provocation of the elites who feel
threatened by the arrival of democracy. To maintain or increase their grab on political power, the elites may
depict the political opponents and the ethnic minorities as traitors by invoking nationalist sentiments in
the public (37).4

These polarizing tactics, in turn, create tensions among ethnic groups and hence increase the risk of violent
clashes in the society.5
3 Rustow (1970) argues that national unity is a background condition for democratization (354). 4 In Snyder’s argument, it is not
entirely clear whether the elites represent the ancient régime or the new opposition. In our discussion, we treat political elites as a more
generic group that may be a member of either the old or new regime.
6 For example, during 1987 Milosevic skillfully used the Serbian state TV to convince the Serbian minority that
Serbs in the Kosovo were suffering discrimination and repression at the hands of the Albanian majority. These kinds of
inciting polarizing tactics by Milosevic and the Serbian nationalist elites were pivotal in contributing to violence in
Kosovo. Violent struggles in post-communist regimes such as Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia during the
1990s are other examples of nationalist upheavals incited by the domestic political elites during
democratization process.
Snyder (2000) argues that the elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is particularly strong and damaging if the
democratizing state has weak political institutions. If state institutions are strong, the institutions may be able to deter the elites’
opportunistic behavior and curb its potentially damaging impacts. However, during early phases of democratization, the
institutions are usually new and fragile and the central authority is weak. The weakening of central authority gives the
elites the opportunity to monopolize the media, create divisions in the society, and control the political discourse.
Without the constraints of strong institutions and state authority, the political elites have more leeway to pull the
society to any direction their interests dictate.
 Transition---2NC
Transition to multipolarity will be peaceful---Other countries fill in and
maintain international order
The Economist 2/2/12, English-language weekly magazine-format newspaper, “The stakes of
American hegemony”, https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2012/02/02/the-
stakes-of-american-hegemony
IN THE latest edition of the New Republic, Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at Brookings and noted Kagan, serves up a ponderous
rebuttal to the proposition that
America is in decline. I don't disagree with Mr Kagan that America remains, for the foreseeable
future, securely
hegemonic, which is the thesis he is most anxious to establish. But I am sceptical of Mr Kagan's
assumptions about why American unipolarity must be so jealously protected, which he announces at the outset of his
essay:

The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even
with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American
principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If
American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and
the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the
twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even
with diminished American power “the underlying
foundations of the l iberal i nternational o rder will survive and thrive ,” as the political scientist G. John
Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion.
There is much to quibble with here. It may be that the current global
dispensation to some extent "reflects American
principles and preferences". If it does, however, it's not because it "was built and preserved by
American power ", except in a rather trivial sense. The American model of political economy has proved in many ways to be the
world's most successful. As the 20th century's main rivals to capitalist liberal democracy failed, polities worldwide looked to the example
of Western Europe and North America, and this led to a glad flowering of democracy and prosperity. But America didn't cause the
world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and
authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run. And America
didn't compel aspiring first-worlders to try
market economies and democratic governance. The nations of the world could see for themselves what was working and, in their
own ways, have mostly followed suit.

If American power does wither, it will be due to America's failure to maintain really first-rate
institutions. The ensuing world order would indeed become, as Mr Kagan has it, one "reflecting the desires and
the qualities of other world powers". But that's simply because the capitals of the world aren't full of blithering dopes who
wouldn't know what to do if Brookings senior fellows didn't tell them. Smart countries will want to emulate those that
remain or have become first-rate. And, as far as I can tell, people who become accustomed to wealth and freedom don't
have to be bullied and cajoled into wanting to keep it. Because they have grown rich, they'll have the means to keep it.
Which is why it's absurd to think that if America loses its lustre, the peoples of the world will inevitably

suffer under the dark reign of Russian or Chinese bad guys. Other wealthy, liberal democracies can
have huge navies, too, if we'd let them. Mr Ikenberry's alleged "pleasant illusion" looks pleasantly solid to me.
Mr Kagan gives it his all arguing that the "rise
of the rest" does not mean America's not still undisputed king of the
hill. But Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown law professor, is right that the skyward trajectory of the BRICs does
mean America's relative influence has waned , and that that's a happy development :

[A]s Reagan recognized, a

decline in relative American power is a good thing , not a bad thing — if we can turn
rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the
land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper
most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve
burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone.

The global public goods Mr Kagan rightly prizes—peace, stability, unimpeded trade routes—will
be more, not less secure if
the burden of their provision is more broadly distributed . And America is more likely to remain worth
emulating were it to redirect some significant portion of the trillions spent maintaining its hegemony into
more productive uses.

No transition wars---Cross-sectional datasets prove retrenchment is

peaceful---only we have non-theoretical support for our argument
Douglas B. Atkinson 16, PhD candidate in the Department of International Affairs at the
University of Georgia, studying international relations and comparative politics. With George W.
Williford, Ph.D. Student at The University of Georgia. December 2016. “Research note: “Should we
stay or should we go? Exploring the outcomes of great power retrenchment””
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168016682888
Exploring the link between shifting power and variation in a state’s foreign policy has long been
central to the study of international relations. However, it has also become a question of
increased political importance as policy-makers in the U nited S tates grapple with fears of
decreasing international influence caused by the economic and military growth of great power
competitors. Scholarship exploring this topic has been deeply divided, with prominent scholars such as Brooks et al. (2013),
Copeland (2000), and Gilpin (1983) suggesting that a strategy of retrenchment will leave declining states less safe and less prosperous
and Copeland (2000) and Gilpin (1983) contending that retrenchment will open a declining state up to predation and imperil their
security. On the other hand, scholars such as Layne (2009, 2012), MacDonald
and Parent (2011), and Posen (2013)
suggest that retrenchment will lead to a more secure and prosperous America.
Although there has been intense theoretical debate regarding the benefits and costs of
retrenchment, these theories have only been tested on a handful of cases with various degrees of
methodological rigor . Work by MacDonald and Parent (2011) represents one notable
exception as they base their findings on a cross-case analysis of all major powers over the
same time span that we analyze . However, their analysis is limited in its ability to control for confounding factors that
may affect the success of strategies of retrenchment . We build on this work by testing these arguments on a
time-series crosssectional dataset of all major powers that stretches from 1870 to the present .
Scholars have often pointed to the United Kingdom’s successful policy of retrenchment following World War II as a rare exception to an
otherwise bleak record (Gilpin, 1983). Our
findings suggest that retrenchment is generally effective, making
states more likely to recover their previous power and less likely to experience the most
dangerous interstate conflicts.
We propose two hypotheses that directly test two of the most contentious claims in the literature.

H1: When in a period of decline, a state that chooses to retrench will be more likely to recover their previous position than a state that
does not.

H2: A great power experiencing a period of decline will be less likely to be the target of predation at the hands of fellow states than a
great power that does not.

Research design

We test our argument on a sample comprising all states identified as great powers by the Correlates of War (COW) project from 1870 to
2007. This specific time-span is analyzed due to data availability.1 States enter the dataset in 1870 or the first year thereafter in which
they achieve great power status and exit the dataset when they lose their great power status for the last time. The full list of countries
and years included in the data is provided in Table 1.

To operationalize relative power, we follow MacDonald and Parent (2011) in constructing an ordinal ranking of all great powers in a
given year. States are ranked according to their overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among great powers. This is
preferable to measures of absolute power, such as overall capabilities, that do not allow us to capture the relational nature of our theory.
States can experience relative decline because their own economic performance is poor, or because other states are simply advancing
faster than they are.2

States are coded as entering a period of relative decline when they lose at least one rank in a given year. States exit a period of decline, or
recover, when they regain at least one ordinal rank after they enter a period of decline. In our view, partial recoveries that reverse the
process of decline without restoring a state to its full previous rank still indicate successful retrenchment. We also believe that states
should maintain their improved ranking for some minimum period of time. States that regain a rank but immediately lose it again have
not successfully recovered. Since we have no strong theoretical priors regarding how long this period should be, we use two different
thresholds and present results for both. One requires a state to maintain their improved ranking for at least one year after recovery, and
the other requires states to maintain their ranking for five years. Once states recover, they become “at risk” of experiencing another
period of decline.

To operationalize retrenchment, we use the percentage change in a state’s military expenditures over the previous year as a proxy for its
military posture. Whether they are drawing down foreign commitments or decreasing military investment at home, states engaged in a
strategy of retrenchment should display declining military expenditures. This provides a continuous measure that allows us to capture
both whether a state retrenches and the degree to which it does so. Data on military expenditures come from the COW project’s National
Military Capabilities Dataset and are measured in nominal values (Lemke and Reed, 1998).3 Because we do not have reliable data on the
inflation rate for military capabilities, we choose not to adjust these values for inflation. This decision should be inconsequential for our
results, since we care more about yearly changes in military expenditures rather than their absolute level.4

We include several control variables to ensure that our models capture the effects of adopting a
strategy of retrenchment rather than changes in latent military capabilities . To control for the
effects of a state’s absolute power, independent of its position relative to other states, we include
the absolute level of GDP per capita. We also include the change in GDP per capita over the previous year to control for
abrupt changes in absolute power. We also control for factors that may affect a state’s ability to retrench effectively. First, states
with strong alliance portfolios should have an easier time retrenching by relying on allies to
take up the slack in managing international security threats. We control for this using the S alliance score
measure, which provides a measure of alliance portfolio strength relative to the system leader (Small and Singer, 1969). Second,
states capable of nuclear deterrence may be able to reduce military spending more easily by
cutting conventional capabilities. We control for this using data on nuclear weapons status from Jo and Gartzke (2007).
Third, regime type may have an effect on a state’s ability to retrench. Because autocracies possess less veto players, we expect that they
may be able to adjust their spending priorities more easily. In addition, since well-consolidated regimes of either type may be more
capable of adjusting state policy than anocracies, regime type may have a curvilinear effect on our variables. To account for this, we
include both the state’s Polity2 score and its square using data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).5 To avoid the
possibility of simultaneity bias, we lag our independent variables and the control variables accounting for power by one year in all
models.

Recovery models

H1 predicts that states in periods of decline are more likely to recover their previous status if they retrench. To test this, we use discrete
time duration models to estimate the probability that a state in a period of decline recovers in a given year. The dependent variable for
these models is our binary indicator of Recovery. For each version of our Recovery variable (1 year and 5 year), we estimate binomial
logit models on the subset of the data for all years in which a state is coded as in decline. We model the change in the probability of
failure as a function of time using cubic polynomials of the time since the beginning of the period of decline (Carter and Signorino, 2010).
Because some countries never experience decline, both sets of models omit observations on some countries.

We begin by discussing the results of our models that employ the one year recovery threshold (see Table 2). Model 1 estimates the
probability of recovery solely as a function of a state’s change in military expenditures. Model 2 introduces the control variables
discussed above, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country (i.e., unit-specific intercepts) to control for unobserved
heterogeneity induced by including repeated measures on the same units. Taken together, these results provide modest support for the
argument that retrenchment helps a state recover their previous standing during periods of decline. Although the coefficient on changes
in military expenditures is insignificant in Model 1 and 2, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in Model 3 reveals that increases in
military expenditures have a negative and significant effect (at the 0.1 level) on the probability of recovery. Put otherwise, states that
decrease their military spending in a given year are less likely to experience recovery in the following year.
To illustrate the substantive significance of this effect, Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of recovery as a function of changes in
military expenditures with all other variables held at their observed values. The probability of recovery is highest after states make
significant cuts in their military spending. This probability steadily decreases from 0.239 to 0.018 at the high end of military
expenditures, indicating that states which make sharp increases in their military spending have almost no chance of recovery. Table 3
presents the results of our models using the five year recovery threshold. Although the coefficients are in the predicted direction, our
military expenditures variable is not significant in any of the three models. In addition, including fixed effects in the model requires
dropping a number of cases, since several states never experience our more restrictive coding of recovery. As such, it is difficult to draw
firm conclusions on the basis of these models. In sum, we find some evidence that retrenchment facilitates recovery, although this is
sensitive to both measurement and model specification.

Predation models

H2 predicts that states in periods of decline may be subject to increased attacks by enemy states.
To test this argument, we use binomial logistic regression to model the probability that a
great power is attacked by another state . Our dependent variable is a measure of whether
another state initiated a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against a state in a given year (Palmer
et al., 2015). Because we care about whether other states actually attack declining great powers, we
restrict our analysis to MIDs that involve fatalities. Our primary independent variables are our
indicator of whether a state is in decline and our measure of retrenchment . Since the choice of recovery
threshold determines how long a state is coded as in decline, we run models using both our one year and five year coding schemes. We
present the models using our one year threshold here. Models using the five year threshold are included in the Supplementary Online
Appendix. These models include the same control variables discussed in the previous section as well as cubic polynomials of the number
of years since the last MID initiation.

Table 4 presents the results of these models. Model 1 includes only our measures of decline and retrenchment, Model 2 introduces
control variables, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country year. Our results provide modest support for the argument that
states experiencing relative decline are subject to opportunistic attacks by challengers. Although this effect does not reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in Model 1, it becomes significant after introducing control variables (Model 2) and fixed effects (Model
3). Holding all other variables constant at their observed values, the predicted probability of fatal MID onset in a given year is 0.063 for
states in periods of decline and 0.031 for states that are not. As such, great powers in periods of decline are effectively twice as likely to
be attacked by another state in a given year. This provides support for the argument that great powers may be subject to opportunistic
attacks by challengers during periods of weakness.

We also find modest support for the proposition that great

powers that retrench may be able to avoid predatory
attacks by challengers. The coefficient for change in military expenditures is positive and
significant at the 0.1 level in two of our three models. This indicates that increases in military
spending are associated with an increased risk of predatory attacks . This effect is also
substantively significant. To provide some intuition of the size of the effect, Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of fatal
MID onset using Model 3 across the observed range of our Retrenchment variable with all other variables held at their observed values.
The predicted probability of fatal MID onset increases from 0.008 at the minimum to 0.146 at its maximum. This provides modest
support for the position of retrenchment optimists. Although great powers do appear to be subject to attack during periods of relative
decline, our results suggest that states that decrease their military expenditures may be less prone to this
type of behavior.
On the whole, our results are relatively robust. In general, the predicted values of both sets of models track well with the
observed data.6 Both our models of recovery and predation are robust to changes in the coding of our
decline variable using both one and five year thresholds for our recovery variable . However, our results
are somewhat sensitive to measurement and model specification, which points to the need for further testing before drawing firm
conclusions. In particular, the fixed effects model performs well in all of our analyses. We
believe this is the theoretically
most appropriate model, since it controls for unit effects and corrects for the violations of the
assumption that observations are measured independently. Nonetheless, this speaks to the need for further
testing before drawing firm conclusions on the basis of our results. Additional studies that employ alternate measures of power and
retrenchment would be especially useful in this regard.

Conclusion
In this paper, we
have assessed the outcomes of great power retrenchment using a dataset of all
great powers from 1870–2007. Counter to the expectations of the skeptics, we have found that
retrenchment has led to relatively successful outcomes . Declining states that choose to retrench
experience shorter periods of relative economic decline and are less likely to be the targets of
predation than declining states that choose not to retrench. While these findings are suggestive, more research
needs to be done to fully assess the outcomes of retrenchment. Among other topics, future work should explore the impact that
retrenchment has on the credibility of the international commitments that the declining state chooses to maintain. Additionally, our data
contain a number of instances of declining states that chose not to retrench and subsequently experienced prolonged economic problems
and predation .
Our findings suggest that retrenchment would have mitigated some of the negative
effects of decline. Of these cases, post-World War II France represents and interesting instance of a declining power that chose not
to retrench (Spruyt, 2005). Future research should employ quantitative counterfactual analyses, such as synthetic control, to explore
how retrenchment could have changed France’s fortunes.
Defense
 Trump Pounds---1NC
Trump slashes US soft and hard power---He shreds public diplomacy and
undermines the US’s image---Empirics prove that unpopular acts decrease
credibility
Joseph S. Nye, JR. 5/6/19, Joseph is a professor at Harvard University and American political
scientist, “American Soft Power in the Age of Trump” https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/american-soft-power-decline-under-trump-by-joseph-s-nye-2019-05

Many in the current US administration argue that soft power does not matter much; countries cooperate
out of self-interest. But this misses a crucial point: cooperation is a matter of degree, and the degree is affected by attraction or
repulsion, not just weapons and sanctions.

CAMBRIDGE – US President Donald Trump’s administration has shown little interest in public diplomacy .
And yet public diplomacy – a government’s efforts to communicate directly with other countries’ publics – is one of the key instruments
policymakers use to generate soft power, and the current information revolution makes such instruments more important than ever.

For philanthropic institutions, the fundamental question of accountability first raised by the emergence of liberal
democracy will not go away. To what extent should modern societies permit independent private agendas in the public realm and
allow their advocates to pursue objectives that are not shared by governments and popular majorities?

Opinion polls and the Portland Soft

Power 30 index show that American soft power has declined since
the beginning of Trump ’s term. Tweets can help to set the global agenda, but they do not produce soft power if
they are not attractive to others.

Trump’s defenders reply that soft power – what happens in the minds of others – is irrelevant; only hard power, with its military and
economic instruments, matters. In March 2017, Trump’s
budget director, Mick Mulvaney, proclaimed a “hard power
budget” that would have slashed funding for the State Department and the US Agency for
International Development by nearly 30%.
Fortunately, military leaders know better. In 2013, General James Mattis (later Trump’s first Secretary of Defense) warned Congress, “If
you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” As Henry Kissinger once pointed out,
international order depends not only on the balance of hard power, but also on perceptions of legitimacy, which depends crucially on soft
power.

Information revolutions always have profound socioeconomic and political consequences – witness the
dramatic effects of Gutenberg’s printing press on Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One can date the current information
revolution from the 1960s and the advent of “Moore’s Law”: the number of transistors on a computer chip doubles roughly every two
years. As a result, computing power increased dramatically, and by the beginning of this century cost 0.1% of what it did in the early
1970s.

In 1993, there were about 50 websites in the world; by 2000, that number surpassed five million. Today, more than four billion people
are online; that number is projected to grow to 5-6 billion people by 2020, and the “Internet of Things” will connect tens of billions of
devices. Facebook has more users than the populations of China and the US combined.

In such a world, the power to attract and persuade becomes increasingly important. But long gone are the days when public
diplomacy was mainly conducted through radio and television broadcasting. Technological advances have led to a dramatic reduction in the cost of

processing and transmitting information. The

result is an explosion of information, which has produced a “ paradox of plenty ”: an
abundance of information leads to scarcity of attention.
When the volume of information confronting people becomes overwhelming, it is hard to know what to focus on. Social media algorithms
are designed to compete for attention. Reputation becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles, informed by
social and ideological affinities, often center on the creation and destruction of credibility. Social media can make false information look
more credible if it comes from “friends.” As US Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential
election showed, this enabled Russia to weaponize American social media.
Reputation has always mattered in world politics, but credibility has become an even more important power resource. Information
that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned, but may also turn
out to be counterproductive if it
undermines a country’s reputation for credibility – and thus reduces its soft power . The most
effective propaganda is not propaganda. It is a two-way dialogue among people.

Russia and China do not seem to comprehend this, and sometimes the United States fails
to pass the test as well. During
the Iraq War, for example, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in a manner inconsistent with American
values led to perceptions of hypocrisy that could not be reversed by broadcasting pictures of Muslims living well in
America. Today, presidential “tweets” that prove to be demonstrably false undercut America’s credibility and

reduce its soft power . The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed (as reflected in
interviews or polls), not dollars spent or number of messages sent.

Domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to others’ views, or based on a narrow
conception of national interest can undermine soft power. For example, there was a steep decline in the attractiveness of
the US in opinion polls conducted after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 . In the 1970s, many people around the world
objected to the US war in Vietnam, and America’s global standing reflected the unpopularity of that policy.
Skeptics argue that such cycles show that soft power does not matter much; countries cooperate out of self-interest. But this
argument misses a crucial point: cooperation is a matter of degree, and the degree is affected by attraction or repulsion.

Fortunately, a country’s soft power depends not only on its official policies, but also on the attractiveness of its civil society. When
protesters overseas were marching against the Vietnam War, they often sang “We Shall Overcome,” an anthem of the US civil rights
movement. Given past experience, there is every reason to hope that the US will recover its soft power after Trump, though a greater
investment in public diplomacy would certainly help.
 Trump Pounds---2NC
Soft power is on the decline thanks to Trump and a multitude of other factors
that overwhelms the aff---Global influence is on the decline and will continue
no matter what the aff does
Natasha Bach 7/13/18, contributors intern at Business Insider graduated from McGill University
with a degree in Political Science, “Under President Trump, the U.S.’s ‘Soft Power’ Is Waning”,
https://fortune.com/2018/07/13/us-soft-power-ranking-fourth-place/

Global American influence is dropping —significantly.

And it’s not just due to President Donald Trump

upending the international order with threats to withdraw
from NATO, the WTO, the UN Human Rights Council, and starting trade wars with China and the EU.
According to an annual global ranking of nations’ soft power by London-based Portland Communications and USC’s Center
on Public Diplomacy, the U.S. has dropped three places since Trump became president. In 2016, the U.S. ranked
No. 1. It dropped to third last year, and fourth this year.

Here are the Top 10: 1. United Kingdom 2. France 3. Germany 4. United States 5. Japan 6. Canada 7. Switzerland 8. Sweden 9. Netherlands
10. Australia

The study draws on the concept of soft power first outlined by political scientist Joseph Nye, which has three pillars:
political values, culture, and foreign policy. Essentially, soft power is the ability to attract and influence
via means other than hard power, which is typically defined as military might and economic incentives or sanctions.
In order to measure the soft power of individual countries, the index relies on objective data across six
categories: government : commitment to freedom, human rights, and democracy, and the quality of political
institutions culture : the global reach and appeal of a nation’s cultural outputs, both pop-culture and high-culture

education : the level of human capital in a country, contribution to scholarship, and attractiveness to international
students engagement : the strength of a country’s diplomatic network and its contribution to global engagement and

development enterprise : the attractiveness of a country’s economic model, business friendliness, and capacity
for innovation digital : a country’s digital infrastructure and its capabilities in digital diplomacy It also draws
subjective data from international polling, which surveyed 11,000 people in 25 countries covering each region of the globe.

Particularly noteworthy are the areas in which the U.S.

did not perform well. While improving from the two previous years,
the U.S. came in 5th in the enterprise ranking, trailing Singapore, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark.

The U.S. ranked 15th in polling, showing a sustained international distaste for Trump’s “America First”
agenda . The U.S. came in 16th in polling last year, a nearly 10% drop from the year prior. Looking specifically at
polling data that determined favorability toward a country, the U.S. now ranks 21st, putting it in the bottom third of the list.

Most significantly, however, is the

government ranking. The U.S. came in 16th this year, dropping four places
from 12th place last year, demonstrating how objective metrics are beginning to register a decline in American soft

power . A shift away from multilateralism toward zero-sum unilateralism under the banner of “America
First” has significantly undermined American diplomatic capabilities and shaped the U.S.’s poor
government ranking this year, according to the report.
As Trump meets with Prime Minister Theresa May on Friday, it is worth noting that the U.K., despite struggling under the pressure of
Brexit negotiations, topped this year’s ranking at No. 1. The U.K. earned this top spot largely due to strengths in cultural and educational
engagement, as evidenced by the popularity of British music, the international trust of the BBC World Service, and the appeal of the Royal
Wedding of Prince Harry to Meghan Markle, which drew nearly two billion viewers around the world.

Trump crushes US soft power---Turns it into hard power and makes the US
more aggressive---Turns stability in the Middle East
Tom Engelhardt, 6/13/17, American writer co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs
the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. “Donald Trump Might Set a Record—for the Biggest
Decline of American Power in History” https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trump-might-
set-a-record-for-the-biggest-decline-of-american-power-in-history/
As we watch, it seems almost possible to see President Trump, in real time, tweet by tweet, speech by speech, sword
dance by sword dance, intervention by intervention, act by act, in the process of dismantling the system
of global power—of “ soft power ,” in particular, and of alliances of every sort —by which the U nited S tates made
its will felt, made itself a truly global hegemon. Whether his “ America first” policies are aimed at creating a future
order of autocrats, or petro-states, or are nothing more than the expression of his libidinous urges and secret hatreds, he may
already be succeeding in taking down that world order in record fashion.

Despite the mainstream pieties of the moment about the nature of the system Donald Trump appears to be
dismantling in Europe and elsewhere, it was anything but either terribly “liberal” or particularly peaceable.
Wars, invasions, occupations, the undermining or overthrow of governments, brutal acts and conflicts of
every sort succeeded one another in the years of American glory. Past administrations in Washington had a
notorious weakness for autocrats, just as Donald Trump does today. They regularly had less than no
respect for democracy if, from Iran to Guatemala to Chile, the will of the people seemed to stand in Washington’s way. (It is, as
Vladimir Putin has been only too happy to point out of late, an irony of our moment that the country that has undermined or overthrown
or meddled in more electoral systems than any other is in a total snit over the possibility that one of its own elections was meddled with.)
To enforce their global system, Americans never shied away from torture, black sites, death squads,
assassinations, and other grim practices. In those years, the US planted its military on close to 1,000 overseas military
bases, garrisoning the planet as no other country ever had.

Nonetheless, the canceling of the Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal, the withdrawal from the Paris
climate accord, threats against NAFTA, the undermining of NATO, the promise of protective tariffs on foreign
goods (and the possible trade wars that might go with them) could go a long way toward dismantling the
American global system of soft power and economic dominance as it has existed in these last decades. If such acts
and others like them prove effective in the months and years to come, they will leave only one kind of power in the
American global quiver: hard military power, and its handmaiden, the kind of covert power Washington, through the CIA in
particular, has long specialized in. If America’s alliances crack open and its soft power becomes too angry or
edgy to pass for dominant power anymore, its massive machinery of destruction will still be left, including its vast
nuclear arsenal. While, in the Trump era, a drive to cut domestic spending of every sort is evident, more money is still slated to go
to the military, already funded at levels not reached by combinations of other major powers.

Given the last 15 years of history, it’s not hard to imagine what’s likely to result from the further elevation
of military power: disaster . This is especially true because Donald Trump has appointed to key
positions in his administration a crew of generals who spent the last decade and a half fighting America’s
catastrophic wars across the Greater Middle East . They are not only notoriously incapable of thinking outside
the box about the application of military power, but faced with the crisis of failed wars and failing states, of
spreading terror movements and a growing refugee crisis across that crucial region, they can evidently only
imagine one solution to just about any problem: more of the same. More troops, more mini-surges, more military
trainers and advisers, more air strikes, more drone strikes… more.
After a decade and a half of such
thinking we already know perfectly well where this ends—in further failure, more
chaos and suffering, but above all in an inability of the U nited S tates to effectively apply its hard
power anywhere in any way that doesn’t make matters worse. Since, in addition, the Trump administration is filled
with Iranophobes, including a president who has only recently fused himself to the Saudi royal family in an
attempt to further isolate and undermine Iran , the possibility that a military-first version of American
foreign policy will spread further is only growing.
Such “more” thinking is typical as well of much of the rest of the cast of characters now in key positions in the
Trump administration. Take the CIA, for instance. Under its new director, Mike Pompeo (distinctly a “ more” kind of guy and an
Iranophobe of the first order), two key positions have reportedly been filled: a new chief of counterterrorism and a new head
of Iran operations (recently identified as Michael D’Andrea, an Agency hardliner with the nickname “the Dark Prince”). Here’s how
Matthew Rosenberg and Adam Goldman of the New York Times recently described their similar approaches to their jobs (my emphasis
added):

Mr. D’Andrea’s new role is one of a number of moves inside the spy agency that signal a more muscular approach to covert operations
under the leadership of Mike Pompeo, the conservative Republican and former congressman, the officials said. The agency also recently
named a new chief of counterterrorism, who has begun pushing for greater latitude to strike militants.

In other words, more!

Rest assured of one thing, whatever Donald Trump accomplishes in the way of dismantling America’s version of soft
power , “his” generals and intelligence operatives will handle the hard-power part of the equation just as “ably.”

US soft power will collapse inevitably---New areas of violence, divisions, and

nationalism
Andrei Tsygankov 6/29/16, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International
Relations at San Francisco State University, “The Age of Transition and the Soft Power Decline”,
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-age-of-transition-and-the-soft-power-decline/

Soft power will continue to decline . In the increasingly polarized world, the United States will seek to preserve its power
by all available means, while the rising powers will aim at improving their international position including by
obstructing the power of hegemon.

The discussion on soft power in international relations rings increasingly hollow. While the world events
demonstrate a limited utility of this instrument in defending national objectives, states continue to attribute an excessive weight to soft
power underestimating other tools of statecraft.

When Joseph Nye first introduced the concept of soft power in the 1990s, he meant to highlight growing prominence of American values
and the importance of sharing them for economic and political success in the increasingly global world. Soft power is the ability to
influence others by example thereby encouraging cooperation, not competition, among states. At the time, the U.S. power was at its
historic peak, and other nations were flocking to win its political and economic support.

Today, however, the world is in transition toward a post-West-centered order. Structurally, we still live in the
familiar world of American primacy, yet dynamically the world is moving toward forming post-hegemonic
international rules. In this brave new age of transition, competition and confrontation are at least as important as cooperation -
not least in the area of values, media, and ideology. Many non-Western nations such as Russia, China, and Iran feel
threatened by the U.S. strategy of regime changes in the Middle East, to which they respond by
promoting their own values . They remain skeptical of the liberal cooperation recommendations in the
inherently hierarchical world especially given Nye’s own argument that soft power “is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a
means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants.”

At least three developments illustrate the decline of soft power.

First , we are witnessing new areas of violence and lawlessness from Ukraine to Syria, new arms races
and proxy wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and new types of symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare
employed by states. When nations’ basic survival is at stake, they are not likely to attribute too much weight
to soft power and construction of positive image in protecting themselves.

Second , as a result of the highly uncertain post-hegemonic transition, new socio-economic divisions
emerge and deepen in Asia, Europe, and Eurasia. The world is well into a regionalization with the U.S., Russia, China,
Turkey, and other major nations struggling to influence their regional environment and build new spheres of geopolitical
influence. Syria, Ukraine, and South China Sea are newly open areas for a military competition. In the area of trade and investments, the
world is being reshaped into potentially competing trading blocs as the WTO is looking increasingly out of place. Although soft power
continues to play its role, in this environment tough public bargaining and secret negotiations are no less important.

Finally , the world is experiencing new processes of cultural reformulations and ethnic nationalism . Instead
of relying on protection and welfare of the U.S. hegemony, nations increasingly seek refuge in developing national
and regional arrangements. It would be a mistake to think of Russia’s recent turn to patriotism and conservative values as the
Kremlin’s exclusive invention. Many others states are looking to build protective “software” in order to rally masses behind their
new national identity projects. These projects are largely inward looking, and soft power is a misleading concept for describing their
nature.

Besides, theUnited States itself has long moved away from its initial preoccupation with soft power. Although following
George W. Bush’s years in the White House Nye’s ideas became popular in the State Department, they were soon
amended with special “digital” and financial tools for engaging foreign activists and monitoring foreign governments.
Activities of the U.S. government exposed by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden can hardly qualify as soft
power. The power of example is increasingly replaced with assertiveness, surveillance, and bribery in defeating the U.S. opponents.

Soft power will continue to decline. In the increasingly polarized world, the United States will seek to preserve its power by
all available means, while the rising powers will aim at improving their international position including by obstructing the power of
hegemon. A likely scenario for a foreseeable future is a prolonged uncertainly with a flexible alliance formation, a limited cooperation
over some issues, and confrontation and competition over others. Great
powers will continue to seek consolidation of
their perceived spheres of influence, even as they try to avoid directly engaging each other. When there are few
internationally recognized rules, there is a greater incentive to compete, rather than rely on the power of example. Until new rules are
established, soft power projects will have a limited appeal.
 I-Law Impact D---1NC
I-law is self-defeating---engagement with international institutions is
perceived as serving elite interests at the expense of the masses---causes
populist backlash and nationalism that undermines international cooperation
Eric A. Posner 17, American law professor at the University of Chicago Law School, professor of
international law, contract law, and bankruptcy, Most-cited legal scholar in America, January 2017,
“LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND THE POPULIST BACKLASH,”
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2898357
Combine these events with the populist backlashes within countries and the overall impression is one of
significant backsliding and retrenchment—something that no member of the Invisible College has, as far as I am aware of,
predicted or even discussed as realistic possibilities. What went wrong? The simple answer is that the benefits of globalization
—greater wealth and freedom—failed to materialize as promised, with most of the gains going to a
small fragment of the global elite, or to vast populations of workers in places like China, with
cheaper consumer goods in the west failing to compensate people in their minds for the economic
dislocation they experienced.42 Human freedom has not advanced since 2000, and has very likely declined.
Meanwhile, the costs of globalization turned out to be massive. These costs included the spread of international
terrorism, disease (such as the SARS epidemic), and economic instability, represented above all by the
financial crisis of 2007-2008, whose causes and effects were global in nature. As in the 1930s, the natural
reaction has been to abandon global commitments in favor of familiar tribal and national loyalties.
But modern international law, born out of that era, was supposed to prevent a return to it by binding
nations ever more closely together. Why did that not happen?
III. What Accounts for the Backlash?

The answer to this question is speculative but clues lie about, and they can be put together into a suggestive theory. The overwhelming
impetus to backlash lay in popular opinion across countries. Many ordinarypeople, left behind by globalization, have
united in their opposition to further international legalization. They have lost faith in
international institutions (as illustrated best by Europe) and in the national leaders who supported them.
They now seek new national leaders who will advance the national interest rather than global
ideals. The backlash should not come as a complete surprise. As we saw, worries about the democratic deficit in
Europe are as old as European integration. While most scholars supported European integration, either because they
believed that the democratic deficit was mythical, or that the benefits of integration exceeded any costs to democracy,43 the dissenting
view persisted if only because it was impossible to ignore the evidence. 44 Public
opinion surveys showed that many
Europeans distrusted European institutions. European politicians successfully ran on antiEurope
campaign promises. Voters in some European countries rejected the European constitution and the
Lisbon Treaty. And pro-integration mainstream leaders took the democratic deficit seriously enough
to try to address it by strengthening the European Parliament. Brexit only ratified a longstanding
worry.
In the United States, the debate took place in a lower key. The
United States is not bound by any international
institutions whose strength and authority is comparable to that of the European institutions. Indeed, the United States has
disproportionate influence over most major international institutions, and nearly always can
protect itself with veto rights. However, from time to time, a relatively minor question of
international law erupted into public consciousness. The possibility that the International Criminal
Court could have jurisdiction over American soldiers provoked Congress to pass a law in 2002 that
appeared to authorize a military invasion of the Netherlands if an American was ever held for
trial.45 Roper and related cases caused a public outcry, leading some state legislatures to pass statutes
that blocked courts from relying on “foreign law.”46 The American political system is suspicious of
human rights treaties, and the Senate has become increasingly reluctant to give its consent to any
treaty at all—although this is partly an artifact of a 2/3 majority rule and the disproportionate influence of rural populations in that
body.

The academic debate in the United States also received little attention. In the 1990s, no one thought in terms of a democratic deficit. The dominant view was that international law was

dissenting views were aired from

good, and therefore judges, bureaucrats, and other officials should use it as much as possible to bind the United States.47 Yet

incorporation of international law into domestic constitutional law by the

time to time. In 2003, Robert Bork argued that

courts violates the “rule of law” by depriving the people of influence over policy through
legislation.48 In 2005, Jeremy Rabkin argued that this style of “global governance” violated Westphalian sovereignty as well as democratic principles.49 In a 2007 article,
John McGinnis and Ilya Somin argued that international law lacks a democratic pedigree because it reflects

compromises with foreign states, most of them authoritarian, and therefore American courts
should not incorporate it into domestic law unless Congress and the president has authorized them to.50 And in 2012, Julian Ku
and John Yoo argued that this style of judicial activism violated the U.S. Constitution.

McGinnis and Somin see international law as the work of global elites.51 They argue that elites across the world
create, interpret, and enforce international law, and that their incentives are not to create international law that
benefits everyone or reflects the values of the global population, but to create international law that benefits
themselves and reflects their own values. However, in allowing that international law should be enforceable if
incorporated by Congress and the president, McGinnis and Somin missed an important feature of the political landscape. The
president and members of Congress are members of the elites themselves. The populist backlash against
international law encompasses international law with impeccable democratic credentials like NAFTA and the WTO system, both of which
were incorporated into domestic law by the president and Congress.

international cooperation
Still, in their normative argument we see a germ of a positive theory of international backlash. Any type of
involves centralization. A greater distance is opened up between the ordinary people and the
decisionmakers with effective power. As centralization occurs, more valuable public goods can be created, but agency costs increase as well.
Since ordinary people cannot observe whether the decisionmakers act for the public interest, they
can only accept on faith the assurances of their national leaders. When people’s ordinary experience
contradicts the assurances of those leaders, they lose faith in them. This is what happened as a
result of the financial crisis and the ensuing global recession —especially as ordinary people learned that only the very
wealthy in western countries have benefited from globalization, while most people have been harmed or unaffected. This last fact seems to confirm the
suspicion that global and national decisionmakers act in the interests of the elites, not of the ordinary people. While this
idea is a simplification, it has
enough basis in fact to produce significant political resonance, igniting the global populist backlash.
Thus, in Europe and the United States, international
institutions have provided a convenient target for
populists, as have the national leaders who have supported them. The populists have been able to blame
globalization and international law for insecurity and economic dislocation as a way to undermine the establishment elites who
constructed them. The populists
can make a powerful argument, supported to some extent by scholarly research, that
the international institutions—or the process of globalization they have facilitated—have benefited
the elites while leaving behind ordinary people.
While Europe does not have a history of populism in the way that the United States does, the anti-European parties—UKIP in Britain,
Law and Justice in Poland, the People’s Party in Denmark, the National Front in France, Syriza in Greece, and many others—bear the
hallmarks of populism. They claim (not always wrongly) that
problems in their countries are due to corruption at
high levels of government, caused by an establishment consisting of cosmopolitan elites, who
disregard the well-being of ordinary people. The right-wing populists are nationalist, and either endorse or flirt with
racist and xenophobic positions, while left-wing populists like Syriza seek wealth redistribution. Like populists throughout history, they
make promises they can’t keep, or vague promises that mean little, and use sometimes violent or vulgar language that appeals to the
crowd and burnishes their anti-establishment credentials. And they draw support from less educated people who
feel left behind and vulnerable to the influx of workers and immigrants, and the threats of terrorism
and economic dislocation.52
In the United States, Donald Trump
rode to victory on his anti-internationalism as well. He attacked
international institutions, including the UN, the WTO, and NATO; repudiated America’s
longstanding commitment to free trade; and advocated a nationalistic, isolationist position, while
blaming the elites on left and right for failing to defend American interests. He attacked
international treaties, human rights, and the laws of war. His anti-elitism, along with his anti-immigrant stance,
marked him out as a populist like the European leaders.

What does the populist backlash mean for the dominant theory of the Invisible College, the one that says that
people have “internalized” international law? There was never much evidence for this view,53 but if it is
correct, then some mechanism must explain why people who have internalized international law might come to reject it. One possibility
is that internationalization is just a form of deference to authority. People
internalize international law just to the
extent that they defer to the views of government officials who support it. When divisions open up
among political leaders, this deference ceases. Another possibility is that internalization occurs only as long as people
are satisfied with their level of well-being and attribute it to international law. When economic dislocation strikes, people are liable to
blame all sources of authority. Both of these views, however, suggest that internalization
was never the right word to
begin with. People see international law in instrumental terms, and support it when it seems
to benefit them. When globalization and international legal integration coincided with economic
growth, people supported it; now they do not.
Conclusion

Globalization is not looking so inevitable these days. Historical perspective explains why global legalists should not
have displayed so much confidence in their predictions. As is well known, an earlier globalization took place in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. It ended with World War I, which ushered in a period of isolation and nationalism that persisted until the end
of World War II. One can identify still earlier periods of globalization cycles: the Roman empire followed by its fragmentation in the
second half of the first millennium; the high middle ages, unified (in Europe) under the Church, followed by the Reformation and the
religious wars; and then the age of empires, which was deeply shaken by nationalist movements in the nineteenth century, though
collapse of most of the empires did not occur until the twentieth. In all these cases, globalization is a process by which
political power is centralized at a high level—in a city, a nation, or a group of nations, which set and enforce policy for a
much larger area. Globalization halts and collapses when the center loses this power. We see, in other words,
periods of centralization and periods of decentralization over the world or large areas of it, just as we see periods of centralization and
decentralization within countries and at even lower levels of administration. Only history will tell, but the
current period, starting
in 2001, seems to be (so far) a gradual period of slowing centralization, which may or may not eventually unwind. If
we must look for a pattern, the pattern we find is cyclical rather than linear.

What could account for this cycle? Pressure

for centralization arises because of the gains from public goods
being generated at an ever larger scale. This pressure always exists, but the right circumstances—technological, political, demographic
—are needed to channel it into greater international cooperation. During the great periods of centralization, trade, investment, and migration flourish,
generating wealth. All of these activities require order, and order is best kept by a hegemon (like Rome, or Imperial
Britain for the high seas), or
by cooperation among a small number of major powers. The problem is that
whatever empire, nation, or group keeps order also can use its power to channel most of the benefits of
order to itself—either by choosing rules that benefit it, or by demanding tribute. When these
transfers become too large—or are simply perceived as being too large—resentments build, and so do the
pressures for decentralization, which may also be assisted by technological change that favors local autonomy rather than centralization.
People demand autonomy for smaller-scale groups whose leaders they can trust. When the centers
of power resist, wars may result. But they may accommodate as well. In the modern era, the problem was less that a
hegemon like the United States seized an excessive share of the gains from international cooperation, than that elites in all countries
supported forms of international cooperation that benefited them and harmed the masses or were
perceived to harm the masses. This process was accompanied by a great deal of self-serving propaganda that the elites themselves may
even have believed, with the members of the Invisible College participating as unwitting servants of power.
 I-Law Impact D---2NC
I-law is dead---alt causes outweigh their internal link, and no one follows
treaties
Eric A. Posner 17, American law professor at the University of Chicago Law School, professor of
international law, contract law, and bankruptcy. Most-cited legal scholar in America. January 2017.
“LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND THE POPULIST BACKLASH” Electronic copy available at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2898357
The rumblings of discontent took many forms. There was significant, even violent, opposition to free
trade, including the Seattle riots of 1999. The deregulation of international capital flows resulted in currency
and sovereign debt crises in numerous countries. The records of the Yugoslavia and especially the Rwanda
tribunals left much to be desired—the tribunals were incredibly slow and expensive, and prosecuted very few
people. The United States refused to ratify the treaty creating the International Criminal Court. Indeed, the notion
that global legalism was triumphant was always hard to reconcile with the position of the
United States, which frequently refused to ratify major treaties, including human rights treaties,
and the Law of the Sea treaty.36

But the turning point was 9/11. Since then, global legalism has stumbled from one disaster to
another. These include: the collapse and reorganization in 2006 of the UN Human Rights Commission,
which had been taken over by human-rights abusing countries; the illegal and unsuccessful Iraq
War of 2003; the legally controversial and unsuccessful military intervention in Libya of 2011; the illegal Russian military
interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014; U.S. counterterrorism policy, including torture,
detention, and drone-based assassination, much of which was in flagrant violation of, or in tension with, the human rights
treaties; the Eurozone crisis, which began in 2008 and is continuing; the migration crisis in Europe; the failure to
stop the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria ; the collapse of the Arab Spring ; the limited
accomplishments of the ICC and the withdrawals from that institution by several African countries
along with a strong signal of Russian displeasure with it.37 The WTO process has ground to a halt, thanks to the backlash
against international trade and worries about sovereignty. 38

As if none of this was going on, Spiro, writing in 2013, argued that “international actors have been able to make the United States pay for perceived human
rights violation in the antiterror context.”39 His only evidence is the decision by European governments to withdraw permission from the CIA to operate
“black sites” on their territory. But refusal to cooperate with a program is not the same thing as retaliation. The Europeans and the U.S. government
disagrees about all kinds of things; the United States has never dictated the behavior of its allies. No
international actor has made
the United States “pay” for torture, assassination, and other human rights violations. Spiro, like Koh and
other global legalists, exaggerate the scope of international legal cooperation by portraying the U nited
States as an outlier which alone is powerful enough to break the law and even then is constantly being reined in at the margins by (unidentified)
“international actors.” On the contrary, most other countries engage in this behavior themselves , and in any
event need the United States for counterterrorism help more than the United States needs them. To all appearances,
cooperation continues to flourish.

Indeed, in that respect the story is not entirely bleak. Cooperation on counterterrorism is one of two bright spots in international cooperation after 9/11, the
other being progress toward combatting climate change, albeit in the weakly institutionalized Paris Agreement. There have also certainly been specific
diplomatic agreements that benefited the countries involved (like the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement), as there always are. International tribunals of various
sorts— mostly regional—continue to decide cases, and the vast bureaucracies in the UN, World Bank, IMF, and in various regional institutions, continue to
do their work. But the tribunals aside, these types of international cooperation are of the traditional Westphalian type: the momentum toward global
legalism is gone.

We can summarize this backward movement by noting that international

security—as embodied in the UN charter’s prohibitions on use of
force—and human rights are the two most significant pillars of international law since the end of the Cold
War. And both are in shambles. The U nited States and Russia have repeatedly violated the use of force
prohibition. And human rights have worsened over the last decade. 40 Meanwhile, tribunals and
other international institutions are contributing little to international order, and there have
been no major efforts to advance international legalization for more than a decade.
Meanwhile, international economic cooperation is also in decline . Here, we should point out something that most
debates about international law leave out: the persistent unhappiness of major developing countries with what they
regard as their coercive and unfair treatment under the major international economic institutions —
including the austerity policies of the IMF, and the trade policies of the WTO.41

Combine these events with the populist backlashes within countries and the overall impression is
one of significant backsliding and retrenchment—something that no member of the Invisible College has, as far as I am aware
of, predicted or even discussed as realistic possibilities. What went wrong? The simple answer is that the benefits of globalization—
greater wealth and freedom—failed to materialize as promised, with most of the gains going to a small fragment
of the global elite, or to vast populations of workers in places like China, with cheaper consumer goods in the west
failing to compensate people in their minds for the economic dislocation they experienced.42 Human freedom has not advanced since 2000,
and has very likely declined. Meanwhile, the costs of globalization turned out to be massive. These costs
included the spread of international terrorism, disease (such as the SARS epidemic), and
economic instability, represented above all by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, whose causes and effects were global in nature. As in the
1930s, the natural reaction has been to abandon global commitments in favor of familiar tribal and national loyalties. But modern international law, born out
of that era, was supposed to prevent a return to it by binding nations ever more closely together. Why did that not happen?

IHRL fails – prefer quantitative empirical analysis

Landman 5 (Todd Landman, senior lecturer in the department of government and member of
the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, “Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative
Study,” October 2005, http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/protecting-human-rights)
In Protecting Human Rights, Todd Landman provides a unique quantitative analysis of the marked
gap between the principle and practice of human rights. Applying theories and methods from the
fields of international law, international relations, and comparative politics, Landman examines
data from 193 countries over 25 years (1976-2000) to assess the growth of the international
human rights regime, the effect of law on actual protection, and global variation in human rights
norms. Landman contends that human rights foreign policy remains based more on geo-
strategic interest than moral internationalism. He argues that the influence human rights ideals
have begun to have on states cannot be separated from the broader impact of socioeconomic
changes that swept the globe in the late twentieth century. Landman concludes that international
law alone will not suffice to fully protect human rights —it must be accompanied by democratic
government, effective conflict resolution, and just economic systems.

I-Law fails to benefit human rights --- Treaties and institutions fail to benefit
people that are suffering
Posner 14, 12/4/2014 – professor of law at the University of Chicago (Eric, The Guardian, “The
case against human rights”, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-
human-rights)
At a time when human rights violations remain widespread, the discourse of human rights continues
to flourish. The use of “human rights” in English-language books has increased 200-fold since 1940, and is used today 100 times
more often than terms such as “constitutional rights” and “natural rights”. Although people have always criticised
governments, it is only in recent decades that they have begun to do so in the distinctive idiom of
human rights. The United States and Europe have recently condemned human rights violations in Syria, Russia, China and Iran.
Western countries often make foreign aid conditional on human rights and have even launched
military interventions based on human rights violations. Many people argue that the incorporation
of the idea of human rights into international law is one of the great moral achievements of human
history. Because human rights law gives rights to all people regardless of nationality, it deprives governments of their traditional
riposte when foreigners criticise them for abusing their citizens – namely “sovereignty” (which is law-speak for “none of your business”).
Thus, international human rights law provides people with invaluable protections against the power
of the state.
And yet it is hard to avoid the conclusion that governments continue to violate human rights with impunity. Why, for example, do more
than 150 countries (out of 193 countries that belong to the UN) engage in torture? Why has the number of authoritarian countries
increased in the last several years? Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly all countries of the world? Why do children
continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries?

The truth is that human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives. There is little evidence that
human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the wellbeing of people. The reason is that human rights
were never as universal as people hoped, and the belief that they could be forced upon countries as a matter of
international law was shot through with misguided assumptions from the very beginning. The human
rights movement shares something in common with the hubris of development economics, which in previous decades tried (and failed)
to alleviate poverty by imposing top-down solutions on developing countries. But where development economists have reformed their
approach, the human rights movement has yet to acknowledge its failures . It is time for a reckoning.
 Soft Power Defense---1NC
Trump creates unsurpassable alt-causes to soft power, or it’s resilient to
anything
Hal Brands 18, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 1/18/18, “Not Even Trump Can Obliterate America's Soft Power,”
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-18/not-even-trump-can-obliterate-america-
s-soft-power
The downsides of President Donald Trump’s first year in office are legion, but among the most
serious has undoubtedly been his effect on American soft power. Case in point is the global response to the
president’s alleged remarks that the U.S. should no longer accept immigrants from “shithole
countries” such as Haiti and various African nations — an episode that has once again shown how Trump excels at using the bully pulpit
to bring down international condemnation on his own country .

Yet, as I argue in my new book, “American

Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump,” the president’s entire first year has
represented a veritable assault on American soft power — one that will likely cause damage outlasting
Trump’s time in office.
When we talk about America’s soft power, we are talking about several related things: the global perception that America is a flawed but basically admirable
society; the sense that U.S. foreign policy serves not just its self-interest but the broader common well-being; the use of non-coercive tools to achieve
diplomatic goals. Over the decades, the U.S. has benefited enormously from all these forms of soft power.

During the Cold War, for instance, humanitarian assistance to needy countries and economic initiatives
such as the Marshall Plan produced international goodwill that proved a crucial tool in the competition with the Soviet

Union . Similarly, America’s democratic ideals have long allowed it to appeal to populations around the
world , and the attractiveness of U.S. culture and society have given Washington influence with the citizenry of allies and adversaries alike.
Soft power can easily be overestimated, of course: The country of the Bill of Rights and “all men are created equal” is also the country with a tragic history of
slavery and segregation. And the effect of U.S. soft power would be far less if Washington did not possess hard-power dominance. But on the whole, soft
power acts as a significant force-multiplier, facilitating cooperation with friends, providing ideological advantages over enemies, and generally enhancing the
impact of U.S. policy.

Based on his record so far, however, Trump

appears to have little understanding of the benefits soft power can
provide. He has repeatedly talked down the power of the American example by arguing that his own
country is morally no better than, say, Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And during his first year in office, Trump has
undermined U.S. soft power in three particular ways .

First, hehas sought crippling budget cuts for the institutions that the U.S. government uses to exercise
nonmilitary influence overseas. Mick Mulvaney, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, described the president’s first budget
submission as “not a soft-power budget.” Indeed, it included trims of nearly 30 percent for the State Department and

the U.S. Agency for International Development, and therefore entailed drastic reductions in
programs focusing on global public health, food security, women’s rights, and myriad other
issues.
The leaders of the Republican-controlled Congress promptly deemed the budget “dead on arrival,” because it would have severely weakened U.S. diplomacy,
development aid and humanitarian assistance — all of which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, has deemed critical to
achieving a lasting defeat of the Islamic State and other foreign policy objectives. But Trump’s disdain for the State Department has still had profound effects:
The president of the American Foreign Service Association warned last fall that accomplished diplomats were leaving the department in droves, taking
enormous institutional knowledge with them.
Second, the president
has attacked — head-on — the idea that the U.S. should stand for something more than
its own self-interest. A year ago, Trump used his inaugural address to frame U.S. foreign policy as a
giveaway to an ungrateful world , and to call for a more narrowly nationalistic approach to American statecraft.
The National Security Strategy released last month emphasized intense competition — not to preserve a liberal world order that benefits all nations who
play by its rules, but on behalf of America's own economic and geopolitical interests.

The president has also repeatedly derided America’s role as chief promoter of democracy
and human rights , thereby undermining the ideological appeal of a nation that stands for universal
values. In fact, he has undertaken policies — such as his persistent efforts to restrict immigration and
exclude refugees from Muslim-majority nations — that are deemed cruel and discriminatory overseas. And, of course, he has
described his foreign policy as “America First” — a label explicitly endorsing the idea that the U.S. must behave more selfishly in the world.

Third, Trump has weakened American soft power through his own behavior. He is hardly the only president to say
loathsome things, but he is unique in displaying his unattractive qualities so openly, so unembarrassedly, so repeatedly. The president’s use of
racist and xenophobic appeals, his disdain for democratic norms, his generally crass style of
rhetoric and action — all these characteristics have been dragging down global respect for America since
the moment he took office . The outraged global reaction to the “shithole countries” incident was sadly familiar — it mimicked the
criticism the president earned through his refusal to condemn white supremacists after the violence last summer in Charlottesville, Virginia, as well as
several other episodes.

There is no ambiguity about the effect this is having. As early as June 2017, America’s global favorability in the Pew poll of global
attitudes and
trends had dropped from 64 percent at the end of Barack Obama’s presidency to 49 percent under
Trump. Large majorities of global respondents described the American president as “intolerant,” “arrogant” and “dangerous.” Even Xi Jinping
and Vladimir Putin — ambitious dictators of revisionist countries — had higher personal
favorability ratings than Trump. As Trump’s own defense secretary, James Mattis, has remarked, the U.S. needs to “get the power of
inspiration back.”
 Soft Power Defense---2NC
Soft power fails---democracy promotion causes backlash---Trump proves
Eric X. Li 18, a member of the council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, MBA from
Stanford, 8/20/2018, “The Rise and Fall of Soft Power”,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/

Until recently, in other words, it really did look as if the 21st century would belong to the U nited
S tates, the West, and their global soft power empire. But it was not to be so.

Several things went wrong. For one, the products didn’t really suit the customers. From the “third wave”
democracies of the 1970s and 1980s to the Eastern European states that rushed to join the EU and NATO after the Cold War to, most
recently, the countries that weathered the Arab Spring, liberal
democracy has had a hard time sticking. In many
cases, moreover, it brought about rather catastrophic outcomes for the people involved.

One theory for why is that the

neoliberal economic revolution, which was part and parcel of the soft power
era, weakened states instead of strengthening them. The market was never a uniting force —the idea
that it could be an all-encompassing mechanism to provide growth, good governance, and societal well-being was an illusion to begin
with. The German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck elaborated on this idea at a conference in Taiwan this summer. Soft power
globalization, he warned, is simply “outpacing the capacity of national societies and international organizations to
build effective institutions of economic and political governance.” In turn, “increasing debt, rising
inequality, and unstable growth” is leading to “a general crisis of political-economic
governability .” That crisis has resulted in internal revolts on soft power’s home turf. Streeck calls it “taking back control.” You
might call it the rise of America’s Donald Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, or Italy’s Five Star Movement
and the League.
such revolts have resulted in anti-liberal governing majorities in Austria, the Czech Republic,
So far,
Hungary, Italy, Poland, and the U nited S tates—and that is just among developed countries. Such is the sorry state of soft
power liberalism that it has had trouble holding on even in places where it should have had the best
chances of surviving.

Or US soft power is resilient – mistakes and correcting them help gain soft
power rather than erode it and it is not only dependent on the government
Joseph S. Nye 18, political scientist, pioneered theory of “soft power”, went to Princeton
University, studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) at Oxford University's Exeter College,
obtained Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, Director of the Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2/9/18, “America’s soft
power is robust and resilient”, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/americas-soft-power-is-
robust-and-resilient-1.2170982
A country’s soft power comes primarily from three sources: Its culture (when it is attractive to others), its
political values such as democracy and human rights (when it lives up to them), and its policies (when they are
seen as legitimate because they are framed with some humility and awareness of others’ interests.) How a government
behaves at home (for example, protecting a free press), in international institutions (consulting others and
multilateralism), and in foreign policy (promoting development and human rights) can affect others by the influence
of its example. In all of these areas, Trump has reversed attractive American policies.
Fortunately, America is more than the government . Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces),
many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its
purposes. In a liberal society, the absence of official cultural policies can itself be a source of
attraction. Hollywood movies like The Post, which showcase independent women and press freedom, can attract others. So, too, can
the charitable work of US foundations or the benefits of freedom of inquiry at American universities.

It is true that firms, universities, foundations and other non-governmental groups develop soft power of their own which may reinforce
or be at odds with the US foreign policy goals. And all of these private sources of soft power are likely to become increasingly important
in the global information age. That is all the more reason for governments to make sure that their own actions and policies create and
reinforce rather than undercut and squander their soft power.

Domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to others’ views, or based on a narrow conception of national
interests can undermine soft power. For example, the steep decline in the attractiveness of the US in opinion polls conducted after the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a reaction to the George W. Bush administration and its policies, rather than to the US generally.

The Iraq War was not the first government policy that made the US unpopular . In the 1970s, many
people around the world objected to the US war in Vietnam, and America’s global standing reflected the
unpopularity of that policy. When the policy changed and the memories of the war receded, the US
recovered much of its lost soft power. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the US managed
to recover much of its soft power in most regions of the world.
Sceptics might still argue that the rise and fall of American soft power does not matter much, because countries cooperate out of self-
interest. But this argument misses a crucial point: Cooperation is a matter of degree, and the degree is affected by attraction or repulsion.
Moreover, the effects of a country’s soft power extend to non-state actors — for example, by aiding or impeding recruitment by terrorist
organisations. In an information age, success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins.

One of the greatest sources of America’s soft power is the openness of its democratic processes.
Even when mistaken policies reduce its attractiveness, America’s ability to criticise and correct
its mistakes makes it attractive to others at a deeper level. When protesters overseas were marching against the
Vietnam War, they often sang ‘We Shall Overcome’, the anthem of the US civil rights movement.

America, too, will almost certainly overcome. Given past experience, there is every to hope that the
US will recover its soft power.

Soft power is useless---Historical evidence proves that it can’t sub-in for

military force or foreign policy
Colin S. Gray 4/8/11, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of
Reading, “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the
21st Century”, Pages 36-39, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1059.pdf
The third fundamental question about soft power in need of answer can best be posed in only two words,
“ So what ?” The combined fallacies of misnaming and over-simplification that threaten the integrity and utility of the
concept of soft power are more than merely 37 an academic itch that can be scratched into oblivion. The soft power concept is
sufficiently valid intellectually that its contestable evidential base in history and thus its true fragility are easily missed. To explain
its logic: soft power resides in the ability to co-opt the willing rather than to coerce or compel the reluctant;
American soft power attracts non-Americans because it represents or advances values, ideas, practices, and arrangements that they
judge to be in their interest, or at least to which they feel some bond of affinity. Therefore, the soft power of the American hegemon
is some conflation of perceived interests with ideological association (by and large more tacit than explicit). Full-
blown, the argument holds, first, that America (for example) gains useful political clout if and when foreigners who
matter highly to U.S. national security share important American understandings, values, and
preferences. The thesis proceeds in its second step to package this thus far commonsense proposition under the banner of “soft
power”; it is now dangerously objectified , as if giving something a name causes it to exist. Next, the third and
most problematic step in the argument is the logical leap that holds that American soft power, as
existing reality—what it is, and its effects— can be approached and treated usefully as an instrument of national
policy. This is an attractive proposition: it is unfortunate that its promise is thoroughly unreliable. The problem
lies in the extensive middle region that lies between a near harmony of values and perceived interests and, at
the opposite end of the spectrum, a close to complete antagonism between those values and interests.
Historical evidence as well as reason suggest that the effective domain of soft power is modest. The scope and
opportunity for co-option by soft power are even less. People and polities have not usually been moved far by
argument, 38 enticement, and attractiveness. There will be some attraction to, and imitation of, a great power’s
ideas and practical example, but this fact has little consequence for the utility of military force. Indeed, one
suspects that on many occasions what might be claimed as a triumph for soft power is in reality no such thing .
Societies and their political leaders may be genuinely attracted to some features of American ideology and practice, but the clinching
reason for their agreement to sign on to an American position or initiative will be that the United States looks convincing as a guardian
state and coalition leader. It is not difficult to identify reasons why militaryforce seems to be less useful as a source of
security than it once was. But it is less evident that soft power can fill the space thus vacated by the
military and economic tools of grand strategy . Soft power should become more potent, courtesy of the electronic
revolution that enables a networked global community. The ideological, political, and strategic consequences of such globalization,
however, are not quite as benign as one might have predicted. It transpires that Francis Fukuyama was wrong; the age
of ideologically fueled hostility has not passed after all.47 Also, it is not obvious that the future belongs to a distinctively
Western civilization.48 It is well not to forget that the Internet is content-blind, and it advertises, promotes, and helps enable
bloody antagonism in addition to the harmony of worldview that many optimists have anticipated. It does not follow from all
this that the hard power of military force retains, let alone increases, its utility as an instrument of policy. But assuredly it does
follow that the historical motives behind defense preparation are not greatly diminished. Thus, there is some noteworthy disharmony
between the need for hard power 39 and its availability, beset as it increasingly is by liberal global attitudes that heavily favor restraint.

US soft power is locked in—structural advantages and attitudinal shifts—

countries sympathize with US wins and losses
Mika Aaltola 14, Programme Director for the Finish Institute of International Affairs, Director of
the Global Security Research Programme and of the U.S. Politics and Power, PhD in Social Sciences,
2/21/14, “Drama Power on the Rise? US soft power may increase as a function of Washington
dysfunction”, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/drama-power-on-the-rise
To argue against such an interpretation would seem counterintuitive. However, certain factors make it difficult to
evaluate how much, if any, soft power the US is losing. The global economic markets can be used as counter-
indicators. The indexes, which are often based on future ‘profit’ expectations, have not reacted
strongly to the recent crises in Washington. On the contrary, US stock markets were achieving
record highs and interest rates remained stable and historically low during the government
shutdown and debt-ceiling crisis of late 2013. It seems there is no significant loss of faith in US
credibility among financial market players. The drama was anticipated and already taken into account in market
valuations. A similar mitigating effect of changed expectations concerning US politics may be at play in the broader political reactions to
Washington crises. It is argued in this paper that the
US soft power – especially in the form of popular culture
products – has changed attitudes concerning what is expected and how negatively or positively
the drama in Washington is evaluated. The mitigating soft power influences – the interpretative frames and discourses –
have changed the overall narratives and interpretations concerning Washington’s political games. Thus, it is suggested that specific
processes cushion and even counter the negative consequences of the Washington drama for
the global status of the US. These include the exceptional position of the US in the current world
order, the spread of new popular culture formats, and the emergence of social media. All of these
serve to support new types of soft power. Soft power is a purposeful toolkit , and a byproduct of
overall societal and political dynamics on the other. Soft power refers to a set of policy instruments that co—opts
other actors’ frames, under which they feel and understand themselves vis—a—vis others‘. Nye adds to this definition the need to attract
others and bias their agenda in favourable ways’. Soft power is a broad phenomenon that refers to capacities and potentialities beyond
what is available to a single unitary actor. Soft
power has institutional and structural characteristics that are
socially diffuse, and which determine what is meant by agency and subjectivity in a particular context of meaning and signification.
Namely, a single unitary actor’s ability to determine their fate is constituted, limited and enhanced in the fabric of relationships and of
systems of signification”. As a strategic resource, diffused soft power requires the use of the Many—to—many model.
Contrary to the One- to—many model, which concentrates on strategic governmental influence on different peoples, the Many-to-many
model presumes that communication involves multiple actors that influence each other in a multi-directional
manner 4.
Thus, besides having strategic capacity, softpower can be seen as a complex situational scenario with several
changing characteristics. Many of these are not under the direct control of any government, such as global information
technology or media culture. Soft power is never straightforward in its use. The outcomes of US soft power are often just
the by-products of American society, economy, and tech nology rather than direct governmental
action5. Furthermore, it is clear that the wider circumstances of soft power can change, and its practices
have to adapt accordingly. Soft power appears to be linked to the changing shapes of the overall
world order. The field of (dis)attraction experienced under a relatively unipolar power hierarchy is
different from that of super-power rivalry during a bipolar order, or from the complex affective climates of more
multipolar orders. In the challenged atmosphere of the present world order, the attraction towards the
exceptionally positioned US is a complex sentiment. Much of the attention has centred on the
overall US successes, such as the popularity of its actions, culture, celebrities, and its media. US
failures, on the other hand, are often seen as signs of its decline and of rising multipolarity. For some,
such fragilities translate into uncertainty and pose a cause for concern. However, these sentiments
also reveal nuanced compassion towards the lone superpower and a type of identification
with the US. It appears that in failing and being fragile, the US can win the sympathies of
others and maintain unparalleled international presence and visibility.
 Cred Irrelevant---1NC
U.S. credibility is dead
Joshua Keating 19. Foreign policy analyst at Slate, a former writer and editor at Foreign Policy
magazine. 5/24/2019, “ Why Would Any Country Trust America Again? ”,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/05/trump-foreign-policy-broken-trust-america.html
This isn’t a very encouraging state of affairs, and not only because there’s a decent chance Trump will be reelected in
2020. If it becomes the norm that agreements struck by a U.S. president will be kept only so long as
that president’s party is in power, why would any country ever sign a deal with the U.S. ever again?
If the entire disposition of U.S. foreign policy transforms depending on whether a Democrat or a Republican occupies the White House, it
will have a destabilizing impact on i nternational r elations long after Trump leaves office .

Politics has never entirely stopped “at the water’s edge.” Richard Nixon’s campaign  scuttled
Vietnam peace talks by promising to change the Lyndon Johnson administration’s policies. The Carter-
to-Reagan transition was no doubt almost as whiplash-inducing for foreign governments as the Obama-to-Trump transition. But
presidents of both parties have, at the very least, shared a disposition toward international
alliances and broad policy objectives that contrasts with domestic political divides. This hasn’t always
been for the best—the bipartisan foreign policy consensus has gotten the U.S. into a number of wars it should never have fought—but it
has allowed for a certain level of continuity that makes diplomacy possible.
The exceptions to the rule are those occasions when the culture war bleeds into foreign policy. One example is the Mexico
City Policy, known by opponents as the Global Gag Rule, a draconian rule introduced by the Reagan administration requiring NGOs that
receive U.S. funding to certify they will not perform abortions or promote abortion as a method of family planning. The policy was
rescinded under Bill Clinton, reintroduced under George W. Bush, rescinded under Obama, then reintroduced and made even more
restrictive under Trump. The policy is bad enough on its own, restricting needed aid to many organizations providing vital family
planning and HIV/AIDS services. The fact that these organizations don’t even know what the U.S. funding policies will be from year to
year, and can’t plan their activities accordingly, makes the problem worse.

In today’s U.S. political climate, all issues are becoming culture war issues , and more and more official U.S.
policies abroad are coming to resemble the Mexico City Policy—switches to be flipped on or off depending on which domestic
constituency the party in power wants to appeal to.

There traditionally has been less daylight between the parties on foreign policy, and it comes up much less than domestic issues in
presidential campaigns, but ironically, partisanship
may come to have more  of an impact on foreign policy: In
an era of congressional gridlock, it’s a rare area where the president can act relatively unfettered .
Even if Bernie Sanders were to become president, it’s unlikely he’d be able to get a controversial domestic policy like Medicare for All
passed by Congress. But he would definitely be able to pursue a vastly different policy on Iran.

The near impossibility of getting Republican support

This dynamic has only been getting more acute in recent years.
meant that Obama had to carry out most of his signature diplomatic achievements—the Iran deal, the Paris
accord, the normalization of relations with Cuba—via executive action. That also meant those
achievements could be  undone by executive action.

Treaties, as defined by Article II of the Constitution, require a two-thirds majority of the Senate for
ratification, so they have become almost unheard of. George W. Bush submitted more than 100
treaties to the Senate for ratification during his time in office, roughly on par with his 20th-century predecessors. Obama
submitted just 38 , only 15 of which were ratified. Trump has submitted just two so far: an amendment
to an earlier fisheries agreement and an update to the North Atlantic Treaty allowing North Macedonia to join NATO. (Trump wasn’t too
enthusiastic about this.)
Meanwhile, Trump
has pulled the U.S. out of negotiations for the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership
and the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty with Russia. Even the Universal Postal Union hasn’t
been safe.

Nearly all the Democratic presidential candidates, to the extent they discuss foreign policy at all, emphasize the importance of rebuilding
international alliances. If any of them becomes president, he or she would probably work to rejoin many of the deals and institutions that
Trump has pulled out of and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to those, notably NATO, that Trump has simply trashed. But it will
be
immeasurably more difficult for the next Democratic president to replicate even the limited
diplomatic achievements of the Obama years. Why would the leader of any U.S. adversary want to
repeat the experience of Iran or Cuba by spending political capital on a rapprochement with the
U.S., only to see the offer humiliatingly rescinded by the next president?

Best political science data confirms past reputation for resolve has no effect
on the credibility of future threats
Ganesh Sitaraman 14, Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, January 2014,
“Credibility and War Powers,” Harvard Law Review Forum,
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/127/january14/forum_1024.php
In late August 2013, after Syrian civilians were horrifically attacked with sarin gas, President Barack Obama declared his intention to
conduct limited airstrikes against the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. A year earlier, President Obama had announced that
the use of chemical weapons was “red line” for the United States .1 Advocates for
military action now argued that if
the credibility of American threats diminished, dictators would have license to act with impunity .2
President Obama himself seemed to embrace this justification for action. “The international community’s credibility is on the line,” he
said in early September. “And America and Congress’s credibility is on the line.”3

For all the talk of credibility, political

scientists have offered devastating critiques of credibility arguments
in the context of military threats. They have demonstrated not only that the concept is often deployed in
incomplete and illogical ways but also that as a historical matter, a country’s “credibility” based on its reputation and past
actions has little or no effect on the behavior of opponents in high-stakes international crises. In the crises in
the run-up to World War I, in the Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and even in the crises leading to World War II,
threats from countries that had previously backed down were not seen as less credible by their
opponents. In some cases, the threats were even thought to be more credible.
 Cred Irrelevant---2NC
Zero data supports the resolve or credibility thesis
Jonathan Mercer 13, associate professor of political science at the University of Washington in
Seattle and a Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics,
5/13/13, “Bad Reputation,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136577/jonathan-
mercer/bad-reputation
Since then, the debate about what to do in Syria has been sidetracked by discussions of how central reputation is to
deterrence, and whether protecting it is worth going to war.
There are two ways to answer those questions: through evidence and through logic. The first approach is easy. Do leaders
assume
that other leaders who have been irresolute in the past will be irresolute in the future and that,
therefore, their threats are not credible? No; broad and deep evidence dispels that notion. In studies of the
various political crises leading up to World War I and of those before and during the Korean War, I
found that leaders did indeed worry about their reputations. But their worries were often mistaken.
For example, when
North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was
certain that America’s credibility was on the line. He believed that the United States’ allies in the West were in a state
of “near-panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act.” He was wrong. When one British cabinet secretary remarked
to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that Korea was “a rather distant obligation,” Attlee responded, “Distant -- yes, but nonetheless
an obligation.” For their part, the French were indeed worried, but not because they doubted U.S.
credibility. Instead, they feared that American resolve would lead to a major war over a
strategically inconsequential piece of territory. Later, once the war was underway, Acheson feared that
Chinese leaders thought the United States was “too feeble or hesitant to make a genuine stand ,” as the
CIA put it, and could therefore “be bullied or bluffed into backing down before Communist might.” In fact, Mao thought no such
thing. He believed that the Americans intended to destroy his revolution, perhaps with nuclear
weapons.
Similarly, Ted Hopf, a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, has found that the
Soviet Union did
not think the United States was irresolute for abandoning Vietnam; instead, Soviet officials were
surprised that Americans would sacrifice so much for something the Soviets viewed as tangential to
U.S. interests. And, in his study of Cold War showdowns, Dartmouth College professor Daryl Press found reputation to have been
unimportant. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets threatened to attack Berlin in response to any
American use of force against Cuba; despite a long record of Soviet bluff and bluster over Berlin,
policymakers in the United States took these threats seriously. As the record shows, reputations do not
matter.
 Alt Causes---1NC
Trump administration decks US global credibility – dismissal of support to
human rights
Sarah Margon 18, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch, 2-13-2018, "Giving Up The
High Ground - America’s Retreat On Human Rights", Human Rights Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/13/giving-high-ground-americas-retreat-human-rights
All U.S. presidents have, to varying degrees, downplayed or even overlooked concerns about human
rights in order to get things done with unsavory foreign partners . But none has seemed so eager as
Trump to align with autocrats as a matter of course. The harm goes beyond mere words. In country after country, the Trump
administration is gutting U.S. support for human rights, the rule of law, and good
governance, damaging the overarching credibility of the United States . Within the United States’
borders, meanwhile, the Trump administration has unleashed an assault on nondiscrimination
and equal justice.
Even before Trump was elected, human rights were under attack across the globe. With crisis, conflict, and instability gripping much of the world, repressive
leaders from Ethiopia to Russia to Thailand have used these developments to justify tightening their hold on power—cracking down harder on dissent while
rejecting the rule of law and flouting international norms. Now, with Trump in office, there’s little reason to believe that such initiatives will be met with
much criticism or consequences from the United States. Indeed, the
Trump administration’s chaotic and virtually values-
free approach to foreign policy is bolstering this global deterioration while corroding the
institutions and alliances needed to reverse it.

The first year of Trump’s presidency was marked by a frenzy of activity on domestic issues .
His administration instituted harsh new immigration rules that are ripping apart families and
communities. Between late January and early September 2017, the total number of immigrants arrested inside the country (versus at the border)
increased by 43 percent compared with the number arrested during the equivalent time period under President Barack Obama in 2016. These are people
who have been uprooted from communities where they have families and deep ties. The
president has also issued a series of
travel bans, all of which use classic scapegoating tactics and bigotry to incite fears about Muslims
and refugee-resettlement programs. Although the courts blocked the original and most draconian versions of this ban, in late 2017, they
did allow a revised version to proceed.

The president has empowered bigots by making racially charged statements, including referring to white supremacists marching in Charlottesville, Virginia,
as “very fine people.” He has sought to end what he calls the “very dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America,” which is a direct rebuke to activists calling
for racial justice in policing. He
has also gravely harmed women’s rights by attacking reproductive choice, halting
an equal-pay measure, and weakening protections against gender-based violence on college
campuses.

On foreign policy, meanwhile, the administration has dismissed or damaged the global human
rights framework . Under Trump, the United States has walked away from (or threatened to walk away from) a
number of vital global commitments , institutions, and initiatives that would provide an opportunity to
share the burden of combating global challenges while respecting rights . The administration has threatened to
withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council, largely because the Palestinian territories (and therefore Israel) are a permanent item on its agenda. It’s true
that the council has flaws, but it has also successfully documented and exposed many human rights issues of concern to U.S. law and policymakers.

Walking away would not only weaken the council but also limit the available avenues for
Washington to promote human rights . From the UN’s negotiations on the compact for global migration to the Paris agreement on
climate change, the Trump administration has repeatedly suggested multilateral institutions are of no use
to the United States, even though the country was instrumental in creating the UN, as well as many
of the norms and laws that guide thinking about human rights today.
Alt-cause to low US soft power – government fails to promote human rights
and democracy
Lee H. Hamilton 18, 1-16-2018, "Decline of U.S. global leadership is not what Americans want",
HuffPost, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">https://www.huffpost.com/entry/decline-of-us-
global-leadership-is-not-what-americans_b_5a5e65d0e4b03ed177016e8f?
guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig
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SXowluJlZw6wfNAlyfksmB7UP68IBRN5mlKm0qur4pp5OyByN2TRkwlHgUqvz3B6RKPPZIK1zG8L
KirtHaF-zSwMU0GHPMXhqO9OAYeT4stISqKn0fdxsVQ72ZueSFdoIaB2keMZS</span>
Experts on foreign policy seem to have reached a broad agreement that America’s influence in the
world is declining. There is remarkable consensus in this belief among pundits, editorial writers, scholars and authors, the experts
who follow international events closely and have supported the traditional, mainstream American foreign policy for decades.

Even many of our allies have joined in criticizing America’s current foreign policy . They believe
that the U.S. had, in the past, deep influence over events and institutions around the world, and that
that influence has waned.
These experts and allies recognize the U.S. has not always lived up to its ideals, but they believe America’s foreign engagement has been
beneficial overall. They think we have played a constructive and generous role in shaping the world order – that we led the way in
building institutions that set the rules of the road for the international community.

They worry that PresidentDonald Trump’s “America First” policy means the U.S. is looking out only for itself,
destroying understanding, relationships and agreements, hollowing out the State Department and abandoning its
promotion of human rights and democracy.
They point to our withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Paris accord on climate along with our rejection of decades of
U.S. policy and international consensus by deciding to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. They see the U.S. no longer playing a
key role in the Middle East peace process.

They worry that, with

Trump wavering on support for NATO’s Article 5 commitment that members
must come to the defense of allies, the greatest military alliance in the history of the world is
diminished by our indifference.
They are alarmed by the president’s dust-ups with leaders of allied nations, including Australia, the United Kingdom, Mexico,
Germany and South Korea, and by his reluctance to challenge Russian interference in our election process and his mysterious support of
Russian President Vladimir Putin. They disagree with Trump’s dismissal of our opening to Cuba. Most recently, many were deeply
offended by his reported use of a vulgar term to refer to African countries and Haiti. They believe
America’s credibility is
damaged by threats to use force to “totally destroy” North Korea and our effectiveness is
weakened by Trump’s attacks on the CIA, the FBI and other national security institutions.

they see America as a nation abdicating its global responsibility and losing its moral
In short,

example.
 Alt Causes---2NC
Soft power will stay low under Trump presidency – Trump’s childish rhetoric
is at the expense of maintaining US alliances
Gretchen Frazee 18, 9-21-2018, reports, produces and edits business and economics content, "Is
Trump undermining America’s most persuasive form of global power?", PBS NewsHour,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/is-trump-undermining-americas-most-persuasive-form-
of-global-power

For decades, the

United States has sustained its status as the global superpower by combining the
promotion of democratic values and the strength of American culture around the
world with its military might. Those dual paths of influence are known as soft power (persuasion using cultural influence)
and hard power (coercion typically using military force).

But President Trump’s bombastic rhetoric and the “America First” agenda is eroding U.S.’
soft power, experts say, and, in turn, is damaging the interests of the very Americans Trump says he wants to help.
The U.S. slipped this year from third to fourth place an index that ranks the global leaders of soft power.

Trump’s supporters counter that his unconventional methods do not represent an abandonment of diplomacy. Rather, they argue a
stronger economy and Trump’s muscular approach to foreign affairs has given the U.S. more bargaining power.

Nevertheless, the U.S. slipped this year from third to fourth place in the Soft Power 30, an index created by the political consultancy firm
Portland that uses international polling and other metrics to rank countries according to their global influence. The United Kingdom,
France and Germany ranked the highest.

The Soft Power 30 cited the U.S. withdrawal from three major agreements — the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal — as the reason
for the slide in ranking.
“These shifts in policy create an inconsistent and unpredictable U.S. foreign policy that gives America the paradoxical look of a great
power in retreat, as well as a bully looking to extort as much as possible from as many possible,” the report said.

Since Trump took office, he has shifted the United States’ soft power strategy again, at least
on the surface.

Trump’s supporters admit he can be unpredictable in any given foreign policy situation — he sometimes appears to shift his approach
from one day to the next — but his broader foreign policy strategy is more consistent. Its key component is an economic-focused view of
the world where countries are competing against each other for a piece of the global pie.

The president’s “America First” agenda puts American interests at the fore, even at the
expense of maintaining relationships with U.S. allies, and, some critics argue, at the expense of the
nation’s soft power .

To achieve his campaign promise of bringing back American jobs and boosting the U.S. economy, Trump has also decried trade
deficits and levied steep tariffs on goods coming into the country, especially from China.

His trademark brashness goes beyond economics, playing hardball with other nations when it comes to everything
from nuclear development to financial contributions to NATO. He has publicly criticized the leaders of U.S.

allies on multiple occasions, and once reportedly called Haiti and African nations “sh*thole countries” at a White House meeting.

In January, reports surfaced that Trump imitated the prime minister of India’s accent . A video of
Trump imitating Prime Minister Narendra Modi without an accent in an address to U.S. governors has since gone viral in India. Shortly
after taking office, Trump reportedly cut a phone call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull short after bragging about his
election victory and telling Turnbull their conversation was the “worst call by far” that he had had with world leaders that day.

Incidents like those have left Trump’s counterparts with two options: shrugging off the insults, or
deciding they can’t work with Trump , and would rather instead partner more closely
with U.S. rivals like China.
Those insults could do lasting damage, according to Harvard professor Joseph Nye.

“Trump has destroyed the ability to have a working relationship because of childish
behavior,” Nye said.
Earlier in his presidency, Trump put a federal hiring freeze in place that included the State Department, as part of his effort to slash
budgets and reduce the federal civilian workforce.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lifted the freeze in May after taking the helm from Rex Tillerson. But as of September, there were still
197 key positions unfilled at the agency, based on an analysis from the Partnership for Public Service and the Washington Post.

Trump has also repeatedly created confusion on the world stage when he has directly
contradicted others in his administration.
Last year, Trump tweeted that Tillerson was “wasting his time” as secretary of state trying to negotiate with “Little Rocket Man,” the
president’s nickname for North Korea leader Kim Jong Un.

More recently, Pompeo listed several conditions for meeting with Iran, hours after Trump said there would be no preconditions.

‘Real power is… fear’

Rather than exerting the United States’ power in the world, former diplomats say they are concerned Trump is overly concerned with his
own reputation.

The title of Bob Woodward’s new book, “Fear,” is based on something Trump told the Washington Post editor and journalist in 2016.

“Real power is, I don’t even want to use the word, fear,” Trump said.

That line of thinking is a dramatic break from how past presidents have viewed America’s role in the world.

“It was powerful when people looked at what America stood for, the fact that America’s word was its bond and that people could count
on us not just to do what we said but to do the right thing,” said McEldowney, who resigned in June 2017 and is now the director of the
Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University.

Trump has now lost the trust of world leaders and become a “net exporter of instability,” she
added.

US leadership decline inevitable – media creates propaganda that destroys

reputation and reduces soft power
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 19, University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean,
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 5-20-2019, "American Soft Power in the Age of Trump",
The Cpd Blog, https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/american-soft-power-age-trump
U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has shown little interest in public diplomacy . And yet
public diplomacy—a government’s efforts to communicate directly with other countries’ publics —is one of
the key instruments policymakers use to generate soft power, and the current information revolution makes such instruments
more important than ever.
Opinion polls and the Portland Soft Power 30 index show that American soft power has declined since the
beginning of Trump’s term . Tweets can help to set the global agenda, but they do not produce soft power if they are not
attractive to others.

Trump’s defenders reply that soft power—what happens in the minds of others—is irrelevant; only hard power, with its military and
economic instruments, matters. In March 2017, Trump’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, proclaimed a “hard power budget” that would
have slashed funding for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development by nearly 30 percent.

Fortunately, military leaders know better. In 2013, General James Mattis (later Trump’s first Secretary of Defense) warned Congress, “If
you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” As Henry Kissinger once pointed out,
international order depends not only on the balance of hard power, but also on perceptions of
legitimacy, which depends crucially on soft power.
Information revolutions always have profound socioeconomic and political consequences—witness the dramatic effects of Gutenberg’s
printing press on Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One can date the current information revolution from the 1960s and
the advent of “Moore’s Law”: the number of transistors on a computer chip doubles roughly every two years. As a result, computing
power increased dramatically, and by the beginning of this century cost 0.1 percent of what it did in the early 1970s.

there is every reason to hope that the U.S. will recover its soft power after
Given past experience,

Trump , though a greater investment in public diplomacy would certainly help.

In 1993, there were about 50 websites in the world; by 2000, that number surpassed five million. Today, more than four billion people
are online; that number is projected to grow to 5-6 billion people by 2020, and the “Internet of Things” will connect tens of billions of
devices. Facebook has more users than the populations of China and the U.S. combined.

In such a world, the power to attract and persuade becomes increasingly important. But long gone are the days when public diplomacy
was mainly conducted through radio and television broadcasting. Technological
advances have led to a dramatic
reduction in the cost of processing and transmitting information. The result is an explosion of
information, which has produced a “paradox of plenty”: an abundance of information leads to
scarcity of attention.
When the volume of information confronting people becomes overwhelming, it is hard to know what to focus on. Social
media
algorithms are designed to compete for attention. Reputation becomes even more important than
in the past, and political struggles, informed by social and ideological affinities, often center on the
creation and destruction of credibility. Social media can make false information look more credible
if it comes from “friends.” As U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election
showed, this enabled Russia to weaponize American social media.

Reputation has always mattered in world politics, but credibility has become an even more
important power resource. Information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned, but may also
turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s reputation for credibility —and thus reduces
its soft power. The most effective propaganda is not propaganda. It is a two-way dialogue among people.
Russia and China do not seem to comprehend this, and sometimes the United States fails to pass the test as well. During the Iraq War, for
example, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in a manner inconsistent with American values led to perceptions of hypocrisy that
could not be reversed by broadcasting pictures of Muslims living well in America. Today,
presidential “tweets” that prove
to be demonstrably false undercut America’s credibility and reduce its soft power . The effectiveness of
public diplomacy is measured by minds changed (as reflected in interviews or polls), not dollars spent or number of messages sent.
No solvency – the U.S won’t be taken seriously on human rights because of
Trump’s support of autocrats
Kenneth Roth 2019, Executive Director at Human Rights Watch, Beware the Trump
Administration’s Plans for ‘Fresh Thinking’ on Human Rights, July 11, 2019,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/united-states
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on Monday the creation of a Commission on Unalienable
Rights to provide “an informed review of the role of human rights in American foreign policy.” But this superficially
laudable step is fraught with threats to the very human rights that it purports to strengthen.
That is because, as Pompeo suggested, the purpose of the commission is not to uphold all rights
but to pick and choose among them: “What does it mean to say or claim that something is, in fact, a human right? How
do we know or how do we determine whether that claim that this or that is a human right, is it true, and therefore, ought it to be
honored?” But human rights do not exist in the eye of the beholder . International treaties that have been widely
ratified (though many not by the United States) codify what they term “inalienable” human rights. The fundamental rights set out in these
treaties are clear, but the Trump administration is
unhappy that they are cited to uphold, for example,
reproductive freedom or the rights of LGBT people not to face discrimination. So there is reason to fear that this
exercise in identifying “unalienable” rights is a unilateral attempt to rewrite international law according to the administration’s
conservative social views.

Those fears are only intensified by Pompeo’s selection of Mary Ann Glendon, a prominent scholar opposed to abortion and same-sex
marriage, to head the commission. Pompeo himself, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, complained that “rights claims are often aimed more
at rewarding interest groups and dividing humanity into subgroups,” apparently taking issue with rights that protect women and LGBT
people.Pompeo justified the need for “fresh thinking” by citing an alleged conflict among rights: “As human rights claims have
proliferated, some claims have come into tension with one another, provoking questions and clashes about which rights are entitled to
gain respect.” He didn’t explain further, but it’s likely he is referring to the Trump administration’s view, asserted domestically in the
courts, that reproductive and LGBT rights conflict with religious freedom such that one’s religious views should take precedence over, for
instance, the duty not to discriminate.

These comments about a “clash” of rights might also be used to reaffirm the long-standing U.S. position that only civil and political rights,
not economic and social rights, are real human rights. Both are detailed in widely ratified treaties — the two “covenants” that list the
rights originally set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But while China, for example, has never ratified the civil and
political rights treaty — the sorts of rights detailed in the U.S. Constitution — the United States has never ratified the one on economic,
social and cultural rights, which lists such rights as to food, health care and housing. China takes the view (as did the Soviet Union) that
economic development should precede concerns about respecting civil and political rights. Rather than embracing a “clash” of rights
perspective that makes possible such false dichotomies, the administration theoretically could reaffirm the covenants’ treatment of them
as equal.

It could note that the best way to ensure that economic development reflects popular needs rather than a government’s preferences for
corruption, power preservation or self-aggrandizement is to recognize both sets of rights — economic and social — to highlight
governmental duties in this area, and civil and political rights, so governmental conduct is scrutinized. But not since Franklin Delano
Roosevelt has the U.S. government recognized the validity of economic and social rights, and no one expects the Trump administration to
change that.

Beyond an apparent effort to rethink the nature of human rights , the commission will advise on
the promotion of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. But we don’t need a commission to figure
out that the Trump administration will have little credibility promoting human rights so long as the
president continues to embrace autocrats — Vladimir Putin, Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, Mohammed
bin Salman and the like — while expressing envy of their ability to silence or compromise the
checks and balances on their authority, such as the independent judges, probing journalists and pesky activists who are essential
to democracy. And that’s not even mentioning his trampling on rights at home, such as the separation of immigrant children from their families and their
detention in horrible conditions. The real aim in this regard may be revealed by Pompeo’s claim that “international institutions remain confused about their
respective responsibilities concerning human rights.” Again, it’s hard to know what this means, but given the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the
U.N. Human Rights Council for supposedly criticizing Israel too much, the asserted confusion sounds more like a failure to fall lockstep into the Trump
administration’s very selective idea of what the enforcement of universal human rights means.
China’s economic success draw in American allies -- Trump administration’s
choices to cut funding to overseas decrease US non-military influence
Brad Honigberg 18, author at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, 8-2-2018,
"Recommitting The United States To Soft Power Strategies", McCain Institute,
https://www.mccaininstitute.org/blog/recommitting-the-united-states-to-soft-power-strategies/
In the late 1980s, political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. first described the concept of soft power. Whereas hard power relies on inducements
(carrots) and threats (sticks), soft power gets others to want the outcomes you want without the threat of coercion. Soft
power is
determined by the attractiveness of a country’s culture, domestic values, and the substance
of its foreign policy. Historically, the United States used its soft power to strengthen its
cultural and moral appeal abroad. During the Cold War, America used the power of
attraction to bolster its image as the leader of the free world and a superior alternative to
Soviet authoritarianism.
In recent years, America’s soft power has waned. In
2017, President Trump’s Budget Director Mick Mulvaney
announced a “hard power budget,” cutting 30% of the State Department and USAID budgets. Funding for

public health, food security, women’s rights and other aspects of America’s non-
military influence overseas , has been critically weakened.
In a Pew Research poll, 50% of individuals surveyed across 33 nations held a positive view of the United States, trailed by China (48%)
and Russia (35%). America’s prestige declined most significantly in Asia. Another Pew poll
found that South Korea
and Japan, America’s most reliable Asian allies, experienced a 71% and 54% drop, respectively,
regarding trust in the American president’s judgement. These statistics depict a blow to
America’s global prestige and an increasingly positive perception of authoritarian states.
Beijing’s efforts are
Over the last few years, China has made great strides to strengthen its soft power capabilities, or “wenhua ruan shili.”

best exemplified by their aggressive economic investment in the developing world. China’s
ambitious Belt and Road Initiative will span 0ver 60 countries and allow it to project influence across Eurasia. Beijing’s use of

economic coercion makes countries and companies wary to confront Chinese

illiberalism and revisionism . As a result, American allies and partners are growing less willing
to cooperate with the United States on diplomatic, economic and security issues.
In terms of soft power, Russia has relied more on cultivating a perception of renewed strength to garner international prestige. Hosting
the 2014 Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup framed Russia as a resurgent world power. Their soft power efforts are
contrasted by Putin’s decision to annex Crimea, wage a shadow war in Eastern Ukraine and support the genocidal Assad Regime in Syria.
Vladimir Putin has been unofficially dubbed “everyone’s favorite despot,” calling into question whether he and Xi Jingping are
challenging America’s soft power advantage with sharp power strategies.

President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy is straining America’s global alliance
structure and enabling bad behavior from authoritarian leaders. His strategy risks
forfeiting America’s moral authority and post-war commitment as the chief promoter of
human rights and democracy. Perceiving America to be opportunistic and unreliable, economist Adam Posen argues that
countries will increasingly bypass the United States to construct a “post-American world economy.”

Sustainable soft power comes from character-driven leadership and a system of

government and values worth emulating. Eurasian strongmen offer a facade of toughness and order, but their soft
power lacks what America’s promises: Freedom, human rights, democracy, and equality . If the United
States wishes to remain the bedrock of the liberal international order – albeit ensure the sustained existence of this order – it must
recommit itself to strengthening its soft power capabilities.
Terror Advantage
Link Turn
 Link Turn---1NC
U.S counter terrorism service in Iraq has been successful but only continued
support can create lasting peace
MICHAEL KNIGHTS 2017, Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. He has worked in every Iraqi province and most of the hundred districts, including
periods spent embedded with the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, and most recently with
Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve. Follow @mikeknightsiraq, 7/19/17,
“THE BEST THING AMERICA BUILT IN IRAQ: IRAQ’S COUNTER-TERRORISM SERVICE AND THE
LONG WAR AGAINST MILITANCY”, War on the Rocks
When the last pocket of the self-styled Islamic State (ISIL) was eradicated in west Mosul last week, it was fitting that the 36th Commando Battalion struck the
final blows. The
36th was the first Iraqi special forces unit to be developed after Saddam’s fall. Today it
is the longest serving component of the Counter-Terrorism Service — a force of less than 8,000
elite troops built by the United States, and the most militarily and politically reliable force at the
disposal of the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi Army and Federal Police have regained some public trust since their collapse in June 2014 ,
when Mosul and around twenty other cities fell to ISIL, but only two forces in Iraq have retained the faith of the Iraqi
people throughout the war. One is the Counter-Terrorism Service, known in Iraq as the “Golden
Division,” a model for multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian nationalism. The other is the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF), the volunteer units raised by a religious fatwa and government orders in June 2014, which has fallen under the leadership of an Iranian-
backed U.S.-designated terrorist, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

The evolution of these two forces will likely shape the future of Iraq itself. Baghdad will need
effective counter-terrorism forces backed by the most advanced intelligence capabilities
available to the U.S.-led coalition if it is to pursue ISIL into Iraq’s deserts, borderlands, mountains,
jungle groves, and urban hideouts. As important, the Iraqi government requires loyalist forces that are under the full command and
control of the Iraqi prime minister — particularly as PMF leaders such as Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri (head of the largest PMF faction Badr) continue to act
outside prime ministerial control.

In the aftermath of Mosul, the Counter-Terrorism Service is exhausted . Being the best has taken its toll: The U.S.
government assesses that the Counter-Terrorism Service suffered “forty percent battle losses” in Mosul. In this piece,
we look at the lessons that have been learned from the first decade of the service’s existence and apply these to how the U.S.-led coalition should support its
rebuilding.

Why the Counter-Terrorism Service Succeeded

One-third of Iraqi army and Federal Police brigades collapsed in June 2014, but the Counter-
Terrorism Service lasted and spearheaded the counter-attack at Tikrit, Beyji, Ramadi, and eventually Mosul. The U.S.-trained Counter-
Terrorism Service kept fighting because of the essential correctness of the force’s basic conception,
recruitment, leadership, and training. What factors made the service so robust when the rest of Iraq’s security forces proved so
brittle?

Size is a definite factor. The Counter-Terrorism Service stayed small, never exceeding around 12,500 personnel. In comparison, the Iraqi Army achieved a combat manpower of 151,250, and the Federal Police maintained
a force of 82,500 at the time of the fall of Mosul. The compact size of the Counter-Terrorism Service meant that selection and training could utilize rigorous standards akin to those used for recruiting U.S. special
operations forces. Using one May 2008 training program as an example, of 2,200 candidates in one Counter-Terrorism Service intake, only 401 (18 percent) succeeded in graduating as troopers. The small size of the
service also allowed it to receive far better pay, living conditions, and equipment than other Iraqi troops. With pay nearly double that of a typical Iraqi army soldier, and equipped almost identically to a U.S. Special Forces
trooper, the Counter-Terrorism Service developed elite espirit de corps and strong retention of skilled manpower, including a high proportion of Iraq’s best military officers.

Unsurprisingly, the force displayed superior discipline to other Iraqi units and suffered far less from corruption and militia penetration, to the extent that the United States was comfortable sharing some of its most
sensitive military intelligence and equipment from the birth of the Counter-Terrorism Service to this day. The service attained a focus on professionalism, cross-sectarianism, and loyalty to Iraq that remains unparalleled
within Iraq’s security forces. Unique among Iraq’s forces, the Counter-Terrorism Service developed the beginnings of a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) cadre.

On the battlefield, the Counter-Terrorism Service undertook “industrial scale” counterterrorism operations in Iraq for nearly seven years, maintaining a grueling, sustained operational tempo unmatched by anyother
special operations force in world. The service developed intelligence, used in-house judges to generate timely warrants, conducted multiple takedowns of insurgent cells per night across Iraq, operated its own helicopter
forces, and undertook the rapid exploitation and fusion of intelligence to drive new cycles of raids. By the time of U.S. withdrawal in 2011, the Counter-Terrorism Service had developed into a finely-tuned
counterterrorism machine, and solidified its reputation as one of the finest special operations forces in the Middle East.

Options for Rebuilding

The Counter-Terrorism Service is a different animal three years after the fall of Mosul. The force has fought numerous conventional battles as an elite light infantry force mounted in U.S.-provided Humvees. In the latter
half of 2014, it was the Counter-Terrorism Service that held out at the surrounded Beyji refinery, deep behind ISIL lines, until they were relieved by a Counter-Terrorism Service-led column. In 2015, the Counter-
Terrorism Service led the urban clearances of Tikrit and Ramadi, followed by Fallujah and Mosul the following year. Veteran NCOs and commandos were lost year after year, followed by the loss of 40 percent of the
service’s frontline troops in Mosul. For instance, beginning with 350 personnel at the start of the Mosul battle, the Najaf Regional Commando Battalion was whittled down to 150 effectives in just 90 days of fighting.

Based on the authors’ tracking of the service’s units, if this kind of cumulative attrition were mirrored across all of its combat units, the total strength of service would have fallen to about 7,600 at the time of writing
(2,700 in the combat battalions, 1,900 headquarters staff, 2,400 reconnaissance battalion and logistics personnel, and 600 other staff). According to our unit tracking, the establishment strength of CTS should be around
13,920, meaning that CTS is currently 54 percent manned, and only 34 percent manned in combat battalions.

The personnel base of the Counter-Terrorism Service and its specialized capabilities will
need to be largely rebuilt. There are two basic models for force regeneration. One is the paring down of
Counter-Terrorism Service into one more narrowly focused on traditional counter-terrorism. The service’s current light infantry functions could be phased
out as soon as ISIL is rolled back from the remaining Iraqi territory it holds in towns such as Tall Afar, Hawijah, and Al-Qaim. The service, under this model,
would “snap back” into the shape it held before 2014. The service’s director Talib Shegati al-Kinani, a retired lieutenant general from the Saddam-era air
defense forces, indicated on July 14 that this would be the model in keeping with existing law. The service’s current 18 commando battalions, four
reconnaissance battalions, and numerous headquarters, logistical and intelligence fusion units would be brought up to strength.

An alternative model offers a more expansionary view of what the Counter-Terrorism Service
could become. Under this model, the “Golden Division” would be expanded and given more
missions. In addition to its core counter-terrorism tasks, the Counter-Terrorism Service might
continue to operate light infantry forces capable of undertaking conventional assaults on fortified
positions held by ISIL or other enemy forces. This model harkens back to the mugawir tradition (commando in Arabic), whereby
special forces are light infantry that would undertake special missions during conventional military conflicts. This was the Iraqi mode of using special forces
in the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait.

This kind of model was considered by the government of Nouri al-Maliki from 2012 onwards, with Maliki seeking to expand the service into a multi-division,
“Special Republican Guard” praetorian force of over 30,000 troops with armored fighting vehicles capable of outfighting any domestic opponents, whether
terrorists, militias, or even army units. The attractiveness of such an option was that the most capable force in the country would be operating directly under
the prime minister’s control. At the time, the Counter-Terrorism Service was not enshrined in law and was not responsible to the cabinet or parliament, as a
legally established ministry would be. The risk was clearly that this force might be used for undemocratic power grabs by a sitting prime minister or by the
Counter-Terrorism Service itself. Maliki’s occasional misuses of the Counter-Terrorism Service to harass political opponents deepened these concerns, but
the austerity imposed by crashing oil prices undercut expansion plans.

The battlefield successes and “conventionalization” of the Counter-Terrorism Service over the last three years will probably drive reconsideration, both
inside the Iraqi government and within the U.S.-led coalition, of an expansion of the Counter-Terrorism Service as a multi-division elite light infantry force.
Popular trust of the Iraqi army, Federal Police, and PMF will remain low when it comes to the complex missions of undertaking counter-terrorism and
outreach to Sunni populations on in some of Iraq’s least hospitable terrain and most divided communities. Military tasks will be drawn to “the men who can,”
especially now that the Counter-Terrorism Service is a legally established, ministry-level government department (as of August 13, 2016). Indeed, the new
U.S. Department of Defense 2018 budget request envisions the Counter-Terrorism Service “building its non-sectarian force to 20,000 personnel over the
next three fiscal years.” This suggests that the service would be brought up to establishment strength and then expanded by 43 percent in three years.

International Assistance to the Counter-Terrorism Service

Resources will now be thrown at the Counter-Terrorism Service. As noted by military expert David Witty — the author of a forthcoming Brookings
Institution study on the Counter-Terrorism Service — in 2008-2010, the service received about $225 million per year from the Iraqi government (cobbled
together from discretionary spending by the prime minister’s office and the Ministry of Defense). To this total, around $55 million worth of U.S. budget
assistance each year would be added. This combined $280 million fell short of the service’s budget requests, which averaged $412 million in the same three-
year period. We can surmise from the continued operational capability of the Counter-Terrorism Service that in-kind support from the U.S. intelligence
community and special operations command bridged much of the budget gap until U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and a small portion thereafter.

In 2017, the Iraqi budget included its first dedicated line item for the Counter-Terrorism Service, totaling $683 million. If this Iraqi allocation were to be
replicated in 2018 and combined with the requested $193 million of U.S. aid to the service, the total would be an unprecedented $876 million — more than
triple the largest pre-2014 budget that the Counter-Terrorism Service received. What else can be done to ensure the resources are invested wisely and that
the Counter-Terrorism Service continues to be effective and a force for good? In particular, what can the U.S.-led coalition do to ensure an optimal outcome?

The first thing the coalition can do is to keep working together. Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve is much more effective and resilient
as a broad multinational coalition than a U.S.-Iraq security partnership ever could be. First, the multinational forces bring real capability and burden-sharing
to the mission of supporting the Counter-Terrorism Service. Australian, New Zealander, French, Belgian and Spanish special forces have all contributed to
training the service in its Baghdad training facility and the Taji training base, both adjacent to Baghdad. Second, the variety of world powers involved —
including most of the international players on whom Iran depends for foreign investment — protects the partnership from attack by Iranian-backed militias
operating within the PMF.

The secondpriority of the U.S.-led coalition is to maintain embedded presence at various levels of
the Counter-Terrorism Service. Close collocation and daily contact allowed U.S. advisors to
inculcate the service with professional ethics until 2010, and there was a strong correlation
between declining service capacity in the counter-terrorism role and the withdrawal of U.S.
advisors. The key levels to embed within include:
Ministry level. As a new ministry-level organization, the service now has to undertake all the functions that Ministry of Defense used to perform on its behalf, such as personnel,
medical support, infrastructure, general expenses, vehicle maintenance, and spare parts. International capacity-building at the ministry level will have cascading positive effects across
the lower levels of the Counter-Terrorism Service, and it is the best way to reduce the risk of both politicization of the service’s leadership as well as human rights violations by
forming relationships and early warning mechanisms. International advisors could assist the service to update the national counter-terrorism strategy and develop an Iraqi counter-
insurgency doctrine.

Counter-Terrorism Service units were brought to a high level of capacity with as few as one hundred U.S. advisors present at secure sites such as the service’s training academy at Area
IV in Baghdad. These advisors kept standards up, maintaining the high “washout” rates of the service’s selection processes. Going forward, the service will be training very large
numbers of replacements, with fewer surviving Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service veterans to guide the process, creating a danger that standards could slip.

Intelligence fusion. The service will now need to reorient its intelligence fusion headquarters in Baghdad away from battlefield intelligence towards counter-terrorism, and it will need
to rebuild its provincial network of Regional Coordination Centers and their underpinning intelligence software networks and judicial sections (for generating arrest warrants). The
coalition needs to maintain a direct intelligence liaison presence in the service’s headquarters at various levels.

Key “enablers.” Intelligence and airlift will be vital to the kinds of “wide area” security that the Counter-Terrorism Service will be undertaking as it pursues ISIL into remote areas and
covert urban hideouts. Due to the vital role of helicopter assaults in the coming phase of the war, the coalition should redevelop the formerly close ties between the service’s aviation
wing and the U.S. military.

Can the Counter-Terrorism Service Fix the Iraqi Military?

A final priority for international supporters should be the fostering of close relations between the Counter-Terrorism Service and its sister services in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry
of Interior, and Iraqi intelligence community. Aside from the common-sense benefits of coordination, the coalition should view interface and exchange of personnel as a means by
which the Counter-Terrorism Service could “cross-pollinate” with other Iraqi institutions. In the past, the Counter-Terrorism Service jealously hoarded its personnel and did not tend
to release them back to Ministry of Defense (where they often originated). As a result, other agencies viewed the service as a threat.

Now the opposite is quickly becoming true, at least at the level of senior commanders. Looking for the best talent to reverse Iraq’s military disasters, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
has drawn heavily on the Counter-Terrorism Service to lead key commands. Deputy commander of the service’s operational staff, Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Sa’adi, was tapped in
January 2015 to lead the northern campaign to liberate Tikrit, Beyji, and then Mosul. Counter-Terrorism Service brigade commander Maj. Gen. Kareem Halfa al-Tamimi was chosen in
May 2015 to head the security division in charge of the government center in the International Zone in Baghdad. In July 2016, following the devastating bombing in Baghdad’s upscale
Karrada district, Abadi appointed Staff Maj. Gen. Jalil Abdul-Jabbar al-Rubaie — then the service’s intelligence director — to head the Baghdad Operations Command, controlling
nearly 60 percent of the total manpower of Iraq’s security forces. Most recently, Maj. Gen. Irfan al-Hayali, the long-serving chief of the service’s Training and Development Directorate,
was appointed as minister of defense in January 2017.

U.S.-led coalition should help

Rather than support an expansion of the Counter-Terrorism Service that could make Iraq’s special forces less “special,” the

the service to serve as an incubator for military talent . This may mean rotating Counter-
Terrorism Service personnel back into other ministries , the Iraqi army, and the Federal Police.
Such circulation could assist the Iraqi army in strengthening its own commando battalions and
special units, and in gaining skill in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.
Cross-pollination of personnel could also reduce militia domination of the powerful Ministry of Interior, which is currently led by the Iranian-backed Badr movement, and its
Emergency Response Division, which has recently been tied to serious human rights abuses. The service could even absorb manpower from the Popular Mobilization Forces and rotate
its officers through the PMF, which might reduce the risk of future tensions between these forces. The Counter-Terrorism Service needs to be better — not bigger — than its sister
agencies, serving as a model of professionalism and loyalty to the Iraqi constitution.

TheU.S. effort to develop Iraq’s security forces is widely viewed as a monumental and costly failure,
but there is at least one element that has been a smashing success: the Counter-Terrorism
Service. Of all the institutions that America birthed in Iraq, the Counter-Terrorism Service has been and could remain the
most well-conceived and effectively realized. The Counter-Terrorism Service needs sustained
U.S. support if the U.S. wishes it to remain as a lasting, living monument to its hopes and good
intentions for Iraq.
 UQ---CT Working---2NC
Iraq and Syrian forces key to countering ISIS --- US support is necessary to
defeat remaining forces
Elizabeth McLaughlin 19- journalist at ABC News, covering the military and foreign policy from
the Pentagon and part of ABC's Global Affairs Unit, 4/10/2019 “Fight against ISIS continues in Iraq
and Syria, despite declaration of victory” https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fight-isis-continues-
iraq-syria-declaration-victory/story?id=62300196
The U.S.-led coalition's fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is not over, despite a declaration of
victory against the group's last remaining stronghold in eastern Syria last month.

In the week following the March 23 victory declaration by Syrian and Kurdish partner forces, the coalition
conducted 52 strikes in Iraq and Syria, according to a statement released by the coalition on Wednesday.
Between March 24 and April 6, the coalition struck 28 ISIS tactical units and destroyed 72 vehicles, 17 fighting positions, 15 supply
routes and three vehicles borne improvised explosive devices in Syria. During that same time period, the coalition struck three ISIS
tactical units and destroyed seven tunnels, four supply routes, two buildings, two caves, one command and control center and one
compound in Iraq.

"While the completion of territorial liberation is a major milestone, we

will continue to work by, with, and through our
partners in Iraq and Syria to deny ISIS the opportunity to re-emerge," Pentagon spokesperson Cmdr.
Sean Robertson told ABC News.

He said Syrian and

Kurdish partner forces continue to conduct back clearance operations -- or double
checking areas already believed to be swept of militants -- and eliminating any remaining ISIS
weapons caches.
"This back-clearance operation will be deliberate and thorough and help ensure the long-term security for the area," Robertson said.

Despite the territorial defeat of a terror group that once controlled about 34,000 square miles of land, U.S. officials
estimate there could be tens of thousands of ISIS fighters still in the region.
Last month, the then-head of U.S. forces in the Middle East warned against the "calculated" retreat of ISIS fighters from their last
stronghold in Baghouz, saying the exodus of thousands is not a surrender, but a decision to retreat to camps and
remote areas in the region until they can reconstitute as a violent extremist organization once again.
"We will see low-level attacks, we'll see assassinations, we'll see IED attacks, we'll see ambush type things as they begin to emerge from
this. What our focus has to be is working with our partners," Gen. Joseph Votel told the House Armed Services
Committee on March 7. "We're going to have to keep pressure on this."

In Iraq, where the military declared liberation from ISIS in December 2017, the terror group has already established
sanctuaries, according to a report released last month by the Institute for the Study of War, " setting the conditions for
future offensive operations against the Government of Iraq ."

Terrorism is low now – the only problem is public perception the aff can’t
solve
Henry Willis 2017, Henry H. Willis is associate director of the RAND Homeland Security Research
Division and a senior fellow at the George Washington University Center for Cyber & Homeland
Security, 11/16/17, “Commentary: America Is Great at Fighting Terrorism, but Terror Is Alive and
Well”, Fortune Magazine, https://fortune.com/2017/11/16/counterterrorism-terror-isis-
terrorism/
The unfortunate reality is that this evolution in terrorism may be the fruit of America’s success in the War on Terrorism. Counterterrorism, since
2001, threatens terrorist safe havens, infiltrates terrorists’ financial and communications networks,
hardens critical infrastructure, and connects the dots among the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. The goal was to prevent another 9/11 in the U.S., and by that measure, the strategy has been a
success. Still, attacks since then have caused terror that persists at high levels.
There is an important distinction between terrorism—the violent actions used by terrorists to affect political
realities—and terror—the reaction these actions cause in the affected population. Unless radical jihadi terrorism is eliminated,
which history suggests is unlikely, existing counterterrorism strategy needs to be complemented with a
strategy to counter terror. Doing so requires taking three steps: Setting and tracking progress toward the right goals, using
public communication to reduce terror, and denying aspiring radicals a claim to their ultimate objective: terror.
The measures used to count the success of U.S. counterterrorism strategy typically include statistics
such as numbers of suspects, attacks, and victims. As terrorist attacks evolved into pure terrorism, the level of
terrorism in the U.S. remains low—based on these same measures—compared to terrorism
threats in the U.S. and western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.
Using the prevention of mega-terrorism or the number of attacks to measure the success of counterterrorism policies and operations likely overlooks
a failure of America’s counterterrorism strategy to reduce terror. To many, terrorism remains a
constant and seemingly random part of society. Despite the assessments of the country’s national security leaders, terrorism
consistently places atop public opinion polls about leading national security threats.

The success of a counterterror strategy should also be measured in terms of public attitudes about the confidence in public safety and security and
perceptions of the effects terrorism has on individual and national well-being and national security. Efforts to track these views are limited to these
occasional public opinion polls. More detailed surveys of public attitudes are needed to truly understand the progress being made to counter the spread of
terror. These surveys of public attitudes could help better explain what is influencing attitudes about well-being, why they vary across groups in society, and
how they change over time. They could also provide a baseline for counter-terror strategies. As individuals, our reactions to terrorist attacks are influenced
by the event and our existing knowledge about terrorism. Our reactions are shaped by what we knew before the attack, the response we expect during and
after it, and what we learn about the attacker’s plans, motives, and actions. When information is not available, our natural reaction is to fill in the details with
our experiences and inference. Through this process, people often adopt beliefs that increase fear. Addressing these uninformed conclusions provides an
opportunity to counter terror. Much like vaccines make society resilient to disease, experts in risk communication demonstrate how well-crafted, effectively
delivered, informative communication can inoculate the public against terror if used before events and reduce it when delivered during and after them. For
example, a study of the effectiveness of inoculation messaging for crisis communication showed that recipients of pre-crisis messages that acknowledge
threats and the efforts taken to address them are more confident of the government’s ability to prevent them and minimize their consequences. To apply
inoculation messaging as a tool, the media and government must know what questions the public has about terrorism, and deliver clear and accurate
information that answers these questions before, during, and after events.

One factor presumed to increase terrorists’ motivation for attacking is their ability to contribute to a
larger cause and the attendant fame that comes with it. Al-Qaida and ISIS rhetoric paves the path to a meaningful existence for many radicalized
individuals who in other ways may be viewed to be lost. Minutes after an attacker’s identity is known, his picture and
name spread instantly across media and social networks, affirming the contribution the attacker has made
to spread terror and advance his adopted cause.
Government and the news media can play a role in advancing a counter-terror strategy by
establishing codes of conduct for reporting on terrorism that include omitting the names and
images of attackers and establishing practices for sharing descriptions that characterize the other details about the threat as they are available.
Reporting practices like these would deny attackers glory yet still provide the public with the
information needed to be informed about the threats faced and the steps public officials are taking to address them.
Counter terror strategies working now – only increasing pressure on terrorist
groups solves
Sanaa Khan et al 2016, Former Policy Advisor, National Security Program, 7/14/16, “The Plan to
Combat Terrorism”, Third Way, https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-plan-to-combat-terrorism
U.S. should
In the near-term, there are several ways the U.S. can ramp up its efforts to destroy ISIS, secure our national interests, and move toward regional stability. The

intensify coalition efforts by increasing airstrikes, enforcing a no-fly zone if the Syrian peace
process collapses, and adding U.S. special operations forces on the ground to assist local ground
forces. These local forces must be increased to take the fight against ISIS on the ground. Congress must also do its part and pass an authorization for the use of military force
(AUMF) against ISIS.

The United States and coalition members have been attacking ISIS targets since 2014. Jointly, over 15,000
airstrikes have been conducted in Iraq and Syria. Over 30,000 ISIS targets have been damaged or destroyed , including

oil infrastructure, combat positions, and tanks. The U.S. has spent more than $9.3 billion since operations against ISIS began in August 2014 and
there are currently about 5,000 U.S. military service members on the ground, primarily serving as advisers to regional forces.12 In recent months, the U.S. and our coalition partners
have accelerated this campaign:

ISIS lost control of Ramadi to Iraqi forces in December.

ISIS has lost 45% of the territory it once controlled in Iraq.13
Hundreds of millions of dollars held in cash by ISIS has been destroyed by coalition
airstrikes.14
Enhance Coalition Efforts
U.S., along with our coalition partners, must continue increasing the pressure on ISIS,
Going forward, the

through more airstrikes, continued training of local forces to take back territory from ISIS, and better information-
sharing.
If no ceasefire is agreed to in Syria, the United States should consider working with coalition partners to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Syria along the border with Turkey. This
would create a safe zone on the ground for civilians to access the humanitarian care that has been blocked thus far in the conflict because of airstrikes. Local forces must complement
the no-fly zone by ensuring ISIS and government forces don’t block civilian access to humanitarian assistance on the ground.A no-fly zone would also have the benefit of slowing the
flow of refugees into Europe and providing the U.S. leverage over Russia in developing a political resolution in Syria. Turkey has long called for a no-fly zone in order to create a safe
zone along its border and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has recently signaled that it would be helpful.15 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has repeatedly expressed her
support for enforcing a no-fly zone to create a humanitarian corridor.16 There is also bipartisan support in Congress for a safe zone for civilians with the potential aid of a no-fly zone.
Last April, Senators Richard Durbin, Tim Kaine, Lindsey Graham, and John McCain stated their support for “humanitarian safe zones with the necessary enforcement mechanisms,
including the potential use of air assets” in a letter to President Obama.17 Should the cessation of hostilities and peace process collapse, the United States and coalition forces must be
prepared to take this approach.There are currently about 5,000 American forces in Iraq, most of whom are serving as military advisers to train Iraqi troops in the fight against ISIS; the
vast majority do not fight ISIS directly.18 A smaller portion of U.S. forces, about 200, are special operations forces in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Syria, who are mounting direct capture
and kill operations against ISIS.19 This is a smart and effective way to safely insert a small U.S. military presence to better prepare local forces to take on ISIS in combat. The United

States should increase the use of these forces to advance precision attacks and make local groups more effective in combating ISIS.
ISIS will not be defeated by airstrikes alone. U.S. regional allies and local groups must supply the
ground troops to defeat ISIS in the Middle East. The United States should not become involved in another ground war in the
region. This would put our military servicemen and women in harm’s way and tie the U.S. to the war and its aftermath for years to come. President Obama
has said this would play right into ISIS’s endgame, stating it would help their recruitment for years and further extend the war.20 Regional ground forces,
complemented with U.S. and coalition airstrikes, will eliminate ISIS in the region.
 Arm Sales Key---General---2NC
Continued arms sales key to counter terror – assists allies and lays foundation
for strong alliances and regional stability
Tina S. Kaidanow 17, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
9/26/17, “MANAGING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY”, State News Service,
https://www-lexisnexis-com.bps.idm.oclc.org/us/lnlib/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5PK3-MRW1-
JCBF-
S30M&csi=8399&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true&secondRedirectIndic
ator=true
These words, from President Reagan's 1982 National Security Strategy, are as true today as they were then, although the statutes and processes through
which American security assistance is programmed and managed have changed significantly since that time. Since 2001 in particular, we have seen a re-
orientation of security assistance, greatly driven by the emergence of the global threat from terrorism, towards the purpose of achieving military ends. Yet at
its core -- as
directed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961[1], the Arms Export Control Act and, indeed, by the annual State and
Foreign Operations appropriations acts, including the most recent FY 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act[2] -- foreign
assistance,
including security assistance, is a tool of foreign policy that may be very effectively used in the
context of the consideration of the long term interests of the United States, among them relationship
building, regional power balancing, interoperability, and the promotion of professionalism in the armed forces of partner nations. Given the
relationship between security assistance and foreign policy, the Department of State must play a crucial role in the provision, direction, supervision and
coordination of this assistance and all similar assistance across the U.S. government.

Security assistance is a powerful tool that the United States can use to strengthen our alliances
and partnerships around the world and mitigate threats that require a collective response: terrorism, organized
crime, restraints on the freedom of navigation, and other challenges to our national security. U.S.
security assistance supports regional stability in the face of terrorist threats, in particular the
threat posed by ISIS and other organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab. Our assistance reassures allies and
partners and provides the means for them to counter destabilizing and malign activities of violent
extremist groups in a regional context. It also strengthens security relationships in a manner that
bolsters regional and global security, increases U.S. influence, secures access and legal protections to
facilitate deployment of U.S. forces, improves interoperability between U.S. and coalition partners, advantageously
shapes partners' capabilities to support strategic priorities, and promotes the U.S. defense industrial base as the first and
best option for states that are procuring defense articles. Our security assistance helps build security sector institutional capacity to
ensure the long-term sustainability, effectiveness, professionalism, and resilience of partner and
ally nations, and it promotes post-conflict stability to enhance partners' internal security and
reduce threats to U.S. and partner interests.

FMS and DCS are key to U.S security assistance to counter terror
JAMES H. JOHNSON 08, COLONEL U.S. ARMY “A Global Counter-Insurgency Campaign Plan for the
War on Terror”, Counter Terrorism Center, JUNE 2008, https://ctc.usma.edu/a-global-counter-
insurgency-campaign-plan-for-the-war-on-terror/
A global counter-insurgency cannot succeed without the success of partner nations’ internal
security forces. These forces not only achieve tactical and operational successes against the enemy, but
they provide strong legitimacy to their governments if they become respected institutions. Through Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) efforts with partner nations, the United States can assist in the following ways: 1. defeat of radical
Islamic organizations and networks in partner nations; 2). secure borders and transit zones thus assisting in denying
radical Islamic organizations of the resources they need to operate and survive; 3. provide a secure and stable
environment for culturally and politically progressive Arab governments to govern, thus discrediting
violent extremist ideology in the eyes of the world’s Muslims. Priority of effort for FID and partnership operations should be in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and then Jordan.

The U.S. was successful in shaping the global environment during the Cold War by assisting partner nations in their internal security efforts. By
supporting Security Assistance Operations for partner nations, the U.S. builds the necessary
capability and capacity for their security forces to function. Security Assistance refers to the group of
programs that support national policies and objectives by providing defense material, military training and other defense related support
to foreign nations by grants, loans, credit, or cash sales. Priority for these efforts should go to security forces in legitimate partner nations in the
Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Asian Littoral. Programs will include, but are not limited to, Foreign
Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, the Economic Support Fund, and Arms Export
Control-licensed commercial sales. The military can support these activities through military training teams, maintenance support
personnel and training, and other related activities.
 Arm Sales Key---Iraq---2NC
Arms sales are key to U.S security assistance – supports allies
Julie Shoemaker 12, 4/30/12, “Traditional foreign military sales role returning to USACE Middle
East District”, US Army Corps of Engineers, https://www.usace.army.mil/Media/News-
Archive/Story-Article-View/Article/477784/traditional-foreign-military-sales-role-returning-to-
usace-middle-east-district/
WINCHESTER, Va. — In Jordan, the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center with realistic settings, sights,
sounds and smells of the battlefield, providing state-of-the-art training to special operations and security forces
from Jordan, the United States and regional allies committed to fighting terrorism …
In Egypt, more than 30 years working with Egyptian defense forces to upgrade facilities that support purchases of military aircraft, naval vessels and related
systems from the U.S., and procurement of various kinds of construction, medical, maintenance, and material handling equipment -- all aimed at enhancing
Egypt's defense capabilities …

In Iraq, construction of F-16 and C-130 infrastructure, facility upgrades, a military training
complex, warehouses, and other facilities...
In Saudi Arabia during the 1970s and 1980s, an unprecedented $14 billion program that encompassed planning, design, and construction of military
cantonments, headquarters complexes, military schools, navy bases, and other facilities related to the Kingdom's modernization program of its defense
facilities …

These programs are examples of the Middle East District's support to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers international mission through the
foreign military sales (FMS) program. FMS had traditionally been the larger portion of the district's workload before the tragic events
of 9/11 changed the world. The next decade brought a military construction focus to the district's work in the Middle East and Central Asia regions.

The FMSprogram is one of the mechanisms available for the U.S. government to provide
assistance to foreign governments. It is a component of the Defense Department's security
assistance program, authorized and regulated by U.S. law.
That process provides for U.S. assistance to friendly foreign nations, specifically for military education and training, peacekeeping
operations, counter-terrorism and counternarcotics. Through FMS, the U.S. government can sell articles and

services, including engineering and construction, to foreign governments' defense establishments.

the security assistance program was designed to promote regional
"As a principle element of U.S. foreign policy,

stability and support mutual goals and security objectives," said Rich Dickson, Program and Project Management Division's FMS Branch Chief.
"An important concept about FMS to keep in mind is that we
would never have a foreign military sales case that does
not support the goals of the United States," said Roger Thomas, Construction Operations Division chief.
While the Defense Security Cooperation Agency carries out the security assistance program, including administering the FMS program, the State Department has program oversight,
according to USACE headquarters' Adam Starks, security assistance case manager for the six combatant command areas of responsibility. "The State Department also determines
which countries are eligible to participate and approves all sales to foreign governments," Starks said.

The FMS process officially begins when the requesting government asks the U.S. government for assistance in obtaining defense articles, military
construction, or other services from the United States. This is usually accomplished through a document called a Letter of Request or LOR. "Oftentimes, we
are involved with a foreign customer long before the LOR is developed," Dickson said. "There are times when customers may need technical input before
they can determine exactly what they do need and want to request officially. We help determine those requirements when needed." Once the process is
complete and both countries have agreed, they sign a Letter of Offer and Acceptance.

While there are several types of FMS cases, USACE is most often involved in three types: construction, technical services, and major equipment.

There are two ways that USACE could be involved with FMS -- as case manager or as line manager on an FMS case held by another agency. As examples, the
Middle East District was the FMS case manager for the construction sales case to design and build the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in
Jordan. Second, since the early 1980s, the district has been involved with FMS cases providing F-16 aircraft to Egypt through various phases of the Peace
Vector program. The case manager is the U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, and USACE is a line manager for construction, providing the facilities to support
the aircraft purchases. As a third example, the district is the case manager for the equipment sales cases providing equipment procurements to Egypt.
Whether case or line manager, the district designs and constructs the infrastructure necessary to support equipment sales and military operations.
According to Thomas, FMS cases are funded in various ways, with three main funding types. • Cash, where national funds from the purchasing country are
collected in advance• Credit, which would be repayable loans or non-repayable grants • Foreign military financing through FMS credit funding, also non-
repayable. "FMS cases could be our potential future, with a rapid return to 70 or 80 percent of the district's workload," said Thomas.

Customer communication points to a surge in FMS cases in the months and years to come, and the district has already begun seeing an increase in potential
FMS cases. "Our workload is shifting back to a more traditional program focused on foreign military sales," said the Deputy for Programs and Project
Management Deborah Duncan. To better meet the anticipated future workload, Duncan realigned her division's branches. "In order to develop all potential
opportunities, each of the four Project Management branches has now been assigned responsibility for a part of the FMS program instead of having FMS
work performed by one branch only," she said. "This solution increases FMS expertise and employee knowledge, while better serving our FMS customers,"
Duncan said. Foreign government agencies may also request engineering assistance for non-defense projects. For civil construction, they follow the Foreign
Assistance Act, Section 607, process, which also requires a Letter of Request followed by a Letter of Acceptance or Memorandum of Agreement

"The Middle East District's engagement with FMS services within the Middle East and Central Asia
supports the overall Department of Defense strategy and plays a vital role in the region as the district
executes a record number of projects in the region," Starks said.

Arms sales is key to U.S military assistance to counter terror

State Department 19, “Programs and Initiatives”, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-counterterrorism-and-
countering-violent-extremism-programs-and-initiatives/#ATA
The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) works to strengthen partnerships, civilian capacity, and
information sharing around the world to counter evolving terrorist threats and prevent the spread
of violent extremism. CT designs, manages, and oversees foreign assistance to build the civilian
capabilities of foreign government partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism in an
effective and sustainable fashion. CT seeks to build law enforcement and judicial capabilities to
mitigate attacks, disrupt terrorist transit, and arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate
terrorists in accordance with the rule of law. To bolster these efforts, CT seeks to promote the
leadership of other countries to build capacity in third countries in their regions. CT also seeks to
strengthen partnerships and initiatives involving government and non-governmental actors to
counter sources of violent extremist messaging, narratives, and recruitment.
Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)
its creation in 1983, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program has served as the primary
provider of U.S. government antiterrorism training and equipment to law-enforcement
agencies of partner nations throughout the world, and has delivered counterterrorism
training to more than 90,000 law enforcement personnel from 154 countries.
From prevention of terrorist attacks to responding to and mitigating terrorist attacks, ATA helps
partner nations build critical capabilities across a wide spectrum of counterterrorism skills. ATA
will continue to provide training courses, consultations, mentorships, seminars, and equipment
relevant to investigations, border security, protection of critical targets, leadership and
management, regional coordination and cooperation, critical incident response and management,
and cyber security. As terrorist networks continue to adjust their tactics and strategies, ATA
will continue to adapt and refine its counterterrorism training initiatives to meet evolving threats.
All ATA courses emphasize the importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Continued support of allied countries is key to the global war on terror – more
effective operations, intel sharing, and recruitment prevention
White House 2018, “National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America”,
October 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf

While the United States will continue to lead and provide support to partners in the fight against
terrorism, our country need not sustain the primary responsibility for counterterrorism activities
around the world. To address this issue, we will work to increase our partners' awareness of
terrorist threats and strengthen their capacity and willingness to address them.

Central to this approach is the adoption of proactive diplomatic engagement, development assistance,
and security assistance to help our part- ners act independently and, ultimately, invest more of
their own capital in bolstering counterterrorism efforts.

Priority Actions

ESTABLISH A BROADER RANGE OF COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIPS: Our increasingly

interconnected world demands that we prioritize the partnerships that will lead to both actions
and enduring efforts that diminish terrorism. The United States will, therefore, partner with
governments and organizations, including allied nations, the technology sector, financial institutions,
and civil society. We will use diplomatic engagement with partner governments and further mobilize
existing coalitions and multilateral and interational fora to increase the will of capable partners to
act against threats while encouraging the implementation of international counterterrorism standards
and the coordination of international burden-sharing efforts.

SUPPORT COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES OF KEY FOREIGN PARTNERS: We will continue to

augment the capabilities of key foreign partners to conduct critical counterterrorism activities. We
will help fostering counterterrorism efforts. We will call on our capable and well resourced partners to
increase their support to countries lacking resources and capabilities. Some partners have better access,
expertise, resources, and relationships in particular geographic and thematic areas, and we will
encourage them to employ and refine such tools to more e ectively internationalize counterterrorism e
orts while reducing reliance on United States assistance. We will also continue to work with our less
resourced, non-traditional, or novel partners who may make unique contributions to help advance
our shared counterterrorism efforts. Over time, this will result in a more balanced, equitable, and e ec-
tive global approach to counterterrorism.

NATiONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORiSM

to professionalize the military, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence, and security services, as well as
nancial authorities, of key partners so that they are able to conduct counterterorrism operations
effectively and justly. We will also work to ensure that partners meet their responsibilities in holding
their citizens accountable for any acts of terrorism committed abroad. In addition, we will enhance the
capabilities of key foreign partners to investigate and prosecute terrorism across borders through law
enforcement cooperation, mutual legal assistance, and extradition.

EXPAND PARTNER INFORMATION-SHARING: To stay ahead of emerging terrorist trends and methods,
we will prioritize the sharing of information, such as biometric and geolocational data and information
about new threats, including terrorists' initial research into new attack capabilities. Building on solid
partnerships and processes for sharing information, we will continue to improve the capacity for
information-sharing and work with partners to allow them to more effectively act on shared
information.

SUPPORT LOCALLY-DRIVEN TERRORISM PREVENTION:

We will work with local stakeholders and civil society to mitigate the grievances that terrorists
exploit. Internationally, where United States interests are at stake, we will seek and encourage locally
driven solutions that target specific causes of terrorist radicalization and mobilization to violence. We
will work with partners to encourage positive narratives that promote tolerance and security.
 Turns---Iraq Instability---2NC
ISIS growth causes Middle East instability – only continued support can solve
Brian Katulis 14, 9/10/14, Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at American Progress, where his work
focuses on U.S. national security strategy and counterterrorism policy. For more than a decade, he
has advised senior U.S. policymakers on foreign policy and has provided expert testimony several
times to key congressional committees, including the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. “Defeating ISIS: An Integrated Strategy to Advance
Middle East Stability”, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2014/09/10/96739/defeating-isis-
an-integrated-strategy-to-advance-middle-east-stability/
The ISISthreat is eroding the borders of both Iraq and Syria, and it represents an immediate and
significant threat to the surrounding region. ISIS also represents an evolving threat to the United States, Europe, and global
security in the form of international terrorism enabled by the group’s thousands of foreign fighters and its abundance of cash and military resources. An
environment of chaos and great suffering has allowed ISIS to emerge. The conflict in Syria alone has created the largest humanitarian crisis the world has
faced in decades. Some 9 million Syrians have fled their homes, and 3 million Syrians are now refugees, making them the world’s largest refugee population
and placing a tremendous burden on neighboring countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

As with efforts to counter extremism elsewhere, defeating ISIS will require a concentrated effort over time. Any
successful U.S. strategy
must be built on a foundation of regional cooperation that requires coordinated action from U.S.
partners—a central concept of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund that President Barack Obama proposed earlier this year. The strategy will be
multifaceted, involving intelligence cooperation, security support , vigorous regional and international diplomacy,
strategic communications and public diplomacy, and political engagement.

While military action alone will be insufficient to defeat ISIS, the United
States and other nations may need to undertake
airstrikes and provide military assistance to disrupt and degrade ISIS in Syria. These strikes should be
conducted in concert with regional and international partners. Ideally, such airstrikes would receive the support from the United Nations or—absent action
to authorize the use of force by the U.N. Security Council—from a coalition of America’s Gulf partners and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO,
allies. As always, the United States should reserve the right to undertake unilateral military action to defend the homeland or protect U.S. personnel from
imminent harm. Whether unilaterally or with partners, U.S. military strikes should be limited in terms of scope and duration and under clear oversight of
Congress. As CAP said in June when it advocated for action against ISIS in Iraq, “The United States should not undertake military action lightly and should be
wary of unintended consequences. But not all military action is the same. Ground troops or invasions to control a country are very different from limited air
strikes or targeted assistance to help push back terrorist extremists.”

Focusing too much on direct U.S. military action in the fight against ISIS ignores the equally important diplomatic and economic steps that will be required to
defeat this extremist group. U.S. military strikes or even boots on the ground cannot defeat ISIS alone and could become a rallying cry and recruitment tool
for extremists, repeating one of the most costly strategic errors of the 2003 Iraq War. At the same time, building a unified, committed coalition to effectively
degrade ISIS will require intense diplomatic and military leadership from the United States to mobilize and coordinate partners. The United States must
leverage its unique capabilities in the military, security assistance, and intelligence arenas. Working together, nations committed to defeating ISIS should
take concerted action to empower regional and local forces to fight back against ISIS terrorism.

A successful U.S. strategy will require reinvigorated support for Syrian opposition forces to establish a third way that is opposed to President Bashar al-
Assad’s regime on one side and ISIS on the other. This reinvigorated support should include the $500 million of additional assistance that President Obama
proposed in June. With 10 nations agreeing to work together against ISIS during the NATO summit in Wales and the Arab League announcing a joint
commitment to fight ISIS, the foundation for such international cooperation is taking shape. These countries—including the United Kingdom, Germany,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—should match their commitment on paper with financial and material resources to complement the
resources committed by the United States in the fight against ISIS.

An integrated strategy to degrade and defeat ISIS and advance stability in the Middle East
ISIS’s advances this summer have made Iraq and Syria part of the same battlefield, erasing the
international border and turning the regional struggles for power into a substantial threat to
international peace and security. The United States should advance its three core goals noted
above by focusing on the following pillars:
Building and managing an international coalition to defeat ISIS and stabilize the region
Increasing support for Iraq’s political, economic, and security transitions, in particular with a revived U.S.-
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement
 Strategy K2 CT---2NC
Military solutions are key to counter terrorism – organization and resources
Richard Davies 10, UWC South East Asia, Highschool, Faculty Member, “THE MILITARY AND
COUNTER TERRORISM”, 4/16/10,
https://www.academia.edu/6700758/THE_MILITARY_AND_COUNTER_TERRORISM

The War on Terror has been predicated on tackling the unconventional and transnational threats that characterise this post-Cold War
environment and, over the course of the past decade, it has evolved into an orchestrated melange of combat
operations, military operations other than war, and operations conducted by various non-military
departments of government that embraces elements of both war and non-war (DoD, p2, 2001; Record, p6,
2003). This arsenal of policy options provides governments with the ability to adopt a nuanced approach to perceived threats that ranges
from a predilection for military solutions, when terrorism is linked to warfare, to a more transparent criminal justice approach when acts of

terrorism are committed in isolation (Crefeld, p58, 1996).

One of the principle characteristics of armed forces, that make them attractive to policymakers as a weapon
in the fight against terrorism, is their mandate to operate across a continuous „ spectrum of
violence ‟ (Meigs, p13, 2003). Certain bandwidths within this spectrum, such as counterinsurgency operations, have
considerable overlap with counterterrorism and there exists the potential for organisational
learning and knowledge transfer between different theatres. The British Army ‟s experiences in
Malaya and elsewhere are testament to this and illustrate how its counterinsurgency doctrine
evolved to provide the platform for counterterrorism operations grounded in the use of minimum force and Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC; cf. Thornton, 2004). Indeed, as a corollary Wilkinson (p62, 2006) advocates a multi-pronged approach
to counterterrorism, termed „hardline‟, which provides sufficient flexibility to cope with this
„spectrum of violence‟ that covers low level spasmodic attacks right through to the intense, mass casualty bombing campaigns of total war
without undermining or 4 seriously damaging the democratic process and rule of law. In an operational theatre of war the military is used as the
vehicle to achieve policy objectives owing to its superior firepower, equipment and training, but these endearing characteristics may
also persuade governments to deploy it outside of conventional warfare in a more refined
counterterrorism role (Loo, p1, 2005). Allied to the substantial manpower of the military and the economic largesse of its budget, its
experience of countering terrorist tactics in counterinsurgency operations would suggest that „ tapping this reservoir of… resources
for counterterrorism efforts… appears to make sense ‟ ( ibid ). Indeed, there are occasions when it would seem law
enforcement agencies themselves must surely advocate the support of the military as Ford (2002) laments when he notes the apparent ineptitude of the
police response to September 11 th . He explains that, in the six months after the attacks, law enforcement agencies in the United States and Europe arrested
nearly 1,400 people in connection with the attacks but charged only one individual ( ibid ). As one professor of criminology diplomatically reflected with
regard to the meagre results of the most pervasive criminal investigations ever conducted: „The low visible yield does not bode well fo r futur e efforts like
this‟ and, moreover , raises questions about the ability of a pure criminal justice model to cope with the complexities of international terrorism ( ibid )

Military cooperation is key to counter terror – intel collection

Richard Davies 10, UWC South East Asia, Highschool, Faculty Member, “THE MILITARY AND
COUNTER TERRORISM”, 4/16/10,
https://www.academia.edu/6700758/THE_MILITARY_AND_COUNTER_TERRORISM

INTELLIGENCE „Take away human intelligence…through an offshoring strategy, and

counterterrorism would be a non- starter‟. Spencer Ackerman 2 (2009) The role of intelligence is
critical to the successful defeat of terrorist organisations through orchestrated
counterterrorism initiatives in which the military provide effective support to the police and
intelligence agencies (Record, p2, 2003). Whilst domestic security services may be able to compile
intelligence on terrorist organisations that pose an immediate threat within its geographical
confines, the pervasive and transnational spectre of terrorism dictates that a more
comprehensive and effective response should be predicated not just on intelligence sourced from
domestic agencies, but also information gleaned from operational theatres by a government‟s
own military and foreign intelligence apparatus and through liaison with its allies. Military
intelligence, specifically, collated from international campaigns is able to make a significant
contribution to the counterterrorism initiatives through the augmentation of the intelligence
horizon. The broad remit of the armed forces to operate across the „ spectrum of violence ‟
and fulfil such a diverse range of requirements has led to the evolution of an established and
substantial infrastructure within the military intelligence community (Norwitz, p4, 2002).
The ability to capitalise on this existing system by increasing its scope to incorporate
terrorism contributes to a more holistic intelligence picture at the strategic level through its
ability to compile worldwide intelligence from an array of sources unavailable to civilian law
enforcement agencies ( ibid ). This organic capability is particularly useful in times of crisis, such
as the immediate aftermath of an attack, when there is a sudden and unexpected demand for the
analysis and dissemination of tremendous volumes of information and civilian law enforcement
agencies lack the capacity to provide this independently ( ibid, p7).
Defense
 Terrorism Inevitable---1NC
Recent technologies allow terrorists to make their own weapons – avoiding
any need for interaction – making tracing near impossible
Lubrano 18, Mauro Lubrano, Analyst at Global Risk Insights Center, Former employee at the
Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1/16/18,
“Emerging technologies: when terrorists print their own weapons”,
https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/terrorism-additive-manufacturing-weapons/
At the non-state actor level, this technology will similarly have security implications. Whereas some foresee an outcome where
additive manufacturing will remove barriers to  developing weapons of mass destruction on
behalf of non-state actors, this will more likely be in the production of small arms and explosives.
Terrorists’ interest in this technology was detected as early as 2015, when nine individuals were arrested in Hong Kong for planning to
carry out attacks with airsoft guns modified with 3D printers. More concretely, there are three ways in which additive manufacturing can
be advantageous for terrorist organizations.

3D Printing could enable terrorists to manufacture weapons, avoid intelligence, and increase
autonomy

As mentioned, terrorist organizations could greatly benefit from additive manufacturing in order to
produce small arms. Currently, terrorist organizations acquire the weapons they need via external suppliers, such as a sponsor
state or the black market, or by seizing them from stockpiles. More sophisticated groups, such as the Islamic State, have even set up their
own production processes. 3D printers could theoretically allow terrorists to produce their own weapons
on the spot in a more efficient and convenient manner, rendering them more independent from
suppliers . The relative simplicity of such a process has already been demonstrated, as private
citizens – notable cases include Cody Wilson and Yoshimoto Imura – have designed and developed
their own 3D printed guns with home 3D printers, devices that do not cost more than a few hundred dollars.
Moreover, as the designs of such weapons are available on the Internet, in principle it would be possible to simply
download them and give the print command. The scale of such production would vary according to the additive
manufacturing device(s) employed. However, as these devices become more available and more efficient, even large-scale output will
most likely become more accessible in the medium term.

Additive manufacturing will enable individuals and organizations to avoid regulations and

restrictions put in place by domestic and international export and weapons production regimes.
Moreover, weapons consisting mostly of plastic components rather than metallic will most likely represent a great concern for security at
airports across the globe, more so when designs of such weapons will be perfected and no longer feature metallic components.
Significantly, a 3D printed gun was found in luggage at the Reno-Tahoe airport in 2016. The weapon was detected only because it was
loaded with live rounds.

A further potential application of additive manufacturing that terrorists could find appealing pertains to the funding of their operations.
Back in 2013, Australian authorities apprehended an individual who had produced an ATM skimmer with a 3D printer in order to clone
credit cards. Moreover, additive manufacturing is eroding the effectiveness of intelligence efforts vis-à -vis terrorist organizations. If,
indeed, manufacturing will enable terrorists to manufacture their own weapons and to raise
funds for the operations in new and unconventional manners, measures that are currently
employed to track the smuggling of weapons and money flows, as well as to identify the
networks behind them, might eventually weaken .
 Terrorism Inevitable---2NC
It is impossible to stop terrorism – low-tech attacks are inevitable
Bergen 17, Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst, Vice President at New America,
Professor of Practove at Arizona State University, 3/22/17, “London shows the challenge of
preventing low-tech terror”, https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/22/opinions/low-tech-terror-hard-
to-defend-against-bergen/
It's a depressingly familiar tale. A vehicle slams into a group of pedestrians in a Western city and
the terrorist driving the car then uses a knife to inflict further damage and is soon shot by police.
This time it was Wednesday's attack outside one of the most iconic buildings in the world, the Houses of Parliament in London.

Four victims and the attacker are dead and there are at least 40 injuries. It's the most lethal terrorist attack in the United Kingdom since
al Qaeda directed four suicide attackers who killed 52 commuters on the London transportation system on July 7, 2005.

The Parliament attack is just one in a series of such relatively low-tech -- and hard to defend
against -- terrorist attacks in the West over the past three years that have typically been inspired
by ISIS, and occasionally also inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born al Qaeda cleric.
On November 28, 2016, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, an 18-year-old legal resident of the United States whose family was originally from
Somalia, used a car to mow down a group of people at the Ohio State University. Artan then attacked the crowd with a knife. He injured
11 people before he was killed by a police officer.

In a message that Artan had posted on Facebook just before the attack, he told readers to "listen ... to our hero Imam Anwar al-Awlaki."
Awlaki is a cleric prominent in al Qaeda who was killed by a CIA drone strike in Yemen in 2011.

A month after the Ohio State attack, 12 people were killed when a large truck plowed into a crowd at a Berlin Christmas market. The
attack was carried out by what ISIS termed "a soldier of the Islamic State." This formulation didn't mean that ISIS had any direct role in
the Berlin attack, only that ISIS had inspired it.

Similarly, during Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, France on July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel killed 84 using a large truck as a
weapon. ISIS claimed that the Nice attack was carried out by one of its "soldiers," though French authorities said Bouhlel had no formal
links to the group.

On October 20, 2014 Canadian Martin Rouleau Couture, an ISIS sympathizer, ran over two soldiers in Quebec with a vehicle, killing one
and injuring another.

Using vehicles as weapons is a tactic that has often used by Palestinian terrorists to target Israelis,
but in 2014 an ISIS spokesman had encouraged such vehicular attacks in the West, saying of
ISIS' enemies, "Run him over with your car."
In 2013, two terrorists mowed down British soldier Lee Rigby with a car as he was walking down a street in London and then hacked
him to death. In court, one of the terrorists described al Qaeda as "brothers in Islam."

Three years earlier, al Qaeda's Yemeni branch had encouraged its recruits in the West in its webzine, Inspire, to use vehicles as a weapon.
An Inspire article headlined "The Ultimate Mowing Machine" called for using a vehicle as a "mowing machine, not to mow grass but mow
down the enemies of Allah."

These attacks are hard to defend against in free societies where crowds will gather, as was the case for
Bastille Day in Nice, or the Christmas market in Berlin, or students attending Ohio State -- and now the throngs of tourists and visitors
that typically crowd the sidewalks around the Houses of Parliament.

Of course, Western countries cannot turn all of their heavily trafficked pedestrian areas into zones
of walls and barriers, but law enforcement needs to have a deep understanding of who may be radicalizing before they carry out
a lethal terrorist attack.
This is not an easy task, as some ISIS-inspired terrorists are radicalizing quite quickly before
they take action .
AT: Iraq Instab
 1NC – Iraq Instab Inev
No one key to Middle East instability---Not interconnected
Jan Kapusnak 3/23, political scientist focused on the Middle East and NGOs. 3/23/19, There is
no key to Middle East stability, https://www.thebaghdadpost.com/EN/Story/37594/There-is-no-
key-to-Middle-East-stability Dana
For decades, manyforeign policy officials, academics and commentators across the West and the Arab world have argued
that there is a key to stability and peace in the Middle East.
For generations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been portrayed as the key to making regional peace. Proponentsof this
concept have claimed that a solution of the protracted conflict would pave the way to Middle East
peace, less terrorism and less anti-Americanism, and would eliminate Iran’s regional expansionism and nuclear pursuits.

According to this logic, if Palestinians had a state, all the Arab countries would become secular
constitutional democracies run by rulers respecting human rights, Turkey would guarantee the right of self-
determination to Kurds, Iran would cut support for its proxies, and militant Salafists would call off their jihad.

There is no similar case in diplomatic history that was so misunderstood by so many entities for
such a long time. Roots of this belief can be traced back to British foreign policy by the end of the
1930s. The British believed that their concerns in the region – such as access to oil, their relations with the individual Arab countries,
undercutting French positions and keeping Nazi Germany from gaining more of a foothold – would play out once the problem of
Palestine was solved to the satisfaction of the Arab countries.

After the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent OPEC oil embargo, US presidents started repeating this “Israeli-
Palestinian conflict key to peace” mantra, which became conventional wisdom in the White House. Jimmy Carter, influenced
by Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser, formulated that “the US has a vital interest in the establishment of a stable peace in
the Middle East” via solving the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Even in 2008, after the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War (one of the deadliest conventional wars ever fought), the Gulf War and the Iraq War,
Carter claimed that “without doubt, the path to peace in the Middle East goes through Jerusalem,” and Brzezinski added that “the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is the single most combustible and galvanizing issue in the Arab world.”

Although this myth was discredited by other violent events connected with the Arab Spring,
including the Syrian civil war and the genocide of Yazidis by ISIS, Donald Trump (the same applies for
Barack Obama) repeated it – thus effectively denying his 2017 National Security Strategy – in saying that “if we can make peace
between the Palestinians and Israel, I think it’ll lead to ultimately peace in the Middle East, which has to happen.”

Unfortunately, this is not going to happen, since there

is no key to Middle East peace. This myth is based on the
false assumption that the Middle East is a highly interconnected structure where the solution of one
specific armed conflict will solve a bunch of other armed conflicts.

However, the
Middle East, regardless of how one defines it, is an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous
region characterized by many complexities and fault lines which throughout the years have
produced multiple intrastate, interstate and transnational armed conflicts among countries and
violent non-state actors, each of which holds competing, overlapping and sometimes contradictory
interests.
Any attempt to simplify affairs in the region and analyze them through the lens of one particular
conflict (currently via the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran ) creates the impression that all
conflicts in the region, their sources and solutions are connected and not independent.
THIS WISHFUL thinking about some kind of domino effect in the volatile Middle East has proved to be a very
dangerous game with disastrous and long-lasting consequences. For example, US president G.W. Bush,
influenced by neoconservatism, launched a war in Iraq, in the belief that regime change in the country would
be a catalyst for stimulating democratic change that would “domino” throughout the Middle East.
Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of state, even linked the Iraq invasion with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, claiming: “It is not true
that the road to Baghdad leads through Jerusalem. Much more likely, the road to Jerusalem will lead through Baghdad.”

However, the hope for a democratic Baghdad, and so ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, did not materialize, and post-invasion
Iraq has become a repellent example of a failed state defined by widespread political violence,
disorder and leadership with authoritarian tendencies.
Moreover, by ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, Washington inadvertently eliminated Tehran’s overriding challenge, thus allowing it to
project its influence in Iraq.

The Arab Spring demonstrated that the notion of democratic dominoes in the region is a mirage. Early
hopes for positive
shifts in Middle Eastern politics, while ignoring the lack of democratic tradition , influence of
Islamism , the weakness of secular forces and widespread poverty , were profoundly misplaced.
Although the upheavals in 2011 had similar roots, that does not mean that their outcomes must be the same. The Tunisian revolution
inspired other countries to revolt. Regrettably, its relatively successful transition into “flawed democracy” did not become an inspiration
for other countries, such as Syria and Libya, which, rather, descended into civil wars.

In February 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that “confronting Iran” is the key to stability and peace in the Middle East. In
truth, increasingly powerful Iran destabilizes the region with its pursuit of regional hegemony, characterized inter alia by a policy of
systematic interference in other countries – such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen – through the sponsorship of local Shia militias. Iran
has mastered the art of proxy wars.

Although it is important to stop Iran’s aggressive expansionism and prevent it from building a contiguous sphere of influence from its
Western border to the Mediterranean, that still will not be enough to bring stability, let alone peace, to the region. Even
if Iran abandons the states, there still will be conflicts ongoing on their soils. Iran is an opportunistic player
that looks for vacuums in failed states, exploits sectarian conflicts to increase its influence, while
using Shi’ism as the main tool to attract foreigners to cooperate . These countries will remain fragmented and
deeply divided, even without Tehran’s presence.

Needless to say, other countries with hegemonic ambitions in the region – namely, Turkey
and Saudi Arabia – have not
contributed to stability either. The list of their stability-undermining activities is difficult to fathom .
Turkey invaded northern Syria in order to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state. Saudi Arabia trapped itself in the civil war in Yemen,
after invading it in August 2015; and, together with other Gulf countries, it has helped to worsen conflicts in Syria and Libya.

Russian intentions in the region are far from being a salvation. Russia tries to brand itself as a problem solver;
however, its conflict-mediation strategy tends to be effective in freezing disputes rather than solving
them. This approach is evident in conflicts that Russia tried to handle, specifically in Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Transnistria or
Ukraine.

Pursuing stability in the current Middle East seems to be chimerical. The

region is going through a time of perhaps
unprecedented instability and turmoil – all enabled by the fact that the region lacks a collective
security framework of any kind that would guide local actors to manage inevitable disputes with
minimal violence and disruption.
The current regional order is fundamentally one of disorder , and pointing out one simplistic frame
obscures from view the complex issues plaguing the region.
There is not one key to stability in the Middle East. It is not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, democratic Iraq or pacified
Iran. Stability requires multiple keys to multiple issues , what seems to be a Sisyphean task just to imagine, let alone to
do.
 2NC – Iraq Instab Inev

The Middle East is ethnically and religiously diverse, there are many causes of
conflict, Theocratic governments, Islamism, and poverty, no one action can
solve Middle East instability, That’s Kapusnak

Iraq instability caused by Sunni-Shiite conflict and terrorism

CFR 7/17- Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher founded in 1921 , July 17, 2019, “Political Instability in Iraq”
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-iraq
Recent Developments Sela

In late April 2018, the U.S. military officially disbanded the command overseeing the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in
Iraq, declaring an end to major combat operations against the group. More
than five thousand U.S. service members
remain in Iraq as part of a train, advise, and assist mission bolstered by NATO troops, to help train
the Iraqi military and stabilize the country.

A coalition of parties led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr won a surprise victory in Iraq’s
parliamentary elections in May 2018, raising questions about Iranian influence in Baghdad and the future of U.S. troops in
Iraq. In October 2018, Barham Saleh was elected president of Iraq. Saleh then named Shiite politician Adel Abdul
Mahdi, a former vice president and oil minister, as prime minister and charged Mahdi with forming
a government. Mahdi had emerged as the consensus candidate following months of negotiations between the two largest Shiite-led
factions in parliament. In addition to overseeing the reconstruction effort, Mahdi’s government faces immediate
challenges in addressing protests that turned violent in the fall of 2018, particularly in the southern
city of Basra.
Background

In 2014, the Islamic State advanced into Iraq from Syria and took over parts of Anbar province, eventually expanding control in the
northern part of the country and capturing Mosul in June 2014. Former President Barack Obama authorized targeted air strikes against
Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, and the United States formed an international coalition that now includes nearly eighty countries
to counter the Islamic State. Regional forces—including as many as thirty thousand Iranian troops—joined the Iraqi army, local tribes,
and the Kurdish Peshmerga in operations to begin retaking territory from the group, eventually recapturing Tikrit in April 2015, Ramadi
in December 2015, Fallujah in June 2016, and Mosul in July 2017. The Iraqi government declared victory over the Islamic State in
December 2017.

The fight to dislodge the Islamic State was exacerbated by underlying sectarian tensions in Iraq
among Sunni and Shiite groups, as well as tensions between Kurdish groups in the north and the
government in Baghdad, which intensified after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein. These tensions
now threaten the stability of the new Iraqi government as it looks to rebuild the country and
prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State.
Iraq faces significant challenges in its recovery from the war against the Islamic State. More than
two million people remain internally displaced and nearly nine million remain in need of
humanitarian assistance following the nearly four-year long war, and reconstruction is projected to cost at
least $88 billion . In addition to reintegrating liberated Sunni communities into the political system, the new government must
also deal with the demobilization and integration of powerful Shiite militias that formed during the fight against the Islamic State into the
Iraqi security forces, as well as ongoing tensions with Kurdish groups pressing for greater autonomy in the north following a failed
independence referendum in October 2017.
Concerns

After leading an international coalition to regain territory taken by the Islamic State, the United States has an interest in preventing a
resurgence of the militant group and supporting a stable government in Iraq. There
remains a larger concern that the
aftermath of the conflict and challenges of reconstruction and reintegration will lead to the breakup
of Iraq and that sectarian tension will plague the region for years to come, possibly expanding into a
proxy conflict among various international groups. Additionally, there are concerns that the Islamic State, having lost
control of territory in Iraq and Syria, may revert to its insurgency roots and refocus on orchestrating
terrorist attacks.

Climate Change causes Iraq instability---Resource loss, and slower

transportation
Sagatom Saha 5/14, Energy policy analyst, researcher for Office of Energy Transportation,
5/14/19, How Climate Change Could Exacerbate Conflict in the Middle East,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-climate-change-could-exacerbate-
conflict-in-the-middle-east
Global warming will do the Middle East no favors. Evidence abounds it will be the region that climate change will hit
hardest. Summer temperatures across the region are expected to increase more than twice the
global average. Prolonged heat waves, desertification, and droughts will make parts of the Middle East and North Africa
uninhabitable. Where Middle Easterners will still be able to live, climate change may fuel violent competition over
diminishing resources. Even though some degree of warming is inevitable, governments in the region and their international
partners have done little to integrate climate change to their strategies to mitigate instability and conflict. Instead, they should brace
themselves for a Middle East in which warming intensifies unrest, weakens state capacity, and provokes resource conflicts.

Civil Unrest and Armed Violence Spikes

For an early example of warming’s damaging power, look no further than Syria. Climate
change caused the generational
drought that preceded the ongoing civil war there. That drought drove rural farmers into urban centers like Damascus
and Aleppo, priming the populace for concentrated, large-scale political unrest. From 2002 to 2010, the country’s total urban population
increased by 50 percent. While climate change certainly did not compel Bashar Al-Assad to brutally crack down on his own people, it
did prompt a confrontation that might not have occurred. Climate-induced economic despair
and migration worked to reinforce other salient conflict drivers including Assad’s “privatization”
efforts and concentration of power that exaggerated inequality and severed the dictator’s connection to rural,
recently migrated communities. As climate change causes rapid temperature increases, food shortages, and
economic pain elsewhere, more Middle Eastern countries might tip over into bloodshed.
Climate-induced water shortages will be another source of conflict . When the Islamic State controlled large swathes of
territory across Iraq and Syria, it wrested control of dams that provided drinking water, electricity, and irrigation to millions along the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers. Ensuing clashes with Kurdish and Iraqi forces left Shiite holy cities like Karbala and Najaf without water. More than 23 million live in the river basin,

and experts predict that, because

of global warming, the Tigris and Euphrates will “ disappear this
century,” making conflict over what remains even more tempting if contested political control
returns to the Fertile Crescent.
State Capacity Evaporates

Further, climate
change will likely make Middle Eastern governments less capable of handling unrest.
First, more frequent weather events will surely put a drag on resource delivery and create new
emergency relief needs. In the Middle East where foreign assistance is often critical, donors may have to work double time to continue to fund
stabilization and governance projects while also providing more humanitarian disaster aid.
Second, oil
producers will have fewer resources as oil receipts contract amid the inevitable global
clean energy transition that will accompany climate action. Take the fact that worsening climate change is already driving a
global transition toward clean energy. In November 2018, even while pursuing close cooperation with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), Russian President Vladimir Putin openly declared that “$70 suits us completely,” referring to an ideal oil price for his country. Unlike his Middle
Eastern partners, Putin seems to acknowledge that OPEC oil will face market competition from renewables and US shale if it reaches too high a price.

In countries where the social contract rests upon limited political freedom in exchange for subsidies and extravagant public works, there will be less
money to go around, and it cannot be expected to go as far. Such is the case in Algeria, where street demonstrations have
forced the country’s ailing leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to step down. Protesters’ grievances are, in part, tied to the oil, which funded social benefits that
buoyed youth employment until prices crashed.

While countries like Saudi Arabia have the financial capacity to likely weather the storm, worry
should be aimed squarely at
unstable oil producers like Iraq and Libya, which require extraordinarily oil prices to fund budgets. It is true that oil is a valuable,
concentrated resource that factions compete for in the region, but it may be a necessary source of reconstruction funding
once conflict abates. In the best case, foreign assistance continues to come from western governments like the United States that still rely on the
global flow of oil to some degree. In the worst case, donor governments abdicate their support as the mass deployment of wind turbines, solar panels, and
electric vehicles become more feasible and affordable. The consequences could be locking in the fragility of the region’s current conflict zones: Even though
Libyan militias fight to control oil infrastructure now, it is hard to imagine the country funding its own reconstruction in the future unless oil returns to a
higher price.

Competition Over Transboundary Resources Heats Up

Climate change might also have the Middle East’s governments warier of their neighbors.
Resource scarcity within a country can provoke nationwide unrest , but competition over transboundary
resources can elevate even higher to bellicose levels. Knowing that water will become scarcer, it is instructive to
understand how Middle Eastern neighbors are already handling disputes over water needed for
irrigation, drinking, and hydropower production.
The Nile River Basin provides one worrying example. Since 2011, Ethiopia has been constructing its Grand Renaissance Dam in a bid to become a regional
electricity exporter. However, the dam will slash downstream flow to Egypt by 25 percent. Cairo alleges that the dam will interrupt water supplies to its
nearly 100 million people. While Ethiopia and Egypt are currently in negotiations, Egyptian officials have been caught considering military action over the
dispute as recently as 2013. The current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has openly declared the dam “a matter of life and death,” highlighting its
continued importance. Climate change, which threatens to disrupt the Nile’s flows, stands to make an already tense situation worse.

Admittedly, direct conflict between Middle Eastern countries has become rarer, but proxy wars are common, featuring in nearly
all the region’s civil wars. Water has already featured in at least one of them: Historically, Damascus has
leveraged support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group loathed by Istanbul, to force Turkey to share Euphrates waters to Syria. Nearly
every country in the Middle East from Morocco to Iran share water resources with a neighbor, and
some have little freshwater of their own. What has played out between Egypt and Sudan and between Turkey and Syria could become
a frequent feature of Middle Eastern politics as water becomes even more scarce.
 1NC – US AS Not Key

US arms sales not key---PMFs get weapons from illicit markets and online
trade
Amnesty International 17, London-based non-governmental organization focused on human
rights, 2017, IRAQ: TURNING A BLIND EYE,
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/iraq_report_turning_a_blind_eye.pdf
As with all armed groups in Iraq, the
PMU militias have accumulated weapons over many years as a result of Iraq’s
long history of arms proliferation and more recent online weapons trade. 66 Iraq has a thriving illicit market
for weaponry. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), over 30 countries supplied Iraq with arms and ammunition at a time when the
Iraqi security forces were committing serious and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.67 On the
invasion and occupationof Iraq in 2003, the US led coalition disbanded Iraq’s 400,000-strong army which lead to a
significant loss of military equipment; individuals looted stockpiles, and illicit markets grew.68
According to US Army assessments of seized weapons, by 2004 large quantities of Soviet/Russian AK model firearms, and smaller
numbers of FAL and Heckler & Koch G3 design rifles were in the hands of insurgents, including PMU groups. A subsequent study of
weapons seized from illicit arms caches across Iraq carried out in 2008, documented over 900
weapons of Iranian origin, 29% of which were manufactured after 2003, suggesting increased arms smuggling across the Iran-
Iraq border.69

From 2003 to 2007, the USA and other coalition members transferred more than 1 million infantry weapons and pistols with millions of
rounds of ammunition to the Iraqi armed forces; weak
oversight and poor to nonexistent record keeping meant
hundreds of thousands of those weapons went missing and are still unaccounted for.70 During this
period illicit markets flourished, as did covert supplies from Iran, making arms and ammunition
readily available to armed groups operating in Iraq.
Illicit arms caches remain a problem . According to one report, Iraqi security forces are aware of at least 20
illegal and completely unregulated militia weapons depots in Baghdad, with arms stashed in
abandoned mosques, homes and schools.71 In September 2016, a Kata’ib Hizbullah depot exploded in the Obeidi
neighbourhood in Baghdad’s eastern suburbs, after a fire initiated mortar projectiles and rockets, killing four people.72
AT: ISIS
 1NC – ISIS No Threat
ISIS does not pose a legitimate threat – regional militias and fear of US
backlash prevents rebirth of Islamic caliphate
Steven Metz 19, Senior Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and received a PhD in Political Science from Johns Hopkins
University, 1/25/19, “Trump Is Wrong. ISIS Isn’t Defeated. But it Poses a Limited Threat,”
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27280/trump-is-wrong-isis-isn-t-defeated-but-it-
poses-a-limited-threat

During the 2016 U.S. presidential race, then-candidate Donald Trump didn’t talk much about the specifics of foreign and national security policy, with one
exception: a pledge to defeat the Islamic State. Once
elected, Trump ramped up the anti-ISIS military campaign that
President Barack Obama had begun and increased support to local militias in Syria, including many
Syrian Kurds, and security forces in Iraq. Eventually, this paid off. Through a grueling campaign led
by the militias and the Iraqis, the Islamic State lost most of the territory it controlled in both Iraq
and Syria.

A month ago, Trump

declared victory. “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there
during the Trump Presidency,” he tweeted, and signaled his intention to withdraw U.S. military
forces from Syria. This week, from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added to the victory chorus, saying that
the United States “defeated the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq alongside more than six dozen nations in the global coalition.”

Many security experts, of course, have pushed back against the Trump administration’s claims,
contending that while the Islamic State is down, it is far from defeated . Like many insurgent movements, the Islamic
State repeatedly adapts to changing conditions. It began as a dispersed, underground organization relying on terrorism and guerrilla attacks, and then
transformed into a quasi-state using more conventional military methods. Now it is returning to its roots. Although it only controls a sliver of territory in
Syria, it still has as many as 30,000 armed militants. It is migrating to different parts of the world, fighting government forces from Nigeria to Afghanistan to
the Philippines, while its guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks continue in Iraq.

“Triumphalism over the end of ISIS, although tempting, is extremely premature,” warns Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council.

As is often the case, history provides clues as to what might come next.
In the past, fully defeating an ideologically based
enemy has required three things. First, the adversary must be vanquished on the battlefield and the
territory that it controlled. For the United States, with its immense military power, this is the easy
part. Second, the ideology that empowered the enemy must be discredited. This is trickier,
particularly when the enemy’s ideology is drawn from religion. Third, the underlying political,
economic and social factors that allowed the enemy to grow powerful in the first place must be
changed, lest the threat re-emerge.
In the total war of World War II, the United States was able to do all three things. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were beaten militarily, then occupied.
This allowed the occupation forces to root out and delegitimize the expansionist ideologies and restructure the German and Japanese political systems to
prevent them from coming back.

The United
States should conceptualize its conflict with the Islamic State not as a war where the
outcome is decisive victory, but as persistent threat management.
But counterinsurgency is different. The United States is not in full control on the ground and cannot assure that all three steps are
implemented. It can help defeat enemy military forces but does not have the leverage to fully delegitimize the extremist ideology or change the conditions
that gave rise to it. That is exactly the situation in Iraq and Syria today: Step one of victory is more or less complete, but steps two and three are not and
probably won’t be.

The United States must decide now whether that matters. Is

damaging and weakening the Islamic State enough? While it
is less satisfying than outright victory, it probably will suffice. While the Islamic State’s grotesque
brutality inspired America to do something about it, the underlying strategic logic of U.S.
intervention was the belief that if the Islamic State sustained its self-declared caliphate, it would
empower and inspire more terrorism, some of it targeting U.S. targets abroad or even the United
States itself. As President George W. Bush claimed when justifying the invasion of Iraq in 2003, “We will fight them over there so we do not have to
face them in the United States of America.”

Even if this assertion was ever true, which is questionable, it no longer is. Local
forces in the Middle East, both governments
and militias like the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, are unlikely to allow the Islamic State
to reconstitute its caliphate . Even if it did, it is unlikely to allow direct attacks on U.S. targets
from its territory because it would understand that would lead to devastating American
counterattacks. Yet at the same time, the United States cannot engineer its decisive defeat at a reasonable strategic cost.
That’s why the United States should conceptualize its conflict with the Islamic State not as a war where the outcome is decisive victory, but as persistent
threat management. America should continue modest support to its state and militia partners, assuring that they are militarily superior to the extremists.
Washington should press its partners to address the political, economic and social factors that fuel the Islamic State, while understanding that they are

unlikely to transform a system that also benefits them. But more broadly, Trump is wrong: ISIS is not defeated. The threat it
poses, though, is tolerable.
 2NC – ISIS No Threat
ISIS is not an existential threat to US – little funding and resources, lack of
allies, and corruption ensure only threat to regional instability -- not a global
threat
John Mueller et al 16, senior fellow at the CATO Institute and is a senior research scientist with
the Mershon Center for International Relations at Ohio State University and received a PhD in
Political Science from UCLA, 5/27/16, “ISIS Isn’t an Existential Threat to America,”
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/isis-isnt-existential-threat-america
In 2014, a militant group calling itself the Islamic State, or ISIL, but more generally known as ISIS, burst into
official and public attention with some military victories in Iraq and Syria in the middle of the year—particularly taking over Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul.

From the outset, Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.)  have deemed the group to be an existential threat to the
United States. President Barack Obama has repeatedly insisted that this extreme characterization is overblown, but he has clearly lost the debate. A poll conducted a few
weeks ago asked the 83 percent of its respondents who said they closely followed news stories about ISIS whether the group presented “a serious threat to the existence or survival of
the US.” Fully 77 percent agreed, more than two-thirds of them strongly.

However, although the vicious group certainly presents a threat to the people under its control and
in its neighborhood, and although it can contribute damagingly to the instability in the Middle East
that has followed serial intervention there by the American military, it scarcely presents an
existential threat to the United States.
Actually, in fact, it seems to be in considerable decline.

Why politicians shouldn’t overestimate the terror group’s power.

Its counterproductive brutalities, such as staged beheadings of hostages, summary executions of

prisoners, and the rape and enslavement of female captives have left it  without allies and outside
support —indeed, it is  surrounded by enemies.
ISIS’s ability to behead defenseless hostages certainly should not be taken to suggest its military might. And its major military advance, the conquest of Mosul in 2014, was essentially a fluke. Its idea was to hold part of
the city for a while in an effort, it seems, to free some prisoners. The defending Iraqi army, trained by the American military at enormous cost to U.S. taxpayers, simply fell apart in confusion and disarray, abandoning
weaponry, and the city, to the tiny group of seeming invaders even though it greatly outnumbered them—even taking into account the fact that many soldiers had purchased the right to avoid showing up for duty by
paying half their salary to their commanders. The fall of a smaller city a few weeks earlier was similar. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, the Iraqi forces weren’t “driven out of Ramadi.” Rather, “they drove

by holding territory, it presents

out.” After its advances of 2014, however, the group’s momentum has been substantially halted, and its empire is currently under a form of siege. And,

an obvious and clear target for airstrikes and other methods by military opponents .Even by late 2014, it was being
pushed back from a strategically-located area in northern Syria, and was finding that its supply lines were overstretched and its ranks of experienced fighters were being thinned. In late 2015, it tried to push back by
launching three badly coordinated offensives in Northern Iraq using, among other things, “armored bulldozers.” The offensives were readily beaten back. By 2016, it had lost some 40 percent of its territory overall,
65 percent of its territory in Iraq.

, ISIS is now in retreat in many areas, and frontline commanders are observing of

After a string of failures

ISIS that “They don’t fight. They just send car bombs and then run away. And when we surround
them they either surrender or infiltrate themselves among the civilians ….Their leaders are begging them to fight, but they
answer that it is a lost cause. They refuse to obey and run away.” One local tribal leader says, “Every week they execute four or five members because they refuse to obey orders or try

They are starting to fall apart. They’re a small movement . If

to turn against their leaders.” More generally, concludes one analyst, “

you bring them under pressure on half a dozen battlefields at the same time, they can’t do it.”
There may also be another problem for ISIS. By most accounts, their most effective fighters are those imported from Chechnya. Many of these arrived in early 2014 because, fearing terrorism at the time of the Sochi
Olympics, Russian authorities were opening borders and urging them to leave. In the latter half of that year, however, the Russians reversed the policy. Overall, the flow of foreign fighters going to ISIS may have dropped
by 90 percent over the past year even as opposition to the group among Arab teens and young adults has risen from 60 percent to 80 percent. A poll conducted in January found that 99 percent of Shiite and 95 percent of
Sunni Iraqis said that they opposed the group.

ISIS is also finding that actually controlling and effectively gov erning wide territories is a major
strain. And it has to work hard to keep people from fleeing its brutal lumpen caliphate. On close examination in
fact, its once highly-vaunted economic capacity seems to be proving to be illusory. Even by late 2014, it was finding that there were major problems with providing services and

ISIS is “extremely unlikely

medical care, keeping prices from soaring, getting schools to function, keeping the water drinkable. Indeed, conclude some analysts,

to be sustainable from a financial perspective. Its economy is small compared to its enemies, its
institutions are not conducive to economic growth, and it is reliant on extractive industries that in
all other non-democratic countries foster the creation of kleptocratic elites….Even if it endures as a
fragile state, it will be vulnerable to internal strife.”
there have been increasing reports of “financial strain,” as well as of “clashes among senior
In 2016,

commanders over allegations of corruption, mismanagement and theft.” The tax, or extortion, base
was much reduced as it lost territory, oil sales were disrupted, and the huge cash windfall from the
seizure of banks during the group’s season of expansion in 2014 was now “mostly gone.” In late 2015, ISIS
was forced to reduce the salaries of its fighters by half; those salaries, it appears, constitute two-thirds of the group’s operating budget.

A major fear is that foreign militants who have gone to fight with ISIS would be trained and then
sent back to do damage in their own countries. However, this may well prove to be a quite limited
phenomenon . As researchers have detailed, foreign fighters tend to be killed early (they are common picks for suicide missions); often become disillusioned, especially
by in-fighting in the ranks; and do not receive much in the way of useful training for terrorist exercises back home.
 1NC – US AS Not Key

US arm sales not key--- 80% of weapons Islamic state owns are from China,
Russia and EU
CAR 17- Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research is a UK based organization that tracks
weapons supplied into armed conflicts, the agency is recognized by EUSCAR, USA Department of
State, EU External Action et al, December 2017 “Weapons of the Islamic State: A three-year
investigation in Iraq and Syria” http://www.conflictarm.com/reports/weapons-of-the-islamic-
state/

Russia and China, combined, manufactured more than 50 per cent of the weapons and
ammunition held by IS forces. Former Warsaw Pact countries that are now EU Member States manufactured a
significant proportion of the remaining materiel (more than 30 per cent of weapons and 20 per cent
of ammunition).
The origins of the weapons
that IS forces deploy in Iraq differ from those of the materiel they use in Syria.
China produced the majority of the materiel (weapons and ammunition combined) fielded by the group in both countries.
However, Russian-manufactured weapons outnumber Chinese weapons deployed by IS forces in Syria
— presumably reflecting Russian supplies to the Syrian regime. Many of the group’s weapons mirror those of the two regimes in its
respective countries of operation. These findings support widespread assumptions that the group initially captured much of its military
materiel from Iraqi and Syrian government forces.

Almost half (845) of the weapons documented by CAR feature serial numbers that are close in sequence to those of other, identical
weapons in the sample. They can be grouped into 240 sets of weapons that were manufactured in the same production runs and
probably exported in the same, or successive, batches.

In contrast to weapons, IS
forces’ ammunition holdings are skewed towards recent manufacture. Weapons
manufactured in the current decade (2010–17) comprise less than 2 per cent of the group’s total
weapon holdings, while more than 60 per cent were manufactured before 1990. In marked contrast,
more than 15 per cent of the group’s ammunition dates from the 2010–17 period, of which most was
produced and supplied after the start of the Syrian conflict. These findings underscore the pivotal role that supplies of newly produced—
and recently diverted—ammunition play in sustaining armed insurgency and terrorism worldwide.
 2NC – US AS Not Key

Plan doesn’t solve terror--- US weapons given to Iraq make up only 2% of ISIS
arsenal
CAR 17- Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research is a UK based organization that tracks
weapons supplied into armed conflicts, the agency is recognized by EUSCAR, USA Department of
State, EU External Action et al, December 2017 “Weapons of the Islamic State: A three-year
investigation in Iraq and Syria” http://www.conflictarm.com/reports/weapons-of-the-islamic-
state/
Considerable international attention has focused on the capture of US-manufactured weapons by IS
forces from Iraqi military units, yet these weapons account for only 2 per cent of the group’s
holdings in its Iraq and Syria operations. Most of the group’s weapons are Warsaw Pact calibres, which are
in widespread service among Iraqi and Syrian forces and also deployed by most opposition forces
fighting in the Syrian conflict. The ultimate origins of these weapons mirror broad trends in the global market for Warsaw
Pact-calibre materiel. China predominates as a producer. Weapons manufactured by EU Member States in
Eastern Europe form the bulk of the remaining materiel deployed by IS forces on either side of the
Iraq– Syria border. Russian-manufactured weapons are the second-most common types among IS
forces in Syria, but not in Iraq (possibly due to Russian support for the Syrian regime and subsequent
acquisition by IS forces).

The following subsections present data on the volumes, types, and origins of ammunition deployed by IS forces in Iraq and Syria. In total,
CAR field investigation teams documented 40,984 units of ammunition in Iraq and Syria (29,168 and 11,816, respectively). The
ammunition originated in 38 producer countries.

Small-calibre ammunition that is used in assault rifles and machine guns comprises almost 93 per
cent of the total volume documented by CAR. This imposes limitations on analysis, because loose small-calibre ammunition is
rarely marked with lot numbers, which are required to identify specific ammunition consignments in production or export records. The
required information is generally marked on ammunition boxes. As noted in the ‘Diversion dynamics’ section, below, CAR recovered
many such boxes and traced their provenance; however, the majority of the smallcalibre ammunition could not be traced because CAR
documented it loose, following its removal from factory boxes. Thus, while the data set presented in this section provides critical insights
into the scale of ammunition supplies into the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and arguably confirms some basic assumptions regarding broad
trends in ammunition acquisition by IS forces, it cannot delineate individual lines of supply to the group.

Ammunition documentation confirms a trend similar to that observed with respect to weapons: Warsaw
Pact ammunition
represents 87 per cent of the small-calibre ammunition sample, while NATO ammunition
represents just 13 per cent of it.
Within the total
ammunition sample, smallcalibre ammunition constitutes almost 93 per cent of the
ammunition recovered from IS forces and documented by CAR. Within this category, 7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 54R mm
calibres outnumber all others.

Although 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition accounts for less than 1 per cent of the regional small-calibre ammunition sample, CAR field
investigation teams found it at 20 different sites. CAR documented weapons chambered for 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition at eight different
locations. The ammunition documentation indicates that IS forces used weapons chambered for this NATO calibre, but these were not
present in the documentation sites visited by CAR.

Russian and Chinese ammunition constitutes just over half of the total sample collected across Iraq
and Syria. Russia, China, and Romania manufactured almost 65 per cent of the regional sample. The
remaining 35 manufacturing countries in the sample all produced significantly smaller amounts.
The manufacturing countries most represented in the ammunition sample documented in Iraq are Russia (27 per cent), China (18 per
cent), and Romania (16 per cent).

In Syria, Chinese ammunition is most common, accounting for 43 per cent of the sample, followed by Russian ammunition (23 per cent).
Domestic production constitutes only a small proportion of the sample in both Iraq (2 per cent) and Syria (6 per cent).

ISIS does not depend on US arms--- 90% are from China, Russian and Europe
while own manufacturing and conflict areas resupply
Jamie Crawford 17- State Department Producer at CNN covers the Pentagon and national
security 12/14/2017 “Report details where ISIS gets its weapons”
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/14/politics/isis-weapons-report/index.html
Washington (CNN)The majority of weapons used by ISIS since 2014 originated in China, Russia and
Eastern Europe, according to a new report from a Belgian research group that studied the issue.
Conflict Armament Research deployed a team of field investigators across ISIS frontline positions in both Iraq and Syria between July
2014 and November 2017, and analyzed more than 40,000 items recovered from ISIS forces.

Researchers deployed with local forces fighting ISIS, mainly Iraqi government forces in Iraq and Kurdish forces in northern Syria, and
studied everything recovered or left behind by ISIS in liberated areas.

The items
recovered encompassed everything from weapons, ammunition as well as chemical
components procured by the terror group to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to be used on the
battlefield.

According to the report, the unauthorized transfer of munitions that were originally intended to benefit groups fighting in an already
chaotic and violent environment eventually found their way to ISIS.

"Time and again, states that seek to accomplish short-term political objectives supply weapons to groups over whom they exert little to
no control," said James Bevan, the executive director of Conflict Armament Research. "These weapons often gravitate to the most
organized and effective rebel and insurgent forces."

90% of the weapons and ammunition studied originated in China, Russia, Eastern
While

Europe, the report also said some of the weapons that were eventually diverted to ISIS was originally provided by the US and Saudi
Arabia to Syrian opposition forces over the course of the conflict.

The report concluded that "international weapons supplies to factions in the Syrian conflict have significantly augmented the quantity
and quality of weapons available to ISIS forces -- in numbers far beyond those that would have been available to the group through
battlefield capture alone."

At the same time,

the report also found instances where weapons deployed by ISIS were found to have
been diverted from stockpiles in other conflict regions such as Libya and moved on to Iraq
and Syria .

Damien Spleeters, the lead author of the report, said another troubling takeaway is that ISIS
"has been able to manufacture
their own weapons and IED's on an industrial scale thanks to a robust chain of supply" that began in
2014.

While many of the chemical precursors for these weapons were either manufactured by the same
factory, or supplied by the same distributor -- mainly in Turkey -- Spleeters said those distributors
serviced many clients, many likely selling products to intermediaries who ultimately worked with
ISIS. That allowed the terror group was able to maintain a robust supply chain of weapons.
With ISIS already having lost its two main 'capitals' of Mosul and Raqqa along with other territory it once held in Iraq and Syria, the
report found the
group still possesses heavier weaponry such as an advanced anti-tank guided weapons
and other heavyarmor equipment along with sophisticated explosives that still pose a danger to US
and coalition forces battling the group.

ISIS get weapons from the Black market and copycat producers
Holly Ellyatt 15, Reporter on European macro-economics and politics, 11/23/15 How US and
Russian arms fell into ISIS’ hands, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/23/us-and-russian-weapons-
held-by-islamic-state.html
Arms in enemy hands

Thanks to a combination of decades of past military campaigns, a black market in weaponry and possible external
sources of munitions, access to weaponry is not a problem for ISIS, according to experts. Jeremy Binnie, Middle
East/Africa Editor at IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, told CNBC where he believed ISIS was sourcing its weapons.

“I think it would be fair to say that there are three

main sources of the Islamic State’s weapons in Iraq and Syria: Soviet-designed weapons
that have proliferated since the collapse of the Iraqi Army in 2003 ; U.S.-made and Soviet-designed
weapons that were issued to Iraqi security forces post-2003 and were subsequently captured by the Islamic State,” he said, and
“mostly Soviet-designed weapons bought or captured from other armed groups operating in Syria.”
That ISIS has gained control of so many weapons has not been lost on Western governments participating in airstrikes against the group in Iraq and Syria.

Since the terrorist attacks in Paris ten days ago, U.S., French and Russian airstrikes have targeted key sources of strength and revenues for ISIS:
oilfields, fuel trucks, communication centers and munitions depots.

They are also on the lookout for larger weaponry. Last year, ISIS militants flaunted the capture of Syrian fighter jets after they captured
an airbase and there were separate reports that the group had captured several U.S. Black Hawk helicopters – worth around $6 million
each.

While defense advisor Beaver said ISIS had been seen to have captured such bounty, he believed such equipment was viewed by the
group as “trophies” than actual weapons: They would rather use light weaponry and thereby remain mobile. “Helicopters are difficult to
hide and the Americans would just go in a destroy them. I would also doubt that ISIS could keep them airworthy - or if they are trained to
fly them properly anyway,” he said.

Friends of ISIS?

ISIS is known to have received donations from wealthy individuals in countries sympathetic to the
Sunni militant group –due to both ideological sympathies and concerns over Shia-dominated Iran’s attempts to exert its influence
in the Middle East, for example, in Yemen with its support of the Houthi rebel uprising.

Countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are keen to counter Iranian influence and have been accused
of helping ISIS, a charge both countries vehemently deny. For one, analyst Binnie said he had seen no “no evidence
that a foreign state is supplying weapons directly to the Islamic State.”

The Pentagon too told CNBC that they had seen no evidence of any assistance being given to ISIS from countries who are members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

“We not aware of any GCC countries that are interested in seeing ISIL expand as many/all are part of the coalition to degrade and
ultimately defeat ISIL.”
However, defense analyst Beaver told CNBC that Islamic State – or “Daesh” as he calls the group (“they are neither a state nor Islamic in
my view,” he said) could possibly have been given weapons from “governments in a clandestine manner.”

“This isn’t to say that rulers of Gulf states are giving Daesh weapons, but it’s probably likely that individual army commanders in some of
those countries are providing weapons out of a sympathy they feel with the strong Wahhabi (an orthodox Sunni Islamic sect originating
in Saudi Arabia) line that Daesh takes,” he said.

Black markets and copycats

Another source of weaponry was the area’s substantial black market , defense analysts noted.
Beaver added that there
was a huge market in “copycat” weapons, with AK-47s a particularly easy
weapon to manufacture. He cited recent figures that suggested that 32 countries around the world made copies of the most
famous of Russian assault rifles, the AK-47 and AK-74 (a later model).

Analyst Binnie agreed that it was important to note that Soviet-designed

individual and crew-served weapons
“have been widely copied and produced around the world and are standard for all non-state armed
groups and many militaries.”
“For example, an ‘AK-47’ seen on the battlefield is probably an AKM copy that could have been made in over a dozen countries – you
cannot describe it as ‘Soviet-made’ unless you can see the relevant factory markings,” he said.
 1NC – Alt Causes

Alt causes to terrorism--- underlaying economic instability and religious

extremism will continue to drive people towards violence
Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks 11- Tim Krieger is Wilfried Guth Professor of Constitutional Political Economy and
Competition Policy at the University of Freiburg, Germany. Daniel Meierrieks- Research Fellow at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center,
Ph.D. in Economics, University of Paderborn

Some scholars
suggest that terrorism is rooted in economic deprivation, i.e., in poverty and within-
country inequality. Gurr (1970) puts forward the idea of ‘relative deprivation’, where violence is generated when there is a
discrepancy between what individuals think they deserve and what they actually receive through the economic (distributive) process.
Poor structural economic conditions create frustration, which in turn makes violence more likely .
This link from economic deprivation to terrorism should matter to the source countries of terrorism. For instance, terrorist
organizations should find it easier (less costly) to recruit frustrated followers or to receive funding
from supporters when economic deprivation prevails. The lack of non-violent economic activities may also fill
the ranks of terrorist organizations by lowering the opportunity costs of violence. Thus, relative economic deprivation is
expected to lead to more terrorism by inciting frustration and lowering the (opportunity) costs of
violence. With respect to the target countries of terrorism, economic success may attract attacks when economic deprivation is
assessed globally (poor vs. rich countries).

Other scholars argue that terrorism is fostered by the process of modernization . Modernization
encompasses, inter alia, economic change (e.g., economic growth), new forms of communication and lifestyles (e.g., shift from
agricultural to urban societies) and new ideas (e.g., Western ideology). These factors may create grievances associated with socio-
economic and demographic strain (Robison et al. 2006). For instance, economic growth may be associated with a restructuring of labor
markets, creating grievances among ‘modernization losers’ who become unemployed due to economic change. As another example,
modern forms of communication may challenge traditional elements of a society, generating social conflict (Robison et al. 2006), while
terrorist organizations may use modern means of communication to disseminate their opinions
more effectively (Ross 1993). Most grievances are generated during the transition from a traditional to a modern society (Ross
1993). Here, terrorists are able to capitalize on the grievances of ‘modernization losers’ linked to economic dissatisfaction, new forms of
alienated living or other challenges to traditional societal patterns, thus making recruitment, financing or other forms of support more
likely. This mechanism is particularly relevant to the source countries of terrorism. Generally, modernization
is linked to
socio-economic and demographic changes which may feed through to conflict. These changes are difficult to
capture in empirical analyses. Therefore, researchers often resort to specific socio-economic (e.g., low educational attainment) and demographic
(e.g., population growth) factors to indicate the impact of modernization on terrorism. 4Note that the different schools of thought are generally
not truly independent of each other. For instance, while GH1 emphasizes the role of structural economic conditions in influencing terrorism, GH2
focuses on the role of socioeconomic change etc. Also, the various hypotheses do not neglect the impact of other factors on terrorist activity. Public
Choice (2011) 147: 3–27 7

The political and institutional order is also argued to matter to terrorism. There is an ongoing academic debate on whether a certain political
system is more prepared to deal with terrorism. Democratic regimes can offer non-violent means of voicing dissent but are unable to realize ‘hard’
counter-terrorism measures due to an obligation to civil liberties (Li 2005). This may make terrorism production (country of origin perspective)
less likely but may increase the probability of terrorist attacks (target country perspective). Autocratic regimes can capitalize on their capability of
repression which may at the same time generate grievances linked to political disenfranchisement. A low level of political openness may make the
genesis of terrorism more likely but lessens the likelihood of terrorist attacks. In general, there is no consensus on which political regime can fend
off terrorism most effectively. Some authors suggest that semi-open societies (partial democracies) are most prone to terrorism because they
cannot capitalize on the advantages of either ‘pure’ regime, suggesting a non-linear link between political institutions and terrorism.
Regardless of the exact regime type, government strength (e.g., military or police power), structure (centralized
vs. decentralized), policies (e.g., welfare policies) and ideological affiliation (e.g., left-wing vs. right-wing) may also
influence terrorists’ calculi. For instance, a large-scale government may make it more difficult for societal groups to pursue
rentseeking, making it more attractive to gain rents through violence (Kirk 1983). In any case, the specificity of various institutions is
expected to enter the terrorists’ calculi in various ways. For instance, government policies and characteristics (which
ensue from the political and institutional order) may also matter to terrorist activity.
Political transformation and instability are also named as causes of terrorism , in particular in popular
discourse. The main idea is that political change may create political vacuums which terrorist groups

use to push their agendas . Such vacuums are attractive as radical groups are less likely to be challenged by
an instable, thus weak government (e.g., measured by a regime stability variable), making terrorism a less costly venture. Also,
an individual may find it more attractive to join or support a radical organization because there are few non-violent alternatives
(meaning low opportunity costs of violence) but high payoffs from terrorist success (meaning increased benefits of violence). Instable or
failed states may even serve as schools of international terrorism, where in phases of domestic instability (e.g., civil war) individuals gain
an ‘education’ in violence that they can also use for internationalized terrorist campaigns (Campos and Gassebner 2009). Political
transformation may generally amplify terrorist behavior, where this process influences both the production of terrorism and terrorists’
target decisions.

2 Famously, Huntington (1996) states that civilizational clash may also result in violence. When groups exhibit
different identities (e.g., different religions or ethnicities), this may lead to more conflict either between
different groups within a country or between different country groups organized along civilizational lines (e.g., Islamic countries
versus the West).5 5Note, however, that cross-country analyses usually do not directly control for between-country but for within-
differences in religious or ethnic affiliation. 8 Public Choice (2011) 147: 3–27 For terrorist groups, it should be easier (less costly) to
muster support against antagonistic identity groups (identified, e.g., by ethnic or religious fractionalization measures). This holds even
more when terrorists build on identity-related ideologies that stress the supremacy of their respective
identity (e.g., representing the ‘only true faith’). Such a world view eliminates moral constraints and
strengthens an organization’s cohesion, making terrorism less costly and more effective (Bernholz
2006). The abstract conflict between world views also becomes manifest in realpolitik, where groups with different identities pursue
different (often diametrically opposed) policies. Such behavior may, e.g., be represented in rent-seeking or other forms of socio-economic
and political interaction between groups with different identities (Arce and Sandler 2003). Terrorism is used by the inferior
group not only as a means to voice their world view but also to shift (material) outcomes in their
favor. Identity (and opposition to other identities) works as a bond facilitating, e.g., terrorist recruitment and financial support. When
terrorists succeed, related payoffs are particularly high due to the enforcement of a claim to the absolute (Bernholz 2006).
 1NC – 3D Printing

Recent technologies allow terrorists to make their own weapons – avoiding

any need for interaction – making tracing near impossible
Lubrano 18, Mauro Lubrano, Analyst at Global Risk Insights Center, Former employee at the
Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1/16/18,
“Emerging technologies: when terrorists print their own weapons”,
https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/terrorism-additive-manufacturing-weapons/
At the non-state actor level, this technology will similarly have security implications. Whereas some foresee an outcome where
additive manufacturing will remove barriers to  developing weapons of mass destruction on
behalf of non-state actors, this will more likely be in the production of small arms and explosives.
Terrorists’ interest in this technology was detected as early as 2015, when nine individuals were arrested in Hong Kong for planning to
carry out attacks with airsoft guns modified with 3D printers. More concretely, there are three ways in which additive manufacturing can
be advantageous for terrorist organizations.

3D Printing could enable terrorists to manufacture weapons, avoid intelligence, and increase
autonomy

As mentioned, terrorist organizations could greatly benefit from additive manufacturing in order to
produce small arms. Currently, terrorist organizations acquire the weapons they need via external suppliers, such as a sponsor
state or the black market, or by seizing them from stockpiles. More sophisticated groups, such as the Islamic State, have even set up their
own production processes. 3D printers could theoretically allow terrorists to produce their own weapons
on the spot in a more efficient and convenient manner, rendering them more independent from
suppliers . The relative simplicity of such a process has already been demonstrated, as private
citizens – notable cases include Cody Wilson and Yoshimoto Imura – have designed and developed
their own 3D printed guns with home 3D printers, devices that do not cost more than a few hundred dollars.
Moreover, as the designs of such weapons are available on the Internet, in principle it would be possible to simply
download them and give the print command. The scale of such production would vary according to the additive
manufacturing device(s) employed. However, as these devices become more available and more efficient, even large-scale output will
most likely become more accessible in the medium term.

Additive manufacturing will enable individuals and organizations to avoid regulations and

restrictions put in place by domestic and international export and weapons production regimes.
Moreover, weapons consisting mostly of plastic components rather than metallic will most likely represent a great concern for security at
airports across the globe, more so when designs of such weapons will be perfected and no longer feature metallic components.
Significantly, a 3D printed gun was found in luggage at the Reno-Tahoe airport in 2016. The weapon was detected only because it was
loaded with live rounds.

A further potential application of additive manufacturing that terrorists could find appealing pertains to the funding of their operations.
Back in 2013, Australian authorities apprehended an individual who had produced an ATM skimmer with a 3D printer in order to clone
credit cards. Moreover, additive manufacturing is eroding the effectiveness of intelligence efforts vis-à -vis terrorist organizations. If,
indeed, manufacturing will enable terrorists to manufacture their own weapons and to raise
funds for the operations in new and unconventional manners, measures that are currently
employed to track the smuggling of weapons and money flows, as well as to identify the
networks behind them, might eventually weaken .
 1NC – No Nukes

Black market deals fail – lack of supply, high policing, and no buyers
Cheryl Rofer 15, chemist retired from Los Alamos National Laboratory and regularly provides
background information for major publications and holds a masters from the University of
California at Berkeley, 11/18/15, “But What if Terrorists had a Nuclear Bomb?”
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/11/18/but-what-if-the-terrorists-had-a-nuclear-
bomb/

Douglas Birch and Jeffrey Smith have been working hard on tracking down samples of enriched
uranium in Moldova. Their headline writer is good at getting clicks, not so much on representing what is in the article, which
contains a fair bit of threat inflation.

This article focuses on enriched uranium, from which a fission bomb might be made. The material
seized in Moldava was similar to two other seizures – in Bulgaria in May 1999 and in Paris in July
2001. In all three cases, the sellers claimed to have a larger cache of material, which Birch and
Smith say “is considered credible by experts who have studied the three incidents.” Middlemen
have been caught and prosecuted, but whoever has whatever cache there may be remains
unknown. Analysis of the samples points to the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, one of Russia’s major nuclear processing
centers, as the origin of the material.

In all three cases, granular uranium metal contained in glass ampoules was packed in a lead container. The ampoules were typical of
samples taken from production runs. This is a routine procedure, so that if something is found to be wrong with material from a run,
engineers can go back to the sample and check it out. A vacuum system is necessary for packing the ampoule. The sample is put in a test-
tube-shaped container that is necked down at one point. Once the sample is in the container and the system pumped out, a glassblowing
torch is used to seal it at the narrow point. It’s a common technique; I have done it for samples of plant pigments.

The Bulgarian sample was determined to have been packed in late 1993. That, and the requirement for a vacuum system, means that it
was probably packed at Mayak, not taken from a larger amount by the smugglers. As Matthew Bunn was quoted in the article, it’s
possible that someone went into the sample storage room and swept a number of ampoules into a briefcase.

Or put one in his pocket every day and took it home. We don’t know how many ampoules were taken, unless there is a classified
accounting. Each ampoule contains maybe ten or twenty grams. The 10 kilograms that the article says are needed for a sophisticated
bomb design would require 500 to 1000 of those ampoules. Which would have to be opened, the material melted and machined into
shape, and conventional explosives, detonators, and timers would have to be added very precisely.

Birch and Smith repeat previous descriptions of other seizures, which gives the impression of large
amounts of uranium available. They give no basis for believing there is a cache of material. From
this article, it is just as believable that the three ampoules from Mayak are all anyone had.

For sixteen years, there has been no buyer . The man captured in Bulgaria was unsuccessfully
seeking a buyer. For approximately the same amount of time, plutonium was lying around for the
picking up – and there were scavengers pulling metal wire out of the ground at Semipalatinsk. Is it
possible that terrorists aren’t that interested in a fission weapon? Neither a fission weapon nor an RDD has been
detonated in the almost two and a half decades since the Soviet Union broke up. Nor have parts been found in the possession of terrorist
groups. Drawings were found in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, but they were sketches only, like the ones you might see in a physics
student’s imaginative notes.
 2NC – No Nukes

Reprioritization of security ensures stealing nuclear materials is unrealistic –

terrorists stick to weapons that are easier to access
Cheryl Rofer 15, chemist retired from Los Alamos National Laboratory and regularly provides
background information for major publications and holds a masters from the University of
California at Berkeley, 11/18/15, “But What if Terrorists had a Nuclear Bomb?”
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/11/18/but-what-if-the-terrorists-had-a-nuclear-
bomb/
Obama has prioritized securing nuclear materials and has sponsored Nuclear Security
President
Summits to bring nations together to improve methods of securing those materials . Yesterday’s article, by
Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Des Browne, focuses on those programs. Unfortunately, the article, following Obama’s lead, focuses on the
terrorist threat. We can expect to see satellite articles from the NGOs touting their “Be very afraid” message.

It is a good idea to secure sources and other nuclear materials . When I came back in 1998 from seeing how the
Soviets had tossed neutron sources around like used popcorn boxes, I tried to push for more attention to the problem. A few people were
working on it at the time, but it was years before funding increased. The Nuclear Security Summit is a good idea to
spread the word and share best practices.
The article vaguely mentions 1,800 metric tons of “weapons-usable materials,” 17% of which are
civilian materials and 83% are military. What they are talking about is all the fissile materials in the
world. Alex Wellerstein developed a nice graphic (small version at top) in this article to show how much that is. But some is in reactors,
some in bombs, and most of it is in the hands of governments. Most of it is in forms very difficult to steal. Perhaps informing us
of the relative dangers of how much of this total of world fissile material might be more helpful than
implying that there are 1,800 metric tons (“tens of thousands of nuclear weapons ”) just lying
around waiting for the next terrorist to pick up.
Because of initiatives led by Nunn, Lugar, and Obama, nuclear materials are locked down tighter than they ever have been, and
continuing attention at Nuclear Security Summits helps maintain and improve vigilance. International police forces have intercepted
material that people have attempted to sell, only some of which has been fissile material. There
is no evidence that a
terrorist has bought any or made parts of a fission weapon or RDD . Terrorists typically stick with
easily available weapons. Should we do what we can to make sure nuclear materials remain and are made further secure?
Certainly. Should those who know better spread fear? I don’t think so.
AT: US-Turkey Relations
 Turkey Relations Collapse---1NC
US-Turkey relations will collapse inevitably---Long history of disputing
interests and mis-understanding overwhelms the link
Alex Ward, 4/11/19, staff writer covering international security and defense issues, “How
America’s relationship with Turkey fell apart”,
https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/11/18292070/usa-turkey-trump-erdogan-s400
The US and Turkey were never perfect partners
The history of US-Turkey relations is, at best, a rocky one. “There probably never was a good old days,” says
Howard Eissenstat, a Turkey expert at the Project on Middle East Democracy think tank in Washington.

Turkey joined NATO in 1951, at which point both countries worked together to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
America and its other allies focused more on threats to Western Europe, leaving Turkey to act as the heavily
armed bulwark against Moscow’s advances in the Middle East, and particularly the Black Sea.

American lawyer Charles M. Spofford joins other international representatives to sign the protocol admitting Greece and Turkety into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on October 22, 1952 in London. Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

That didn’t make the two countries the best of friends, though.
In 1963, for example, then-President Lyndon Johnson warned Turkey in a letter against invading Cyprus, the small
island nation in the Mediterranean. Between 1963 and 1964, fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots
increased after Cyprus’s president made constitutional changes perceived to benefit Greek Cypriots.

The US president’s letter was perceived as a major insult to Turkey.

“Johnson’s letter has done more to set back United States Turkish relations than any other single
act,” a CIA officer wrote in a once-secret June 1964 cable. The letter “illustrates that the United States has not
understood and still does not understand Turkish intensions or positions on Cyprus” and “makes it almost
mandatory for Turkey to become more independent of the United States in the field of international relations.”

And then in 1974, when the Greek government backed a military coup on the island, Turkey went ahead with the
invasion. To this day, Cyprus remains a divided country where a Turkish-Cypriot government controls the northern third and a Greek-
Cypriot government controls the rest.

Experts say Ankara never really felt like Washington had its back throughout the Cold War. Nonetheless,
they remained allies, banded together by their mutual Soviet concerns.

But then two events happened that changed all that.

The first, of course, is that the Cold War ended , exposing the deep fissures masked by their mutual anti-
communist stances. The second event, putting those relationship cracks on full display, was the aftermath of the 1991
Gulf War .

After the US military kicked out Iraqi forces from Kuwait, then-President George H.W. Bush worried about
Baghdad’s repression of the Kurdish people in the north of Iraq. America therefore imposed a no-fly zone —
meaning warplanes couldn’t operate in a defined airspace without the threat of retribution — over that part of the country.

While it did protect thousand of Kurds from slaughter, the Kurds also decided during this time to push for their own state — Kurdistan
— within Iraq.

Kurdish refugees set up camp during their move to Iran.

That was something the Turks strongly opposed . Ankara has been fighting a decades-long
insurgency of Kurdish separatists inside Turkey, and thus considers growing Kurdish power to be a security problem. And
yet here was the US, providing military cover while the Kurds aimed to establish their own
government near Turkey’s southeastern border.
Considering all of this, former Turkish parliamentarian Aykan Erdemir told me, “ it’s naive to assume this relationship has
always been harmonious.”

But lately, it’s gotten worse . Much worse.

The current US-Turkey dispute, explained

Burak Kadercan, a Turkey expert at the US Naval War College, says the current problems between Washington and
Ankara should be thought about in three separate ways.
First, there are just some intractable issues neither side is likely to solve soon. Second, there are long-
term problems they might fix over time. And third, some new concerns have popped up that probably will bedevil the
relationship for a while.
 1NC – No Escalation

US-Turkey Relations won’t escalate – Trump and Erdogan’s strong relations,

US interests in the Middle East, and Turkey’s strategic positioning ensure no
action [even sanctions]
Asli Aydintasbas and David Welna 19, Aydintasbas is a senior fellow at the European Council
on Foreign Relations and a Turkish journalist based in Istanbul and David Welna is NPR’s national
security correspondent, 7/15/19, “All Things Considered: US-Turkey Relations Threatened After
Turkey Accepts Air Defense System from Russia,”
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/15/741967267/u-s-turkey-relations-threatened-after-turkey-
accepts-air-defense-system-from-rus

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST: 

A moment that foreign policy watchers had been waiting for happened on Friday.

(SOUNDBITE OF CAR HORN BEEPING)

the S-400 - arriving in Ankara in Turkey. The system is made

KELLY: That's the sound of parts from a new missile defense system -

by Russia. Turkey is an American ally and a member of NATO. And U.S. officials have threatened to
cut Turkey out of any sales of F-35 fighter jets if they work with the Russians.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

MARK ESPER: If Turkey procures the S-400, it will mean they will not receive the F-35. It's that simple.

KELLY: That's Mark Esper, President Trump's nominee for defense secretary, speaking last month. The S-400 sale also triggers U.S. sanctions against Turkey. And the fate of the
relationship between Turkey and the U.S. is now in question.

I asked two experts to join me to talk about this last point. One is David Welna, our national security correspondent. And the other is Asli Aydintasbas. She's senior fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations and a Turkish journalist based in Istanbul. I started by asking Aydintasbas for the view from Turkey and from Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan.

ASLI AYDINTASBAS: Erdogan sees it as his calling to see Turkey emerge as a great power. And I think the calculus is that in order to do that, you just cannot be a loyal member of the
western league because things are in flux. And, you know, even NATO is now undergoing some difficult periods with President Trump clearly expressing a lack of faith in the NATO
system. So I think the people who are running Turkey right now think that they need to retain some independence from the different power groups that are emerging.

KELLY: Quick sense from each of you, what are the stakes here? Asli, you start.

The price is too high . It's not just a matter of being equidistant to United States and
AYDINTASBAS:

Russia. Being a part of the western league has benefited Turkey enormously, economically,
militarily, strategically and in social ways. We are now a western country, and giving that up isn't just about giving - you know, facing U.S. sanctions,
which is definitely...

KELLY: On the table, which we'll get to.

AYDINTASBAS: ...Coming. It's also giving up possibly whatever is left of our democracy. The only place where you can safely establish a democracy today is if you are part of the
western camp, so to speak. So if we actually do think of this as a point in history later in our lives, go back to this S-400 purchase and that was the day Turkey exited the West - it may
well become also the end of our democracy.

KELLY: David, what about from here in Washington? Why does the U.S. relationship with Turkey matter?

Turkey is in a very strategic place on the map. It really is sort of the spot where East
DAVID WELNA, BYLINE:

meets West. It is just north of the Middle Eastern countries where the U.S. has been involved in
wars over the past couple decades.
KELLY: Iraq, to start at the top of that list.

There is a major Turkish airbase almost on the border with Syria, Incirlik, where U.S. jets have
WELNA:

been flying sorties out of. And there are also U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled there. And this may be
also why Erdogan feels so emboldened to go ahead and get Russia's air defense system because he
knows how much the West needs Turkey.
KELLY: So obviously a long and complicated history. Bottom line is Turkey is a keen NATO ally, and it's in a really rough neighborhood where the U.S. has many interests at stake - Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, everything else going on around the Persian Gulf.

And Turkey, I think, is betting that those interests are going to outweigh any kind of concern
WELNA:

about Turkey making alliances with Russia. And domestically, President Trump has been very cozy
with President Erdogan of Turkey.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: He's a tough cookie, OK, right. President Erdogan - he's tough, but I get along with him. And maybe that's a bad thing, but I think it's a really good thing.

WELNA: Really kind of defended almost his decision to buy the S-400 system. It's forcing that sentiment in confrontation with what Congress has done. And Congress passed a law two
years ago saying that, if any country buys or has a significant transaction with Russia's defense sector, that there would be sanctions. And right now, as of three days since the first
delivery of the S-400 system, there has been no announcement of sanctions.

KELLY: And just to be clear, how much leeway does the president have here? Because my understanding was sanctions are automatic. That's what members of Congress, including
many Republicans, have come out and said - we don't got a choice here.

WELNA:Yes, they are automatic. But the president can delay imposing those sanctions for up to 180
days if he finds that it's in the interests of U.S. national security. And he can, after that, delay for up
to six months - and this is renewable - if he finds that Turkey is diminishing its purchases of
significant transactions with Russia's defense sector.
KELLY: OK. I want to bring in the voice of President Erdogan of Turkey into the conversation. He was at the G-20 summit recently. He was asked by a reporter about this whole
situation.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

PRESIDENT RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN: (Speaking Turkish).

KELLY: The gist of that, Asli Aydintasbas, is no one says President Trump has given him assurances that there will be no sanctions on Turkey, that there is some way out of this, that
their personal relationship is going to carry the day. What is the view from Turkey?

AYDINTASBAS: Look. There has been very confusing messages coming from Washington. Erdogan has never heard it from Trump that he would be facing sanctions if he bought S-
400s. The U.S. president really focused on having good meetings, having a good talk with Erdogan even as late as the G-20 meeting two weeks ago.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

TRUMP: And now they're saying he's using the S-400 system, which is incompatible with our system.

AYDINTASBAS: Basically, President Trump repeated Turkish talking points...

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

TRUMP: But honestly, I'm all for our country. But he got treated very unfairly.

AYDINTASBAS: ...Saying Turkey was treated so unfairly by the Obama administration and this and that, so basically leading Turkish government to think that even if we buy this
system, President Trump, our trusted friend in Washington, surrounded by deep state in the Turkish imagination, but that he will do his best to make the sanctions business go away.

KELLY: So what next? We mentioned that just on Friday, missile parts started arriving from Russia. They were being shipped to Ankara. They're coming in. What are you each
watching for? Asli.

AYDINTASBAS: I'll be watching to see what happens in Washington. Is Trump going to go for a suspension, as they were talking...

KELLY: Suspension of sanctions, yeah.

Is it the case that Congress is so tough that the State Department or the administration
AYDINTASBAS:

feels they have to slap Turkey with something? In that case, is it going to be light, medium, heavy? Is that going to involve banks, which would
really be problematic for Turkish financial industry? Or is it going to be just a bunch of individuals and, you know, a few companies that are involved in the sale?

And also, I'll be watching to see what happens in six months to a year from now. Is there a day-after scenario? OK, sanctions and (unintellgible) - but how do we climb down from all of
this? Is there a chance to save the strategic relationship on both sides?

KELLY: David.

WELNA: I guess I'm looking to see if we have any kind of official response.

KELLY: You're watching Twitter is what you're saying.

 I think if we don't see something this week, it's going to raise a real question about whether
WELNA: Yes.

these sanctions are a paper tiger. And there are other countries that are also looking at buying
Russia's S-400 air defense system.
 2NC – No Escalation

Turkey won’t escalate – relations will remain strong post Russia deal since
Trump admin will try to shield the sanctions
Edward G Stafford 19, Received a Masters Degree from National Intelligence University, was
former US Foreign Service Officer, and was former Counselor for Political-Military Affairs in Ankara,
Turkey, 7/14/19, “Washington’s Response to S-400 Delivery Will Shape US-Turkey Relations,”
https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-united-states/washingtons-response-s-400-delivery-will-shape-us-
turkey-relations
The July 12  arrival of components of the Russian S-400 at the Akinci Air Base near Ankara demands a response from Turkey’s most powerful NATO ally
given the oft repeated adamant opposition of the U.S. to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 system.  A
response will surely come.  How
punitive or accommodating that response is will shape U.S.-Turkey relations for years to come.
The arrival of S-400 components less than two days after the arrival of the new U.S. envoy to Turkey, Ambassador David Satterfield, and only a few days
before the anniversary of the July 15 2016 failed coup attempt, raises questions about the timing of the delivery. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğ an’s
desire to distance Turkey from the West and the U.S. has shaped his foreign policy decisions for decades – if he did accelerate the delivery of some
components, it only reminds us of that long-standing goal, not a change in his attitude. Most importantly, the video loop showing the off-loading of
components from a Russian transport plane laid to rest the unrealistic hopes that Erdogan could be induced to cancel the deal with Russia.

Will the U.S. go through with plans to remove Turkey from the F-35 programme?  Will it impose sanctions under CAATSA (The Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)? Will it reduce engagement with Turkish counterparts at NATO?  Put simply, where will it come down on the continuum
between accommodation and punishment in responding to the long-predicted delivery of S-400s?

The indications are that the Trump Administration will take several steps to safeguard U.S.
interests, in particular ending Turkish participation in the F-35 programme, but not impose
punitive measures. That is to say, it will soften the impact of sanctions as much as the law and
Congressional pressure will allow . 
There are several bits of evidence for this:

First, the administration knew this event was coming , and if they wanted to signal extreme
dissatisfaction and a resulting punitive attitude, it would have released strong (and fully
coordinated) messages from the White House, State Department, Department of Defence (DoD),
and the Embassy in Ankara.  It certainly did not do this; in fact, the Trump administration has been mostly quiet.  This reflects, assuming
coordination between the U.S. national security agencies and the White House, that the discussions about an initial response reflected a consensus to not
exacerbate tensions by bellicose statements but to adopt a public “wait-and-see” posture that allows the administration to calibrate its response. 

Second, Satterfield has arrived. His arrival in Turkey was not delayed, for surely the US knew components were on their way and could
have delayed his arrival to send a message of displeasure to Turkey.  Thus, his arrival when the U.S. knew the delivery of S-
400 components was imminent shows that the U.S. has decided for continued, or even enhanced,
dialogue over blunt and counterproductive gestures.

Third, there were  no immediate and harsh tweets from Trump .  The current U.S. president is
not constrained by precedent and protocol in his foreign policy actions, and if he wished to blast
Turkey for taking delivery of the S-400 components, he would have done so, regardless of any
advice from State or DoD. 

Finally, calmer minds seem to be prevailing regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.   In part, this is due to the
success of Ekrem Imamoglu in winning the mayoral elections in Istanbul, narrowly at first, resoundingly in the re-run.  This reminded Washington policy
makers and pundits that Turkey does not reflect only the tendencies of its president, but remains a democracy, albeit a flawed one with weakened
democratic institutions, in which the people have the ultimate say.  Responding in a punitive way to Turkey based on its president’s pursuit of a foreign
policy that seeks distance from Western democratic values would ill-serve the interest of the U.S. and the Trans-Atlantic community of democracies that it
leads.
The next few weeks will paint a clearer picture of how the U.S. will respond.  We should take note of some specific events to gauge the U.S. response.Who receives Satterfield when he presents his letters of credence to be
formally and officially received by Turkey as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey will indicate Erdogan’s interest in closer engagement with the U.S.  In countries with a largely ceremonial president, it is common practice for
him/her to receive new ambassadors; that is less common in countries with Executive Presidents, in which case the new Ambassador is usually first received by the foreign minister.  If Erdogan personally receives
Satterfield to present his letters of credence that will send a message that he seeks continued close relations with the United States.   If Satterfield were to present his letters to someone ranked below the minister of
foreign relations, that would send a negative message.  For almost two years, charges d’affaires ad interim have conducted formal U.S. diplomatic relations in Ankara.  While highly competent, they do not possess the
prestige or authority of a presidentially appointed and senate-confirmed ambassador.  Once Satterfield is formally accredited, Turkey will have an authoritative interlocutor with whom it can communicate directly and
through him confidentially and confidently with Washington.  Almost as important, Satterfield is widely respected in Washington – his opinions on how to respond to the Turkish government will be given due
consideration at State and in the White House as those of the charges could not.  His and Embassy public statements on relations with Turkey in the weeks ahead, after he is formally accredited, will be a useful gauge of
the relationship. 

For now, it looks like Erdogan will succeed in his ongoing efforts to assert Turkish independence
from the meddlesome Western nations without seeing the economy, on which his political future
increasingly depends, weakened further by punitive U.S. sanctions.  Turkey will lose access to the F-
35s and be treated even more warily by its NATO allies, but it appears Washington policy makers
realize that inflicting further economic pain on Turkey’s people will not benefit the U.S., and would
only play into Erdoğ an’s nationalistic rhetoric about the West’s efforts to constrain Turkey’s rise.  
But, it is early days. Erdoğan will likely continue to seek cosier relations with  (and unacknowledged increased dependence on) Russia and to manipulate the
United States into being seen as the cause of a rupture in U.S.-Turkey relations . 
For the United States to maintain its relations
with Turkey in the face of those efforts will take some deft handling by the new Ambassador and
great patience on the part of Washington policy makers.  Patience with Erdoğan has already worn thin - we shall see in the
U.S. response to the delivery of S400 components whether those policy makers retain a willingness to put up with Turkey’s anti-American rhetoric and
actions for the sake of keeping Turkey’s people within the Trans-Atlantic democratic community. 
Structural Violence Adv
 1NC – Colonialism Turn

Child Soldier narratives constructed through in an inherent scale of value

established by human rights discourse rooted in colonial superiority that
mandates military intervention
Maureen Moynagh 11, PhD in Comp Lit from University of Texas at Austin and is Professor at St.
Francis Xavier University, “Human rights, child-soldier narratives, and the problem of form,”
Research in African Literatures: Volume 42, Number 4, Winter 2011, https://muse-jhu-
edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/article/454506
Human rights discourse attempts to counter the instrumentalizing of human life and to suture over
global inequalities by holding out a vision of the fundamental equality of all human beings . It is in
the name of a universal human that NGOs appeal to their constituencies—national governments, intergovernmental agencies, private
and corporate donors—to take action, and it is also through the willingness of humanitarian agents to put their own lives on the line, as
Didier Fassin points out, that the equality of human lives otherwise "worlds apart" (507) is reasserted (514). Despite
this
conviction in equality, however, humanitarian action itself is marked by what Fassin calls a
"politics of life. " That is to say, even the "ethics in action" of humanitarian organizations like
Médecins sans frontières entail establishing a scale of value and consequently expose the ways
geopolitical structural inequalities impinge upon human rights and humanitarian work.3 This
differential valuation of human lives operates in the ways that human rights NGOs distinguish between suffering victims and combatants
(Fassin 501), a distinction that national governments, not surprisingly, also use to justify their refugee policies.4 The United States, to
take but one example, in extending refugee status to 3,600 of the so-called Lost Boys from Sudan in 2001, screened potential refugees
living in camps in Kenya, turning away any that US authorities believed had served as child soldiers. While NGOs like Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers insist that child soldiers themselves
ought to be understood as "victims," the child-soldier figure remains an ambiguous one. Simultaneously
emblematic of the global human and of the fundamental inequality of the politics of life, the child soldier presents an
impediment to the human rights model, even as that model is invoked in order to oppose the
necropolitics that mobilize child soldiers in the first place.
Apart from the constraints
of human rights discourse itself, there is another horizon of reading for the memoirs and
novels alike, and that is Africa's locus in the Western imagination as "a place of violence" (Priebe 46). War
machines operate
around the globe, and child soldiers have been found serving in Colombia, in Sri Lanka, in
Afghanistan and Iraq , as well as in several countries in Africa. The figure that features most
commonly in documentaries, films, on talk shows, and in published memoirs and works of fiction,
however, is the African child soldier. There is, it seems, a place already prepared in the Western
imagination for the African child soldier as a subject of violence in need of human rights
intervention and rehabilitation— intervention that threatens to mimic colonial infantilising of
Africans as needing the "protection" of European powers . The African child soldier, I would go so far as to
claim, serves as an especially unsettling instance of Kipling's "half devil / and half child." It is this dynamic that risks turning the bonds of
global feeling (see Robbins) elicited by the narratives into the pejorative version of sentiment that Nietzsche called pity at a
distance.5 Within the constraints imposed by this particularly vicious iteration of the hermeneutic circle, child-soldier memoirs and
novels interpose an alternate view of transnational ties.
 2NC – Colonialism Turn

Child soldier narratives inherently represent both the innocent and the guilty.
This ambiguity results in Eurocentric narratives that construct a false voice of
suffering.
Maureen Moynagh 11, PhD in Comp Lit from University of Texas at Austin and is Professor at St.
Francis Xavier University, “Human rights, child-soldier narratives, and the problem of form,”
Research in African Literatures: Volume 42, Number 4, Winter 2011, https://muse-jhu-
edu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/article/454506
A better way of thinking about the African child soldier's imbrication in transnational linkages is supplied by Achille Mbembe. For my
purposes it is his elaboration of a contemporary necropolitical formation, the war machine, that offers an especially useful framework for
analyzing and understanding [End Page 41] child-soldier narratives. Drawing
on Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of
the machine, Mbembe describes a type of warfare "whose relation to space is mobile," in which
armies are supplemented by "segments of armed men that split up or merge with each other
depending on the tasks to be carried out" (32). These nonstate actors "enjoy complex links with state forms"; they have
the "features of a political organization and a mercantile company" (32); and they are able to "forge connections with transnational
networks" (33). The
war machine, in other words, is a system for producing power and profits from
violent conflict. It is also a regime of subjection that produces exploitable infrahumanity —the
refugee, the civilian soldier, the sex slave, the child soldier. From a human-rights perspective, these
are clearly the violated , those in need of intervention , those whose rights need to be restored.

If, as Spivak puts it, " one

cannot write off the righting of wrongs" (524), the human rights work to be done
nonetheless entails a couple of key questions. How
does one construct the voice of suffering humanity, the voice
of the one whose rights have been wronged? Who gets to construct that voice ? It is here that the
"politics of life" meet the "politics of death." In Human Rights and Narrated Lives, Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith point
out that certain generic conventions constrain the narration of human rights abuses and provide a kind of barrier between audiences and
claimants. Essential to human rights narratives is a clear divide between victim and perpetrator:
"storytellers in the context of rights campaigns are expected to take up the subject position of
'innocent' victims; they are expected to be able to occupy that position unambiguously" (161). Such
a lack of ambiguity in occupying the role of victim is difficult, not to say impossible for the child
soldier. There is, consequently, a marked tension between the human rights discourse that both frames the reception of child-soldier
memoirs and memoir-style novels and is invoked by them, and the necessarily compromised status of the child soldier that the
narratives foreground. Like the US prison narratives Schaffer and Smith address, child-soldier narratives "test the
limits of the human rights paradigm" (162).
 reintegration key
Child soldiers undergo unique trauma and demonstrate severe aggression---
specific reintegration programs are key---simply getting rid of weapons
doesn’t solve
Katharin Hermenau, 11/6/13, Dr. rer. nat., teaches at Universitä t Konstanz Department of
Psychology, et al., “Growing up in armed groups: trauma and aggression among child soldiers in DR
Congo”, European Journal of Psych traumatology 4-1, DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v4i0.21408, ezc

Experiences of war and armed conflict can lead to severe mental suffering and illness in
combatants, especially when the individual joined the armed group as a minor. Exposure to
violence and perpetration of violent acts can lead to mental health problems like posttraumatic
stress symptoms and aggressive behavior (Maclure & Denov, 2006 Maclure R, Denov M. “I didn't want to die so I joined them”: Structuration and the
process of becoming boy soldiers in Sierra Leone. Terrorism and Political Violence. 2006; 18(1): 119–135. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Schauer &
Elbert, 2010 Schauer E, Elbert T, Martz E. The psychological impact of child soldiering. Trauma rehabilitation after war and conflict. 2010; New York, NY: Springer. 311–360. [Crossref],

). According to our results, former child soldiers can be characterized as follows: while
, [Google Scholar]

they resembled adult combatants concerning the recruitment type and time within armed groups,
former child soldiers were less likely to hold military ranks than former adult combatants. Consistent with
the literature (Schauer & Elbert, 2010 Schauer E, Elbert T, Martz E. The psychological impact of child soldiering. Trauma rehabilitation after war and conflict. 2010; New York, NY:

former child soldiers reported being both victims and perpetrators

Springer. 311–360. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ),

of violence. For example, they reported more experienced and perpetrated violence types than
adult former combatants. Consequently, former child soldiers also showed higher PTSD symptom
severity and higher appetitive aggression than former adult combatants. These findings are in
accordance with other research reporting that especially child soldiers suffer from trauma-related
disorders and aggressive behavior (Betancourt et al., 2010 Betancourt T. S, Borisova I. I, Williams P, Brennan R. T, Whitfield T. H, De la Soudiere M, etal.
Sierra Leone's former child soldiers: A follow-up study of psychosocial adjustment and community reintegration. Child Development. 2010; 81(4): 1077–1095. [Crossref], [Web of
Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Derluyn et al., 2004 Derluyn I, Broekaert E, Schuyten G, De Temmerman E. Post-traumatic stress in former Ugandan child soldiers. Lancet. 2004; 363:
861–863. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Schauer & Elbert, 2010 Schauer E, Elbert T, Martz E. The psychological impact of child soldiering. Trauma rehabilitation

the results revealed that exposure to

after war and conflict. 2010; New York, NY: Springer. 311–360. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ). Moreover,

violence is linked to higher PTSD symptom severity in former child soldiers. Thus, our results
confirmed the building block effect in child soldiers: Repeated exposure to different types of
traumatic stressors cumulatively heightens the risk to develop PTSD symptoms (Neuner et al., 2004 Neuner F,
Schauer M, Karunakara U, Klaschik C, Robert C, Elbert T. Psychological trauma and evidence for enhanced vulnerability for

posttraumatic stress disorder through previous trauma among West Nile refugees . BMC Psychiatry. 2004; 4: 34.
[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ). In summary, this study has shown that former child soldiers reported more

adverse experiences during service and more mental health problems after demobilization than
adult former combatants. We found no direct relationship between appetitive aggression and PTSD, which is in line with recent findings (Hecker, Hermenau,
Maedl, Schauer, et al., 2013 Hecker T, Hermenau K, Maedl A, Hinkel H, Schauer M, Elbert T. Does perpetrating violence damage mental health? Differences between vorcibly recruited
and voluntary combatants in DR Congo. Journal of Traumatic Stress. 2013; 26(1): 142–148. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Weierstall et al., 2013 Weierstall R,
Bueno Castellanos C. P, Neuner F, Elbert T. Relations among appetitive aggression, post-traumatic stress and motives for demobilization: A study in former Colombian combatants.

we
Conflict and Health. 2013; 7: 9. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ) showing that the protective effect of appetitive aggression wanes if the level of traumatization is high. Additionally,

found a positive relationship between appetitive aggression and perpetrated violence types in
former child soldiers. Furthermore, the positive correlation between appetitive aggression and military
rank indicates that former child soldiers, who perceive perpetrating violence as fascinating and
arousing , seem more likely to be promoted in the military hierarchy of an armed group. This
finding is consistent with a study of former child soldiers in Uganda (Crombach et al., 2013 Crombach A, Weierstall R, Hecker
T, Schalinski I, Elbert T. Social status and the desire to resort violence—Using the example of Uganda's former child soldiers. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma. 2013;
22(5): 559–575. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ). Concordantly, other studies reported a gradual transformation in the perception of the
perpetration of violence in child soldiers, who were forced to perpetrate violence: At first it was frightening, however, with repeated experience it became not only normal and
acceptable, but even exciting and arousing (Elbert et al., 2010 Elbert T, Weierstall R, Schauer M. Fascination violence: On mind and brain of man hunters. European Archives of
Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience. 2010; 260: 100–105. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Maclure & Denov, 2006 Maclure R, Denov M. “I didn't want to die so I
joined them”: Structuration and the process of becoming boy soldiers in Sierra Leone. Terrorism and Political Violence. 2006; 18(1): 119–135. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of

living in an extremely violent environment such as in armed groups may

Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ). Thus,

reinforce the appetitive perception of aggression and violence in former child soldiers and in this
way increase the perpetration of violence. Furthermore, appetitive aggression was positively related to
voluntary recruitment in former child soldiers. Highly appetitively aggressive child soldiers tend to
perceive their recruitment as voluntarily more often than low appetitively aggressive child soldiers .
However, this study cannot determine whether child soldiers showed appetitive aggression already before their enlistment or whether they developed appetitive aggression during
their time with an armed group. Therefore, longitudinal studies are highly important to understand the development of appetitive aggression in child soldiers and its causal
relationship to perpetrated violence. Although we did not investigate reintegration in detail in this study, we can conclude from prior findings that suffering from PTSD and aggression
can lead to discontinuation of reintegration programs and consequently heighten the risk of voluntary reenlistment in armed groups (Betancourt et al., 2008 Betancourt T. S, Simmons
S, Borisova I, Brewer S. E. High hopes, grim reality: Reintegration and the education of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Comparative Education Review. 2008; 52(4): 565–587.
[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Boyden, 2003 Boyden J. The moral development of child soldiers: What do adults have to fear?. Peace and Conflict. 2003; 9(4): 343–
362. [Taylor & Francis Online], , [Google Scholar] ; Mogapi, 2004 Mogapi N. Reintegration of soldiers: The missing piece. Intervention. 2004; 2(3): 221–225. [Google Scholar] ; Stott,
2009 Stott K. Out of sight, out of mind? The psychosocial needs of children formerly associated with armed forces: A case study of Save the Children UK’ s work in Beni and Lubero
territories, North Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo. International Journal of Health Planning and Management. 2009; 24: 52–72. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google

former child soldiers with higher appetitive aggression rejoined armed groups
Scholar] ). Similarly, we found that

more often. Appetitive aggression therefore may interfere with the success of reintegration programs
and heighten the risk of voluntary reenlistment in armed groups . Former child soldiers who behave aggressively are at high risk
of failing in reintegration programs. As prospects in a conflict region like the eastern DRC are limited, they are more likely to go back to military life and armed conflict. As most
participants in this study very recently left the armed groups and were still in the process of integration, we only focused on one variable concerning reintegration and could not
include typical integration variables like employment or socio-economic status. Future studies should investigate the possible challenges appetitive aggression poses to integration
more closely. Moreover, future research should include further psychological reactions to traumatic stress like depression, anxiety, and guilt and their impact on integration. This

To address their
study demonstrates that former child soldiers are burdened in two ways: suffering from PTSD and displaying appetitively aggressive behavior.

needs and ease their suffering, we advocate adding a mental health component to reintegration
programs for former child soldiers. If a young man is suffering from PTSD or displaying an enhanced readiness for aggression, his ability to profit from
reintegration programs, such as vocational training in manual trades will be severely impaired (Betancourt et al., 2008 Betancourt T. S, Simmons S, Borisova I, Brewer S. E. High hopes,
grim reality: Reintegration and the education of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Comparative Education Review. 2008; 52(4): 565–587. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google
Scholar] ; Boyden, 2003 Boyden J. The moral development of child soldiers: What do adults have to fear?. Peace and Conflict. 2003; 9(4): 343–362. [Taylor & Francis Online], , [Google

mental suffering and aggression have not been in the focus of most reintegration
Scholar] ). However,

programs so far (Maedl et al., 2010 Maedl A, Schauer E, Odenwald M, Elbert T, Martz E. Psychological rehabilitation of excombatants in non-Western, post-conflict
settings. Trauma rehabilitation after war and conflict. 2010; New York, NY: Springer. 177–213. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ; Medeiros, 2007 Medeiros E. Integrating mental health
into post-conflict rehabilitation: The case of Sierra Leonean and Liberian “child soldiers.”. Journal of Health Psychology. 2007; 12(3): 498–504. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google
Scholar] ; Mogapi, 2004 Mogapi N. Reintegration of soldiers: The missing piece. Intervention. 2004; 2(3): 221–225. [Google Scholar] ; Stott, 2009 Stott K. Out of sight, out of mind? The
psychosocial needs of children formerly associated with armed forces: A case study of Save the Children UK’ s work in Beni and Lubero territories, North Kivu province, Democratic
Republic of Congo. International Journal of Health Planning and Management. 2009; 24: 52–72. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ). It is imperative to redress these
deficits by adding a psychological/psychotherapeutic intervention to the established economic and social reintegration programs (Betancourt et al., 2008 Betancourt T. S, Simmons S,
Borisova I, Brewer S. E. High hopes, grim reality: Reintegration and the education of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Comparative Education Review. 2008; 52(4): 565–587.
[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Hermenau, Hecker, Schaal, Maedl, & Elbert, 2013 Hermenau K, Hecker T, Schaal S, Maedl A, Elbert T. Addressing post-traumatic
stress and aggression by means of narrative exposure: A randomized controlled trial with ex-combatants in the Eastern DRC. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma. 2013;
22(8): 916–934. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Mogapi, 2004 Mogapi N. Reintegration of soldiers: The missing piece. Intervention. 2004; 2(3): 221–
225. [Google Scholar] ; Stott, 2009 Stott K. Out of sight, out of mind? The psychosocial needs of children formerly associated with armed forces: A case study of Save the Children UK’ s
work in Beni and Lubero territories, North Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo. International Journal of Health Planning and Management. 2009; 24: 52–72. [Crossref], [Web
of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ).

Aff can’t solve---violence for child soldiers doesn’t end without reintegration---
they experience PTSD and are stigmatized upon release
Brandon A. Kohrt, 9/4/13, is Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Duke,
et al., “Impact of Peer Support on PTSD, Hope, and Functional Impairment: A Mixed-Methods Study
of Child Soldiers in Nepal”, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 22:7, p.714-734, DOI:
10.1080/10926771.2013.813882, ezc
Child soldiers not only encounter traumatic events during association with an armed group, but
they also could be the victims of stigmatization and discrimination when they return home
(Betancourt, Agnew-Blais, Gilman, Williams, & Ellis, 2010; Betancourt et al., 2013; Betancourt & Khan, 2008; Betancourt et al., 2008; Boothby, 2006; Jordans
et al., 2012; Kohrt, Jordans, et al., 2010; Kohrt, Tol, Pettigrew, & Karki, 2010; Wessells, 2006). When
provided family and social
support, child soldiers display resilience and positive outcomes in adulthood (Annan, Green, & Brier, 2013;
Boothby, 2006). However, in the face of negative family relations and community discrimination, a child
soldier’s psychosocial well-being might not only be slow to recover, but it might actually worsen
over time (Betancourt, Borisova, et al., 2010; Boothby & Thomson, this issue; Borisova, Betancourt, & Willett, 2013). Social support is of
critical importance for child soldiers returning home. Social support has been consistently
identified as one of the strongest predictors of post-traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD ) after trauma
exposure in multiple meta-analyses (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). For child
soldiers, as with adolescents in general, peer support plays an especially important role.
Adolescence is a period of transition from viewing one’s parents and other adult family members as
role models to prioritizing the examples set by one’s peers (Hruschka, 2010). In a recent review, peer rejection
was found to be a vulnerability factor for further negative influence by peers (Dishion & Tipsord, 2011).
Among Palestinian children aged 10 to 14 years old, exposure to military trauma was associated
with reduced quality of friendships (Peltonen, Qouta, El Sarraj, & Punamäki, 2010). Moreover, in this sample the quality
of friendships mediated the relationship between military trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms .
The effect of association between military trauma and friendship quality was moderated by age, with middle childhood showing greater sensitivity than
adolescence to this relationship. Among immigrant children in Israel, peer relations in the school environment were powerful predictors of mental well-
being (Walsh, Harel-Fisch, & Fogel-Grinvald, 2010). Given
the importance of peers for adolescent well-being, there is a
need to consider how reintegration programs foster improved peer relations and the environments in which
those relationships are developed.
 AT: Sharkey/Media Perception
Conventional perception of Child Soldiers is distorted---Media campaigns like
Kody 2012 rely on assumptions and don’t accurately describe soldiering
conditions
Mark A. Drumbl, 11/01/12, Professor at Washington and Lee University, School of Law, “Child
Soldiers and Clicktivism: Justice, Myths, and Prevention”, Journal of Human Rights Practice, Volume
4, Issue 3, November 2012, p. 481-485, ezc
The Kony 2012 campaign, conducted under the auspices of an American advocacy group, Invisible
Children, highlighted – somewhat belatedly – the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its leadership, and
its many victims in northern Uganda, notably child soldiers. Deeper questions lurk, however, amid the breezy media flurry.
How does Kony 2012 inform our understanding of child soldiers? How does it sculpt international
efforts to prevent child soldiering? Kony 2012 draws from and buttresses pre-existing assumptions and
narratives . I argue in my book Reimagining Child Soldiers that these assumptions and narratives, however well
intended, incubate policy initiatives that assuage collective sensibilities but, ultimately, fall short
in terms of actual effectiveness (Drumbl, 2012). People have thought hard about the impact of media
on messages for quite some time, including well before the dawn of the internet . Nearly 50 years ago, Marshall
McLuhan opined that the medium was (is) the message (McLuhan, 1964). Undoubtedly, activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would do well
to harness the power of contemporary social media. But the
content of the message itself still really matters. Is it
sensible for international law and policy to be based upon stylized content deliberately airbrushed
just to increase attention-worthiness? More international law, and more attention to international
law, does not invariably lead to progress . Substance counts, too. Misguided law, after all, leads to
ineffective outcomes. Portrayals of Child Soldiers The image of child soldiering that Kony 2012 communicates
to the public is not representative of the complexities of child soldiering as a whole. This image is
Africanized . Yet only about 40 percent of child soldiers worldwide are in Africa. This image is of
the very young child staggering under the weight of automatic weaponry. Most child soldiers,
however, are not young children – most are adolescents, with many aged 15, 16 or 17 . Many former child
soldiers, upon demobilization, are well into their twenties or, even, thirties. Some, like the LRA's Dominic Ongwen and Thomas Kwoyelo, become notorious
senior or middle-level leaders. Although
popularized discourse tends to portray child soldiers as boys, nearly
40 percent of child soldiers are girls. Regardless of their gender, child soldiers often do not
carry weapons . Most child soldiers are not implicated in serially committing acts of atrocity, even
within the LRA. The prevailing image, furthermore, is of an abducted child. Although abduction reflects the experiences of a great number of LRA
child conscripts, worldwide most child soldiers are neither abducted nor forcibly conscripted. Overall, approximately two-thirds of child soldiers exercise
some (at times considerable) initiative in coming forward to enroll. These motivations, which are varied, should be explored. It is counterproductive for
activists to deny, dismiss, or wish them away. Nor
are most child soldiers rescued by humanitarians – in particular,
Western humanitarians – or by anyone for that matter: most child soldiers exit armed forces
(including from the LRA) on their own initiative , through escape or by abandoning the group.
Finally, popular discourse tends to downplay that Western children, too, become militarized and

also suffer human rights violations. For example, Australia recently released documents detailing
hundreds of cases of physical and sexual abuse of minors – dating back decades – in its national
armed forces (Siegel, 2012: 2). In sum, it may amount to strategic short-term media outreach to portray child
soldiers as passive clueless victims, as devastated, and as dehumanized tools of war robotically
programmed to kill in purportedly senseless African wars. But these images belie a much more
sublime, humanistic, and granular reality of resilience, agency, potential, and globality. Prevention,
Reintegration, and Rehabilitation The Kony 2012 campaign stridently encourages LRA leader Joseph Kony's capture and transfer to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to face an array of charges, including the war crime of unlawful recruitment, enlistment, or active use of children under the age of 15 in
hostilities. Although it is a war crime to recruit children younger than 15, child soldiers increasingly are defined as being under the age of 18.1 This definition
meshes with internationalized understandings of when childhood ends and adulthood begins. These putatively universal understandings are sharply
chronological in nature, as opposed to liminally experiential, and crystallize around the watershed of 18 (Convention on the Rights of the Child: article 1).
The ICC lacks jurisdiction over anyone under the age of 18 (Rome Statute: article 26). This means that it cannot investigate or prosecute a 15, 16, or 17-year-
old alleged to have committed acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. This leads to a troubling gap. There is no criminal responsibility at
the ICC for the adult recruiter who conscripts 15, 16, or 17-year-olds, and the ICC cannot hold these conscripts responsible for their conduct. A nefarious
incentive arises to recruit persons in this age cohort (to wit, the cohort corresponding to the majority of child soldiers). On a broader note, international
law's predilection with chronological binaries places a heavy burden on all soldiers aged 18 or older. They bear the full weight of legal responsibility when
they commit crimes. They do so despite the fact they operate in the exact same context as many child soldiers, and despite the currency of neuroscientific
research that suggests that the brain continues to develop well past the age of 18. The law, therefore, may be indulgent in its approach to those under the age
of 18 while being exigent in its approach to those 18 or older. Advocacy groups that emphasize chronological bright lines end up protecting too much, and
too little, at the same time. Completely
coincidental to the viral success of Kony 2012, in March 2012 the ICC
convicted Thomas Lubanga, a rebel warlord from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), of the war crime of unlawful recruitment,
enlistment, or active use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities. Lubanga – the ICC's first convict – was sentenced in June to 14 years' imprisonment.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), sitting exceptionally in The Hague, convicted Charles Taylor in April on charges that included child soldier
conscription – he later received a 50-year sentence.2 However laudable, the fact remains that criminally prosecuting and convicting commanders who
illicitly recruit children into armed forces or groups represents only a tiny step towards justice. Child soldiers do not place such incarceration high on their
list of priorities; instead they emphasize education, reconciliation, community reintegration, physical rehabilitation, medical care, conflict resolution, and
jobs. Persons affected by the violent acts of child soldiers need for those harms to be addressed and, in turn, redressed. It is, moreover, convenient to blame a
handful of crazed commanders for child soldiering. But the ease of blame fails to uproot the many factors that conspire to facilitate child soldiering. These
factors include the small arms trade, state political alliances, poverty, and illegal export of pilfered natural resources. At times, ironically, long-term justice
may depend on short-term injustice. In Uganda, generous use of amnesties from criminal prosecution – a practice that is now triggering considerable legal

controversy – has helped severely weaken the LRA by encouraging fighters to abandon the group. Kony 2012 glosses over these
complexities ; it also commodifies Kony's arrest and trial, which it naively sells as a cure-all (Waldorf, 2012). Conclusion The Kony 2012
campaign – and clicktivism generally – have short attention spans and limited shelf life. The search volume
index of ‘Kony’ meteorically shot up in the wake of the video's rapid dissemination. But it soon plummeted. Searches today in fact appear to be running only
slightly higher than they had been before the video went viral. It is my hope that this brusque up–down trajectory does not reflect the pulse of public interest
regarding child soldiering. Such would be a palliative outcome and anodyne legacy, indeed, for the Kony 2012 campaign.
AT: Framing
 Util
Util first --- Only rational way of making policy
Josh Greene 10, Assc Prof Social Science (Psychology) at Harvard. 2010 “The Secret Joke of
Kant’s Soul” published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine
rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional
dispositions , which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both
biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent
normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions . Moreover, anyone who claims to have
such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems
then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore
(Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning
moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore
anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred
on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization
of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist
deontologists will
remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have
simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will
say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition . It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism.
Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow
rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a;
Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this
insider's view, as I've suggested,
may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are
not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside . Consider the following
analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's
about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger
than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for
distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other
people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular
humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of
view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious
institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may
appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the
standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other
approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that
consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as
mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share , etc. A consequentialist
respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-
being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational
creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests,
i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real
differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral
thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as
consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and
footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If
you ask a deontologically-
minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five
others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological : "Because
it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to
respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if
you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above),
they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge
case applies equally well to one or both of these cases . Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can
share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions
that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there
seems to be
"something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as
with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain
what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.
 war turns S.V./child violence
War uniquely turns their children’s violence impact---it exacerbates existing
conditions of physical and psychological violence
Joanna Santa Barbara, December 2006, Head of Dept. of Psychiatry and Centre for Peace Studies
of McMaster University, "Impact of War on Children and Imperative to End War”,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2080482/, ezc
The impact of war on children War affects children in all the ways it affects adults, but also in different ways.
First, children are dependent on the care, empathy, and attention of adults who love them. Their
attachments are frequently disrupted in times of war, due to the loss of parents, extreme
preoccupation of parents in protecting and finding subsistence for the family, and emotional
unavailability of depressed or distracted parents . The child may be in substitute care with someone who cares for him or her
only slightly – relatives or an orphanage. A certain proportion of war-affected children lose all adult protection –

“unaccompanied children,” as they are known in refugee situations. Second, impacts in childhood may
adversely affect the life trajectory of children far more than adults. Consider children who lose
the opportunity for education during war, children who are forced to move into refugee or
displaced person camps, where they wait for years in miserable circumstances for normal life to
resume, if it ever does. Consider a child disabled in war; they may, in addition to loss of a limb, sight, or cognitive capacity, lose the opportunity
of schooling and of a social life. A girl who is raped may be marginalized by her society and lose the opportunity for marriage. Long after the war has ended,
these lives will never attain the potential they had before the impact of war. Listing the impacts of war on children is a sadly straightforward task: Death.

Hundreds of thousands of children die of direct violence in war each year (2). They die as civilians caught in
the violence of war, as combatants directly targeted, or in the course of ethnic cleansing. Injury. Children suffer a range of war injuries.
Certain weapons affect them particularly. A landmine explosion is more likely to kill or seriously
injure a child than an adult (3). Thousands of children suffer landmine injuries each year (4). Disability.
Millions of children are disabled by war , many of whom have grossly inadequate access to
rehabilitation services. A child may have to wait up to 10 years before having a prosthetic limb fitted. Children who survive landmine blasts
rarely receive prostheses that are able to keep up with the continued growth of their limbs. Illness. Conditions for maintenance of child

health deteriorate in war – nutrition, water safety, sanitation, housing, access to health services .
There may be loss of immunity to disease vectors with population movement. Refugee children are particularly vulnerable to the deadly combination of
malnutrition and infectious illness. There is also interruption of population immunization programs by war
which may be responsible for increases in child mortality. Rape and prostitution for subsistence.
These phenomena which often occur in situations of war, ethnic cleansing, and refugee life leave
lasting physical impacts in sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, psychological
impacts and changes in life trajectory. Psychological suffering . Children are exposed to situations
of terror and horror during war – experiences that may leave enduring impacts in p os t traumatic
s tress d isorder. Severe losses and disruptions in their lives lead to high rates of depression and
anxiety in war-affected children. These impacts may be prolonged by exposures to further
privations and violence in refugee situations. Moral and spiritual impacts. The experience of indifference from
the surrounding world, or, worse still, malevolence may cause children to suffer loss of meaning
in their construction of themselves in their world. They may have to change their moral structure
and lie, steal, and sell sex to survive. They may have their moral structure forcibly dismantled and replaced in training to kill as part of a
military force. Social and cultural losses. Children may lose their community and its culture during war, sometimes
having it reconstituted in refugee or diaspora situations. Child soldiers. It is estimated that there are tens of thousands of young people under 18

serving in militias in about 60 countries. They are particularly vulnerable to all of the impacts listed above
 Epistemically wrong
Child soldier narratives are overblown for a western audience---Advocates continue
to use wrong statistics to bolster their claim
David Mastley 15, Professor at Carleton University and Africanist scholar, 6/8/2015, Child
Soldier Stories and their Fictions https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2015.1042397
Child soldier stories differ from other examples of misery literature in a number of important ways.
Those produced and sold in the United States typically feature US characters and settings. Conversely, child soldier stories are
largely African in content; similar stories written by authors from, or which take place in, other regions of the world, such as
Ṣ ō pā Cakti's ‘auto-fictional’ story Gorilla (2008) or Patricia McCormick's novel Never Fall Down (2012), have not been successful.
Afro-pessimism is a likely reason: the continent, and by association the lives of African children,
are indelibly marked by misery in the minds of most Americans. Even more significantly, child
soldiering is an extreme form of the degradation that misery literature relies upon . Unlike domestic
misery literature, as many critics have noted, child soldier protagonists are both victims and perpetrators of
violence. This is one of the most distinguishing features of the genre. Many characters acknowledge the
untoward cycle in which child soldiers brutalize civilian children, ultimately leading to their own recruitment. The protagonist of
Ahmadou Kourouma's novel Allah is Not Obliged rhetorically wonders what a child can do if ‘you’re really young, just a little kid, living in
some fucked-up barbaric country where everyone is cutting everyone's throat’, before answering his own question: ‘You become a child-
soldier of course … so you can have lots to eat and cut some throats yourself; that's all your only option’ (2007 Kourouma, Ahmadou.
2007, 90). The inevitability of this outcome is emphasized throughout the genre.

Why have child soldiers become central to the contemporary image of Africa in the United States ?
Again, Afro-pessimism is certainly a factor, but so too is increasing media attention about the subject.
Many popular accounts in newspapers, magazines and other media cite the same 2001 Child Soldiers International (CSI) report, which
indicates that three hundred thousand children participated in armed conflict in eighty-five countries between June 1998 and March
2001. At least one hundred and twenty thousand young people operated in Africa during this time, most notably in Angola, Burundi,
Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers 2001 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2001, 10–14). CSI
researchers concede that while their
findings are carefully documented, they cannot account for the total number of children recruited
over the duration of any given conflict (495). Moreover, their definition of child soldier encompasses children who directly
participate in combat but also includes sexual captives and camp followers. In addition to semantic and methodological concerns, it is
also difficult to gather quantitative data on the number of child soldiers who are now, or were at one time, mobilized for combat
(Pedersen and Sommerfelt, 2007 Pedersen, Jon, and Tone Sommerfelt. 2007). Notwithstanding these challenges, CSI
provided a
figure – three hundred thousand child soldiers – that advocates, reporters and writers can use to
bolster their claims about the practice. And they have done so, often without context and long
after revised calculations have been published.
The CSI report that followed in 2004 does not include a global estimate for child soldiers during its research period, but notes a general
decline in their recruitment (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2004, 15). On the
African continent, ‘long-running wars came to an end releasing thousands of child soldiers but up to 100,000 children were estimated to
remain involved in hostilities’ (31). Neither global nor regional forecasts appear in its 2008 report. Still, its authors note a further
reduction in the number of child soldiers around the world to ‘tens of thousands’ (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008, 9). In lieu
of publishing a quadrennial report in 2012, CSI issued
a limited study on the use of child soldiers by state armed forces and allied groups (but not rebel
forces) between January 2010 and June 2012, again without global or regional statistics. The best
remaining authority on the number of active child soldiers around the world is the UN Secretary-General's annual report Children and
Armed Conflict, which documents alleged and verified cases for most countries. Between
2010 and 2012 roughly fifteen
thousand child soldiers were identified worldwide, twelve thousand in Africa. These estimates are
also somewhat imprecise; in some states where under-age combatants are known to operate, the
United Nations and its partners lack the ability adequately to monitor conditions or report cases.
However, together with data from CSI these studies indicate a pattern. Not only do we have a better understanding of the scale and scope
of the practice from information collected over the past fifteen years, we can also confirm its downward trend .

Most of the persons who read these reports (or child soldier stories, for that matter) would agree that even a
handful of child soldiers is too many. But the practice must also be put into perspective. Perhaps the best
way to comprehend it is to compare the above estimates with the number of children of recruiting age. From 1998 to 2001, the same
period when CSI first collected data, there were more than one-and-a-half billion children around the world between the ages of six and
seventeen. Therefore, according to the 2001 CSI estimate, roughly one out of every five thousand children were child soldiers. The ratio
widens even further between 2008 and 2012, as the number of combatants decreases to less than one in thirty-three thousand children.
This approach is not without bias; of course, the possibility of recruitment is much greater in some areas of the world than others.
Moreover, the
perception that child soldiers are an African problem is correct in at least one respect:
more can be found in Africa than in any other region. But a similar analysis of data from African
states reveals the same contradiction between the scale of the practice and how it is popularly
represented. Between 2008 and 2012 one out of every ten thousand African children served as child soldiers. When the statistical
sample is restricted to those states in which they are known to operate – Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast,
Libya, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Sudan and Uganda – it remains
clear that their experiences are not at all
representative of the majority: just five one-hundredths of a per cent of children of recruiting age who live in these states are
child soldiers. The fact remains that the military recruitment of children is a marginal practice in Africa and the number of child soldiers
is extremely small.